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The European Neighbourhood Policy and Why the Northern Dimension Matters
Abstract
In the build up to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) debates about the nature and extent of (EU) Europe became widespread. Questions as to whether the 2004 enlargement would be the last major expansion of the EU were hotly debated, and the different candidate countries made great efforts to ensure they did not miss the departing boat toward membership. Within the EU, concerns about the enlargement focused on issues such as the need to avoid any dilution of the significant gains of the European project, as well as fears that the EU’s expansion to 25 members would turn the Union into a bureaucratic dinosaur and further undermine its democratic legitimacy. In this context, a desire to draw the final borders of (EU) Europe has become pronounced, with the perceived threat being that unchecked expansion will not only make the Union unworkable, but may actually pose an existential threat to it. Although it is clear that much disagreement exists on where the final borders of (EU) Europe should be drawn (e.g., should Turkey be in or out), the belief that Europe’s finalité should soon be decided has become widely held.
... In general, the ENP originated in the assumption that external liberalization, coupled with domestic economic reforms, should have been given priority over political changes. It was argued that the provision of basic needs was most important for respective populations, and that political freedoms would follow suit (Tarnawski, 2014; see as well Stryjek, 2016). However, as practice suggests, liberalization of the economy, as well as the financial support provided by the EU, proved to be ineffective without a system of democratic control (Tarnawski, 2014). ...
... Several techniques, which are included in European Neighbourhood policy, were used in pre-accession policy. 6 The role of European Commission, as making regular reports on neighbours' achievements, programmes' implementation, negotiating and determining the priorities for the Action plans, assistance 7 , conditionality policy, is very similar as in enlargement policy 8 . The other element of enlargement strategy -differentiation -is also evident in European Neighbourhood policy. ...
This article examines the divergence in the EU's strategies towards neighbours. The goal is to connect different EU neighbourhood initiatives into one framework in making a correlation between national and supranational levels. The distinction between bilateralism/multilateralism and Russia inclusion/Russia exclusion is made within both levels. The division is between European Neighbourhood policy and Eastern Partnership (within bilateral framework) on the one hand, and Northern dimension initiative and Black Sea Synergy on the other. These different EU's strategies towards neighbours reflect contradictory EU development models. The argument is made that national preferences and interests precondition a variety of the EU's neighbourhood initiatives and create a web in EU's neighbourhood policy that is filled with many contradictions.
... The JHA dimension is important, as the political initiation of ENP was also caused by the geostrategic fear of new threats, stemming from insecure borders with rather insecure new neighbours. A core aim in the beginning was to avoid the risk of " negative spillovers " such as illegal immigration, terrorism, organized crime, etc. (see Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, 2008). The main areas of demands and cooperation in JHA are migration and border policy, combating organised crime and drug trafficking and judicial and police training and cooperation (Occhipinti, 2007). ...
This paper provides a survey on studies that analyze the macroeconomic effects of intellectual property rights (IPR). The first part of this paper introduces different patent policy instruments and reviews their effects on R&D and economic growth. This part also discusses the distortionary effects and distributional consequences of IPR protection as well as empirical evidence on the effects of patent rights. Then, the second part considers the international aspects of IPR protection. In summary, this paper draws the following conclusions from the literature. Firstly, different patent policy instruments have different effects on R&D and growth. Secondly, there is empirical evidence supporting a positive relationship between IPR protection and innovation, but the evidence is stronger for developed countries than for developing countries. Thirdly, the optimal level of IPR protection should tradeoff the social benefits of enhanced innovation against the social costs of multiple distortions and income inequality. Finally, in an open economy, achieving the globally optimal level of protection requires an international coordination (rather than the harmonization) of IPR protection.
At a time when the EU is attempting to mark itself out as a power for transformation, particularly in its neighbourhood, this article analyses the ability of outsiders in the margins of Europe to have a constitutive impact on the nature of the EU's policies, its borders and not least its identity and perception of its security environment. Analysing the EU's relationship with Ukraine and Belarus through the European Neighbourhood Policy, the article argues the ENP's effectiveness and nature is dependent upon two factors: first, where the partner countries are located (and locate themselves) along a continuum of positive–negative otherness with respect to the EU and; second, their ability to utilise particular strategies of marginality to pursue their goals. If the EU is understood as a transformative power, this article argues that the nature of this power is significantly circumscribed by the attitudes, preferences, strategies and identities of those it seeks to influence.
Events in the vicinity of the European Union are constantly challenging the EU's foreign policy, but complex internal governance processes have been hampering the EU from responding coherently. This analysis of the Northern Dimension Initiative considers whether the EU is compensating for this dilemma by adopting an innovative network governance strategy to integrate those external actors in the European North who can bring complementary resources to the policy-making processes. The formulation and execution of EU foreign policy may thus be alleviated, and the lack of internal problem-solving capacity does not automatically lead to failure in foreign policy-making.
The EU's external security concerns have caused it to encourage regional integration at all levels in central and east Europe. However, its emerging internal security policies (contained in the newly integrated Schengen Convention, and in justice and home affairs cooperation) are having contrary effects by reinforcing barriers between countries in eastern Europe. The goals of regional integration and good-neighbourly relations between applicants and non-applicants are still present in the Union's enlargement strategy, but border policies are also being developed that run counter to them. EU border policies are raising new barriers to the free movement of people and goods that inhibit trade and investment between candidates and their non-applicant neighbours. There is a risk that the EU could end up giving the central and east European (CEE) countries the benefits of westward integration with their richer neighbours at the high cost of cutting ties with their poorer neighbours in the east. This bargain is still acceptable overall to most political leaders in central Europe; however, acceptance of the EU's terms has been accompanied by great unease about its unintended consequences for intra-regional relations. Moreover, this is not just a problem for CEE countries: the overall security of Europe depends on preventing the isolation of countries left at the edges of an enlarged Union.
This article analyses the relationship between the European Union's (EU) policy framework for Northern Europe, the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI), and the United States' parallel policy, the Northern European Initiative (NEI). On the one hand, it is noted that these policies share much in common. Of particular note is that both policies lead to a relatively inventive approach to questions of governance and regional co-operation that departs from the confines of modernist understandings of international politics with their focus on questions of state sovereignty. On the other hand, the policies have also exhibited certain and important differences, in particular in their relationship to the issue of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) enlargement to the Baltic States. Having laid out, explored and tried to account for these similarities and differences, the article then debates what 11 September and the future enlargements of the EU and NATO will entail for the development of the NDI and NEI and the relationship between them. Whilst it is argued that opportunities for further co-operation between the initiatives will probably grow, there is a danger that the innovative aspects of the policies will be lost with the reassertion of the concerns of high politics.
In November 2005 the 'Barcelona Process' will celebrate its tenth anniversary. To honour this event, the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers decided recently in The Hague that 2005 will be the 'Year of the Mediterranean'. The Barcelona Process or the 'Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' (BP/EMP respectively) was launched on 27 November 1995 by the (then) 15 EU Member States and 12 Mediterranean countries 1 formally endorsed the Barcelona Declaration. The Barcelona Declaration was designed to promote peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean. It was 'the launching pad of a regional process' 2 for the establishment of a common area of peace, stability, and shared prosperity, based on the establishment of a free trade area, the development of human resources, the promotion of understanding between cultures and partnership between civil societies. In the nine years since its inception, most view the success of the Barcelona Process as limited. During this time a series of individual (and non-standardized) bilateral Association Agreements were concluded with all the original Mediterranean partner states as a precursor to an eventual inter-regional free trade area. In addition, an EU-directed programme for development assistance was initiated according to which potential recipients throughout the region competed for funds on a project basis, adding a new dimension to traditional bilateral aid between states. Finally, a number of fora on social, cultural, and to a lesser extent, political issues were established, which brought representatives from the various European and Mediterranean states to a common table. Overall, European Foreign Affairs Review 10: 39–77, 2005. © 2005 Kluwer Law International.
This article addresses the issue of the relationship between security-speak and regional cooperation in Northern Europe. In the post-Cold War period, it is argued, regional cooperation has been driven by a mixture of realist- and liberalist-based security discourses. While realism results in cooperation through othering, liberalism rather promotes cooperation through inclusion. On the whole, security has been a unifying theme, not a divisive one. European Union and NATO enlargements, however, are undermining the security bases of regional cooperation. The article asks the question of what will happen to regional cooperation if security is removed from the frame. Will regional cooperation wither away as a political project? Or will attempts at re-securitization be made to rejuvenate regional cooperation? Either way there are apparently difficulties in thinking of regional cooperation without relying on security for motivation and justification. Through a revisionist account of Nordic cooperation that challenges the idea that Norden is a security community par excellence and is rather driven by a security concerns, a way out of the security-cooperation dilemma is offered.
European Union enlargement has left Russia on the margins of European political processes and led to widespread suspicion in the Moscow foreign policy establishment of European motives. This has resulted in, first, increasing resistance to the imposition of European norms and, second, a more assertive policy, particularly in the EU's and Russia's ‘overlapping neighbourhoods’. Although Moscow is likely to continue the strategy of engagement initiated under Putin, Brussels must radically rethink the nature and extent of Russia's ‘Europeanisation’. Russia's drive for modernisation will coexist with the strengthening of sovereignty and the power of the state, seen by the Putin administration as key to external and internal security. The EU will have to limit its ambition and work within this ‘window’—wider or narrower depending on state of play—of policy possibilities.
Over the past fifty years, the power constellation that has taken shape in Europe has blended security concerns and integration in a new, different correlation that was previously unknown in international relations. There is probably no better way to understand the challenges posed by European security and integration than by observing how the EU has been relating to its neighbours over time. Until 2004, the EU addressed the neighbourhood challenge essentially by oscillating between integration and security. It either focused on security - by stabilising its peripheries and largely by keeping neighbours at arm's length - or it focused on integration - by promising membership, and thus by inviting neighbours into the European project. With the last enlargement round, as the boundaries of the EU stretched out to their geographical and political limits, the need to address the security-integration nexus re-emerged. In response, this paper makes the case for regionalism as a possible conceptual framework and policy instrument to address the challenges posed by Europe's new, diverse neighbourhood. It explains why, where and how regionalism can emerge as a political practice and policy instrument that contributes to tackling the correlation between security and integration in the wider European space. A set of recommendations to develop regionalism is then proposed and applied to the emerging case of the Black Sea Region.
In May 2004, the European Union acquired not just ten new member states but several new neighbours. At about the same time, it began to flesh out a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to bring some order to the EU's relations with its old and new neighbours and to ensure that the newly enlarged EU would be surrounded by a ‘ring of friends’. The ENP is also supposed to stave off further enlargement to eastern Europe. However, several problems with the ENP are evident. It requires much of the neighbours and offers only vague incentives in return, making it unlikely that the ENP can meet its core objectives. Furthermore, the ENP is ambiguous about where the EU's borders will end, and it is already apparent that such ambiguity is not helping to foster reform in eastern Europe. Either the EU should say ‘no’ to further enlargement, so the ENP becomes the framework for relations with the neighbour for the foreseeable future, or it should say ‘yes’ to eventually letting in a specified number of neighbours which then move out of the ENP.
Pardo puts it, the aim has become one of keeping the chaos on the outside, while at the same time trying to enhance security by keeping the outside friendlyEurope of Many Circles: European Neighbourhood Policy
- S S As
- Pardo
European Soft Security Policies: The Northern Dimension (Helsinki and Berlin: Finnish Institute of International Affairs and Institut für Europäische Politik
- H Moroff
See also R. Albioni, Lopata and Raik, Friends or Family?The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy
- Gromadzki
- Raik Lopata
EU and Russia to Cement Their Relations in the New Northern Treaty
- See A Rettman
- A Rettman
From Barcelona to Neighbourhood Policy. Assessments and Open Issues As Smith notes, the actual criteria for assessment are far from clear. For example, often it is unclear who is responsible for undertaking an action or exactly how progress will be judgedThe Outsiders
- On
- M Example
- G Emerson
- Noutcheva
Russia’s Futures: Implications for the EU, the North and the Baltic Region (Helsinki and Berlin: Finnish Institute of International Affairs and Institut für Europäische Politik
- S Medvedev
As Smith notes, the actual criteria for assessment are far from clear. For example, often it is unclear who is responsible for undertaking an action or exactly how progress will be judged
- Enp On The
- M Example
- G Emerson
- Noutcheva
- M Emerson
The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy
- Lopata Gromadzki
- R Albioni
Several arguments made in these analyses are also applicable to the northern context. However, our contention is that developments in the North stand out as rather unique and raise a number of important questions for the implementation of the ENP. On the ENP and the Mediterranean, see
- RA Del
On Russian attitudes toward the ENP see D. Averre, ‘Russia and the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?
- D Averre