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Why early collective action pays off:
evidence from setting Protected
Geographical Indications
Xiomara F. Quiñones-Ruiz
1
*, Marianne Penker
1
, Giovanni Belletti
2
, Andrea Marescotti
2
and
Silvia Scaramuzzi
2
1
Department of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna
(BOKU), Austria.
2
Dipartimento di Scienze per l’Economia e l’Impresa, Università di Firenze.
*Corresponding author: xiomara.fernanda.quinones-ruiz@boku.ac.at
Accepted 4 April 2016 Research Paper
Abstract
The registration of Geographical Indications (GIs) under the European Union (EU) legislation requires collective action
and considerable efforts borne by multiple actors such as producers, processors, public authorities and research centers.
We analyze their efforts, risks and benefits by comparing two EU GI registration processes in Italy and Austria, namely
the Sorana bean Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) and the Perry from Mostviertel PGI. Results from the insti-
tutional and transaction costs analysis suggest that intensive interaction for solving conflicting interests, negotiating
quality standards and defining common rules might pay off in indirect benefits and reduced risks. In particular, an in-
clusion of diverse and heterogeneous interest groups and a high degree of direct enterprise participation along the GI
application process (as observed in the Italian case) generate benefits such as trust and social cohesion, which then
support the actual use of the GI label and a better implementation of associated quality standards. A supportive
legal framework with assistance from public authorities can back up the community of producers not only in technical
aspects, but also as mediators when conflicts seem to be difficult to solve. As there seems to be a positive relationship
between the intensity and effectiveness of collective action and the likelihood of achieving broadly accepted standards
and social cohesion needed for successful GI implementation, the question for future research would not be how to avoid
collective efforts but how to effectively organize the interaction among heterogeneous producer groups.
Key words: geographical indication, protected geographical indication, collective action, registration, efforts, benefits, risks, EU
Introduction
Geographical Indications (GIs) allow producers to define
quality standards and defend their food products’repu-
tation, while highlighting their geographical origin,
local skills and value to consumers. For the registration
of a GI within the European Union (EU) scheme, initial-
ly set up by EU Council Regulation 2081/1992 (now
Regulation 1151/2012), local producers and processors
have to organize and collectively define the area of pro-
duction, the characteristics of the production process
and those of the final product. These common rules are
summarizedintheso-calledProductSpecification,
which is essential for the application to the EU. Once
EU recognition is obtained, GIs in EU territory will
be used only for products complying with Product
Specification.
Due to heterogeneous interests of producers and proces-
sors diverging in size, location and quality standards,
mutual agreements (Paus and Reviron, 2010;Galtier
et al., 2013) have to be reached. This requires considerable
collective efforts on the meso-level (Vandecandelaere et al.,
2009). We assume that the interaction of GI enterprises will
be shaped by formal and informal institutions (Reviron and
Chappuis, 2011; Sidali and Scaramuzzi, 2014). The
European legal framework provides the overall regulatory
structures for GI registration; however, there is some
scope for national specifications (e.g., requirements, proce-
dures and authorities responsible for the national analysis
of dossiers). We assume that the way EU states design
and organize the national phase of the GI registration
process is relevant, e.g., top-down processes often result in
low ex-ante efforts and high ex-post efforts, while participa-
tory processes usually have high ex-ante and low ex-post
Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems: Page 1 of 14 doi:10.1017/S1742170516000168
©Cambridge University Press 2016
efforts (Hanna, 1994,1995; Jena and Grote, 2010); add-
itionally, very weak cooperation or too centralized manage-
ment might not be efficiently run collective organizations
(Hanna, 1995). Furthermore, efforts made for information
gathering and for other forms of interaction can also result
in transaction benefits (Hanna, 1995; Enengel et al., 2014)
that surpass the efforts made to obtain the GI registration.
However, the governance of participatory group processes
also bears risks, such as unsolvable conflicts (Hanna,
1994; Enengel et al., 2014; Sidali and Scaramuzzi, 2014).
Reviron and Chappuis (2011) explain the importance
of collective organization in the European vision of
Protected Geographical Indications (PGI) and Protected
Designations of Origin (PDO). However, there is yet very
little literature scrutinizing GI registration processes and
the institutional mechanisms that shape collective efforts,
risks and benefits of this process among the interaction
of various supply chain actors (Paus and Reviron, 2010)
and institutional diversity (Bowen and Zapata, 2009).
Thus, we aim to get empirical insights on the GI regis-
tration processes and the associated efforts, risks and
benefits of the producers’collective action. The aims of
the paper are:
(1) to identify the types of public and private actors who
are involved along GI registration processes in the EU,
(2) to estimate and compare efforts, risks and benefits
they perceived during the registration process and
(3) to identify the link between the GI registration
process and the success of the GI initiative in terms
of GI use by enterprises.
We present the theoretical framework and methods that
guide our research in the following section. In the Results
section, we illustrate the analysis of the registration pro-
cesses and the collective efforts, risks and benefits of two
cases from Italy and Austria. In the Discussion, we
compare and discuss the case studies’results. We end
with the Conclusion.
Theoretical framework and methods
Following the research carried out by Quiñones-Ruiz
et al. (2014), the comparative study of the two GI registra-
tion processes in Italy and Austria is guided by the
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) frame-
work (Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom, 2005; Hess and
Ostrom, 2007) as well as an analytical scheme that struc-
tures the analysis of efforts, risks and benefits of participa-
tory processes (North, 1990; Allen, 1991; Penker and
Klemen, 2010).
The IAD framework
GIs and the reputation they incorporate are comparable
with common-pool resources (Winfree and McCluskey,
2005; Quiñones-Ruiz et al., 2015), as they refer to
natural or human systems that generate limited benefits
and are challenged by over-exploitation and free-riding
(Ostrom et al., 1994). Collective efforts to build up and
sustain product quality, clear rules, considerable monitor-
ing and sanctioning efforts are needed to maintain the GI
reputation and to effectively exclude illegitimate users.
Producers that are located in the defined GI area and
comply with the product specification are allowed to
benefit from the reputation of protected GIs (Babcock
and Clemens, 2004; Biénabe et al., 2011).
The collective action in diverse GI production systems
is shaped by GI firms’own formal and informal rules
(e.g., rules of producer organizations, conventions of pro-
duction) and by the formal legal context, in which the de-
velopment of a GI takes place. The opportunities or
limitations that individuals face in a given situation, the
information acquired, the benefits they would accrue or
be excluded from and how they rationalize a situation
are all affected by the rules or the lack of rules that
frame an event (Ostrom, 2005). Ostrom (1990) and
Ostrom and Polski (1999) claim that all efforts to organize
collective action must address a common set of problems,
such as coping with free-riding or monitoring individual
compliance with GI rules. As GI enterprises also
manage the common reputation of their regional
product and protect it from free-riding, we opted for the
long-standing IAD framework designed for the institu-
tional analysis of self-organized common-pool resource
management (Ostrom et al., 1994; Hess and Ostrom,
2007).
The IAD framework distinguishes key variables that
researchers use to assess the role of institutions in
shaping human interactions and decision-making pro-
cesses. Thus, following the IAD framework’s variables
(Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom and Polski, 1999; Hess
and Ostrom, 2007) and GI literature, the relevant categor-
ies of analysis regarding the contextual and institutional
situation include:
(1) The link of the product to the territory (analog to the
bio-physical characteristics as defined by Hess and
Ostrom 2007). Here, it is necessary to understand
the concept of ‘terroir’argued by Casabianca et al.
(2005). Terroir is defined as a geographical boundary,
in which a community has constructed—through
history—an intellectual and collective know-how of
production, which is based on a system of interactions
between a physical and biological environment to-
gether with human factors that reveal originality,
confer typicality and engender a reputation for a
product.
(2) The attributes of the community of producers and
other actors involved in the GI production, with a
special focus on representative organizations.
(3) The rules in use, including European and national
regulative GI frameworks and informal rules (e.g.,
local customs or social norms on collaboration)
2 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al.
affecting the stakeholders’interaction in the action
arena.
(4) The ‘action arena’, which is defined as the social place
where actors interact, make decisions, solve problems
or fight.
(5) The outcome of the GI process (Product Specification
setting the quality standards for the EU registration).
The IAD framework’s core is the ‘action arena’
(Ostrom, 2005; Hess and Ostrom, 2007), which—as we
assume in this paper—also shapes the allocation of trans-
action efforts, benefits and risks.
Collective efforts, risks and benefits
The protection of GIs, similar to agri-environmental
schemes or ethical food labeling, requires considerable or-
ganizational and bureaucratic efforts. In recent decades,
several empirical studies looked at these efforts borne by
farmers and by other public and private actors
(McCann and Easter, 1997; Falconer and Whitby, 1999;
McCann et al., 2005; Mettepenningen and Van
Huylenbroeck, 2009; Enengel et al., 2014). These
studies refer to transaction cost theory and make special
reference to non-market transaction costs. We follow the
definition of McCann et al. (2005), in which transaction
costs are linked to the resources needed to create and
maintain property rights and as dependent on the institu-
tional environment (North, 1990; Allen, 1991).
GI enterprises and other actors involved in GI produc-
tion systems aiming to register and protect their GI must
agree on Product Specification. According to the EU
regulation, only a group (of producers and processors) is
entitled to apply for registration. Producers normally do
not share the same production techniques and have differ-
ent interests in the GI product. For this reason, the
process of convergence is costly, indeed interactions that
take place in the action arena ask for considerable effort
to be made by individual enterprises, collective associa-
tions and public organizations involved in the GI produc-
tion system. The main elements are time spent in meetings
and the time required to acquire information and to com-
municate with other actors (Penker and Klemen, 2010;
Enengel et al., 2011,2014).
However, along the GI process, some monetary
expenses may also occur. They can include consultancy
costs (e.g., studies supporting the definition of Product
Specification, legal and technical advice), some invest-
ments (laboratory analysis for the product characteriza-
tion) and overheads (phone calls, fuel, trips). The latter
can be assumed to be proportional to the time spent;
therefore we did not include them in our comparative ana-
lysis. Although other expenses may highly affect GI regis-
tration costs, they were not relevant in the cases analyzed
or transferred into time efforts. For instance, some studies
about product characteristics had been carried out before
the GI registration process, and some consultancies were
free of charge because of the personal involvement of
experts. We converted the remaining monetary expenses
into working hours, so that all the results could be com-
paratively presented as time efforts. Taking the collective
efforts until GI registration as boundaries of our study, we
did not examine production costs before and after regis-
tration, efforts to adapt to the GI requirements or certifi-
cation and transaction costs for GI use after registration
(e.g., costs for quality control, court costs).
Ilbery and Kneafsey (2000) cautioned that some GI
applicants will most likely be discouraged because of
high-bureaucracy hurdles and associated efforts.
Transaction costs theory argues that time efforts for infor-
mation gathering, negotiations and other forms of inter-
action can result in transaction benefits (McCann et al.,
2005). Thus, efforts made in the registration process
cannot be assessed without including the benefitside.
Besides direct benefits, such as increases in product prices
or sales figures, researchers and rural development agents
emphasize indirect benefits resulting from the intensified
interaction of producers and processors during the registra-
tion process. Transaction cost theory provides the concep-
tual framework to contrast these indirect benefits—or
transaction services—with the associated transaction costs.
We analyzed benefits resulting from the intensified
interaction of producers, processors and other parties in
the GI territory to set up the GI protection, but not the
post-registration benefits from the very use of the regis-
tered GI. We derived relevant benefit categories from GI
literature, e.g., vertical and horizontal integration,
higher or better accepted quality standards, social learn-
ing processes (Sanz-Cañada and Macias-Vázquez, 2005;
Giovannucci et al., 2009,2010; Reviron and Chappuis,
2011; Coulet, 2012; Bagal et al., 2013; Barjolle, 2016),
but we excluded benefits that would result from the
actual use of the GI (e.g., price premiums, rural develop-
ment benefits). In the action arena analysis and as ex-
planatory variable of efforts, we also included risks
linked to possible failures of the collective GI registration
process (unsolvable conflicts, lack of information, unclear
regulation) (Barjolle and Sylvander, 2000; Ilbery and
Kneafsey, 2000; Giovannucci et al., 2009,2010; Coulet,
2012; Rangnekar and Mukhopadhyay, 2016). However,
we excluded post-registration risks that affect the GI use
(e.g., inadequate consumer knowledge of the GI).
Methods: comparative case study design,
data collection and analysis
Our paper is based on a comparative analysis of two GI
case studies. According to Poteete et al. (2010), a case
study allows an intensive analysis of a well-bound phe-
nomenon and is the only feasible choice for empirically
based research when cross-case data are limited. Case
studies identify the main sources of collective efforts,
risks and benefits associated with the GI registration
process and the involved actors, measure efforts in terms
3Why early collective action pays off
of time and identify the main features of the contextual
and institutional framework, which affect the magnitude
of efforts, risks and benefits.
We selected two comparable, registered GI cases to
guarantee data quality. This relied on the recall of inter-
viewees. Considering the kind of data needed, access to in-
formation and availability of key-informants were also
very relevant criteria for the case selection.
We selected the Sorana bean PGI (Fagiolo di Sorana) in
Italy and Mostviertel perry PGI (Mostviertler Birnmost)
in Austria (Table 1). They share similar value chain char-
acteristics (few producers involved, and producers also
process and market the products, mainly via short market-
ing channels), good product reputation and strong links
to the territory. In both cases, producers registered a
PGI according to EU legislation, and in both cases the
whole supply chain (production and processing and prep-
aration) is located in the delimited territory (even if
according to EU regulation, a PGI can be granted also
to products even when only one stage of the production
process takes place in the indicated territory).
After analysing value chain characteristics, we col-
lected data from 15 diverse supply chain actors
(Table 1 ). The qualitative interviews (e.g., for understand-
ing the PGI registration process, including open questions
on benefits and risks), the structured interviews (e.g., for
assessing the time effort of individuals involved, to rank
risks and benefits derived from literature) and document
analyses (e.g., for grasping the Product Specification and
national GI regulations) took place from October 2013
through May 2014. Qualitative interviews were tran-
scribed, coded and analyzed based on the IAD
framework.
For estimating collective efforts, we asked interviewees
to identify tasks along the four work packages of the PGI
registration process:
.conception of and consensus on starting the GI regis-
tration process (e.g., main efforts involved in time
invested in meetings by GI enterprises and related GI
actors);
.agreement and drafting of the Product Specification
(e.g., efforts needed for scientific trials to demonstrate
the link between product and territory);
.national (and regional) phase of the GI registration
process (formal procedures); and
.EU phase of the GI registration following the GI
regulation.
We asked for the number of actors involved and time
efforts spent on each task. We included efforts borne by
the community of stakeholders in the GI territory, includ-
ing producers’and/or processors’organizations and semi-
public organizations acting at sub-national level (regions,
provinces, municipalities, and/or development agencies).
We did not include the efforts of national and EU author-
ities (e.g., national governments, EU Commission), as
they are located outside of the GI territory.
Although we pursued an in-depth work, an evaluation
of efforts based on a recall-approach remains a rough es-
timation (Mettepenningen and Van Huylenbroeck, 2009).
Regarding data quality, producers documenting time and
monetary efforts in real time throughout the whole regis-
tration processes would be a methodological proxy. This
therefore required a substantial commitment from a
large number of stakeholders involved in the registration
process that lasts several years. Thus, empirical analyses
of transaction costs are still a challenge (Wang, 2003;
Mettepenningen and Van Huylenbroeck, 2009).
However, multiple methods, cross-case triangulation as
well as reflective loops (e.g., discussion of results with
experts and interviewees) support the validity of the com-
parative analysis.
Furthermore, we asked interviewees to identify per-
ceived risks and benefits at the time of the GI registration.
We conducted the interviews in two steps. The first step
was open. In the second step, we established risks and
benefits according to predefined answer categories
derived from literature. Interviewees answered using a
five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strong-
ly agree). According to Barjolle et al. (2009), this method
can support the analysis of GI effects. Since both GIs were
registered some time ago, we also consulted archives and
documents to support the memory work of the intervie-
wees. Data collection was followed by a qualitative text
analysis (Patton, 2002), in which we triangulated the
results from the interviews and document analyses to
enhance the validity of results.
Table 1. PGI cases, affiliation and number of interviewees.
Sorana bean, Italy Mostviertel perry, Austria
GI management Il Ghiareto ONLUS Associazione dei Piccoli
Produttori del Fagiolo di Sorana
Regional Management Office, Mostviertel
Affiliation and number
of interviewees
Tuscany Region Office (3), Municipality of Pescia
(1), Ghiareto Association (1), Producers (4)
Regional Management, Mostviertel (3), Association
of fruit producers, Mostviertel (1), Experts (2)
Documents GI documents and protocols, reports from
Tuscany Region Office, Door Database
Reports from Patent Office, GI documents and pro-
tocols, Door Database
Source: Own compilation.
4 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al.
Results: analysis of registration processes,
transaction efforts, risks and benefits
For each case study, we first portray the contextual and in-
stitutional situation according to the IAD framework (ter-
ritorial link to the product, attributes of the community,
rules in use, action arena and outcome) and then
present the collective efforts, risks and benefits.
Sorana bean
Contextual and institutional situation. The link between
product and territory is strong. The bean cultivated today
belongs to the Phaseolus vulgaris L. species. The seed is
obtained from the plants that have been on site for
many generations and have thus developed an ecotype
that is perfectly adapted to the local environment, the
climate and the characteristics of local soils. The produc-
tion of the Sorana bean is located in the municipal area of
Pescia in the district of Pistoia (Tuscany), a valley with
pedological characteristics that impede the adoption of
modern production techniques. The PGI area covers
around 660 hectares, from the banks of the Pescia di
Pontito creek (Ghiareto) to the uplands (Poggio). The
local community is identified with the Sorana bean, but
it is also well known in Tuscany and marketed on some
niche channels. Consumers pay a price 6/7 times higher
than for a standard bean, which prompted the rise of a
large amount of imitations. For the few big specialized
farms, the Sorana bean accounts for a high percentage
of total income, but it has minor economic relevance for
many diversified small producers.
As for the attributes of the community, the few bean pro-
ducers that exist are generally non-specialized, and some
of them are retired or undertaking other working activ-
ities. The Associazione dei piccoli produttori del Fagiolo
di Sorana Il Ghiareto ONLUS, founded in 1994, was re-
sponsible for the PGI application and now represents pro-
ducers in the lowlands, who achieve higher quality (e.g.,
by developing promotional initiatives).
Regarding the rules in use, the good reputation of the
Sorana bean coupled with unclear and missing rules on
the use of its name brought problems of misuse and
abuse. Following the approval of EU Council regulation
2081/92, Sorana bean producers started considering a
PGI application. The small number and physical proxim-
ity of producers favored a direct, informal interaction,
particularly in the lowlands.
In the action arena, some conflicts emerged between
Poggio and Ghiareto producers due to the higher
average production per hectare in Poggio and consequent-
ly different production costs, which allowed Poggio pro-
ducers to sell their product at a lower price. During GI
registration, the Municipality of Pescia coordinated the
scientific research, involved producers in the design of
the Product Specification and facilitated the achievement
of an agreement. The close relationships between produ-
cers due to the very small size of the GI area and the
low number of actors facilitated the registration process
and recognition in 2002 (Fig. 1). These relationships sup-
ported the achievement of a common GI strategy.
As an outcome of the GI process, producers agreed on
the Product Specification. Producers finally decided to
extend the PGI production area to the entire Sorana
valley (both Poggio and Ghiareto). The Municipality of
Pescia and regional authorities supported this solution,
given the narrowness of the area and the limited
amount of production. Producers can add special men-
tions on the label when beans are from the most reputed
Ghiareto sub-area. The extension of the production area
to other historically less traditional areas, like Poggio,
has strengthened the quantity produced, the visibility of
Sorana bean in the market and the possibility to carry
out collective promotional activities. The PGI production
area however remains very small, showing pedological
characteristics that impede the adoption of modern
farming techniques. Other important points stated by
the Product Specification are the ban on using chemical
herbicides, a relatively low maximum yield per hectare
(20 quintals) and an exact description of product charac-
teristics as well as permitted harvesting methods. All these
specific elements, guaranteed by the PGI scheme, give a
strong identity to the product and, consequently, increase
Sorana bean’s reputation and recognizability among con-
sumers, thus justifying the high-resale price on the
market.
Figure 1. Timeframe for the Sorana bean GI registration.
5Why early collective action pays off
Efforts, risks and benefits. Efforts made to register the
Sorana bean PGI were considerable, when the small
number of producers involved and low quantities pro-
duced are taken into account, in particular at the time
the process started. According to the registration
process (Table 2), the first work package demanded the
highest effort (66.2%, in absolute terms 1.23 person
years) due to the discussion needed for establishing the
boundaries of the GI area and the rules for producers to
take part in the GI process. The second work package
took place from 1994 to 1995 and included diverse
types of actors, such as producers, members of local gov-
ernment, local universities and research institutes. The
Municipality of Pescia coordinated the activities for the
design of the Product Specification. The second work
package represented 18.3% of the total efforts, followed
by the national (and regional) phase of the GI registration
process. Although the effort in absolute terms was low
(0.28 person years), it demanded about 5 years because
of adjustments of the Product Specification and a delay
of the national authorities due to bureaucratic reasons.
During this second work package, the public consultation
also took place in the area of production (mandatory
according to Italian procedures of national implementa-
tion of the EU GI regulation) aimed at informing all sta-
keholders and to giving them the opportunity to debate
(and to oppose to) the proposed Product Specification.
Finally, in 2002 the Sorana bean PGI was registered.
The EU phase of the GI registration took approximately
2 years and was the lowest effort in absolute (0.01) and
percentage terms (0.5%). Not all producers actively took
part in the formal GI process, as some producers are
very small and/or hobby producers. However, the strong
territorial contiguity and social interactions facilitated
the circulation of information and informal communica-
tion of producers.
Before registration, interviewees perceived the main risks
as the difficulty in reaching consensus between producers
located in Ghiareto and Poggio due to diverging ideas
about product quality and the delimitation of the produc-
tion area (Table 3). Initially, Ghiareto producers did not
approve inclusion of the Poggio area in the PGI boundar-
ies due to Poggio’s slightly diverging product characteris-
tics. After registration, the main risks still entailed
Table 2. Efforts and number of persons involved in the Sorana bean PGI registration.
Work packages Years
Effort
1
in
person years Effort in (%)
Number of
persons
IConception of and consensus on the GI strategy 1994 1.23 66.2 21
II Agreement and drafting of the Product Specifications 1994–1995 0.34 18.3 15
III National (and regional) phase of the GI registration process 1995–2000 0.28 15.0 40
IV EU phase of the GI registration 2000–2002 0.01 0.5 1
Sum 8 1.86 100 (
2
)
1
The time effort was estimated as person years (7.5 working hours day
−1
, 220 working days year
−1
).
2
Not possible to sum up because of overlap/double counting between work packages.
Source: Own primary data.
Table 3. Sorana Bean—risks until registration as perceived by interviewees.
Risks (shortened and translated statements from Italian and German questionnaires with scores ≥2) Score
Standard
deviation
Coefficient of
variation (%)
Difficulties in reaching consensus on the definition of the territorial area 3.9 0.33 8,53
Difficulties in reaching consensus on the Product Specification about process and/or product
quality
3.0 0.87 28,87
Increased frictions between actors due to debate 2.9 0.60 20,85
Lack of knowledge of the legal situation as well as the inadequate experience of involved
organizations
2.8 0.97 35,21
Lack of involvement of all actor groups (due to poor level of information, poor empowerment) 2.6 0.79 30,75
The long and tedious GI registration process 2.4 0.70 29,30
The debate about inclusion of additional geographical mentions (sub-designations) 2.3 0.43 19,25
The involvement of public administrations due to their influence 2.1 0.33 15,56
The potential rejection or failure of the GI application 2.0 0.50 25,00
The elaboration of the Product Specification (e.g., scientific analyses) as a financial challenge 2.0 0.50 25,00
The score is the average level of agreement expressed by interviewees on a five-point scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly
agree; pre-defined statements with case specific statements and specifications (in brackets) added from the interviewees.
6 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al.
difficulties in reaching consensus on how to control the
PGI (e.g., due to the perceived low level of market con-
trols of Sorana bean by public authority). The lack of
knowledge about the legal framework and the informa-
tion asymmetry among different producers categories
were also perceived as relevant risks.
In terms of benefits, interviewees pointed out that,
despite conflicts, the registration process facilitated co-
operation between producers to achieve a common aim.
Moreover, the GI process fostered the motivation to
produce high-quality beans and increased the local pride
of producers. Interviewees stated that the PGI registration
process (news about the requested registration were
reported frequently by media, from local newspapers to
national TV) boosted the reputation of Sorana bean,
favoring its direct marketing. Traceability and quality
control enhanced product quality on the final market
and opened up the access to new markets and marketing
channels (Table 4).
The use of the Sorana bean PGI. From a total number
of 40 bean producers in Sorana valley, about 22 actually
use the GI label. The other mainly non-professional pro-
ducers do not really need the GI certification, as many of
them sell small quantities of beans to friends and relatives.
Today’s production is characterized by very low quan-
tities and high-sale prices (22 euro kg
−1
on average, com-
pared with 3–4 euro kg
−1
for conventional beans). Sorana
beans are generally sold through direct marketing.
Tuscany is the prevalent consumption market, although
a small share of beans is sold to restaurants and agri-
food shops in Northern Italy. The PGI certified produc-
tion has grown from 57 quintals of certified beans in
2004 (first year of PGI implementation) up to 76 quintals
in 2012, following a growth of surfaces (4.78 ha in 2004 to
5.22 ha in 2012 and 5.21 ha in 2013). Most production is
carried out by small farms often managed by non-profes-
sional producers (retired, hobby, or part-time). The
number of producers who use the PGI has slightly
grown over the years but still remains very small (15 in
2004 and 22 in 2013). In addition, both supply chain
actors and the whole territory benefited from Sorana
bean’s reputation gained through the PGI registration.
In fact, the PGI supported the survival of agriculture in
this area and revitalized the marginalized territory of
the Sorana valley (Belletti et al., 2014) by facilitating the
valorization of other products, such as local extra-virgin
olive oil, or by promoting rural tourism (restaurants offer-
ing special bean menus and agro-tourism).
Mostviertel perry
Contextual and institutional analysis. Perry is produced
by cask fermentation of pear juice obtained from press-
ing. ‘Mostviertel’(Perry-Quarter) is the traditional geo-
graphical and administrative term for the south-eastern
part of the province of Lower Austria. The first denomin-
ation of perry dates back to the year 1240 (Sommer et al.,
2012). Since then, it has become integral to regional iden-
tity and economy. Perry lost its reputation after the
Second World War and was replaced by beer and wine;
nevertheless, a perry revival has been observed since the
1990s (Sommer et al., 2012). Nowadays, in addition to
on-farm sales, several culinary and touristic events
promote perry. However, perry producers usually
depend on other sources of income. Approximately 20%
of the production is classified as high-quality perry and
obtains premium prices, which can be 10 times the
normal price.
The analysis of the attributes of the community shows
that approximately 250 producers yield two million
liters per year (2/3 perry and 1/3 cider). These producers
have their own individual brands and marketing strat-
egies. In total 150 producers are gathered under the
Association of Fruit Producers from Mostviertel, which
was founded in 1998 and is closely linked to the
Chamber of Agriculture. Producers individually cultivate,
harvest, process and directly market 90% of the perry to
consumers within a distance of 40 km. Although produ-
cers are gathered in the association, horizontal integration
is weak. The GI registration process was initiated by the
Table 4. Sorana bean—benefits until registration as perceived by interviewees.
Benefits (shortened and translated statements from Italian and German
questionnaires with scores ≥2) Score
Standard
deviation
Coefficient of
variation (%)
Improved pride of local GI enterprises with regards to the product 4.3 0.48 11.07
Increased motivation to produce better quality 4.0 0.50 12.50
Broader acceptance of common quality standards 4.0 0.50 12.50
Producers’deeper knowledge and awareness of product characteristics 3.8 0.66 17.64
External actors’(Italian and foreign) deeper knowledge and awareness of product characteristics 3.8 0.66 17.64
Improved relations between private (enterprises) and public actors 3.6 0.48 13.36
Improved horizontal integration between producers 2.8 0.83 30.15
Improved vertical integration between producers and other supply chain actors (e.g., mass
retailers)
2.3 0.43 19.25
The score is the average level of agreement expressed by interviewees on a five-point scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly
agree; pre-defined statements with case specific statements and specifications (in brackets) added from the interviewees.
7Why early collective action pays off
Regional Management Office in Mostviertel in close col-
laboration with the Association of Fruit Producers from
Mostviertel.
As for the rules in use, the study pointed out that prior
to the GI registration process, perry production was regu-
lated by quality standards of Lower Austria and the
Austrian Wine Law. Right from the beginning, producers
were sceptical about new, additional regulations.
Therefore, they adapted already existing quality regula-
tions. Producers decided to protect the name ‘Mostviertler
Birnmost’after they realized that a German company
was using that name on its homepage. Producers also
looked for a common and consistent marketing strategy
to differentiate their perry from Upper Austria.
The characterization of the action arena allowed iden-
tifying the actors that played a role along the GI registra-
tion process. After consulting the Austrian Patent Office,
the Regional Management Office started and drove the
GI registration process. In a board meeting at the end of
2000, the Association of Fruit Producers from
Mostviertel on behalf of their members agreed to start
the GI registration process (Fig. 2). Overall, there was
little collective action among producers during the
process. The Chamber of Agriculture located in Lower
Austria provided external support regarding horizontal
integration, quality management and marketing, but it
had little previous GI experience.
The main outcome of the GI registration process was
the Product Specification. The process allowed perry pro-
ducers to become more aware about the product, quality
standards and their regional identity. According to the
Product Specification, only pears of 59 varieties typically
cultivated in Mostviertel can be used to produce
Mostviertel perry and approximately 2 kg of fruit are
required for 1 liter of perry. As producers generally only
use the fruit from their own trees, it is easy to relate the
volume of perry to the yield of a farm tree by means of
a plausibility test. If producers buy perry pears, they
must ensure traceability by means of delivery notes.
Efforts, benefits and risks. Work package I formally
started with the decision of the board of the Association
of Fruit Producers from Mostviertel to initiate the GI
process, after it interacted with Regional Management
Office and the Austrian Patent Office. The approximately
55 members of the Association of Fruit Producers from
Mostviertel were not actively involved in the debate but
were informed about the board’s decision. Thus, the esti-
mated effort of 0.04 person years (Tab le 5) was much
lower than in the Sorana bean case. The efforts for the
second work package were higher, as most of the registra-
tion efforts (46%) focused on preparing the Product
Specification. Although already existing information
and quality standards were used and adapted, the
Regional Management Office hired an expert to
Figure 2. Timeframe for the Mostviertel perry GI registration.
Table 5. Efforts and number of persons involved in the Mostviertel perry PGI registration.
Work packages Years
Effort
1
in
person years Effort in (%)
Number of
persons
IConception of and consensus on the GI strategy 2000 0.04 11.4 55
II Agreement and drafting of the Product Specifications 2001–2003 0.17 48.6 23
III National (and regional) phase of the GI registration process 2003 0.01 2.9 21
IV EU phase of the GI registration 2003–2011 0.13 37.1 22
Sum 11 0.35 100 (
2
)
1
The time effort was estimated as person years (7.5 working hours day
−1
, 220 working days year
−1
).
2
Not possible to sum up because of overlap/double counting between work packages.
Source: Own primary data.
8 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al.
scientifically analyze the pears. The time effort for the
third work package was minimal, since the GI application
was handed over to the Patent Office staff. There was little
need for further interaction, as the Patent Office had been
involved from the beginning of the GI process. This phase
only needed 2.9% of the total registration efforts. The
period for the fourth work package was the longest
(from 2003 to 2011), since the content of the Product
Specification did not comply with EU stipulations. After
national registration in 2003, the EU PGI registration
was obtained in 2011, the EU phase of the GI registration
demanded 37.1% of the total efforts.
In terms of risks (Table 6), interviewees were already aware
of the challenge of finding an agreement on an external
control body, although the withdrawal of the PGI was
only decided after the interviews. Apparently, many produ-
cers were not truly aware of what the GI meant for them. It
was only after debates and the negotiations after registra-
tion that several producers realized that they could have
better protected the pears instead of the perry or that
they could protect the name via wine regulations.
Considering the benefits, the interviewees perceived
that ‘the marketing of the region under one roof, as
collective marketing’was a benefit. Table 7 shows the
ranked benefits stated by the interviewees.
The use of the Mostviertler perry PGI. After PGI regis-
tration, producers were unable to agree on a control
system. As a result, in a meeting in 2014, the board of
the Association of Fruit Producers from Mostviertel
decided not to use the PGI and formally withdrew from
the EU protection. Producers have never used the PGI,
since the majority of them—particularly the smaller
ones with lower quality and farm sales—did not agree
on a control body, additional controls and certification
fees. Nonetheless during and after the PGI process,
some other collective marketing strategies, such as
Genussregion (delicacy region), were successfully devel-
oped in the region. Producers located in the
Genussregion Mostviertel continued selling their perry
predominantly with their own individual brands as before.
Unlike the Sorana bean, the Mostviertel perry producers,
after a long GI registration process, decided not to use the
PGI, as they were not able to agree on an external control
body. In the Sorana case, the certification body did not
play a role in the registration process, although in
general it may happen that the certification body
Table 6. Mostviertel perry—risks until registration as perceived by interviewees.
Risks (shortened and translated statements from Italian and German questionnaires with scores ≥2) Score
Standard
deviation
Coefficient of
variation (%)
Long and tedious GI registration process 5.0 0.00 0.00
Complex GI concept (which decreased participation of producers) 4.3 0.47 10.88
Difficulties in reaching consensus on the Product Specification about process and/or product
quality
3.7 1.25 34.02
Lack of knowledge on legal situation as well as the inadequate experience of the involved
organizations
4.0 0.82 20.41
Not all actor groups were involved (strategic reasons) 3.0 1.63 54.43
GI debate increased frictions between actors 3.0 0.82 27.22
Producers’low acceptance of an external control system (already before GI registration) 2.7 1.70 63.74
Competition among producers 2.7 1.70 63.74
Unclear competence and/or the amount of public authorities involved 2.3 0.47 20.20
Difficulties in reaching consensus on the definition of the territorial area 2.0 1.41 70.71
The score is the average level of agreement expressed by interviewees on a five-point scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly
agree; pre-defined statements with case specific statements and specifications (in brackets) added from the interviewees.
Table 7. Mostviertel perry—benefits until registration as perceived by interviewees.
Benefits (shortened and translated statements from Italian and German questionnaires with scores
≥2) Score
Standard
deviation
Coefficient of
variation (%)
Better product specification and product description 4.0 0.00 0.00
Motivation to debate the future of region and its development 4.0 0.00 0.00
An opportunity to increase perry sales (e.g., out of the region) 3.7 0.47 12.86
Improved horizontal integration between producers 3.0 0.82 27.22
Improved vertical integration between producers and other supply chain actors (e.g., gastronomy) 2.0 0.00 0.00
The score is the average level of agreement expressed by interviewees on a five-point scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly
agree; pre-defined statements with case specific statements and specifications (in brackets) added from the interviewees.
9Why early collective action pays off
already supported the ex-ante phase. Another particular-
ity is that in the perry case local authorities were not
involved during the GI registration process, but an
expert was recruited to scientifically analyze the pears.
Discussion
Both GI registrations were formally successful and share
similar contexts (e.g., small production areas, products
embedded in the region, heterogeneous producers both
non-professional and professional, short supply chains).
However, the action arenas show very contrasting pat-
terns of interaction and involvement among producers,
semi-public organizations and research centers that
result in diverging transaction efforts, risks and benefits
as already illustrated by Enengel et al. (2014) for the
example of landscape co-management. A synthesis of
both GI registration processes (Sorana bean and
Mostviertel perry) is shown in Table 8 .
The Sorana bean producers and associated local actors
put much more effort in meetings, information gathering
and negotiation for the conception of and consensus on the
GI strategy (1.23 person years). In the perry case, this first
phase was limited to 0.04 person years and restricted to a
board meeting and subsequent information of producers.
This early phase in the Sorana bean case was accompanied
by many difficulties, conflictual debates, which contrasted
the smooth consensus in Mostviertel. In addition,
defining the Product Specification needed twice as much
effort for Sorana bean (0.34 person years) as for perry
(0.17). Many of the associated conflicts in the Sorana
bean territory focused on quality (quality standards, terri-
tories of lower qualities to be included or not), whereas this
was not an issue of major debate in Mostviertel, as produ-
cers agreed to stick to existing quality standards.
The difference in the PGI use however is remarkable.
While many professional and semi-professional Sorana
bean producers sell their beans with the PGI label, perry
producers are still selling their product under diverse indi-
vidual farm brands without the GI label. Perry producers
even decided to withdraw from the PGI protection, allow-
ing them to use the geographical name without having to
stick to the PGI rules.
We argue that these mixedoutcomes arise from the diver-
ging scope of collective action and participation of the com-
munityof producers in the early phase of the GI registration
process. The Sorana bean case, in comparison with the
Mostviertel perry, showed the ability of the producers to
constitute themselves in a group and to discuss all issues
related to the GI registration strategy. Our findings
confirm that intensified interaction of producers results in
higher trust and in a better appropriation of the meaning
of GI protection. The propensity to collaborate with
someone depends on the degree of trust previously depos-
ited in that person (Torre, 2006). Thus, as the relationship
advances, participants obtain new information, forinstance
regarding the integrity of the partner, what promotes the
possibility to make judgments.
National institutional settings of the EU regulations on
GIs also played a role. In Italy, for instance, the public con-
sultation of stakeholders in the area of production is manda-
tory. This improves the information of all stakeholders’,but
also increases the probability of time-demanding debates
and oppositions before registration. The Mostviertel case,
however, indicates that it might be useful to have these
debates before, rather than after the registration.
The Sorana bean case illustrates substantial collective
efforts. Despite the diversity of producers and different
reputation of the two production sub-areas implying a
low level of trust, intensive interaction in the first two
phases of the registration process facilitated consensus
on the GI strategy. The individual producers were actively
and directly involved in reaching consensus on the
common quality standards needed to obtain the PGI rec-
ognition. This happened both in formal consultations and
in informal ways, thanks to strong territorial proximity
and exhaustive social interactions. Menard (2004) states
that inter-firm arrangements imply the need for consider-
able amounts of time and resources to collectively find
agreements on adjustments needed in order to reach
agreements and solve conflicts. Thus, beans producers
were able to elaborate horizontal arrangements. On the
contrary, the perry case shows that the majority of produ-
cers, whose perry is marketed locally and individually,
were not involved in the first two important phases of
the registration process. The ones who took the lead
along the GI process together with the Regional
Management from Mostviertel might have not repre-
sented the interests of the majority but rather those of
few high-end quality producers looking for international
fairs and markets.
According to Arnstein (1969), who distinguishes infor-
mation, consultation and co-decision making as different
forms of participation, the Sorana bean case represents a
situation with a high degree of consultation and co-deci-
sion making, while most perry producers were merely
informed of decisions made by the representative body.
In the Sorana bean case, exhaustive discussions and
major conflicts and negotiations ended in the broad
accepted of common agreements and decision making
that inherently implied a shared understanding of GIs,
trust building and integration of producers. In contrast,
the majority of perry producers only fully grasped the
meaning of the GI after it was granted, when the majority
of them realized that they do not want formalized control
but just wanted to sell their perry with individual farm
labels as they had before GI registration. This confirms
Randall’s(1981) argument that transaction costs are not
‘money down a rat hole’and is in line with previous em-
pirical transaction studies on landscape co-management
showing positive correlations between individual time
efforts for and benefits of participation (Enengel et al.,
2014). In the perry case, major risks and challenges were
10 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al.
Table 8. Synthesis of both registration processes.
Sorana bean Mostviertel perry
Work packages
Effort
1
in
person years Effort in (%)
Number of
persons Years
Effort
1
in
person years
Effort in
(%)
Number of
persons Years
IConception of and consensus on the GI strategy 1.23 66.2 21 1994 0.04 11.4 55 2000
II Agreement and drafting of the Product Specifications 0.34 18.3 15 1994–1995 0.17 48.6 23 2001–2003
III National (and regional) phase of the GI registration process 0.28 15.0 40 1995–2000 0.01 2.9 21 2003
IV EU phase of the GI registration 0.01 0.5 1 2000–2002 0.13 37.1 22 2003–2011
Total 1.86 100.0 (
2
) 8 0.35 100.0 (
2
)11
Contextual and institutional structure
Link between product and territory The seed is obtained from the plants that have been on site
for many generations, thus enabling an ecotype perfectly
adapted to the local environment
The first denomination of perry dates back to the year
1240
Attributes of the producers Mainly non-specialized farmers, some of them retired or
undertaking other working activities as well as specialized
farmers
Only few farmers produce high-quality perry, most of
them produce average or low quality
Motivation to protect the product Misuse and abuse of the (unprotected) Sorana bean GI Misuse of the name ‘Mostviertler Birnmost’by a
German company, and the need for a common
marketing strategy
Action arena The association of small bean producers was established
at the beginning of the GI process. Conflicts between
Poggio and Ghiareto producers due to the higher average
production per hectare in Poggio and associated quality
discrepancies. The Municipality of Pescia coordinated
scientific research and served as facilitator for reaching
agreements
The GI registration process was initiated by the
Regional Management Mostviertel in collaboration
with the already existing Association of the Fruit
Producers Mostviertel, which acted on behalf of their
members. The registration was successfully concluded
without major conflicts
Outcome Producers implement common quality standards and the
definition of Product Specification. Ghiareto producers
are allowed to add special mentions. There is an increase
of quantity produced and visibility of the Sorana bean
Several producers were not actively involved in the
debate to understand what the protection of GIs
implies. After the PGI was obtained, conflicts about
the control body resulted in a withdrawal of the GI
protection. Producers use other strategies to jointly
market their perry (e.g., Genussregion)
1
The time effort was estimated as person years (7.5 working hours day
−1
, 220 working days year
−1
).
2
Not possible to sum up because of overlap/double counting between work packages.
Source: Own primary data.
11Why early collective action pays off
postponed, as there were not truly collective debates and
justifications for starting the GI process in the initial
phase. This confirms Hanna’s(1994,1995) assertion
that less collective efforts invested and realized in the
ex-ante phase has to be spent afterwards. Debates or
conflicts avoided during the early phases of the perry
registration were observed in the implementation phase.
Nonetheless, we assume that the efforts for a collective
GI process will not only depend on the degree and form of
participation but also on group size and heterogeneity of
supply chain actors (e.g., how many andwhat kind of pro-
ducers are involved—specialists, artisans). Both cases
present two small universes of heterogeneous producers,
implying the appearance of risks, such as conflicting inter-
ests (Dentoni et al., 2012; Crespo et al., 2014; Dervillé and
Allaire, 2014). However, strong interactions among diver-
gent types of producers in forms of debates, collective de-
cision making, knowledge sharing and communication in
itself resulted in a more beneficial ex-post situation in the
Sorana bean case due to the social cohesion that was
developed. Promoting the authority of individuals to for-
mulate their own rules might result in social processes that
allow the evolution of social norms and therefore might
boost the probability that individuals solve their collective
action problems (Ostrom, 2000).
Both GI registration processes were initiated and driven
by small groups of producers in cooperation with (regional
or national) authorities. In the Austrian case, the Regional
Management Office initiated the process and implemented
it together with the Association of Fruit Producers from
Mostviertel, while in the Italian case the GI registration
process was led by some producers with the support of
the local municipality (Pescia). In both cases, the overall
duration of the PGI registration was long, due to the
lack of knowledge for designing the Product
Specification, limited GI experience of the producers and
national authorities in charge of the GI registration
process. The institutional environment of self-organization
(established rules of producer organizations but also infor-
mal customs of collaboration) (Tregear et al., 2007;
Markelova et al., 2009; Belletti and Marescotti, 2011;
Belletti et al., 2015) and supportive organizations (e.g.,
public authorities) were more favorable in the Sorana
bean case. Geographical proximity can activate collective
action and the institutional networking of actors (Filippi
and Torre, 2003). Previous collective investments on the
product (such as research to technically characterize the
product made by local universities) and informal support
from public bodies (such as consulting, mediation and
moderation of group processes) facilitate applications
even for small producer groups, which otherwise would
be disadvantaged because of considerable fixed costs in re-
lation to the small production volume and value. These
fixed costs include costly technical analyses justifying the
link between product and territory or consultancies in
writing the Product Specification. In the Austrian case,
support from the Chamber of Agriculture and the Patent
Office was limited, due to little GI experience in Austria,
unclear competencies and limited personnel resources.
The analysis shows that researchers and consultants can
also act as third parties to reconcile diverse viewpoints
and interests of heterogeneous producers. Neither of the
two cases involved certification bodies in the elaboration
of Product Specification, although they checked the produ-
cers’compliance with the Product Specification after regis-
tration. The support of facilitators or innovation brokers
promote interaction and debate when pursuing the regis-
tration of GIs, similar to other innovative agricultural
systems (Klerkx and Gildemacher, 2012).
Conclusion
Among the manifold strategies for product differenti-
ation, GIs present an interesting opportunity for those
products whose characteristics are strongly linked to the
territory from which they originate. In order to protect
and regulate GI use, producers have to self-organize and
collaborate. As highlighted by our case studies, this inter-
action of heterogeneous supply chain actors, authorities
and researchers can be conflict-laden, complex and
time-demanding. Although interaction is costly in terms
of time, our results suggest that the early and direct in-
volvement of all conflicting interest groups pays off and
can facilitate empowerment, trust and social cohesion,
higher acceptance of common quality standards, co-
learning processes on product characteristics and a
higher use of the GI label after registration. A supportive
legal framework along with the support of public author-
ities can back up the community of producers not only in
terms of technical aspects but also in a mediator when
conflicts appear to be difficult to solve. As there seems
to be a positive relationship between intensity and effect-
iveness of collective action and the likelihood of achieving
broadly accepted standards and the social cohesion
needed for the successful GI implementation, the question
for future research is how to effectively organize the inter-
action among heterogeneous producer groups.
Acknowledgments. We gratefully acknowledge the funding pro-
vided by the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) for conducting
this research. We kindly thank Elisa Barzini and Magdalena
Pircher for conducting the interviews. We thank all interviewees,
especially Angela Crescenzi, Luciano Zoppi, Stefano Barzagli,
Giovanni Piscolla, Simona Toni, Giorgio Castiglione, Fabrizio
Salvadorini, Mauro Carreri, Romano Dingacci, Rita Chelini,
Alfio Marchini, Ota and Olma in Italy and Andreas Ennser,
Karl Becker, and Gerald Weinhart in Austria for the efforts of
providing data and recalling the PGI-registration processes.
We also thank Christina Roder for proofreading the paper.
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