Exploring the Linkages between Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in South Sudan

Full text

Exploring the Linkages between Education Sector
Governance, Inequity, Conict, and Peacebuilding
in South Sudan
Research Report Prepared for UNICEF Eastern and Southern
Africa Regional Ofce (ESARO)
February 2016

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Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
Exploring the Linkages between Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict, and
Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Research Report Prepared for UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Ofce (ESARO)
February 2016
Research Team
Mario Novelli, University of Sussex (Project Lead)
Gabrielle Daoust, University of Sussex (Lead Researcher, South Sudan)
Jan Selby, University of Sussex
Oscar Valiente, University of Glasgow
Rosario Scandurra, Universitat de Barcelona
Luka Biong Deng Kuol, University of Juba
Emma Salter, University of Sussex
Cover Photo: © UNICEF/Children Learning in Back to School Campaign, South Sudan, 2015

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Acknowledgements
This research report is the result of active collaboration between the University of Sussex (including the
Centre for International Education and the Sussex Centre for Conict and Security Research), the University
of Glasgow, the Universitat de Barcelona, and the University of Juba (Centre for Peace and Development
Studies). Alan Smith and Caroline Marks, from the University of Ulster also contributed to the success of
this broader research program, and led similar research in Kenya.
We would like to thank the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) of South Sudan,
including Honourable Minister John Gai Yoh and Honourable Undersecretary Michael Lopuke Lotyam, who
not only enabled this study to take place but also expressed active interest in the research process, ndings,
and recommendations. We would also like to thank the members of the Peacebuilding Technical Reference
Committee, including the MoEST and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, for their contributions
to this project, as well as State Ministries of Education in Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Western
Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, and Upper Nile, and the county education directors, payam education supervisors,
school managers, teachers, and students in each of the sites visited, who so generously shared their time,
experiences, and suggestions, as well as their own questions about this research.
Representatives of various national and state ministries and commissions, international donors and partners,
and national organisations in the education and peacebuilding sectors, as well as young people (students
and members of youth organisations) made valuable contributions which are central to the success of this
research project, and contributed their time and ideas to enable a better understanding of the governance
of South Sudan’s education sector.
The tremendous support of UNICEF’s South Sudan Country Ofce was critical to the successful implementation
of this research. Particular thanks go to Country Representative Jonathan Veitch, Deputy Representative Ettie
Higgins, Chief of Education Phuong T. Nguyen, and the PBEA team (Thelma Majela, Ticiana Garcia-Tapia,
Lucy Lomodong, and Genzeb Jan Terchino). We would also like to acknowledge the invaluable support of the
Western Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, and Upper Nile eld ofces. These teams welcomed the
research team, provided continuous support to the eld researcher, facilitated access to research sites and
contact with participants, and provided opportunities to share emerging research ndings. Their efforts and
time taken to actively support this project and the research team are hugely appreciated.
We would also like to acknowledge the support received for the quantitative portion of this study, which
enabled the research team to better understand and contextualize the various data, enriching the resulting
ndings. The MoEST provided access to comprehensive Education Management Information System
(EMIS) data, with additional assistance provided by FHI 360, and the National Bureau of Statistics, which
provided assistance with population census data. Finally, we would like to thank UNICEF ESARO, which
commissioned this research, and Regional Education and Peacebuilding Specialist Neven Knezevic (PhD)
in particular, for his constant encouragement, support, input, and patience over the course of this research
process.

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Acronyms and abbreviations
NPPR National Platform for Peace and
Reconciliation
OCHA Organisation for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs
PBEA Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy
(UNICEF)
PEG Partners for Education Group
POC Protection of Civilians site
PTA Parent Teacher Association
SAF Sudan Armed Forces
SMC School Management Committee
SPLA/M Sudan Peoples’ Liberation
Army/Movement
SPLM-IO SPLM-In Opposition
SSDP South Sudan Development Plan
SSEC South Sudan Education Cluster
SSP South Sudan Pound
SSPRC South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation
Commission
TTI Teacher Training Institute
TVET Technical and Vocational Education and
Training
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientic
and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan
USAID United States Agency for International
Development
WFP World Food Program
AES Alternative Education System
ALP Accelerated Learning Program
BALP Basic Adult Literacy Program
BoG Board of Governors
CEC County Education Centre
CHF Common Humanitarian Fund
CNHPR Committee for National Healing, Peace
and Reconciliation
CSO Civil society organisation
CGS Community Girls’ Schools
CTMC County Transfer Monitoring Committee
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration
DFID Department for International
Development (UK Aid)
ECD Early Childhood Development
EDOG Education Donor Group
EFA Education For All
EiE Education in Emergencies
EMIS Education Management Information
System
ESARO Eastern and Southern Regional
Ofce (UNICEF)
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
GBV Gender Based Violence
GER Gross enrolment rate
GESP General Education Strategic Plan
GESS Girls’ Education South Sudan
GPE Global Partnership for Education
GRSS Government of the Republic of
South Sudan
IDP Internally displaced person
IEC Intensive English Course
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on
Development
IMED Improved Management of Education
Delivery (EU)
JSR Joint Sector Review
LS&PE Life skills and peacebuilding
education (PBEA)
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MoCYS Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports
MoEST Ministry of Education, Science and
Technology
MoFCIEP Ministry of Finance, Commerce,
Investment and Economic Planning
MoGCSW Ministry of Gender, Child and Social
Welfare
MoGEI Ministry of General Education and
Instruction
NBS National Bureau of Statistics
NER Net enrolment rate
NGO Non-governmental Organisation

Caption: © UNICEF/ Student drawing expressing aspirations for education in South Sudan, 2015

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Research context
While there is growing evidence that educational inequality can be a driver of conict (FHI 360, 2015) and
that the education system can both promote and undermine sustainable peacebuilding processes (Bush
& Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2004b; Smith, 2005), education systems are often marginalized in both peace-
making and peacebuilding processes (Novelli & Smith, 2011). This study explores the relationship between
education sector management, inequality, conict and peacebuilding in South Sudan. It examines the
linkages between inequities in education, broader political economy dynamics which contribute to conict
pressures, and how education sector governance could support sustainable peace and development
processes.
South Sudan gained independence in 2011, following decades of civil war. However, conict – linked to
patterns of marginalization and inequity along interrelated political, ethnic, geographic, and economic lines
- has persisted in the country. These patterns of inequity and pressures for conict have been perpetuated
(and reproduced) in South Sudan’s education system since the colonial period.
This research – commissioned and funded by UNICEF’s Eastern and Southern Regional Ofce (ESARO) as
part of its global Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) program – consisted of country studies
in Kenya and South Sudan. The University of Sussex led the research in South Sudan, with the support of
colleagues in the University of Juba, University of Glasgow, and Universitat de Barcelona.
Research methodology
This research draws on a conceptual framework that captures the economic, cultural, political, and
social dimensions of education governance and inequality and their relation to conict and peace. The
framework combines dimensions of redistribution (equality and inclusion in education access, resources,
and outcomes), recognition (afrmation of diversity in education structures, processes, and content),
representation (participation in decision-making related to resource allocation and use), and reconciliation
(dealing with the past and relations of horizontal and vertical trust).
This mixed-methods research involved quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative analysis of
education, census, and conict data examined educational inequalities at the national and subnational
levels. Qualitative interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with 217 government ofcials,
education and peacebuilding partners, teachers, and students in seven sites in ve states in South Sudan.
Key ndings
Examining educational inequalities in South Sudan
Quantitative analysis of education, census, and conict data revealed clear patterns of inequality in
educational access, resources, and outcomes in South Sudan. Inequalities were particularly clear across
different states and across counties within states. For example, states in the Greater Upper Nile region
experienced low access to school facilities and resources as well as low enrolment in upper primary grades,
while southern counties were generally characterized by more adequate school resources and outcomes
compared to central and northern counties. An analysis of EMIS and conict data reveals that states with
the highest occurrence of conict events since 2011 (Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei) have the lowest provision
of educational resources and the lowest percentage of students in upper primary, reecting the relationship
between the occurrence of conict and inequalities in educational resources and outcomes. These concerns
were reected in qualitative interviews during which participants described the effects of geographic
location, rural communities, socio-economic status, livelihoods activities (e.g. cattle-keeping), and older
youth on education access, resources, and outcomes of inequalities. These were perceived as contributing
to pressures for conict.

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Redistribution: Responses to inequities in education
In South Sudan, a range of policy initiatives and programs have been aimed at addressing different
dimensions of educational inequity. However, specic policy strategies reect the inuence of global
education agendas, with less attention to context-specic dimensions of inequity linked to conict in
South Sudan, including ‘pastoralist’ communities and older youth. These include policy strategies which
focus on girls’ education and students with disabilities. While some key dimensions of inequity linked to
conict are considered in programs such as the Alternative Education System (AES) and vocational training,
implementation in practice is limited. Gaps between policy and practice are linked to under-resourcing of
the education sector, which received 5 per cent of the national budget in 2014-15, compared to nearly 50
per cent for rule of law and security sectors. The under-resourcing of the education sector is reected in per-
student spending, which was as low as SSP 143.5 (USD 48.5) at the primary level in 2014-15, as well as in
poor teacher salaries. This is of particular concern given the current economic climate and global oil prices.
Budget allocations and expenditures also limit redistribution efforts to equity priorities within MoEST, which
is reected in the gap between stated policy priorities and budget allocations and outturns. For example,
in 2014-15, AES received 1 per cent of the education budget and Technical and Vocational Education and
Training (TVET) received 0.5 per cent, although in 2013-14 only 21 per cent of AES allocations and no TVET
allocations were disbursed. In this sense, approaches to the (re)distribution of opportunities and resources
(including increasing support for private education services) on the part of both government and donors
may be reproducing certain dimensions of inequity linked to conict, along geographic, socio-economic,
ethnic, and other lines. Resource allocation to subnational (state and county) levels, such as government
budget transfers, reects an equal but not necessarily equitable approach, with no systematic policy to
redress existing and historically driven disparities across geographic areas. While school-based resource
allocation by donors may be based on ‘conict sensitive’ criteria, more attention should be paid to the
potential role of allocation approaches in further entrenching patterns of marginalization and exclusion for
particular communities.
Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the expansion of education services was described
as a key ‘peace dividend’ with little attention paid to how various approaches to the (re)distribution of
opportunities and resources might reproduce inequity and contribute to future conict. Failure to deliver
these ‘dividends’ and meet community expectations has affected perceptions of government legitimacy
and trust. This, in turn, has signicant implications for condence in political representation and vertical
dimensions of cohesion (and reconciliation) between communities and authorities. (Re)distribution
of education opportunities and resources in South Sudan has been hugely affected by the outbreak of
violent conict and associated humanitarian responses. This has raised concerns about (government)
representation in education service provision, the emergence of a ‘parallel’ system of education in conict-
affected contexts, and geographic inequities in humanitarian-development resource allocation as well as
perceptions of ‘conict dividends’.
Recognition: Integration and social cohesion in education
The role of schools in bringing together members of diverse communities is often identied as a key
contribution of the education sector. However, education services promoting unity and cohesion may not
necessarily be equitable, and may in fact actually contribute to further inequity and exclusion. For example,
there are geographic and socio-economic inequities in access to national secondary schools intended to
bring together students from diverse communities. While responses to diversity and conict represent
opportunities to address the legacies of violence and contribute to (re)building both horizontal and vertical
relations of trust, the ways in which policies and practices afrm or exclude diverse identities or forms of
violence can reinforce patterns of inequity and contribute to pressures for continued conict.
In South Sudan, education system policies and content have the potential to (re)produce patterns of cultural
violence, linked to languages of instruction (including the selection of national languages), the validation
of particular versions of history and citizenship, ministry narratives that dismiss or disrespect ‘bad’ or
‘backward’ communities or cultures, and the development of formal curricula that focus on ‘productive’
economic activities and are not aligned with the economic and cultural priorities of diverse communities.
The cultural and economic irrelevance of education programs is of particular importance for cattle-keeping

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communities, as over 85 per cent of South Sudan’s population is engaged in livestock care (FAO, 2012).
These patterns of inequity contribute to pressures for violence linked to political, economic, and cultural
marginalization in terms of representation in decision-making, recognition of identities and livelihoods, and
access to relevant education opportunities.
Teachers as well as students experience horizontal and vertical inequities that hinder recognition and
cohesion. Fragmented recruitment and management approaches, ‘localized’ deployment in remote counties
or payams, recruitment and promotion based on patronage networks, salary disparities between sectors
(e.g. security versus education) and within education (e.g. national and state teachers, permanent and
contract teachers), and language capacity differences (English versus Arabic) all contribute to inequities
along geographic, ethnic, and socio-economic lines. These reect broader political and economic dynamics
contributing to pressures for conict, including allocation of opportunities and resources to mobilize and
reward connections, aside from the negative effects on vertical relations of trust in government.
Representation: Education sector governance and management
South Sudan’s Local Government Act refers to a system of decentralized governance based on the
devolution of power and authority to state and local governments. However, participant descriptions of
sector management reected a deconcentrated form of decentralization based on centralized policy
decisions with limited political authority at the sub-national level and little space for representation of local
education ofcials. Participants at the school and payam level felt that their voices and concerns are not
clearly heard, and that they are often undermined by higher government levels and donors (for example,
by bypassing payams when approaching schools). While school governing bodies play a key role in school-
level management, teachers and youth suffer lack of representation in decision-making processes, which
can increase their risk for involvement in violence when combined with inequalities in access to professional
and economic opportunities.
Local opportunities for representation in administration and management of the education sector reect
wider structures and dynamics of political authority at sub-national levels, including appointments based
on ethnic, military, or political connections. Apart from limiting trust in higher levels of government,
these processes contribute to the reproduction of factional political systems, competition over access to
political opportunities and resources, and grievances over exclusion from decision-making opportunities.
Discussions with central and sub-national government ofcials reected tensions between the perceived
need for centralized policy development and management systems (contributing to state and nation-
building processes), and the perceived importance of locally-responsive service delivery.
Contributing to processes of reconciliation
The elements of redistribution, recognition, and representation indicate that broader processes of
reconciliation, which involves addressing the past and the effects of conict as well as horizontal and vertical
trust, take place through inter-personal exchange and engagement. In addition, processes of reconciliation
should address the structural and historical grievances that underpin tensions and pressures for conict,
which are connected to relations between communities and between communities and authorities. While
relations between groups may be facilitated by recognizing identity and diversity in education structures
and content, vertical trust between communities or schools and government, and between levels of
government, is negatively affected by inadequate redistribution of education opportunities and resources.
Limited attention to vertical aspects of recognition, and limited opportunities for representation in decision-
making also hinder the development of this trust. These elements of reconciliation are of critical importance
when considering the connections between education governance, inequity, and peacebuilding. Limited
vertical trust along with a perceived lack of power and representation in decision-making has signicant
implications for perceived government legitimacy on the part of communities as well as perceived
marginalization based on demographics and geography. This potentially weakens state-society relations
and perceived state legitimacy, and contributes to pressures for conict.

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Recommendations
The research ndings outlined in this report illustrate the importance of addressing multiple dimensions of
inequity and promoting peacebuilding objectives prior to, during, and after situations of violent conict. The
ndings inform the following recommendations:
Promoting equity in education through redistribution
zExamine the potential for school management and student admissions approaches to address
entrenched patterns of marginalization.
zImplement strategies to address existing imbalances and ensure equitable access to education
opportunities.
zAdopt, or continue to use, conict-sensitive criteria or guidelines to inform allocation of
resources.
zEnsure that reasons for resource allocation decisions are clearly explained to key actors
particularly schools, payam ofces, and county departments.
zAdopt strategies such as quotas to address existing imbalances and ensure equitable access to
education opportunities.
zAlign salary reforms and advancement policies across and within sectors.
zConsider revising decentralized resource allocation policies, such as budget transfers, to
promote equitable allocation.
zContinue strengthening local government capacity in budgeting, monitoring, transparency, and
accountability.
zSupport efforts to bridge humanitarian and development efforts in education.
zIncrease the proportion of government and donor resources allocated to the education sector.
Promoting equity in education through recognition
zSupport the establishment of local border schools (including boarding schools) between
counties and payams.
zEnsure that curricula are relevant to the cultural and livelihoods systems of diverse
communities.
zRespect and value diverse communities and their livelihoods, particularly for cattle-keeping
communities.
zInvolve members of marginalized communities, including cattle-keeping and rural communities,
in education policy and curriculum development.
zEnsure clarity and transparency in the selection of national languages for instruction.
zConsider recognizing diverse experiences, narratives, and identities in history and citizenship
education.
zStrengthen psychosocial support services in learning spaces at all levels.

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Promoting equity in education through representation
zConsider county and payam representation in curriculum revision or development processes.
zConsider questions of voice and power when supporting decentralization efforts, moving
beyond a purely technical focus.
zStrengthen community participation in education management and decision-making processes.
zEnsure that assessment ndings or reports are communicated to stakeholders, particularly
school managers, teachers, and students.
zIdentify and implement strategies to target marginalized communities for teacher training,
including women and rural and cattle-keeping communities.
zDesign and implement initiatives to enhance teachers’ professional status and recognition from
society and the wider government.
zFacilitate access to English language and literacy training for teachers.
zIdentify and implement strategies to promote equitable youth representation in decision-
making.
zConsider vertical dimensions of cohesion and reconciliation as well as horizontal inter-group
relations.
zStrengthen the coordination of the Peacebuilding Reference Committee.
Beyond the specic policy recommendations outlined above, this study also points out that inequities
perpetuated via education contribute to conict. This goes beyond the more common concern that conict
merely disrupts education, as is often argued in Education in Emergencies (EiE) discourse. Addressing
inequalities and structural issues around the management of education service delivery can work on
broader political economy factors in conict settings that contribute to conict, and thus have an important
preventative role. These inequalities take different forms, including the quality and relevance of education,
and are often ignored by dominant global paradigms for inclusion and equity. Crucially, this study suggests
that addressing inequalities and the factors which give rise to conict is rooted in development programming,
rather than responsive emergency programming. This speaks to the importance of mainstreaming conict-
sensitive and peacebuilding approaches to the entire portfolio of education programming, rather than
restricting peacebuilding and education work to emergency and post-conict settings.

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Contents
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................................iii
Acronyms and abbreviations .............................................................................................................................iv
Executive summary ............................................................................................................................................vi
Research context ................................................................................................................................................vi
Research methodology .....................................................................................................................................vi
Key ndings ........................................................................................................................................................vi
Examining educational inequalities in south sudan ..................................................................................vi
Redistribution: responses to inequities in education .................................................................................vi
Recognition: integration and social cohesion in education .....................................................................vii
Representation: education sector governance and management ..........................................................viii
Contributing to processes of reconciliation ..............................................................................................viii
Recommendations ..............................................................................................................................................ix
Promoting equity in education through redistribution .............................................................................ix
Promoting equity in education through recognition .................................................................................ix
Promoting equity in education through representation .............................................................................x
List of tables and gures ..................................................................................................................................xiv
Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................1
1.1 Introduction to the research ....................................................................................................................1
1.2 Key concepts and denitions .................................................................................................................1
Governance in education ...................................................................................................................2
Equity and inequality in education ....................................................................................................2
Social cohesion ...................................................................................................................................3
Peacebuilding ......................................................................................................................................3
Relationship between education, inequality, conict, and peacebuilding .....................................4
1.3 The 4rs theoretical and analytical framework .......................................................................................4
1.4 Research questions and hypothesis .......................................................................................................6
1.5 Structure of the report .............................................................................................................................6
Chapter 2. Research methods .............................................................................................................................7
2.1 Data collection approach .........................................................................................................................7
Quantitative analysis of secondary statistical data..........................................................................7
Qualitative data collection .................................................................................................................8
2.2 Research sites ...........................................................................................................................................9
Data analysis and validation ............................................................................................................10
2.3 Research partnerships and capacity development ............................................................................. 11
2.4 Research limitations ..............................................................................................................................12
Chapter 3. Conict, peacebuilding, and education in south sudan ...............................................................14
3.1 Chapter introduction ..............................................................................................................................14
3.2 Conict and peacebuilding in south sudan .........................................................................................14
History of conict in south sudan ...................................................................................................14
Current conict dynamics ................................................................................................................15
Peace- and state-building approaches ............................................................................................16
3.3 History of education in south sudan ....................................................................................................17
Development of education in south sudan ...................................................................................17

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National policy context ....................................................................................................................19
3.4 Contemporary education system management and governance ....................................................20
Education system in south sudan ...................................................................................................20
Education sector nancing ..............................................................................................................20
Education sector coordination .........................................................................................................22
Chapter 4. Examining educational inequalities in south sudan ....................................................................25
4.1 Chapter introduction ..............................................................................................................................25
Measuring inequality in education: quantitative analysis.............................................................25
Understandings of inequality: qualitative perspectives ................................................................26
4.2 Inequality of access ..............................................................................................................................26
Access inequalities across geographic locations ...........................................................................27
Access inequalities and gender .......................................................................................................29
Access inequalities and socio-economic status .............................................................................30
Access inequalities and cattle-keeping communities ....................................................................31
4.3 Inequality of resources .........................................................................................................................31
Resource inequalities across geographic locations .......................................................................31
4.4 Inequality of outcomes ........................................................................................................................35
Outcome inequalities across geographical locations ....................................................................35
Outcome inequalities and older youth ...........................................................................................36
4.5 Conict occurrence and educational inequalities ..............................................................................37
4.6 Chapter summary ..................................................................................................................................39
Chapter 5. Redistribution: responses to inequities in education ..................................................................42
5.1 Chapter introduction ..............................................................................................................................42
5.2 (Re)distribution of education opportunities .........................................................................................42
Examining ‘peace dividends’ in education .....................................................................................44
5.3 (Re)distribution of education resources ...............................................................................................44
Budgeting and distribution of education funding ..........................................................................44
Donor allocation of school resources .............................................................................................47
Transparency and accountability of education resource utilisation .............................................48
Privatisation of education ................................................................................................................48
5.4 The humanitarian-development divide ................................................................................................49
A parallel system of education ........................................................................................................49
(Perceived) inequities in humanitarian resource allocation ..........................................................50
5.6 Chapter summary ..................................................................................................................................51
Chapter 6. Recognition: integration and social cohesion in education .........................................................53
6.1 Chapter introduction ..............................................................................................................................53
Understanding education’s peacebuilding role .............................................................................53
6.2 School diversity, integration, and cohesion ........................................................................................53
Diversity in schools: promoting inclusion and integration ...........................................................53
National schools and border schools ..............................................................................................54
Conict and violence in schools ......................................................................................................55
6.3 Integration, cohesion, and cultural violence in the curriculum .........................................................56
Languages of instruction .................................................................................................................56
Curriculum content ...........................................................................................................................57
Narratives of diversity: reproducing exclusion and cultural violence .........................................59
6.4 Economic relevance of education programs .......................................................................................60
6.5 Teacher diversity and cohesion: the impact of recruitment and management practices .................61

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Diversity, cohesion, and inequity in teacher recruitment and management ...............................61
Teacher salaries and professional recognition ...............................................................................63
6.6 Chapter summary ..................................................................................................................................64
Chapter 7. Representation: education sector governance and management ...............................................67
7.1 Chapter introduction ..............................................................................................................................67
7.2 Approaches to decentralized governance .............................................................................................67
Perceptions of decentralization in education .................................................................................67
Sub-national participation in decision-making .............................................................................68
Local political structures and inuences on decision-making .....................................................69
7.3 School-level management and representation ....................................................................................71
School governing bodies ..................................................................................................................71
Teacher representation in decision-making .....................................................................................72
7.4 Political and economic representation among youth .........................................................................72
7.5 Chapter summary ...................................................................................................................................73
Chapter 8. Conclusions and recommendations .............................................................................................. 76
8.1 Chapter introduction ..............................................................................................................................76
8.2 Key research ndings: reecting on the 4rs .......................................................................................76
8.3 Connecting education and peacebuilding processes .........................................................................80
8.4 Recommendations .................................................................................................................................80
Promoting equity in education through redistribution ................................................................81
Promoting equity in education through recognition .....................................................................82
Promoting equity in education through representation ................................................................82
References ..........................................................................................................................................................85
Appendix 1: detailed descriptions of research sites ......................................................................................94
Central equatoria state ................................................................................................................................94
Western equatoria state ..............................................................................................................................94
Western bahr el ghazal state .......................................................................................................................94
Warrap state .................................................................................................................................................95
Upper nile state ............................................................................................................................................96
Appendix 2: decentralized roles and responsibilities in the education sector .............................................97
Development policies and strategies .........................................................................................................98
Education policies and strategies ...............................................................................................................98
Child, youth, and gender policies and strategies ......................................................................................98
Appendix 3: peacebuilding policies and strategies .......................................................................................98
Appendix 4: data collection documents ..........................................................................................................99
Information sheet for key stakeholder informants ....................................................................................99
Study title: education sector governance in south sudan and kenya ......................................................99
Invitation ......................................................................................................................................................99
Interview consent form.............................................................................................................................. 101
Project title: education sector governance in south sudan and kenya .................................................. 101
Interview questions for key stakeholders ................................................................................................102

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List of Tables and Figures
Table 1: Dimensions of horizontal inequality ....................................................................................................4
Table 2: Working in the Education Sector: Analysing Education Systems Using the 4Rs .............................5
Table 3. EMIS coverage rate by education sector for 2009-13 .........................................................................8
Table 4. Summary of research participants .......................................................................................................8
Table 5. County proles for selected research sites ........................................................................................10
Table 6. Educational indicators in Sudan in 1960 and 1972-83 .....................................................................17
Table 7. Primary, secondary, and AES enrolment by state in 2005, 2013, and 2015 .....................................18
Table 8. Approved education sector budget allocations for 2014-15 .............................................................21
Table 9: International comparison of education access by country type in 2013 .........................................27
Table 10. National trends in education access for 2009-13 ............................................................................27
Table 11. Socio-economic indicators for rural and urban areas in 2008-09 ..................................................28
Table 12. National trends in educational resources for 2009-13 ....................................................................32
Table 13. National trends in primary education outcomes for 2009-13 ........................................................35
Table 14. Socio-economic indicators for youth aged 15 to 34 years in 2008-2009 ......................................37
Table 15: Occurrence of conict and educational inequalities by state in 2013 .........................................38
Table 16. Annual primary education delivery transfers to states for 2014-15 ...............................................45
Table 17: Select budget allocations and outturns for 2013-2014 ....................................................................47
Figure 1: Map of South Sudan ...........................................................................................................................9
Figure 2: Net and gross enrolment rates in primary education by state in 2013 ........................................28
Figure 3: Gender parity in primary education by state in 2013 ......................................................................29
Figure 4: Gender parity in primary education by county in 2013 ..................................................................30
Figure 5: Student-teacher and student-classroom ratios in primary education by state in 2013 ...............33
Figure 6: Primary schools with access to drinking water and latrines by state in 2013 ...............................33
Figure 8: Percentage of primary schools with access to drinking water by county in 2013 ........................34
Figure 9: Percentage of primary students enrolled in P7 and P8 by state in 2013 .......................................35
Figure 11: Number of conict events by county in 2011-2014 ........................................................................38
Figure 12: Number of conict events by county in 2011-2014 ........................................................................39
Figure 13: Scatterplot matrices of conict and education inequalities by county in 2013 .........................40

Caption: © UNICEF/ Outside a primary school in Upper Nile State, 2015.

1
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction to the research
This study explores the relationship between education sector management, inequality, conict and
peacebuilding in South Sudan, and examines the linkages between inequities in education and broader
political economy dynamics that contribute to conict pressures. South Sudan gained independence in 2011,
following decades of civil war. However, conict has persisted in the country reecting political economy
dynamics which give rise to marginalization and inequality along interrelated political, ethnic, geographic,
and economic lines. These dynamics are also reected in recent outbreaks of violence, most notably on-
going ghting and associated violence against civilians that broke out between government and opposition
forces in 2013. Patterns of political, economic, geographical, and cultural inequality have been perpetuated
(and reproduced) in the education system in South Sudan since the colonial period, contributing to feelings
of resentment, alienation, and exclusion, which act as drivers of conict. While national and international
actors have developed a range of peacebuilding strategies to promote ‘governance reform’ to respond to
prior and current violence, linkages of such reforms to the education sector are weak, despite the historical
connections between education and inequality, the political economy, and violence.
In this context, this study seeks to understand how and in what ways education sector management, and
the education system itself, is a contributing or mitigating factor in conict and how better education sector
management might facilitate ‘governance reform’ to support sustainable peace and development processes
in South Sudan. While the education system is often marginalized in both peace-making and peacebuilding
processes (Novelli & Smith, 2011), there is growing evidence that educational inequality can be a driver of
conict (FHI 360, 2015) and should therefore be taken more seriously. The education system itself, as a key
social service, can both promote and undermine sustainable peacebuilding processes (Bush & Saltarelli,
2000; Davies, 2004b; Smith, 2005), and access to quality education both as a basic human right and a means
to fullling other rights (Sen, 1999). While education can be a powerful driver of economic growth and
social mobility (Becker 1964; Schultz, 1961), it can also be a driver of social stratication and a vehicle for
social reproduction and elite closure, and can undermine social cohesion and reconciliation (Smith, 2005).
The key issue at stake is not merely how much in terms of resources is spent on education (although this is
important) but where, on what, and with what effects.
While a strong body of literature has examined relationships between education and conict, little attention
has been given to the linkages between governance, political economy, and education sector management.
This study seeks to ll this gap by exploring questions on the coordination and management of the education
sector including policies and priorities, funding, implementation, and its effects. In an increasingly globalized
and interconnected world, this study also recognises that research on education governance cannot begin
and end within the borders of the nation state but must also explore the complex roles of regional and
global actors in shaping national educational agendas. This study’s mixed method approach combines
quantitative analysis of available education data with qualitative interviews and focus groups amongst
key constituencies. The study builds on these insights by exploring education sector management and its
relationship to governance, inequity, conict, and peacebuilding in two country case studies: Kenya and
South Sudan. The research in South Sudan was led by the University of Sussex and supported by colleagues
in the University of Juba, University of Glasgow, and Universitat de Barcelona. The research was funded
and commissioned by UNICEF’s Eastern and Southern Regional Ofce (ESARO), as part of their global
Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) program.
1.2 Key concepts and denitions
A number of key conceptual tools are central to this research including the inter-connected concepts of
governance, equity and inequality, social cohesion, and peacebuilding. This section of the report lays
out working denitions of some of the key research concepts, and outlines the theoretical and analytical
framework that has guided the research.

2
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
Governance in education
Governance refers to the sum of all concurrent forms of collective regulation of social issues: from the
institutionalized self-regulation of civil society and the diverse forms of cooperation among state and
private actors, to the action of sovereign state agents (Mayntz, 2003: 66). Aragon and Vegas (2009) highlight
two distinctive aspects of denitions of governance. The rst concerns political control of a system and the
context this creates, with governance dened in terms of the policy-making process (e.g., how the rules
of a political regime provide the context for policy-making). The second aspect refers more to technical
capacity and the ability to implement policies and deliver and manage services (Smith, 2010, 2014). This
study concerns both of these aspects: the politics and process of education sector governance.
A third and more analytical aspect of governance considers ‘governance’ as a concept of our time, reecting a
shift from government to governance, and for some towards ‘global governance’ (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992).
This involves a shift from the idea of the government as the unitary source of educational governance (that
funds, provides, regulates, and owns the education system) towards a more ‘coordinating’ and facilitating
role involving a range of actors operating at multiple geographical scales. This can be traced to the shift
from Keynesian to neoliberal political economy approaches that have dominated international development
debates since the 1980s (Robertson et al., 2006). Dale (2005) sees this as the scalar and functional division
of education governance, which necessitates exploration of the supra-national or international, national,
and sub-national levels. It also requires exploration of governance activities: funding, provision, regulation,
and ownership, and the actors and institutions (state, market, community, and household) responsible for
carrying them out. Analysis of educational governance reects on who is doing what, where, with what
outcomes, and for whom. This requires sensitivity towards the multi-scalar and functional division of these
processes in contemporary contexts. This study adopts a broad view of the education sector, considering
both formal and non-formal (alternative) education at primary and secondary levels.
Equity and inequality in education
Horizontal inequities have been identied as important indicators for conict outbreak (Cederman et al., 2011;
Stewart, 2010). For UNICEF, equity is a guiding principle and implies “that all children have an opportunity to
survive, develop and reach their full potential without discrimination, bias or favouritism […] regardless of
gender, race, religious beliefs, income, physical attributes, geographical location or other status” (UNICEF,
2011). UNICEF’s equity-focused approach to development “addresses the economic and social barriers
that prevent access to services, focusing on the most vulnerable sectors and thus contributing to a fairer
distribution of resources and benets. It helps to level the playing eld” (2012b: 8).
In this sense, education policies and programs aim to address root causes of inequality, to ensure the
fundamental rights of all children, particularly those experiencing deprivation, including access to the basic
protections and services necessary for survival and development. In discussions of equity and inequality,
there are tensions over the principle of equality of opportunity and provision, versus targeted redress of
unequal social location. For example, while a version of equity might be achieved through ensuring that all
schools receive the same funding (based on pupil numbers), for others this would be seen as inequitable
precisely because some schools are located in more socially deprived locations and face more difcult
challenges than others and therefore should be prioritized. Reecting UNICEF’s view of equity, Bourdieu
(2008: 36) notes that,
To favour the most favoured and disfavour the most disfavoured, all that is necessary and sufcient
is for the school to ignore in the content and teaching it transmits, in the methods and techniques of
transmission and the criteria of judgement it deploys, the cultural inequalities that divide children from
different social classes. In other words, by treating all students, however much they differ, as equal in
rights and duties, the educational system actually gives its sanction to the initial inequality.
In seeking equity in education, the targeted distribution of resources might therefore be necessary to redress
historical inequalities. This has been the underlying argument for policy measures such as afrmative action
and positive discrimination. Analysis of equity in education thus needs to be grounded in the contextual
analysis of the country, existing socio-economic, cultural, political, and religious inequalities, and the
resources, policies, and practices aimed at addressing them. While the economic dimensions of inequalities
or redistribution, are important, there are also other dimensions of inequality that require attention.
Recognition refers to the ways in which culturally-related and identity-based issues manifest themselves,

3
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
while representation concerns a sense of isolation from decision-making spheres. As outlined by Nancy
Fraser (1995, 2005), these reect the ways in which different dimensions of inequity and inequality manifest
themselves and highlight the need for a holistic strategy for redressing them.
Social cohesion
Social cohesion, like many key development concepts, is contested and open to a variety of interpretations
(see Jenson, 2010). The Council of Europe denes social cohesion as “the capacity of a society to ensure
the welfare of all its members, minimize disparities and avoid polarisation. A cohesive society is a mutually
supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means.” This
denition captures two key aspects of many denitions: ‘inequalities’ and ‘social relations and ties’ (Berger-
Schmitt, 2002: 404-5). The UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Program (PBEA) captures the
social and structural dimensions of social cohesion, dening it as “the quality of coexistence between the
multiple groups that operate within a society […] along the dimensions of mutual respect and trust, shared
values and social participation, life satisfaction and happiness as well as structural equity and social justice”
(UNICEF, 2014).
Social cohesion is a societal rather than individual property based on the promotion of positive relationships,
trust, solidarity, inclusion, collectivity, and common purpose. Social cohesion refers not only to individual
or communal attitudes and relations (horizontal dimensions), but also involves structural1 aspects of
governance (vertical dimensions) that affect connections between communities or civil society and the state
(Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Friedkin, 2004). Social cohesion is linked to social justice and equity. Higher income
inequality has been associated with lower social cohesion, while more equitable societies tend to have
greater social and political trust and less violence and crime (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010). Educational equality
has been linked with greater social cohesion across a number of measures, with educational inequality
positively correlated with violent crime and political unrest and negatively correlated with political and
civil liberties (Green et al., 2006). Improving social cohesion requires addressing structural, inter-personal,
and inter-group domains. In this sense, social cohesion can sometimes be used interchangeably with the
concept of peacebuilding in conict-affected contexts, as a kind of synonym for the aspirational production
of a society with strong social inclusion, social capital, and social mobility (see OECD, 2012). In the UNICEF
PBEA program, social cohesion has been used in several contexts as a proxy for peacebuilding, due to
local sensitivities related to peace or peacebuilding language in some of the countries in which the PBEA
operates.
Peacebuilding
While this study recognizes that there are multiple interpretations of the term ‘peacebuilding’, the framework
herein draws on a conceptualization that focuses on the need for core transformations for post-conict
societies to move towards sustainable peace. Key post-conict transformations necessary to produce
sustainable peace, or positive peace, as Galtung (1976) calls it, requires going beyond the mere cessation
of violence (negative peace) in order to address the root causes of violent conict. This involves addressing
both drivers and legacies of conict and the promotion of both social justice and cohesion by addressing
injustices and bringing people and communities together. This is in line with a range of contemporary
theories of war and conict (Stewart et al., 2005, 2010; Cramer, 2005), which see horizontal and vertical
inequalities as drivers of conict. Addressing these inequalities in their different economic, cultural and
political dimensions supports the promotion of social cohesion whereby trust, solidarity, and a sense of
collectivity and common purpose are strengthened. Such an approach is also highly relevant in fragile
contexts where the risks of conict are signicant.
This research also refers to the concept of ‘conict sensitivity’ in discussing peacebuilding approaches in the
education sector. Drawing on UNICEF PBEA denitions (UNICEF ESARO, 2015), ‘conict sensitivity’ involves
explicitly addressing factors which contribute to violent conict, mitigating the spread of conict, supporting
conict-affected communities in dealing with trauma, and protecting vulnerable children and adolescents.
However, conict sensitivity has often been associated with humanitarian (‘emergency’) responses, which
may limit analysis of the connections between education sector governance or management and the
political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of broader conict and peacebuilding processes.
1 ‘Structural’ dimensions refer to institutional and political structures and patterns of societal relations and distribution of power
and resources

4
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
Relationship between education, inequality, conict, and peacebuilding
Within conict studies, there has been a long and heated debate on the relationship between inequality
and conict. The debate is often framed in terms of greed versus grievance, which suggests that wars are
driven less by justied ‘grievances’ and more by personal and collective ‘greed’ (Collier & Hoefer, 2004).
Humans are viewed as ‘economic agents’ making cost-benet calculations and trying to maximize returns
on engagement in violent conict. Therefore, the route to peace and security is not through addressing
inequality and structural exclusion, but through increasing the cost of access to resources for violent actors.
While ‘greed’ may play a role in shaping, exacerbating, and reproducing conict, a strong critique of this
work argues that horizontal inequalities (between groups) are important indicators for conict outbreak
(Stewart, 2010), arguments supported by strong econometric evidence (Cederman et al., 2011). Horizontal
inequalities, often related to ethnicity, tribe, or religion, involve a range of dimensions, as outlined in Table 1.
Table 1: Dimensions of horizontal inequality
Economic dimensions Access resources, assets, employment (e.g.
government, private), and income
Political dimensions Access to political power and representation at all
levels (e.g. government, local authorities, armed
forces)
Social dimensions Access to public services (e.g. education, health,
housing, water)
Cultural dimensions Recognition and respect for difference and identity
(e.g. ethnicity, religion, language)
Source: Stewart, 2010
In armed conicts, real or perceived horizontal inequalities or injustice can provide a catalyst for group
mobilization and uprisings. While a signicant body of research has examined the role of education in
conict, there is limited research on the relationship between education and inequality and the manner in
which it gives rise to violent conict. Recent quantitative research drawing on two international education
and conict datasets (FHI 360, 2015) demonstrates a robust and consistent relationship, across ve
decades, between higher inequality in educational attainment between ethnic and religious groups, and
the likelihood that a country will experience violent conict. However, this research is less able to identify
causal mechanisms (i.e. how inequities are perpetuated or reproduced via education sector management
and service delivery). Therefore, as the authors note in their conclusions, there is a need to explore multiple
dimensions of inequality beyond just educational outcomes, as well as the different ways in which the
education system might contribute to or alleviate conict. In this sense, the current research begins where
this previous study ends, delving deeper into the broad nature of inequalities in education, the management
of education and its relationship to governance, including the allocation of resources and development of
policies, as well as the possible ways that education systems might address these inequalities and political
economies that drive violent conict.
This research distinguishes between concepts of ‘inequality’ and ‘inequity’. ‘Inequality’ is used to refer
to measurement or analysis of differences between individuals and social groups, while ‘inequity’ is
used to examine the implications of these inequalities for social justice. The term ‘inequality’ is used in
quantitative data analysis, while ‘inequity’ is used when discussing structural or systemic factors shaping
and perpetuating inequalities.
1.3 The 4Rs theoretical and analytical framework
The framework used in this study builds on some of the above concepts and thoughts. It develops an
analytical and normative approach that seeks to capture the multiple economic, cultural, political, and
social dimensions of inequality in education, and the ways in which these might relate to conict and peace
(see Novelli, Lopes Cardozo, & Smith, 2015). The framework combines four dimensions of recognition,
redistribution, representation, and reconciliation, linking Fraser’s (1995, 2005) work on social justice with
the peacebuilding and reconciliation work of Galtung (1976), Lederach (1995, 1997), and others, to explore
what sustainable peace and development might look like in post-conict environments. This approach has

5
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
many parallels with UNICEF’s equity approach (see Epstein, 2010), which emphasises inclusion, relevance
and participation – concepts which overlap with redistribution, recognition and representation respectively,
whilst adding reconciliation, which is vital in conict-affected contexts.
This examination of inequalities in the education system seeks to capture the interconnected dimensions
of these ‘4Rs’:
zRedistribution concerns equity and non-discrimination in education access, resources, and
outcomes for different groups in society, particularly marginalized and disadvantaged groups
(thus addressing the ‘access’ dimensions of equity).
zRecognition concerns respect for and afrmation of diversity and identities in education
structures, processes, and content, in terms of gender, language, politics, religion, ethnicity,
culture, and ability (thus addressing the ‘cultural’ dimensions of equity).
zRepresentation concerns participation, at all levels of the education system, in governance
and decision-making related to the allocation, use, and distribution of human and material
resources. This addresses the ‘political’ dimensions of equity.
zReconciliation involves dealing with past events, injustices, and material and psychosocial
effects of conict, as well as developing relationships and trust.
The framework provides a useful tool for analyzing the extent to which education can support cross-
sectorial programming for conict transformation in terms of redistribution, recognition, representation,
and reconciliation. It can also be used as an analytical tool in the education sector, as outlined in Table 2.
Table 2: Working in the Education Sector: Analysing Education Systems Using the 4Rs
Analysing Education Systems Using the 4Rs: Potential ‘Indicators’
Redistribution
(addressing
inequities)
• Vertical and horizontal inequalities in education inputs, resources, and
outcomes (quantitative data)
• Distributive effects of macro education reforms or policies (e.g. impact of
decentralization and privatization on different groups and conict dynamics)
Recognition
(respecting difference,
addressing cultural
equity)
• Policies on language of instruction
• Recognition of cultural diversity and religious identity in curriculum
• Citizenship and civic education as a means of state-building
• ‘Relevance’ of curriculum to diverse communities and local livelihoods
• Addressing violence based on difference in educational settings
Representation
(encouraging
participation,
addressing political
equity)
• Participation (local, national, global) in education policy and reforms
• Political control and representation through education administration
• School-based management and decision-making (teachers, parents,
students)
• Support for fundamental freedoms in the education system
Reconciliation (dealing
with injustices)
• Addressing historical and contemporary injustices linked to conict
• Integration and segregation in education systems (e.g. common institutions)
• Teaching about the past and its relevance to the present and future
• Vertical trust in schools and education system, and horizontal trust between
identity-based groups

6
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
1.4 Research questions and hypothesis
This research is guided by three primary questions:
1. To what extent is educational management generating equity or inequities in education in South Sudan?
2. In what ways is, or might, the governance of education contribute to ‘sustainable peace and development’
in South Sudan?
3. How do inequities perpetuated and/or produced via education reect broader dynamics of political
economy that contribute to violent conict in South Sudan?
Following these guiding questions, a number of sub-questions were identied:
zWhat are the dimensions and main drivers of educational inequity in the country?
zHow do these inequities relate to recognized drivers of conict in the country?
zHow do key decision-makers (global, national, local) see the relationship between educational
inequity and violent conict, and seek to address educational inequities?
zWhat are the effects of key educational reforms (e.g. decentralization, privatization) and policies
on educational inequities and sustainable peace and development?
zWhat types of educational governance reforms might contribute to addressing educational
inequities and to ‘inclusive’ state-building and sustainable peace and development?
This research is based on the hypothesis that inequities perpetuated and produced through the governance
of the education system can contribute to pressures for conict, reecting broader political and economic
dynamics. Addressing inequities in education management and delivery can thus support peacebuilding as
well as broader political economy reform.
1.5 Structure of the report
This research report explores the ways the management and governance of education services in South
Sudan is addressing or redressing inequity in its multiple dimensions (the 4Rs) and therefore promoting
or undermining equity, social cohesion, and sustainable peace and development. Chapter 2 describes the
research methods, while Chapter 3 provides a background to the research including conict dynamics and
an overview of South Sudan’s education system. Chapter 4 presents qualitative and quantitative ndings
on educational inequities including key dimensions of inequity linked to conict. Chapter 5 outlines some
key policy and program responses to aspects of inequity and redistribution, and their implementation in
practice. Chapter 6 presents ndings on vertical and horizontal dimensions of recognition and social cohesion
in the education sector, reected in approaches to school diversity, curriculum relevance, and equity in
teaching. Chapter 7 discusses representation in education governance and management, including policy
approaches to decentralization and school-based management. Finally, Chapter 8 provides conclusions and
recommendations for policy and practice.

Cover Photo: © UNICEF/ Children in Upper Nile, 2015

8
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH METHODS
2.1 Data collection approach
This mixed methods study used both qualitative and quantitative approaches drawing on a range of
data sources including rst-hand discussions with diverse education and peacebuilding stakeholders in
South Sudan, existing statistical datasets, and policy documents. This facilitated the inclusion of multiple
perspectives and the examination of similarities and differences between different data sources.
Existing literature on education governance in South Sudan was reviewed between September and
November 2014 and a contextualised political economy and conict analysis and overview of education
sector inequalities as well as policy and program responses based on the review of government and donor
policy and strategy documents, reports, academic literature, and education statistics. Following the desk
review and initial visit to Juba in November 2014, the research team developed a broad methodological
framework outlining key education governance and policy areas:
1. Educational inequalities (e.g. access, resources, outcomes)
2. Macro reforms (e.g. decentralization, privatisation)
3. Horizontal and vertical dimensions of integration and social cohesion
4. Teacher policies and practices
5. Youth policies and programs
6. Context-specic issues (e.g. refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs), links to peace and
reconciliation processes)
Quantitative analysis of secondary statistical data
Quantitative data analysis provided information on the nature and trends of educational inequalities at
the national and subnational (state and county) level in South Sudan between 2009 and 2013. Existing
statistical micro-data on education, socioeconomic conditions, and conict was analyzed with South Sudan’s
Education Management Information System (EMIS)2 providing data on educational access, resources, and
outcomes for 2009-2013 (the most recent validated data available at the time of publication). In 2013, EMIS
coverage rates3 were above 90 per cent for both primary and secondary schools (see Table 3). Population
and socioeconomic data were obtained from the fth Sudan Population and Housing Census of 2008 and
population projections of the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). However, national and sub-
national EMIS trends must be interpreted with caution: key indicators on education access might be affected
by political instability and conict as well as under-estimation of 20084 population census data (on which
enrolment rate estimates are based) and potential over-estimation of enrolment in EMIS data.5 Conict
data for 2011-2014 at both the state and county level were obtained from the Uppsala Conict Data Program
(UCDP) and the Armed Conict Location and Event Data project (ACLED).6 While EMIS and census data
precede the current civil war (with 2014 and 2015 EMIS data unavailable at the time of analysis), identied
inequities reveal social, political, economic, and cultural pressures potentially linked to the emergence of
the current conict.
2 EMIS data was extracted in November 2014 from the MoEST website (http://www.southsudanemis.org/data). Inconsistencies
in the available data were claried with support from EMIS personnel.
3 Coverage rate refers to the percentage of known schools (schools identied and entered into the EMIS database) reached and
accounted for in the data (MoEST, 2014a).
4 Census data was extracted in January 2015 from the Minnesota Population Center IPUMS website (https://international.ipums.
org/international/), the world’s largest archive of publicly available census microdata.
5 Census and EMIS data limitations were identied during discussions with NBS and MoEST representatives, respectively. 2008
population census under-estimations are due to huge population movement during the data collection period, with the return of
South Sudanese from neighbouring countries. School managers or local authorities may inate EMIS student enrolment gures
in order to obtain additional teachers and resources.
6 UCDP data was extracted in March 2015 from the UCDP website (http://www.ucdp.uu.se/), which provides annual data on
state-based armed conict, non-state conict, and one-sided violence. ACLED Version 5 data was extracted in May 2015 from the
ACLED website (http://www.acleddata.com/data/), which provides event data on political violence between state and non-state
actors.

9
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
Table 3. EMIS coverage rate by education sector for 2009-13
Primary education Secondary education
2009 2013 2009 2013
Number of schools 3,221 3,766 158 236
Coverage rate (%) 95 98.2 90 93.3
Source: EMIS 2009, 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
Qualitative data collection
Qualitative data collection took place between December 2014 and August 2015, through in-depth interviews
and focus group discussions with approximately 200 participants. National level, in-depth interviews were
conducted with ofcials from various MoEST directorates and other relevant ministries (e.g. MoCYS,
MoGCSW), and representatives of international and national education and peacebuilding actors. In sub-
national sites, interviews and group discussions were conducted with ofcials from state ministries of
education and county and payam education ofces, national and international education and peacebuilding
actors, youth organisations, and primary and secondary school managers, teachers, PTA members, and
students (see Table 4). Prior to data collection, ethical approval was obtained from the University of Sussex
Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities Cross-School Research Ethics Committee. South Sudan’s central
MoEST approved the study as part of the country research clearance process, and researchers adhered
to UNICEF’s Ethical Guidelines on research with children. Informed consent, either written or verbal, was
obtained from participants after explaining measures to protect their condentiality and anonymity (see
Appendix 4 for data collection documents). No identifying information (e.g. name, position, location) is
included in this report or shared with any person outside the research team.
Table 4. Summary of research participants
Participants Female Male Total
Central MoEST ofcials 3 14 17
Other ministry ofcials 4 7 11
State MoEST ofcials 5 11 16
County education
ofcials
0 10 10
Payam education
ofcials
14 5
School managers 2 79
Teachers, union
representatives, and
PTA members
23 30 53
Students and youth
representatives
25 27 52
Education partner
representatives
820 28
Civil society
representatives
336
Peacebuilding actors 2 810
Total 76 141 217

10
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
2.2 Research sites
Data collection sites were selected with the aim of representing diverse geographic, demographic, and
conict contexts, although initial site selection as well as follow-up visits to certain sites was affected by
on-going violence during the eldwork period. Data was collected from seven sites in ve states: Juba in
Central Equatoria state (CES), Yambio in Western Equatoria state (WES), Wau in Western Bahr el Ghazal state
(WBG), Kuajok and Tonj East in Warrap state (WS), and Malakal and Wau Shilluk in Upper Nile state (UNS)
(see Figure 1 for a map of South Sudan). These represent diverse geographic, demographic, and conict
contexts, reecting a range of perspectives and experiences of inequality, conict, and education. Table 5
provides some descriptive gures illustrating differences in poverty, conict events, education access and
resources, and ethnicity in the study states and counties, although correlations between these indicators are
not analyzed. Detailed descriptions of the research sites are located in Appendix 1.
Figure 1: Map of South Sudan

11
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
Table 5. County proles for selected research sites
Education indicators (primary schools)
County State Ethnic
majority
Poverty
rate
20087
# conict
events
2011-14
Gender
parity
index
Student-
teacher
ratio
Student-
class
ratio
Drinking
water
access
Latrine
access
Juba CES Bari 36 186 0.93 56.6 61.4 53.5 70.4
Malakal UNS Shilluk 12 86 1.05 42.2 93 15.4 61.4
Maiwut UNS Nuer 27 5 0.58 111.6 502 10.5 15.8
Gogrial
West
WS Dinka 63 15 0.46 28.3 123.4 50.4 47.9
Tonj
East
WS Dinka 67 3 0.29 45.6 218.4 21.6 21.6
Wau WBG Fertit, Jur-
Chol
41 36 0.85 40.8 71.7 46.4 58.3
Yambio WES Azande 38 5 0.85 33 404 38.2 63.2
Source: 2008 Census (Minnesota Population Center, 2015), EMIS (MoEST, 2015e), ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010)
Data analysis and validation
Drawing on a template coding approach, the eld researcher analyzed qualitative data, including interview
transcripts and notes. Themes and sub-themes were identied through the analysis of a sample of data,
and were then used to organize the remaining data for more in-depth analysis (see Crabtree & Miller, 1999).
From April to August 2015, reections on the data were shared during discussions with UNICEF, MoEST, and
University of Juba representatives. Final research ndings and recommendations were reviewed during
two national validation workshops held in August 2015 and feedback obtained from ministry and partner
representatives during a workshop held in collaboration with UNICEF, MoEST, civil society and university
(faculty and student) representatives, the Centre for Peace and Development Studies, and the University
of Juba. The research report was revised based on feedback from validation workshops, and was nalized
following a peer review process involving the University of Sussex, University of Juba, UNICEF South
Sudan, and UNICEF ESARO.
2.3 Research partnerships and capacity development
Fieldwork for this study would not have been possible without the support of the UNICEF South Sudan
Country Ofce and MoEST, at both the national and state level. Both institutions facilitated access to research
sites and research participants, and also provided feedback on emerging ndings during the validation
process. The Centre for Peace and Development Studies at the University of Juba was also a key research
partner and provided feedback and support during the data analysis and validation processes.
Training workshops on qualitative and quantitative research approaches were facilitated in order to contribute
to national-level capacity development as part of the research process, and following a request for support
from MoEST’s Peacebuilding Reference Committee. A qualitative research training workshop organized
in collaboration with MoEST representatives and facilitated by the University of Sussex eld researcher
and UNICEF South Sudan’s PBEA personnel was held in Juba in July 2015. Participants included MoEST
and MoCYS representatives from the Peacebuilding Reference Committee and ofcials from facilitating
knowledge exchange between the research team and MoEST, and exploring different ways in which ministry
ofcials in different directorates can engage in policy-oriented research activities.
7 According to the 2008 Sudan Population and Housing Census, the poverty rate refers to the estimated percentage of the
population in each county or state with per person consumption below the poverty line (72.9 Sudanese pounds, SDG) (NBS,
2012).

12
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
2.4 Research limitations
Certain limitations should be noted when considering the research ndings. This research aims to present
a comprehensive description and discussion of how education sector management and governance
contributes to inequality and conict as well as to equity and peacebuilding in South Sudan. The validity
of the data is strengthened by the triangulation of data and methods through the inclusion of diverse
perspectives (e.g. government ofcials, partners, teachers, students) across multiple sites and the use
of multiple data collection methods, including individual interviews, group discussions, literature and
policy review, and secondary quantitative analysis. This research is not an assessment or evaluation of the
outcomes of particular education policies or programs.
While the research sites represent diverse geographic, demographic, and conict contexts, site selection
was affected by ongoing violence during the eldwork period. Data was collected in one state (Upper Nile)
affected by ongoing government-opposition violence involving government representatives and members
of displaced communities, but for security reasons, it was not possible to visit opposition-held areas.
Interviews with representatives of organisations working in opposition-held communities provided some
insight into challenges faced. Education service provision and governance in these areas is likely markedly
different from other areas in South Sudan.
It is important to note that the signicant diversity of experiences and perspectives across and within
communities in South Sudan has shaped the responses provided by research participants and also limited
the generalizability of ndings. Perceptions, experiences, and expectations of education services may
differ widely between ethnic, linguistic, religious, geographic, or livelihoods communities between South
Sudanese who have returned from East Africa, Sudan, North America, or Europe, and those who remained
in South Sudan prior to and after the CPA and independence. Additionally, as in all research, it is possible
that some participants may have provided the answers that they thought the researchers expected. In order
to address this limitation, measures taken to ensure condentiality and anonymity were explained to each
participant, and efforts were made to maximize their sense of safety and comfort during interviews (for
example, taking hand-written notes rather than audio-recording the interview if a participant expressed any
hesitation about recording).
This report does not quantify participant responses by indicating the number or percentage of participants
who raised a particular point. While this can be of interest when examining qualitative research results,
calculating the frequency of responses across both individual interviews and group discussions involving
multiple individuals, and across semi-structured interviews and discussions during which different questions
were discussed, presented challenges. Ultimately, even concerns or suggestions raised by one or two
participants are considered to be of value and signicance in the context of this research. Efforts were made
to note when particular points were raised by broader participant sub-groups, such as students, teachers,
payam or county ofcials, and so on, and to note the state in which participants raising location-specic
points were based, although without providing information that could enable participant identication.

Caption: © UNICEF/ Girls Learning in School, South Sudan, 2015.

14
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
CHAPTER 3. CONFLICT,
PEACEBUILDING, AND EDUCATION
IN SOUTH SUDAN
3.1 Chapter introduction
This chapter provides the context for the research in South Sudan, describing historical and current conict
dynamics, approaches to governance and social services in peacebuilding processes, and the history of
the education system in South Sudan, including the use of education as a mechanism of colonial and post-
colonial governance and exclusion. The current structure, policy context, and nancing of the education
system are also examined, providing some background to the broader political and economic dynamics
reected in the education sector.
3.2 Conict and peacebuilding in South Sudan
History of conict in South Sudan
The history of violent conict in South Sudan is clearly linked to patterns of marginalization, exploitation,
and inequity. From 1899 to 1955, during Sudan’s Anglo-Egyptian colonial period, development favoured the
north, with minimal administrative presence, infrastructure, or resources in the south. Following Sudan’s
independence in 1956, the south was largely excluded from political processes (Johnson, 2003; Young,
2012). The northern government attempted to legitimize and enforce state control and ‘national’ identity
through the imposition of Arabic language and Islamic religion and law. In the 1960s and 1980s, ties with
Arab states, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, inuenced the promotion of Islamist and Arab nationalist
ideologies (Ayers, 2010; Deng, 1995; de Waal, 2007; Johnson, 2003; Medani, 2012). Armed conict broke
out between north and south in 1955 following the Anyanya I rebellion among southern soldiers, linked
to interconnected factors including political exclusion, economic marginalization, and southern exclusion
from ‘national’ identity (Deng, 1995; de Waal, 2007; Rolandsen, 2011; Young, 2012). The politicization and
mobilization of religious, ethnic, and geographic identity in conict over political and economic power,
resources, and opportunities (Ayers, 2010; Johnson, 2003) also played a role in the conict.
The signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement resulted in the creation of an autonomous southern region
(encompassing the Greater Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile regions) and some (limited) reform
and development (Young, 2012). The northern government revoked the agreement in 1983 following the
discovery oil in the south, triggering armed rebellion in the south (Medani, 2012; Young, 2012). The Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by Dr John Garang, emerged as the dominant rebel force,
ghting for control of land and oil resources in the south and north/south border areas. From the 1990s, the
United States supported the SPLM/A, inuenced by security and counter-terrorism agendas (with Sudan
considered a centre of ‘Islamism’ in the Horn of Africa), economic interests (including oil), and evangelical
Christian lobbies, and provided military support to SPLM/A allies such as Ethiopia and Uganda (Autesserre,
2002; Ayers, 2010; de Waal, 2004; Young, 2012). Fighting also occurred between forces within the south,
including between SPLM/A factions that split in the early 1990s due to disagreement over leadership and
political agendas. Armed groups targeted civilians through mass killings, often along ethnic lines, and also
diverted or blocked humanitarian aid from opposition areas (Autesserre, 2002; de Waal, 2013; Young, 2012).
In 2005, following decades of war during which an estimated 2.5 million people died and 4.6 million
were displaced (Knopf, 2013), the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA), which focused on power sharing, oil revenue, and security arrangements during a six-
year transitional period. The process was led by the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD), which includes Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, and was supported and inuenced by the US and
allies Britain and Norway. The CPA legitimized the SPLM as the ruling party and the SPLA as the ofcial
army, while excluding other actors and paying limited attention to justice, human rights, and reconciliation
(Rolandsen, 2011; Selby, 2013; Young, 2012). This represented the constitution of a political authority based
on power imbalances (one-party dominance), heavily centralized authority, and militarized administrative
institutions characterized by coercion and force rather than trust (African Union, 2014; De Waal, 2014; Knopf,
2013). This has inuenced existing governance structures, including within the education sector.

15
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
The semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was formed in 2005, and the Government of
the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) established when South Sudan became independent following the 2011
referendum. Tensions between Sudan and South Sudan persist, linked to border demarcation and security,
oil revenues (South Sudanese oil is exported through Sudanese pipelines), citizenship rights, cross-border
population movement (and associated conict involving ‘pastoralist’ communities), and mutual accusations
of support to rebel forces (Bennett et al., 2010; Jok, 2013; Kimenyi, 2012). North-south conict was linked
to internal conict dynamics in the south, which have persisted since the CPA, including the mobilization
of ethnic communities by different SPLM/A factions (and other southern forces) and mass violence against
civilians, often along ethnic lines (Ayers, 2010; Jok, 2013; Young, 2012).
Current conict dynamics
Violent conict has persisted across South Sudan since the CPA, including ghting between government and
non-state ‘rebel’ forces, and inter-group or communal conict, including between ‘pastoralist’ communities.
Tensions at both the national and local level are linked to inequitable distribution of government power
and resources (especially oil revenues), border demarcation, economic and natural resource access and
control, and inadequate services and economic opportunities (Bennett et al., 2010; Knopf, 2013; Pedersen
& Bazilian, 2014; Schomerus & Allen, 2010; Sudd Institute, 2014; Young, 2012). Increased pressures on land,
social services, and economic opportunities have resulted from the post-CPA return of over 1.5 million South
Sudanese from neighbouring countries as well as internal displacement due to internal conict and natural
crises occurring since 2005 (Bennett et al., 2010; Pantuliano et al., 2008). Anger and trauma are also linked to
violence against civilians perpetrated by southern groups (including SPLM/A factions) during the previous
civil war, which were not addressed by the CPA (HRW, 2014).
Conict between government and opposition forces has persisted in South Sudan since 2005 (ACLED, 2015).
Tensions have persisted in South Sudan between southern militia (rebel) leaders and the SPLM/A over
concerns about political, geographic, and ethnic representation, which were not effectively addressed by the
CPA (Knopf, 2013; Sudd Institute, 2014). Following the CPA and independence, the government has reached
agreements with certain rebel groups and leaders (such as the David Yau Yau’s South Sudan Democratic
Movement/Army-Cobra Faction in Jonglei state), including agreements on administrative control and/or
integration into the SPLA (ICG, 2014; Sudd Institute, 2014).
In mid-2013, President Salva Kiir dismissed Vice President Riek Machar, as well as other key government and
party gures including the SPLM Secretary General. This was prompted by competition for party leadership
ahead of elections scheduled for 2015 (Knopf, 2013; Rolandsen, 2015; Sudd Institute, 2014). Violence broke out
in Juba, the national capital, in December 2013, and quickly spread to other states, primarily north-eastern
Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states. Some blame the violence on an attempted coup while others refer to
attempts to silence government rivals (ICG, 2014), along with weak state institutions, power imbalances, and
militarisation of government institutions (African Union, 2014), illustrating the effects of the post-CPA type of
political authority on current conict. While the conict involves some ethnic dimensions with Dinka forces
largely loyal to Kiir and many Nuer forces joining Machar’s SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), it is also rooted
in competition for power and long-standing divisions within the SPLM/A and members of diverse ethnic
groups, who have been mobilized by government and opposition forces. (In the 1990s, Machar headed a
faction that split from, and later re-joined, the SPLM/A). Numerous armed groups are active in different
states – some are aligned with government or opposition forces, and some are not (ICG, 2014; Johnson,
2014; Rolandsen, 2015; Sudd Institute, 2014).
Armed conict concentrated in the oil-rich Upper Nile and Unity states continues where armed forces have
been ghting for the control of state capitals and oil-producing areas. Civilians (including children) have
been targeted through abductions, destruction of villages, sexual violence, and killings, including on the
basis of ethnic and political allegiances (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014; Sudd Institute, 2014).
This has resulted in massive population displacement. As of August 2015, approximately 1.6 million people
had been displaced within South Sudan and over 615,000 had ed to neighbouring countries (UNHCR,
2015). Humanitarian activities have been obstructed with armed forces targeting humanitarian property and
personnel (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014).
The government and SPLM-IO signed multiple ceasere agreements between January 2014 and August 2015,
following IGAD-led negotiations in Addis Ababa, although neither party has adhered to the agreements.
In August 2015, both parties signed an Agreement on the Resolution of the Conict, which focuses on
transitional power sharing and security arrangements. This largely replicates pre-2013 structures, and omits

16
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
clear responses to underlying conict dynamics. The US, UK, Norway, European Union, and China have
supported the peace process, linked to regional security and economic (especially oil) interests. Uganda and
Kenya’s involvement in peace processes reects economic interests in the country, and Ugandan military
support reects long-standing ties with the SPLM/A. On its part, Sudan has reportedly provided assistance
to the SPLM-IO (ICG, 2014).
In addition to conict between government and non-state forces, communities in South Sudan are affected
by ‘local’ inter-group or communal conict involving over 100 ethnic and communal militia groups (ACLED,
2015), which increased with high fatalities after 2005. This includes conict between ‘pastoralist’ 8 (cattle-
keeping) and farming communities and between cattle-keeping groups linked to disputes over local borders,
resource (e.g. land, water) access and control, and cattle raiding and reprisal attacks (Bennett et al., 2010;
Knopf, 2013; Schomerus & Allen, 2010; Young, 2012). Local violence is often described as ‘ethnic’ conict,
taking place between particular tribes, sections, or clans. There are approximately 64 main ethno-linguistic
groups in South Sudan (and signicantly more when sub-groups, such as sections or clans are counted).
The four largest groups (Dinka, Nuer, Zande, and Bari) represent roughly 65 per cent of the population and
the largest 10 groups (including Shilluk, Otuho, Luo, Moru, Mandari, Didinga, and Toposa) represent roughly
80 per cent (Marshall, 2006; Power & Simpson, 2011).
However, purely ‘ethnic’ explanations of conict are overly simplistic and misleading, reecting limited
attention to the structural patterns of marginalization reected in political institutions and policies, the
impacts of environmental pressures (e.g. delayed rainfall) and economic pressures (e.g. rising dowry costs),
and trauma resulting from many decades of conict. The role of political instrumentalization of group
identities and allegiances linked to broader political and conict dynamics (including the mobilization of
community members by politicians or militia leaders on the basis of grievances linked to ethnic or geographic
marginalization) in this conict should also be taken into consideration. These pressures for conict are of
critical importance in discussions of educational inequalities, governance, conict, and peacebuilding.
Peace- and state-building approaches
Early peacebuilding frameworks, beginning with the CPA, focused on north-south conict and its perceived
root causes, with little attention to ‘internal’ conict dynamics. State and peace-building efforts were
rooted in this north-south understanding of conict with little attention to internal grievances over political
representation and governance of resource access. The 2005 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) ‘Framework
for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication’, developed by the United Nations and World
Bank in collaboration with the SPLM and Government of Sudan guided the implementation of the CPA. The
2008-2011 ‘Sustaining Peace through Development’ Plan developed by the Government of National Unity
and GoSS (GoNU & GoSS, 2008) built on both CPA and JAM priorities. In addition to security arrangements,
these plans prioritized strengthening governance through institutional reform, including a focus on
decentralization, resource management, and accountability (CPA, 2005; GoNU & GoSS, 2008; JAM, 2005).
They also emphasised expansion of basic services, including education, suggesting that access to education
itself would support peace and state-building by providing a ‘peace dividend’, rather than examining links
between governance and education service delivery (GoNU & GoSS, 2008; JAM, 2005), including attention
to the ways in which the education system had previously been used, as a tool of political control and
marginalization (Briedlid, 2010).
These priorities have been echoed by national peace and reconciliation bodies established in South Sudan
since independence, including the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission (SSPRC), established
in 2011, and the church-led Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation (CNHPR), established
in 2013.9
8 Some potentially problematic issues with the term ‘pastoralist’ must be acknowledged. The term is often used to indicate broad
ethnic origin, with less attention to people’s actual (and changing) livelihoods. Research participants generally used ‘pastoralist’
to refer to cattle-keeping and herding communities, although communities may shift between pastoralist and agro-pastoralist
livelihood activities. Many cattle-keeping communities in South Sudan are also engaged in small-scale agriculture (FAO, 2012).
9 The government established the SSPRC as an independent body to oversee peacebuilding policies and initiatives, advise national
and international peacebuilding actors, and develop local peacebuilding capacity (Ministr y of Justice, 2012; SSPRC, 2013). The
CNHPR was established by presidential mandate in 2013, operating as an independent body intended to strengthen intergroup
relations, transform individual and community ‘mind-sets’, and develop more inclusive institutions (CNHPR, 2013). The CNHPR
replaced the former National Reconciliation Committee, led by Riek Machar. A National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation
(NPPR) was established in 2014, composed of the SSPRC, CNHPR, and the Specialised Committee for Peace and Reconciliation
(based in the National Legislative Assembly and responsible for overseeing development and implementation of legislation on
peace and reconciliation) (NPPR, 2014).

17
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
They have emphasized the importance of ‘good governance’ including decentralization and accountability,
and access to education services (CNHPR, 2013; SSPRC, 2013), with no explicit consideration of the ways
in which governance of social services can contribute to conict pressures or to addressing root causes
of violence. Similarly, these issues have been neglected in the 2012 Peacebuilding Support Plan guiding
United Nations10 actions, which includes a focus on inclusive political settlements as well as basic service
(including education) delivery systems (UNESC, 2012).
3.3 History of education in South Sudan
Development of education in South Sudan
The history of education in South Sudan reects patterns of political, economic, and cultural marginalization
by colonial and post-independence Sudanese governments. These include minimal investment in and
development of education, the imposition of an Arabic-language, Islamic religious curriculum, and closure of
non-government (missionary) schools, which had provided most education services in the south. Education
was used as a tool of power, representing an approach to population repression and control that supported
the broader political, economic, and social marginalization of the south (Breidlid, 2010, 2013). The use of
education as a tool of political power, and resulting inequalities in educational services between Sudan’s
north and south (see Table 6), led to feelings of resentment, alienation, and exclusion among southern
Sudanese, contributing to the outbreak of conict in both the rst and second civil wars.
Table 6. Educational indicators in Sudan in 1960 and 1972-83
Educational
level
1960 1972-83
North South Total North South Total
Primary schools
Primary
enrolment
- - - 1,349,000 143,000 1,492,000
# of primary
schools
- - - 5,343 809 6,152
Primary
teachers
- - - 39,188 3,432 42,620
# of
intermediate
schools
249 21 270 1, 378 96 1,474
Boys’
schools
194 20 214 - - -
Girls’
schools
55 156 - - -
# of
secondary
schools
68 3 71 199 15 214
Boys’
schools
49 2 51 - - -
Girls’
schools
14 014 - - -
Commercial/
technical
schools
513
# of
universities
404 3,499 29 3,528
Source: Oduho & Deng, 1963, cited in Deng, 2003; Yongo-Bure, 1993, cited in Deng, 2003
10 The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established in 2011 (replacing the UN Mission in Sudan, established
in 2005), mandated to consolidate peace and security (UNSC, 2011).

18
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
Education became a site of resistance in terms of language of instruction (English or southern languages)
and curriculum content (secular or Christian) (Breidlid, 2010; Deng, 2003; Sommers, 2005). The SPLM/A
established a Secretariat of Education and developed an education policy and curriculum in 2002 for regions
under their control. Education policies were viewed as central to the establishment of a more inclusive
national identity, although lack of resources restricted implementation (Breidlid, 2013; Brophy, 2003;
Kevlihan, 2007; Sommers, 2005).
From 1989 to 2003, international support for education was coordinated through the UNICEF-led Operation
Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a UN-NGO consortium (Sommers, 2005; UNICEF, 2008), although system-level support
to education was limited and services were fragmented and restricted primarily to SPLM/A-controlled areas
(Brophy, 2003; Kevlihan, 2007; Sommers, 2005). Subsequent donor initiatives focusing on education access
and enrolment included the USAID-led Sudan Basic Education Program launched in 2002, and the UNICEF-
led Go-to-School initiative, launched in 2006, while additional initiatives focused on promoting girls’
education (Culver et al., 2010; Sommers, 2005). Under CPA power-sharing protocols, GoSS was identied
as the southern education authority and a national Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST)
established. Between 2005 and 2013, primary school enrolment increased from roughly 700,000 to nearly
over 1.3 million, and secondary school enrolment increased from 17,000 to 47,000 (see Table 7) (MoEST,
2014a; World Bank, 2012). However, decades of conict resulted in high numbers of out-of-school children
and youth; prior to the outbreak of conict in 2013, between 1 million and 1.3 million primary school-aged
children were out of school (Watkins, 2013; World Bank, 2012).
Table 7. Primary, secondary, and AES enrolment by state in 2005, 2013, and 2015 11
2005 2013 2015
Prim. Sec. AES Prim. Sec. AES Prim. Sec. AES
CES 95,261 150,629
(153,718)
7,403 14,988
(15,472)
194,230 25,506 12,673
EES 51,233 94,876
(95,370)
4,655 3,816
(3,325)
112,041 4,369 4,179
107,144 205,389 2,039 22,274 - - -
Lakes 82,206 97,894
(98,264)
949 26,256
(23,276)
128,949 3,049 21,819
NBG 72,984 161,425
(162,788)
4,621 43,974
(38,045)
191,772 5,824 31,735
Unity 53,935 99,488 1,771 38,393 - - -
UNS 88,523 177,583 10,467 21,235 - - -
Warrap 87,998 182,997
(183,231)
4,218 12,568
(10,051)
203,186 6,054 13,382
WBG 29,146 58,735 5,726 10,380
(9,952)
83,727 6,755 10,616
WES 40,579 82,451
(82,556)
4,718 14,686
(12,751)
91,457 5,444 12,434
Total 700,448 1,311,467
(834,662)
46,567 208,570
(112,872)
1,005,362 58,928 106,838
Sources: GoSS & UNICEF, 2005; MoEST, 2014a, 2015c
The current conict has hugely disrupted the education sector. As of May 2015, 70 per cent of schools
in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile were non-functional, an estimated 13,000 children and adolescents had
been recruited or abducted by government or opposition forces, and roughly 400,000 previously-enrolled
students were out of school due to school closure, displacement, and chronic insecurity (UNICEF, 2015a,
2015b) (see Table 7). Children and youth in conict-affected areas have lost nearly two years of education
since ghting broke out between government and opposition forces in 2013. Substantial resources have
been diverted from development to humanitarian response, resulting in signicant short- and long-term
education development consequences.
11 Figures in parentheses represent updated 2013 enrolment numbers cited in the 2015 education statistics report (MoEST, 2015c).

19
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
National policy context
South Sudan’s education policies and strategies, including the 2012 General Education Act and the General
Education Strategic Plan (GESP) for 2012-2017, have been developed within a broader national legal and
policy context based on the 2011 Transitional Constitution, the Vision 2040 national planning strategy,
and the 2011-2013 South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), and within a global policy context based on
Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Transitional Constitution and
General Education Act guarantee the right to free primary education and to equitable education services
free from discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, religion, ability, or health status (GoSS,
2011b; GRSS, 2012a). The GESP draws on Vision 2040 and SSDP objectives (GoSS, 2011a; GRSS, 2011),
focusing on enhancing education access and quality, increasing enrolment and gender equity in education,
improving learning outcomes, infrastructure development, curriculum and textbook development, teacher
recruitment and development, strengthening leadership and management, and promoting partnership
between government and development partners (GRSS, 2012a). The Implementation of GESP priorities has
been limited by low resources, unrealistic timelines, and lack of clear objectives and indicators (National
Education Forum & Local Education Group, 2012; Sigsgaard, 2013). A new General Education Sector Policy
Framework is currently being developed.

20
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Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
3.4 Contemporary education system management and governance
Education system in South Sudan
MoEST is responsible for the development and provision of education services in South Sudan. The Ministry
includes seven directorates and one secretariat: Directorates of Planning and Budgeting, Administration
and Finance, General Education, Alternative Education Systems, Technical and Vocational Education, Quality
Promotion and Innovation (which includes Departments of Curriculum Development, Teacher Education and
Training, and National Languages), and Gender Equity and Social Change (which includes Departments
of Girls’ Education and Inclusive Education), and the Secretariat of Examinations. A proposed MoEST
restructuring includes three new secretariats: National Curriculum, National and Foreign Languages, and
Teaching Service, Training and Management. South Sudan’s education system includes primary education,
secondary education, technical and vocational education and training (TVET), the alternative education
system (AES), and early childhood development. The formal education system includes eight years of
primary education (P1 to P8) and four years of secondary education (S1 to S4).
South Sudan’s ten states 12 are divided into counties, which are further divided into payams and bomas.
Based on the 2009 Local Government Act, South Sudan’s education system is meant to be decentralized,
involving a central MoEST, state education ministries, county education departments (CEDs), and payam
education ofces. The central MoEST is responsible for the formulation of national education policies and
guidelines, strategies and standards, and curricula, the development of annual budgets, and the management
of teacher training institutions (TTIs) and national secondary schools. State ministries are responsible for
implementation and resource distribution at the state level, including delivery of secondary education and
TVET. CEDs are responsible for the delivery of primary and alternative education in collaboration with payam
ofces (GoSS, 2009, 2010; GRSS, 2012a; MoEST, 2014c; RSS, 2012; World Bank, 2012). School governing
bodies are responsible for school management. Each school is required to have a parent teacher association
(PTA) and a school management committee (primary schools) or board of governors (secondary schools)
responsible for school management, plans and budgets (DFID-GESS, 2014). See Appendix 2 for proposed
education sector roles and responsibilities.
The way in which power is negotiated shapes the governance of institutions, and inuence of (informal)
political bargaining and settlements on the functioning of the education sector must be considered. The
Sudanese-based National Congress Party was responsible for the post-CPA MoEST in South Sudan. Under
the rst independent government in 2011, the now-dissolved United Sudan African Party was responsible
for the Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI), 13 while the SPLM controlled key ministries
of cabinet affairs, national security, defence, foreign affairs, and nance (Africa Condential, 2011; Stephen,
2010), which have the highest budgets. The limited power and resources accorded to the education ministry
may signify that it is more likely to be ‘given’ to opposition parties, which is of particular interest given
ongoing transitional power-sharing negotiations. According to the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution
of the Conict (IGAD, 2015), the SPLM, SPLM-IO, and other political parties will select ministries on a rotating
basis from three clusters: governance (e.g. national security); economic (e.g. nance); and service delivery
(e.g. education). The education ministry may be among the last selected, due to its limited resources, may
be allocated fewer government resources, and perceived as less legitimate at central and local levels if it is
under the control of the political opposition.
Education sector nancing
Since 2006, education sector allocations have accounted for between 5 per cent and 8 per cent of total
government spending in South Sudan, with an even smaller proportion of allocated funds actually disbursed;
in 2013-14, less than 60 per cent of funds allocated to the education sector were actually disbursed (MoFCIEP,
2014). This is lower than education sector allocations in other East African countries (UNESCO, 2014; World
Bank, 2013b), and much lower than the Global Partnership for Education recommended amount of 20 per
cent of the overall government budget (National Education Forum & Local Education Group, 2012).
12 In October 2015, president Salva Kiir issued Establishment Order Number 36/2015, which divided the existing 10 states into 28
new states, drawn largely along ethnic lines (Radio Tamazuj, 3 October, 2015).
13 The post-CPA MoEST became the MoGEI in 2011, and was restructured as the MoEST in 2013. The August 2015 Agreement
refers to a Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI).

21
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In 2014-2015, 5 per cent of the national budget was allocated to the education sector (SSP 603,643,900; USD
203,933,750) ,14 while 49 per cent went to the rule-of-law and security sectors. Security has been allocated
the majority of government funds since 2006, with the majority going to salaries of armed forces. In 2013-
2014, actual security sector spending was nearly 20 per cent higher than the allocated budget (MoFCIEP,
2014). Education spending is focused on primary education, with nearly half the education budget (47 per
cent) allocated to basic education in 2014-2015 (see Table 8). Nearly all education funds (85 per cent in 2014-
2015) are allocated to recurrent costs including salaries and operating costs (MoFCIEP, 2014).
Table 8. Approved education sector budget allocations for 2014-15 15
Allocation in SSP Allocation in USD Proportion
Basic education 281,025,867 94,941,171 47%
Post-primary 86,039,142 29,067,277 14%
AES 6,159,090 2,080,773 1%
Higher/tertiary 155,189,059 52,428,736 26%
Other 75,230,742 25,415,791 12%
Total 603,643,900 203,933,750 -
Source: MoFCIEP, 2014
South Sudan’s economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues, which accounted for roughly 98 per cent
of the national budget between 2006 and 2010 (World Bank, 2012). Revenues dropped as a result of the
global nancial crisis in 2009 and oil production was shut down in 2012 following disputes with Sudan over
transit fees. This resulted in the adoption of austerity budgets, signicantly reducing funding allocations to
education. Although oil production resumed in 2013 following agreements mediated by the African Union,
nancing pressures persist due to revenue loss linked to reduced production and low global oil prices
(Knopf, 2013; Watkins, 2013; World Bank, 2013a). The current conict has had further negative economic
impacts, resulting in a projected 15 per cent drop in GDP for 2014 (Frontier Economics et al., 2015). Ongoing
ghting centred in the oil-rich Upper Nile and Unity states has further disrupted oil production and strained
relations with investors, including China (ICG, 2014). However, oil revenues continue to account for the
majority of South Sudan’s national budget, identied as the source of 80 per cent of government funds in
2014-2015 with 11 per cent from non-oil revenue (e.g. taxes, fees, customs), and 8 per cent from nancing
(external and commercial loans) (MoFCIEP, 2014).
South Sudan’s education sector relies heavily on support from donors and development partners, who
support nearly all education development. In 2013-2014, external funds accounted for roughly 30 per cent
of all education funding, focusing primarily on basic education (75 per cent of funds were allocated to
basic education and 6 per cent to alternative education). Approximately 67 per cent of donor education
funds came from bilateral donors, with 55 per cent of these from the United Kingdom (Department for
International Development, DFID), 38 per cent from the United States (US Agency for International
Development, USAID), and the remainder from Norway, Canada, and France (MoFCIEP, 2013). DFID (UK Aid)
is funding Girls’ Education South Sudan (GESS), a ve- year program that promotes girls’ education and
school development through capitation grants and cash transfers (GESS, 2014). USAID is funding Room to
Learn, which includes the establishment of community-based schools.
In 2013-2014, 31 per cent of donor education funds came from multilateral donors (92 per cent from UNICEF
and 9 per cent from the European Union), with another 2.3 per cent from the Common Humanitarian Fund
(CHF) (MoFCIEP, 2013). UNICEF’s education programs include the Global Partnership for Education (GPE),
which includes policy advocacy (e.g. curriculum development), school construction, and girls’ education,
the Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy program (PBEA), which focuses on life skills and peacebuilding
education and policy advocacy, and Education in Emergencies (UNICEF South Sudan, 2013).
14 USD amounts are calculated using the ofcial exchange rate of SSP 2.96, as cited in the 2014-15 Budget Book (MoFCIEP, 2014).
15 Post-primary education includes both secondary and TVET. ‘Other’ includes policy and systems development, capacity
strengthening and quality assurance, and support systems. USD amounts are calculated using the ofcial exchange rate of SSP
2.96, as cited in the 2014-15 Budget Book (MoFCIEP, 2014).

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The EU is funding the Improved Management of Education Delivery (IMED) program, which focuses on
planning and management capacity development of central and state ministries, as well as capitation grants.
South Sudan is a member of the GPE, which is managed by UNICEF and coordinated by UNESCO and
USAID, with funds intended to support GESP implementation (Watkins, 2013). GPE priorities for 2013-2016
include strengthening national systems, school construction and rehabilitation, curriculum development,
and girls’ education.
Overall, the education sector receives only a small proportion of international development and humanitarian
funds in South Sudan. In 2013-2014, roughly 6 per cent of donor aid was allocated to education (MoFCIEP,
2013). In the 2015 Humanitarian Response Plan for South Sudan, education funding accounted for 3 per
cent of requested funds (OCHA, 2015a). Despite advocacy efforts by the South Sudan Education Cluster
emphasising the importance of education in humanitarian response, education is generally viewed as a
long-term development goal rather than a ‘lifesaving’ service. 16
Education sector coordination
A number of mechanisms have been established to facilitate coordination between MoEST and various
education sector partners. The National Education Forum, overseen by MoEST, focuses on key sector
policies and strategies and includes all main MoEST directorates, the Ministry of Finance, education
partners, and other stakeholders. The Education Donor Group is responsible for the organisation and
coordination of donor and partner efforts, including support for education sector plan development. The
Partners for Education Group (PEG) includes international and national NGOs and CSOs, and is chaired
by MoEST. Finally, the GPE Joint Steering Committee coordinates the implementation of four major donor
projects: GPE, GESS, IMED, and Room to Learn. The Joint Sector Review (JSR), launched in 2014 with GPE
support and led by MoEST and the Ministry of Finance, evaluates education progress and sector needs
and priorities. Research participants reported that these coordination mechanisms are functioning well,
with strong MoEST involvement. However, short-term partner objectives may not fully support longer-term
education system development, and programs and materials (e.g. teacher training) developed by different
partners may not be clearly aligned (with one another or with MoEST programs) in terms of content,
duration, or target populations.
At the sub-national level, coordination mechanisms include State and County Education Forums (MoEST,
2015a). Financial monitoring and coordination mechanisms include State and County Transfers Monitoring
Committees, responsible for coordinating and monitoring the use of budget transfers and grants, and
regular budget reporting (MoEST, 2014a). However, forums and monitoring committees are not functioning
in all states or counties. At the central and state level, the South Sudan Education Cluster (SSEC), co-led by
UNICEF and Save the Children, oversees the coordination of humanitarian ‘education in emergencies’ (EiE)
activities by national and international partners. However, as discussed in Section 5.4, there are gaps in the
coordination of humanitarian and government activities in EiE contexts.
Technical working groups have been established within MoEST to focus on specic issues including gender
and girls’ education, AES, TVET, teacher education, curriculum, and national languages (MoEST, 2015b). A
Peacebuilding Technical Reference Committee involving representatives of seven directorates, MoCYS, and
UNICEF (PBEA) has also been established in MoEST. This committee is responsible for integrating conict
sensitivity and peacebuilding principles into MoEST activities and policies, although its inuence appears to
be affected by consistency in representation among ministry directorates and its engagement with external
peacebuilding bodies.
In general, there appear to be few links between the education sector and broader peacebuilding processes.
Peacebuilding actors have been involved in some education initiatives such as the involvement of peacebuilding
and reconciliation bodies in the UNICEF-MoEST Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace Conference in 2014 and
in education projects involving partner organizations supporting conict response and transformation (e.g.
UNDP). However, there does not appear to be sustained engagement between MoEST or education donors
and key peacebuilding actors (e.g. SSPRC, UNMISS) or civil society organizations working on peacebuilding
issues. Relationships between education and peacebuilding actors do not appear to be fully institutionalized
through, for example, mutual inuence on sectorial policy and strategy development.
16 Tensions between humanitarian and development goals are discussed in UNICEF ESARO’s (2015) PBEA case study on
humanitarian action, conict sensitivity and peacebuilding through education in South Sudan

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The perception among certain peacebuilding actors of education as a development activity may limit
engagement with the education sector. One national peacebuilding representative, for example, stated that
education service support must wait until some degree of peace (stability) has been secured reecting
a ‘security rst’ perspective. However, security does not necessarily lead to development or sustainable
peace (Novelli & Smith, 2011; Richmond, 2009). Limited engagement between education and peacebuilding
actors may also be linked to the view equating ‘peacebuilding’ in education with EiE activities (discussed in
more detail in Section 5.4).
The governance of education services is also affected by coordination challenges between the education
sector and other ministries. For example, the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MoGCSW) is
responsible for supporting young people with disabilities, orphans, and children living on the street, while
the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MoCYS) provides programs and support for out-of-school youth.
Both the MoCYS and Ministry of Labor are responsible for vocational training, and the Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry and Ministry of the Environment can play a key role in livelihoods training. However, the actual
degree of cross-sectoral engagement seems to vary by state and sector, and linkages are generally project-
based rather than institutionalized.

Caption: © UNICEF/ Young people playing sport in a Protection of Civilians site, South Sudan, 2015.

25
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
CHAPTER 4. EXAMINING
EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITIES IN
SOUTH SUDAN
4.1 Chapter introduction
Inequalities between groups are drawn along horizontal identity lines (e.g. religion, ethnicity, gender,
geographic or urban/rural location) and vertical socioeconomic lines (e.g. class). Such inequalities result
not only from differences in available opportunities (inequality of opportunity), but also from discrimination
of some territories or groups by decision-makers such as governments or donors (inequality of treatment).
This chapter presents the results of quantitative analysis of dimensions of educational inequalities related to
access, resources, and outcomes. It focuses on national trends and inequalities between states and counties
and also explores the level of association between the occurrence of conict and educational development
indicators at the state and county level. This quantitative analysis is integrated with qualitative discussions
of educational inequalities focusing on dimensions of inequality identied by research participants as being
connected to pressures for conict in South Sudan, including inequalities related to geographic location,
socio-economic status, livelihoods, and older youth.
Measuring inequality in education: Quantitative analysis
In this study, quantitative analysis was intended to measure and describe the nature and trends of educational
inequalities at the sub-national level in South Sudan, and to explore the association between these
inequalities and conict occurrence for the period under study. In order to capture different dimensions of
quantitative educational inequalities, the study distinguishes between inequalities of 1) access, 2) resources,
and 3) outcomes:
Access. Inequality of access often results from unequal patterns of demand for education (e.g. child labour,
pastoralist communities) and unavailability of schools in a particular area (e.g. distance to school). In this
study, three key indicators of access inequality are examined: gross enrolment rates (GER), net enrolment
rates (NER), and gender parity index (GPI). 17
Resources. Resource distribution is an important source of inequality in lower-income and conict-affected
countries. Schools with inadequate provision of teachers, materials, or infrastructure face greater difculties
in ensuring effective student learning opportunities. Indicators such as student-teacher ratios or school
facilities represent proxies to measure whether resources (material and human) have actually reached
schools in particular areas. In this study, four key indicators of resource inequality are examined: student-
teacher ratio, student-classroom ratio, school access to drinking water, and school access to latrines. 18
Outcomes. Inequality of outcomes refers to the unequal capability of students to make the most of available
educational opportunities. Unequal outcomes usually result from the combined effect of inequalities in
quantity, quality, and relevance of educational provision. While often referred to as ‘efciency indicators’,
outcome indicators used in this study include promotion, repetition, and dropout rates, although these
indicators are not very reliable and are difcult to interpret due to inconsistencies in data reporting by
schools and cohort size effects. In this study, the percentage of students enrolled in the last grades of primary
(P7 and P8) was used as the key outcome indicator. High attrition rates in South Sudan reect the inability of
many students to complete primary education. The percentage of students in P7 and P8 can be interpreted
as a measure of the real opportunities available to students to complete primary education.
17 Both GER and NER indicate general levels of participation in education. GER considers the total number of students of all
ages in a specic grade level, while NER considers only students of ofcial school age (6 to 13 for primary education) enrolled at
appropriate age and grade level. The GPI measures the relative access to education of males and females, expressed as a ratio of
girls to boys, with 1 indicating perfect equality and values lower than 1 indicating lower female participation.
18 Student ratios measure the level of human resources (e.g. teachers) and facilities (e.g. classrooms) available to students. The
higher the value of the ratio, the lower the access to resources.

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Understandings of inequality: Qualitative perspectives
During interviews and group discussions, participants spoke of educational inequalities perceived as linked
to conict and violence. They referred primarily to inequality in terms of access, retention, and performance
of children and youth, particularly girls and older youth, with a focus on those living in poverty, hard-to-
reach rural areas, and cattle-keeping (pastoralist) communities.19 For these groups, education experiences
are affected by school costs, distance from schools, household and livelihood responsibilities, and risk of
violence (e.g. gender-based violence). Geographic disparities in school infrastructure, teaching, and program
availability, as well as the (ir)relevance of formal curricula are also mitigating factors. Participants’ emphasis
on the inequalities associated with poverty, rural location, and cattle-keeping communities reect national
population demographics, and reect some of the key ndings emerging from the secondary quantitative
analysis.
Participants expressed a range of perspectives on inequality; some sub-national ofcials (state, county, and
payam authorities) and teachers, particularly in the Equatorial states, stated that there are no inequalities in
education, with no groups facing greater challenges in access to education, for example than others. As one
state-level ministry ofcial explained, there is no challenge of inequality as both girls and boys are allowed
to enter the school. In general, participants’ denitions of ‘equality’ focused on equal rights and access to
the same education services (e.g. the same curriculum), fair or equal treatment in schools (focusing on boys
and girls or children with disabilities), and equal distribution of resources to schools, payams, and counties.
“Equality in education means children [are] given chance of education equally. We do not say that, ‘These
are boys, these are girls,’ no. They [are] given equal chance” (State MoEST ofcial).
Some participants also dened equality in terms of interaction, collaboration, helping others and working
together, as well as sharing knowledge and skills. In this context, most participants described educational
inequalities as resulting from a lack of awareness of the importance of education, rather than the inequitable
distribution of education opportunities and resources or broader systems of marginalization. As one central
MoEST ofcial stated,
This place has been marginalized […] It’s actually a place that the community are not very much in
knowledge of the value for education here. So it’s very marginalized and it’s only because the community
are following much of their own tradition.
While these factors affect education access and outcomes, a narrow focus on community perceptions
or awareness can limit attention to broader inequalities (and inequities) in the distribution of education
opportunities, resources, and decision-making power. Additionally, understandings of (in)equality focused
almost exclusively on students with limited attention to teachers and signicantly less (if any) attention to
these issues at the level of management, including representation in leadership and decision-making.
4.2 Inequality of access
International comparisons illustrate the signicant challenges faced by South Sudan with respect to access
to both primary and secondary education. Economic and social development challenges combined with the
consequences of decades of conict have resulted in education access indicators well below international
averages (see Table 9). In 2013, only 42 per cent of primary school-aged children were enrolled in primary
education, and for every four boys in school there are only three girls. National education access trends
have worsened in a number of domains in recent years with data showing little improvement in access
to education in primary and secondary education and the alternative education system (see Table 10).
The total number of students in primary education declined between 2009 and 2013, as did gross and
net enrolment rates. This decline began before the current civil war, during a period of relative peace and
stability, illustrating the importance of examining factors other than conict (e.g. systemic inequalities)
affecting access to education.
19 Other disadvantaged groups, identied less frequently, include children and youth with disabilities, orphans, and children
living in the streets, reecting the signicant impact of violent conict on South Sudan’s young population. While these are key
dimensions of educational inequity, this report will focus on political, economic, and cultural dimensions which participants,
including ofcials, teachers, and students from all research sites, identied as being of greatest importance in relation to dynamics
of conict and peacebuilding.

27
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Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
Table 9: International comparison of education access by country type in 2013
Primary education Secondary education
NER Gender parity NER Gender parity
High income
countries
95.5 1.00 89.9 1.02
Middle income
countries
89.7 0.99 66.8 0.96
Low income
countries
79.9 0.94 31.6 0.83
Fragile/conict-
affected countries
74.9 0.91 36.9 0.81
South Sudan 41.5 0.75 1.9 0.73
World 89.0 0.98 66.0 0.96
Source: World Bank & EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
Table 10. National trends in education access for 2009-13
Number of students GER NER
Total Male Female GER gender
parity
NER gender
parity
Primary education
2009 1,380,580 871,804 508,776 72 0.67 48 0.73
2013 1,311,467 800,868 510,599 61.9 0.71 41.5 0.75
% change -5 -8.1 0.4 -14 5.9 -13.5 3.3
Secondary education
2009 44,027 31,977 12,050 6.2 0.44 3 0.54
2013 46,567 31,709 14,858 5.1 0.55 1.9 0.73
% change 5.8 -0.8 23.3 -17.7 25.6 -36.7 35.1
Alternative education
2009 217,239 124,959 92,280 - - - -
Source: EMIS 2009, 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
When examining enrolment statistics, it is important to note the large differences (>20 per cent) between
gross and net enrolment rates in many states, indicating a signicant proportion of over-age students.
The majority of enrolled students in South Sudan are signicantly older than ofcial school ages (6 to 13
for primary, 14 to 17 for secondary); in 2013, 87 per cent of primary students and 91 per cent of secondary
students were over-age (MoEST, 2014a).
During qualitative interviews, participants emphasized the challenges associated with the large proportion
of over-age students enrolled in primary education. Some primary school managers reported enrolment of
students of up to age 30 or 40, linked to the limited availability of alternative or adult education services.
While access to education for older youth and adults is extremely important (contributing to livelihoods
activities, increased condence, community engagement, leadership, and so on), the presence of older
youth and young children in the same class was described as negatively affecting learning and social
outcomes for all students, including reducing the likelihood that over-age students will complete primary
education and/or continue to secondary education.

28
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
Access inequalities across geographic locations
An analysis of educational inequalities between geographic regions such as states and counties in South
Sudan reveals inequalities between groups, as inequalities between locations overlap with other sources of
inequality such as ethnicity and social class. EMIS data indicated signicant differences in access indicators
between states. Enrolment rates (see Figure 2) are higher in Upper Nile, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western
Bahr el Ghazal, and Warrap, which is somewhat counterintuitive given the high levels of poverty in states
such as Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap. County-level EMIS data illustrates inequalities in gender parity
within states as well as between states (see Figure 4). Within-state differences are very important in states
such as Central Equatoria where equity of access is very low in counties such as Terekeka, one of the poorest
counties in the country.
Figure 2: Net and gross enrolment rates in primary education by state in 2013
Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
Rural/urban location represents another dimension of inequality linked to geographic region. Approximately
83 per cent of South Sudan’s population lives in rural communities (SSCCSE, 2010a). Socio-economic
indicators, such as poverty and literacy rates vary signicantly across rural and urban communities, as
outlined in Table 11, as well as across states and counties. Reliance on agriculture and cattle in rural areas
can increase the impact that livelihood responsibilities have on children’s access to education.
Table 11. Socio-economic indicators for rural and urban areas in 2008-09
Rural areas Urban areas
Primary school-aged children out
of school
58% 27%
Never attended school (age 6 and
older)
76% 49%
Literacy rate (age 15 and older) 22% 53%
Poverty rate 55% 24%
Source: SSCCSE, 2010a, 2010b; World Bank, 2012
Distance from schools is a particular barrier for remote and dispersed rural populations. Participants
reported that education services, especially secondary education and TVET, are generally concentrated in
urban areas, primarily in state capitals: “The schools from rural areas, they sit primary leaving certicate

29
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
and they do not have access to secondary schools […] There are no secondary schools open outside the
town” (State MoEST ofcial). However, even within urban centres, including Juba, secondary schools are
generally concentrated in one area, while surrounding neighbourhoods and payams have no secondary
schools (although available EMIS data does not provide concrete data on number of schools per payam).
As a result of lack of schools in rural areas and insecurity, many young people move from rural to urban
centres in order to access education. This incurs added transport and accommodation costs, putting children
at risk of living on the streets if they do not have a support structure in town, and leading to over-crowding
in schools.
Access inequalities and gender
While negative trends were observed in overall enrolment, positive patterns are observed in gender
equality. The number of girls remained stable in a period of overall enrolment reduction, resulting in a
slight improvement in gender parity in education access between 2009 and 2013, and potentially reecting
the inuence of various programs focusing on the promotion of girls’ education. In general, gender parity
may be a better indicator of access inequality than enrolment rates, as it is not affected by population
census underestimations. Gender parity comparisons across states (see Figure 3) present a different picture
from enrolment comparisons. There are wide primary-level gender disparities between states, with greater
equity in states such as Central and Western Equatoria and greater inequity in Warrap and Lakes, where
for every two boys in class there is only one girl. When comparing gender equality at the county level
(See Figure 4), there is relative gender equality in primary school access in counties such as Juba and
Kajo-Keji. Generally, central (Yirol East, Yirol West, Awerial, Terekeka) and northern counties (Gogrial West,
Gogrial East, Tonj North, Tonj East, Tonj South, Jur River) experience more signicant inequalities in access
to education between boys and girls.
Figure 3: Gender parity in primary education by state in 2013
Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
During qualitative interviews, although participants in Warrap discussed the impacts of ‘cultural’ or
‘traditional’ practices on girls’ education more frequently, participants in all states identied gender as a key
dimension of educational inequity. These include traditional gender role expectations, reproductive health
concerns (e.g. menstruation), and patterns of gender-based discrimination and gender-based violence
(GBV), including sexual harassment, ‘sex for grades’, rape in schools, and early and forced marriage. Family
nancial concerns related to dowry payment often determine girls’ access to education, as they are generally
viewed as a source of wealth for the family (particularly in cattle-keeping communities). Schooling may be
viewed as delaying marriage, resulting in lower dowry payments (younger age is associated with higher
dowry), and of increasing risk of sexual activity or violence due to contact with male students and teachers,
which would decrease girls’ perceived value. Early marriage may be linked to family poverty and efforts
to reduce the risk of sexual activity or violence (CARE, 2014), with parents (particularly in poorer families)
focusing on girls’ immediate ‘value’ (e.g. dowry wealth) rather than longer-term benets of their education.

30
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Some say, like the boys say, if they are sent to school, who will be looking after the animals? So it is
difcult. The girls, if they go to school they will get spoiled and they will lose these cows for dowry.
(Central MoEST ofcial)
[Cattle] are providing meat [and] they are giving wealth in terms of creating dowry […] to the extent that,
‘Okay, why should I educate [the] girl? When she grows up she’s going to be married and given animals.’
So not knowing that the value of this girl via education is higher than what you see as provision of cows
to the family. (State MoEST ofcial)
Figure 4: Gender parity in primary education by county in 2013
Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
Access inequalities and socio-economic status
Although a quantitative analysis of educational inequality by wealth or income was not possible with the
available data, socio-economic status was identied as a key indicator of inequality during qualitative
interviews. South Sudan’s 2011 Transitional Constitution and 2012 Education Act state that primary education
is to be compulsory and free of charge. However, families must still cover school costs such as contributions
to ‘school development funds’, examination paper fees, uniforms and materials, as well as hidden costs,
presenting signicant challenges for families and young people living in poverty. School capitation grants20
and feeding programs are intended to ease the nancial pressure on families and ensure that all children can
access schools, regardless of nancial status: “The capitation grant is building the management capacity
of the school, meaning there’s no child that can be sent home because of the registration [fees]” (Central
MoEST ofcial). While capitation grants are intended to remove school registration fees, schools continue
to collect funds (as ‘school development funds’) from parents. When families cannot cover school costs for
all children, boys are generally prioritized, and nancial concerns cause many young women and men to
drop out of school in order to earn a living by working in the market or setting up informal businesses such
as selling tea.
20 Capitation grants (GRSS and UK funded) are provided to primary and secondary schools. Grants are based on student enrolment,
and include a set amount per school (SSP 5,000 for primary, SSP 10,000 for secondary) and an amount per pupil (SSP 39 for
primary, SSP 80 for secondary) (MoEST, 2015a).

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Questions of poverty and wealth in South Sudan are very complex, and it is important to distinguish
between wealth in monetary terms and other forms of wealth, such as cattle. For example, some families
or communities may be described as unable to nancially support their children’s education, but may hold
signicant wealth in terms of cattle. In general, participant discussions of poverty and inequity focused on
monetary/nancial resources, but various forms of wealth within families and communities, and the ways
in which they may or may not be used to support education access and service provision, should also be
considered.
Access inequalities and cattle-keeping communities
As noted by participants in all states, challenges associated with school access and relevance are particularly
signicant for ‘pastoralist’ or cattle-keeping communities (FAO, 2013; Forcier, 2013). It is estimated that 70
per cent of out-of-school children in South Sudan live in pastoralist communities (Watkins, 2013) and that
over 85 per cent of the population is engaged in livestock care (FAO, 2012). There are an estimated 11 to
12 million cattle in the country, with Jonglei, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Warrap states each home to
roughly 1.6 million cattle (SSCCSE, 2010a, 2010b). Numerous groups are identied as ‘pastoralist’ groups,
including diverse Dinka, Nuer, and Mundari sections in different states and counties. The size of ‘pastoralist’
populations in different states is difcult to estimate, as cattle herding is not identied as an occupational
category in the 2008 population census, and as such, quantitative analysis of inequalities affecting these
communities was not possible.
During the dry season, cattle-keeping communities move far away from established schools to seek pasture
and water. In the rainy season, when cattle camps are established close to towns, education services
may not be available due to a general lack of schools in certain counties and payams and timetables that
overlap with cattle supervision schedules (young people are responsible for herding cattle – a very time and
labor-intensive activity. Insecurity also affects the implementation of education services, including mobile
schools.21 However, when discussing cattle-keeping communities, ministry ofcials generally cited ‘lack of
awareness’ of the importance of education as the key challenge, rather than (in)equitable distribution of
opportunities and resources:
How do people know the importance of education while they are just used to their cows? What do they
know [when] their nearest resource is cow? So now, when you go to one community and you say, ‘Okay,
let us build a school,’ you will see the community seems not more eager to do that […] [They] will say,
‘School for what? Our children are just pastoral.’ (Central MoEST ofcial)
However, as discussed in greater detail in Section 6.4, barriers to education access for children and youth in
cattle-keeping communities are not necessarily due to the perceived unimportance of education, but rather
the cultural and economic irrelevance of formal education and training programs.
4.3 Inequality of resources
Resource inequalities across geographic locations
Inequality of resource distribution between geographic regions is of great importance for education policy
and planning in a country facing huge resource challenges in terms of infrastructure, teachers, and so on.
The provision of resources to schools has markedly improved during the period under study (see Table 12).
Between 2009 and 2013, the number of schools increased by 17 per cent and the number of classrooms more
than doubled, resulting in decreased student-classroom ratios at both primary and secondary levels and,
in turn, potential improvement in learning conditions. Teacher deployment has not improved as markedly,
suggesting that it has been easier to build new schools and classrooms than to train and deploy teachers
to those schools and classrooms. The increase in AES centres (40 per cent) has been higher than in primary
education, and student-teacher ratios are somewhat lower in AES (35) than in primary education (47).
21 The AES programme includes pastoralist mobile schools where teachers and materials move with cattle camps. However,
mobile schools accounted for only 0.7 per cent of AES centers and 0.3 per cent of teachers in 2013 (MoEST, 2014a), due to
insecurity and difcult working conditions for teachers.

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Table 12. National trends in educational resources for 2009-13
Number of
schools
Number of
classrooms
Student-
class ratio
Number of
teachers
Student-
teacher
ratio
Primary
education
2009 3,221 10,663 129 26,575 52
2013 3,766 24,279 99.6 27,709 47.3
% change 16.9 127.7 -22.8 4.3 -9
Secondary
education
2009 158 764 58 2,191 20
2013 236 1,197 41 3,042 15.3
% change 49.4 56.7 -29.3 38.8 -23.5
Alternative
education
2009 1,022 - - 5,753 38
2013 1,429 - - 5,947 35.1
% change 39.8 - - 3.4 -7.6
Source: EMIS 2009, 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
There are also inequalities in terms of the distribution of trained teachers, with a large proportion of
underqualied or unqualied teachers in South Sudan. In 2013, 40 per cent of primary teachers, 61 per
cent of secondary teachers, and 42 per cent of AES teachers had some form of training (MoEST, 2014a).
Teacher training in South Sudan is quite fragmented as teacher training institutions (TTIs) and County
Education Centres (responsible for in-service training) are not functioning in many states, resulting in
training disparities across states (AET, 2015), with some teachers receiving short-term training on specic
topics from various international organisations. In 2014-2015, only 0.2 per cent of the national education
budget was allocated to the management of teacher training, and in 2013-2014, no allocations were actually
disbursed (MoFCIEP, 2014).
Disparities in teacher deployment and teacher absenteeism across different states, counties and rural areas
are linked to insecurity and access to accommodation and services. Inequities in teacher distribution may
be linked to lack of transportation, accommodation, and basic services in many communities, as well as a
lack of incentives to encourage teachers to work and remain in remote or difcult areas. When considering
inequalities in teacher distribution, it is also important to consider questions of attendance, absenteeism and
distribution of supervision resources. Weak education sector human resource management and supervision
systems contribute to disparities in teacher deployment, attendance, and performance, as discussed in
detail in Section 6.5.
Regional comparisons of resource distribution inequalities is relevant in political terms, as these can be
considered an indicator of capacity limitations on the part of central and sub-national governments and
international donors to respond to the needs of students in certain areas. Participants described signicant
variations with respect to school infrastructure and facilities, materials, school functioning (e.g. school
calendar, hours, and grades), and teaching coverage and capacity. They described perceived inequalities
in education services and resources across geographic areas, such as hard-to-reach rural areas, different
counties or payams, or different states such as conict-affected versus ‘peaceful’ states. Participants in
each state identied counties that face particular challenges in education governance and service provision,
focusing on the most remote or hard-to-reach counties, as well as counties in which cattle-keeping
communities are based (e.g. Terekeka County in Central Equatoria).
Quantitative analysis reveals signicant disparities in student ratios between states (see Figure 5), with
higher ratios of students per classroom and teachers in states such as Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, Warrap,
and Lakes, indicating that learning conditions in these states may be signicantly poorer than in others.
Inequalities are particularly high for student-classroom ratios and slightly lower for student-teacher ratios
(although this does not tell us about teacher absenteeism rates). The percentage of schools with adequate
facilities such as drinking water and latrines, represents another good indicator of resource inequalities
between geographic regions, illustrating the quantity and quality of available resources. With respect to
facilities, states such as Upper Nile and Unity experience the greatest limitations in resource provision (see
Figure 6), while states such as Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal have a greater proportion of
schools with access to basic facilities.

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Figure 5: Student-teacher and student-classroom ratios in primary education by state in 2013
Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
Figure 6: Primary schools with access to drinking water and latrines by state in 2013
Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
The combination of data on student ratios and school facilities provides a general overview of resource
inequalities between states in South Sudan. Patterns of inequalities in distribution of teachers and facilities
(e.g. drinking water) exist across counties within states (see Figures 7 and 8). Moreover, counties with higher
student-teacher ratios (reecting lower teacher numbers) are also characterized by lower school access
to drinking water, suggesting that certain geographic areas (e.g. Rumbek in Lakes state, Akobo in Jonglei
state) are affected by limited access to both human and material resources. In general, counties in the south
seem to enjoy a more adequate provision of school resources, while resource provision is poorer in central
and northern counties. The government and donors should pay attention to these consistent patterns of
resource distribution inequalities between counties in making decisions on allocation of material resources
such as infrastructure, and facilities, as well as human resources (e.g. teacher deployment).

34
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Figure 7: Student-teacher ratio in primary education by county in 2013
Figure 8: Percentage of primary schools with access to drinking water by county in 2013
Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)

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4.4 Inequality of outcomes
Educational outcomes represent an area of major concern for education planners and practitioners, although
access to comprehensive data is often limited due to limitations in how data is collected and reported. In
South Sudan, the proportion of students enrolled in upper primary level is very low (see Table 13), with
less than 7 per cent in P7 and P8. Although national trends show a slight improvement in primary school
retention between 2009 and 2013, national gures remain very low.
Table 13. National trends in primary education outcomes for 2009-13
2009 2013 % change
% enrolled students in P7 2.55 3.98 56.1
% enrolled students in P8 1.33 2.52 90.1
Source: EMIS 2009, 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
Outcome inequalities across geographical locations
Given the low percentage of students in the last grades of primary education, inequalities between
geographic regions appear quite low, although inequalities do exist (see Figure 9). In states such as Central
Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal, roughly 4 per cent of primary students are enrolled in P8, while in
states such as Jonglei the proportion does not reach 1 per cent. There are no signicant differences between
enrolment in P7 and P8, indicating that most dropouts occur in early primary grades.
Educational outcomes vary across counties within the same state (see Figure 10). In states such as Central
Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria, some counties (Magwi, Torit, Juba, Kajo-Keji, Yei River) have a relatively
high proportion of students in upper primary levels while the proportion is very low in others (Budi, Kapoeta
South, Lopa, Terekeka). Reecting patterns of inequality identied above, central and northern counties
generally experience lower educational outcomes. While educational outcomes are not necessarily the
direct consequence of resource provision, there appears to be a clear pattern in that regions with lower
access to educational resources (potentially reecting marginalization and neglect) are those with the
poorest educational outcomes.
Figure 9: Percentage of primary students enrolled in P7 and P8 by state in 2013
Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)

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Figure 10: Percentage of primary students enrolled in P8 by county in 2013
Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
Outcome inequalities and socio-economic status
During qualitative interviews, participants at the school and ministry level described socio-economic
inequities in terms of educational opportunities accessible to children from wealthy or elite families, reporting
that the children of many ‘big men’ are sent to study in neighboring countries where the quality of education
is higher: “Those who are able, they send their children outside, mostly to Kenya or Uganda, for education.
What about the poor? That means their children will not be educated” (Central MoGCSW ofcial). Some
families may also view the Sudanese, Ugandan, or Kenyan secondary certicates as more valuable than a
South Sudanese certicate in terms of international recognition and access to post-secondary education and
employment. A group of secondary teachers reported that some students travel to neighbouring countries
to write secondary leaving examinations.
While some ministry ofcials discussed the resulting impacts on the development of national identity and
social cohesion, most focused on inequities in education outcomes. For example, a group of secondary
students explained that employers (government and private organisations) are more likely to employ young
people with foreign credentials, resulting in jealousy and conict: “You are in good condition, I am in worse
condition.” Some participants felt that ministry ofcials are less likely to advocate for education sector
improvement if their own children are not affected by national policy and management decisions. These
practices can therefore contribute to the reproduction of socio-economic inequities as well as to pressures
for conict linked to grievances over access to higher quality educational and employment opportunities.
Outcome inequalities and older youth
South Sudan’s Youth Development Policy denes ‘youth’ as young people between age 15 and 3522 years
(MoCYS, 2014). In 2008-2009, 72 per cent of South Sudan’s population was under age 30, while 55 per cent
was under the age of 19 years. These young people face signicant inequalities in educational and economic
outcomes (see Table 14).
22 This denition reects contextual social, demographic, and judicial dynamics and was adopted by stakeholders at the policy
validation workshop (MoCYS, 2014), aligning with the African Youth Charter denition of “youth” (AU, 2006).

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Table 14. Socio-economic indicators for youth aged 15 to 34 years in 2008-2009
Never attended school 68%
Literacy rate 40% (15-24)
Unemployment rate 31%
Poverty rate 48%
Source: SSCCSE, 2010a, 2010b
Many participants identied youth, particularly ‘idle’ or ‘redundant’ (out-of-school and unemployed) youth,
as sources of insecurity due to their involvement in criminal activities and communal conict (e.g. cattle
raiding), and their mobilization by politicians and armed forces (see also Bennett et al., 2010; Jok, 2013; Knopf,
2013; Schomerus & Allen, 2010). This was linked to lack of relevant training and employment opportunities as
well as to poverty, as noted by national and sub-national government ofcials and international organisation
representatives. Youth in conict-affected areas may be particularly vulnerable to recruitment by armed
forces in the absence of education, training, and employment opportunities (OCHA, 2015a; UNICEF, 2015b).
They are redundant and then it will lead to, they are involved in this kind of violence. If there are places
like Malakal and Bentiu where they can join the armed forces, they will always join […] There were no
opportunities for going to school, so they had no choice but to join the forces. (International organisation
representative)
4.5 Conict occurrence and educational inequalities
Analysis of conict data reveals that conict events were concentrated in southern Equatorial states prior to
2011 and shifted to central and northern regions (primarily in the Greater Upper Nile region of Unity, Upper
Nile, and Jonglei) after independence, although the Juba region experienced a high occurrence of conict
both before and after 2011 (see Figures 11 and 12). This geographical shift in violent conict reects broader
governance dynamics and patterns of power (ACLED, 2015). During the second civil war, most militia groups
were based in the Greater Upper Nile region, which had historically been isolated and marginalized from both
north and south (Sudd Institute, 2014). The continued concentration of rebel commanders (including Riek
Machar) and their bases of support in the Greater Upper Nile, combined with perceptions of marginalization
from political power concentrated in Juba, have contributed to armed mobilization. The geography of
conict also reects the role of oil resources in ongoing conict, with government and SPLM/A-IO forces
battling for control of oil elds concentrated in the north-eastern states.
Areas more affected by violent conict are expected to present worse educational development indicators
than those less affected by conict. Analysis of EMIS and conict data reveals that states with the highest
occurrence of conict events during 2011-2014 - Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei - are those where provision
of educational resources (teachers and facilities) is the lowest (see Table 15). Similarly (with the exception
of Upper Nile), these are the states with the lowest percentage of students in upper primary grades. While
conict occurrence appears to be correlated with inequalities in educational resources and outcomes,
gender parity in access to primary education does not appear to be related to conict occurrence.
In South Sudan, states with the highest occurrence of conict are precisely those that receive fewer
educational resources in terms of teachers, classrooms, and school facilities. The relationship between
indicators of conict and educational access, resources, and outcomes at the county level were examined
as part of the quantitative analysis (see Figure 13 below). The highest correlation occurs between indicators
of resources and outcomes, suggesting a strong relationship between these forms of educational inequality
at the county level. Less pronounced, but still signicant, is the correlation between gender parity and
resources and outcomes. However, although analysis shows a geographic shift in conict events before and
after 2011, measures of correlation between conict and educational indicators are generally quite low. This
is expected given the wide socio-economic diversity between counties, concentration of conict events in
some counties (outliers), and large number of counties with zero conict events. Additional factors affecting
analysis include potential under-reporting of conict events in 2013, as well as the exclusion of ‘criminal’
violence from conict data, which may reect the effects of past violence and the prevalence of violent
behaviours inuencing current conict.

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Table 15: Occurrence of conict and educational inequalities by state in 2013
Conict events
2011-14
Access School resources Outcomes
NER gender
parity
Student-
teacher
ratio
Student-
class ratio
Drinking
water
access
Latrine
access
% students
in P7
% students
in P8
CES 213 0.99 33 60 58.3 67.6 5.89 4.14
EES 40 0.83 33 89 46 50.7 4.96 2.84
Jonglei 372 0.87 85 196 37.7 35.1 2.68 0.74
Lakes 194 0.61 44 136 47.3 41.3 4.57 2.78
NBG 52 0.62 43 61 36.6 32.4 3.52 2.07
Unity 309 0.65 59 201 31 25.0 2.30 1.31
UNS 309 0.84 66 126 20.3 35.2 4.45 3.49
Warrap 67 0.52 52 134 42.5 37.2 3.33 2.28
WBG 60 0.80 41 69 47.8 53.8 5.11 4.11
WES 27 0.96 33 79 32.2 55.5 4.42 2.96
Source: UCDP (UCDP, 2015)
Figure 11: Number of conict events by county in 2011-2014
Source: ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010)

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Figure 12: Number of conict events by county in 2011-2014
Source: ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010)
In sum, the quantitative analysis of educational inequalities provides some insight into the current
education and conict situation in South Sudan. Despite efforts to expand education services through
school construction and teacher deployment, large inequalities persist in the provision of educational
resources across states and counties. Some states (Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei) have experienced a
relative deprivation of resources. These are precisely the states with the highest concentration of conict
events following a shift from south to north since 2011. These inequalities in resource distribution could
be associated with inequitable distribution of development partners in different counties, as well as to the
historical marginalization of particular geographical regions including the Greater Upper Nile states, which
may be linked to the shifting geography of violence in South Sudan. Education planning and educational
interventions should consider these regional inequalities in allocating educational resources if they wish to
expand the education system while contributing to greater equity, social justice, and cohesion.
4.6 Chapter summary
Quantitative analysis of education, census, and conict data have revealed clear patterns of inequality in
educational access, resources, and outcomes in South Sudan. Inequalities were particularly clear across
different states and across counties within states. For example, states in the Greater Upper Nile region
experienced low access to school facilities and resources as well as low enrolment in upper primary grades,
while southern counties were generally characterized by more adequate school resources and outcomes
compared to central and northern counties. Analysis of EMIS and conict data reveals that states with the
highest occurrence of conict events since 2011 (Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei) have the lowest provision of
educational resources and the lowest percentage of students in upper primary, reecting the relationship
between conict occurrence and inequalities in educational resources and outcomes. These concerns
were reected in qualitative interviews during which participants described the effects of inequalities
associated with geographic location, rural communities, socio-economic status, livelihoods activities (e.g.
cattle-keeping), and older youth on education access, resources, and outcomes. These were perceived as
contributing to pressures for conict.

40
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These patterns of inequality, and their contributions to pressures for conict, illustrate the importance of
the redistribution of education opportunities and resources to support equitable access and outcomes
for marginalized or disadvantaged population groups. Equitable access and outcomes are also linked to
education policies, programs, and curricula that recognize diverse identities and are relevant to the needs and
priorities of communities across South Sudan. This in turn is rooted in equitable representation in decision-
making on the allocation of education sector resources and the content of education policies and programs.
Taken together, these elements can support horizontal processes of reconciliation between groups as well
as vertical relations between communities and government, thus addressing structural legacies of conict.
Figure 13: Scatterplot matrices of conict and education inequalities by county in 2013 24
Source: ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010), EMIS (MoEST, 2015e)
24 Scatterplot matrices enable rapid evaluation of correlations between multiple variables. In Figure 14, variables are written in a
diagonal line from top left to bottom right and each variable is plotted against the others, with the points representing counties.
For example, in the matrix plotting students in P7 and in P8, the points follow an approximate 45-grade line representing a strong,
positive correlation between the two variables. In the matrix plotting NER gender parity and student-teacher ratio, points move
from top left to bottom right, representing a negative, and rather weak correlation.

Caption: © UNICEF/ Learning in makeshift spaces, South Sudan 2015.

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CHAPTER 5. REDISTRIBUTION:
RESPONSES TO INEQUITIES IN
EDUCATION
5.1 Chapter introduction
Redistribution involves ensuring equity and non-discrimination in education opportunities and resources
for different groups in society in response to patterns of disadvantage and marginalization. In South Sudan,
a range of policy initiatives have been aimed at addressing different dimensions of educational inequity
including for girls, students with disabilities, ‘pastoralist’ communities, and older youth. This chapter
examines policy initiatives responding to different dimensions of inequity in education, and factors affecting
their implementation in practice including approaches to education resource allocation, distribution, and
management by both government authorities and international partners. This chapter also examines the
potential effects on peacebuilding, reproduction of inequities and pressures for conict, and explores the
‘humanitarian-development divide’ in education service provision, which is critical to discussions of (re)
distribution of education opportunities and resources in South Sudan.
Caption: © UNICEF/ Primary school attendance board in Western Bahr el Ghazal, 2015.
5.2 (Re)distribution of education opportunities
While South Sudan’s national education policies (including the GESP and national curriculum framework)
refer to ‘inclusive’ services at all levels, specic policy objectives and responses focus primarily on gender
equity and disability, reecting the inuence of global education agendas and priorities such as EFA and
MDGs (see also Holmarsdottir et al., 2011). South Sudan recently launched the Girls’ Education Strategy for
South Sudan for 2015-2017 (and some states have developed their own policies for girls’ education), and a
National Inclusive Education Policy, focusing on learners with disabilities, is being developed. A Directorate
of Gender Equity and Social Change, responsible for girls’ education and inclusive education (disability),

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has been established within MoEST. Inclusive education objectives are also included in the National Gender
Policy and the National Disability and Inclusion Policy (MoGCSW, 2012, 2013). While reecting advances
in the development of an equitable and inclusive education system, these also reect gaps in systematic
policy responses to some of the over-arching and context-specic dimensions of inequity described in the
previous section. For example, while the Inclusive Education Policy refers to the inclusion of linguistic,
ethnic, and cultural minorities and disadvantaged or marginalized areas, specic policy strategies focus
only on learners with disabilities.
The Alternative Education System (AES), guided by the 2014 Policy for Alternative Education Systems,
addresses some of the dimensions of inequity emphasized by participants including poverty, rural location,
and cattle-keeping communities at the program level. The AES includes non-formal basic education programs
such as Community Girls’ Schools (CGS) in (rural) communities without regular schools, Accelerated
Learning and Basic Adult Literacy Programs (ALP, BALP) for older youth and adults, with some focus on
women, the Pastoralist Education Program (PEP), which includes exible mobile schools, and Intensive
English Courses (IEC) to facilitate transition from Arabic to English instruction (MoEST 2014c).
TVET programs also target older youth, generally focusing on trades such as construction, carpentry, welding,
masonry, auto mechanics, computers, food processing, and tailoring. Three ministries are responsible for
aspects of vocational training (MoEST, MoCYS, and the Ministry of Labour and Public Service). However,
lack of a cohesive policy and programming approach has resulted in program fragmentation. In 2014, a
TVET policy was drafted with support from UNESCO; a national policy and strategy review is underway and
modules are being developed as part of the national curriculum review process. However, as discussed in
detail in Section 6.4, these training programs focus on ‘modern’ commercial activities that may hold limited
cultural and economic relevance for local livelihoods systems in rural and cattle-keeping communities.
Not all AES and TVET programs are prioritized in implementation. This limits responses to specic
dimensions of inequity, including geographic location and age, which are linked to conict. In 2013, CGS
accounted for 4 per cent of AES learners and PEP for 0.7 per cent, while ALP accounted for 84 per cent
(MoEST, 2014a). Programs are not equitably distributed across geographic regions. For example, CGS and
PEP are not implemented in all states or counties. For example, it was reported that in Warrap, ‘pastoralist’
education programs are being implemented in only four of six counties). Sub-national ofcials reported
that they did not know why AES programs are implemented in some locations and not in others. Only
two government TVET centres are reportedly functioning, and the few operating government or donor-
supported programs are concentrated in towns limiting access for young people in other counties and
communities and reinforcing urban/rural divides. MoCYS has developed a Youth Payam Service program
intended to provide local livelihoods and skills training. This has not yet been launched due to lack of funds.
Several participants, particularly at the state level, reported that ALP and BALP implementation focus heavily
on security forces, including military and police, and that technical, livelihoods, and literacy training has
been included in national demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) efforts (SSDDRC, 2010;
UNESCO, 2013). In some cases, ALP services are also provided for civilian (host community) populations,
such as in the context of reintegration programs for children involved in armed groups. However, in many
states, a strong security-oriented focus – at least in terms of implementation – has the potential to inuence
perceived inequity in terms of who benets from such programs. This can contribute to frustrations and
grievances and pressures for conict when young people see that members of security forces benet from
alternative education programs while the wider population does not.
Programs intended to address various dimensions of educational inequality are primarily supported by
donors. For example, the DFID-funded GESS program focusing on capitation grants and cash transfers is the
main girls’ education initiative. In an approach intended to encourage retention, girls in upper primary and
secondary (P5 through S4) receive cash transfers of 125 SSP per year based on regular school attendance.
The program also includes community awareness and mentoring components. The WFP-supported Food
for Education school feeding program also provides incentives to encourage girls’ education, as well as
broader school enrolment and retention in rural schools. AES and TVET programs are also supported and
implemented primarily by donors and development partners. In 2013-2014, 70 per cent of budgeted AES
funds were from external donors (MoFCIEP, 2013), with donors such as USAID are supporting the provision
and expansion of alternative education, including CGS and ‘pastoralist’ education. Reliance on donor

44
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support in these areas may limit government initiative in responding to dimensions of inequity linked to
pressures for conict, and contribute to the dominance of global agendas over context-specic priorities.
Examining ‘peace dividends’ in education
How education sector opportunities are (re)distributed affects public perceptions of government legitimacy,
which represents one of the key links between education service provision and conict (or peace) (Barakat
et al., 2008; Burde et al., 2011; Rose & Greeley, 2006). The education sector is of particular signicance
in shaping relations and trust between governments and populations “given that it is the largest, most
widespread and visible institution in the country” (Rose & Greeley, 2006: 4). In South Sudan, post-CPA
government and donor strategy documents described education as representing a ‘peace dividend’ or
tangible peace outcome through increased access to education and livelihoods opportunities (e.g. GoNU &
GoSS, 2008; UNESCO, 2011; UNICEF, 2012). Provision of services is itself viewed as the key objective, with
little or no consideration of how those services may contribute to structural or cultural forms of violence and
inequity and to pressures for conict.
During qualitative interviews, participants in all research sites reported that aspects of education sector
governance limited public condence and trust in the government. Local ofcials and school representatives,
including PTA members and head teachers, expressed frustration over insufcient government resources
for education: “[The] government only sends teachers, but they don’t even give a piece of paper to the
school” (Payam ofcial). A national public opinion survey in South Sudan (IRI, 2013) found that 68 per
cent of respondents were not satised with government provision of education services. As one group of
secondary students stated, when the government does not provide needed resources, citizens are ‘exposed’
to risks (associated with poverty and a lack of services and economic opportunities) and will blame the
government. This undermines post-CPA promises and expectations of ‘peace dividends’ for communities
through increased access to social services such as education. This affects state-society relations, including
community perceptions of government legitimacy linked to quality of service delivery (Davies, 2011; Knopf,
2013; Rose & Greeley, 2006). This is of key importance in a context in which relations between government
and citizens, and public trust in government and governance institutions, is identied as central to peace
and state-building (e.g. GoNU & GoSS, 2008; JAM, 2005).
In general, participant discussions about the (re)distribution of education services and the importance of
facilitating access to education for marginalized groups identied service provision as the key objective, with
limited consideration of connections to structural forms of violence and inequity. For example, participants
stressed the importance of engaging ‘idle’ or ‘redundant’ youth to keep them busy and to prevent crime,
political mobilization, and armed violence. These narratives illustrate a stabilization and security-oriented
view of youth as risks to be controlled in order to maintain social order (Davies, 2011; Rose & Greeley,
2006). This reects a neoliberal view focusing on the security contributions of both education (Novelli, 2010;
Robertson et al., 2006; Rose & Greeley, 2006) and peacebuilding (Paris, 2010), as well as a ‘greed’ (as opposed
to ‘grievance’) understanding of conict. However, primarily security-oriented perspectives often focus on
‘containment’, with less attention to underlying conict dynamics including power relations, exclusion, and
grievances (Newman, 2011). Service provision is the key objective, with little or no consideration of how
those services may contribute to perpetuating structural forms of violence and inequity.
5.3 (Re)distribution of education resources
Budgeting and distribution of education funding
How resources are allocated can redress or entrench marginalization and inequity, as well as contribute
to conict. This is of particular signicance with respect to the education sector, which may be especially
prone to manipulation and polarisation (Davies, 2011). Funds are transferred and distributed to states and
counties in the form of general block grants and conditional transfers earmarked for education, used for
salary payments and operating costs. Transfers vary by state and county, based on the number of schools
and personnel (MoFCIEP, 2014).
Transfers reect equal but not necessarily equitable allocation, as they are not necessarily proportional to
population size, student enrolment, actual service provision costs, or level of need, reecting the signicant
under-funding of the education sector and resulting in inequitable allocation of resources (and development)
across states and counties (see Table 16). Per-student spending varies widely across states, ranging from
SSP 143.5 (USD 48.5) in Warrap to SSP 394.9 (USD 133.4) in Upper Nile in 2014-2015. Connections between
state funding allocations and conict are unclear, given that Upper Nile, characterized by some of the

45
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greatest educational inequalities and conict events, receives the highest per-student allocations, reecting
the need for attention to how education transfers are allocated and managed at the state and sub-state level.
Disparities across geographic locations reect disparities across ethnic groups or sub-groups, as many
local borders (e.g. counties, payams, bomas) are drawn along ethnic lines (Schomerus & Allen, 2010). This
can result in perceived marginalization when there are signicant inequities in distribution of human and
material education resources across counties, as illustrated by the quantitative analysis.
Table 16. Annual primary education delivery transfers to states for 2014-15 25
Education
transfers (SSP)
Projected
population (2015)
Primary
enrolment (2013)
Transfers per student
SSP USD
CES 33,271,522 1,462,604 150,629 220.9 74.6
EES 26,839,787 1,274,684 94,876 282.9 95.6
Jonglei 34,516,137 1,753,272 205,389 168.1 56.8
Lakes 23,024,245 963,541 97,894 235.2 79.5
NBG 27,671,719 955,346 161,425 171.4 57.9
Unity 20,954,335 804,703 177,583 118.0 39.9
UNS 39,284,490 1,281,365 99,488 394.9 133.4
Warrap 26,261,122 1,283,621 182,997 143.5 48.5
WBG 17,598,572 440,010 58,735 299.6 101.2
WES 25,105,336 759,884 82,451 304.5 102.9
Source: MoEST, 2014a; MoFCIEP, 2014; NBS, 2015
25 USD amounts are calculated using the ofcial exchange rate of SSP 2.96, as cited in the 2014-2015 Budget Book (MoFCIEP,
2014).
Caption: © UNICEF/ Outside a primary school in Upper Nile State, 2015.

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While some program decisions such as school construction may consider disparities in education indicators
based on EMIS data, for example, planning and budgeting generally do not account for geographic
disparities (Sigsgaard, 2013). There are also variations in the proportion of funds actually disbursed versus
those allocated across states (MoFCIEP, 2014). Counties are responsible for distributing funds to payam
ofces, and allocating (reportedly) an equal share to each payam. However, this can result in inequities
across geographic areas, disadvantaging counties with more payams or counties and payams with larger
populations. Perceived inequities in budget allocations among local authorities may also be associated with
lack of participation in decision-making.
The allocation sent to Tombura County, it’s bigger than that of Ibba County […] [But] Ibba County has
ve payams, when Tombura County has three payams […] The small allocation for the county with ve
payams, when it is divided it is very less, compared to the bigger county that has only three payams.
(Participant from Central Equatoria)
Transfers to states and counties do not currently cover operating and capital costs. In theory, they are meant
to ‘top off’ transfer funds through local revenue or income (e.g. taxation, customs charges, oil revenues),
although different states have different levels of access to revenue sources such as oil or customs charges.
In practice, states generally do not have their own revenues and rely on central transfers for education
service provision (GRSS, 2012a, 2013; RSS, 2012; Watkins, 2013; World Bank, 2012). Oil-producing states are
meant to receive 2 per cent of national oil revenues, and communities (local government councils) in oil-
producing areas are meant to receive 3 per cent. However, existing legislation has not been implemented,
and although revenues are reportedly disbursed, there are few oversight and accountability procedures
and revenues barely benetted communities (Deng, 2015). Some MoEST ofcials felt that local revenue
shortages were due to a lack of motivation at the state level, or that revenues are not allocated to education:
There’s no political will in the lower level of governance. Because if the states prioritize education, that
means from their own local revenue collection, they can top up from their own generation of resources.
But they don’t want [to]. Instead, from what we sent, they deduct it for their own use. (Central MoEST
ofcial)
In discussing allocation of funds to the state level, a number of central and sub-national MoEST ofcials
interviewed as part of this study described concerns regarding the transfer process, including blocking or
diverting of funds at the state level, reecting limited vertical trust between levels of government. Some
payam ofcials criticized the lack of follow-up by the central MoEST, to ensure proper budget allocation
(“They just stay there idle in Juba”). Funds are transferred from the centre to the state Ministry of Finance,
and then to the state MoEST, and some central and state MoEST ofcials also described poor communication,
delayed disbursement, and diversion of education funds by the Ministry of Finance, reecting a lack of
trust between different ministries within states. As one central ofcial noted, “When these states receive
this money, they go and pay their local staff instead of paying teachers. The little money that goes to the
teachers, the state government uses it for other things.”
Those who are transferring the cash from Juba, the national Ministry of Finance, they don’t provide us
with copies of transfer. So sometimes we don’t know if this money is transferred or not […] How can we
go and ask [the state] Ministry of Finance that we have money here if we don’t have some paper? […]
That is why sometimes we don’t know what is going on. Is this money going to the counties or not? No,
we don’t know. (State MoEST ofcial)
When states and counties are unable to cover basic school operating costs (e.g. infrastructure, facilities,
supplies), schools charge registration fees (‘school development funds’ contributions) which can affect
access for certain populations, including children with limited nancial means, and girls in particular (GRSS,
2012a; Watkins, 2013; World Bank, 2012). This practice also reinforces disparities between wealthy and poor
communities, contributing to pressures for conict. As illustrated by quantitative analysis, certain areas
that experience greater deprivation in educational resources (e.g. Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei) have also
experienced more conict events since 2011, reecting the importance of considering the potential effects
of educational inequities on broader pressures for conict.

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Budget allocations illustrate gaps between global and national education policy priorities (e.g. expanded
access to education opportunities) and their implementation, as well as limited equity-oriented redistribution
of resources in terms of the populations and areas targeted. Stated priorities are also undermined by
allocation disparities within MoEST (see Table 17), which suggest that sector budgeting does not necessarily
address, in practical terms, key areas of inequity and governance identied by research participants as being
connected to conict. For example, in 2014-2015, AES received 1 per cent of the education budget and TVET
received 0.5 per cent although in 2013-2014, only 21 per cent of AES allocations and no TVET allocations were
disbursed. Funds are allocated primarily to basic education, with only 14 per cent allocated to secondary
and TVET (and less actually disbursed) (MoFCIEP, 2014), reecting limited attention to older youth, who are
often accused of involvement in violent conict. In addition, those responsible for addressing equity and
inclusion in the MoEST are marginalized in terms of resource allocation: the Directorate of Gender Equity
and Social Change received 0.2 per cent of the education budget in 2014-2015, and in 2013-2014 only 4 per
cent of allocated funds were disbursed.
Table 17: Select budget allocations and outturns for 2013-2014
Budget allocation
(SSP)
Reported outturn % disbursed
Basic education 322,454,219 252,966,110 78.5%
AES 6,905,309 1,480,278 21.4%
Secondary education 67,799,510 24,733,747 36.5%
TVET 3,741,974 0 0
Management of teacher training 3,963,491 0 0
Promotion of national languages 783,330 0 0
Policy and systems development 42,250,253 1,054,302 2.5%
Gender equity and social change 2,357,323 87,332 3.7%
Source: MoFCIEP, 2014
Donor allocation of school resources
Donor and government representatives were generally aware of the potential for resource distribution
to contribute to community tensions. Some described the use of ‘conict-sensitive’ criteria for resource
distribution (e.g. school construction, capitation grants, and school feeding), as intended to avoid tensions
and political inuence, and to encourage communities to improve their schools in order to access resources.
Criteria for different programs include accessibility (presence of roads and mobile networks), security,
school facilities (e.g. latrine, kitchen), school governing bodies, and record-keeping (e.g. registration and
attendance). However, certain schools and communities, particularly in hard-to-reach or conict-affected
areas, struggle to meet criteria (e.g. accessibility, communication, security, school facilities) and to adhere to
program requirements (e.g. school calendars, reporting), resulting in further disadvantage or marginalization.
Donor resources are often allocated based on the presence of NGOs or other implementing partners in
specic areas. One research participant explained that numerous NGOs may be concentrated in certain
areas, and that states or counties with multiple NGOs providing resources and services receive the same
government budget as those without. This can shape perceived inequities in resource distribution as well
as disparities across locations. How education partners engage with schools also affects perceived inequity
in the allocation of resources. Teachers, PTA members, and students in different states reported frustrations
when donors and partners visit schools, conduct needs assessments and raise expectations, and do not
subsequently provide the expected support or even share assessment results. This leads to perceived
inequity when they hear (on the radio or television) that other schools or communities have received
resources such as learning materials or latrines, while their school or community has not.
You will go and generate kind of a need and an interest in the community and you move out, so it will
kind of cause a frustration in the community because this [donor] came and has gone out with nothing
that they have left on the ground. (International organisation representative)
Some payam ofcials and school managers stated that they do not know how donors make decisions about

48
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resource allocation, for example, why some schools receive resources while others do not, or why donors
decide to stop providing support to some schools. This impacts community or school trust in donors and
development partners. In this sense, efforts to promote equity for certain communities may further entrench
actual marginalization and inequity for others, even when criteria for resource allocation exist, and can
contribute to perceived inequities among communities or geographic areas. As one teacher and PTA group
explained, when resources are allocated to one community or school and not to others, “we think that we
are not important.” This is particularly signicant in conict-affected contexts where perceived fairness of
resource allocation for service delivery affects community perceptions of government (and donor) legitimacy
(Davies, 2011), as discussed in greater detail in Section 5.4 below.
Transparency and accountability of education resource utilisation
Concerns identied by some teachers, payam and county ofcials, and education partner representatives,
included political inuence over resource allocation and distribution (e.g. school construction, distribution
of materials), nepotism in teacher and school headmaster appointments (including politically-motivated
appointments), and diversion of funds, including salaries, all of which have been cited as examples of misuse
and ‘elite capture’ of resources in the education sector (Hallak & Poisson, 2007). The diversion of public funds
represents a signicant concern in South Sudan’s ‘political marketplace’, limiting resources available for the
delivery of basic services such as education (de Waal, 2014; Mores, 2013). During interviews, participants
spoke of the diversion of educational resources or opportunities (e.g. inuence on school construction, hiring
of teachers) as a means of securing political support, as well as in terms of ‘collective’ benet (e.g. enabling
access to resources and services, such as schools, for communities). However, diversion or manipulation of
scarce educational resources and opportunities, particularly when linked to ethnic or tribal politics (Mores,
2013; Rolandsen, 2015) can entrench existing inequities and exacerbate factional social and political divides.
Recognizing the need to address such issues, the government has introduced a number of systems and
initiatives to increase accountability and transparency in education sector resource management. These
include the development of the World Bank-supported Local Services Support (LSS) education sector
planning, budgeting, and reporting guidelines for state and county governments, and the establishment
of State and County Transfers Monitoring Committees, responsible for coordinating transfer use and
monitoring and producing regular budget performance reports (GRSS, 2013; MoEST, 2014). However, these
are not implemented at all levels or in all states and counties, and local dynamics of political authority shape
decision-making processes at the sub-national level.
Privatisation of education
Donors referred to the increasing number of private schools in South Sudan. These include church-run,
NGO-run, and community-run schools as well as for-prot schools run by individuals or groups. Between
2009 and 2011, the number of private primary schools increased from 117 to 275, and private secondary
schools rose from 30 to 59 (MoEST, 2010, 2014a). In 2013, 74 per cent of primary schools and 62 per cent of
secondary schools were government-run or government-aided, while 26 per cent of primary schools and 37
per cent of secondary schools were private or community-managed (MoEST, 2014a). Private teacher-training
institutions (TTIs) also play a central role in the education system, as faith-based TTIs have been described
as the only fully functioning TTIs in the country.
The privatization of education services reects neoliberal policies focused on private responsibility for
public service provision, which is linked to efforts to lower public spending and facilitate cost-effective
education service expansion, individual choice and increased efciency, accountability, and quality through
competition (Astiz et al., 2002; Mundy & Menashy, 2014; Robertson & Dale, 2013). In South Sudan, private
schools are meant to “bring about school competition leading to improved quality of delivery, increase
access to education, reduce congestion in public schools and facilitate sending children abroad for studies”
(MoEST, 2015a: 34). Private schools are described as lling much-needed gaps in the education system, and
account for the majority of enrolment in some areas. For example, non-government schools accounted
for 52 per cent of all primary schools in Juba County in 2013, compared to 23 per cent in Malakal County
(MoEST, 2014a). One payam ofcial reported that it would be impossible to meet education needs without
private schools; roughly 6,600 students are registered in government primary schools in the payam, while
over 19,500 are registered in private primary schools.

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While private schools must be registered with MoEST, there is no national policy to regulate private schools
(one is reportedly under development) and no guidelines have been established for registration fees, teacher
salaries, or student admission. Private schools are based primarily in towns, rather than in rural areas, and
fees are often quite high, restricting enrolment for students of lower income groups. This has the potential
to reinforce socio-economic stratication across schools. Inequities also emerge in relation to the quality
of teaching and learning; private schools can afford to hire qualied teachers, for example from Kenya or
Uganda, and class sizes are smaller.
It appears that both the government and donors are explicitly or implicitly encouraging this system of
education: private (not-for-prot) schools can access capitation grants if they have annual fees of less than
200 SSP in urban centres or 100 SSP in rural areas, and can benet from WFP school feeding if they meet
similar criteria. However, it has been reported that low-fee private schools do not necessarily facilitate access
for poor communities (Robertson & Dale, 2013), and might also reect that donors (and indeed MoEST) have
lost condence in the national government to deliver public education services. While it appears that most
private schools in South Sudan are ‘low fee’ rather than ‘elite’ private schools, the potential implications
for inequality in access, resources, and outcomes must still be considered. The privatization of education
services can marginalize or exclude certain groups, reinforcing existing inequities – including both
horizontal inter-group and vertical socio-economic inequities. Privatization of schools can also contribute to
the reproduction of an ‘elite’ class with greater access to economic and political resources, contributing to
pressures for conict.
5.4 The humanitarian-development divide
Responses to inequity and conict in the education sector in South Sudan are further complicated by ongoing
armed conict. This includes ghting between government and opposition forces concentrated in Unity,
Upper Nile, and Jonglei, while the other seven states have been affected by past and recent smaller-scale
ghting between government and non-state armed groups, and between ‘communal’ groups. Inequities
in education services and outcomes in conict-affected areas, including between northern and southern
states, have been exacerbated by school closure, displacement, chronic insecurity, and the targeting of
young people by armed forces. These inequities have in turn created pressures for young people to join
armed groups, feeding into cycles of violence. However, discussions of education and conict in South
Sudan have focused predominantly on the disruptive effects of conict on education, rather than on the
contributions of the education sector to conict. This requires attention to how approaches to resource
allocation in humanitarian contexts contribute to inequities and, in turn, to pressures affecting the
continuation or reoccurrence of violent conict. Two key governance concerns 26 were identied during
qualitative interviews: the emergence of a ‘parallel’ system of education in conict-affected contexts, and
geographic inequities in education resource allocation resulting from a focus on humanitarian response.
A parallel system of education
A critical concern stated by representatives of central and sub-national ministries and education partners
was the emergence of a parallel system of education, based on the use of different curricula, teacher training
programs, and management approaches (e.g. school fees), in humanitarian contexts. Education services
in these contexts are provided nearly exclusively by (international) humanitarian organizations, with
limited government engagement, although discussions with government and humanitarian actors revealed
differing perspectives. Government actors stated that they would like to be involved in EiE provision, but
were limited by security concerns. For example, a participant in Upper Nile explained that MoEST would
like to reopen a primary school in Malakal, but that parents are afraid of sending their children out of the
Protection of Civilians site (POC – where education services are provided) due to continued insecurity. An
international NGO representative added that parents are also reluctant to send their children to government
schools because education services are provided free-of-charge in the POC. MoEST ofcials perceive some
humanitarian actors’ approaches to service provision as overshadowing or bypassing the government,
resulting in tensions and potentially affecting community perceptions of government legitimacy: “Are you
in front of the government, or are you supporting the government?” (Central MoEST ofcial).
26 Tensions between humanitarian and development goals are discussed in detail in UNICEF’s (2015) PBEA case study on
humanitarian action, conict sensitivity and peacebuilding through education in South Sudan.

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On the other hand, a number of international organization representatives described MoEST’s lack of
involvement in EiE services, with one explaining that the ministry views POCs ‘as another nation’. In many
conict-affected communities, including opposition-held areas, the government is viewed with hostility,
and MoEST education services may be viewed as tools of the government, which restricts MoEST ofcials’
access here due to security concerns. This raises questions about how to support government services in
a context in which the government is a key conict actor. In cases where the government cannot provide
education, humanitarian services are necessary. In these areas, communities may view the government
as having limited legitimacy, potentially due to perceived marginalization in terms of the redistribution
of education services and resources, as illustrated by quantitative analyses revealing greater resource
inequalities in states such as Unity and Upper Nile. In these conict-affected areas, government services
may also be viewed as reecting limited representation and recognition of diverse political perspectives and
ethnic communities, linked to broader dynamics of political, economic, and cultural exclusion. However, as
noted by some international organization representatives, the government has questioned the ‘impartiality’
of humanitarian actors operating in opposition-held areas and criticized their cooperation with the SPLM-IO.
(Perceived) inequities in humanitarian resource allocation
Approaches to education resource allocation by international donors in humanitarian contexts have been
described as fuelling and reinforcing geographic inequities and contributing to pressures for conict. In
August 2015, education cluster (EiE) humanitarian activities were being implemented in 9 of 10 states
(Northern Bahr el Ghazal was the exception), with education activities concentrated primarily in Unity,
Upper Nile, and Jonglei (OCHA, 2015b). Humanitarian activities have necessarily focused on communities
most highly affected by conict, including POCs and IDP communities in the Greater Upper Nile region.
However, this has led to frustrations among authorities and communities in ‘stable’ (e.g. Equatorial) states,
due to perceived exclusion from resources and support as well as perceived ‘rewarding’ of violence (‘conict
dividends’), which was noted by both central and state MoEST ofcials: “Where there is re, more water will
be thrown […] If you are okay, no one takes care of you” (Central MoEST ofcial). As noted in one paper, this
“suggests that the only way a community can be heard is by taking arms against its government” (Lotyam
& Arden, 2015: 8). While some participants explained that they understood why international responses
were concentrated in ‘crisis’ areas, the signicance of perceived inequities for example by sub-national
governments or communities, was nonetheless emphasized.
The distribution of national and international partners across geographic locations affects education service
provision and perceived inequities, including within conict-affected states. Participants explained that
organizations may be concentrated in particular locations, or there may be gaps in geographical coverage,27
exacerbating disparities in services and support across regions and communities. For example, in Upper
Nile state, ve education cluster partners were operating in Malakal County in August 2015 and none were
operating in six other counties, with further disparities across payams (OCHA, 2015b). However, this is
also due to the prioritization of particular areas resulting from funding shortages. While operation sites
are determined based on security, physical access, access provided by opposition forces, population
displacement, presence of implementing partners, and so on, implications for community perceptions of
marginalization should be considered.
Currently we have partners but in a handful, just a few pockets of locations. Some of the locations have
not had the kind of responses […] What has always been a problem is that in some of the locations good
partners are able to take on the activities. In some of the locations there are no partners. (International
organization representative).
The diversion of funds from development to humanitarian response since late-2013 has signicantly affected
the operation of South Sudan’s education sector, placing additional pressures on a system that was already
reproducing patterns of inequity and pressures for conict. However, both MoEST and donors described
efforts to ensure the continuation of development-oriented programs across the country, including in
conict-affected areas. GPE funds were not diverted to humanitarian response, and the government and
partners both decided to retain those resources for longer-term national education system development.
27 While maps showing the distribution of education cluster (EiE) partners across counties in South Sudan are prepared by OCHA
(see http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/), comprehensive geographic distribution information is not available for education
development partners. However, the PEG is conducting a partner mapping exercise that includes details on geographic areas of
operation.

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GESS capitation grants are being provided in opposition-held areas, and programs such as UNICEF’s PBEA
are being implemented in EiE contexts, representing the exibility of certain development-oriented programs
in terms of their adaptation to humanitarian response. The PEG is currently working on a strategy to address
the emergency-development divide, although it is unclear to what extent (if at all) multiple dimensions of
inequity and peacebuilding objectives will be considered.
Short-term humanitarian efforts respond to the impacts of violence, ideally using a conict-sensitive
approach, rather than addressing issues at the root of the conict. However, these efforts have long-term
implications that can perpetuate inequities and contribute to pressures for future conict. This is linked to
perceptions regarding inequities in resource (re)distribution and recognition of the diverse needs of different
conict-affected communities, as well as the resulting effects on vertical relations between communities
and decision-makers, including government authorities and donors. In South Sudan, efforts are being
made to integrate principles of conict sensitivity into both development and humanitarian efforts. For
example, the retention of GPE funds for longer-term education development is based on the requirement
that efforts involve a conict-sensitive approach considering how education programs can contribute to (or
mitigate) conict. A conict-sensitive tip sheet has been adapted to guide planning and implementation
of CHF-funded EiE activities). This represents a signicant step beyond pre-2013 development approaches
that were ‘conict-blind’ and did not consider the ways in which service delivery might contribute to
inequities and pressures for conict. However, as noted earlier, conict sensitivity has often been associated
with humanitarian EiE responses, which may limit analysis of the connections between education sector
governance or management and the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of broader conict
and peacebuilding processes.
5.6 Chapter summary
In South Sudan, a range of policy initiatives and programs such as the AES have aimed to address different
dimensions of educational inequity. However, specic policy strategies, including those focusing on girls’
education and students with disabilities, reect the inuence of global education agendas, with less attention
to context-specic dimensions of inequity linked to conict including ‘pastoralist’ communities and older
youth. Gaps between policy and practice are linked to under-resourcing of the education sector, inequitable
budget allocations across states, counties, and communities (linked to ‘equal’ or ‘transparent’ criteria), and
limited budget allocations and expenditures on equity priorities within the MoEST. In this sense, approaches
to the (re)distribution of opportunities and resources (including increasing support for private education
services) on the part of both government and donors may be reproducing certain dimensions of inequity
linked to conict, along geographic, socio-economic, ethnic, and other lines.
Following the CPA, the expansion of education services was described as a key ‘peace dividend’, with little
attention to how approaches to the (re)distribution of opportunities and resources might reproduce inequity
and contribute to future conict. Failure to deliver these ‘dividends’ and meet community expectations
has affected perceptions of government legitimacy and trust. This in turn has signicant implications for
condence in political representation and vertical dimensions of cohesion (and reconciliation) between
communities and authorities. (Re)distribution of education opportunities and resources in South Sudan
has been hugely affected by the outbreak of violent conict and associated humanitarian responses. This
has raised concerns about (government) representation in education service provision, the emergence of
a ‘parallel’ system of education in conict-affected contexts, and geographic inequities in humanitarian-
development resource allocation, as well as perceptions of ‘conict dividends’.

Caption: © UNICEF/ Girls selling milk in Warrap State, 2015.

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CHAPTER 6. RECOGNITION:
INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL
COHESION IN EDUCATION
6.1 Chapter introduction
The broader dimensions of integration and social cohesion are inuenced by recognition of, respect for,
and responses to diversity, identity, and equity in education structures, processes, and content. This chapter
examines how responses to diversity in schools affects inclusion and integration, including specic attention
to national and border schools, as well as responses to conict and violence in schools. The effects of the
management and governance of the education sector on patterns of cultural violence and inequity are also
examine in this chapter, which also explores how education content and narratives, including languages
of instruction, curriculum content, and the economic relevance of education programs, contribute to both
social cohesion and cultural violence. Finally, this chapter examines aspects of recognition among teachers,
who play a critical role in ensuring inclusive and cohesive learning processes, focusing on the impacts of
recruitment and management practices.
Understanding education’s peacebuilding role
Participant descriptions of the education sector’s peacebuilding role focused primarily on shaping social
relations, behaviours, and identities and contributing to (horizontal) social recognition and cohesion. They
described education, including schooling and co-curricular activities, as promoting peaceful attitudes (e.g.
having ‘peace in your heart’), ‘good’ behaviour (e.g. respect, self-control, obedience), non-violent conict
resolution (e.g. apologising for mistakes, negotiation), and cooperation and coexistence. This reects a view
that reduces cohesion to peace education, rather than considering more complex horizontal and vertical
dimensions of recognition and cohesion.
Education will build peace instead of increasing conict, because it will make people understand how to
solve problems instead of resulting in violence […] If there’s a problem, you discuss or solve it through
dialogue, and maybe you agree and you solve it peacefully rather than taking violence [rst]. (Central
MoEST ofcial)
While these are essential peacebuilding elements, they reect a view of peacebuilding as individual or
inter-personal knowledge, attitude, and behaviour, resulting from learning about peace (peace education)
and inter-group contact (Novelli & Smith, 2011; Tawil, 2001), rather than responding to structural patterns
of political, economic, and cultural inequity that manifest themselves in the education system through
policy, nancing, and implementation. While peacebuilding approaches focusing on inter-group contact and
dialogue can have positive impacts on individuals’ attitudes and relations, they generally have a limited
effect on political and economic structures or realities linked to conict (Abu-Nimer & Hallward, 2007;
Hewstone et al., 2014; Steinberg, 2013).
6.2 School diversity, integration, and cohesion
Diversity in schools: Promoting inclusion and integration
Nearly all participants spoke of the importance of schools in bringing together students of different (ethnic)
groups, to facilitate interaction and understanding. However, school diversity may be limited in areas where
local borders (e.g. payams, counties) are drawn along ethnic lines, with students and teachers more likely
to come from the same community.28 Some participants felt that this can contribute to peace in schools:
“There [are] the borders between county and county, and the people remain in their own […] It is good
because they will have their own peace within themselves” (Central MoEST ofcial). Others felt that “tribal”
schools reinforce divisions, while mixed schools are central to peacebuilding:
28 Quantitative data on student and teacher ethnicity across different locations (e.g. counties, payams, schools, urban or rural
locations) in South Sudan is not available, which limits comprehensive analysis of these trends.

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You have some schools, tribal schools. You see maybe a school for Bari, and right from a teacher to the
pupils, all belong to the same ethnic [group][…] There is no mixing at all [and] they should regard maybe
others as not their friends […] If you have mixed schools, children play together. Different tribes, they are
in school, they make friendship with one another, and they can form a new generation which is different
from the old one which is divided on tribal lines. (Central MoEST ofcial)
School diversity appears to vary by level of education, as well as by location. Diversity may be greater in
urban schools and secondary schools, which tend to draw students from different communities. Primary
students are more likely to remain within their own communities, while secondary students may study
outside their community due to the lack of secondary schools in many areas. Generally, schools in urban
centres were described as being more diverse than schools in rural areas. For example, one primary school
in Tonj East reportedly included students from six or seven payams, representing multiple sections and
clans of the same tribe. Discussions of diversity in schools are also shaped by perceptions of inter-group
difference and similarity, which vary across geographic areas and communities. For example, there may be
greater perceived similarity and lower perceived conict among Equatorial communities (due to similar or
shared languages, for instance) compared to Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and others.
School diversity in different communities may also be increasing due to the scale of internal displacement.
However, while many participants emphasised the importance of diversity in schools, the potential results of
such diversity were rarely critically examined, with interaction, understanding, and unity often an assumed
outcome and the potentially negative implications (e.g. conict) generally silenced.
[In] towns you nd different tribes together, so in the schools also they come together. But the schools in
the payams, like in Wau […] there is only Shilluk around Wau, they are the one who come to the school.
They will not see a Nuer there, they will not see a Dinka there, they will not see a Murle there […] When
they come to Murle one day, ‘This Murle is not my tribe, he’s different,’ so they will hate each other. But
in the towns, they come together. (Participant from Upper Nile)
Questions of diversity and integration are key concerns in education for displaced communities including
IDPs, refugees, and returnees. Partner representatives in Malakal, for example, described ethnic tensions
and violence in the POC (between Nuer, Dinka, and Shilluk communities), resulting in segregation of schools
along ethnic lines. Another partner representative explained that they ensure that education services (e.g.
ALP) are provided (separately) to each ethnic group in the POC, in order to reduce tensions. On the other
hand, actors supporting refugee and returnee communities generally promote school integration with host
communities. One donor representative emphasized the importance of allowing local students to study in
schools for refugee communities, in order to reduce tensions over education costs, as schools for refugees
are free. However, while host community students may be free to access refugee and returnee schools, and
vice-versa, integration may be limited by the physical separation of the communities. One participant in
Warrap state explained that residents are able to attend schools constructed by UN agencies for ‘returnees’
from Sudan. However, returnees have settled on one side of town, apart from the rest of the community, and
this physical separation can limit school integration.
National schools and border schools
Many participants including teachers, school managers, education ofcials, and partner representatives,
emphasized the importance of national secondary schools in bringing together students from different
states and ethnic groups. These schools are meant to be “the symbol of unity, model, cohesion and centers
of excellence in the country […] and set the state for interethnic dialogue, leading to peacebuilding” (MoEST,
2015a: 34). Each state is supposed to have one national secondary boarding school with students from all
states (20 per cent from the host state, 80 per cent from other states), but these schools are “are operating
in name, but not in the full status” (State MoEST ofcial). Students generally come from the host state, with
a few from neighbouring states, and the admissions process can marginalize or exclude certain groups,
reinforcing existing inequities. One school principal explained that student admission is based on absolute
levels of academic performance (South Sudan primary school leaving examination), with no clear criteria
to ensure equitable access based on gender, socio-economic status, or community (e.g. pastoralist, rural)
background.

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People may perceive inequities between national and state-run secondary schools, especially when criteria
for admission are not clearly communicated or are perceived to marginalize certain groups. These potential
impacts are not necessarily recognized by national school management; as one school principal reported,
there is no difference in outcomes between national and state schools because the same curriculum is
used. Inequalities are also perceived to exist between teachers in national and state-run secondary schools.
For example, teachers in national schools reportedly receive housing allowances, which state-managed
teachers do not.
Local border schools, located between counties, payams, or communities, represent another approach
to promote school diversity and reconciliation by bringing together members of conicting groups. For
example, UNICEF has supported the construction of schools along borders between conict-affected payams
in Tonj East County. A donor representative in Malakal described the establishment of education services
along POC borders in response to tensions between Nuer, Dinka, and Shilluk communities. However,
very few participants discussed the potential value of local border schools, which, compared to national
schools, would require fewer resources to establish, benet both primary and secondary students as well as
communities outside state capitals, and specically target conicting groups.
Conict and violence in schools
While aspects of language and curriculum reect ‘cultural’ forms of violence, broader dynamics of direct
conict and violence are also perpetuated in schools (Tawil, 2001), representing the legacy of historical
conict and contributing to intergenerational transmission of violence and to community involvement in
continued conict. In terms of education sector management and governance, this requires attention to
the ways in which different forms of violence (including GBV) are manifested, how conict and violence
in schools and surrounding communities are handled, and how such factors affect horizontal and vertical
relations.
During interviews and group discussions, some participants noted that teachers may be biased toward
particular students, favoring some based on ethnicity or tribe. Primary and secondary teachers generally
reported that they did not observe inter-group (e.g. inter-ethnic) conict between students, although conict
may occur over limited classroom resources (e.g. pens, desks, seating). Previous experiences of violence, and
parental inuence, can affect how students respond to and cope with conict and diversity in schools, which
is increasingly likely given the scale of internal displacement. Some primary students described fear, hatred,
and conict between ‘newcomer’ students and other students, while other students and youth reported that
parents may affect conict dynamics in schools, reecting some intergenerational transmission of fear and
violence: “They will think their child has been treated badly and will bring tribe into it. They will say that the
child is treated badly because of tribe” (Youth representative).
Participants emphasised the role of both teachers and students in responding to school conict. In some
schools, head girls and boys or student committees will address conict between other students, while
teachers (disciplinary committees) deal with disciplinary measures and more serious conicts. Students and
teachers in different schools reported that conicts are addressed through mediation and dialogue. While
some students described the use of physical discipline methods (for example, one primary student referred
to students ‘who deserve a stick’), teachers denied using physical punishment. This may reect limited
knowledge of alternative discipline methods, with some teachers reporting the need for training on conict
management skills (and classroom management in general). Teachers’ experiences of violence, as well as
systems of power based on fear or humiliation, may also inuence their classroom approaches, reecting
legacies of exposure to previous conict and militarized governance systems. Numerous participants
explained that as a result of decades of violence in South Sudan, people ‘just react’ (violently) to disputes.
Many participants described the key role of PBEA life skills and peacebuilding education (LS&PE) in promoting
non-violent conict response on the part of both teachers and students. This program is being piloted in pre-
primary, primary, secondary, alternative, and vocational education, in both EiE and ‘development’ contexts,
and for out-of-school youth. During a joint UNICEF-MoEST conference in 2014, MoEST and MoCYS signed
a Communiqué on Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace (including both formal and non-formal learning
spaces). The two ministries are currently developing standards for learning spaces as zones of peace. In
addition, the updated Education Sector Plan (currently under development) refers to the establishment of
learner support services to respond to legacies of past and current violence.

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GBV is another key factor affecting education experiences and outcomes, reecting broader patterns of
discrimination and violence, and how vulnerability to violence is increased in conict situations. The national
curriculum framework refers to gender equity and stereotypes, but does not appear to include specic GBV
content. International partners have provided GBV training to school actors, and GBV and sexual health is
included in the LS&PE curriculum, reecting their importance in peacebuilding. These topics should be fully
covered at all levels in the national curriculum. National Standard Operating Procedures for GBV Prevention,
Protection, and Response (MoGCSW, 2014) call for MoEST to develop strategies to address GBV in schools
and ensure safe environments for survivors. No school representatives spoke of specic responses in
education spaces or content. Forms of GBV do not appear to be taken seriously at the school level; one
group of male secondary teachers referred to sexual harassment as a ‘very minor’ form of violence. This
might also reect teachers’ involvement in GBV, as well as broader societal impunity or acceptance in
response to certain forms of GBV (such as marriage between male teachers and female students). There also
exist broader systemic barriers to GBV reporting and response, including non-enforcement of existing laws
and guidelines and reliance on customary judicial structures (CARE, 2014; D’Awol, 2011).
Participant discussions involved limited attention to connections between GBV and broader conict and
peacebuilding dynamics. This reects broader marginalization of structural gendered violence in security
and peacebuilding efforts, which often refer to the end of male-dominated violence despite the continuation
of GBV (Handrahan, 2004; Pankhurst, 2003). Community security responses in South Sudan have generally
paid limited attention to forms of domestic and community violence affecting women, which have persisted
since the CPA (D’Awol, 2011; Oosterom, 2014). This reects limited recognition of the different forms of
violence that affect diverse student and teacher populations in the education sector.
6.3 Integration, cohesion, and cultural violence in the curriculum
Languages of instruction
English is the ofcial language of instruction in South Sudan. This is intended to contribute to the formation
of national identity, equitable access to economic opportunities, and regional ties and trade (Power &
Simpson, 2011), illustrating the political and economic priorities associated with language of instruction
policies. While some participants acknowledged the role of English as a unifying language, they were
more preoccupied with the challenges associated with the transition from Arabic to English learning. Many
teachers use Arabic or national languages to provide explanations or examples to students, and some felt
that Arabic would be a more practical (and unifying) language: “People can unite using the language. South
Sudanese, they speak Arabic as their language, almost everybody speaks Arabic as their lingua franca”
(Central MoEST ofcial). Many participants expressed frustration with the perceived lack of attention to the
practicalities of the transition from Arabic to English, but explained that English as the ofcial language
cannot be questioned:
The announcement of English language as the language of instruction and ofcial language is political
[…] No one thought about, ‘Okay, this is going to be the ofcial language. How is it going to be
implemented?’ No one thought about it, and it’s still hanging […] [But] English is the ofcial language.
That one, you can never even discuss it. It cannot be discussed. (NGO representative)
The Education Act and national curriculum framework call for national language (or ‘mother tongue’)
instruction in early primary years, to respond to ethno-linguistic diversity, increase school access, and
facilitate early learning (MoEST, 2014b). P1 to P3 would be taught in national languages, with a move to
English and Arabic from P4 onwards. The term ‘national languages’ reects Education Act and Transitional
Constitution statements that all indigenous languages are ‘national’ rather than ‘local’ languages. While
some participants described the benets of national language instruction, many discussed the selection of
languages for instruction as linked to inequity and conict. Language selection is an extremely sensitive
and political issue, as language is so closely tied to ethnicity and identity: “The language here is the vehicle
of culture […] Everybody wants his language to appear” (Central MoEST ofcial). This illustrates language’s
unifying and dividing role, with selection reecting either recognition or repression (Bush & Saltarelli,
2000; Tawil, 2001). Language selection may result in frustration and anger among particular groups when
education services are seen to represent certain group interests while excluding others.

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We have 64 languages […] Of course the country cannot implement 64 languages. Now, we know that
the country’s undergoing a lot of war and all this, a lot of tribal afliations, so the problem comes if
the country, the curriculum now […] there are certain languages that will not be implemented. (Central
MoEST ofcial)
In this sense, national language policy efforts and implementation have the potential to contribute to
identity-based divisions and pressures for conict linked to language-based dimensions of education access
and outcomes. They can also affect the perceived representativeness of education sector decision-makers,
thus affecting vertical dimensions of social cohesion.
While a policy framework for national languages is being developed, it is unclear how many languages
will be selected for piloting and instruction, how they will be selected, and by whom. The 2013-2014 budget
document identied 10 languages for national language instruction (Dinka, Nuer, Zande, Bari, Shilluk,
Murle, Moru, Avokaya, Mondu, and Baka) (MoFCIEP, 2013), although participants more recently reported
that three to six pilot languages would be selected. The level at which languages of instruction will be
selected has signicant implications for their perceived representativeness in schools and communities.
Individual schools, states, and the central MoEST have, at different points, been identied as responsible
for language selection, with no mention of community involvement. The languages to be selected are those
with an existing writing system and basic literacy materials. These would likely be the language of the
majority group (Spronk, 2014).
These language selection guidelines risk further marginalizing minority groups, and raise questions as to
how ‘majority’ is dened; does this refer to the majority language of a school, payam, county, or state?
While some different language groups may understand one another, there are also differences in language
among sections of the same group. For example, some words may be different for Dinka communities in
Lakes state versus Warrap. The national language policy proposes additional research on the ‘inclusiveness’
of national languages with respect to gender, disability, and urban/rural location, which is key to ensuring
that language selection does not further disadvantage these groups.
Some education ofcials suggested that national language instruction might be more appropriate in rural
areas than in more diverse urban centres, where English may be a more appropriate language of instruction:
“The mother tongue is supposed to be taught in the rural areas. [In] the towns [there] is a combination of
different tribes so no language could be chosen to be taught” (Central MoEST ofcial). In general, however,
lower value may be attached to national language learning by teachers, students, and families, given that
political and economic engagement, for example, employment, is often linked to prociency in English,
Arabic, or other regional languages such as Kiswahili or French, which are identied as languages of
instruction at the secondary level in the national curriculum framework.
National language instruction may also affect the deployment of primary teachers, who may be more
likely to remain in their home communities or experience frustration or resentment if deployed to an area
where a different language is taught, as illustrated by a central MoEST ofcial: “[If] you transfer him to
another state, he has to learn another language […] ‘Why should I learn the language of another person?’”
Primary students may be more likely to be taught by teachers of the same ethno-linguistic group, affecting
school diversity. Other challenges affecting national language instruction, and associated inequities, include
inadequate teacher capacity training in national languages, cost of producing learning materials, lack of
a clear implementation plan, and inadequate budgetary resources. National languages received only 0.1
per cent of the education budget in 2014-2015 and in 2013-2014, no national language funds were actually
disbursed for the development of language policies (MoFCIEP, 2014), demonstrating a mismatch between
policy aspiration and realistic implementation.
Curriculum content
South Sudan’s revised national curriculum framework,29 covering Early Childhood Development (ECD),
primary, and secondary levels, was launched in October 2015. It focuses on promoting national citizenship,
unity, and cohesion, with LS&PE, Environmental Education, and Human Rights as cross-cutting components.
29 The national curriculum review process began in 2013, drawing on existing primary and secondary curricula developed after
2005. The revised framework, launched in September 2015, represents South Sudan’s rst comprehensive national curriculum.
The process was supported by UNICEF GPE and DFID, reecting the inuence of global education priorities on the national
curriculum.

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While many participants described the importance of LS&PE in changing individual attitudes and behavior,
some donor and peacebuilding representatives noted that simply adding peacebuilding components to the
curriculum will not change long-held, group-level beliefs. This emphasizes the importance of concurrently
addressing structural aspects of conict. Structural patterns of marginalization and inequity are reected
in representations of historical narratives, citizenship, and identity. These curriculum issues are key to
reconciliation and peacebuilding, either representing one ‘ofcial’ national history or citizenship (for
political purposes) or recognizing and legitimizing, rather than suppressing, diverse stories, experiences,
and identities (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Cole & Barsalou, 2006; Davies, 2004a; Tawil, 2001), redressing or
entrenching patterns of cultural marginalization.
Many participants described how the current curriculum, which draws on curricula from neighbouring
countries, lacks relevance for students and limits the development of a cohesive national identity. As one
county MoEST ofcial stated, “These curricula are confusing our people […] Children mentally will be
geared toward other countries.” Participants stressed the importance of students being able to learn about
the geography, history, leaders, and people of South Sudan, including traditional knowledge and practices
(e.g. traditional systems of governance, conict resolution, and reconciliation), in order to strengthen
connections to the past.
The importance of promoting a ‘shared’ history has been emphasized as part of broader peacebuilding and
reconciliation approaches, such as the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation. The revised
curriculum framework refers to the importance of historical narratives, such as South Sudan’s struggle
for independence and key leaders, although it is not clear how these will be represented, as curriculum
materials are under development. Subjects such as geography also involve questions of recognition; for
example, given current conict linked to local borders and territories, the representation of payam and
county borders in learning materials requires signicant consideration.
Curriculum development presents an opportunity to formulate inclusive representations of national
identity and citizenship that promote cohesion and belonging. The education system (citizenship, political,
and legal education) plays a key role in the development of civic culture in conict-affected contexts, with
critical understandings of human rights, discrimination, accountability, identity, diversity, and nationalism
identied as being of particular importance (Davies, 2004a). Participant discussions of ‘constructive’
citizenship, particularly at the central MoEST level, focused primarily on legal rights and responsibilities,
rather than questions of identity (ethnic, linguistic, religious, geographic, etc.). Some peacebuilding and
CSO representatives emphasized the need to acknowledge the central importance of ethnic or tribal identity,
rather than focusing only on ‘national’ identity. However, it has also been noted that in contexts affected
by violent conict and identity-based divisions, a focus on rights and responsibilities, rather than ethnic or
cultural identity, may be considered a more appropriate approach to citizenship education (Smith, 2003).
MoEST ofcials emphasized the importance of states’ involvement in the curriculum development process
to ensure representation and relevance, of particular importance in the post-independence context: “Every
citizen in South Sudan must feel that he’s in there […] because we were not included in the curriculum done
by the North. We don’t see ourselves inside there” (Central MoEST ofcial). This reects the use of education
as a tool of political and economic power and southern repression and control by post-colonial Sudanese
authorities, based on an Arabic language, Islamic religious curriculum (Breidlid, 2010, 2013) that almost
completely excluded southern histories, cultures, and religions (Oyenak, 2006, cited in Breidlid, 2010).
Under the current system in South Sudan, state ministries were formally involved in curriculum and sector
policy development but county and payam ofcials were not. This potentially limits recognition of diverse
experiences and identities across places and groups within states and reproducing patterns of historical and
cultural marginalization within national curricula.
Integration and cohesion processes are also affected by the continued use of curricula from neighboring
countries. The use of different curricula across schools and regions was identied by a number of participants
as a form of inequity, resulting in different learning outcomes for students, some of whom expressed
confusion and frustration over the use of different curricula. The adoption of the English-language curriculum
has been more difcult for northern states, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region, compared to
Equatorial states bordering East African countries. The current conict has also delayed the transition to
the South Sudan curriculum: “We have to phase out all the Arabic syllabuses, but war now has stopped
everything” (Participant from Upper Nile). This may also be linked to post-2011 shifts in the geography of
violence and ‘centralisation’ of authority in Juba, with greater stability in the Equatorial states facilitating
education management and curriculum implementation.

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The frontline states, especially Greater Upper Nile, most of them are Arab pattern [...] They were so
much oriented to the education system in Sudan, so for them to switch quickly to the South Sudan
curriculum, to the language of instruction, is still a huge challenge [...] They are really doing very badly,
while teachers of states like Greater Equatoria that are very close to East Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and so
on, they do very well. (Central MoEST ofcial)
Decentralization of education has been associated with lower consistency in the implementation of national
curriculum (Astiz et al., 2002), both in terms of language and content. This might be due to disparities in
implementation capacity on the part of decentralized authorities in different locations, or their resistance
to centralised policies linked to perceived marginalization (non-recognition) of particular languages or
cultural or geographical narratives from national curricula. This presents a challenge to the push for the
implementation of a unied, consistent curriculum in South Sudan, which was described by numerous
participants as central to educational equity as well as the development of national identity. Geographic
differences and disparities in curriculum implementation and teaching approaches are also linked to the
fragmentation of inspection and supervision approaches due to a lack of a national framework, with sub-
national ofces developing their own tools and procedures. The disparities are also related to a variation in
the capacities of state and county inspectors, as well as payam supervisors. Lack of a national inspection
framework has led to a variation in content and quality of guidelines across states, counties, and payams.
MoEST is currently in the process of developing this framework.
Narratives of diversity: Reproducing exclusion and cultural violence
Although national government (and MoEST) discourse reects a general attempt to deny ethnic divisions,
the ways in which education sector actors speak about different groups or communities reect systems and
structures of cultural violence that contribute to inequities and alienation and contribute to pressures for
conict. For example, in ‘peaceful’ regions, discussions of conict and peacebuilding often focus on ‘others’
(other ethnic groups or geographic locations) who are involved in violence; one participant suggested that
teachers in Central Equatoria refer to violence among groups in Jonglei and Upper Nile as examples for
students during peace club activities. While this can stimulate discussion of conict and peacebuilding
issues, it also has the potential to contribute to divisive ‘us/them’ perceptions and strengthen pre-existing
ethnic or tribal stereotypes.
Caption: © UNICEF/ Cattle herding in Warrap State, 2015

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Participants in all states consistently identied cattle-keeping communities as responsible for insecurity and
violence, linked to ‘bad’ cultural practices or traditions, cattle raiding and reprisal attacks, and cross-border
movement to neighbouring counties and states. Some MoEST ofcials described education as a means of
“teaching them other ways” (playing a ‘civilizing’ role) in order to reduce tensions and conict. For example,
by preventing population movement, reducing group contact, and promoting commercial activities through
formal education.
If we would compare those who are in the cattle camps and those who are in the school, I think there is
a bit of difference, like those who are in the cattle camp who misbehave in a different setting compared
to the others, especially if you compared the cattle keepers and the other communities in South Sudan.
(International organisation representative)
We want our communities to be stable. They need to settle so that we build for them permanent houses,
and then build houses for the teachers […] I’m talking about targeting the Greater Upper Nile and the
Bahr el Ghazal, then we need those communities to settle. (Central MoEST ofcial)
While cattle-keeping communities are involved in violent conict, a focus on ‘bad’ culture limits attention
to the political, economic, and environmental dimensions of violence. Consistently negative descriptions or
portrayals of diverse cattle-keeping communities and their cultural, economic, and political systems, have
the potential to (further) stigmatize, marginalize, or alienate communities, rather than recognize or validate
the diverse identities and cultures. This can also inuence communities’ engagement with education
services, if they perceive them to be focused on changing their culture. It may also negatively affect the
perceived legitimacy and representativeness of education ofcials and institutions, thus affecting vertical
dimensions of cohesion and trust. This reects the importance of considering representations of cultural
diversity in formal policies and curricula, as well as in terms of how actors, particularly at the ministry level,
speak about diverse communities and the role of education.
Many participants explained that conict and violence happen because people are uneducated or ‘ignorant’
(and thus vulnerable to mobilization by politics or armed groups), and that peace can occur when people
are educated, as they will know how to resolve conict without violence and resist mobilization. Many
also described education’s peacebuilding role in terms of changing ‘bad’ cultural values and practices:
“Education can open the mind [and] make you civilized […] Due to lack of education, some people, some
other tribes from other places are not educated, their behavior here is different” (State-level MoEST ofcial).
While education does play a key role in promoting positive changes in behaviour and attitudes, the equation
of formal education with peace and ‘civilization’, and lack of formal education with ignorance and ‘violent
cultures’ has the potential to stigmatize, marginalize, or alienate particular communities, as well as limit
attention to structural inequities that contribute to the marginalization of those communities. Only two
participants questioned the assumption that being educated necessarily leads to peace, explaining that
conict (including the current ghting between government and opposition) is often driven by ‘educated’
elites. They explained that this illustrates the importance of distinguishing between ‘academic’ learning and
other dimensions of education.
6.4 Economic relevance of education programs
Participants’ descriptions of primary, secondary, and AES curriculum priorities and content reect their
limited cultural and economic relevance for certain communities and livelihoods systems, including youth
from rural and cattle-keeping communities. This represents how education sector policy decisions and
implementation perpetuate cultural violence as well as political and economic inequities. As discussed
in Section 4.2, children and youth in cattle-keeping communities face particular barriers to education (at
primary and post-primary levels), linked to lack of education services, cattle-herding responsibilities and
the cultural and economic irrelevance of formal education and training programs. While parents and young
people may consider formal education as important in order to facilitate access to wider economic and
political participation (Forcier, 2013), research participants explained that cattle-keeping communities do
not view formal curricula as relevant to their cultural and economic needs. Instead, they prioritize informal
cultural learning and development of practical livelihoods skills (e.g. milk production and cattle treatment)
by working in cattle camps. Parents may choose certain children to go to school while others supervise cattle
(a time-consuming activity), in order to balance education with immediate livelihood needs, protect family

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wealth, and wider community obligations. Some participants explained that children who are sent to school
might be those considered unable to properly supervise cattle.
This reects the importance of more exible, relevant education options (e.g. afternoon lessons when cattle
are resting) that enable young people to balance school and cattle-herding responsibilities. Participants
emphasized the importance of adapting curricula to local contexts, as one youth union representative
explained, young people in rural areas are looking for training on agriculture or cattle management, rather
than, for example, micro-enterprise training (“They have their cows, they don’t need money”). Within the
education sector, however, there appears to limited focus on livelihoods skills such as agriculture or animal
(e.g. cattle) husbandry, although these have been identied as important training areas (Atari & McKague,
2014). While some donors such as USAID and FAO are funding agriculture and animal care programs, as
well as education programs for pastoralist communities in collaboration with relevant ministries, consistent
links with the education sector at all levels appear weak. There may also be tensions between ministries
involved in such projects (e.g. agriculture and education) over access to project resources.
Additionally, training (TVET) programs generally focus on ‘modern’ commercial trades such as construction,
carpentry, welding, masonry, auto mechanics, computers, food processing, and tailoring, which may be
more suited to urban or peri-urban areas where opportunities and access to materials are greater. This
focus on ‘productive’ income-generating activities can devalue and marginalize unpaid productive work
traditionally carried out by women or members of rural communities, including household labor and
small-scale agriculture, as well as cattle-keeping communities. In South Sudan, youth are concentrated in
agricultural and livestock sectors, with 62 per cent of employed individuals aged 15 and older working in
agriculture, forestry, or sheries (SSCCSE, 2010a, 2010b). ‘Cookie-cutter’ approaches to training supported
by neo-liberal global education agendas focused on market economies can fuel grievances when young
people are encouraged to focus on formal knowledge and skills that are not aligned with local conditions.
These youth may end up frustrated by the lack of economic opportunities in their communities.
The cultural and economic irrelevance of formal education to certain communities and livelihoods represents
a key dimension of educational inequality emerging from this research. Disconnections between education
and training curricula and local economies limit parents’ decisions to send their children to school, contribute
to early school leaving, and reproduce patterns of marginalization and inequity along socio-economic lines.
Similar ndings are noted in a recent study on ‘pastoralist’ communities in Kenya (Scott-Villiers et al., 2015),
which highlights the signicant risks for a ‘lost generation’ of young people vulnerable to involvement in
armed violence due to the irrelevance of the available formal educational opportunities.
6.5 Teacher diversity and cohesion: The impact of recruitment and management practices
Most participants discussed school diversity and cohesion with a focus on students, with only a few referring
to diversity and cohesion among teachers and managers. However, recruitment and management practices
can (re)produce inequities among teachers linked to factors such as geographic location, ethnicity, and
language.
Diversity, cohesion, and inequity in teacher recruitment and management
Recruitment and deployment processes have signicant effects on diversity and inequity among teachers.
However, these processes are fragmented due to a lack of clear guidelines and procedures and affected
by broader political developments in the country. Teacher recruitment and deployment at both primary
and secondary levels, is the responsibility of the state MoEST and as such, procedures vary across states.
Teachers are generally deployed within their own counties and payams, which can limit diversity among
teachers in a school or community. Teachers in national secondary schools are the exception as they are
nationally recruited and deployed to different states. Participants perceived benets and limitations of this
‘localized’ deployment; some felt that this approach can help ensure teacher familiarity with local culture
and language, foster community trust in teachers, and enable teachers to serve as role models within their
own communities: “They know where they are applying to, they know that they are going to work in that
particular community” (County education ofcial). However, this can also limit teachers’ mobility, potentially
disadvantaging those restricted to remote or conict-affected counties or payams. Other participants felt
that deployment across different states and counties could enable teachers to learn about different places,
people, and languages, and share knowledge, contributing to a sense of nationalism.

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Broader political networks inuence teacher recruitment and deployment processes, resulting in the
marginalization of particular groups or communities. For example, one group of primary teachers reported
that state ministries recruit teachers from particular ethnic groups or counties, and some payam ofcials
reported that the state ministry recruits (unqualied) relatives as teachers so that they can receive salaries,
with teacher recruitment used as part of patronage and rent-seeking networks (Ratcliffe & Perry, 2009).
These aspects of recruitment are reected in the management of teacher promotion or advancement, which
primary and secondary teachers identied as another key source of inequity and frustration. Teachers can
spend 10 or 15 years in the same grade without being promoted or receiving a salary increase, with their
salary grade not necessarily reecting experience and performance. This is a particular source of frustration
among teachers who began teaching prior to 2005 and who expected improved professional conditions,
support, and opportunities with the CPA and independence. Teacher representatives reported that teachers
in certain counties and from certain ethnic groups are promoted while others are not, as are civil servants
from other ministries. This creates inequity when teachers who are due for promotion do not receive it and
echoes the misuse of recruitment processes as part of patronage and rent-seeking processes. While some
explained that this is due to a shortage of funds to cover salary increases, others were sceptical: “You will
remain in your grade until you die or go to pension, [but] they don’t want you to ask about this” (Teacher
union representative).
The recruitment of contract (e.g. part-time) or volunteer teachers by sub-national education authorities or
school governing bodies has resulted in socio-economic inequities within the teaching workforce, as these
teachers receive nominal or no remuneration. In 2013, volunteer or ‘unknown’ (e.g. part-time) teachers
accounted for nearly one-third of teachers at primary (28 per cent), secondary (31 per cent), and AES (38 per
cent) levels (MoEST, 2014a). Reliance on contract or volunteer teachers results from the inadequate provision
of teachers to schools, which is in turn connected to inadequate education sector budget allocations. State
salary transfers do not cover all recruited teachers, with states expected to cover funding gaps:
[If the states] have more teachers recruited now, they are considered volunteers. We are not responsible
for them. We wanted the states themselves to top up that money […] The budget gets xed because our
budget also here has not been increased at the national level […] We have not increased the salary from
here, for states. (Central MoEST ofcial)
Teacher performance is affected by fragmentation of training, inspection, and supervision approaches.
Fragmentation of teacher training experiences is linked to variations in the management of TTIs in
different states and between government and private (e.g. faith-based) TTIs, and to a reliance on donor-
supported teacher training programs due to the limited functioning of government teacher training services.
Government TTIs are centrally run, admitting students from across the country, although many may remain
in their own states, either by choice or due to a lack of nancial resources necessary to study in another
state. TTIs have been closed in conict-affected states, which limits access to training. Additionally, in the
current conict context, certain groups may be excluded from training opportunities along ethnic lines. For
example, one participant described the exclusion of Nuer students from government TTIs and universities
in the Equatorial states, due in part to concerns for student safety. As one central MoEST ofcial noted, “The
majority of people who are teachers of this country come from Equatoria region […] The rest of the areas,
those people there, they don’t even want to become teachers”.
Geographic inequities in teacher management are linked to the fragmentation of inspection and supervision
approaches. As noted above, no national inspection or supervision frameworks have been implemented, and
sub-national ofces generally develop their own tools and procedures. Variations in tools and procedures
and in capacities of state and county inspectors and payam supervisors result in disparities in approaches
to teacher management, contributing to inequities in teacher support and teaching quality across states,
counties, and payams. Failure to address inequities in teacher training, recruitment, deployment, and
supervision, as well as support through payment of allowances and resource materials and recognition
of teachers’ status, can contribute to the entrenchment of broader perceived inequalities in access to
professional opportunities and resources across demographic groups and geographic locations.
Teacher salaries and professional recognition
Teacher salaries and support are of critical importance when considering issues of recognition, diversity,

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and vertical dimensions of cohesion. Participants described severe inequities in salary scales across
ministries, with teachers receiving the lowest salaries of all civil servants, although differences may also
result when civil servants in some sectors receive allowances (in addition to base salaries) while others
do not. Most primary teachers are at the ‘non-professional’ Grade 14 on the salary scale, receiving roughly
SSP 300 a month, although specic amounts vary by state. Secondary teachers start at Grade 9 (based on
‘required’ qualications), receiving roughly SSP 900, although a review of teacher pay scales is reportedly
being planned. Low salaries are of particular concern given the current economic climate, with rising costs
of living and rapid depreciation of the SSP: “A teacher is getting something like SSP 250 or 300 […] The
rate of a dollar in the black market is SSP [7], that means what they are getting is less than 50 dollars”
(Central MoEST ofcial). This economic devaluing of teachers’ professional role results in feelings of
discouragement, resentment, and frustration, and also negatively affects motivation and retention: “If you
don’t pay a teacher well then you are making him a third class in the society. He’s supposed to be a rst
citizen of this country because he is training people for the future” (Central MoEST ofcial).
Teachers and MoEST ofcials at all levels described delayed, irregular, or non-payment of teacher salaries
and incentives. While this may be linked to weak salary payment systems at the central and sub-national
levels, some participants believed that non-payment of teacher salaries is due to diversion of funds at
the state level: “When these states receive this money, instead they go and pay their local staff instead of
paying teachers. That little money that goes to the teachers, the state governments use it for other things”
(Central MoEST ofcial). Others reported that delays or non-payment of government salaries is linked to the
prioritization of security spending, reecting another source of tension between social service and security
sectors: “[Teachers] spend three, four months without salary. The money’s not there [...] We are no longer a
priority. The priority is the war, all the resources are going to the war” (Central MoEST ofcial).30
This reects
the political and economic prioritization of the security sector, contributing to inequitable distribution (and
diversion) of education resources linked to local political and conict dynamics.
Many teachers seek better-paying jobs in other sectors, which affects distribution of teachers and quality of
teaching. As some teachers and ministry ofcials explained, ‘good’ teachers obtain other jobs while those
unable to do so remain in teaching: “Teaching is work for people who have failed from other big things”
(Central MoEST ofcial). Teachers also join security forces (particularly in conict-affected states), where
entry-level salaries are higher, reecting a key impact of education inequality on armed violence through
the creation of pressures for involvement in armed groups:
Imagine, somebody who has studied for eight years in primary school and goes to secondary school for
three years. 11 years. When he sits [the] Sudan school certicate, he’s going to be appointed in Grade 14,
and Grade 14 gets only SSP 270 […] A villager who has never gone to school, when he comes and gets
recruited to the police, then he will get 700 […] This makes a teacher not feel at home. Some of them,
they are even transferring to organized forces because of the high salaries. (State MoEST ofcial)
Differences in salary scales also exist within the teaching workforce. Teachers in national secondary schools
are recruited and paid by the central MoEST, rather than the state, and receive higher salaries than state-
supported teachers as they receive housing allowances in addition to their salaries. For example, teachers
in national secondary schools may earn SSP 1,400 at Grade 9, compared to roughly SSP 900 for state
teachers in the same grade. However, as some teacher representatives stated, recruitment criteria for
national teachers are unclear, which causes resentment among state-supported teachers. Teacher payment
has also been used as a tool in the context of the current conict. Some participants reported that teachers
in opposition-held areas are not receiving salaries, and that in government-held areas in conict states,
teachers from certain ethnic groups (e.g. Dinka, Shilluk) are receiving salaries while others (e.g. Nuer) are
not. In this sense, education (teacher) management, through salary payment, is used to ‘punish’ those said
to be associated with the opposition (through ethnicity alone) and to coerce loyalty.
30 Interview conducted in January 2015. At the time of writing (November 2015), the parallel exchange rate was approximately
SSP 18=USD 1, while the ofcial exchange rate remains unchanged at SSP 2.9 (Bank of South Sudan, 2015). Salary or income
inequalities are further exacerbated by differential access to preferential exchange rates, with certain people (those with the ‘right’
connections) able to access US dollars at the ofcial rate and sell them for SSP at the parallel rate.

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Teachers and language inequities
Language capacity is a key concern for teachers and education ofcials and partners, reecting a key
aspect of inequity as well as affecting teaching performance and integration. The majority of qualied
teachers, primarily in northern states, were trained under the Sudanese Arabic pattern system. Few have
received comprehensive language training to enable them to teach in English. This presents barriers to their
adaptation to the English-language South Sudan curriculum (Janke & Reisman, 2014; Power & Simpson,
2011; Watkins, 2013). Some teachers had received shorter-term in-service training, but this was viewed as
insufcient to enable them to acquire the skills needed to teach in English with condence. In addition
to teaching ability, language capacity affects professional opportunities, such as promotion to education
management positions: “Without English, there are a lot of things which is going ahead, which will not wait
for you, somebody who doesn’t know English” (State MoEST ofcial). For qualied Arabic-pattern teachers,
difculties in teaching in English and accessing professional opportunities reect a process of de-skilling or
‘de-professionalization’.
Participants at all levels described a critical need for English-language training for Arabic pattern teachers.
While in-service teacher training is meant to include English-language training (GRSS, 2012a; MoFCIEP,
2013), nearly all school managers and teachers reported that no government training has been provided,
with some explaining that they learned English on their own, without any support. While the AES includes
intensive English courses, state-level MoEST ofcials reported that these are provided for other government
employees (e.g. prison guards), but not for teachers. There may be uncertainty or disagreement within
the MoEST over responsibility for teacher language training (the Directorate of Quality Promotion and
Innovation is responsible for teacher training, while AES is responsible for English courses), and no budget
is allocated for teacher language training: “They have never, ever budgeted, in their annual grants from the
central government, to train teachers in English language. It has always been a donor thing” (International
NGO representative). However, MoEST is currently developing a policy framework for English language
training in collaboration with Windle Trust and UNICEF.
Teachers’ perceptions of fairness in allocation of resources and opportunities (e.g. salaries, training,
promotion) and professional recognition and respect affect their perceptions of government legitimacy and
trust in government authorities (Davies, 2011; Rose & Greeley, 2006). Inadequate salaries and disparities
across sectors, salary delays and non-payment, nepotism and patronage in recruitment and promotion
opportunities, and perceived disregard for the profession affect teachers’ condence in government and
their perceptions of broader government legitimacy, negatively affecting vertical dimensions of cohesion.
This also affects public recognition of teachers’ status: “Because of the low salary, low regard by political
leaders at the top, people up there, toward teachers, [the] attitude toward teachers is so negative” (Central
MoEST ofcial).
6.6 Chapter summary
The role of schools in bringing together members of diverse communities is often identied as a key
contribution of the education sector. However, education services promoting unity and cohesion may
not necessarily be equitable, and may actually contribute to further inequity and exclusion. For example,
there are geographic and socio-economic inequities in access to national secondary schools intended to
bring together students from diverse communities. While responses to diversity and conict represent
opportunities to address the legacies of violence and contribute to (re)building both horizontal and vertical
relations of trust, the ways in which policies and practices afrm or exclude diverse identities or forms of
violence can reinforce patterns of inequity and contribute to pressures for continued conict.
Education system policies and content have the potential to (re)produce patterns of cultural violence linked to
languages of instruction (including the selection of national languages), the validation of particular versions
of history and citizenship, ministry narratives that dismiss or disrespect ‘bad’ or ‘backward’ communities
or cultures, and the development of formal curricula that focus on ‘productive’ economic activities and
are not aligned with the economic and cultural priorities of diverse communities (of particular importance
for cattle-keeping communities). These patterns of inequity contribute to pressures for violence linked to
political, economic, and cultural marginalization in terms of representation in decision-making, recognition
of identities and livelihoods, and access to relevant education opportunities.

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Teachers, in addition to students, experience horizontal and vertical inequities that affect recognition and
cohesion. Fragmented recruitment and management approaches, ‘localized’ deployment, recruitment
and promotion based on patronage networks, salary disparities between sectors and within education
(e.g. national and state teachers, permanent and contract teachers), and language capacity differences
contribute to inequities along geographic, ethnic, and socio-economic lines. These reect broader political
and economic dynamics contributing to pressures for conict, including allocation of opportunities and
resources to mobilize and reward connections, as well as the negative effects on vertical relations of trust
in government.

A teacher at a primary school in Western Bahr el Ghazal, 2015

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CHAPTER 7. REPRESENTATION:
EDUCATION SECTOR
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT
7.1 Chapter introduction
Representation concerns participation in governance and decision-making at all levels of education, from
communities and schools to the central government. While approaches to decentralization may focus
on technical aspects of institutional reform or capacity development, this research considers ‘political’
dimensions, including dynamics of representation and power, and perceived ‘voice’ in governance processes.
This chapter examines approaches to decentralized education governance in South Sudan, examining
perceptions of decentralization and participation in decision-making among education authorities as well
as the inuence of local political structures on decision-making processes. Aspects of representation at the
school level are also explored, including the role of school governing bodies in school-based management
and the representation of teachers in decision-making. Finally, the representation of youth in decision-
making processes is examined.
7.2 Approaches to decentralized governance
South Sudan’s education system is meant to reect the country’s broader system of political decentralization,
as well as associated inequities in distribution of power and representation in decision-making. Different
types of decentralization exist, involving different objectives and forms of decision-making authority.
Deconcentration (often considered the weakest form of decentralization) redistributes nancial and
management responsibilities among different levels of the central government (e.g. to local administrative
ofcials under the supervision of central government ministries). Delegation involves the transfer of
responsibility for decision-making and administration to semi-autonomous authorities accountable to the
central government, but with a great deal of decision-making power. Devolution involves the transfer of
nance and management responsibilities to quasi-autonomous local governments with decision-making
authority within recognized geographical borders (World Bank, n.d.).
South Sudan’s 2009 Local Government Act and 2011 Transitional Constitution both refer to a system of
decentralized governance based on the devolution of power and authority to state and local governments
(GoSS 2009, 2011b). International donors actively support decentralized governance as part of broader state-
building efforts in South Sudan, including social service delivery, emphasising scal decentralization, local
nancing and improved resource mobilization, capacity development, and enhanced local service delivery
as well as efciency and accountability (UN, 2012; USAID, 2011b; World Bank, 2013a). However, discussions
with central and sub-national government ofcials reected tensions between the perceived importance of
locally responsive service delivery and more centralized policy development and management in practice.
Perceptions of decentralization in education
Several education-sector participants described potential benets of decentralization for the education
system, as a means of increasing efciency and accountability, needs-responsive decision-making
and resource allocation, and government visibility and legitimacy. Some participants explained that
decentralization also contributes to increased service quality through competition between states, counties,
and schools. One participant explained that decentralization allows regions that are more advanced in
education to further expand their own education systems, and can serve as examples for surrounding
regions, reecting a devolved form of decentralization. Others spoke of decentralization as promoting local
ownership and engagement in service provision, particularly in hard-to-reach areas:
There’s a state of ownership, because we made it and we own it and we can run it, so that is the benet.
It also promotes a lot of teamwork, you know, people go together […] ‘If these are the resources, then
A teacher at a primary school in Western Bahr el Ghazal, 2015

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we need to divide these resources accordingly,’ so that it allows for proper accountability. (State MoEST
ofcial)
Some donors channel resources directly to local authorities, such as county governments, while supporting
institutional capacity development at central and state levels. For example, GESS (UK) and IMED (EU)
programs both support decentralized service delivery through school capitation grants, and the World
Bank-supported Local Services Support (LSS) program focuses on strengthening local government service
delivery, transferring payam development grants for local projects (such as school construction) directly to
county governments. One donor representative explained that sending funds directly to counties is faster
and more efcient, as they pass through fewer hands, while another described the importance of local
engagement: “Strong community involvement in education needs to be maintained and strengthened,
especially in terms of reducing misuse of funds and facilities by ofcials”. While this can strengthen local
service delivery and participation, it can also reinforce disconnections and tensions between central and
local governments, as well as potentially undermining the legitimacy of state governments. This reects a
key tension between ‘centralised’ and ‘decentralized’ approaches to governance.
Decentralization is described as facilitating political reform and enhancing stability in conict-affected
contexts, responding to political and economic dimensions of conict by dispersing power from centrist
structures, responding to diverse population needs, and increasing political and institutional legitimacy
(Crawford & Hartmann, 2008; Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006). Decentralization also reects global (neoliberal)
discourses of state restructuring and sub-national responsibility for public service provision linked to efforts
to lower public spending and enhance competition, productivity, and exibility (Astiz et al., 2002; Robertson
& Dale, 2013). However, in practice, decentralization is limited by capacity, coordination, and communication
gaps between government levels, lack of operating budgets for sub-national ofces, limited sub-national
policy dissemination and implementation, and physical access challenges. Challenges vary across states
and counties, contributing to differences and disparities in education management, and the deconcentrated
form of decentralization, which, in practice, limits political authority at the sub-national level compared to
the devolved form described in policy documents.
The state-level Ministry of Local Government is mandated to play a key role in education service delivery
and management, as stated in the Local Government Act 2009. Responsibilities of state ministries and Local
Government Councils include establishing and managing primary education institutions, implementing
education policies at local levels, and promoting peaceful coexistence and reconciliation among communities
(GoSS, 2009). However, none of the state, county, payam, or school representatives interviewed for this
study referred to Ministry of Local Government involvement in education governance. This may reect
limited engagement at the sub-national and community level. At the central level, the Local Government
Board, responsible for decentralization support to local governments (including administration, nancial
management, and policy implementation), receives minimal budgetary support, accounting for 0.02 per
cent of total budget allocations in 2014-2015 (MoFCIEP, 2014). This suggests that in practice, these local
government institutions at central and sub-national levels have limited capacity to support decentralized
education management.
Sub-national participation in decision-making
In many so-called ‘decentralized’ education systems, national governments often maintain centralized
control over policy and curriculum but deconcentrate or delegate responsibility for implementation (Astiz
et al., 2002). While South Sudan’s Constitution and LGA refer to devolved governance, decision-making
processes described by sub-national education ofcials reect a deconcentrated approach with little space
for participation in decision-making processes by local ofcials, let alone local community members.
Some argue that inclusive decision-making should be a key aspect of education governance in conict-
affected contexts (Ratcliffe & Perry, 2009). While state ministries in South Sudan described involvement
in national policy reviews and state-level policy and budget development (based on national guidelines),
devolution of decision-making power is limited, reecting deconcentrated decentralization in practice:
“The issue is everything is put in Juba. It’s not sent to the state […] Every money, every resources, every
decision, only in Juba” (Youth union representative). Many state ofcials described irregular participation in
decision-making, with involvement varying across states, and decision-making capacity restricted by budget

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shortages, as transfers rarely cover anything but salaries. Many school, payam, and county representatives
described limited representation related to lack of involvement in national or state policy processes, limited
engagement by donors, difculties in upward communication, and poor policy communication. At these
levels, engagement with higher authorities is generally in the form of reporting, rather than decision-making.
Payam education ofcials in different states expressed frustration when government or development
partners engage only with state and county authorities, or when they approach schools without passing
through the payam ofce: “It is like in the family and someone goes direct to your children without
consulting you as head of family […] so I feel as somebody who does not know anything […] I cannot feel
like a responsible person” (Payam ofcial). In this sense, government and donors might undermine what
limited power local ofcials feel they have. School managers and teachers in different states also expressed
frustration when donors and partners engage only with state and county authorities, as they feel that their
voices and concerns will not be adequately represented, which was a frequent concern. As one head teacher
explained, it is difcult to communicate concerns or suggestions to higher authorities as there are so many
steps involved (school to payam to county to state to centre) and payam supervisors will not transmit their
concern unless they consider it important. Some county and payam ofcials reported that they frequently
communicate concerns and suggestions to the state ministry, but there is rarely any feedback and never any
resultant increase in budget allocations, leading to frustration.
Participants’ descriptions reected a deconcentrated form of decentralization, with generally limited vertical
participation and engagement between different levels: centre, states, counties, payams, and schools.
While some participants described involvement in aspects of national or state-level policy development,
most described limited involvement in decision-making, signicant challenges in policy communication,
and perceptions that concerns and suggestions are not being adequately communicated ‘up the chain’ or
considered by higher authorities.
Donor approaches to decentralization in South Sudan tend to focus on technical, rather than political,
aspects of decentralization. Participants discussed support for decentralization in technical terms (e.g.
‘capacity development’ and ‘strengthening institutions’), without reference to the political aspects such as
norms of power, representation, and voice (Davies, 2011), which were identied as important by payam
and school ofcials, in particular. Partners often focus on strengthening the capacity of people in power,
without explicitly encouraging more diverse and equitable representation (e.g. geographic or ethnic
representation). However, this is of critical importance when considering the inuences of local political
structures on ‘decentralized’ decision-making, including in the education sector.
Local political structures and inuences on decision-making
Local opportunities for representation in education sector administration and management reect wider
structures and dynamics of political authority at sub-national levels. The Local Government Act refers to
the devolution of decision-making authority to (autonomous) local governments (GoSS 2009, 2011b), who
are responsible for development planning and budgeting based on central government transfers and local
revenues. However, in practice, governance in South Sudan is characterized by heavily-centralized, neo-
patrimonial decision-making and authority over policy and legislation (de Waal, 2014; Rolandsen, 2015).
This is reected in the ‘deconcentrated’ nature of governance approaches and limited bottom-up education
sector representation described in the preceding sections.
The ‘decentralized’ system is based on local administrative structures established by the SPLM/A during the
previous civil war (Johnson, 2003). While county commissioners (who oversee education and other services)
are meant to be elected, they are often appointed by state governors (themselves appointed by the central
government, in practice) (Knopf, 2013), often along ethnic or tribal lines or based on military or political
connections (Janke & Reisman 2014; Maxwell et al., 2012; Schomerus & Allen, 2010). Some participants,
including MoEST ofcials and teachers, described factional political systems based on patronage, nepotism,
and tribalism in hiring and promotion practices, which results in frustration and tension among education
personnel. This is particularly signicant in a context where government jobs, including in the education
sector, are a primary source of employment (ICG, 2011; Knopf, 2013). One group of primary teachers, for
example, felt that under the decentralized system, state ministries only employ people from one ethnic group
or county, marginalizing others, so that members of their network can receive salaries. This rent-seeking

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approach to recruitment (Ratcliffe & Perry, 2009) can result in the recruitment of unqualied personnel, and
the presence of ofcials with little education sector knowledge and experience.
The ministers who are being appointed as ministers in the Ministry of Education, sometimes they don’t
have the background of policy of education […] Especially if they are not teachers, when they came
here they don’t implement well the education policies […] He does not ask how can this work to be
implemented or how can the ministry be helped. (State MoEST ofcial)
However, most state, county, and payam level ofcials participating in interviews described long histories
of involvement in the education sector, including experience as teachers. While discrepancies between
perceptions of ofcials’ lack of education sector experience and the actual experience of many ofcials
may be linked to limited interaction between ministry bodies and schools or communities, frustrations over
inequality in decision-making representation based on patronage, nepotism, and tribalism can negatively
affect trust in government legitimacy, thereby contributing to pressures for conict. These processes also
contribute to the reproduction of factional political systems and political ‘elites’ and grievances over exclusion
from decision-making opportunities, increasing the risk of conict by exacerbating ethnic, political, and
geographic divisions in an already-fragmented society (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008; Siegle & O’Mahony,
2006).
Civilian administrative structures remain highly militarized, and military personnel occupy many senior
government positions (Knopf, 2013; Pinaud, 2014; Sudd Institute, 2014). Some participants described
‘militaristic’ approaches to education sector leadership (linked to the presence of former armed group
members in MoEST). They explained that within a rigid hierarchy, local education ofcials “work on orders”
and often feel unable to voice suggestions (“You don’t give ideas to the boss. You just salute.”), and that
education personnel (e.g. teacher) management is often based on rank, threats, intimidation, and fear.
Decentralization in South Sudan has been associated with competition for state-level political representation,
opportunities, and resources, including land, infrastructure, and services (Awolich et al., 2015; Schomerus
& Allen, 2010). Participants described ‘political’ inuences on decision-making, focusing primarily on school
construction, linked to the mobilization of community support: “Some politicians were saying, ‘No, in my
constituency, there is no school.’ They want a beautiful school there so that now people can vote for [them]”
(Central MoEST ofcial). For example, some decision-makers may call for the equal allocation of school
construction projects across all counties, in order to satisfy county commissioners and ensure their support
for state governments. However, this can result in perceived inequities for states with fewer counties, as
well as limiting responses to disparities in existing school conditions (for example, when certain counties or
payams have more permanent or mobile schools than others). Perceived inequities in resource allocation
and distribution are linked to frustrations and tensions across communities and to the entrenchment of
ethnic identities and divisions, due to the links between administrative borders and ethnic distribution
(Awolich et al., 2015; Schomerus & Allen, 2010). Describing previous resource allocation processes, one
central MoEST explained that,
They identied one county here and then jumped another county and then identied another one there
and then jumped and identied. Now this county that is jumped, we say, ‘[Is] this county you identied
because so-and-so is from this county?’ That’s already brought a tribal conict here, meaning you are
not representing us all.
Participant discussions generally illustrated limited vertical trust between schools and government, and
between different levels of government, with those at ‘lower’ levels having limited condence in higher
levels to represent their interests and provide necessary resources. This perceived lack of representation in
government decision-making, including in education sector management, and an associated lack of trust
in higher levels of government can affect perceptions of marginalization and contribute to pressures for
conict. Considerations of (perceived) political representation, marginalization, and conict are of particular
importance in the context of what some participants described as a system of ‘ethnic’ decentralization,
with county and payam borders drawn around territories settled by particular ethnic groups, sections, or
clans. As one peacebuilding representative stated, “It’s good to have different states, but [the] issue of
regionalization is getting worse and worse. People want to be more and more fragmented.”31
31 This is reected in the October 2015 Establishment Order Number 36/2015 dividing the existing 10 states into 28 new states,
drawn largely along ethnic lines (Radio Tamazuj, 3 October, 2015).

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Some participants described this form of governance as facilitating more ‘locally’ representative
administration and empowering local communities. Others, however, felt that this would contribute to
greater divisions between ethnic groups or sections and increase the risk of political mobilization and inter-
group conict.
7.3 School-level management and representation
School governing bodies
As stated in the South Sudan School Governance Toolkit, developed by DFID with support from the EU,
“school-based management is a form of decentralization. It relies on the redistribution of decision-making
authority from national or state government to head-teachers, teachers, parents, students and community
members to stimulate and sustain improvements at school level” (DFID-GESS, 2014: 6). School-based
management is described as promoting community engagement in school management and learning
outcomes as well as accountability to communities (USAID, 2011a; World Bank, 2007).
School governing bodies, including PTAs, primary school management committees (SMCs), and secondary
school boards of governors (BoGs), are responsible for overseeing school management, plans, and
budgets. In general, school managers, teachers, and PTA members reported that they had a role to play in
the management of education services, through participation in school planning and budgeting, disciplinary
bodies, and contributing resources for school development. However, recent reports describe a lack of
functioning governing bodies in South Sudan’s schools (GRSS, 2013; Janke & Reisman, 2014), and some
study participants described members’ limited understanding of their specic roles:
[They think it] is a forum where parents meet, probably to make contribution to the school, more money
to the headmaster for particular work or increasing registration fees […] Many of them did not know
exactly that the school belongs to them, that they have to ensure that they run [the] school. (International
NGO representative)
School nancing approaches can undermine the positive effects of school-based management in
‘decentralizing’ management responsibility and increasing community participation. Service delivery funds
are transferred to primary and secondary schools in the form of capitation grants, which are intended to
nance basic operating costs such as maintenance, supplies, and volunteer teacher incentives, to enable
the provision of free primary education (MoEST, 2014d). Several participants reported that capitation grants
have strengthened the role and inuence of school governing bodies, whose presence is a requirement to
obtain grants, as is the collaborative development of school development plans and budgets. However,
tensions have been reported between governing body members and teachers over leadership and nancial
control. Some school managers explained that capitation grants, calculated based on student enrolment,
are not sufcient to cover projects such as classroom or facility construction. Funding shortages mean
that parents and communities often cover basic operating costs including volunteer teacher incentives
and school materials and equipment, which are nanced through ‘school development’ (registration) fees.
This can affect access for certain populations, including those of lower socio-economic status, and girls in
particular.
This also results in tensions over school support responsibility; several participants explained that
the government expects communities to maintain schools because schools are ‘for the people’, while
communities feel that schools should belong to the government, particularly when government and donors
emphasize the importance of education for ‘national development’. Some MoEST and international partner
representatives emphasized the importance of community contributions to school support and education
service delivery:
The community, they open schools and they are not serious of [looking] after them [...] They take it for
granted [that] children are children of the government and government will do the whole job. But the
government has put the policy [and] is not having any funds to support the policy. It is only the parents
who could support the policy. (State MoEST ofcial)

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We have to tell people school does not belong to the government, because people think the government
comes and constructs the school […] No, we are telling them, ‘The school belongs to you, the government
is not here.’ (International NGO representative)
While community contributions illustrate the perceived importance of education and are key to service
delivery in fragile and conict-affected contexts (Ratcliffe & Perry, 2009), reliance on community nancing
can hinder longer-term government service development, create tensions between communities and
government, and reproduce geographical and economic inequities as wealthy communities are better placed
to maintain services and poor communities fall further behind. This can also contribute to pressures for
conict associated with perceived marginalization linked to inadequate resource distribution and perceived
failures of ‘peace dividends’ through provision of education services.
Teacher representation in decision-making
Teachers reported a lack of representation in decision-making at the school level, as well as at the local
government level. Primary and secondary teachers in different states reported that they do not receive
information about education policies, or that information is signicantly delayed. This causes confusion
and frustration: “The Ministry of Education has its policy, but we don’t know what happens inside the ofce
[…] Without transparency, there is something moving in the darkness. You will not see” (Teacher union
representative).
As discussed in Section 6.5, limited recognition of teachers’ professional status, affected by marginalization
and inequities in terms of allocation of resources and opportunities, inuences public recognition of
the status of teachers. The status of the teaching profession in South Sudan is low and teachers are not
perceived as having political weight, despite the establishment of teachers’ unions in most states. Unions
aim to address challenges faced by teachers (e.g. training), but they do not appear to be engaging in efforts
to advocate for broader policy-level change. While there is some engagement between state ministries, they
do not appear to be engaged in a concerted action for policy change. Relationships between unions and
MoEST, and engagement in policy processes, vary from state to state. For example, a union representative
in one state reported no involvement in MoEST planning processes, while a representative in another state
described engagement with the state MoEST to ensure that teacher concerns (e.g. training, promotion,
payment, allowances) are included in ministry plans, even though these are not necessarily implemented.
One group of secondary teachers reported that the state union is not effective in encouraging government
action or responses.
7.4 Political and economic representation among youth
Older youth, many of whom have histories of violence, face inter-connected challenges associated with
limited training, livelihood, and employment opportunities, limited opportunities for social and civic
engagement and participation in decision-making, and involvement in crime and armed conict. These
challenges were discussed by participants, and reect the ndings of other recent consultations with
youth in South Sudan (Forcier, 2012; MoCYS, 2014). While some students described participation in student
governments, disciplinary bodies, and clubs (e.g. peace clubs) that enabled some involvement in shaping
education service delivery, a group of secondary students reported that they do not have opportunities or
mechanisms to make their voice heard by decision-makers and to engage in peacebuilding processes.
MoCYS plays a lead role in youth policy and programming. With support from UNICEF and the Canadian
International Development Agency, MoCYS has developed the South Sudan Youth Development Policy
(focusing on ages 15 to 35 years), which emphasizes the importance of youth engagement in peacebuilding,
leadership, and community development (for example, through voluntary service), in addition to access to
education, training, and income-generating activities. Youth unions have been established at the national
and state level, with representation from (and in) counties, intended to facilitate youth engagement
and representation. However, only a few participants (primarily non-governmental actors) discussed
the importance of engaging young people in civic activities and decision-making, in either education or
peacebuilding sectors.
Discussions of youth engagement were generally quite depoliticized and instead focused on economic rather

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than civic participation, for example. Many youth sector stakeholders, including union representatives,
described active discouragement of youth engagement in political processes, to avoid manipulation by
politicians. In addition, state youth unions are supported by the MoCYS, which may limit involvement in
more ‘political’ activity. As one state union representative explained, the union is involved in implementing
MoCYS policies and activities, but not in decision-making and policy advocacy, as it is a ‘non-political’
organization. Some union representatives, however, described more active engagement in politics, despite
initial statements of ‘non-involvement’. For example, as one youth union representative explained,
We challenge the government [...] This is our role as a civil society organisation […] This corruption issue,
it is one of our topics […] especially with this current conict happening now. We don’t fear, but we
challenge them diplomatically and clearly. We don’t insult, but we have to tell the truth.
Existing mechanisms for civic engagement and decision-making representation can reproduce socio-
economic inequities and marginalization in youth populations. Union executive positions can only be
held by ‘qualied’ youth with at least a secondary school education, although representatives reported
that most have advanced certicates, diplomas, or degrees. One state youth union representative reported
that all executive members are also employed in the government or NGOs. While members may address
issues affecting youth who are not engaged in formal education or employment, their voices may not be
fully represented in decision-making and they may be viewed as union ‘beneciaries’ rather than as active
members.
Socio-economic inequities have a strong inuence on access to political and economic representation for
youth. For young people who have completed education and training programs, opportunities are limited
by lack of employment opportunities in both the civil service and private sector. Youth representatives
described inequities in access to employment across states (e.g. concentration of opportunities in Juba), as
well as nepotism or tribalism in hiring practices. Inequities or disparities in access to education, training,
and employment result in frustration and tensions among youth, and can take on added signicance when
such opportunities are framed as key peace dividends or post-independence expectations (Sommers &
Schwartz, 2011).
Youth who have their relatives in those places, they have those opportunities [and] it creates a gap
[…] Others will say, ‘You are educated because you are the sons and daughters of big people’ […] This
brings conict […], especially as a young country which has come out of war, where people have many
expectations to get money to sustain themselves. (Youth union representative)
There are tensions related to perceived cultural and identity differences (e.g. ‘Sudanese’, ‘East African’, and
‘South Sudanese’) between older youth who remained in South Sudan during the previous war, and those
who have returned from neighbouring countries. Unequal access to employment opportunities between
these youth is also a source of tension. Returnee youth, particularly those from Kenya and Uganda, often
have higher and ‘better’ educational qualications, and have been educated in English. They are viewed
as monopolizing positions in government and international organizations, which is particularly signicant
given the limited employment opportunities (Ensor, 2013; Jok, 2013; Sommers & Schwartz, 2011). Youth
returning from Sudan, who have been educated in Arabic, face particular challenges with respect to (English-
language) education and employment (O’Hagan, 2013; UNESCO, 2011; Watkins, 2013).
7.5 Chapter summary
South Sudan’s Local Government Act refers to a system of decentralized governance based on the devolution
of power and authority to state and local governments. However, participant descriptions of sector
management reected a deconcentrated form of decentralization based on centralised policy decisions
with limited political authority at the sub-national level and little space for representation of local education
ofcials. School and payam level participants felt their voices and concerns are not clearly heard, and were
often undermined by higher government levels and donors (for example, by bypassing payams when
approaching schools). While school governing bodies play a key role in school-level management, teachers
and youth lack representation in decision-making processes, which when combined with inequalities in
access to professional and economic opportunities, can increase their risk for involvement in conict.

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Local opportunities for representation in education sector administration and management reect wider
structures and dynamics of political authority at sub-national levels, including appointments based on
ethnic, military, or political connections. These processes contribute to the reproduction of factional political
systems, competition over access to political opportunities and resources, grievances over exclusion from
decision-making opportunities, and limit trust in higher levels of government. Discussions with central and
sub-national government ofcials reected tensions between the perceived need for centralized policy
development and management systems (contributing to state and nation-building processes), and the
perceived importance of locally-responsive service delivery.

Caption: © UNICEF/ Students during a MoEST-UNICEF Back to Learning event in Upper Nile State, 2015

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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 Chapter introduction
Recent quantitative research drawing on international data (FHI 360, 2015) demonstrates a consistent
relationship between educational inequalities and violent conict, and that violent intra-state conict
is more than twice as likely to occur in countries where education inequities exist. In South Sudan,
quantitative analysis indicates that while the provision of school infrastructure and resources improved
markedly between 2009 and 2013, the proportion of students enrolled in upper primary levels is very low
and overall enrolment began to decline before the current civil war, that is, during a period of relative
peace and stability. This illustrates the importance of examining factors other than violent conict (such as
systemic inequalities) that affect education access, resource allocation, and outcomes. This study provides
important insights into how such inequities are produced or reproduced through the education sector and
how education governance, as a reection of broader political economy dynamics, can be an effective entry
point for governance reform that can contribute to sustainable peace and development and reduce the risk
of conict. This chapter provides a summary of key research ndings and offers recommendations on how
to capitalize on education’s peacebuilding role in conict-affected settings.
8.2 Key research ndings: Reecting on the 4Rs
Quantitative analysis of education, census, and conict data revealed clear patterns of inequality in
educational access, resources, and outcomes in South Sudan. Inequalities were particularly clear across
different states and across counties within states. For example, states in the Greater Upper Nile region
experienced low access to school facilities and resources as well as low enrolment in upper primary grades,
while southern counties were generally characterized by more adequate school resources and outcomes
compared to central and northern counties. Analysis of EMIS and conict data reveals that states with the
highest occurrence of conict events since 2011 (Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei) have the lowest provision of
educational resources and the lowest percentage of students in upper primary, reecting the relationship
between conict occurrence and inequalities in educational resources and outcomes. These concerns were
reected in qualitative interviews, during which participants described the effects on education access,
resources, and outcomes of inequalities associated with geographic location, rural communities, socio-
economic status, livelihoods activities (e.g. cattle-keeping), and older youth. These were perceived as
contributing to pressures for conict. Governments and donors should pay attention to these consistent
patterns of resource distribution inequalities between counties in decision-making on allocation of material
resources (e.g. infrastructure, facilities) as well as human resources (e.g. teacher deployment).
Redistribution. In South Sudan, a range of policy initiatives and programs have aimed to address different
dimensions of educational inequity. However, specic policy strategies, including those focusing on girls’
education and students with disabilities, reect the inuence of global education agendas. Less attention is
thus paid to context-specic dimensions of inequity linked to conict in South Sudan, including ‘pastoralist’
communities and older youth. While some key dimensions of inequity linked to conict are considered in
programs such as the AES and vocational training, in practice, implementation is limited. Gaps between
policy and practice are linked to under-resourcing of the education sector, which received 5 per cent of
the national budget in 2014-15, compared to nearly 50 per cent for rule of law and security sectors. Under-
resourcing of the education sector is reected in per-student spending, which was as low as SSP 143.5 (USD
48.5) at the primary level in 2014-2015, as well as in poor teacher salaries, which is of particular concern
given the current economic climate.
Redistribution efforts are also limited by budget allocations and expenditures to equity priorities within
MoEST. This is reected in the gap between stated policy priorities and budget allocations and outturns.
For example, in 2014-2015, AES received 1 per cent of the education budget and TVET received 0.5 per
cent, although in 2013-2014 only 21 per cent of AES allocations was disbursed and no TVET allocations
were disbursed. In this sense, approaches to the (re)distribution of opportunities and resources (including

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increasing support for private education services) on the part of both the government and donors may be
reproducing certain dimensions of inequity linked to conict along geographic, socio-economic, ethnic,
and other lines. Resource allocation to subnational (state and county) levels, such as government budget
transfers, reects an equal but not necessarily equitable approach. There is no systematic policy to redress
existing and historically-driven disparities across geographic areas. While school-based resource allocation
by donors may be based on ‘conict-sensitive’ criteria, reecting knowledge of resource-related tensions
and conicts, attention should be paid to the potential contribution of allocation approaches to further
entrenching patterns of marginalization and exclusion for particular population groups and geographic
communities.
Caption: © UNICEF/ School Condition, South Sudan, 2015.
Following the CPA, the expansion of education services was described as a key ‘peace dividend’, with little
attention to how approaches to the (re)distribution of opportunities and resources might reproduce inequity
and contribute to future conict. Failure to deliver these ‘dividends’ and meet community expectations
has affected perceptions of government legitimacy and trust. This in turn has signicant implications for
condence in political representation and vertical dimensions of cohesion (and reconciliation) between
communities and authorities. (Re)distribution of education opportunities and resources in South Sudan
has been hugely affected by the outbreak of violent conict and associated humanitarian responses. This
has raised concerns about (government) representation in education service provision, the emergence
of a ‘parallel’ system of education in conict-affected contexts, geographic inequities in humanitarian-
development resource allocation, as well as perceptions of ‘conict dividends’.
Recognition. The role of schools in bringing together members of diverse communities is often identied as
a key contribution of the education sector. However, education services promoting unity and cohesion may
not necessarily be equitable, and may actually contribute to further inequity and exclusion. For example,
there are geographic and socio-economic inequities in access to national secondary schools, which are
intended to bring together students from diverse communities. While responses to diversity and conict
represent opportunities to address the legacies of violence and contribute to (re)building both horizontal
and vertical relations of trust, the ways in which policies and practices afrm or exclude diverse identities
or forms of violence can reinforce patterns of inequity and contribute to pressures for continued conict.

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Teachers as well as students experience horizontal and vertical inequities that affect recognition and
cohesion. Fragmented recruitment and management approaches, ‘localized’ deployment in remote
counties or payams, recruitment and promotion based on patronage networks, salary disparities between
sectors (e.g. security versus education) and within education (e.g. national and state teachers, permanent
and contract teachers), and language capacity differences (English versus Arabic) contribute to inequities
along geographic, ethnic, and socio-economic lines. These reect broader political and economic dynamics
contributing to pressures for conict, including allocation of opportunities and resources to mobilize and
reward connections, as well as the negative effects on vertical relations of trust in government.
Representation. South Sudan’s Local Government Act refers to a system of decentralized governance
based on the devolution of power and authority to state and local governments. However, participant
descriptions of sector management reected a deconcentrated form of decentralization based on centralized
policy decisions with limited political authority at the sub-national level and little space for representation
of local education ofcials. School and payam level participants felt their voices and concerns are not
clearly heard, and were often undermined, by higher government levels and donors (for example, by
bypassing payams when approaching schools). While school governing bodies play a key role in school-
level management, teachers and youth experience lack of representation in decision-making processes,
which, when combined with inequalities in access to professional and economic opportunities, can increase
their risk for involvement in conict.
Local opportunities for representation in education sector administration and management reect wider
structures and dynamics of political authority at sub-national levels, including appointments based on
ethnic, military, or political connections. These processes contribute to the reproduction of factional political
systems, competition over access to political opportunities and resources, grievances over exclusion from
decision-making opportunities, and limit trust in higher levels of government. Discussions with central and
sub-national government ofcials reected tensions between the perceived need for centralized policy
development and management systems (contributing to state and nation-building processes), and the per
Local opportunities for representation in education sector administration and management reect wider
structures and dynamics of political authority at sub-national levels, including appointments based on
ethnic, military, or political connections. These processes contribute to the reproduction of factional political
systems, competition over access to political opportunities and resources, grievances over exclusion from
decision-making opportunities, and limit trust in higher levels of government. Discussions with central and
sub-national government ofcials reected tensions between the perceived need for centralized policy
development and management systems (contributing to state and nation-building processes), and the
perceived importance of locally-responsive service delivery.
Reconciliation. These elements of redistribution, recognition, and representation indicate that broader
processes of reconciliation, which involves addressing the past and the effects of conict as well as horizontal
and vertical trust, take place through inter-personal exchange and engagement. Reconciliation will also take
place through addressing the structural and historical grievances that underpin tensions and pressures for
conict, which are connected to relations between communities and between communities and authorities.
While relations between groups may be facilitated through recognition of identity and diversity in education
structures and content, vertical trust between communities or schools and government, and between levels
of government, is negatively affected by inadequate redistribution of education opportunities and resources,
limited attention to vertical aspects of recognition, and limited opportunities for representation in decision-
making. These elements of reconciliation are of critical importance when considering the connections
between education governance, inequity, and peacebuilding. Limited vertical trust, along with a perceived
lack of power and representation in decision-making, has signicant implications for perceived government
legitimacy on the part of communities as well as perceived marginalization across demographic and
geographic communities. This potentially weakens state-society relations and perceived state legitimacy
and contributes to pressures for conict.
Overall, responses to addressing inequity and conict through education sector management, governance,
and service delivery in South Sudan by government, non-governmental, and international actors, reect the
inuence of global education agendas. These present less than systematic responses to locally and nationally-
driven needs and priorities associated with inequity and conict and include an EFA and MDG-driven focus
on gender, disability, and primary education, as well as broader education and peacebuilding priorities
focusing on economic growth and security. While these might contribute to positive education outcomes

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In South Sudan, education system policies and content have the potential to (re)produce patterns of cultural
violence. This is linked to languages of instruction (including the selection of national languages), the
validation of particular versions of history and citizenship, ministry narratives that dismiss or disrespect ‘bad’
or ‘backward’ communities or cultures, and the development of formal curricula that focus on ‘productive’
economic activities and are not aligned with the economic and cultural priorities of diverse communities.
The cultural and economic relevance of education programs is of particular importance for cattle-keeping
communities, as over 85 per cent of South Sudan’s population is engaged in livestock care (FAO, 2012).
These patterns of inequity contribute to pressures for violence linked to political, economic, and cultural
marginalization in terms of representation in decision-making, recognition of identities and livelihoods, and
access to relevant education opportunities.
Teachers as well as students experience horizontal and vertical inequities that affect recognition and
cohesion. Fragmented recruitment and management approaches, ‘localized’ deployment in remote
counties or payams, recruitment and promotion based on patronage networks, salary disparities between
sectors (e.g. security versus education) and within education (e.g. national and state teachers, permanent
and contract teachers), and language capacity differences (English versus Arabic) contribute to inequities
along geographic, ethnic, and socio-economic lines. These reect broader political and economic dynamics
contributing to pressures for conict, including allocation of opportunities and resources to mobilize and
reward connections, as well as the negative effects on vertical relations of trust in government.
Representation. South Sudan’s Local Government Act refers to a system of decentralized governance
based on the devolution of power and authority to state and local governments. However, participant
descriptions of sector management reected a deconcentrated form of decentralization based on centralized
policy decisions with limited political authority at the sub-national level and little space for representation
of local education ofcials. School and payam level participants felt their voices and concerns are not
clearly heard, and were often undermined, by higher government levels and donors (for example, by
bypassing payams when approaching schools). While school governing bodies play a key role in school-
level management, teachers and youth experience lack of representation in decision-making processes,
which, when combined with inequalities in access to professional and economic opportunities, can increase
their risk for involvement in conict.
Caption: © UNICEF: A boy herding cattle in Warrap State, 2015

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and peacebuilding processes, limited attention given to addressing the root causes of violent conict,
including context-specic economic, cultural, political, and social dimensions of inequity, can impede both
sustainable peace and development and, importantly, sustainable quality learning for children and young
people in South Sudan. The education sector can play a central role in addressing different dimensions of
violence. While commendable efforts are being made to do so, some key dimensions of inequity linked to
education management and governance have been accorded limited attention. When considering questions
of inequity, the importance of perceived inequity or marginalization must be seriously considered. Even
when legal frameworks or policy responses exist, they may not be disseminated or implemented, and their
existence or implementation does not erase decades of violence, marginalization, and inequity that have
been experienced by diverse communities.
Both the qualitative and quantitative research ndings suggest that there are clear inequities being
reproduced, or produced, by the management and governance of South Sudan’s education sector and
current policy and program approaches (on the part of local, national, and international actors), which
contribute to tensions linked to violent conict. However, the ndings also suggest that there are clear
opportunities to address these inequities and contribute to sustainable peace, development, and learning
processes, building on local and national priorities. In this sense, the education sector can serve as a model
for inclusion, equity, and peacebuilding via other sectors within South Sudan and beyond.
8.3 Connecting education and peacebuilding processes
While educational inequities prioritized by participants are linked to ongoing conict in South Sudan,
connections between education and peacebuilding actors (both national and international) remain limited,
despite some policy, curriculum, and project efforts to initiate dialogue on the peacebuilding role of education
by UNICEF PBEA and other partners. Based on the ndings of this research, some recommendations can be
identied to support policy and program development by government, non-governmental, and international
actors to promote educational inclusiveness and equity while strengthening connections between education
and peacebuilding processes and better address both drivers and legacies of conict in South Sudan.
The Agreement of the Resolution of the Conict, signed in August 2015, largely replicates pre-2013 power-
sharing and security arrangements and does not refer to the key peacebuilding role of the education sector.
This research indicates that broader dimensions of political economy and associated inequities reected in
South Sudan’s education system contribute to pressures for conict, but also have the potential to contribute
to sustainable peace and development. This ought to be reected in ongoing peace and governance
negotiations, as well as in future education policy processes.
When considering governance of the education sector in South Sudan, it is important to note that it is
not solely the responsibility of MoEST or education donors and partners. Multiple institutions, including
other ministries and international and national partners, play key roles in processes affecting the sector.
The Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Service, MoCYS, MoGCSW, ministries concerned with particular
education or training programs (e.g. agriculture), peacebuilding bodies (e.g. SSPRC), and state-level
Ministry of Local Government (meant to play a key role in both education and peacebuilding efforts) are
critical actors in promoting economic, political, and cultural dimensions of equity to support sustainable
peace and development.
8.4 Recommendations
An education system that better promotes sustainable peace and development in South Sudan should be
grounded in national and local realities and able to address both the drivers and legacies of conict. This
requires conict-sensitive, evidence-based policy formation, rooted in national and local policy dialogue.
If it is to be successful, this requires important organizational changes and commitments from national
and regional government actors and institutions, international donors, national and international NGO
communities, and UN education and security actors. While the education system alone cannot resolve the
drivers or the legacies of conict, it can play a much greater role in supporting vital peacebuilding processes
in South Sudan.

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The research ndings outlined in this report illustrate the importance of addressing multiple dimensions
of inequity and promoting peacebuilding objectives as part of humanitarian and development efforts, both
during and after situations of violent conict. Waiting until conict has ‘ended’ to begin considering the
peacebuilding role of education can result in the reproduction and exacerbation of inequity and violence. It is
hoped that the following recommendations will be considered in the developing education and peacebuilding
policies, strategies, and programs in humanitarian, recovery, reconstruction, and development processes
in South Sudan:
Promoting equity in education through redistribution
zExamine the potential for school management and student admissions approaches to address
entrenched patterns of marginalization along gender, socio-economic, ethnic, and geographic
lines and to privilege already-advantaged groups. This is particularly important for national
schools (which are cited as contributors to cohesion and peacebuilding) and private schools
(which are described as promoting education quality and choice).
zImplement strategies to address existing imbalances and ensure equitable access to education
opportunities in terms of gender, ability, socio-economic status, and community (e.g. pastoralist,
rural) background. This might include the implementation of specic admissions criteria, quotas,
or subsidies for students from marginalized groups in national and private schools and training
programs (e.g. vocational or livelihoods training).
zAcknowledge, and attempt to address, factors that can affect education and training outcomes
for marginalized groups, such as structural discrimination in legal or customary systems (e.g.
right to own land or control nancial resources) and recognition of local livelihoods systems.
zAdopt, or continue to use, conict-sensitive criteria or guidelines to inform allocation of
resources such as school support, addressing conict ‘drivers’ and peacebuilding objectives
rather than a solely risk-informed conict response. The time required for negotiating conict-
sensitive decisions (e.g. with government, communities, or partners) should be built into project
timelines.
zWhen resources or services (from both government and partners) are allocated to particular
areas or communities, ensure that reasons for decisions are clearly explained to key actors
particularly schools, payam ofces, and county departments. Clear explanations about why
programs are implemented in some counties and not in others, or why one school receives
support while another does not, might reduce perceptions of inequity or marginalization. This
transparency is crucial in building government legitimacy and vertical trust and cohesion.
zWhen nancial support (e.g. scholarships, stipends) for education (e.g. secondary, post-
secondary) is provided to young people, strategies such as quotas should be adopted to address
existing imbalances and ensure equitable access to opportunities in terms of gender, ability,
socio-economic status, and community (e.g. pastoralist, rural) background.
zAlign salary reforms and advancement policies across and within sectors, to support the
valorization and professionalization of education sector personnel, including teachers, and to
promote equity across sectors. This includes alignment with recent salary scale revisions in the
health sector and within the education sector (e.g. university teaching staff).
zAs part of decentralization and budget support programs, consider revising resource allocation
policies such as budget transfers to promote equitable allocation to redress existing disparities,
rather than equal allocation based on existing resources (e.g. schools, personnel).
zAs part of decentralization and budget support programs, continue to strengthen local
government capacity in areas of budgeting, monitoring, transparency, and accountability.

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zSupport efforts to bridge humanitarian and development efforts by continuing development-
oriented programs (including governance and peacebuilding objectives) in EiE contexts,
ensuring the provision of alternative and post-primary education and training (supporting
transitions for diverse young people), and considering the transition of EiE teachers to the
formal education sector.
zTo the greatest extent possible, increase the proportion of government and donor resources
allocated to the education sector in order to support the attainment of stated education goals in
a manner that reduces inequities.
Promoting equity in education through recognition
zSupport the establishment of local border schools (including boarding schools) between
counties and payams at both primary and secondary levels, and prioritize rural conict-affected
communities. These could also be promoted as part of school construction programs as well as
community-based peacebuilding and reconciliation processes.
zEnsure that curricula are relevant to the cultural and livelihoods systems of diverse
communities, such as cattle-keeping and rural communities in response to specic needs and
preferences and support horizontal and vertical social cohesion and respect for diversity. This
might involve the integration of cultivation and animal husbandry elements into both formal
and non-formal curricula, along with elements of informal or traditional learning prioritized by
communities.
zRespect and value diverse communities and their livelihoods, particularly for cattle-keeping
communities, through education policies and programs as well as in how education actors
(including ministry ofcials, partners, and teachers), speak about and engage with different
communities. This involves acknowledging the importance of livelihoods activities such as cattle
herding in community life, strengthening livelihoods activities rather than ‘culture change’, and
positively representing communities and traditions.
zInvolve members of ‘marginalized’ communities, including cattle-keeping and rural
communities, in the development of education policies and curriculum materials. This can
provide an opportunity for representation in decision-making, and also support the development
of curricula that recognize the cultural and economic systems and traditions of diverse
communities, based on communities’ determination of how they are represented.
zEnsure clarity and transparency in the selection of national languages for instruction by
ensuring consistency in policies (e.g. level responsible for language selection) and engaging
community members, schools, and local education authorities in decision-making. Open and
transparent language policy development can help to allay fears of cultural marginalization,
which often underpin tensions. In the longer term, the written development of other national
languages could be supported.
zApproaches to the development of history and citizenship education should consider the
recognition of diverse experiences, narratives, and identities, as well as the potential for
‘shared’ histories and identities to entrench systems of cultural and political marginalization.
These dimensions of recognition can play a key role in contributing to social cohesion and
reconciliation processes.
zStrengthen psychosocial support services in learning spaces at all levels for students as well as
teachers and education managers affected by violence and trauma to respond to conict and
violence in and outside of education settings.

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Promoting equity in education through representation
zIn addition to promoting ‘local’ representation in national language selection, future curriculum
revision or development processes should consider county and payam representation. Although
this would require more time and resources, it would facilitate recognition and representation of
the signicant diversity within states (ethnic, linguistic, geographic, etc.).
zConsider questions of voice and power when supporting decentralization efforts. This would
enable moving beyond a purely technical focus, in order to enhance perceptions of trust and
legitimacy. This might include setting strategies to increase representation in decision-making,
mechanisms to ensure that schools and payams can easily communicate concerns to higher
ministry levels, and ensuring that government and partner actions do not undermine their
limited power, for example, by bypassing payams when approaching schools.
zStrengthen community participation in education management and decision-making processes,
including decisions about relevant school curricula and monitoring the implementation of
education programs.
zWhen conducting assessments or studies involving schools and local government ofces,
ensure that ndings or reports are communicated to stakeholders, particularly schools
(managers, teachers, and students). This is a way of recognising their contributions and
explaining resource-allocation decisions.
zAs part of teaching training (pre and in-service), identify and implement strategies to target
members of marginalized communities, including women and teachers from rural and
cattle-keeping communities. Quotas, subsidies, and childcare provision could increase their
representation in the education sector, and support them to serve as role models in their schools
and communities.
zDesign and implement initiatives to enhance teachers’ professional status, including their status
and recognition from society, ministry ofcials, and the wider government. Initiatives might
be integrated into existing community awareness programs (e.g. girls’ education), in order to
facilitate implementation with minimal resources. This is linked to increasing teacher salaries
and access to material support.
zFacilitate access to English language and literacy training for teachers, in order to support
integration and capacity. Resources supporting basic literacy and intensive English programs for
security forces (e.g. police, soldiers) could be more equitably reallocated to ensure support for
teachers (and as a result, students).
zIdentify and implement strategies to promote equitable youth representation such as afrmative
action strategies or quotas for young women, youth from rural or cattle-keeping communities,
or those with lower levels of education in youth unions.
zConsider vertical dimensions of cohesion and reconciliation as well as horizontal inter-group
relations. Central and local government ofcials ought to engage directly with school governing
bodies to strengthen vertical relationships. On their part, donors should critically examine how
their approaches inuence relations between governments and communities, and between
levels of government.
zStrengthen the coordination of the Peacebuilding Reference Committee across MoEST
departments, including internal and external representation, and strengthen its legitimacy and
relevance in institutional processes.
Beyond the specic policy recommendations outlined above, this study also points to how the inequities
perpetuated via education contribute to conict, rather than conict merely interrupting education, as is often

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argued by the Education in Emergencies (EiE) discourse. Addressing inequalities and structural issues around
the management of education service delivery can work on broader political economy factors in conict
settings that can contribute to conict, and thus have an important preventative role. These inequalities take
different forms, including the quality and relevance of education, which are often ignored by dominant global
paradigms for inclusion and equity. Crucially, this study suggests that sustainable approaches to addressing
inequalities and factors which give rise to conict are rooted in development programming, rather than in
responsive emergency programming. This speaks to the importance of mainstreaming conict-sensitive
and peacebuilding approaches to the entire portfolio of education programming, rather than restricting
peacebuilding and education work to emergency and post-conict settings.

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Appendix 1: Detailed descriptions
of research sites
Central Equatoria state
Central Equatoria state (CES) is home to South Sudan’s national capital, Juba, which is also the state capital.
The 2008 Population Census estimated the state population to be roughly 1.1 million (NBS, 2011a), although
estimates do not reect the number of returnees from neighbouring states and countries during and after
the census period. By 2010, approximately 91,000 South Sudanese had returned to CES (UNMIS, 2010b). The
state is home to roughly 14 ethnic groups, including Bari, Mundari, Kakwa, Lokoya, Pajali, and Makaraka
(UNMIS, 2010b). Roughly 65 per cent of the population lives in rural areas (lower than in many other states),
with the highest population density of all states and a poverty rate of 44 per cent In 2008-09, people aged 15
and older reported a literacy rate of 44 per cent while 42 per cent of those aged six and older had never been
to school. 58 per cent of the population depended on crop farming or animal husbandry as their primary
livelihood source, while 21 per cent were paid employees (NBS, 2011a). CES includes six counties (Juba,
Lainya, Morobo, Kajo-Keji, Terekeka, and Yei), and data was collected in two payams in Juba County.
CES has experienced conict between groups within the state (including between Bari and Mundari
communities), as well as cross-border conict involving groups in Lakes states (UNMIS, 2010b). The state
has been heavily affected by displacement resulting from the current civil war. The violence that erupted
in Juba in December 2013 involved the targeting of Nuer civilians and soldiers by predominantly Dinka
security forces (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014), causing signicant displacement. In July 2015,
there were over 74,000 IDPs in Central Equatoria, with approximately 29,000 living in UNMISS Protection of
Civilians (POC) sites in Juba (European Commission, 2015), mainly from Nuer communities.
Western Equatoria state
In 2008, Western Equatoria state (WES) had a population of roughly 620,000 (SSCCSE, 2009), which includes
eight main ethnic groups, including Azande, Avokaye, Balanda Baka, Beli, Fertit, Moru, and Mundu (UNMIS,
2010e). Approximately 84 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, with a poverty rate of 42 per cent In
2008-09, people aged 15 and older reported a literacy rate of roughly 33 per cent while 52 per cent of those
aged six and older had never been to school. Ninety per cent of the population depended on crop farming
or animal husbandry as their primary livelihood source, while 9 per cent were paid employees (NBS, 2011e).
Livelihoods in WES are based primarily on farming, with rich agricultural production and lower livestock
ownership compared to other states (UNMIS, 2010e). WES includes ten counties (Mundri West, Mundri East,
Maridi, Mvolo, Ibba, Yambio, Ezo, Nzara, Nagero, and Tambura), and data was collected in Yambio, the state
headquarters.
Participants in WES described insecurity and conict (often involving youth) in border counties such as
Mvolo, Mundri East, Mundri West, and Maridi, including between farming communities and cattle-keepers
from Lakes state. They also reported frequent disputes over land ownership (which, as one participant stated,
account for the largest proportion of court cases in Yambio). Although participants in WES emphasised their
history of peace and stability (one ministry ofcial referred to the state’s ‘peaceful culture’), armed violence
has recently broken out in Yambio and Maridi. WES borders the DRC to the south and CAR to the west. Past
insecurity has been associated with Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) activity, particularly along southern and
western state borders (UNMIS, 2010e). WES is home to refugees from the DRC, displaced primarily by LRA
activity in 2009, as well as refugees eeing on-going violence in the CAR, with nearly 9,000 refugees in the
state in July 2015 (UNHCR, 2015).
Western Bahr el Ghazal state
In 2008, Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBG) had a population of roughly 333,000, the smallest of all states,
although it is the second largest geographically (SSCCSE, 2009). Between 2004 and 2010, an estimated

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122,000 people returned from Sudan and other neighbouring countries (UNMIS, 2010a). The population
includes three main ethnic groups, including Dinka, Luo (Jur), and Fertit. While WBG is home to a more
visible Muslim community than some other states, Christians are the dominant religious community
(UNMIS, 2010a). Approximately 57 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, with the lowest population
density of all states, and a poverty rate of 43 per cent. In 2008-09, people aged 15 and older reported a
literacy rate of roughly 34 per cent, while 62 per cent of those aged six and older had never been to school.
64 per cent of the population depended on crop farming or animal husbandry as their primary livelihood
source (NBS, 2011d). WBG covers forested areas and fertile agricultural land, supporting small-scale farming
supplemented by small-scale cattle raising (UNMIS, 2010a). The state includes three counties (Wau, Jur
River, and Raja) and one municipality. Data was collected in Wau Municipality, the state headquarters.
Participants in WBG described tensions associated with inter-group conict (between Dinka, Fertit, and Luo
communities) during the previous civil war. Dinka and Jur communities were linked to the SPLM/A, while
Fertit were linked to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) (UNMIS, 2010a). Participants also described conict
between farming communities and cattle-keeping communities arriving from Warrap state, disputes over
land ownership, and insecurity along northern borders due to the targeting of Sudanese rebel groups by
the Sudanese government. WBG borders the CAR to the west and Sudan’s South Darfur to the north, and
the presence of the SPLA, SAF, and other armed groups and militias along the northern border contributes
to insecurity (UNMIS, 2010a).
Warrap state
In 2008, Warrap had a population of roughly 973,000 (SSCCSE, 2009). The population is predominantly
Dinka (Jieng), with minority groups including Luo (Jur Chol and Jur Mananger) and Bongo. Warrap is home
to many returnees and refugees from Sudan, due to its proximity to the north (BCSSAC et al., 2012b; UNMIS,
2010d), with approximately 115,000 people returning to the state between 2005 and 2010 (Saferworld, 2011).
Warrap has historically been the most ‘under-developed’ state in South Sudan (UNMIS, 2010d), a point
emphasised by numerous participants from the state. Approximately 91 per cent of the population lives
in rural areas, with a poverty rate of 64 per cent. In 2008-09, people aged 15 and older reported a literacy
rate of roughly 16 per cent, while 87 per cent of those aged six and older had never been to school (the
highest proportion of all states). Eighty-seven per cent of the population depended on crop farming or
animal husbandry as their primary livelihood source (NBS, 2011c). Warrap is home to roughly 1.6 million
cattle (SSCCSE, 2010b), which represent the dominant livelihood source. However, in recent years, delayed
rainfall and drought have increased food insecurity as well as limiting access to water and grazing land
(UNMIS, 2010d), a point emphasised by participants from the state. Warrap includes six counties (Twic,
Gogrial East, Gogrial West, Tonj North, Tonj East, and Tonj South). Data was collected in Kuajok, the state
headquarters, in Gogrial West County, and in three payams in Tonj East County.
Participants in Warrap reported insecurity along its eastern borders, due to conicts over cattle raiding,
borders, and control of water points and grazing land between groups in Tonj North, East, and South
counties and groups from Unity and Lakes. Similar conicts occur between groups from different payams
and counties within the state (e.g. different Dinka sections), leading to cycles of reprisal violence (BCSSAC
et al., 2012b; Saferworld, 2011; UNMIS, 2010d). Some participants in Warrap state described the role played
by gelweng, youth often armed with small weapons and responsible for protecting cattle and community
members. While gelweng carry community respect to their protective role in families and communities, as
some government representatives in Warrap explained, due to their central role in protecting community
resources, these youth are generally not engaged in formal education or employment, and are involved in
violent inter-group conict.
Tensions and conicts in Warrap state are linked to economic pressures, food insecurity, and environmental
pressures such as delayed rainfall. Warrap borders Sudan’s South Kordofan as well as the contested Abyei
area, and insecurity has been associated with the movement of groups from these areas as well as attacks
from northern rebel and militia groups and the border presence of both the SPLA and SAF (BCSSAC et al.,
2010b; UNMIS, 2010d).

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Upper Nile state
In 2008, Upper Nile state (UNS) had a population of roughly 964,000 (SSCCSE, 2009). The state is home to
three main ethnic groups, including Shilluk, Dinka, and Nuer (Jikany and Gajaak), as well as Berta, Burun,
Dajo, and Mabani, with counties dominated by particular groups (BCSSAC et al., 2012a; UNMIS, 2010c).
Approximately 75 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, with a poverty rate of 26 per cent, the lowest
of all states. In 2008-09, people aged 15 and older reported a literacy rate of roughly 45 per cent, while 68 per
cent of those aged six and older had never been to school. Fifty-nine per cent of the population depended on
crop farming or animal husbandry as their primary livelihood source, while 15 per cent were paid employees
(NBS, 2011b). The population relies on agro-pastoralist livelihoods activities, primarily agriculture, although
this has been affected by increased ooding in recent years (BCSSAC et al., 2012a).
UNS includes 13 counties (Akoka, Bailet, Fashoda, Longochuk, Maban, Maiwut, Makal, Manyo, Melut,
Luakpiny/Nasser, Panyikang, Renk, and Ulang). Data was collected in Malakal, the state headquarters,
including in Malakal POC, and in Wau Shilluk, both in Makal County. Historically, UNS has had limited
representation in the SPLM/A hierarchy (UNMIS, 2010c), and many militia groups have operated in the state
during the previous civil war due to its proximity to the north (BCSSAC et al., 2012a). Signicant oil deposits
are located in the state, making it politically and economically valuable. However, communities have not
beneted from the state’s oil resources, either through allocation of oil revenues or local development
initiatives (BCSSAC et al., 2012a).
UNS has experienced frequent conict between various groups over county borders, grazing land, and
water points (between Lou Nuer and Jikany Nuer groups, and between Dinka and Nuer and Dinka and
Shilluk groups), with violence (including cattle raiding) associated with seasonal movement toward rivers.
Security has also been affected by cross-border conict (including cattle raiding and border disputes),
between communities in Upper Nile’s southern counties and Jonglei (BCSSAC et al., 2012a; UNMIS, 2010c).
UNS borders Ethiopia to the east, and Sudan to the northeast. Insecurity in the state has been linked to the
presence of both SPLA and SAF along the northern border, and to the movement of groups from Sudan
and Ethiopia to rivers in UNS during the dry season (BCSSAC et al., 2012a; UNMIS, 2010c). The presence
of military barracks in the state has also been associated with signicant sexual violence (BCSSAC et al.,
2012a).
UNS is one of the states most affected by the on-going conict, as the centre of SPLM-IO activity in the
country. In December 2013, most Nuer security forces joined the opposition, which targeted Dinka and Shilluk
civilians (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014). Malakal has changed hands several times, and several
military commanders have defected from both government and opposition forces. On-going ghting in the
state has resulted in massive population displacement. In July 2015, there were roughly 245,000 displaced
persons in Upper Nile, with nearly 31,000 people living in the Malakal POC (European Commission, 2015),
primarily from Dinka and Shilluk communities, as well as some Nuer. In addition to IDPs, there are also over
134,000 refugees in UNS (UNHCR, 2015).

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Appendix 2: Decentralized
roles and responsibilities in the
education sector
Central MoEST State MoEST County
education
department
(CED)
Payam education
ofce
School governing
bodies
• Develop
policies,
standards,
strategies, and
curricula
• Determine
distribution of
education staff
across states
• Set
qualications
and
responsibilities
of teachers
and education
managers
• Develop sector
budgets,
allocate
resources to
states
• Manage
secondary
exams and
national
assessments
• Manage EMIS
• Monitor state-
level service
delivery
• Manage TTIs
and national
secondary
schools
• Disseminate
education
policies and
guidelines
• Develop
plans and
budgets based
on national
policies and
strategies
• Allocate state
and county
transfers
• Monitor
primary and
alternative
education
delivery
• Deliver
secondary
education and
TVET
• Recruit, deploy,
and manage
teachers
• Coordinate in-
service teacher
training
• Manage state
inspection
system
• Manage
primary
examinations
• Manage state
EMIS data
• Report on
budget
performance
(to central
ministry)
• Deliver primary
and alternative
education (with
payam ofces)
• Manage County
Education
Centres, payam
education
ofces
• Manage budget
transfers for
CEDs, payam
ofces, schools
• Manage teacher
transfers and
supervision
• Supervise
education
infrastructure
• Compile
inspection
reports and
send to state
ministry
• Manage county
EMIS data
• Monitor PTAs
and SMCs (with
payam ofces)
• Report on
budget
performance (to
state ministry)
• Participate
in county
planning and
budgeting
• Deliver primary
and alternative
education (with
CEDs)
• Manage day-
to-day contact
with schools
• Conduct school
inspections
• Support PTAs
and SMCs (with
CEDs)
• Monitor use
of capitation
grants
• Collect EMIS
data
• Formulate
school
development
plan and
budget
• Manage school
funds, including
capitation
grants
• Purchase
materials with
school funds
• Day-to-day
supervision of
head teachers
and teachers
• Monitor student
and teacher
attendance and
achievement
• Provide EMIS
data
• Collaborate
with school
inspectors
Sources: DFID-GESS, 2014; GoSS, 2009, 2010; GRSS, 2012a; MoEST, 2014c; RSS, 2012; World Bank, 2012

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Appendix 3: Key education,
governance, and peacebuilding
policies and strategies
Development policies and strategies
zSouth Sudan Development Plan 2011-13: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and
prosperity for all (GoSS, 2011)
zSouth Sudan Vision 2040: Towards freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all (GRSS,
2011)
zGovernance policies and strategies
zJoint Plan of Action – Local Services Support: A joint plan to strengthen the capacity of local
governments to deliver public services (GRSS, 2013)
zLaws of Southern Sudan: The Local Government Act 2009 (GoSS, 200)
zThe Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan 2011 (GoSS, 2011)
Education policies and strategies
zCurriculum framework: South Sudan (MoEST, 2014)
zGeneral Education Act (GRSS, 2012)
zGeneral Education Strategic Plan 2012-2017: Promoting learning for all (GRSS, 2012)
zGirls’ Education Strategy for South Sudan 2015-2017 (MoEST, 2015)
zPolicy for Alternative Education Systems (MoEST, 2014)
zPrimary education: Service delivery framework (RSS, 2012)
zSouthern Sudan Teachers’ Professional Code of Conduct (MoEST, 2008)
zState and local government education sector planning, budgeting and reporting guidelines for
scal year 2014/15 (MoEST, 2014)
Child, youth, and gender policies and strategies
zNational Gender Policy (MoGCSW, 2012)
zSouth Sudan National Disability and Inclusion Policy (MoGCSW, 2013)
zSouth Sudan Youth Development Policy (MoCYS, 2014)
zStandard operating procedures for gender based violence prevention, protection and response
in South Sudan (MoGCSW, 2014)
Peacebuilding policies and strategies
zComprehensive strategic dimensions for healing, peace and reconciliation for all South
Sudanese (CNHPR, 2013)
zLaws of South Sudan: Peace and Reconciliation Commission Act, 2012 (Ministry of Justice, 2012)
zStatement of the principles of the National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation. (NPPR, 2014)
zSouth Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission Strategic Plan 2013-2015 (SSPRC, 2013)

102
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Information sheet for key stakeholder
informants
Study title: Education Sector Governance in
South Sudan and Kenya
Invitation
You are being invited to take part in a research
study on education sector governance and its role
in promoting sustainable peacebuilding. Before you
decide to participate in this study, it is important
for you to understand why this study is being done
and what it will involve. Please read the following
information carefully. You can discuss it with others
if you wish, and you should feel free to ask the
researcher if you have any questions about the study.
What is the purpose of this study?
The purpose of this study is to understand the
role of education sector governance in promoting
sustainable peacebuilding in Kenya and South
Sudan. This includes studying what key stakeholders
think about the role of education governance in
promoting peace, equity, social cohesion and
resilience. Participants will include government
representatives from central, state, and county
levels and representatives of international and non-
government organisations.
Why have I been invited to participate?
You are being invited to participate in this study
because of your role as a key education sector
stakeholder in your country.
Do I have to take part?
Participation in this study is completely voluntary.
It is up to you to decide if you wish to take part in
the study or not. You are free to refuse to participate.
Even if you decide to participate now, you can refuse
to answer certain questions or you can choose to
withdraw from the study at any time, and there
will be no negative consequences. If you decide to
withdraw from the study, you do not have to give a
reason, and none of the information that you share
will be used.
What will happen to me if I take part?
If you decide to participate in this study, you will be
asked to take part in a one-on-one interview with
the researcher. The researcher will ask you to share
your ideas about the issues mentioned above. This
interview will last around 45 minutes and you can
choose where the interview will take place. The
interview will be in English. The researcher will take
notes during the interview, and you will be asked
if the interview can be recorded, so that it can later
be transcribed. The researcher may contact you after
the interview if there are any additional questions.
What are the possible disadvantages and risks
of taking part?
Participating in this study will take around 45 minutes
of your time. The discussion will take place at a
location that you choose, to make it as convenient as
possible for you. The discussion might cause some
feelings of stress, if difcult experiences such as
conict, violence, or being excluded are discussed.
The researcher will not ask any questions about
your personal experiences in these areas. These
experiences will only be discussed if you introduce
them and the discussion will continue only as long
as you decide. If you feel upset at any time you can
decide to refuse to answer any questions, end the
interview, or end your participation in the study.
What are the possible benets of taking part?
Participation in this project will provide an
opportunity to share your thoughts about
educational governance, equity, social cohesion and
peacebuilding in Kenya and South Sudan and help
improve UNICEF policies and strategies around the
world. It is important to study these issues in order
to have a better understanding of how education
sector governance can better contribute to long
term and sustainable peacebuilding. The study
ndings will be shared with representatives from
the government and international organisations
who are involved in the education system in both
Kenya and South Sudan.
Will my information in this study be kept
condential?
Personal information will only be collected with your
consent. Identifying information, including your
name and your role, will not be shared with anyone
and will not be included in the research reports. The
information that you share will never be identied
with your name, and will only be identied by a code
on documents and in the research reports. All of the
information that you share will be kept condential
by the researcher.
Appendix 4: Data collection
documents

103
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
study to take place, which was facilitated by UNICEF.
Contact for Further Information
If you have any questions or would like more
information about the study, you can contact the
lead researcher at the University of Sussex
Professor Mario Novelli
Department of Education
Telephone: +44 12 73 67 86 39
E-mail: M.Novelli@sussex.ac.uk
South Sudan Researcher:
Gabrielle Daoust
Telephone: 0926064932
E-mail: G.Daoust@sussex.ac.uk
Thank you
Thank you very much for taking the time to read
this information sheet. Please feel free to ask the
researcher if you have any questions about the
information that is provided, or if you have any other
questions about the study.
Date
January 1, 2015
You can ask for your information to be removed
and destroyed even after the discussion. You can
do this at any time until the written report has been
prepared, then the information cannot be removed
from the report. You can ask the researcher for a
copy of the transcript of the interview to review
and provide comments before it is included in the
research report. All of the research documents and
recordings will be stored and saved in a locked
cabinet or on a password-protected computer. The
information that you share will only be used for the
purposes of the study described in this document.
Only the researcher and the research supervisors
will have access to the study information.
What should I do if I want to take part?
The researcher will call you two days after you have
received this information sheet, to ask you if you
wish to participate in an interview. If yes, you will
then decide on a date, time, and location for the
interview.
What will happen to the results of the research
study?
The results of this study will be used for the nal
UNICEF report and aspects drawn upon to produce a
series of articles and research briengs. You can ask
the researcher to give you a copy of this report and
any other products that emerge from this research.
The results of the study will also be shared during
presentations with government ministries and
international organisations and during university
conferences. All of the information that you share
will be kept anonymous and condential in the
reports and presentations. The researchers will
give you a copy of the study ndings to review and
approve before the nal report is prepared.
Who is organising and funding the research?
The research is funded by UNICEF and being
carried out by a team of 4 international researchers.
Professor Mario Novelli, University of Sussex is the
lead researcher and will also lead the South Sudan
research. Professor Alan Smith, University of Ulster
will lead the Kenya research. Gabrielle Daoust and
Caroline Marks, from Sussex and Ulster respectively,
will conduct eldwork in collaboration with local
partners in each country.
Who has approved this study?
This study has been approved by the School of the
Education and Social Work ethical review process
and by the Social Sciences Cluster Research Ethics
Committee (C-REC) at the University of Sussex.
The Ministries of Education from South Sudan and
Kenya respectively have given permission for this

104
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
Interview consent form
Project title: Education Sector Governance in South Sudan and Kenya
You should feel free to ask the researcher if you have any questions about this consent form or if you have
other questions about the study. Please take the time to read this form carefully before signing. You can ask
for new information at any time during the study. You will be given a copy of the signed form to keep.
I agree to take part in this study. The study has been explained to me and I have read and understood the
Information Sheet, which I may keep for records. I have had the opportunity to ask questions which have
been answered by the researcher.
I understand that agreeing to participate in this study means that I am willing to:
• Participate in a one-on-one interview with the researcher
• Allow the interview to audio recorded
• Be available if the researcher has other questions after the interview
Yes _____
No _____
I understand that any information I share is anonymous and private, and that my name and
personal identifying information will be not included in the research reports. I understand
that the research will keep my information condential, except if required by law.
Yes _____
No _____
I understand that the information I share will only be used for the purposes of the study
described in the Information Sheet, and that the data will be stored and saved in a secure
location.
Yes _____
No _____
I understand that I can ask for a copy of the interview transcript to review before it is
included in the report, and that I can review and approve the study ndings before the nal
report is prepared.
Yes _____
No _____
I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary, that I can choose not to
participate in the study, that I can choose not to answer certain questions, and that I can
withdraw from the study at any time without any negative consequences and without
giving a reason.
Yes _____
No _____
I agree to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research
study. I understand that this information will be kept strictly condential and handled in
accordance with the United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act 1998.
Yes _____
No _____
Participant name: Researcher name:
____________________________________________ ________________________________________________
Signature: _________________________________ Signature: ______________________________________

105
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
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Date: ______________________________________ Date: __________________________________________
Interview questions for key stakeholders
Follow-up probing questions will be drawn upon to expand each question depending on the response.
These interviews are intended to gain a better understanding of national and international perspectives on
key issues and challenges around the governance of education in South Sudan.
1. Could you tell me a little about your role in relation to education in South Sudan?
2. How do you think the education system is related to the on-going conict and tension in the country?
In your state or county?
3. In what way do you think educational governance systems and practices (management, policy reform,
coordination) are addressing or contributing to on-going conict and tensions?
4. Which regions of the country or state do you think require most educational attention and effort?
5. Is there sufcient attention? If not, why do you think that is?
6. Which sectors of the education system do you think require the most attention to address inequalities?
7. Is there sufcient attention? If not, why do you think that is?
8. What role do you think recent educational reforms such as decentralization have played in addressing
inequalities within the governance system?
9. What role have international actors played in addressing or contributing to addressing educational
inequalities?
10. What policies and strategies do you think need to be adopted in order to better address educational
inequalities?

United Nations Children’s Fund
Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Ofce (ESARO)
UNON, Gigiri
P.O. Box 44145-00100 Nairobi, Kenya
Tel. Ofce +254 20 762 2741,
Website: www.unicef.org/esaro
For further information contact:
Neven Knezevic (PhD)
nknezevic@unicef.org
Humanitarian Action, Resilience and Peacebuilding Section (HARP)
Camille Baudot,
Regional Education Advisor (ESARO)
cbaudot@unicef.org