From haunted brain to haunted science: A cognitive neuroscience view of paranormal and pseudoscientific thought

Abstract

"Not our houses, but our brains are haunted"
G. M. Beard, 1879 (p. 67)

Guidebooks to haunted places usually organize their contents according to geographic criteria or to the main types of "paranormal" events a visitor is invited to expect. This chapter is intended as an introductory guide to the most frequently and thoroughly haunted site, indeed, the cradle from which all hauntings ultimately emerge. It is the human brain. Localization criteria seem premature. Although we know a great deal more about the functional neuroanatomy of psychotic and paranormal belief than we did a century ago, when the American neurologist George Beard wrote about the topic (Beard, 1879; see Brown, 1983 for a review and bibliography), we are still far from being able to pinpoint, in a physical sense, those brain loci giving ghosts a permanent housing. Nevertheless, as cognitive neuroscience enters the 21st century, it is increasingly successful in identifying interactions between distributed neural systems and the experience of and the beliefs in forces whose origins some of us project into the outside world.

Full text

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Chapter 9 from: J. Houran and R. Lange (Eds.), Hauntings and Poltergeists: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Jefferson,
NC: McFarland, 2001 (pp. 195-213)
From Haunted Brain To Haunted Science:
A Cognitive Neuroscience View of Paranormal and Pseudoscientific Thought.
Peter Brugger
Department of Neurology
University Hospital Zurich
CH-8091 Zurich, Switzerland
(peter.brugger@usz.ch)
Acknowledgement
The ideas presented in this chapter were substantially shaped by continuous discussions with Kirsten I. Taylor who was
also much concerned about the way I wanted to forward them here. I am entirely to blame for any remaining
shortcomings, and especially the occasionally blunt formulations.
Some of the research reviewed in this chapter has received funding by the Swiss National Science Foundation, the
Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences, the Canadian Natural Sciences and Engeneering Research Council, and the
Institut für Grenzgebiete der Psychologie und Psychohygiene (Freiburg, Germany).

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"Not our houses but our brains are haunted"
G. M. Beard, 1879 (p. 67)
Guidebooks to haunted places usually organize their contents according to geographic criteria or to the main
types of "paranormal" events a visitor is invited to expect. This chapter is intended as an introductory guide to the most
frequently and thoroughly haunted site, indeed, the cradle from which all hauntings ultimately emerge. It is the human
brain. Localization criteria seem premature. Although we know a great deal more about the functional neuroanatomy of
psychotic and paranormal belief than we did a century ago, when the American neurologist George Beard wrote about
the topic (Beard, 1879; see Brown, 1983 for a review and bibliography), we are still far from being able to pinpoint, in
a physical sense, those brain loci giving ghosts a permanent housing. Nevertheless, as cognitive neuroscience enters the
21st century, it is increasingly successful in identifying interactions between distributed neural systems and the
experience of and the beliefs in forces whose origins some of us project into the outside world.
I will describe two cognitive functions whose notorious susceptibility to transient breakdowns has duped
people across all cultures with respect to the origin of allegedly paranormal events. The first mechanism is the
appreciation of oneself as the agent of a behavior. I will introduce the case of Ludwig Staudenmaier, a German
professor of chemistry, who provided us with an extraordinary account of his beginning psychosis. He described how
he developed the ability to write without conscious control over his hand movements and finally lost the ability to
control the ghosts he had thus contacted. This is an individual case, but in very recent times we see entire populations
inflicted with the symptoms of denial of ownership of hand movements. I am referring to the propagators of "facilitated
communication", a method suposedly allowing patients with severe communication disorders to produce sophisticated
texts on typewriters, provided their hands are gently supported by a therapist. This "communication unbound" (Biklen,
1990; 1993) is in fact brought about by the therapists themselves, who unintentionally guide the patients' hands while
maintaining a disturbingly complete lack of insight into their motor actions, which are manipulations in the truest sense
of the word. My aim is not to "pathologize" the misinterpretations of the forces at work in this "illusory
communication" (Burgess et al., 1998). Instead, I wish to demonstrate how smooth the transitions are from individual
delusions to the madness of crowds (Mackay, 1841/1993). I will describe neuropsychiatric conditions in which the
ownership of parts of one's own body or its motor behavior is denied (i.e., auditory verbal hallucinations, the alien hand
syndrome and somatoparaphrenia). Current research on the mechanisms underlying these disorders is aimed at the
functional neuroanatomy of "me-ness", whose elucidation may ultimately explain the lack of self-monitoring in both
pathological and paranormal manifestations of one's "poltergeist within".
The second mechanism that I will discuss is the pervasive tendency of human beings to see order in random
configurations. "Randomness" is as impossible to be experienced directly as it is impossible to be proven
mathematically (Chaitin, 1975). To a large extent, randomness is in the eye of the beholder, and the bias of our
perceptual-cognitive system to perceive order rather than disorder can betray the layman's senses as much as it can
influence scientists' interpretation of noisy data. Again, I begin with the description of a single case: the famous
Swedish writer August Strindberg. He kept a diary of his first schizophrenic episodes, a remarkable collection of
"meaningful" coincidences and, on the literary level, a highly creative work. It is also a particularly attractive example
of the "relativity of creativity", i.e., the continuum from creative detection of real patterns at one end, to the
"hypercreative" interpretation of patterns in "noise" at the other end. The ability to associate, and especially the

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tendency to prefer "remote" over "close" associations, is at the heart of creative, paranormal and delusional thinking. I
will discuss the role of the right hemisphere in establishing associations between distantly connected concepts and
events, and briefly summarize the experimental evidence for a right hemisphere processing bias in highly creative
subjects, believers in paranormal phenomena, and people with acute schizophrenia.
The Poltergeist Within: Ludwig Staudenmaier's Magical Science
Ludwig Staudenmaier was born in the Bavarian village of Krumbach on February 14, 1865. Nothing is known
about his father, and all we know about his mother is that she was a poor seamstress. Apart from chronic
gastrointestinal problems which urged him to live as a vegetarian, and apart, perhaps, from a certain reluctance to seek
the company of other kids of his age (Ahlenstiel, 1965), young Ludwig was physically and psychologically healthy. He
was a bright student, inclined from the first years on to study subjects belonging to the natural sciences. He was
especially fascinated by botanical and zoological topics. Unfortunately, the financial situation at home prevented him
from pursuing his interests beyond the high school level. The Catholic Church provided assistance in the form of a
stipend for a college education with subsequent university studies in theology. In 1888, Ludwig Staudenmaier was
ordained. After a year of ecclesiastic services, he somehow managed to obtain a further stipend, which allowed him to
study chemistry and zoology. Less than seven years later, Staudenmaier's life took a turn; he was offered a position as a
professor for chemistry, mineralogy and geology at a university-level school in Freising, near Munich. Happily he took
it, and this marked the beginning of a prolific period of scientific work. Staudenmaier contributed as much to basic
research questions (e.g., regarding the element tellurium; Staudenmaier, 1895) as to applied aspects of chemistry (e.g.,
the disengagement of graphite and, in particular, the synthesis of graphitic acid; Staudenmaier, 1898). We do not know
anything about Staudenmaier's religious inclinations or affiliations at that time. What we must assume, however, is that
he always remained grateful toward the Church which had made it possible for him to get where he was; in any case,
we are told that he used to wear the robe of a priest during his daily laboratory work (Ahlenstiel, 1949, p. 74).
Ludwig Staudenmaier's academic career seemed assured when, in 1901, his life took another turn, this time a
more dramatic one. It was a turn which would finally lead to the publication, in 1912, of a book entitled "Magic as an
Experimental Natural Science", a breathtaking, autobiographical account of the events to unfold.1 It all began when an
acquainted scientist approached Staudenmaier with the somewhat exotic question as to the possible physical basis of
the fluorescent phantoms occasionally observed during spiritistic seances. Staudenmaier, totally naive with respect to
psychical research, began to read some popular work about spiritism and, following the advice of the acquaintance,
experimented with "automatic writing", a spiritualist fad which had come into vogue around the middle of the 19th
century2. For several hours each day he practiced, sitting at a table and holding a pencil in his hand. He describes his
first partially successful attempts as follows:
"After only a few days, I already felt a peculiar pull in my fingertips seemingly aimed at moving the pencil
obliquely from left to right. This impression became more and more distinct. Holding the pencil as softly as
possible, I concentrated my thoughts on this pull and gave way to it. I attempted to assist and reinforce it. Within
the following two weeks, this process became easier and easier to accomplish" (Staudenmaier, 1912; p. 23).
1 Portions of Staudenmaier's impressive document have been translated into English by the American psychologist Leonard
Zusne (Zusne, 1983; cf. also Zusne, 1989). For a brief review see also Sudre (1927).
2 For a brilliant overview of early and modern experimental approaches to and the changing conceptualizations of automatic
writing see Koutstaal (1992).

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So far, Staudenmaier had maintained a healthy, critical attitude toward the spiritistic literature he continued to
study in parallel with his experimentations. He explicitly complained about the superstitious nature of this literature in
which the automatic movements of one's writing hand was attributed to the will of those discarnate individuals bustling
about in the great beyond. In one of these books, he read about a particular ghost whose name was "Julie Norne".
Staudenmaier was not mildly surprised when one evening the pencil in his hand decidedly wrote: "Julie Norne is here!"
"In my mind I asked whether a ghost was present. The written answer was affirmative. Various questions and
answers followed but always concerned things I already knew about. First of all I wanted to find out whether I
was confronted with a fairly intelligent 'ghost' and thus inquired 'Julie's' knowledge in - - chemistry!"
(Staudenmaier, 1912; p. 23)
Understandably, Julie Norne quickly became tired of this sort of examination and soon refused to cooperate. Before she
decided to stay away for good, however, she changed her character (between the lines we read that she became less
amiable), and this change was accompanied by a change in Staudenmaier's handwriting. It was perhaps this sign of
autonomy on the part of the "ghost" which led Staudenmaier to drop the quotation marks referring to ghosts further on
in his report. And there were many more ghosts to come, most of them less friendly than Julie Norne, and many of them
refusing to properly cooperate right away. According to Staudenmaier, one of the first significant changes was that
what started as automatic writing soon proceeded to "automatic hearing".
"With time, the inner anticipatory knowledge ['Vorherwissen'] of what would be written developed to an
'inner' anticipatory hearing located close to the ear. The usefulness of the pencil thus faded away. At this stage
my hand would move mechanically over the paper, the single letters frequently only suggesting, because more
and more clear and with increasing certainity I would faintly hear what was to be written. (...) In spiritualist
terminology I had turned from a writing into a hearing medium" (Staudenmaier, 1912; p. 24; his italics).
Hallucinations in other modalities occurred. Again, Staudenmaier described in the meticulous way of a natural scientist
how simple illusions, to mention an example from the visual modality, developed from the illusory interpretation of the
shapes of clouds and branches. He described how, when the hallucinations had gained "full clarity and distinctness",
they were further integrated into multimodal experiences of complex scenes. The hallucination of an evil face would
thus be accompanied by corresponding olfactory and auditory hallucinations of a sulphuric smell and the Devil's
threatening voice. Again, it was the convincing autonomy of the hallucinatory percepts which led to a breakdown in
reality testing; as was the case in automatic writing, when the ghosts directing Staudenmaier's hand finally lost the
quotation marks in his narrative, Staudenmaier's initial insight into the central nervous system origin of his perceptual
experiences slowly vanished. He was convinced of the possibility of photographing his visual hallucinations and is thus
an unappreciated precursor of the more modern protagonists of "thoughtography" (e.g., Eisenbud, 1968; see Wimmer,
1971, for a brief overview, Conklin, 1925, for a rare psychiatric case study, and Lange & Houran, 1997 for further
discussion). He was also convinced of the possibility to move objects by means of his will, although he admitted that at
times the arm of the balance he tried to psychokinetically manipulate in one direction maliciously moved in the
opposite direction. Such instances of PSI-missing (as modern parapsychologists would label the phenomenon) were
occasionally followed by the appearance of a gnome sitting on the balance and grimacing at him, seemingly ridiculing
his failed endeavor -- Staudenmaier had definitely lost the sense for the borders between perception and imagination,
between experience and belief, and between volition and automaticity. It is at this point in the story that hauntings in
the more traditional sense of the word came into play. Rapping noises seemed to emerge from the walls of his house,
invisible hands knocked at the windows and pulled blankets from the bed, apples and buns flew through the air. In

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some of these apparently spontaneous events of "makro psychokinesis"3, Staudenmaier physically "felt" the presence of
the agents around him. Again, he was convinced that the invisible entities were actually "out there" despite transient
insight into the subjective nature of the illusion and the comment that he could "project" at will multiple images of
himself into extracorporal space (p. 106)4. More intriguing, however, than the classical poltergeist phenomena which
unfolded in Staudenmaier's presence were the ghostly manifestations confined to his own body, the "poltergeists
within". There were several distinct personalities inhabiting different internal organs and sending orders from there.
There was "Roundhead", for instance. He was named after a rubber toy which, on being squeezed, pulled a big tongue
far out of a large mouth. Roundhead guided Staudenmaier's tongue, forcing it to exert certain movement sequences, to
interfere with the act of speech, and to promote grimacing. Another personality introduced himself as "Horsefoot". He
inhabited the rectum and was a particularly nasty character. When he dominated, Staudenmaier's feet felt as if they
would change their form to mere hooves. Horsefoot tended to manifest himself mainy when Staudenmaier felt cold. If
this happened while taking a walk outdoors, Staudenmaier tried to walk more briskly in order to get warmer and thus
prevent his rectal personality from getting stronger. Horsefoot soon developed a counterstrategy; he would force
Staudenmaier's right heel to kick the left ankle, thus slowing down the process of walking. Another personality, the
"Child", was physically less distinctly confined to a specific location within Staudenmaier's body. Nevertheless, this
personality distracted Staudenmaier as frequently as the others, albeit in much more refreshing ways. The Child
announced its presence with children's songs and rhymes which Staudenmaier, much to his annoyance, could not easily
rid himself of5. It addressed him as "Papa" or "Putzi" and urged him to crawl on the floor, to pivot around in a childish
manner or to play with dolls. One day, Staudenmaier passed a toy shop in downtown Munich, and the inner children
(when particularly euphoric and agitated, the Child could multiply) forced him to stay there against his will. They also
demanded the establishment of a children's room in his home.
So far, Ludwig Staudenmaier's account. He underwent multiple transitions, from the world of religion to that of
science, from science to magic, and finally from the world of the anomalous to the world of psychosis6. His hauntings
began with harmless experiments in automatic writing. This is not a unique beginning: a plethora of reports describe
people drawn to automatic writing or drawing in the beginning stages of a "mediumistic psychosis" (Bender, 1984;
Cutomo, 1989; Earle and Theye, 1968; Henneberg, 1901; Margulies, 1906; Winslow, 1877). More devastating, from a
social-psychological perspective, than the consequences of a loss of control over one's motor actions are certain
3 Some parapychologists employ this term because they conceive of these poltergeist phenomena as large-scale
manifestations of the claimed ability of living organisms to move objects by forces of the mind ("psychokinesis"). In my
opinion, it would be wiser to refer to "psychokinesis" as a "mikro poltergeist" phenomenon, thus acknowledging that its
origin lies in the brain of the observer rather than in any "objective" manifestation in the outside world.
4 The "feeling of a presence" is frequently reported in neuropsychiatric patients haunted by aspects of their own selves
(Brugger et al., 1996; Fenwick et al., 1985; Persinger, 1994). It is also quite common in healthy individuals, especially in
situations of sensory deprivation and social isolation (Brugger et al., 1999; Poser, 1999; Suedfeld and Mocellin, 1987).
Neurologically, the illusion has much in common with other types of bodily reduplication, such as doppelgänger
phenomena and out-of-body experiences (see Brugger et al., 1997, for an extended discussion).
5 In German, the phenomenon of the unintentional persistence of a melody is called an "Ohrwurm", i.e., an "ear worm". The
study of ear worm melodies in healthy individuals may reveal significant information regarding the mechanisms underlying
schizophrenic "voices". Like so many other neurobehavioral symptoms, also the ear worm has been the subject of
psychodynamic superstitions (e.g., Eckert, 1979) and still awaits scientific investigation.
6 Rather unanimously, Staudenmaier was diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia (e.g., Ahlenstiel, 1949; Bash, 1959; but
see Zusne, 1989). In later editions of his book, Staudenmaier himself admitted similarities between his experiences and
those of psychotic patients. However, he insisted that his mental state was a consequence of his magico-experimental
research which he claimed to have deliberately initiated and whose development he considered the highlight of his life's
work. After Die Magie als experimentelle Naturwissenschaft, Staudenmaier prepared a second book, Das Problem des
Alterns (The Problem of Aging) which only reached the manuscript stage (Ahlenstiel, 1964). Therein he dealt with a
reversal of the processes of aging for which he thought to have found the key. It is most ironic that, while Staudenmaier so
consistently failed to acknowledge ownership for many of his schizophrenic motor productions, he claimed with no less
consistency to have voluntary control over an as yet uncontrollable disease, and finally, over life itself.

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theories developed to account for such a phenomenon, theories which silently assume that these actions are controlled
by outside forces. The past turn of the century has witnessed such an attack on common sense in the spiritualist theories
about tables, pendulums and spelling boards as a means of communicating with the spirit world (Hunt, 1985; but see
especially Chevreul, 1854 and Faraday, 1853 for meticulous experimental studies of the mechanisms involved).
As we approach the next turn of the century, a modern variant of spirit control is being offered to account for a new
form of communication with apparently ego-alien sources. I will proceed to a description of the folly at some length.
Gullibility unbound: the illusion of "Facilitated Communication"
"FC", the abbreviation for "facilitated communication", designates a method purportedly enabling persons
with severe communication disorders to express their feelings and thoughts by typewriting. Originally developed in
Australia (Crossley & McDonald, 1980)7, the method was brought to the United States by sociologist Douglas Biklen
(Biklen, 1990). FC is established incredibly simply: a "facilitator" holds a patient's hand or arm over a computer
keyboard or analogous spelling board (Figure 1) and "communication gets unbound" (Biklen, 1990; 1993), i.e., the
person with the pervasive developmental disorder displays a sudden, transient release of literacy. This release, in the
opinion of the adherents of FC, is brought about by the emotional support resulting from the physical contact between
patient and facilitator. Proponents of FC claim that autism (Fein et al., 1996, for a comprehensive review of the clinical
literature) is not in fact a primary disorder of cognitive skills, but of the ability to program appropriate motor sequences
for the expression of these intact skills ("apraxia"). This deficit in motor expression, it is argued, can be overcome when
proper emotional contact is established by physical contact.
There is one catch with the method of FC: the messages which evolve letter by letter on the computer screen
do not originate from the patient's mind, but from the facilitator's. Facilitators physically guide the patients' hands to the
letters to be typed, albeit without conscious intention and with the vehement denials of doing so. A multitude of
controlled studies have proved this beyond any reasonable doubt (see Table 1 on page 8 ).
Figure 1: An autistic patient haunted by his "facilitator" (blocked eyes). "Facilitated communication" is a
modern variant of automatic writing and constitutes a severe abuse of persons with markedly reduced abilities to defend
themselves.
(Photograph courtesy of Sepp Müller and Jeanette Weilenmann, Zürich)
7 For still earlier developments, see the monograph by Spitz (1997), which also provides a detailed and insightful elaboration of the
ideas presented in this paragraph.

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It is of interest that some of the experimental manipulations used by these studies have successfully been applied, well
over half a century ago, to disprove claims of another type of "facilitated communication". I am referring to probably
the most famous precursor of this technique in the history of science: the performances of Clever Hans. This is the
name of a horse trained by a retired schoolteacher in Berlin, Wilhelm von Osten. At the beginning of this century, von
Osten made headlines in both European and American newspapers by claiming that Clever Hans could read, count and
respond to a variety of yes/no questions. On being asked to provide the result of the calculation "7 times 3", for
instance, Clever Hans would patiently paw 21 times on the ground with one of his hooves. "Yes" and "No" responses
were given by vertical or horizontal head movements, more complex, "open-ended" questions were answered by
pawing a number of times, each number corresponding to a letter of the alphabet. It soon became obvious that while
Clever Hans carried out the motor part of the performance, the content of a response was not determined by the horse.
Rather, it produced its responses in reaction to subtle visual cues given by his trainer or by some person in the audience.
Simple experimental manipulations of the process of apparent communication (Pfungst, 1907) revealed that slight
changes in von Osten's posture were perceived by the horse as a sign to stop pawing or to respond by nodding or
shaking its head. For instance, preventing the horse from watching the person who asked the question abolished his
successful performance. Likewise, a question to which nobody in the audience knew the answer could not be answered,
even in the absence of sensory shielding. Such "communication unbound" in a horse (as well as similar demonstrations
in dogs, pigs, apes and dolphins, for that matter; see e.g., Mountjoy and Lewandowski, 1984; Pinker, 1994 [chapter
eleven]; Sebeok and Rosenthal, 1981; Umiker-Sebeok and Sebeok, 1981) was interpreted by its primary demonstrators
as evidence for the inaccuracy of existing theories of animal cognition8. It is in fact possible that we have remained
insensitive to many cognitive abilities of our animal friends (see, e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998 for a review of the literature
on animal arithmetic capabilities), and we may still miss much of the inner world of persons with autism9. The point is
not to deny that individuals with whom we cannot communicate in standard ways might not have a rich inner life; the
point is that a method like FC is embarrassingly out of place in revealing access to this world (as shown by the
consistent failures to validate the method; cf. Table 1). The adherents of the FC method actively dispute all evidence
that a Clever Hans effect is the basis of their technique. Thus, the FC method does not even merit the label of a
pseudoscience (whose members are "just" unaware of alternative interpretations of a phenomenon); it is a proper
antiscience (Jacobson et al., 1995; Bailey, 1992 in the broader context of antiscience hauntings in the treatment of the
mentally retarded). Dillon et al. (1994) provided direct evidence that, among a group of therapists, those who engaged
in FC displayed a more adverse attitude towards scientific method than those who did not. Apart from the obvious
abuse of the patients themselves, FC therapies involve the evocation of false hopes in their family members. Moreover,
they have provided a platform for unfounded allegations of various kinds, very much reminiscent of the witch
accusations of previous centuries (Spitz, 1997 for a relevant review)10.
8 It is interesting to note that botanists Louisa and Joseph Rhine, shortly before committing themselves to the study of
human magical abilities, investigated the horse "Lady", a US-variant of Clever Hans which, apart from reading and writing,
was also proficient in mind-reading. Both considered the communicative skills and extrasensory abilities of Lady as
genuine, despite their knowledge of the Clever Hans case and without accepting the methodological precautions
recommended by critical observers (see Mackenzie, 1981 for details).
9 Griffin (1992) refers to the "Inverse Clever Hans Error" which designates the toppling over of the application of scientific
caution into an a priori denial that animals may have conscious experiences. See, in this context, the discussion of Type 1
and Type 2 errors in the second part of this chapter.
10 Reflecting the facilitators' preoccupations, the contents of "spontaneously" typed messages often center around ideas
haunting psychotherapy. The myth of "repressed memories" (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994) is an own chapter in the X-files of
psychological research. It has likewise provoked an immense amount of psychodynamic superstitions; cognitive and
neurobehavioral studies have just begun to unravel the potentially underlying mechanisms (e.g., Gazzaniga, 1998; Kramer
et al., 1998; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).

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Nourished by the poltergeist within (the unconscious guidance of another person's hand), FC has thus
developed into a truly large-scale haunting. Propagators of FC behave like little Staudenmaiers; they are playing around
with a pervasive, powerful force the agency of which they deny. Like Staudenmaier, they have, as a community, lost
the sense of the borders between magic and science.
Tab.1: Some experimental variations in the standard FC situation
Experimental variations Main findings: Selected references:
The communication-disabled person and the facili- The typed message contains the answers Bligh & Kupperman, 1993; Hostler, 1996;
tator are asked different questions … to the questions posed to the facilitator. Klewe, 1993; Hudson et al., 1993 ;
and/or: Shane & Kearns, 1994;
… the patient is asked a question of which the facili- Either no typed answer is “received”, Siegel, 1995; Wheeler et al., 1993.
tator remains unaware. or it is not to the point or consists of See Green, 1994; Jacobson et al., 1995,
“random typing”. And Rimland, 1993 for reviews.
A healthy person simulates a person with a communi- The typed messages contain the correct Burgess et al., 1998
cation disorder. Several facilitators, unaware of the responses to the questions.
simulation, are given fake information of the “pati-
ent's" biography. In a subsequent standard FC situ-
ation, the facilitator is asked about biographical
details. Importantly, the simulation person is kept
unaware of the questions.
Linguistic “finger printing” analyses (Fucks, 1954; (1) Typed messages show different charcte- Beck et al., 1992; Ombudsman Victoria,
Morton, 1979) are performed on (1) several facilitators ristics for each facilitator, independent of 1993 (cited in Hudson, 1995);
working with the same patient or (2) on one facilitator the patient facilitated. (2) The facilitator’s Wheeler et al., 1993
working with different patients. “linguistic fingerprints” dominate across
all facilitated patients.
In a “telepathy game”, a facilitator tries to transmit Typed responses correspond to the target Kezuka, 1997
single digits to an autistic person. Physical contact digits. Both video and strain gauge analy-
between patient and facilitator is indirect by means ses demonstrate that the selected keys are
of a plastic rod. Videometric analyses of dyadic choosen by the facilitator, not the patient.
interactions and electronic recordings of the forces
applied to both ends of the rod are carried out.
Facilitators fill in a questionnaire about faith/skepti- A greater belief in FC is positively Perry et al., 1998 (cf. also Dillon et al.,
cism in FC. In a consecutive standard FC setting, the correlated with the degree of facilitator 1994)
degree of facilitator influence is assessed. influence.
After a FC session, facilitators are asked to perform a The number of messages typed during the Burgess et al., 1998
classic Chevreul pendulum task (Chevreul, 1854; FC session is positively correlated with the
Easton & Shor, 1976) assessing individual strength facilitator’s production of unconscious
of ideomotor responding. muscle movements in the pendulum task
(both amplitude and latency parameter).
Student subjects (n>250) are asked to facilitate (“read Subjects’ responses to the questions are Wegner , in press
the unconscious muscle movements” of) a confederate correct in 87% of trials. 37% of the manual
on a binary keyboard (yes/no answers). Without their responses are attributed to the confederate,
knowledge, the confederate does never hear any ques- illustrating the considerable prevalence of
tions and has been explicitly instructed to refrain from “action projection” in the normal, untrained
making relevant movements. A subgroup of subjects population. FC-believers show a poorer self-
is asked about belief in FC; other subjects are adminis- monitoring of finger movements than disbe-
tered a scale on dissociative experiences (Carlson & lievers; dissociative experiences scores
Putnam, 1993). are associated with increased involuntariness
of motor responses.

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From magic to science: automatic behavior as a current research topic
In a way, Clever Hans was really smart. Although his part in the response process was confined to the when
and how of a motor response, he gave a vivid demonstration of animal conditionability. What is even more intriguing
than the horse's performance, however, is the behavior of its "facilitators", in particular his trainer's. Until the end of his
life, von Osten remained convinced that he had not influenced Clever Hans in any of the ways suggested by Pfungst's
experiments and by the numerous other controlled investigations of other Clever animals all over the world (see, in
particular, the literature in Umiker-Sebeok and Sebeok, 1981). Why is it, we have to ask, that an apparently healthy
person so vehemently denied ownership of complex behaviors? How does this denial relate to other types of non-
recognition of ownership so characteristic of many psychotic experiences? These questions are intimately linked to one
central issue in neuropsychiatry: the appreciation of "me-ness". With this term ("moïité"), the French psychiatrist
Claparède (1911/1950) designated a basic function of the human brain, the function of linking one's own experience
and behavior with the self as the subject of an experience or the agent of a behavior11.
One major symptom which must be considered a consequence of a disconnection between behavior and me-
ness is the hearing of voices. Usually considered as pathognomonic for schizophrenia, hallucinations of voices, also
labeled "auditory verbal hallucinations" (AVH), do occur in normal (Barrett and Etheridge, 1992; Posey and Losch,
1983) and slightly para-normal subjects as well (Cutomo, 1989; Lévy-Valensi, 1910; Stokes, 1980). Whether
"abnormal" or "normal", the experience of AVH arises from a breakdown of the monitoring of one's own inner speech
(see the target article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences by Hoffman (1986) and the associated open peer commentaries
for an extended discussion). While early studies used electromyograpic recordings from the lips and larynx of
hallucinating patients to demonstrate subvocal activity of the muscles during AVH (Gould, 1949; Cerny, 1965; Inouye
& Shimizu, 1970), more recent investigations have employed brain imaging techniques (positron emission tomography
and functional magnetic resonance imaging) to study the cortical and subcortical areas activated during the experience
of "voices" (McGuire et al., 1993; David et al., 1996; for review see David & Busatto, 1998). These studies have shown
that the "voices" are generated by distinct cortical networks traditionally associated with language production (and by
homologous areas in the right hemisphere; Cleghorn et al., 1992). They have not, however, directly addressed the
question of me-ness: why is subvocal verbal activity, although initiated by one's own brain, experienced as originating
from outside one's own self and ascribed to alien entities? Two recent elegant studies have shed some light on this
question, both investigating "me-ness" in a context highly relevant for a functional neuroanatomy of the denial of
facilitator control in FC. Daprati et al. (1997) required normal subjects and schizophrenic patients with and without
hallucinations and delusions to execute simple hand movements which were videotaped. Video feedback of either the
own hand or a pseudo-feedback showing somebody else's hand performing similar movements was presented to
subjects in real time. The task was to discriminate whether the hand displayed on the screen belonged to the subject or
not. The schizophrenic patients with positive signs of psychosis (hallucinations and/or delusions) misattributed a
foreign hand as their own in about 80% of the trials, that is, they displayed a breakdown in the appreciation of me-ness.
Daprati et al. (1997) interpreted their findings as a supramodal disturbance in schizophrenic patients with productive
11 Literal use of the term "me-ness" is found in Kihlstrom (1997), who discussed its relationships with consciousness and
emotion. A valuable discussion of the problem of me-ness in the framework of dissociation theories of hypnosis can be
found in Kirsch and Lynn (1998). Other authors, concentrating on single aspects of me-ness, used derivatives of the terms
"self-recognition", "self-awareness" or "self-monitoring". There are considerable bodies of literature for several single
aspects of self-recognition: recognition of one's own face (Bringas Vega, 1996; Kircher et al., 2000; Phillips et al., 1996),
one's own voice (Cahill et al., 1996; Holzman et al., 1966; McGuire et al., 1996), one’s own gait (Beardsworth and

10
symptoms, in distinguishing between intending, observing and imagining an action. They suggested, in part on the basis
of brain imaging studies on action observation in normal subjects (movements of one's own vs. somebody else's hand;
Decety et al., 1994), that premotor and parietal areas of the brain might be primarily involved in producing this type of
deficit. Evidence for abnormal cerebral blood flow in these regions, prominently on the right side of the brain, was
presented by Spence et al. (1997) in a positron emission tomography experiment of voluntary hand movements. One
experimental population was schizophrenic patients who, during scanning, all reported the specific delusion of being
controlled by alien forces. Subjects had to engage in two types of hand movements: "random" (without constraints) and
"fixed" (following a stereotyped movement pattern). In the random movement condition, specifically those patients
who felt under external control (i.e., who lacked me-ness for their motor actions) showed a hyperactivation of parietal
and cingulate cortex, regions which both subserve the functions of executing and monitoring movements in
extrapersonal space. The fact that the abnormal activation patterns were particularly evident in the right hemisphere is
consistent (1) with earlier reports of disturbances of me-ness in seizure patients with specifically right-sided epileptic
foci (e.g., Mesulam, 1981), (2) with the observation that ego-alien intrusions were associated with right but not left
temporal lobe dysfunction (Lavallée & Persinger, 1992), and (3) with the proposition that the right hemisphere is
generally dominant for the appreciation of the "personal relevance" of a wide variety of stimuli (van Lancker, 1991, for
overview)12.
Among other known neuropsychiatric conditions involving a disturbed sense of me-ness, I wish to briefly
mention the "alien hand" syndrome and somatoparaphrenia. In the alien hand syndrome (for overviews see Della Sala
et al., 1991; Gasquoine, 1993a), a patient observes one of his upper limbs performing complex behaviors in an
apparently autonomous way, as if controlled by an alien force. Most of these behaviors are transient acts which, in a
seemingly purposeful manner, interfere with the patient's overt intentions. For instance, the alien hand may snatch
money offered to a store cashier by the other hand for which me-ness is preserved (Baynes et al., 1997) or turn the
steering wheel of a car in a direction opposite to that intended by the normal hand (Smith-Doody and Jankovic, 1992;
Hanakita and Nishi, 1991). Often, the alien hand engages in socially provocative behavior such as masturbating in
public or other obscene acts, much to the embarrassement of the patient (Kischka et al., 1996; Gasquoine, 1993b).
There are cases in which a hostile motivation of the alien hand toward the patient is notable. For instance, one patient's
alien hand pinched her nipples (Smith-Doody and Jankovic, 1992, case 6) while other patients were terrified that their
alien limb might strangle (Ay et al., 1998; Banks et al., 1989, case 1; Goldstein, 1908), drown (Hari et al., 1998) or
otherwise assault and even kill them (Leiguarda et al., 1993)13.
Persons exhibiting the alien hand syndrome have suffered a partial disconnection of anterior parts of the
corpus callosum, the bundle of nerve fibers connecting the two hemispheres, brought about by variable vascular
incidents or space-occupying lesions. In addition, a lesion in the left frontal lobe is commonly observed when "alien-
ness" is ascribed to one's dominant, right hand (Della Sala et al., 1991). Up to now, no functional imaging study exists
which could help to identify those brain areas involved in this highly specific, focal type of a loss of me-ness (see,
Buckner, 1981) and one's own thoughts (Heilbrun, 1980) and actions (Frith and Done, 1989; Wegner and Wheatley, 1999).
See Keenan et al., 2000, for a valuable review.
12 For the view of AVH as a phylogenetic relict of the evolution of language see Julian Jayne's (1976) eccentric but highly
stimulating monograph. Jaynes argued that, during earlier stages of human development, AVH originated from the temporal
lobe of the right hemisphere and were conceptualized by its left hemisphere homologue as the "voices of the gods".
13 In all but one of these cases, it was the patients' left hand behaving in an “anarchic”, or self-destructive manner. One is
tempted to speculate about relationships between this left-sided bias and the observation (Brugger et al., 1996, p. 119) that
one's own doppelgänger has threatening personality characteristics, specifically when it approaches from the left.
"Heautoscopic suicide", the urge to kill oneself in order to escape one's own double, is frequently reported, both in the
belletristic and clinical literature (Brugger et al., 1994a).

11
however, the neuromagnetic assessment of one patient with an alien hand presenting as a supernumerary "ghost" limb;
Hari et al., 1998)14. Although overt brain pathology with no hemisphere bias is involved in the alien hand syndrome,
phenomenologically, automatic writing in healthy individuals can be viewed as the transient evocation of an alien hand
specializing in graphomotor behavior (see Brion & Jedynak, 1972 (case 4); Gil et al., 1995; Joseph, 1986). Most recent
research, following the tradition of the "split-brain"-methodology, supports the view that written and spoken language
can be dissociated from one another (Baynes et al., 1998). This type of experimentation will certainly affect the way
"multiple personality" (more recently: "dissociative identity") disorder is interpreted, and will overall expel much of the
mysticism these phenomena are currently enshrouded in (McHugh, 1995; Simpson, 1995).
Compatible with the view of the right hemisphere as the door for "alien intruders" (Nasrallah, 1985) is a most
peculiar neuropsychological condition, somatoparaphrenia (Gerstmann, 1942). This is the delusional denial of
ownership of one's own paralyzed extremities, seen almost exclusively after damage to the right hemisphere (Bisiach et
al., 1991). Typically, it is associated with a general neglect of stimuli in the left hemispace and with anosognosia, the
denial of illness (of hemiplegia, in these cases)15. Patients with somatoparaphrenic delusions typically think of their
paralyzed limbs as belonging to the examiner, their husbands or wives, or to some other person. Complex unilateral
(left-sided) hallucinations may accompany the delusion, as in the case described by Nightingale (1982). This author's
patient felt the left side of his body to be "evil and controlled by external agents, sometimes the Devil and sometimes
his deceased father in collusion with the Devil" (Nightingale, 1982, p. 464). The alien left side made the patient
perform evil acts such as injuring himself or others. The loss of control over the left half of his own body also "spread"
to events taking place in the left extracorporal hemispace16. Sometimes he hallucinated that a ghostly figure was to his
left, sometimes he only felt the presence of somebody, usually his deceased father, standing nearby (cf. Brugger et al.,
1996).
A particularly interesting aspect of somatoparaphrenia (as well as of the associated deficits mentioned)
concerns its modifiability. Unilateral stimulation of the vestibular system (responsible for equilibrium and, more
generally, the "sense of space") can temporarily alleviate patients' delusional ideas (Bisiach et al., 1991; Rode et al.,
1992). Specifically, stimulation of a patient's left inner ear with ice-water (which brings about systematic distortions in
the perception and representation of space) does not only improve orientation towards the left side of one's body (i.e.,
the neglect symptoms) but also insight into one's own state of health. This is a revolutionary finding insofar as cognitive
14 We should be wary, however, of attempts to localize "me-ness" to one specific area of the brain. Monsell (1996)
discusses what can be considered the case of an "alien limb" in the starfish. If a section is performed in the neural ring
coordinating the activity of all five arms, the arm next to the section will move independently of the other arms and display,
at least for the observer, a remarkably "alien" behavior. Monsell's point is that, in the intact starfish, no single part of the
neural ring is directly responsible for the unity in behavior, but that "co-ordination is an emergent property of the interaction
among the segments" (Monsell, 1996, p. 101).
15 If much of this sounds like Greek, this is only because these terms have their origin in a time when both German and
French neuropsychiatry had their highlights, and Greek rather than English was the language common to scientists.
"Exosomaesthesia" is another term mentioned in connection with disorders of the type discussed here. It refers to the
displacement of bodily sensations into extrapersonal space (Shapiro et al., 1952). I am referring to the phenomenon because
of its relevance for a neurological interpretation of out-of-body experiences, a highly interesting type of human experience,
which, unfortunately, is discussed in the parapsychology literature without reference to underlying brain processes.
16 An elegant experimental demonstration of the extension of claimed disownership for left-sided body parts to familiar
objects associated with the left hand (e.g., rings, wrist-watch) can be found in Aglioti et al. (1996).

12
functions as complex as the appreciation of me-ness can obviously be dependent on a biologically highly relevant,
although by cognitive scientists still much neglected, sense: the sense of space17.
The experimental studies and clinical findings discussed above leave no doubt that a disturbed sense of me-
ness is at the heart of claims about alleged alien forces seemingly controlling one's own behavior. This does not imply
that all persons denying agency over table-turning, pendulum and diving rod movements, or movements leading to
illusory forms of communication, would necessarily suffer from the same brain lesions as do persons with a psychotic
disorder. It suggests, however, that the experience of me-ness is dependent on a proper coordination between higher-
order brain functions. Different dysfunctions within these neuronal circuits may result in widely varying degrees of a
disturbed experience of oneself as a unitary and familiar person. Rather than being an all-or-none function, the
appreciation of me-ness is aligned along a continuum, and it is apparent that even healthy individuals show
considerable variation along this continuum. Under extraordinary social and motivational circumstances, breakdowns in
central nervous system functioning can simply happen (cf. Persinger, 1987, in the context of religious ideas). These
breakdowns are the true hauntings. Contrary to Beard's (1879, p. 67) contention that the spirits "only dwell in the
cerebral cells", however, we may also find their manifestations afflicting whole subcultures and attacking rational
thought.
So far we have dealt with the misattribution of the agency for one's own behavioral processes. In the second
part of this chapter, I will examine another type of misattribution, the attribution of "meaningfulness" to chance and
randomness.
Borderlands of Creativity: August Strindberg's Occult Diary and the Dark Side of the Brain
In 1912, the publication year of Ludwig Staudenmaier's Magic as an Experimental Natural Science, the
inhabitants of Stockholm witnessed one of the largest funerals Sweden had ever seen. On May 15, tens of thousands of
people gave the writer and playwrite August Strindberg the last honor (McGill, 1930). After 63 years and well over 55
volumes of collected writings, Strindberg was assured a lasting place in the history of modern drama. Part of his
success may have been attributable to his excentric ideas and the courage with which he defended them; Strindberg was
twice legally prosecuted, once in his home country for blasphemy and once in Germany for immorality (on both
occasions he was finally acquitted). At the age of 45, August Strindberg experienced the first in a series of psychotic
episodes. Strindberg's accounts of these episodes in the works Inferno and From an Occult Diary (Strindberg,
1897/1979), are an impressive testimony to the association between genius and madness (Galton, 1892; Karlsson,
1970). In the words of Burnham (1973a; p.230), these autobiographic works "remind one of the wisdom embodied in
the dual meaning of the Chinese character for crisis -- disaster and opportunity." The disastrous aspects of Strindberg's
psychotic crisis18 involved painsteaking delusions of persecution, encompassing the fear of being tortured, paralyzed or
17 We have suggested to label “otoneuropsychiatry” the subfield of cognitive neuropsychiatry devoted to the study of the
connections between the sense of self, reality testing and vestibular (dys)functions (Brugger, 1999). There are indications,
however, that the vestibular system may also play a modifying role in delusions other than those referring to one's own
body and self (see Jones and Pivik, 1983 for overview). It is thus tempting to speculate whether a few drops of ice-water
would not be an efficient means of exorcizing some of the poltergeists alluded to in this chapter...
18 Most European and American psychiatrists diagnosed Strindberg with schizophrenia (e.g., Burnham, 1973a,b; Jaspers,
1922/1949; Lidz, 1964/65) although some authors also considered a bipolar disorder or toxic influences (Anderson, 1971).
Some Scandinavian authors were strongly offended by these diagnoses, without, however, providing a better one (e.g.,
Hedenberg, 1959). From a symptom-oriented point of view (Persons, 1986), it is irrelevant whether Strindberg actually
suffered from schizophrenia or from some other form of psychotic illness.

13
killed by electric currents, and a sometimes barely controllable urge to commit suicide. Those aspects of Strindberg's
psychosis which certainly offered an "opportunity" to his writings are best captured in what is considered a key
symptom of florid psychotic experience, i.e., a hightened awareness of the "meaningfulness" and personal relevance of
any event together with the absolute conviction that no two things in the world are devoid of meaningful connections.
Conrad (1958) coined the term "apophenia" for this manner of seeing and interpreting the world. He defined apophenia
as the "unmotivated seeing of connections" accompanied by a "specific experience of an abnormal meaningfulness" (p.
46). Table 2 (see pages 16-17) presents selected descriptions of apophenic reactions from Strindberg's Inferno and
From an Occult Diary (Strindberg, 1897/1979). The instances listed in Table 2 were elicited by visual stimuli of either
highly ambiguous character (such as the formation of clouds, the patterns observed in rocks and pieces of wood, or the
folds in a pillow) or whose spatial arrangement invites inferences of non-random origins (e.g., fallen twigs seem to
form a symbolic shape, the arrangement of furniture is felt to carry a message). Apart from these visuo-spatial triggers
of apophenia, Strindberg also described a vast number of temporal coincidences, of which Table 2 contains only one
characteristic instance, i.e. the reading of the word "thunder" in a Bible verse coinciding with a clap of thunder during a
storm. Coincidences of this sort are in fact the most powerful driving forces not only for psychotic reactions, but also
for the experience of profound creativeness. This is best expressed in the words of a schizophrenic nurse who, in
retrospect, described the essence of her first psychotic episode:
"Every single thing 'means' something. This kind of symbolic thinking is exhaustive... I have a sense that
everything is more vivid and important; the incoming stimuli are almost more than I can bear. There is a
connection to everything that happens - - no coincidences. I feel tremendously creative" (Brundage, 1983, p.
584).
The propensity to see connections between seemingly unrelated objects or ideas most closely links psychosis to
creativity. Indeed, with respect to the detection of subjectively meaningful patterns, apophenia and creativity may even
be conceived of as two sides of the same coin. One must keep in mind, however, that the term "detection" as used here
does not refer to a process of mere identification, to finding the solution to a perceptual puzzle. Rather, the assumption
of "meaningfulness" in randomness always involves a subjective interpretation of spatial or temporal configurations.
The creative arts acknowledge and take advantage of this purely subjective aspect of perceiving. They have always
been inspired by chance and randomness to create works of art (Holoczek and von Mengden, 1992; Janson, 1968)
whose meaningfulness is, however, left to the interpretation of its viewers (Fig. 2, p.15)19.
The examples of Strindberg's apophenia (Table 2; pp. 15-16) neatly illustrate these borderlands of creativity:
his paradoxical attitude toward chance and randomness suggests a partial insight into the delusional character of his
ideas of reference. Up to a certain point, Strindberg is willing to ascribe the random placement of furniture in a hotel
room to mere chance (cf. Table 2), but at the same time he seems unable to grasp the meaning of "chance". One day,
once again struck by coincidence, he wondered: "... of course it was just a coincidence. But by whom had it been
prepared and for what purpose?" (p. 186). Glatzel (1981) designated this mixture of sensitivity to and misconception of
19 To stimulate a creative style of expression, Leonardo da Vinci recommended to his disciples to "look at walls covered
with many stains or made of stones of different colors, with the idea of imagining some scene" (da Vinci, 1519). Like
Strindberg, also Albrecht Dürer recognized the "physiognomic potential" of crumpled pillows. In a pen drawing entitled
"Pillows", he portrayed six of them, each containing a hidden face (Janson, 1968, p. 345). In his intriguing work The
Beginings of Art in the Rainforest, Koch-Grünberg (1905) studied Brasilian aboriginals' drawings of star patterns in the
night sky. He found that people attend to the same salient constellations as do "civilized" subjects (although the verbal
labels differ; cf. also Tyson, 1996), a notable indication of the biological bases of "Gestalt" laws.

14
random events as a "denial of chance", a trait which he considered to be at the heart of paranoid thinking. However, a
similary compulsive denial of chance is also apparent in the process of scientific inquiry. In contrast to artistic
creativity, scientific creativity requires not only the ability to detect patterns, but also the interpretation of their
underlying causes.
Figure 2: Seeing connections in art: Art invites interpretation rather than providing it.
(Untitled photograph by Georges Joniaux, around 1960)

15 15

16 16

17
As a natural consequence, the history of science is replete with "theories" that emerged from an overly careful
inspection of "patterns" in actual randomness. Incorrectly assuming the presence of a pattern where, in fact, none exists,
is labeled in the language of statistics a "Type 1 error". In contrast, a "Type 2 error" refers to the incorrect conclusion
that the data reflect "noise" when a pattern is actually present. Figure 3 attempts to metaphorically illustrate these
complementary error types and suggests that they may represent drastically different ways of seeing the world20.
Figure 3: Order and chaos are to a large extent in the eye of the beholder. In interpreting the world, somebody
inclined to overlook a real pattern against a background of randomness (a "Type 2 error" in the language of statistics)
tends to behave like a person reading the four words from top to bottom, capturing "order" only in the fourth line. On
the other hand, a bias toward erroneously perceiving patterns in actual randomness (a "Type 1 error") corresponds here
to reading the words from bottom to top, only arriving at "chaos" in the fourth line.
(Adapted from Haken and Haken-Krell (1992) with kind permission by the authors)
20 Haken & Haken-Krell (1992), from whose work this Figure was adapted, discussed the four lines in the context of perceptual
hysteresis, i.e., the persistence of the original picture when scanning a series of ambiguous pictures gradually changing from one
disambiguated meaning to the other. Apart from the metaphor illustrated in Fig. 3, we would predict that persons with Type 1 error
behavior exhibit a more pronounced hysteresis than persons with Type 2 error behavior (cf. Brugger and Graves, 1997a).

18
Well-known examples of Type 1 errors include claims about canals (Webb, 1957, for review) or other apparently
nonrandom "constructions" on the surface of Mars (Gardner, 1988)21 and the "homunculi" seen in the protoplasmatic
perturbations of human sperm and fertilized egg cells (which gave raise to the once popular theory of preformation
according to which the entire adult organism is contained in miniaturized form in the gametes; Scharf, 1990). On both
ends of the magnitude scale, the macroscopic and the microscopic, science is continuously confronted with theoretical
interpretations of the creative works of chance. The fluffy, house-sized snowballs pelting Earth 30'000 times a day
(Frank et al., 1986) lately turned out to be "television snow" on satellite images (Parks et al., 1997). One of the most
recently suggested meaningful pattern under the magnifying lense was the fossil bacteria and "worms" purportedly
found on a meteorite from Mars (McKay et al., 1996). Some researchers suspect that these "microfossils" are in fact
random arrangements in the surface structure of the mineral (Kerr, 1997; see the appealing NASA images on the World
Wide Web at http://rsd.gsfc.nasa.gov/marslife).22 The issue is still controversial but will probably be settled within the
next few years. It is important to note that until we know more about the alleged bugs from space (e.g., whether their
composition diverges from that of the rest of the meteorite), it will be impossible to determine whether their discovery
was an instance of creative pattern recognition or a Type 1 error, the apophenic interpretation of visual randomness.
This is true for most claims of patterning, especially with reference to alleged connections between objects or events.
Only in retrospect, once the original claim has been sucessfully substantiated or refuted, will a distinction between
"scientific creativity" and "scientific apophenia" be possible. Occasionally, it may take centuries for such a distinction
to be made. The left-hand panel of Figure 4 provides a relevant illustration.
Is the apparent similarity of the two curves in the left panel of Figure 4 due to chance or is there an underlying
mechanism? In fact, this question evoked a considerable controversy among scientists which lasted for well over 300
years. If this book is rotated 90 degrees clockwise, the outline of the western coast of Africa is easily recognizable in
the top curve (roughly between the western border of ivory coast and Windhuk). The bottom curve represents the
eastern coast of South America between the mouth of the Amazon and Montevideo. The space between the two curves
can be imagined as being filled with the Atlantic Ocean. Despite the compelling similarity of the two coast lines, most
geologists refused the proposition put forward by Abraham Ortelius as early as 1596 (Romm, 1994) that the two
continents were originally attached to one another. By rejecting this proposal and ascribing the similarity of the two
coast lines to mere chance, these scientists committed a classical Type 2 error. This error was not corrected until
converging experimental evidence for the mechanisms underlying continental drift was established (Wegener, 1915;
Oreskes, 1999; want to watch the continents move? www.scotese.com provides a lively animation).
21 A second look at the famous "Face on Mars" (some twenty years after the first) reveals a disappointing picture,
remarkably devoid of any facial features (Morrison, 1998).
22 For some of the more bizarre cases of microscope-induced apophenia, the interested reader may consult chapter ten in
Gardner (1957). In a neuroscience context, it has recently been pointed out that Penfield's original drawings of the
"homunculi" in the brain's sensorimotor cortex (Penfield and Bouldry, 1937) may contain more fantastic elements than
previously acknowledged (Schott, 1993).

19
Figure 4: Seeing connections in science and pseudoscience: Apart from seeing connections, scientific reasoning
demands the illumination of the underlying mechanisms. In some instances of suggested nonchance similarity, the
proposed causal mechanisms have withstood repeated testing such as they now are accepted as scientific facts (e.g.,
left panel; axes in hundreds of km; adapted from Brugger, 1992). If hypotheses about the nature of purported
nonchance similarities are not readily testable, fantasies about their "origin" will continue to haunt the pseudoscientific
mind -- however uncreative it may be to see a connection (right panel; axes in cm). See text for explanation.
Another example of claims of causal mechanisms linking two spurious observations is schematically presented
in the right panel of Figure 4. Again, the question reads: is the obviously apparent similarity between the two lines due
to chance? Probably it is, but the question has remained open until today. I am afraid that a definite answer will never
be possible because the proposed causality is not testable. The top line represents a typical fissure between two
adjacent slabs of pavement, the bottom line a typical female genital organ (slightly simplified outside-view). In 1929,
the acknowledged psychoanalyst Paul Federn devoted 9 pages (in the prestigious "International Journal of
Psychoanalysis") to what he termed the "street-pavement obsession", i.e. the more or less compulsive urge to avoid
stepping on the cracks of paved sidewalks (Federn, 1929). He seriously proposed that "every fissure stands
symbolically for the vagina" (p. 133), and this common obsession originated from the subconscious insight that "one
must not touch the female symbol with the foot, which is so commonly a male symbol" (p. 133). Similar apophenic
associations of Type 1 are abundant in psychoanalysis, beginning with numerological essays by Freud (1941/1973; see
also Prince and Reiss, 1990) and Adler (1905) and not ending with the notorious denial of chance in the "analyses" of
everyday coincidences (especially Jung, 1952; Silberer, 1921, for an early collection). The psychiatrist Prince's
intriguing paper, co-authored by one of his schizophrenic patients (Prince and Rice, 1990) presents particularly
revealing examples of the phenomenological equivalence of apophenic reactions on both sides of the couch.
The purpose of the above illustrations is not to deny that the "free" associations found in the psychoanalytic
literature at times have a highly entertaining character, but to indicate that they reflect everything but scientific

20
reasoning23. The best service one can presumably offer psychoanalysis is to regard it as a purely literary endeavor
(Cohn, 1992; Macmillan, 1992; see also Götz, 1932, for an early appreciation). This would free it from the obligation
to validate its various claims and, at the same time, it would free the psychological sciences from one major ghost by
which it has long enough been haunted. As Pletcher (1982) poignantly formulated: "An important part of our
understanding of the world lies in knowing what not to try to explain" (p.176, italics in the original). As puzzling as it
may read, a proper understanding of the world sometimes requires the successful inhibition of associations.
Creative, paranormal and apophenic thought: a disinhibition of semantic processing
What motivated August Strindberg to assume that it was not coincidence when he, during a visit in Paris,
heard the bells from Sacré-Coeur ringing immediateld after having picked up a heart-shaped pebble from the ground
(Strindberg, 1897/1979, p. 160)? Why does a person with schizophrenia, when confronted with an ashtray, complain:
"My trouble is that I have too many thoughts. You might think about something, let's say that ashtray and just
think 'Oh! yes, that's for putting my cigarettes in', but I would think of it and then I would think of a dozen
different things connected with it at the same time" (MacGhie and Chapman, 1961; p. 108).
Why do some normal people so vehemently reject an explanation of chance when confronted with a "meaningful"
coincidence which, for other normal people, is clearly a mere coincidence? The answer to all three questions is: a
disinhibition of associative processes. Investigations of the nature of this disinhibition have a long tradition within the
field of neuropsychiatry and are currently enjoying revived attention. As early as 1911, Bleuler (1911/1950) identified
peculiarities of associative thought as the key feature of schizophrenic language. Since then, attributes like "loose",
"distant", "remote", "indirect" and "oblique" have been used to characterize the associations produced by patients with
acute schizophrenia. Their associative thinking has been investigated with word association tasks (Galton, 1879/1880;
Kent and Rosanoff, 1910; Spitzer, 1992 for overview) and, more recently, semantic priming tasks (Meyer and
Schwaneveldt, 1971; Manschreck et al., 1988)24. The general findings from word association tasks indicated that
people with "positive" symptoms of schizophrenia (hallucinations, delusions, and thought disorder) responded to
stimulus words with more "uncommon" associations (i.e., with semantically more unrelated words) than the responses
provided by control persons without signs of acute psychosis (but see Schwartz, 1982, for a harsh and, on the whole,
unfounded critique). Variations of the semantic priming paradigm have further helped to explicate the neuronal
mechanisms underlying this basic disorder of associative processing. In essence, visuo-verbal priming tasks require a
subject to respond as quickly as possible to the second of two words flashed in close temporal succession. What is
observed is a "semantic priming effect", i.e., faster responses when the two words are semantically related than when
they are not. For instance, latencies to the target word SPOON are shorter when it is preceded by the prime word
FORK than on control trials when it is preceded, for example, by the word BOOK. Priming effects are interpreted as
reflecting the spread of activation within semantic networks from one concept to a related concept (Collins and Loftus,
1975).
23 Translating the question of the validity of a claimed psychodynamic mechanism into an experimental design will also not
turn psychoanalysis into science; "positive" results will still be open for alternative, more plausible interpretations. Johnson
(1966) found that significantly more women than men did not return their pencils after an examination for which testees had
received special pencils. He interpreted this finding as evidence that "the concept of penis envy is valid" (p. 758). See
Skinner (1997) for a failed replication.
24 For alternative techniques see Armstrong and McConaghy (1977), Gianotti et al., (submitted), Lovibond (1954) and
Rattan and Chapman (1973).

21
Maher and coworkers (Maher et al., 1987; Manschreck et al., 1988) first demonstrated that semantic priming effects are
larger in schizophrenic patients than in normal controls, thus confirming, at the millisecond level, the hypothesis of the
patients' increased responsiveness to associative relations. A very elegant modification of the semantic priming
paradigm was introduced, less than 15 years ago, by Balota and Lorch (1986). These authors described, in healthy
subjects, what they called a "mediated" semantic priming effect. "Mediated" or "indirect" semantic priming occurs
between pairs of words which are related by a common association, e.g. the words LION and STRIPES are both
associates to the mediating word "tiger" (or "zebra"). The observation that LION significantly primes STRIPES is
interpreted as a consequence of a spread of activation spanning more semantic concepts than in direct semantic
priming25 (see the BOX, above).
The roles of the two hemispheres of the brain in the processing of semantic associations can be investigated in
lateralized semantic priming paradigms. One or both words of a pair are presented to the left or the right visual field
(projecting to the contralateral hemisphere). As a general rule, the left hemisphere tends to keep the spread of semantic
25 Mediated semantic priming effects are smaller than those between directly related words. Nevertheless, some studies
found small but measurable mediated priming even between words related by two mediating concepts (e.g., MANE (-> lion
-> tiger) -> STRIPES; McNamara, 1992), testifying to the intriguingly sensitive nature of a simple behavioral task. The
specificity of the paradigm for semantic (as opposed to phonological) associations is acknowledged; LIGHT does not prime
DAMP (McNamara and Gray, 1990; cf. also Dell and O'Seaghdha, 1991). For the role of the time interval between prime
and target words, especially with respect to neuropsychiatric applications of priming tasks, see the review by Spitzer (1997).

22
activation within a narrow range while the right hemisphere pursues an opposite but complementary strategy of
defocusing semantic activation. Unfocused, coarse semantic processing may give rise to new, uncommon and creative
ideas. A focusing mechanism is needed, however, to protect associations from spreading "too far" and to allow
integration of new concepts into established knowledge.
A number of studies have taken advantage of the mediated semantic priming paradigm to test whether
psychotic thought is accompanied by a disinhibition of semantic activation (as would be expected from the high
prevalence of "loose" and indirect associations in acute schizophrenics' word association responses). Spitzer (1993)
first demonstrated that this was indeed the case; in fact, compared to direct associations, mediated associations appear
to be disproportionately facilitated in patients with disturbed thought (Spitzer et al.,1993; Weisbrod et al., 1998).
Viewed in the light of these experimental studies, it no longer seems puzzling when Strindberg, on seeing a
horn and a besom in the unstructured surface of a rock (Table 2), immediately integrated these two stimuli into the
single percept of "insignia of witches". A similar propensity to overappreciate semantic similarity may also be
responsible for the attribution of meaningfulness to coincidences in healthy people. Over the past decade, we have
investigated associative-semantic processing as a function of belief in the paranormal with a broad variety of
experimental paradigms. The observation that, in random number generation tasks, believers in extrasensory
phenomena suppress repetitions of the same digit on consecutive trials more than disbelievers (Brugger et al., 1990)
can be interpreted as a "chance-baseline shift" (Blackmore and Troscianko, 1985) for the occurrence of coincidental
events (i.e., the underestimation of the frequency of repetitions in a random series; note that identity between two
elements is just an extreme case of semantic similarity!). In a study of the reactions to "artificial coincidences", a robust
effect of paranormal belief was noted; we presented subjects with a series of randomly paired line drawings (each
extracted in front of the subjects from a separate deck of thoroughly shuffled cards) and asked them to rate the
associative similarity of each pair. Observed ratings positively correlated with self-expressed belief in extrasensory
perception (Brugger et al., 1994b). In an experiment of similar design but with randomly paired words as stimuli,
subjects were later asked to fill in the "Magical Ideation" scale (Eckblad and Chapman, 1983) which assesses various
beliefs in invalid forms of causation. Magical ideation significantly correlated with the semantic similarity ascribed to
the two words (Brugger and Graves, 1998). Belief in the paranormal also seems to be associated with enhanced
mediated semantic priming, especially if the target words are exposed to the subject's left visual field (projecting
primarily to the right hemisphere; Pizzagalli et al., in press). We are currently pursuing the question of the
electrophysiological nature of believers' higher sensitivity to associative relatedness; some EEG measures seem
particularly promising for this purpose26.
Irrespective of whether we judge two events as closely or as distantly related, this judgment will certainly
influence the "meaningfulness" we will ascribe to their co-occurrence. For example, consider a person's dream about
winning a red car in a competition. Assume that this person's green bicycle was stolen the following day. Personally, I
know more than a handful of people who would swear that this coincidence, if it happened to them, was due to
"something more than chance"; they would consider the association between "red" and "green", "car" and "bicycle" and
"winning" and "losing" as too meaningful to be the consequence of a chance occurrence. Such persons have typically
experienced a great number of "meaningful" coincidences in their lives and will tend to attribute them to underlying
26 In particular, we expect that event-related potentials to repetitive and consecutively presented semantically similar stimuli
(Duncan-Johnson and Donchin, 1977; Kutas and Hillyard, 1984; Spitzer et al., 1997) may differentiate between those
persons who do and those who do not believe in a paranormal causation of coincidences. By using EEG indices for the
study of paranormal beliefs, we are following a long but somewhat forgotten tradition (cf. Franke and Koopman, 1938).

23
paranormal causes. On the other hand, I also know about as many people who would not even notice any associative
links between the dream and the event by which it was followed! These latter persons are typically not inclined to
develop paranormal beliefs. They also tend to be, unfortunately, utterly "uncreative" in other respects.
Creativity and "remote" associations: the role of the right hemisphere
The results of early "split-brain" experiments suggested a functional specialization of the left hemisphere for
language processing and, at the same time, an almost complete lack of linguistic competence of the right hemisphere
(Gazzaniga, 1998). As a consequence, and because of the prominent role ascribed to language in our society, many
scientists referred to the right hemisphere as the "mute", "minor", "non-dominant" or "dark" side of the brain. However,
most split-brain studies have assessed "linguistic competence" by ways of naming or lexical decision tasks27. For
instance, when a split-brain patient, whose corpus callosum was dissected for the treatment of pharmacoresistant
epilepsy, is shown the name of an object in the left visual field / right hemisphere, he or she is typically unable to read
it. However, the patient is able to point with her left hand (controlled by the right hemisphere) to the correct object
when it is presented along with several alternatives. Much less well-known than this demonstration of the absence of
right hemisphere capacity to name objects are experiments demonstrating that the right hemispheres of split-brain
patients are able to form associations between different objects. Sugishita (1978) showed that a callosotomized patient
was still able to point, with his left hand, to objects associatively related to an object whose name was briefly flashed to
the left visual field, thus proving evidence for a basically intact semantic network within the "mute" right hemisphere
(cf. also Zaidel, 1982). Using lateralized semantic priming tasks, later experiments with healthy subjects not only
confirmed the ability of the right hemisphere to establish associations (Chiarello et al., 1990; Beeman et al., 1994), but
revealed an intriguing pattern of interhemispheric competition whose broad implications for neuropsychiatry are just
about to be recognized. Whereas "close", prototypical associations are preferentially processed by the left hemisphere,
there is a superiority of the right hemisphere in the appreciation of specifically "remote", or less prototypical
associations. In other words, while the left hemisphere is specialized for a focused semantic analysis, semantic
activation in the right hemisphere is more diffuse or "coarse" (Chiarello, 1995; Rodel et al., 1992; Kiefer et al., 1998,
for electrophysiological data). In considering this complementary hemispheric specialization at the level of associative-
semantic processing, a number of parallels to the emergence of both creative and paranormal thought become obvious
(see Leonhard and Brugger, 1998, for a comprehensive overview): (1) A creative style of thinking is accompanied by
an above-average participation of the right hemisphere in language-related tasks (Harnad, 1972). Also, the right
hemisphere seems to outperform its left counterpart in creating patterns out of random configurations (Brugger et al.,
1993a; Brugger and Regard, 1995). (2) Belief in a paranormal causation of coincidence is associated with a similar
shift toward right hemisphere processing (Pizzagalli et al., 2000, for the electrophysiological evidence); in particular,
believers in extrasensory perception and related magical phenomena evidenced a better left visual field / right
hemisphere lexical decision accuracy than disbelievers (Brugger et al., 1993b; Leonhard and Brugger, 1998).
Furthermore, the degree of right hemisphere participation in a spatial exploration task was found to correlate with
healthy men's scores on Eckblad and Chapman's (1983) "Magical Ideation" scale (Brugger and Graves, 1997b; cf. also
Luh and Gooding, 1999; Mohr et al., in press).
27 In a standard lexical decision paradigm, words and pseudowords (e.g. NOSL) are randomly flashed on a screen, and
subjects are required to respond as quickly as possible if they recognize a real word. In a lateralized lexical decision task,
the letter strings are presented to either the left or right visual half-field, projecting primarily to the right or left hemisphere,
respectively.

24
(3) Taken together, the role of the right hemisphere in establishing both creative and paranormal associations may
eventually resolve a long-standing puzzle in neuropsychiatry, that is, the question of how it is possible that genes
predisposing to schizophrenia continue to survive despite the obvious disadvantages of this devastating disease (e.g.,
Crow, 1997). Although a common genetic basis for a continuum of creative to paranormal and finally to psychotic
styles of thinking has repeatedly been postulated (e.g., Crow, 1995; Dykes and McGhie, 1976; Schuldberg et al., 1988),
no cognitive mechanisms reflecting this continuum have been identified. Overreliance on a coarse as opposed to a
focused semantic analysis seems to be a prime canditate for such a mechanism (see Nestor et al., 1997, for direct
physiological evidence). In this context, it is essential to recall a highly reliable finding from cognitive neuropsychiatry,
i.e., the observation that periods of acute psychosis are associated with an absence of a clear pattern of hemispheric
dominance for language (Crow, 1997, for review). An enhanced right hemisphere participation in linguistic processing
could provide individuals predisposed to develop schizophrenia with the obvious selective advantage of being able to
associate across stereotyped borders28. From an evolutionary perspective, it is not surprising that we must pay the price
for this ability; the price for a protection against committing Type 2 errors is a susceptibility to commit Type 1 errors29.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have attempted to substantiate George Beard's (1879) contention that, rather than our houses,
it is our brains which are haunted. Strictly speaking, I have addressed only one part of the contention; I have provided
the reader with evidence from cognitive neuroscience that brains are generally susceptible to being haunted, and that
some brains are in fact the site of continuous hauntings. What I have not addressed is the question of whether, in
addition to our brains, our houses could also be haunted. In other words, did the rapping noises Staudenmaier heard in
the walls of his house really emerge from these walls, were the blankets physically removed from his bed, did apples
and buns fly through the air in any literal sense? I am fully aware that I risk committing a Type 2 error when I firmly
respond: No!30 The argument that the high consistency of individual reports of hauntings testifies to the reality of
"outside forces" is obviously misleading. This consistency in fact only confirms something rather trivial, i.e., that the
central nervous system of all human beings exhibits some common functional properties31. The accounts that more than
one person witnessed a poltergeist phenomenon (see, e.g., Staudenmaier, 1912, pp. 26-27) likewise does not buttress
the "objectivity" of a spooky percept. Shared delusions are commonplace in the records of psychiatry (Hofbauer, 1848;
Dippel et al., 1991; Lévy-Valensi, 1910, with particular reference to spiritistic ideas), and the mechanism of a
"perceptual contagion" is reportedly quite powerful, even in places which are "thoroughly unhaunted" (Houran and
28 Apart from hemispheric differences, individual differences in limbic responsiveness may be crucial for the formation and
maintenance of creative, paranormal and delusional beliefs. A discussion of the role of the medial temporal lobes, and
especially of the hippocampal formation, in establishing “superstitious” associations is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Interested readers are referred to the overview in Brugger et al., 1994. Moreover, Shaner (1999) presents a discussion of
related neuropharmacological issues and Joseph (1996), Persinger (1987) and Saver and Rabin (1997) deal with the
associations between temporal lobe functions and religious thought.
29 In the language of signal-detection theory (Tanner and Swets, 1954) this deal reads: for any given response criterion, the
number of correct detections can only be increased at the expense of a corresponding increase in the number of false alarms.
30 I am also fully aware that, in many instances, objective events in the outside world are secondarily misinterpreted as
poltergeist phenomena (e.g., Houran and Lange, 1998, for a review, and Martin, 1915, Houran, 1997, and Houran and
Williams, 1998 for some psychological factors involved). The range of potentially deceptive stimuli is broad, including, on
the hilarious side, the calls of mating lice (Eastham, 1988) and, on the harmful side, fungi in hay bales of a Halloween
haunted house (Dooley et al., 1997). The identification of the physical source of haunting experiences is sometimes the
mere product of sheer luck, as reported in the case of a standing air wave produced by a fan (Tandy and Lawrence, 1998).
31 The fact that people universally see a red spot on a white wall after having stared at a green patch does not involve changes on the
surface of the wall. Likewise, the observation that people identify the ambiguous figure of a duck/rabbit more frequently as a rabbit
on Easter than in October (Brugger and Brugger, 1993) only corroborates the existence of an "Easter-Bunny within"!

25
Lange, 1996)32. The importance of understanding this mechanism increases if one considers the craze of the popular
media for any "anomalous" happening (Sparks, 1998; Vokey and Read, 1985; cf. Mazzoni et al., in press). Hofstadter
(1998) recently complained that the decline of rational thought (and the parallel growth of the "magical realism"
movement) during the past thirty years was mainly caused by movies and TV coverage of the mysterious and
supernatural. Although he may be right, I think he was too pessimistic in concluding that "All I can do is look on in
sadness and worry about the future of rational inquiry..." (p. 513). The history of science is marked by alternating
periods of increasing rationality and irrationality, with the popular media enhancing these contrasts and commonly
unilaterally favoring the irrational peaks. However, today's influence of TV was yesterday's impact of ghost stories.
Reports of hauntings have always reflected elements found in contemporary fiction and vice versa (Sullivan, 1978)33. In
this spirit, the celebrated American astronomer Simon Newcomb (who, in the mid-1880s, became the first president of
the American Society for Psychical Research) commented on contemporary British poltergeist research: "The report of
the Committee on Haunted Houses, however, can hardly be regarded by lookers-on as any thing better than very
scientific children's ghost stories" (Newcomb, 1884, p. 373).
I am as convinced that science will always remain haunted during its everlasting struggle to illuminate the
occult as I am convinced that there will always be individuals who themselves feel haunted. But I am equally certain
that there will always be scientists willing to acknowledge that "when we are confronted by some extremely rare mental
phenomena, exhibited by a select few individuals, their implications for brain research are perhaps more important than
the phenomena in themselves" (Julesz, 1979, p. 609). Although cognitive neuroscience may not be competent to
exorcize ghosts, it may nevertheless provide prescriptions that restrain their activities. One potential remedy is - -
humor. Ramachandran (1996; 1998; see also Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1998) pointed to a hitherto neglected
functional asymmetry of the two hemispheres of the human brain. It involves a specialization of the left hemisphere for
the suppression of anomalies and the preservation of the status quo and a complementary function of the right
hemisphere as an "anomaly detector" whose main task is to shift a currently accepted paradigm. Ramachandran
suggested that humor emerges after a paradigm shift whose implications are recognized as trivial. The situation he
describes to illustrate his point is akin to the case of a beginning haunting:
"Imagine that you are in a dimly lit room late at night and hear some annoying sounds. Ordinarily you interpret
this to be the wind or something equally innocuous. If it gets a little louder you continue to ignore it, following
the left hemisphere's strategy of ignoring evidence contrary to its pre-existing model. But now the sound gets
really loud and your right hemisphere forces a paradigm shift; you decide it must be a burglar and orient to the
presumed anomaly. Your limbic system is activated so that you are both aroused and angry -- preparing to fight
or flee. But then you discover that it is, in fact, your neighbor's cat and so you laugh and harmlessly displace the
emotion that has been built up." (Ramachandran, 1996; p. 360)
32 The study of shared delusions is instructive to the understanding of the emergence of pseudosciences from individual
instances of magical ideation. From a social-psychological perspective, however, the task is not an easy one; in the words of
Halligan and Marshall (1996, p. 236): " A 'folie' can be individual or 'à deux', but where between three and infinity does a
delusion become a cultural given?"
33 Scientific "urban legends" (Brunvand, 1981) are not confined, however, to parapsychology. They are quite common in all
fields of science, including medical research. One example is the "Popeye-spinach myth", the widespread belief that spinach
is a rich source of iron. This belief can be traced to the 1930s when the iron content of spinach was printed with an
incorrectly placed decimal point. Continuously reinforced by the popular press, this myth can hardly be corrected (see
Skrabanek and McCormick, 1989). For an elegant, quantitative demonstration of how the testimony for a fallacious
observation can become exaggerated over time, see Wiseman and Lamont (1996). Informations about urban legends in the
Internet can be found in Wallich (1998).

26
Laughter, Ramachandran argues, is "nature's 'false-alarm' signaling mechanism" (p. 361) which, from an evolutionary
stance, originally served to alert group members that a purportedly threatening anomaly was in fact inconsequential. In
the special case of the assumed anomaly being a ghost rather than a burglar, it is precisely this strategy of humor that
the Chinese have long and successfully employed to protect themselves from hauntings. Perhaps a bit more humor is
also required in the pages of scientific journals when discussing non-pathological, "anomalous" phenomena whose
origins can actually be traced to exceedingly normal sources.
Figure 5 (from Harding, 1996) provides a final visual summary of the main points discussed in this chapter's
three sections: (1) poltergeists are confined to one's own body, (2) an overinterpretation of patterns in chaos may give
the impression that they are "out there", and (3) as long as not indicative of obvious pathology, any ghosts would best
be met with a good portion of humor.
Figure 5: Computer tomography of a "haunted scrotum" depicting the left testis of a man with an undescended
right testis. According to the medical report (Harding, 1996), the absence of the right testis is readily explainable in this
case: "If you were a right testis, would you want to share the scrotum with that?" (p. 600).
(Reprinted from the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine with kind permission by the author)

27
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