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141
8.1 Decentralising Education in Indonesia: Introduction
In many ways, the worldwide pendulum swing from educational centralisation to
decentralisation has been based more on fashion than solid arguments. In the
respective periods when each held sway, both claimed to have been based on
notions of increased quality, equality, and efficiency. As part of wider structural
adjustment measures, international agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank, continue to press many developing countries to introduce
decentralisation, making them objects of this “experimentally fashion-based”
policy, (Alexander 2001, p. 33), notwithstanding evidence that local government
often lacked the resources and capacity to manage the process effectively.
While Indonesia was subjected to these external pressures, its colonial and post-
colonial history, together with recent political developments, make its experience
of decentralisation distinctive. Before and after independence, Indonesia was
characterised by centralisation rather than decentralisation. Before independence,
during its three and a half centuries of colonialism, Dutch rule was highly centralised.
After independence, Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president (1945–1966), introduced
“Guided Democracy,” a governing principle marked by emphatic presidential
power and strong centralisation.
Under the New Order (Orde Baru) regime (1966–1998), Suharto, Indonesia’s sec-
ond president, imposed “Pancasila Democracy,” also characterised by strong centrali-
sation. Arguably, his adoption of centralisation was partly a response to the legacy of
colonialism (Amal 1994; Kahin 1994; Malley 1999). Under his regime, the economy
was partly liberalised, but political liberalisation was curtailed (Robison and Hadiz
Decentralising Indonesian Education:
The Promise and the Price
Alpha Amirrachman, Saefudin Syafi’i, and Anthony Welch
J. Zajda and D.T. Gamage (eds.), Decentralisation, School-Based Management, and Quality,
Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 8,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2703-0_8, © Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009
A. Amirrachman
University of Amsterdam
S. Syafi’i
University of Sydney
A. Welch ()
University of Sydney
e-mail: a.welch@usyd.edu.au
142 A. Amirrachman et al.
2004). In the education sector, teachers were forced to “deliver the national curriculum
and to transmit the values (of obedience and loyalty)” (Bjork 2003, p. 192).
Nevertheless, mounting internal and external pressure for decentralisation
and democratisation climaxed following the 1997 regional economic crisis, which
imposed great hardship on the Indonesian people, forcing millions to withdraw
their children from school. Amid such pressure, President Habibie’s government
(1998–1999) launched its decisive, so-called “big bang” decentralisation reform
(Hofman and Kaiser 2002).
Currently, Indonesia faces a crisis of considerable proportions. The crisis is
inter-related – one of governance, demographics and finance. The world’s largest
Muslim nation, a country of around 220 million inhabitants (a high proportion of
whom are under the age of 15) with a higher education population totalling around
2.7 million (mostly private), still suffers from effects of the regional economic crisis
of the late 1990s, and faces a major debt burden. Ongoing financial constraints,
together with spiralling demand for higher education, have underpinned the growth
of private higher education at the expense of public institutions who, in turn, are
adopting some of the strategies of the private sector (Welch 2007a, b).
Well before this, however, ethnic and religious rivalries, some long-standing and
often violent, were evident in areas, such as Aceh, Papua, Ambon, the Moluccas and
Timor, while the role of the politically powerful army and local militias, that they sup-
port, in suppressing such dissent, at times brutally, cannot be over-estimated. Current
efforts to implement decentralisation (including within education), while commanding
popular support, are also poorly understood at times, or co-opted by regional or ethnic
political leaders. The corrupt, authoritarian Soeharto regime was succeeded by a range
of short-term political leaders with varying allegiances, some commitment to building
civil society (Aspinall 2005), but at times, uncertain leadership qualities. Transparency
International, the international watchdog, still lists Indonesia as among countries suf-
fering most from corruption, in its annual reviews. Hence, after some 30 years of
authoritarian rule and a few short years of democratic experiment, “the challenge now
is to consolidate democracy” (Madjid 2003; see also Tipton et al. 2003). Current disil-
lusionment about the prospects for reform, and for building a democratic Indonesia is
now widespread, undermining political legitimacy:
Many segments of the population, particularly members of the younger generation, begin
to seriously doubt whether their leaders understand and really mean what they say. Many
have lost confidence in their leaders (Surakhmad 2002, p. 15).
This context imparts a distinctive quality to the Indonesian experience of decentralisa-
tion. Indeed, in many ways, it could be argued that in the Indonesian case, it is not
decentralisation or centralisation that is the critical axis around which the reform agenda
turns, but the political issue of transparent, accountable and open government. Some
analysts, indeed, have characterised recent moves to a more decentralised form of gov-
ernance as having largely exported corruption from the centre to the local level.
Resource constraints, particularly in the case of the Madrasah, are another key factor.
Based on the recent field research, the following two cases examine key sites of
decentralisation in education: the state schooling system, and the religious system.
In each case, it can be argued that the initial enthusiasm for more local control, by
143Decentralising Indonesian Education: The Promise and the Price
communities and some teachers, was undercut by factional politics, inadequate
experience and capacity development at the local level, the lack of clarity in the
guidelines to key legislation, the persistence of traditional status hierarchies, and
forces that supported the status quo ante. In each case, too, the process can be
characterised as having been a “top down” one – a form of centralised decentralisation
(Mok 2004). Lastly, both cases suggest that the fissiparous effects of the move to a
more market-based system further disadvantaged less successful institutions, often
in poorer areas. The following two sections examine in sequence the effects on state
schools (Sekolah), and the religious schools (Madrasah), administered by the
Ministry of National Education (MNE) (2002), Ministry of Religious Affairs
(MORA) (2002), respectively.
8.1.1 Decentralising the Sekolah: “Big Bang,” Local Responses
The national school (sekolah) system, administered by the MNE, was swept by
decentralisation, in particular via Ministerial Decree 044/U/2002. This decree man-
dated that local communities form Education Boards at city/regency level and
School Committees at school level, as part of a general push for increased com-
munity participation. Tensions, however, accompanied community participation.
In the Indonesian context, the tensions seemed to have stemmed both from the
legacy of centralisation and the socially complex nature of Indonesian society,
including a certain traditional deference to higher authority (Amal 1994; Bjork 2003).
Recent research conducted in Sekolah, as well as the local Education Board, and
relevant NGOs in “Bintang,” a major, comparatively wealthy city in East Kalimantan
province, examined key features of school decentralisation. These included the extent
to which decentralisation of school authority was politicised, how far Indonesia’s long-
standing and entrenched centralist culture remained intact, effects on parental choice,
the role of the principal’s leadership, and lastly, whether a quasi-market approach was
effective in limiting some of the more pernicious effects of marketisation.
8.1.1.1 Politics within the “Bintang” Education Board (BEB)
Politics certainly became evident within local Education Boards. The “Bintang”
case study revealed that tensions between the two key “Business” and “Government”
factions in the BEB stemmed both from the insistence of non-government actors on
taking every opportunity afforded by decentralisation, and the ambivalence of
government actors towards sharing their authority with others. In short, non-
government actors reacted with enthusiasm, while government actors were much
less keen. The implementation of the policy, thus, proved turbulent.
It is worth reiterating the importance of ethnic politics in Indonesian society. In this
case, the membership of the “Business Faction” was dominated by the two largest
ethnic groups in “Bintang,” namely the Bugisnese and Javanese, while only one mem-
ber (the least active) was considered local. By contrast, the mayoral and other
144 A. Amirrachman et al.
important posts in the local government were dominated by locals. While it is too
simplistic to conclude that the conflict stemmed from the rivalry between migrants
from other areas and the locals (see Maley 2002; Brodjonegoro 2003; World Bank
2003), personal allegiances were evident in the membership of the Business Faction.
Notwithstanding some ethnic rivalry, the Business Faction seemed to be based
principally on business interests. Two events showed this most clearly: firstly, a
less-than-credible BEB election that resulted in the victory of the Business faction,
(many of whose members were allies of a local business leader, within his personal
education business empire); and secondly, the insistence of this faction in siting
the BEB office in a private school located within this education business complex.
The determination, on the other hand, of the Government faction to place the office
in a public (i.e., government) school contributed to the strong perception on the part
of the Business Faction that their rivals were eager to place the BEB under local
government control.
Clearly, siting the office in a public school did not mean that it would necessarily
fall under local government influence, while having the office in a school belonging
to the local business leader did not necessarily mean that the BEB would fall under
his influence. In the more transparent era that accompanied the passing of the Orde
Baru regime, many parents argued that the physical location was not important as
the degree of openness had substantially improved. Hence, any local government
intervention, or undue business influence could easily be seen and headed off.
The above example might seem a trivial example of factional politics. It was
perhaps understandable, after all, that each faction had a certain ideological orienta-
tion. Nonetheless, it proved indicative of wider concerns when each faction failed to
shed their differences and come to a consensus regarding the body’s mission, some-
thing complicated in the first place by the failure to conduct a credible election of its
members. Consequently, as the gap between the two camps broadened, the effective-
ness and credibility of the body were hampered. Thus, the collaboration among
stakeholders that the community had desired and expected, failed to materialise. The
two factions’ conflicting ideological alignments weakened accountability, while
reaching consensus in the absence of trust became difficult (see Crowson and Boyd
2001; Lauglo 1995). This marked the first evidence that decentralisation does not
always encourage local democratic political culture (Maley 2002), particularly given
little practical experience of it, during decades of authoritarian rule.
These tensions raise questions regarding the BEB’s effectiveness in conducting
its assigned duties in dealing with the city’s education affairs. Key values needed to
underpin successful decentralisation were lacking:
building consensus for reform, bringing together all the key players in an inclusive process,
is time-consuming and difficult. It requires communication and trust (CSBA 1997, p. 16).
The second piece of evidence was the passivity of key actors, such as school prin-
cipals, during the early days of the BEB elections. Three decades of centralised
rule, during which teachers and principals had learned to always look to the centre
for leadership, had transformed principals and teachers into passive “transmitters,”
145Decentralising Indonesian Education: The Promise and the Price
not independent-minded individuals (Bjork 2003). This further weakened prospects
for locally based participatory democracy in education.
The third piece of evidence was the strong perception on the part of many local
government personnel that the BEB should answer to the Mayor rather than to the
people, despite the perception by many parents that the body should be indepen-
dent. Parents and teachers generally agreed that it was the local government’s
responsibility to financially support the BEB, albeit without undermining the inde-
pendence of the body.
A lack of clarity and specificity in the guidelines accompanying the decentralisa-
tion legislation underlined that “the devil is in the detail” (Maley 2002, pp. 23–37).
Varying interpretations of central government guidelines caused somewhat chaotic
implementation. The ambiguity and contradictions contained in the guidelines
partially contributed to confusion at the local level. Contradictions between
independence and accountability became apparent, since though the guidelines
stipulated that Education Boards are independent and equal to local governments,
their formation could be invoked by Mayoral decrees (thus potentially placing them
under mayoral authority, to some extent). Neither the ministerial decree, nor the
attendant regulations clearly specified the accountability mechanism. Equally, the
mechanism for the conduct of elections was less than clear (MNE 2002).
While these loose guidelines arguably gave more flexibility to local communities,
residual confusion remained as to which part needed to be loose, and which part
should be specific. Consequently, during implementation, the loose regulations
resulted in both multiple interpretations, and a view by some that decentralisation
was a license to do whatever they liked. The perpetuation of vested interests by local
stakeholders made it impossible to achieve a clear consensus as to central govern-
ment legislation/regulations, resulting in somewhat muddled implementation.
The rise of non-government organisations (NGOs), a tangible result of the
breakdown of the Orde Baru regime, also had an impact on the decentralisation of
schooling in Indonesia. Nonetheless, while local NGOs (such as “Bintang” Watch)
played a role as constructive partners with local government, the latter seemed to
perceive the BEB as a disruptive element. There were two possible reasons for this
perception. First was the concern on the part of the local government that the roles
of the BEB would overlap with those of the EO (Education Office). Second was the
concern on the part of the local government that the motivation of non-government
actors in the organisation was more oriented towards business than education.
The fact that “Bintang Watch” was successful in positioning itself as a sparring
partner with the local government shows that grassroots initiative was likely to be
more meaningful than the top down initiatives.
Teachers and parents were generally supportive of the four roles of the BEB
(supporting, controlling, bridging, and advisory roles). However, some respondents
did not support expanding the roles, for example, sharing a decision-making role
with local government. This was despite the fact that many expected the BEB to
have an equal position to the local government. The findings indicate that the BEB
should play its part as a “mini local parliament” that would support, control, and
146 A. Amirrachman et al.
advise the local government, as well as liaise between the local government and the
people regarding educational issues.
8.1.1.2 City and Rural Schools: Contrasting Reaction and Implementation
Regional disparities have been a long-standing problem in Indonesia, including in
education. In the new, more competitive climate engendered by decentralisation,
such disparities could well increase. A detailed case study of two “Bintang” schools,
one rural and one urban, revealed stark contrasts between the successful city
School’s enthusiastic embrace of decentralisation, and the rural School’s general
pessimism. Although many teachers at the rural school had a positive attitude
towards the policy, pessimism was induced by the Principal, who was considered
weak in implementing it. By contrast, the principal of the city school seized the
opportunity to extend the existing success of his school, including strengthening
the patronage of key local politicians. From the outset, the two schools implemented
the policy differently, with the City School Committee’s arguably participative election
contrasting markedly with the Rural School Committee’s “engineered” election1.
Several factors favoured the City School. Its principal’s strong leadership, good
school management, solid support from influential parents and local community,
and political patronage of key local government officials strengthened the school’s
position. In turn, the local government’s apportioning of financial support to
schools further entrenched these differences – the Rural School’s subsidy remained
the same as the previous year, while the City School’s increased. This was a
worrying indication that under the more competitive climate that accompanied
decentralisation, less successful schools may become even further marginalised
(Carnoy 1998; Coffey 2001; Welch 1997, 2007a, b). A quasi-market approach, in
which local government mediated the more egregious effects of marketisation
(Vandenberghe 1999), could only work if the local government agreed to intervene.
Active intervention by local governments to mediate the worst effects of marketisa-
tion, however, was not always forthcoming.
In the “Bintang” case study, most respondents welcomed the formation of the new
School Committees and their four assigned roles. Some uncertainty remained, how-
ever, about how far parent participation and authority should extend. For example,
while many teachers were unhappy at parents sitting in classes, parental participation
in determining local curriculum and producing a more open annual financial report
was generally welcomed. Respondents, especially parents, showed increased expec-
tation and awareness of both transparency and accountability. Despite this expecta-
tion, in practice, transparency and accountability were largely absent, particularly in
the case of the rural school. Arguably, this was partly due to the unclear guidelines:
The governance framework for school committees is only partially defined. It is not made
clear whether their roles in finance apply solely to parent raised funds ( . . . ) or whether
1This again highlights Maley’s (2002) view that decentralisation does not always bring about
democracy at local level in Indonesia.
147Decentralising Indonesian Education: The Promise and the Price
they are to have oversight over all financial matters. [It is not clear] whether school com-
mittees have the right to enter into contracts. The boundaries between their monitoring
functions and the professional autonomy of the teacher or head teacher are not yet compre-
hensively defined (Davison et al. 2004, p. 4).
Likewise, as Surakhmad (2002) has argued, the ambiguity of the law and the
low levels of professionalism at the local level mean that significant progress,
particularly in the education sector, may not be feasible, at least in the near
future.
Furthermore, different stakeholders held different views on the form and extent
of participation. Also, a degree of reticence in assuming the wider powers available
under decentralisation was evident. While many teachers agreed with the expansion
of the School Committee’s four roles, including its participating in the selection of
the school principal, parents were divided on the issue. Even those teachers and
parents that agreed with extending local participation expressed the view that the
School Committees should only propose candidates, for example, while the Head
of the EO should retain the final say. To some degree, this indicates the persistence
of the centralist culture and the reluctance of School Committees to assume further
power. At the same time, the fact that the same respondents agreed that the School
Committee should propose candidates for Principal reveals heightened local expec-
tations regarding the participatory mechanisms.
Differences of wealth and social class, a further factor that has long fractured
Indonesian integration, have deepened in recent years, partly under the influence
of external agencies, such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, which
have each pressed for more structural adjustment measures. Under this new
regime of structural adjustment, or economic globalisation (Welch and Mok
2003), wealthier and more powerful communities with greater cultural and finan-
cial resources have extended their advantage. Decentralisation has further licensed
this cleavage. Clearly, factors, such as school management and parental socio-
economic status, each play a key role in determining school success under decen-
tralisation. Some parents and teachers of the City School acknowledged that their
school (comprising largely middle class parents) would have more opportunities
to succeed compared to schools in rural areas. However, many also argued that
location did not count as success would mainly depend on how the school is man-
aged. The less successful schools, according to many, should learn from the
success of the City school.
While most respondents agreed on the importance of local government in
mediating the worst effects of school competition, in practice, each school
tended to defend its interests. For example, teachers at the City school argued
that their school should receive bigger subsidies due to its higher operational
costs (despite the claim of the Rural School Principal that the subsidy for his
school was manifestly inadequate to meet its costs). Many parents and teachers
of the Rural School, by contrast, said that decentralisation would result in
competition between the strong and the weak, and that it was virtually impossible
for their school to catch up with schools in the city. Likewise, parental choice
seemed to be the privilege of the City School parents as the Rural School
148 A. Amirrachman et al.
parents, in reality, had only limited choices (Gewirtz et al. 1995; Welch 2000;
Welch and Mok 2003).
The above case study of a relatively wealthy province in Indonesia resulted in
the following tentative conclusions:
Firstly, education decentralisation was not merely an administrative matter, but
also socio-political.
Secondly, the centralist culture of the New Order regime appeared difficult to
dislodge, and hence, decentralisation was mechanistic rather than organic, notwith-
standing signs of heightened expectations of a more transparent and accountable
education governance on the part of most respondents.
Thirdly, as a result of the educational marketisation that paralleled decentralisa-
tion, parental choice seems likely to become the preserve of the richer, more influ-
ential, or middle class parents. Poorer, less influential, or working class parents are
likely to have more limited choices.
Fourthly, the role of the local government (together with the Education Board)
in limiting the gap between schools and moderating the force of marketisation was
critical. In practice, however, this does not always occur.
Fifthly, a principal’s leadership remained crucial particularly in encouraging
collaboration between school members and the community, and in nurturing rela-
tionships between the schools and the local government.
8.1.2 The Madrasah Dilemma
The Sekolah system was not the only one to reveal the limits of decentralisa-
tion in practice. Although a decentralised system of government was written
into the 1945 Constitution, it was not until the implementation of the two Laws
(Law 22 and Law 25 of 1999) in early 2001 that a genuinely decentralised
system of government was fully put in place. Disappointed by the long-
standing centralised and authoritarian rule, especially in the last 33 years of
Suharto’s rule (the so-called Orde Baru regime), regions, especially the natu-
rally resource-rich regions, responded to the move towards decentralised
governance with great optimism and confidence. Indeed, for its proponents,
decentralisation was seen as an effective strategy to promote both democrati-
sation and good governance (Burki et al. 1999; World Bank 2001). Unfortunately,
in the case of the religious schooling system, traditionally governed centrally
by the MORA, the early hopes of many Indonesians often went unrealised.
According to Law 22, policy-making authority in all but a few policy areas was
devolved to districts. This newly gained autonomy and the subsequent financial
support stipulated by Law 25 enabled districts to develop policies based on local
condition and preferences. For Islamic schools (Madrasahs), however, the new era
of regional autonomy presented new challenges and dilemmas. On the one hand,
Madrasahs are educational institutions whose control was decentralised to districts.
On the other hand, Madrasahs remained under the rubric of religious affairs, and
149Decentralising Indonesian Education: The Promise and the Price
hence, under the central MORA. The following section explores these implications
of this contradictory result, and in particular, the response of the local Madrasah
communities to decentralisation.
8.2 Background
The development of both the Sekolah system and the religious Madrasah system
in Indonesian education can be traced back to at least colonial educational policy
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when Dutch colonial rule was
at its peak. As the growth of secular schools paralleled that of the East Indies
economy, the Islamic traditional boarding schools (Pesantren) adopted elements
of the European schooling system practiced by the colonial schools. This resulted
in the development of Madrasahs as semi modern schools, combining both reli-
gious and modern curriculum (Mukhtar 2000; Steenbrink 1974). Despite this,
there was a sharp contrast between the way the Sekolahs and the Madrasahs
developed. The Sekolahs depended largely upon government (Mauldin 1961;
Nasution 1983), while the Madrasahs relied heavily upon Muslim communities’
initiatives (Mukhtar 2000; Yunus 1979). This community-based character was
indeed an important feature of the Madrasahs. The fact that the majority of
Madrasahs were private (80–90%, depending on level) is a clear indication of
how dominant local Muslim community was in determining the condition of their
Madrasahs.
Another distinctive characteristic of the Madrasahs was their curriculum.
Madrasahs initially evolved from traditional Pesantren education where most cur-
riculum content was oriented around making their santris (students) knowledgeable
in the religious subjects, and inducting them into being good Muslims (Jones 1991).
As colonial schools became more acceptable in the wider Indonesian populace,
Muslim leaders came to realise the need to modernise their traditional education
(Noer 1973). The awareness by the proponents of the early Madrasahs of the
importance of modern curriculum, however, did not automatically translate into
reality. Instead, religious preoccupations hindered the Madrasahs from fully
embracing a modern curriculum. Thus, it was not until the early period of the New
Order Rule (early 1970s) that the curriculum of Madrasahs became more fully
modernised.
The 1975 curriculum reform that mandated a 70:30 proportion in favour of modern
curriculum brought the Madrasahs closer to the Sekolah system, although lack of
both government support and parental capacity limited its success. Bray and
Thomas (1998) indicate, for example, that more than 94% of private Madrasahs’
funds were derived from parents, (government funding comprising less than 6%).
Additionally, the fact that the majority of parents came from the lower income
categories made it even harder for the Madrasahs to implement the modern curricu-
lum mandated by the 1975 Joint Ministerial Decree. Such conditions shaped the
reactions of the Madrasah supporting community to decentralisation. This included
150 A. Amirrachman et al.
the response to the MORA decree number E101 of March 2001 that called for
greater autonomy of the Madrasahs, accentuating local collaboration between local
staff, parents, and community members.
8.2.1 The Perceived Marginalisation of the Madrasahs
A recent study of responses by Madrasah communities in Central Java Province to
decentralisation reveals that controversy over whether or not Madrasahs would be
decentralised to districts was part of a bigger debate over decentralisation prevail-
ing among the Indonesian public. As Aspinall and Fealy noted, a key concern of
Indonesian decentralisation (putting districts at the centre of public policy making)
was about the possible decline in quality of governance (Aspinall and Fealy 2003,
p. 4). Indeed, in many cases, the beneficiaries of this newly gained autonomy were
district heads, local politicians, and members of local parliament, who lacked both
motivation and experience to build good local governance. In addition, although a
variety of NGOs flourished, they could not exert significant influence on public
policy making due to their dependence upon donors, including at times, local
government itself. As a result, what happened in many districts was re-centralisa-
tion at the local level, with minimal engagement by wider public and civil society.
Both public discontent over this re-centralisation tendency and an increase in
corrupt practices (Korrupsi, Kollusi and Nepotism, known as KKN) associated with
decentralisation were used by many MORA bureaucrats, Madrasah principals, and
community figures to resist its implementation. Many favoured retaining a centra-
lised arrangement under MORA authority. A number of rationales for the status
quo were developed: decentralising Madrasahs to districts would only result in
further marginalisation; it could endanger the Islamic identity of Madrasahs; and
Madrasahs would only fall under the control of local politicians, especially those
perceived as being secular or anti-religious. This underlines the political character
of decentralisation, in which the issue of who controls what resources and for what
purposes became the bone of contention between different factions (Fiske 1996).
Another element in the controversy about Madrasahs remaining under MORA’s
central authority was the prospect of greater government financial support. Support
for devolution of Madrasahs to districts by a minority of MORA bureaucrats, some
Madrasah principals, and the majority of private Madrasah teachers was based on
the argument that difficulties in accessing more of the district budget experienced
by many Madrasahs were the result of current centralized arrangements. According
to this view, central MORA officials failed to realise the best arrangements for
Madrasahs in the era of district autonomy, resulting in them being kept out of reach
of local policy-making, which in the end, only went against the Madrasahs even
more. In this regard, the apparent reluctance of the Ministry of Home Affairs
(MOHA) to take control of Madrasahs from MORA can be seen as part of a state
strategy to avert responsibility for providing necessary resources. Given that the
current centralised arrangement seems fully supported by policy-makers in MORA,
151Decentralising Indonesian Education: The Promise and the Price
MNE, and MOHA, whether the state finally adopts centralisation or decentralisa-
tion policy becomes largely a matter of what best serves the basic goal of minimising
government expenditures. Ironically, many MORA bureaucrats seemed relieved at
the retention of centralised arrangements, arguably underlining their principal
position as agents of the government, rather than as they claimed, the protectors of
Madrasahs. Arguably then, for the Madrasahs, decentralisation policy has only
perpetuated their traditional problems: lack of government support, declining pro-
vision of resources, and their marginalisation within local policy-making.
8.2.2 MORA Enacted School-Based Management
The retention of centralised arrangements for Madrasah excluded MORA from the
rigor of the national reform measures prevailing in almost every aspect of public
life. It is under such circumstances that the promulgation of Decree E101 in March
2001 (Decree 101 for short) devolving limited autonomy to individual Madrasah
can be understood. Decree 101 was virtually a product of bureaucratic practice, and
thus was a centralised decentralisation initiative produced by MORA policy-makers
to gain reform credentials amidst public criticism over the perpetuation of MORA’s
centralised structures.
It is evident from the policy production process and the text of the Decree that
the notion of Madrasah-based management enacted by MORA was inspired by the
international trend towards school-based management. For example, Decree 101
required Madrasah to establish Majelis Madrasah (MM) or Madrasah Council,
comprising parent, teacher, and community representatives, somewhat like require-
ments to establish School Councils in countries, such as the USA, New Zealand,
and Australia (Caldwell and Spinks 1988; Leithwood and Menzies 1998; Murphy
and Beck 1995; Whitty et al. 1998). The core message of Decree 101 represented
the will for change, but policy makers at the centre were inspired by both the inter-
national discourse on de-centralisation policy and the national political euphoria of
the Reform Era. These policy makers sought to reform the internal organisational
life of Madrasahs and renew the relations between Madrasah staff (principals and
teachers) and MORA provincial office (Kanwil). Seven areas of authority were
devolved to MM: authority to elect the principal, budgeting, local content of
curriculum, learning plan, teacher recruitment, and supervision and evaluation of
learning. The Decree also imposed a 4-year term for Madrasah principals,
including requiring incumbent principals who had been in office longer than
stipulated to end their term.
The disempowering effect of the Decree upon the Kanwil and incumbent prin-
cipals became the main source of controversies, which subsequently became the
main barrier to successful implementation. Complicated further by the approach
to its dissemination, that relied upon the existing MORA bureaucracy, the resul-
tant lack of shared understanding, especially by those supposed to be the key
implementers (the Kanwil and incumbent principals), and conflicting interests
152 A. Amirrachman et al.
among different parties ultimately rendered Decree 101 ineffective, neither
changing the relations between Kanwil and Madrasahs, nor the internal organisa-
tional life of the Madrasahs. Indeed, while key Kanwil officials expressed formal
support for the proposed devolution in speeches, that explicitly commanded every
Madrasah to establish an operational MM, their practical opposition was
evidenced in the continuing appointment of new principals without the involve-
ment of MMs. The Kanwil’s Janus face understandably created confusion within
the Madrasahs.
8.2.3 Implementation of Decree 101
As indicated, conflicting interpretations of the Decree resulted in a tug of war
between those wanting the Decree implemented, and those who felt its weaknesses
warranted its withdrawal. One reflection of the prevailing perception among local
Madrasah communities that politics was the source of conflicts and disintegration
was that many principals and teachers argued that giving limited but significant
decision-making authority to MM would turn Madrasahs into political arenas,
which would make improving school performance levels more difficult.
Many were pessimistic about the prospects of partnership between the
Madrasahs and their supporting communities. The prevailing assumption of many
principals and teachers was that the lower social economic background of Madrasah
parents limited what could be achieved via partnerships. Although some interna-
tional research supports this assumption (Lareau 1997), other studies suggest that
parental involvement is a likely catalyst to other positive developments, such as
parents’ greater understanding of their children’s schools (Jowett and Baginsky
1988). Nonetheless, the lesson of Decree 101 is that policy-makers in MORA
failed to make principals and teachers aware of the potential benefits of increased
involvement of parents, teachers, and community members. The lack of resources
and political will on the part of MORA is behind its failure to market parental and
community participation.
While some Madrasah principals exhibited a certain compliance, this was often
formal, rather than designed to generate increased parental and community partici-
pation. In other cases, principals claimed that the unclear stipulation of the Decree
was the cause of its failure. Each underlines the prevalence of a mentality of depen-
dence on technical guidelines [popularly known in the Indonesian bureaucratic
tradition as Petunjuk Teknis (juknis)], an indication of covert resistance to the notion
of wider participation. Centrist attitudes also persisted in the lack of respect
accorded to local, less privileged, and uneducated parents by some Madrasah prin-
cipals and teachers. To some extent, this attitude was closely related to the strong
hierarchy within both the bureaucracy and Javanese society, of which Madrasah
teachers and principals were part. The mentality of dependence on instructions
from the upper level of bureaucracy and the persistence of centrist attitudes among
many of those who were supposed to implement the policy formed a real stumbling
block to its full implementation.
153Decentralising Indonesian Education: The Promise and the Price
Nonetheless, some positive examples emerged. In three Senior Secondary Public
Madrasahs, enhanced partnerships between Madrasahs and their wider communi-
ties were evident in the establishment of successful MMs, and increased communi-
cation between parents and the Madrasahs. Even this positive development,
however, was challenged by the reality that the capacity to develop innovations and
garner needed resources remained unchanged. Funds from parents and government
(central and local) remained inadequate for everything beyond teachers’ salary.
As a result, the enthusiasm of MM members for participation and partnership
waned because local initiatives, including the provision of various types of skills
training, could not be implemented. This underlines that, in the absence of resources,
the devolution of authority to school level will not yield effective partnerships.
Another part of the picture of ground level implementation of the Decree was
conflicts between opposing parties in some public Madrasahs. Conflicts were
inevitable where principals were reluctant to implement the Decree, yet teachers
insisted on trying to have it implemented. Tension was heightened in many cases of
principal appointments. Some MMs found it difficult to get their candidate for
principals endorsed by Kanwil authorities. In one Secondary Public Madrasah,
approval was given only after a protracted tug-of-war involving on the one side,
teachers, parents, and community members of the MM, and on the other, Kanwil
and MORA district authorities. Resistance by Kanwil to full implementation was
predictable because the authority to appoint some 169 public principals was a rich
source of patronage. Kanwil resistance, however, had to face the persistence of
some MMs, inspired by public support and awareness of their authority to elect
principals.
Conflicts were also evident at school level. Most Madrasah teachers aspired to a
more democratic organisation, characterised by more egalitarian relations between
teachers, parents, and principal, and democratic decision-making process. Most
incumbent principals, however, opposed this model. Ultimately, a decentralisation
measure intended to change power relations within Madrasahs, and between
Madrasahs and their patrons was confronted by existing power relations, which
proved more effective and powerful. The resultant policy deadlock was predictable.
The promulgation of MORA Decree 409 in October 2003, nullifying Decree 101
even before a formal evaluation of its effectiveness, again subjected the everyday
life of Madrasahs and the relations with its patron Kanwil to a more bureaucratic
and undemocratic culture.
The Indonesian Madrasah experience revealed how power relations remained
critical in moving towards more decentralised governance. The unstinting support
for Law 22 and Law 25 exhibited by local governments and communities can be
explained in terms of their aspirations for more control over available resources,
especially after 33 years of heavy centralised rule under the Suharto regime.
The decision of the State to keep Madrasah under centralised MORA management
is equally understandable because decentralisation of Madrasahs would only
reduce the available resources, without any real advantages to central government.
To put it another way, the retention of centralised Madrasah management can be
seen as part of a state strategy to minimise its responsibilities for the Madrasahs in
154 A. Amirrachman et al.
the face of an increasing fiscal burden in the Reform Era (post 1998), when the rift
between rising demand for education and severely limited state capacity was deepened
by regional economic crisis. While the aim was perhaps the same, this contrasts
with the experiences of other countries, such as Australia, where decentralisation
was deployed as a strategy by the state to withdraw from its role of providing more
resources to its education system (Welch 1996, 2003). The failure to decentralise a
portion of authority towards Madrasahs via the promulgation of Decree 101 also
highlighted the unlikelihood of gaining support from key sectors affected by the
Decree (such as incumbent principals and Kanwil bureaucrats), as its implementa-
tion meant loss of power, perks and advantages. In the end, decentralisation policy
failed to deliver on its promises to act as a means by which local democracies,
increased public participation, and good local governance could be generated.
8.3 Conclusion
Indonesia’s experience of decentralisation gives the lie to those, including interna-
tional agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, who
have argued that it represents a universally effective strategy that will make curricu-
lum more responsive to local communities, diversify income sources for education,
and enhance democracy at the local level. Indonesia’s abrupt “Big Bang” introduc-
tion of centralised decentralisation (Mok 2004) in the late 1990s, in the face of both
falling state capacity (in part a product of the Asian economic crisis) and rising
demand for autonomy from many regions, was always unlikely to succeed. With
little experience of local democracy, unclear legislative guidelines, lack of local
capacity building, ongoing factional politics, corruption and co-option of the decen-
tralisation process by local politicians, resistance on the part of key officials and
principals whose interests were threatened, and the impoverishment of tens of
millions of Indonesians upon whose greater contributions their local Sekolah, and
particularly Madrasah, was now more dependent, the sudden introduction of decen-
tralisation into Indonesian education was doomed. While wealthier districts and
institutions have been able to make more of their opportunities than their poorer
cousins, thereby further entrenching social class and rural-urban differences, the
widespread failure of decentralisation measures in education has contributed to
overall disillusionment with government and political leaders among the Indonesian
population. Unquestionably, the policy could have been more effective, if better
prepared and supported. Nonetheless, in actuality, the price paid was high, while
the promise lies, as yet, largely unfulfilled.
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