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A Regional Security System in the Persian Gulf
Abstract
This chapter explores the development of a new regional security framework for the Persian Gulf and discusses the sources and security implications of actual and potential threats that have to be considered in any study of the Persian Gulf security system.
... However, the question is how much is enough for the defence of states, which need their scarce national resources for the development of the civilian sectors of their economies. 10 Second, a pure "glitter factor" may have defined Gulf arms procurement for a while but, more recently, Qatar and the UAE seem to have moved away from it. This is not to say that appearances are no longer a determinant in their purchases: there are indeed strong internal and international incentives for them to keep buying shiny, modern and sophisticated military equipment. ...
The Gulf countries have become an increasingly lucrative market for international arms trade, especially since the shrinking of Western defence budgets added fuel to the global export race in their direction. Amidst the profuse literature on security relations of the Gulf with outside powers, however, few publications aimed at explaining the incentives driving this trade beyond security motives on the part of clients, and economic determinism on the part of suppliers. This paper, which focuses on evolving trends of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE, aims at filling this gap by offering an overview of their multifaceted internal and international drivers and the way it has impacted the rules of the regional and global security game. Qatari and Emirati defence procurement used to be a means to an end that had little to do with addressing threats they faced on their own, let alone gaining more power on the international stage. Because they were small – and young – states unable to overcome their own security dilemma, their military acquisition served other main purposes. The author hence begins by focusing on the famous “glitter factor” implied in their arms acquisitions. She starts by giving an overview of the reactions that this importance of – sparkly – appearances in Gulf countries’ arms purchases stirs before trying and analysing the internal and international motivations behind this reality. Then, the essay turns to all indirect ways through which arms trade in Qatar and the UAE guarantee the security and stability of the state and, above all, the regime. Pointing to multiple international and domestic political, social and strategic determinants playing out in this area, the author argues that it perfectly illustrates their multifaceted survival strategy as “Small Princes-States”. Finally, the study turns to new dynamics of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE as a consequence of new external incentives – chief among which was the global economic context combined with the regional turmoil and its associated vacuum of power – meeting with new internal priorities. The author points to the two countries’ recent assertiveness, analyses the impact this has on the Client State – Supplying State – Industrial company triangle, and questions whether or not this can lead to new rules of the regional and global security game.
The consequences of the led invasion of Iraq have not only been limited within Iraq, but passed beyond its borders. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that was accepted as a loose alliance until that time has been one of the most affected units by these consequences. This paper argues that in the post-Iraq war period, even if the GCC is not yet a security community, it has made progress toward being so. The analysis of the developments occurring both outside and inside of the GCC leads us to reach this conclusion. (GCC), the United States of America (USA).
The Arab Gulf states have systematically worked to tighten their cooperation in various fields. However, progress toward increased defence collaboration continues to be slow due to a number of factors including fears of angering neighbouring countries, particularly Iran; protecting state sovereignty; and reliance on other forms of defence, such as national militaries and foreign allies. This article traces the ups and downs of defence cooperation between the Arab Gulf nations, focusing on the establishment of the GCC and the joint Peninsula Shield Force, crucial milestones in Arab Gulf security coordination. A timeline of increased and decreased cooperation is presented, including during the two Gulf wars, along with the manner in which the joint force has been employed, its associated concerns, and the potential future for defence collaboration.
An American geographer and specialist on Iran and Southwest Asia surveys the key geographic, historic, and political factors highlighting Iran's geostrategic importance at the crossroads between the petroleum-rich Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf regions. Focusing on contemporary socioeconomic and sociopolitical developments since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the author also discusses Iran's complex relations with its 15 neighbors. Coverage (through mid-February 2003) includes material on procurement of nuclear and missile technology from Russia and jurisdictional disputes over economic zones in the Caspian. Also noted are Iran's concerns in light of the prospective military operations in Iraq by the U.S.-led coalition.
The Gulf Cooperation Council's abysmal performance during the last 30 years clearly demonstrates that the member-states of this alliance remain unprepared to seriously commit themselves to the establishment of a credible joint defense force able to facilitate the goal of collective security for which the GCC was established in the first place. This thesis seeks explanations as to why the GCC has made little progress in establishing mechanisms to provide collective security for its members through the lenses of neorealist theory and regime theory. Neorealist theory explains the GCC's stumble on the path to achieving collective security by expecting that the GCC would not succeed if there were other options for security, but it fails to explain the causes that led the GCC member-states to seek other security options. Applying regime theory in the case of the GCC will identify the GCC's reasons for seeking other security options. This thesis hypothesizes that the GCC failed to guarantee security to its members due to its weakness as a regime, explained by regime theory, which led the GCC member-states to seek other security options provided by external power through bilateral security agreements, as predicted by neorealism.
This thesis examines the development of cooperative maritime security efforts in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Recent regional efforts to combat maritime security threats in the Gulf of Aden have drawn comparisons to similar efforts undertaken in the Malacca Straits. However, such comparisons fail to address the unique nature of security cooperation in the Persian Gulf, specifically the necessity of external security support for states in the region. This thesis argues that despite similarities shared by the two regions, the states of the Persian Gulf must deal with issues of prioritization, regional animosities, and external dependence before they can attempt to develop cooperative maritime security arrangements akin to those existing in Southeast Asia. Success will require a concerted effort by these states as well as the realization, by the United States, that it is undermining effective security cooperation in the region.
The relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been a tenuous one following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The research question investigates what type of threat Iran poses to Saudi Arabia and how the Saudi's will respond. This threat is not limited to a military one; it includes those to the Saudi economy and political instability. Iran seeks regional dominance; standing in its way is Saudi Arabia. It has rebuilt its military, sponsored violent organizations, and threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. These threaten not only the security of Saudi Arabia but its legitimacy in the Arab world. The relationship of these two nations will continue to impact the region and possibly the world economy.
This book contains a probing and comprehensive theoretical analysis of the emerging notion of national security in light of the dramatic post-Cold War transformation of the international system. It begins with a discussion of the nature of this change, emphasizing declining national sovereignty, escalating international interdependence, and proliferating anarchic conflict. After developing a framework of the conceptual components of national security, this study focuses on analyzing change--both in priorities and tradeoffs--in military security, economic security, resource/environmental security, and political/cultural security. Brief case studies of the 1991 Gulf War, the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the 1992 Earth Summit, and the ongoing Yugoslavia conflict illustrate the theoretical contentions. Finally, a set of crucial, fundamental security policy challenges and responses conclude the book.
The basic assumptions of U.S. policy toward the Gulf demand rethinking. The Pentagon pays up to 30 billion worth of oil that would flow anyway. Playing the role of regional hegemon ties America to troubled regimes and leaves it out on a limb, while allies sit back. Washington must hedge against inevitable political change in the region by spreading the burden and the say, reversing arms proliferation, and encouraging the Gulf states to come up with some security of their own.
After the 'oil boom' of October 1973, the major oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf had to deal with a complicated dilemma: what to do with the extremely vast revenues from oil export. It seems that they decided to invest in three major economic and social fields. The first was the development of infrastructure and power stations as well as governmental ministries and services. The second field was the development of the industrial and agricultural sectors. The authorities of the GCC countries realized that there were no guarantees for the continuation of high prices of oil and that they would have to diversify their economies in order to maintain long-term high levels of per capita income and GNP. The third field was the substantial improvement in the area of social services, including the health care and education systems as well as other social services. However, these projects required an extensive work force of a quality and quantity which could not be supplied by local sources. There were two main reasons for the shortage of the national work force in the GCC countries. The first was small national populations. In 1975, the total national populations of the GCC countries were estimated to be little more than 6 million. The largest national population was in Saudi Arabia - about 4.6 million - and the smallest in Qatar, with only 60,000 (see Table 1). The second reason was very low rates of labour force participation (due to high rates of natural increase): about 20-23 per cent;' as compared with 50 per cent, and even higher, among the developed countries.2 These trends forced the GCC countries substantially to increase the number of their foreign workers. One of the distribution characteristics of proven oil reserves in the Arab world is that they are greatest in the countries with relatively small populations. As a result, those countries with the larger populations and the greatest need for additional work opportunities have little, if any, oil.3 Since the beginning of the 1970s, the authorities of the labour-exporting countries realized the benefits that could be reaped from inter-Arab labour movement, with the main benefits deriving from the financial remittances transferred by workers to their home countries and the reduction of pressure for work opportunities. In 1989, the last year before the Gulf crisis, the total of workers' remittances sent from the rich Arab oil-producing countries to Egypt, Jordan and Yemen reached $5.190
The authors discuss policy development options to deal with migrants and refugees to developed countries. "Our principal argument--perhaps to state the obvious--is that international migration and refugee movements are foreign policy, not simply domestic, issues. Nevertheless, citizens and policy makers are all too often unaware that if they want to secure their borders against unwanted population flows, this cannot be done simply by unilateral decisions to regulate entry." The focus is on Germany and the United States.
Demographic trends in the states of the Arab Gulf are analyzed. The author first describes some fundamental aspects of current demographic trends, particularly as they concern the relative share of nationals and non-nationals in the total population, and then draws some policy-related conclusions from the projections presented. Data are from national sources and from the data base developed by the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA).
Transfer of Major Conventional Weapons
- T Siemon
- Pieter D Wezeman
- Wezeman
- ST Wezeman
Iran and the Gulf crisis A similar argument is presented by Ramazani concerning Iran’s resentment toward British domination in the Persian Gulf in the nineteenth century, particularly after the United Kingdom decided to place Bahrain Island under its protection The Persian Gulf
- Chubin
The Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons”, SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
- Pieter D Björn Hagelin
- Siemon T Wezeman
- Wezeman
There are empirical studies supporting the view that higher military expenditures and arms production have an adverse impact on environmental quality; see, forThe environmental consequences of Third World military expenditures and arms production: the Latin American case
- Robert E Salaam
- David Looney
- Winterford
The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Dispute: Historical Background and the UN Decisions of 1992 and
- Harry Brown
Address to the NationThe Iran-Iraq war: conflict, linkage, and spillover in the Middle East
- Fbis Hussein In
- Middle East
Threats to the Gulf-Part 1
- Andrew Rathmell
- A Rathmell
The Gulf Monarchies: New Economic and Political Realities (London: The Royal Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism
- Gawdat Bahgat
The Iraqi-Kuwaiti Boundary
- Ewan Anderson
- Jasem Karam
- E Anderson
The Royal Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism
- Gawdat Bahgat
- G Bahgat
The Iran-Iraq war: conflict, linkage, and spillover in the Middle East
- Saddam Hussein
- JW Amos II
Iran’s foreign policy: both North and South”
- R K Ramazani
- RK Ramazani
The Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons
- Björn Hagelin
- Pieter D Wezeman
- Siemon T Wezeman
- B Hagelin
World Military and Social Expenditures
- Ruth Leger
- RL Sivard
A similar argument is presented by Ramazani concerning Iran’s resentment toward British domination in the Persian Gulf in the nineteenth century, particularly after the United Kingdom decided to place Bahrain Island under its protection
- Shahram Chubin
- RK Ramazani
Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Mohammed Besharati expressed the official view that “our neighboring countries are signing military pacts with big powers one by one, and strengthening their military arsenals; so why can’t we replace the weapons we lost during the eight-year imposed war
- J Wyllie