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Korean National Identity,
Civic Activism and
the Dokdo/Takeshima
Territorial Dispute
Alexander Bukh1
Abstract
This article joins the debate on the territorial dispute between South Korea and
Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. The extant literature tends to attribute
the continuous importance of the dispute for Korean politics to the collective his-
torical memory of Japanese colonialism. This article seeks to offer a more nuanced
interpretation of the symbolic role of Dokdo in Korean national identity. By focus-
ing on the largest civil society organization engaged in ‘Protect Dokdo’ activism,
this article examines the similarities and differences between the Dokdo related
narrative and the ideas of the democratization movement of the 1970s and 1980s.
The argument of the article is twofold. First, it argues that there are important simi-
larities between the ways Korean national identity has been constructed in the two
discourses. At the same time, the article identifies important differences between
the two. These differences, it argues, enable the Dokdo related identity construct
to bridge between the democratization movement’s conception of Korean identity
and the conception of national identity advocated by the pre-1987 ruling elites. In
other words, the article argues that the symbolic importance of Dokdo lies not
only in the historical memory of Japanese colonization but is directly related to
post-independence domestic processes in South Korea.
Keywords
Dokdo/Takeshima, territorial disputes, civil society, national identity, Korea, Japan
Introduction
Dokdo (Japanese name Takeshima) is the name of two tiny islets in the Sea of
Japan (East Sea in Korean). Since early 1950s, they have been administered by
Article
1
School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations, Victoria University of
Wellington, New Zealand.
Corresponding author:
Alexander Bukh, School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations, Victoria
University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand.
E-mail: alexander.bukh@vuw.ac.nz
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
3(2) 1–17
2016 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2347797016645459
http://aia.sagepub.com
2 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)
the Republic of Korea (Korea) and claimed by Japan. Today, the dispute over
Dokdo/Takeshima islets is one of the main areas of contention between the two
neighbours. The current phase of tensions started to take shape in early 2000s and
since then ‘Dokdo’ became one of the most important national symbols in Korea.
Over the last decade, numerous governmental institutions were established with
the purpose of advocating Korea’s historical rights to the islets through research,
conferences, publications and other activities. During the same period, ‘Protect
Dokdo’ movement has become one of the noticeable features of the Korean society.
The movement is comprised of multiple civil society organizations that engage in
activities aimed at protecting Dokdo, educating the public about the issue and
generally manifest their love and devotion to the islets (Choi, 2005).
In general, the extant academic literature on the issue attributes this prolifera-
tion of civic activism to the symbolic importance of ‘Dokdo’ in the context of
historical memory of Japanese colonialism, the latter being one of the dominant
tropes in Korea’s contemporary national identity (Bong, 2013; Wiegand, 2015).
As this symbolic role is generally taken as a given, none of the extant works actu-
ally examines the arguments and statements made about the dispute by the ‘Protect
Dokdo’ movement. There is no doubt that the anti-Japanese sentiment is an inte-
gral part of the Dokdo related activism. However, in order to provide a more
nuanced interpretation of this movement and its role in today’s Korean society,
here I suggest locating it within the context of civic activism in Korea and its
relationship with the discursively constructed Korean national identity.
The first part of this article will provide a brief historical introduction to the
Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and set the background for the emergence of ‘Protect
Dokdo’ movement in early 2000s. The second part will start with examining the
discursive construction of post-independence Korean identity and the role of the
democratization movement in this construction. This will be followed by a detailed
analysis of Dokdo related narrative promoted by the largest civil society group in
the ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement. This section will argue that, when examined
against the background of civic activism and national identity in Korea, the discur-
sive role of ‘Dokdo’ can be seen as going beyond the construction of the Korean
‘self’ in opposition to Japan. To a large extent, Dokdo related activism can be seen
as an extension of the democratization movement of the 1970s–1980s. The narra-
tive on Dokdo, it will be argued, plays an important role in stabilizing Korean
national identity after the transition to democracy and related developments.
Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute
Since there are numerous academic works that examine the history of the Dokdo/
Takeshima dispute (Choi, 2005; Kajimura, 1997; Launius, 2002), this section will
introduce only those aspects that are important for contextualizing the ‘Protect
Dokdo’ movement.
The islets were officially incorporated into Japan’s Shimane Prefecture on
28 January 1905. Today, Japan’s official position argues that this incorporation
was simply an act of confirmation of historical possession. The fact that the
Bukh 3
incorporation of the islets happened prior to Japan’s official annexation of the
Korean Peninsula as well as the history of administration of the islets by Japan’s
Shimane Prefecture rather than the Government-General of Korea are used by
Japan today to argue the illegality of Korea’s possession of the islets (Tsukamoto,
2011). This interpretation raises numerous questions and there is enough evi-
dence to suggest that the incorporation of the islets in 1905 was not a simple act
of confirming historical ownership but stemmed from Imperial Japan’s strate-
gic interests (Naito, 2008). Contrastingly, The Korean government’s official
position argues that the 1905 incorporation was illegal as the islets were an
integral part of historical Korea. Today, the Korean scholars and the general
public alike generally perceive the 1905 incorporation of the islets as the first
step in Japan’s colonization of the peninsula (Bong, 2013, p. 193).
From 1905 till Japan’s defeat in WWII and its subsequent occupation by the
allies, Japan’s Shimane Prefecture effectively administered the islets. Seal hunt-
ing and abalone gathering were the main economic activities conducted there. The
Japanese officials signed the Instrument of Surrender on 2 September 1945, and
the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) became the highest authority
in occupied Japan. In June 1946, SCAP issued a decree (SCAPIN 1033) that
restricted the areas of fishing, whaling and other similar activities by the Japanese.
This decree placed Dokdo/Takeshima outside the restricting line that came to be
known in Japan as ‘MacArthur Line’, named after the Supreme Commander of
the occupation authorities. The purpose of these boundaries was of a purely
administrative nature and did not purport to delimit Japan’s territory.
While preparing the final peace treaty with Japan, various drafts were pro-
duced by the US authorities. In the early drafts, compiled in 1947–1949, the
ownership over the islets was allocated to Korea. Later drafts however either
allocated the islets to Japan, or did not mention them at all. There were probably
numerous reasons for this change but arguably the politics of the Cold War played
the decisive role in this transformation (Hara, 2006). The Peace Treaty with
Japan (also known as San-Francisco Peace Treaty) was signed on 8 September
1951 in the midst of the Korean War (1950–1953). While neither of the two
Koreas were parties to the treaty, in Article 2(a) Japan recognized Korea’s inde-
pendence. The article does mention some of Korea’s islands but does not have
any references to Dokdo/Takeshima. In the period preceding the signing of the
treaty, both the Japanese and the South Korea governments lobbied the US
authorities to specify their respective ownership over the islets in the treaty.
Neither side’s wishes were granted. Subsequently both governments adopted
interpretations of the treaty and the preceding processes that support their respec-
tive claims of ownership (Lee, 2002).
In January 1952, three months before the Peace Treaty with Japan came into
force, Syngman Rhee government issued a presidential proclamation of sover-
eignty over the adjacent seas. In this proclamation, South Korea declared national
sovereignty over the seas within the designated line, known as the Peace Line
or Rhee Line. The purpose of the line was to replace the ‘MacArthur Line’ that
limited the fishing activities of the Japanese vessels during the occupation period.
The line passed just outside of Dokdo/Takeshima including the islets within
4 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)
Korean territory. Japan’s government protested immediately arguing territorial
rights to the islets. Over the following years, there were a number of clashes on
the islets and the adjacent waters that involved Japanese and Korean fishermen
and coast guards of the two countries but Japan did not make any attempts to
recapture the islets by force.
Since South Korea was not a party to the Peace Treaty with Japan, there was a
need for a separate treaty to settle the various disputes and determine the basic
principles of post-war Japan’s relations with its former colony. The negotiations
started in 1952 but the parties could not reach an agreement on many issues related
to the four decades of Japan’s colonial rule including the question of territorial
rights to Dokdo/Takeshima. Anti-Japanese sentiment played an important role in
maintaining South Korean President Syngman Rhee’s domestic legitimacy
(Cho & Seo-Hyun, 2011, p. 286). Thus he pursued a hard-line policy in normali-
zation negotiations. As the Japanese side was also not willing to compromise on a
number of issues related to colonial legacy, the negotiations in the 1950s were not
very fruitful. In April 1960, mass protests against rigged elections forced Rhee to
resign. In 1961, as a result of a military coup d’etat, South Korea came under the
rule of General Park Chung Hee. Park viewed Japan’s economic assistance as
vital for Korean development and embarked on developing closer ties with Japan
soon after seizing power (Huh, 2013).
In 1965, the two governments officially normalized the bilateral relations by
signing the Japan-Korea Treaty on Basic Relations. The issue of ownership over
Dokdo/Takeshima was one of the main stumbling blocks in the negotiations
process. Both sides realized that the economic importance of the islets is negli-
gible.1 Neither however was willing to yield to the other side’s demands. The
reasons for this could be found in domestic politics. Park Chung Hee’s dictato-
rial rule was perceived as illegitimate by many of his countrymen. Furthermore,
his policy of rapprochement with Japan was very unpopular in South Korea and
revelation of the details of the forthcoming treaty resulted in mass demonstra-
tions against it (Lee, 2011). In Japan, the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) faced strong criticism from the Socialist Party, the latter being
against fostering closer relations with South Korea’s military dictatorship.
Giving up the claims to the islets would have enhanced the opposition.
Thus, the final text of the treaty did not touch on the territorial issue. Interviews
with bureaucrats and politicians involved in the negotiations suggest that the sides
have reached a tacit agreement regarding the dispute.2 According to this agree-
ment, the dispute was to be shelved and both governments would continue to hold
their respective interpretations regarding the belonging of the islets but would
avoid escalation of the dispute.
The territorial dispute however could not be successfully shelved without
resolving the question of fishing rights in the waters surrounding the islets. This
issue was addressed in the agreement on fisheries that accompanied the treaty.
Under this agreement, a joint regulation zone that included waters surrounding the
islets was established. The agreement enabled fishermen from both countries to
fish in the joint regulation zone where the party whose flag the vessel flies
enforced laws.3
Bukh 5
Until mid-1990s, the territorial dispute was mostly in a dormant state. Both
governments maintained their respective interpretations of the 1965 Treaty of
Basic Relations and their claims to the islets. Neither side however took any signi-
ficant steps to challenge the status quo. The issue of ownership over Dokdo/
Takeshima rose to the fore of bilateral agenda again in 1996 when both Japan and
Korea ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
and declared their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). In accordance
with their claims, both countries included the islets as their sovereign territory.
This led again to both Japanese and Korean politicians proclaiming their country’s
historical rights to the islets and denouncing the other side’s claims. After two
years of exchanges, the parties reached a solution not dissimilar to the 1965 one.
They agreed to separate claims of sovereignty from fisheries related issues and
demarcated their respective EEZs in a new fisheries agreement, which was signed
in 1998.4 A central area in the Sea of Japan that encompassed Dokdo/Takeshima
was designated, this time as a ‘provisional zone’, where rules similar to the 1965
Fishing Agreement applied. Thus fishermen from both countries could continue to
fish in the waters surrounding the islets while both governments continued to
maintain their respective claims to territorial rights. There was one important diffe-
rence however between the 1965 and the 1998 arrangements. Namely, Article 15
of the new treaty implicitly referred to the territorial question by stating that the
present agreement should not be interpreted as undermining positions of either of
the parties related to international legal problems other than fisheries.
‘Protect Dokdo’ movement emerged in early 2000s and to a great extent con-
stituted a response to the new fisheries treaty, the latter perceived by the activists
as a betrayal of the national cause by their own government.5 In 2004, Japan’s
Shimane Prefecture passed a prefectural ordinance that designated the 22nd of
February as ‘Takeshima Day’. The ordinance was more of an expression of frus-
tration with Japan’s central government’s dealing with the territorial issue rather
than of anti-Korean sentiments and directed at Tokyo rather than at Seoul (Bukh,
2015). Nevertheless, it was met with strong protests from the Korean government
and civil society groups alike. Despite any attempts of the Japanese government
to regain control over the islets and continuous administration of the islets by
Korea, from 2004 onwards the territorial dispute gained nationwide popularity in
Korea and the number of civil society groups devoted to the protection of Dokdo
grew significantly.
Korean National Identity and the Democratization
Movement
The previous section outlined the main historical and political developments
related to the dispute. It may seem that the importance of Dokdo for Korean
society lies solely in the history of Korea’s relations with Japan. At the same
time, it was noted in the previous section that Korea’s relations with its former
colonial ruler was also an important issue in domestic political struggles between
Korea’s successive authoritarian regimes and their opponents. This section
6 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)
provides further analysis of this confrontation and examines the two competing
national identity constructs advocated by the ruling elites and the democratiza-
tion movement.
The events that led to the liberation of Korea from colonial rule and Cold War
politics that shaped the post-liberation political developments on the Korean
Peninsula created three major interrelated problems for the construction of Korean
identity. One was the fact that unlike most of other former colonies, Korea’s libera-
tion from the colonial subjugation was achieved by external forces rather than by
indigenous struggle (Kang, 2011, p. 173). The other was the nature of the new state
and the government, which was to a large extent created by the American occupa-
tion in complete disregard of the indigenous provisional government. Moreover,
Syngman Rhee’s government was not only created by the occupation but also
continued to be strongly dependent on the US (Brazinsky, 2007). The third was the
division of the Korean Peninsula and the Korean nation into two states, which not
only opposed each other in ideological terms but also engaged in a bloody war in
which even family members occasionally fought on opposite sides.
As independence, uniqueness and the overlap of the nation with the state are
central traits of modern nationalism, the South Korean national identity narra-
tive developed by the new ruling elites had to conceal the above-mentioned pre-
dicament. This was achieved by mobilizing anti-communism as the main tenet
of South Korean identity. Syngman Rhee and his associates did draw on the
ethnic and organic nationalism that spread in Korea during the colonial period.
As such nation was articulated as natural, indivisible and superior to all indi-
vidual interests (Shin, 2006, pp. 100–102). By coupling this ethnic nationalism
with anti-communism, however, the North Koreans and other Koreans that did
not adhere to anti-communist ideology were by default excluded from the
national community. This emphasis on anti-communism as the main tenet of
Korean identity enabled the ruling elites to avoid the question of Korean inde-
pendence. Well into the 1960s, the official historical narrative as epitomized in
history textbooks did not pay much attention to the Korean independence move-
ment and depicted the liberation as being the result of the Allied (mainly, the US)
victory (Baek, 2005).
General Park Chung Hee seized power in Korea in 1961 and ruled the country
till his assignation in 1979. Park who suffered from legitimacy deficit adopted
various measures aimed at tackling this problem. Thus he was an ardent promoter
of indigenous culture and identity, and modified the historical narrative on Korea’s
independence to emphasize the centrality of the Korean provisional government
in the liberation process. The purpose of the latter was to enhance the legitimacy
of Park’s regime by establishing continuity with the colonial era independence
struggle. Not surprisingly, the modified historical narrative also delegitimized
North Korea by downplaying or omitting the role of socialist or communist groups
in the struggle for independence (ibid., p. 57). Economic development was one of
the main policies pursued by Park and hence the established official identity dis-
course was infused with developmentalism during his rule. Overall however, the
role of ethnic nationalism and anti-communism as the main tropes of Korean
identity remained unchanged during Park’s rule (Shin, 2006, p. 103).
Bukh 7
There are possibly different ways to categorize and periodize civic activism in
post-independence Korea, but generally its origins are traced to the spring of 1960
when students engaged in large-scale demonstrations against Syngman Rhee. The
democratization movement against Korea’s successive dictators was not only
about the domestic political system but also advocated a more independent policy
for South Korea. Thus the 1960 uprising (4.19 Movement) that eventually toppled
Rhee was as much about his dictatorial ruling style and corruption as it was about
the economic dependence on the American aid (Oohata, 2011, p. 28). Hence it is
not surprising that many of the leaders of this revolt initially welcomed the coup
of Park Chung Hee perceiving his policies as ‘nationalistic’ (Lee, 2007, p. 29).
However, Park’s economic development plan that envisioned Korean develop-
ment as dependent on attraction of foreign capital and the related Korea–Japan
Treaty on Basic Relations that enabled flow of Japanese capital to Korea was
perceived by the domestic civic organizations as a betrayal of the national cause.
Thus the subsequent struggle was directed at both the government and the ‘exter-
nal forces’. In the worldview of the activists, both of these entities existed in a
synergy (Mizuno, 2010, pp. 14–15).
Importantly, the democratization movement also advocated an alternative
national identity narrative for the nation, which was directly related to its percep-
tion of Korea’s politics, the national history and Korea’s relations with its neigh-
bours. The most important manifestation of this counter discourse was the critical
historiography and its focus on minjung, which can be roughly translated as the
‘people’ or the ‘masses’. The minjung ideology emerged in the second half of the
1970s, spurred by the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Park’s regime and
the growing economic inequality (Koo, 1999, p. 59).
Minjung was defined as the people in the ruled position (politically, economi-
cally or culturally) and, while belonging to different social and economic strata,
engage in a struggle against the unjust political power (as cited by Han Wan Sang
in Kim, 1995, p. 47). Thus minjung was not identified with a particular class and
aimed as including all parts of the Korean society such as workers, farmers, stu-
dents and intellectuals that engaged in a struggle against the regime. The minjung
ideology was strongly influenced by various neo-Marxist theories such as depend-
ency theory (Koo, 1999, p. 59). Thus it is not surprising that the definition of
minjung bears striking resemblance to the notion of multitude, central to a much
more recent neo-Marxist theory developed by Hardt and Negri (2001). Both min-
jung and multitude are defined not by certain inherent characteristics but mainly
through their oppositional position to the oppressive ‘other’. In case of the former,
it acquired its subjectivity through opposition to the domestic regime and its
external supporters. Similarly, for multitude it is the struggle against the empire
that creates it as a subject.
This new critical historiography was an integral part of the democratization
movement and sought to establish Korea’s subjectivity as a nation by rewriting the
nation’s modern history from a people (minjung)-centred position as opposed to the
previously dominant focus on the role of great powers and individual leaders. It
also aimed at producing praxis-oriented individuals, arming them with knowledge
of the ideal community worth struggling for (Em, 1993, p. 452). Thus, minjung
8 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)
historiography was not only an intellectual exercise but also a social movement that
engaged in an emancipatory struggle both against the authoritarian state, as well as
the colonial past and present (Choi, 1993, p. 91). In this new activist discourse that
engaged in the production of alternative Korean identity, the post-independence
Korean state and the colonial forces (mainly Japan and the US) existed in a symbio-
sis of difference, juxtaposed with the minjung (Wells, 1995, p. 17). Unlike the ear-
lier historiography that portrayed the Korean people as passive victims, the new
historiography narrated them as innocent heroes that engage in a continuous strug-
gle against the external imperial forces and domestic oppressors (Em, 1993, p. 457).
Most importantly, in minjung narrative, democratization was associated with unifi-
cation of the two Koreas and the emergence of a new, truly independent Korean
nation that would be governed by the cultural values of the people.
The main tenets of the historiographical narrative were as follows. The failure
of the indigenous united movement of the left and the right aimed at establishing
one socially oriented national state in the immediate post-liberation days, and the
subsequent division of the Peninsula were attributed to external forces and their
supporters (i.e., Sygman Rhee group) (Kang, 2011, p. 257). Korean geopolitical
importance was seen as one of the main factors in precluding unification of Korea
as the peninsula became the clashing point between the continental communist
(USSR and China) and maritime capitalist (US) forces (ibid., p. 248). It was also
argued that national unification could be achieved only through indigenous Korean
initiative. The ‘Korean nation’ was juxtaposed with the political elites (both South
and North) that are driven by their egoistic interests. Minjung was seen as the lead-
ing force in the struggle for independence throughout modern Korean history.
Thus minjung was argued to be the main actor in the nineteenth century struggle
to maintain independence and reform, the subsequent struggle against Japanese
colonialism and the post-liberation struggle for democracy and national unifica-
tion (Kang, 1995). Emphasizing the importance of national unification, minjung
nationalism was strongly anti-imperial and was inspired by Franz Fanon and other
ideologues of anti-colonial struggle. It construed the Korean struggle for national
unity as being an integral part of the international anti-colonial movement. It also
advocated the need for a cultural unity based on indigenous culture as opposed to
the commercialized and consumerist culture of the West. The latter was perceived
as alienating those that lack the means to adopt it, and was blamed for driving
further apart the two Koreas. The advocates of this cultural unity based on popular
culture saw it as a prerequisite for a national unity. Popular culture was given a
very specific meaning: it was seen as an empowering and liberating element, jux-
taposed with the dividing and oppressing imported Western culture (Choi, 1993,
pp. 106–108).
The emergence of this counter-discourse on Korean national identity embodied
in the critical historiography meant that in the 1970s and 1980s there were two
competing national identity discourses in South Korea. One was the narrative pro-
moted by the ruling elites. It constructed Korean identity as existing in opposition
to North Korea and communism in general, and located the Korean nation within
the capitalist camp. The other discourse embraced by the critical intellectuals,
students and other social movements construed the people or minjung as the
Bukh 9
embodiment of Korean national identity. Similarly, to the mainstream narrative,
the counter-discourse emphasized the ethnic and organic nature of the Korean
nation. On the other hand, it did not construe the nation in opposition to commu-
nism but to the oppressors, both domestic and external. The nation was not seen as
independent and it was argued that only through democratization and unification
true national independence and subjectivity can be achieved.
The democratization of South Korea that started with the June 1987 uprising
did not result in the rise to dominance of the minjung discourse but resulted in the
destabilization of both of the identity discourses. Needless to say that democrati-
zation brought a number of important changes many of which were welcomed by
the minjung activists. At the same time, however, the policies pursued by the
newly elected progressive leaders did not embody either of the extant identity
discourses. It is rather obvious that the Sunshine Policy pursued by Kim Dae-Jung
(1998–2003) and Roh Mu-Hyun (2003–2008) governments, which emphasized
co-operation, co-existence and eventual peaceful reunification between the North
and the South, undermined the construction of South Korean identity in direct
opposition to the North. These and other related political developments however
also destabilized the minjung construct.
First, the abolition of dictatorship and democratization as well as the emer-
gence of new ruling elites whose members included many former activists under-
mined the most important tenet of minjung identity, namely, its definition in
opposition to the ruling power. Moreover, the new democratic leadership not only
continued to maintain the close relations with the US but adopted numerous poli-
cies (such as the Free Trade Agreement) that were perceived by many activists as
further undermining Korea’s autonomy (For example, Citizen’s Solidarity for
Implementation of Human, 2007).
Second, the democratization did not bring about a national unity based in the
cultural values of minjung. To the opposite, many groups such as the workers’
unions, which, according to the minjung narrative, constituted their core and
participated in the democratization movement, started to distance themselves
from the minjung ideology and pursue their narrow interests (Kim, 1995, p. 55).
Furthermore, while relations between the two Koreas have improved, the pros-
pects for the reunification of the peninsula remains as dim as before, undermining
the veracity of the democratization and unification symbiosis dominant in the
minjung narrative. As such, it can be argued that one of the side effects of the
democratization of South Korea and related developments was destabilization
of the extant identity narratives. As the section below will argue, it is against
the background of the democratization movement and in the context of post-
democratization national identity crisis that the symbolic role of Dokdo and
related activism should be understood.
Dokdo Headquarters and the Dokdo Crisis
Today there are tens if not hundreds of organizations in Korea that engage in
Dokdo related activism. Most of these civil society organizations have emerged
10 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)
in early 2000s and together comprise the ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement. As already
noted, in academia and media alike, the movement has been generally located
within the context of Korea’s historical memory of Japanese colonization and
interpreted as another expression of the negative feelings Koreans have towards
one-time colonial ruler. There is no doubt that to a large extent this interpretation
is correct and the movement is a manifestation of this historical memory shared
by many Koreans. At the same time, however, it will be argued below that the
narrative promoted by certain key agents in the movement is more complex than
a simple expression of anti-Japanese sentiment. It will also show that many of the
roots of many of the ideas advocated by parts of the movement can be traced to
the democratization movement of the 1970s and 1980s.
It is important to note that ‘Protect Dokdo’ organizations are numerous and very
diverse in terms of their membership, sources of funding, activities and ideas. Their
perceptions of Dokdo and its value as well as governmental policies and their effec-
tiveness in protecting Dokdo are also quite diverse. As such, while the ‘Protect
Dokdo’ movement is unified by its desire to sustain and further enhance Korea’s
administration of the islets, the discourse produced by the movement is rather
diverse. This section focuses only on one of the organizations in the movement
called Dokdo Headquarters (Doktto Bonbu). Dokdo Headquarters (DH) was the first
organization that formed ‘Protect Dokdo’ movement. It is also the largest organi-
zation in the movement. As of 2013, DH has about 4000 to 5000 members.6 The
most important reason for focusing on DH however is its independence from the
government. Unlike most of other large organizations in the movement, DH does
not receive any financial or other assistance from the Korean government and relies
solely on donations and membership fees.7 As such while probably not representing
the views of others and government dependent organizations in the movement, it
can be considered as a genuine representative of the Korean civil society.
DH was established in 2000 and headed by Kim Bong U. Kim was active in the
democratization movement in late 1980s and early 1990s and at that time occu-
pied a senior position in one of the students’ organizations (Chosun Ilbo People’s
Database, 2014). The main purpose of DH activities is to protect Dokdo from the
Korean government giving it away to Japan. The actual activities are focused on
education of the public (public speeches and pamphlets), exercising pressure on
the government through demonstrations and petitions, monthly study meetings
and visits to Dokdo.8 The organization also created a virtual Dokdo archive that
consists of Dokdo-related articles from newspapers.
In 2006, DH published a series of booklets, which, according to one of its lead-
ers, embodies the main arguments of the organization.9 Below I will introduce the
main tenets of this narrative and analyze it in the context of Korea’s national
identity crisis described above.
According to DH, the main reason for the occurrence of ‘Dokdo Crisis’ and the
subsequent need to protect the islets is the new fisheries agreement concluded
between Japan and Korea in 1999. Criticizing the dominant understanding of the
Dokdo issue, promulgated by the government, mainstream scholarship and media,
DH argues that Article 15 of the new agreement does not confirm Korea’s rights
to the islets but gives an equal position to both Korea’s and Japan’s claims of
rightful ownership. Hence it is argued that the agreement serves only Japan’s
Bukh 11
interests but Korea’s national interests dictate its swift abolishment (Dokdo
Headquarters, 2006a). In the question of ownership over Dokdo, DH adopts a
position, which is surprisingly similar to that of Japan. Namely, unlike the Korean
governmental position that argues Korea’s ownership over the islets to be indis-
putable, DH states that Dokdo is actually a disputed territory. As Japan has
expressed persistent objection to Korea’s ownership, the activist narrative argues
that ignoring this fact can eventually lead to the disappearance of Korea’s rights or
make them indeterminate (ibid., p. 37). Therefore, it is argued, the national interest
in this situation dictates the need to establish beyond doubt the legality of Korea’s
ownership. To achieve this, it is important to show Korea’s intention to govern
Dokdo and have an effective control over the territory. The degree of Korea’s
will and exercise of effective control over Dokdo is seen as a key to a successful
resolution of the dispute (ibid., pp. 14–18).
DH argues that the economic and strategic importance of Dokdo has increased
significantly after the coming to force of UNCLOS in 1994 which enabled nations
to claims 200 miles of adjacent waters. As a result, control over Dokdo has ena-
bled to control the whole East Sea (Sea of Japan). Besides being an important base
for maritime research it is argued that the islets can become an important rest area
for ships as well as a base for dealing with emergency situations in the East Sea.
The narrative also emphasizes the potential oil deposits in the waters adjacent to
the islets that can provide Korea with energy resources and the benefits for Korean
economy that will result from construction of various facilities on the islets and in
the surrounding waters (Dokdo Headquarters, 2006b).
DH narrative criticizes both the Korean government and Japan. The former is
criticized for not preparing properly for the negotiations of the new fishing agree-
ment and not protecting Korea’s national interests. Japan is criticized for what is
seen as a clever cunning plan to get control over Dokdo. As a result of the fisheries
agreement, it is argued, Japan managed to establish itself in an equal position to
Korea in relation to the ownership of Dokdo (ibid., pp. 75–78).
As such, DH sees the new fisheries agreement as compromising Korea’s own-
ership economically and strategically important territory and argues for the need
to defend it from both the Japanese encroachment and the Korean government’s
ineptness. Most importantly however the discussion of Dokdo is not limited to
this criticism but develops into a broader narrative directly related to Korean
national identity. It is in this narrative that the continuity between the DH con-
struction of Korean identity and the minjung ideology as well as the stabilizing
role of the narrative can be observed.
DH construes the Dokdo problem as a symptom of a broader national crisis
that has befell the Korean since the end of the seventh century. The Dokdo
issue is seen as both being a symptom of this national crisis and, in a somewhat
paradoxical fashion, its remedy. The main characteristics of the national crisis
as depicted by DH are the dominance of flunkeyism among the Korean elites
and the general lack of a national consciousness among the members of the
nation. The ‘Dokdo crisis’ is seen as providing the Korean people with the
opportunity of getting rid of flunkeyism, which is seen as the main ideology of
the Korean mainstream and achieving a true and proper national consciousness
(ibid., p. 36).
12 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)
Flunkeyism is seen as one of the main historical ills of the Korean elites and its
origins are perceived as going back to the seventh century. DH argues that Korea
became secluded from the world after the demise of the Goguryeo Kingdom,
locked on the Korean Peninsula and continuously engaged in internal conflicts
while relying on external powers. The narrative denies the sole responsibility of
Japanese colonialism for the ills of post-independence Korean society and traces
the roots of contemporary flunkeyism to Joseon dynasty’s relations with China.
This characteristic of the Korean elites is seen and the cause of today’s social divi-
sions and mutual hatred along class, education, regional, political, religious and
professional lines. DH argues that all the domestic forces that produce these social
divisions continue to rely on external powers hoping to gain an upper hand and by
this continuously preserve these internal conflicts (ibid., pp. 37–38).
Another aspect of the national crisis is the lack of proper ‘territorial con-
sciousness’ (yeongto insik) among the Korean people. Territory, it is argued, is a
bowl that holds the nation. Without a territory the nation will not be able to func-
tion properly and hence there is a need to defend national territory. Korean
nation however is lacking a proper understanding of territory, which was lost
after the fall of Goguryeo Kingdom in the seventh century and the embracement
of flunkeyism (sadae juui) by the ruling elites. The reason for the continuity in
this lack of proper understanding of territory is traced to the process that led to
Korea’s liberation from the Japanese rule. The liberation, it is argued, was not
achieved through indigenous effort. Korea gained its independence as a result of
an external intervention and entrusted its fate to the US. Thus, during the Cold
War, Koreans failed to gain an understanding of the importance of territory for
the nation and were preoccupied with the Cold War ideological struggle.
Together with flunkeyism, this lack of a proper understanding of the importance
of territory is seen as the main reason behind the conclusion of the new fisheries
agreement. If the situation is not changed and the new understanding of territory
does not gain dominance inside the Korean society, it is argued, that there is
danger of Korea again becoming a victim of great powers policy of redrawing
borders (ibid., pp. 13–16).
The persistence of the national crisis is further explained through a structural
prism that combines elements of geopolitical theory that construes world history as
a struggle between maritime and land powers (for example, see Mahan, 1900), and
the theory of cultural imperialism not dissimilar to the post-colonial discourse of
the 1960s spread among the radical intellectuals in the West.10 The latter manifests
itself in a critical reference to globalization, which is seen as one of the causes of
national crisis. ‘Globalization’ is construed as a process aimed at destroying
national consciousness and brought by the imperialistic great powers and their
domestic collaborators and is argued to be one of the causes of the gradual disappe-
arance of Korean national consciousness (Dokdo Headquarters, 2006b, p. 28).
Influences of geopolitical theory can be observed in the emphasis on the location
of the Korean Peninsula as sandwiched between the land powers Russia and China
and the maritime powers US and Japan. This geopolitical factor is argued to be
responsible for Korea’s colonization by Japan and the division of the peninsula
in the aftermath of the Asia-Pacific War. Today’s South Korea is argued to be a
Bukh 13
protectorate of the US-Japan Alliance while the North that of Russia and China.
US-Japan hegemony over South Korea is seen as one of the main factors that
perpetuate Korean elites’ flunkeyism and their subsequent inability to properly
respond to Japan’s Dokdo related claims (ibid., pp. 20–21). The division of the
Korean Peninsula, which resulted from great powers struggle, is seen as another
factor in the disappearance of Korean national consciousness. It is argued that the
division and the continuous conflict between the South and the North Koreas
create and perpetuate a feeling of animosity and distance between members of the
same nation (ibid., p. 27).
In the context of this continuous national crisis, Dokdo is seen not only as its
symptom but also as a great gift that will help the Korean nations to overcome
it. First, Dokdo is argued to be the ultimate cure that will enable the recovery of
historical consciousness of Korean people. Today, it is argued, Korean histori-
cal consciousness of their national history starts with the colonial time. Thus
the majority of Koreans perceive their nation as having a very short history.
Similarly, the spatial consciousness of their national borders is limited to the
southern part of the peninsula. As, according to DH, the history of Dokdo goes
back to at least sixth century, learning this history is the solution to overcoming
the problems related to historical and spatial consciousness of the nation (ibid.,
pp. 17–19).
Furthermore, Dokdo has the potential of uniting all of the members of the
nation (South, North and overseas Koreans) and fostering the emergence of a true
autonomous consciousness for the nation, which in turn will bring national unifi-
cation (ibid., p. 22). As Dokdo is not disputed and loved by all of the members of
the national community and requires a unified response, it is seen as a ‘treasure’
that will enable national unification (ibid., pp. 23–26). As such, Dokdo is seen
as the key to the national reunification, which has been the most important issue
in Korean politics since the end of WWII.
To a great extent, the depiction of the nation and the national crisis in DH nar-
rative repeats the main tenets of the minjung discourse. It construes the Korean
people in opposition to the all of the external ‘colonial’ forces-Japan but also the
US, and in opposition to the domestic elites and the government. It also con-
strues the nation as an organic, ethno-cultural entity whose members include all
ethnic Koreans including those living on the other side of the 38th parallel and
the overseas Koreans. Not dissimilar to the activists in the 1970s and 1980s that
emphasized the rediscovery of indigenous culture (Koo, 1999, p. 60), DH argues
for the need to rediscover Dokdo as an important cultural symbol of the Korean
people. Furthermore, similarly to minjung activists (Wells, 1995, p. 25), DH
emphasizes the importance of historical knowledge as a tool of liberation, con-
strues the people as unware of their historical role and sees education of the
masses as their mission.
At the same time, the DH narrative is completely void of any socialist ele-
ments that were quite dominant in the minjung ideology. The critique of globali-
zation is reminiscent of Marxism but does not carry any references to capitalism,
economy, inequality and other traits of a progressive discourse. Furthermore,
the narrative does not ascribe any socially progressive values to the people’s
14 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)
culture. Territorial consciousness and historical consciousness are seen as tools
of national liberation but the current condition of semi-dependence on US and
Japan is seen as a product of centuries-old cultural habits and geopolitics, rather
than economic relations. While the narrative does make references to gaps and
inequalities within the Korean society, these are not seen as related to economic
relations of power, either domestic or global, but resulting mainly from the divi-
sion of the peninsula. The narrative does not refer to oppression and, while criti-
cal of elites’ flunkeyism, does not criticize the current political system of the
Korean society. Finally, the Korean experience is seen as absolutely unique and
there is no attempt to establish a certain unity between Korea and other nations
in similar condition.
As such, the construction of the Korean national identity depicted in the DH
narrative can be seen as a modified version of the minjung discourse. Both con-
strue the Korean nation as an organic, ethnic entity that includes all those who
share Korean blood, constructed in opposition to certain domestic and external
‘others’. At the same time, the centrality of the disputed islets in the DH narrative
enables it to avoid completely any discussion of political ideologies. Unlike in
the minjung discourse, Korean people are not construed as oppressed but simply
as lacking proper understanding of history and territory. The people/government
dichotomy relies solely on the flunkeyism of the elites for its existence and does
not involve any socially or politically progressive elements. The unity of the
nation is construed as possible through achievement of proper historical and
territorial consciousness and, most importantly, through the love of Dokdo. In
other words, national unity is constructed without resolving important questions
related to ideological differences inside South Korea but also between the South
and the North, South Korea’s relations with the US and other political issues that
brought about the national identity crisis. Dokdo is the embodiment of the Korean
nation, and the Korean nation is the love of Dokdo. All other ideational aspects
that characterized the two national identity constructs are simply eliminated from
the discourse.
Conclusion
Focusing on one of the main civil society organizations in the ‘Protect Dokdo’
movement, this article analyzed its main ideas and arguments. Unlike the extant
scholarship that attributes Dokdo related activism solely to anti-Japanese senti-
ment in Korea, this article located the Dokdo narrative in the context of the
broader debates on Korea’s national identity. I argued that while anti-Japanese
sentiment is definitely one of the factors that led to the emergence of this move-
ment, the symbolic role of Dokdo is not limited to historical memory of
Japanese colonialism. By juxtaposing the main tenets of DH narrative with
those of minjung ideology, I have shown that there are important similarities
between the two in terms of their construction of the Korean nation. At the
same time, I argued that the former is void of any socialist elements, which
Bukh 15
were rather dominant in the latter. Territory is an empty signifier that does not
imply any political norms. This emptiness enabled a construction of national
identity discourse that bridges between the two extant identity constructs by
focusing on Dokdo and the epitome of the Korean nation.
Acknowledgements
Research conducted for this article was funded by the Academy of Korean Studies Grant
AKS-10R-56 and a Royal Society of New Zealand Marsden Fund Grant VUW1320.
Notes
1. Roh, Takeshima, 175.
2. See Roh, Takeshima for a detailed discussion.
3. An English language translation of the Agreement can be viewed here: http://www.
ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPKR/19650622.T2E.html (accessed on
20 November2015).
4. Japanese and Korean versions of the new Agreement can be viewed here: http://
www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/A-H11-1039.pdf (accessed on 20 November
2015).
5. Kim Jeom Gu, interview by author, Seoul, 18 December 2014.
6. Interview with Hong Seun Keun, Dokdo Research Institute, 5 April 2013.
7. Interview with Nam Sang Gi, Secretary General of Dokdo Headquarters, 13 December
2013.
8. Interview with Nam Sang Gi, Seoul, 20 December 2014.
9. ibid.
10. Tomlinson, J. (1991). Cultural imperialism. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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