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Conclusion: Foreign Policy as the Continuation of Domestic Politics by Other Means
Abstract
Analysts and policymakers alike were largely caught by surprise, if not by the Ukraine crisis itself, then at least by its form and magnitude. The crisis was influenced by various causal factors (both internal and external to Ukraine) and went through different phases (political, economic, military), but by many accounts it was Moscow’s decision to annex Crimea that appears in retrospect to have been the most crucial development. The active use of political, economic and even military levers by Moscow to secure its interests in its immediate post-Soviet neighbourhood does not constitute a new feature in Russia’s post-communist foreign policy. However, the absorption of territory into the Russian Federation does. In that sense, it could be argued that, in analysing Russia’s foreign policy course, the organization of the referendum in Crimea is even more significant than the military manoeuvres deployed to secure the naval base in Sevastopol. It has certainly constituted a thread line for the present volume and a backdrop against which the authors test their hypotheses.
... Our focus was on Putin's key speeches at (1) the Federal Assembly, (2) the plenary session of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, and (3) the so-called "annual news conferences." These speeches were chosen based on the idea that Russia's foreign policy is closely tied to its domestic politics and vice versa (Cadier and Light 2015). Therefore, analyzing what is said to external audiences can also provide insights into Russia's domestic affairs. ...
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
This open access edited volume (available freely at https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3) examines Russia-China relations across a variety of civilian and military areas of cooperation. Leading experts in the field present empirical case studies covering a wide range of strategic cooperation areas between Russia and China, such as technological, military, economic and political cooperation. The contributing authors shed new light on Chinese and Russian strategic goals, external push and pull factors, and mutual perception shifts, and discuss the options for Western countries to influence this development.
This book analyses the evolution of the relationship since the watershed moment of the Crimean crisis in 2014, and whether or not a full-blown military alliance, as hinted in late 2020 by President Putin, is indeed a realistic scenario for which NATO will have to prepare. It will appeal to students and scholars of international relations, political decision-makers, as well as anyone interested in Eurasian politics and the potential military-strategic impact of a Russian-Chinese alliance for NATO.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
Arms transfers are an important indicator of the level of strategic trust between countries. During the past 70 years, relations between China and the Soviet Union/Russia have gone through phases that were characterized by dramatically different levels of military-industrial cooperation. This paper explores how the fallout from the Crimea crisis of 2014 has impacted the Russian-Chinese arms trade relationship against the backdrop of a history where Russia aimed to restrict arms transfers to China. It argues that the sanctions imposed on China after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 and on Russia since early 2014 have had the combined unintended consequence of incentivizing closer Russian-Chinese arms-industrial cooperation than had ever existed before. Western ambiguity toward Ukraine after 2014 furthermore provided China with opportunities to profit from openings in Ukraine’s arms-industrial complex. The chapter starts with a historical overview of the Russian-Chinese arms trade relationship before analyzing the impact of Russian and Ukrainian transfers on China’s military modernization before and after 2014. The final part discusses how changed incentives since 2014 have fostered unprecedented Sino-Russian arms-industrial cooperation. This could solidify the developing Chinese-Russian military relationship and eventually lead toward a more equal relationship in joint arms development.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
China and Russia are both keen to exploit cutting-edge technologies for military use. Most of these advanced technologies are embedded in the so-called fourth industrial revolution (4IR), such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, automation and robotics, quantum computing, big data, 5G networking, and the “Internet of Things” (IoT). At the same time, most research and development (R & D) taking place in the 4IR is occurring in the commercial realm. The usefulness of 4IR technologies to future military capabilities will depend on how well countries can leverage breakthroughs in commercial R & D, via military-civil fusion (MCF). China and Russia are pursuing concurrent and often intertwined R & D programs to develop and advance 4IR technologies in their respective countries—particularly AI—and to subsequently utilize these technologies (via MCF) in military applications. Their mutual interests in exploiting cutting-edge technologies to underwrite military modernization could motivate Beijing and Moscow to collaborate on future 4IR R & D. Nevertheless, such cooperation could be limited. In particular, Russia lacks the resources or overall technological capacities (money and manpower, plus an already low level of innovation in the national economy) to function as an equal to China, and it may not wish to play the junior partner in such a relationship.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
Both China and Russia are heavyweights in multilateral Geneva. While their priorities and strategies are not identical, their interests are often aligned in many forums. Thus, close cooperation can be observed in several Geneva-based organizations. In some, such as the UN Human Rights Council, China and Russia form the backbone of an increasingly assertive “autocratic alliance.” Particularly China has attempted to establish a counter-narrative on questions of democracy, human rights, and international law. This article outlines some factors that increased the effect of Chinese-Russian cooperation, but also depicts its limits. Cooperation between Russia and China is often defensive rather than proactive and not (yet) based on a joint long-term strategy. However, it is a tactical alliance that is, and will likely remain, a major challenge for the proponents of a rules- and values-based multilateralism even though Russia’s war in Ukraine will further shift the balance in this alliance towards China. This article argues in favor of stronger engagement in UN forums by the West and outlines possibilities for how the growing influence of this tandem can be countered.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
Nuclear issues have historically played an important role in the development of relations between Moscow and Beijing, acting as a source of both potential discord and emergent cooperation. From 1964, when China conducted its first nuclear test, until Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s tenure in the 1980s, nuclear relations between the Soviet Union and China were explicitly adversarial. The normalization of Sino-Soviet relations introduced an era of implicitly adversarial relations that lasted until the Ukraine crisis. During this phase, Russia’s concerns about China’s growing military power and its resulting determination to maintain nuclear deterrence of China remained apparent. Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis, Russia and China have built an increasingly close relationship, leading to a new phase of implicitly cooperative nuclear relations featuring coordinated efforts to maintain nuclear deterrence of the United States. The two countries jointly oppose US efforts to build missile defense systems and high-precision conventional weapons. They coordinate their positions on such issues as multilateral arms control and the post-INF strategic landscape. Russia is helping China to build a missile attack early warning system. Growing levels of defense cooperation raise the possibility of coordinated efforts to maintain nuclear deterrence of the United States in a crisis.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
Allies in 1950, at odds in 1960, at war in 1969, on opposite sides of the Cold War during the 1980s, the Russians and Chinese have worked out their border issues in recent years to partner against a common challenge: the United States. While it can be argued that both countries distrust one another, Moscow and Beijing share a common concern and can’t afford bad relations. Both abhor the US-Western interventions of the last two decades that in their view have destabilized the Middle East, generating terrorism and instability within or near their borders. Both resent US support for their domestic opposition or to neighboring intimate “foes,” most notably Taiwan, Ukraine, and Georgia. Both have displayed their support for Syria and Iran. Both have been engaged in a “strategic partnership” within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization since 2001. Both are now conducting joint naval exercises, sometimes in sensitive areas. But beyond those gesticulations, how far can this naval partnership go? Is it a harbinger of a future military alliance? Does it suggest an intent to deter future Western interventions from the sea? Is there evidence and are there documents that formally support this signaling of strategic and naval partnerships?
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
After two decades of Global War on Terror, the US is confronted by two near-peer military competitors, Russia and China, which have aligned in their opposition to the US-led international order. Russia is determined to revise the post-Cold War settlement, while China aims to replace it altogether with one built around its economic power, its military, and increasingly its values and ideological tenets. The West’s post-Cold War assumptions that economic globalization would lead to democratization have been proven false, with a new round of great power competition in full view. With the United States military refocusing on great power competition in the Indo-Pacific, Washington needs Europe to rearm and provide real capabilities to deter Russia in the event of a kinetic conflict in Asia. For the NATO alliance, “burden transferring” should be the way forward, with Europe providing core military capabilities while the US maintains its nuclear umbrella and high-end enablers. This approach will ensure deterrence in Europe holds, while the United States confronts China in the Indo-Pacific. It is even more urgent today in light of Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that Europe rebuild its militaries.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
This chapter argues that domestic politics plays a significant role in shaping Sino-Russian relations. Domestic political factors strengthen certain trends in the relationship and, more occasionally, generate obstacles. In structural terms, the growing similarity of political systems, characterized by a high degree of centralization of power in leaders’ hands and the rising crackdown on dissent, shapes the threat assessment. The Russian ruling regime is not challenged by Beijing, hence an increase in China’s power and influence. While disadvantageous geopolitically, it does not pose a threat to regime security and regime survival in the Kremlin. Domestic actors have contributed to Russia’s policy towards China in two ways: by influencing the leadership’s threat assessment and by implementing particular policies. In some areas, such as energy cooperation, a privileged position on behalf of certain actors enables them to promote closer cooperation with China. There is no openly anti-Chinese lobby within the ruling elite and its supporters. More often than not, domestic politics act as a facilitating factor, which mitigates systemic pressures related to China’s rise and growing asymmetry between Russia and China and creates a conducive environment for bilateral cooperation with China in certain sectors.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
This paper focuses on Sino-Russian scientific cooperation in the Arctic over the time period from 2012 to the current day. Academic cooperation with China entails more than meets the eye, as Chinese counterparts see the interactions with their partners from the prism of people-to-people diplomacy designed to create positive sentiment towards Chinese interests via non-governmental exchanges. The first part of this paper focuses on this engagement and Chinese attempts to steer the discourse in support of its interests in the Arctic.
Foreign academics and leaders at the local level, untrained in the Chinese language and political system and unfamiliar with the hidden meanings of academic exchanges, become vulnerable and valuable targets for Chinese influence activities due to their high standing and access to valuable knowledge. The second part of the paper investigates the Sino-Russian scientific cooperation and capacity building that enables China to become a great maritime power—not always for the benefit of Russia, and to the disadvantage of NATO.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
In recent years, the Sino-Russian partnership has emerged in Western eyes as the principal threat to the post-Cold War, rules-based international order. According to this narrative, the challenge is no longer simply one of China’s rise or Russia’s resurgence, but a growing strategic convergence: a mutually reinforcing “axis of authoritarians.” Talk of an alliance has become commonplace. In leading Western capitals, the Sino-Russian “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era” has become the existential menace of our time. This sense of alarm has been heightened by a feverish international context, dominated by great-power rivalry and the devastating consequences of the covid-19 pandemic. One region, however, has been largely exempt from such speculation. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) remains a backwater of Sino-Russian engagement, and Western reactions have been correspondingly muted. Nevertheless, the region provides a useful window through which to assess the dynamics of the relationship.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
Are Russia and China an emerging alliance or eternal rivals? And what would it mean for NATO? NATO reacted to the Russian aggression against Ukraine with a paradigm shift called “NATO Adaptation.” At the 2014 Wales Summit, it increased its responsiveness with the “Readiness Action Plan,” the 2016 Warsaw Summit strengthened its deterrence and defense posture, and the 2018 Brussels Summit re-designed NATO’s Command Structure toward collective defense. Although embedded in a “360-degree approach,” all key defense elements of NATO’s adaptation have been primarily focused on Russia, which was recognized from March 2014 on as potential threat to the territorial integrity of the Eastern European members. However, this changing of the paradigm was based entirely on the understanding that Russia alone poses a serious military threat to the alliance. There was never any consideration given to the question of what it would mean if Russia were supported by a like-minded great power such as China, nor to the question of what simultaneous aggressions—one by Russia in Europe and another by China in the Indo-Pacific—would mean for NATO. Hence, the answers to these questions are of high relevance to NATO’s further adaptation to the new geopolitical realities.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
The contributions to this volume in sum paint a multifaceted picture of the complex and evolving Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. It seems clear that depending on the particular issue area studied and the methods adopted for studying it, a number of varying diagnoses can be made regarding the current state and future prospects of this “strategic partnership.” Capturing such complexity was expressly one of our goals; we consider it dangerous to approach the reality of Russian-Chinese cooperation with ready-made interpretations and thus risk falling victim to confirmation bias. That said, a few clear patterns do emerge from our material when it comes to answering the key questions that this research project set out to study and that were listed in the introduction.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
China no longer sees Russia as a rival. This is not the result of friendly ties, shared values, or growing economic cooperation, but an outcome of the dramatic shift in the balance of power between them. Moreover, China’s contemporary policy toward Russia is not driven by Xi Jinping’s possible fondness for Putin or Russia, but by strategic calculations about what best serves Chinese interests. China’s number one priority today is to balance the United States in the Indo-Pacific naval theatre, and it is thus in Beijing’s interest to keep its strategic rear to Russia safe. This chapter argues that balance of power theories is the best tool to explain China’s growing ties with Russia. History, identity, and ideology are important variables for understanding China’s relationship with Russia. Yet, few, if any, bilateral relationships between two major countries have changed back and forth so dramatically as that of China and Russia. Examining Sino-Russian relations across several time periods, this chapter illustrates that there is no single continuous historical narrative or identity in China on Russia. During the last century, China has seen Russia as an imperialist master, a comrade in arms, a foe, and a partner, and it is now discussing whether it should be an ally.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
The existence of an alliance between Russia and China seems to be changing the European security environment in a fundamental way. In light of historical experiences, one has to start with the assumption that any such alliance between authoritarian powers directed against Western democracies and free societies will increase the likelihood of major wars. In at least two European regions—the Black-Sea and the Baltic Sea area—merely the existence of such an alliance and the ensuing opportunity to overburden the U.S. military might increase the risk-level Russia was ready to accept. This might entail the danger of a high intensity war between Russia and NATO. It is high time for NATO to consider a more effective defence and deterrence posture in order to prevent Russian aggression against the Baltic states and to envision effective measures that would deter Russia from continuing to destroy Ukraine.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
The aim of this volume is to contribute to an ongoing discussion on the scope and meaning of Russian-Chinese cooperation since 2014, the year Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea. During the past few years, the number of research projects on Sino-Russian cooperation at Western think tanks has markedly increased, complementing a likewise increasing number of monographs and edited volumes that had begun to appear on related topics during the preceding years.
... Whereas many scholars identify regime security and the consolidation of the domestic regime as the main driver of Russia's assertive foreign policy (Adomeit, 2019;McFaul, 2020; and interpret foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics (Cadier & Light, 2015), the factor of regime survival plays an important role in shaping Russia's policy towards China. It cannot be considered a direct cause behind Moscow's constant rapprochement with Beijing, but it provides conducive conditions for such a rapprochement. ...
This examination deals with the mental maps and basic assumptions underlying Russia’s foreign policy and how these relate to China. I will take issue with the narrative, advanced in particular by Kremlin officials and pro-Putin apologists in the West, that Russia’s “pivot to Asia,” with China as its centerpiece, can be understood as the consequence of the West having rejected Putin’s outstretched hand for close cooperation, Russia’s exclusion from an all-European security structure by pushing NATO’s eastward expansion, and finally the imposition of economic sanctions. This, to complete the account, had left Russia with no other option but to turn to Asia. Such interpretations will be shown to be fundamentally flawed. Putin’s China policies fit squarely into both the Russian power elite’s global strategic outlook and its narrow perception of what is needed to hold on to power domestically. The benefits accruing to Russia from its liaison with China can be found in military, economic, and systemic dimensions, and they are for the most part asymmetric in favor of the Kremlin. The asymmetries may cause problems in the future, but for the time being, they are carefully managed so that they will not spin out of control.
... Authors wonder if an explanation of these developments could be found in the proposition, known in international relations studies, that foreign policy (and public diplomacy is a part of it) is a continuation of domestic politics with other means (as many students in international relations believe; cf. Cadier & Light, 2015), that is, domestic concerns precede international issues, thus leading to unintended deterioration of relations between nations. The potential positive effects of energy spent on public diplomacy are annulled by the comparatively greater energy spent on domestic politics exploiting external disagreements, thus creating an external enemy to homogenize domestic populations. ...
Thirteen years ago, a study was conducted in which authors opened a question of applying co-orientation theory in studying communication behavior between two countries. The original study had two primary objectives: to compare attitudes toward certain issues relevant for the two nations and to examine degrees of agreement, accuracy, and congruency between two nations under the co-orientation model. The original study was later extended with another one in which authors included a third country and introduced not only evaluations of two countries’ attitudes toward a third country but also evaluations of opinions the two countries have between themselves (and to which the first is only an observer). They called it “second-order co-orientation.” More than a decade later, the original study was replicated to test how potential agreement, accuracy, and congruency between the two counties on these issues have changed over time.
Many populist leaders politicise disputes with external financial ‘elites’, but most are forced by economic pressures to fundamentally change their ‘people-versus-elite’ problem representations and ‘concede defeat’. Notable exceptions are Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Argentina’s Cristina Kirchner, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who sooner or later resisted strong push-back and defied the IMF or distressed-debt funds. These instances of prolonged populist defiance differ widely across commonly used structural and agential explanatory factors at international, domestic, and individual levels. To explain how Orbán, Kirchner, and Erdoğan managed to ‘beat the elite’, this paper clusters several root causes into a parsimonious framework of two intervening variables. The temporality of strong ‘elite’ push-back and the openness of advisory systems are theorised as shaping distinct cognitive mechanisms of representational continuity or change, through which ‘people-versus-elite’ input is either preserved until – or discarded before – feeding into decision outputs. As the two-by-two matrix of early/later external shocks and open/closed inner circles explains, Orbán did not move beyond marginal representational adjustments; Kirchner’s contingent representational fluidity benefited from opportune situational developments; and Erdoğan defied significant socio-economic cost with fundamental representational continuity. These insights highlight the potential of studying populism at the intersection of foreign policy analysis and international political economy.
This article explains the shift in Russia’s foreign policy strategy towards the Middle East. Particularly, it aims to address the question of why Russia supported the UNSC Resolution 1970 towards Libya in 2011 but refused to cooperate with the West in Syria. In this article, it is argued that the West’s use of the authorization of the no-fly zone as a green light for military intervention in Libya paved the way for Russia’s obstinacy in Syria. To test this hypothesis, this article focus on the foreign-policy decision-making mechanism in Russia regarding these two events. In this article two decision-making processes are compared to provide an alternative explanation of Russia’s Middle Eastern policy. This article contributes to the existing literature on Russian foreign policy and Foreign Policy Analysis literature.
Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the idea that the EU and Russia are engaged in a geopolitical contest over their common neighbourhood and that the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is Brussels’ instrument in this context appears ‘common sense’. Yet, the reality of the EaP as a policy programme hardly corresponds to such representation, whether in its original purpose, actual content or effects on the ground. To unpack this discrepancy, this article presents a genealogy of what is conceptualised here as the geopoliticisation of the EaP, a notion set forth to designate the discursive construction of an issue as a geopolitical problem. While Russia’s actions in Ukraine certainly contributed to deepen and reinforce this dynamic, the article shows that the geopoliticisation of the EaP was neither merely exogenous nor simply reactive. It was also carried forward from within the European policy community by a discourse coalition which, based on its own political subjectivities and policy agenda, came to frame the EaP as an endeavour aimed at ‘winning over’ countries of the Eastern neighbourhood and ‘rolling back’ Russia’s influence.
Russia’s role in world politics has become the object of a spirited debate among policymakers, think-tank analysts, and academics. Much of this debate focuses on one central question: What are the main drivers, or causes, of Moscow’s increasingly proactive and assertive foreign policy? The purpose of this special issue is to address this question by focusing on the interplay of power, ideas, and domestic influences. Our introductory article sets the scene for this analytical endeavor. More specifically, the article has three aims: (1) to review the existing explanations of Moscow’s assertiveness; (2) to discuss the challenges, opportunities, and benefits of employing eclectic approaches in the study of Russian foreign policy; and (3) to outline the contributions of the articles that follow.