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397
15
Craft Brewing in Australia, 1979-2015
André Sammartino
(in C. Garavaglia & J. Swinnen (eds), Economic Perspectives on Craft Beer: A Revolution
in the Global Beer Industry, Palgrave Macmillan: pp. 397-424)
15.1 Introduction
Craft brewing is booming in Australia. The number of independent beer producers has leapt from
just less than 100 in 2005 to over 350 by 2015.1 The path to this boom was slow and
punctuated however. The mid-to-late 1980s saw an initial rush of craft beer start-ups, with 34
firms operating by 1990. Yet this was followed by a lull, such that the firm count had only crept up
to 43 by 2000. As I will argue, partially this delay reflects a correction to the over-exuberance of
the first wave of entrants. Only a small number of firms developed a viable business model, and
even fewer a model for sustainable growth. What is particularly distinctive about Australia in the
early days of craft, is that macro brewers often acquired the rare successful market entrants. In
doing so, they also laid a key foundation for the eventual boom by easing mainstream access to
gateway pseudo craft beers.
----------
A.Sammartino
University of Melbourne, Australia
samma@unimelb.edu.au
398
The lull in craft beer start-ups from 1991 served an important purpose, as the smaller number
of new players carved out more sustainable niches and set about building a community of co-
evolving firms and consumers. The scene was set for the subsequent boom in a number of ways.
As a result of the innovations of the pioneering craft brewers, and also greater exposure to
imported beers, drinkers became more sophisticated and adventurous. This community of
consumers and prospective entrepreneurs was nurtured and inspired through festivals and
industry associations. Those willing to make the entrepreneurial leap faced a more amenable
start-up environment. The skills and resources were more readily available in the form of
employees within the early generations of breweries. A viable distribution system of retail outlets
and sales agents slowly developed. Innovations also occurred in the entry form. While the initial
entrants were a mix of small brewing operations and brewpubs, this second wave of start-ups
includes a large number of gypsy operations--firms using excess capacity of fellow brewers--and
this strategy appears to be facilitating much greater ease of access.
This chapter explores this evolution by first setting the scene of the broader Australian beer
industry. Extensive data are then introduced showcasing the entire population of entrants into the
craft segment over the period 1979-2015. Three distinct periods are examined with mini-case
studies of various path breaking ventures. I draw lessons regarding the nature of entrepreneurial
motivations, the interaction of various contextual factors in both eliciting and constraining growth,
and demonstrate the diversity of viable business models that have emerged in this vibrant but
still small segment of the Australian beer market.2
15.2 The Broader Australian Beer Industry
Beer was introduced to Australia with European settlement, and has been a persistent presence
in the nation’s culture and economy ever since. Australia was the fourteenth largest beer market
in the world by volume in 2000 (Euromonitor, 2015), bigger than the Czech Republic and Italy.3
The geographic isolation of the country, in particular the costliness of shipping beer across
oceans to Australian drinkers, has historically precluded engagement with international markets.
399
And for over 150 years the immense size of the continent and distances between major cities
prevented even the emergence of national brewers. The Australian brewing industry did undergo
considerable consolidation through the second half of the twentieth century however.
While almost 1200 breweries, excluding the craft brewers discussed herein, have operated
during the period since colonization (i.e. the arrival of Australia’s first European settlers in 1788),
by 1979 there were only eight breweries still in business (Deutscher, 2012, p.353). These
breweries were predominantly regional monopolists or duopolists, served principally their home
state.4 The surviving firms had achieved economies of scale in production and transportation
such that all smaller brewers had been either acquired by their bigger rivals or simply shut down
over the preceding century. The remaining players had sustained and reinforced their
advantages through continued expansion and modernization of production, but equally important
was the practice of tied pubs. Hotels, by far the biggest outlet for beer sales, were often locked
into exclusive sale contracts with a single brewer. This practice coupled with price maintenance
schemes encouraged a détente on encroachment across state borders and served as very
effective barrier to new entrants (Merrett, 1998; Stubbs, 1999). Beer drinkers were typically
exposed to very few choices, and presumed to be intensely loyal to state brands.
This ecosystem became unstable however. Beer consumption had plateaued by the mid-
1970s as cultural norms changed, and drinkers faced increased regulatory imposts and ever-
rising sales taxes.5 New competition laws from 1974 on broke the ties binding pubs and the price
maintenance schemes (Merrett, 1998). Relaxation of liquor licensing laws meant beer purchases
were also increasingly through retail stores rather than pubs. The brewers were under pressure
to sustain growth through grabs for market share. This opened up the prospect of cross-border
incursions. An attack on Carlton & United Brewers’ (CUB) home market of Victoria by British
brewer Courage, who set up a Melbourne brewery in 1968, had triggered an unprecedented
investment in branding and advertising by the incumbent, crucial weapons for a national battle.
This all set the scene for the consolidation to follow.
The year 1979 saw the first of several interstate mergers and acquisitions, many fuelled by
ambitious corporate raiders building debt-laden conglomerates. When the dust settled in the
400
early-to-mid 1990s, there were two very large national players--CUB (known internationally as
Foster’s Brewing) and the New Zealand-owned Lion Nathan.6 These two players often accounted
for over 90 percent of national beer sales by volume for following two decades, with fortunes
swinging back and forth between the two in terms of market predominance. Each firm had a full
portfolio of mainstream beers, but was highly reliant on sales of barely distinguishable bland
euro-lagers and, increasingly, low alcohol variants.7 Through the 1990s and 2000s each also
secured licensing deals to brew and import various international brands such as Stella Artois,
Corona, Heineken, Budweiser, Carlsberg and Grolsch. Both also expanded internationally, with
Foster’s at one point the sixth largest brewer in the world.8 Unsuccessful entries into China
damaged both firms, as did Foster’s diversification into wine (Zalan and Lewis, 2007).
Although a low growth market, the isolated duopolistic Australian market was viewed as
unusually profitable in comparison to other Western beer markets. In 2009 Lion Nathan was
acquired by Japanese brewer Kirin. South African giant SAB Miller acquired Foster’s in 2011.
This left family-owned Coopers as the largest Australian-owned brewer. In 2015 Coopers has a
national market share of roughly 5 percent.9 The remaining players in the Australian macro beer
market as of 2015 are Japanese brewer Asahi who purchased a local contract brewing facility in
2011, and Coca Cola Amatil (CCA) one of the five largest Coca Cola bottlers in the world,
headquartered in Sydney. CCA had a joint venture, Pacific Beverages (see below), with SAB Miller
from 2006 until the Foster’s acquisition. CCA re-entered the beer market in December 2013 with
a new joint venture with Casella Wines (owner of the highly successful Yellowtail Wines brand). As
discussed below, each of these five macro players has shaped the nature of craft brewing in
Australia also.
15.3 The Micro Upstarts
A total of 479 new non-macro brewing entities have opened in Australia since 1979. I define a
brewing entity as an independently owned and operated Australian-based firm producing beer. As
discussed below, this includes firms who may not own brewing facilities, but who do take a locally-
401
Fig. 15.1 Entries, Exits and Total Firm Counts in the Australian Craft Beer sector 1979-2015
made beer to market. Figure 15.1 tracks the emergence of these craft brewers from 1979 to
2015.10 As the figure shows, there was an initial flurry of entries through the mid-to-late 1980s,
peaking at 14 in 1988. Entries tapered off for the subsequent decade or so, with the total count
of operating craft brewers not exceeding 50 until 2002. By 2006 there were 110 craft brewers in
business. That number doubled to 220 by 2012, and by the end of 2015 the count had reached
358. Only three years saw exits exceed entries (1991, 1994 and 1995).11
Figure 15.2 breaks down the annual firm counts by type of operation. Table 15.1 reports data
for select years with percentages. For the first 15 years, start-up craft operations were pretty
evenly split between breweries (production facilities which might or might not have a retail
outlet/tasting room) and brewpubs (an in-pub brew facility and limited/no off-site sales). From
the late 1990s a third option emerged--brewing companies--firms that utilized other brewers’
facilities to produce their own branded product.12 As discussed below, this category includes both
firms who were principally engaged in marketing (and who left recipe design and actual
production to the contracted brewery), and gypsy brewers who were much hands on with the brew
process (and can be thought of as leasing brew time and space).13 There were also small
402
Fig. 15.2 Total Firm Counts in the Australian Craft Beer sector by type 1979-2015
numbers of brew-in premises businesses, where the public could engage in brewing, and several
firms who offered contracted brewing services exclusively.14
Brewpubs have declined as a percentage of the population firms since the mid-1990s, and by
2013 were less than 20 percent of all craft beer producers. Breweries have remained
consistently around half the firms in the sector, with brewing companies the emergent force.
Firms do switch between modes of operation. Particularly common is a shift from brewing
companies to breweries. The reverse shift has happened occasionally. A few brewpubs have
evolved into breweries (often through a successful move to greater packaged beer sales) or
contracted out manufacturing.
Figure 15.3 shows the geographic distribution of the craft brewers by state/territory. Table
15.2 reports percentage data for select years with a comparison to the relative size of each state
by current population and output. The predominant state for craft beer operations has typically
been Victoria. Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia have produced more firms than
would be expected for their population bases. The mineral-rich Western Australian economy
makes a disproportionately large contribution to the Australian economy, and the state’s resultant
higher per capita income may explain, partially, the high craft beer activity. There is also a likely
spillover effect from the huge successes of two of that state’s pioneering craft start-ups (see
403
Table 15.1 Australian Craft Brewers by type, select years 1980-2015
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Brewery
1
(100%)
2
(67%)
16 (46%) 12 (47%)
20
(47%)
48
(52%)
83
(48%)
96
(50%)
104
(48%)
124
(49%)
149
(48%)
169
(47%)
Brewpub -
1
(33%)
18
(54%)
14
(53%)
17
(40%)
25
(27%)
39
(23%)
42
(22%)
45
(20%)
45
(18%)
52
(17%)
62
(17%)
Brewing Company - - - -
6
(14%)
18
(19%)
47
(27%)
52
(27%)
67
(30%)
80
(32%)
103
(33%)
117
(33%)
Brew-on Premises - - - - -
1
(1.1%)
1
(0.6%)
1
(0.5%)
1
(0.5%)
2
(0.8%)
4
(1.3%)
7
(2.0%)
Contract Brewer only - - - - -
1
(1.1%)
2
(1.2%)
2
(1.0%)
2
(0.9%)
2
(0.8%)
3
(1.0%)
3
(0.8%)
Total 1 3 34 26 43 93 172 193 220 252 311 358
Source: Author's own calculations.
404
Fig. 15.3 Total firm counts in the Australian Craft Beer Sector by state/territory 1979-2015
below). Australia’s largest state by population and output--New South Wales--has slightly
underperformed. Queensland has been the real underachiever throughout the rise of craft beer.
Despite being roughly three times larger than South Australia, Queensland has often trailed its
southern counterpart on brewery count.
15.4 The First Wave of Australian Craft Brewing (1984-1990)
The first new independent brewer in Australia, since Courage, opened in 1979. Cygnet Brewery
was based at a winery in rural Tasmania and only brewed for the tourist season each year. In
1985 it was delicensed due to breaches of labelling laws in their winery business (VBLCS, 1986).
Victoria’s pioneer was the Old Ballarat Brewery which opened as part of a new motel and
convention centre in 1984, brewing one style--a full malt lager. Within three years ownership had
shifted to a maltings company who introduced a stout and another lager. By 1990 the firm was
shut down (Deutsher, 2011, p.308-9). It is fair to say the impact of these business were low,
especially when compared to the action on the country’s west coast.
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Table 15.2: Australian Craft Brewers by state/territory, select years 1980-2015 (%)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Population Output
Victoria - 33 29 22 28 32 33 32 30 33 32 33 25 22
New South Wales - - 29 22 16 26 27 27 29 27 28 27 32 31
Western Australia - 33 6 15 23 17 19 18 16 15 14 13 11 17
Queensland - - 12 7 9 4 5 7 8 10 11 11 20 18
South Australia - - 12 11 9 11 11 10 10 10 9 9 7 6
Tasmania 100 33 6 7 7 6 4 4 4 3 5 5 2.2 1.6
ACT - - 2.9 7.4 4.7 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.2
NT - - 2.9 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.4
Norfolk Island - - - 3.7 2.3 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 n/a
Note: ACT = Australian Capital Territory, NT = Northern Territory.
Source: Brewer counts are author's own calculations. Population percentages from Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Series 3101.0 - Australian Demographic Statistics, Jun 2015.
State output from ABS Series 5220.0 - Australian National Accounts: State Accounts, 2014-15.
406
The first ripples of the craft beer wave came from the opening of the Sail and Anchor brewpub
in Western Australia in late 1984. One of three founders, Phil Sexton exemplifies a common craft
beer journey. He had worked as a brewer at local macro Swan before studying in Britain, where
he was exposed to the emerging brewpub phenomenon, as well as traditional Belgian styles on
European travels. Keen to target the new increasingly affluent Perth drinkers, Sexton and his
partners imported a specialized small-scale brew system from Burton-on-Trent (Stubbs, n.d.).
Drinkers were soon exposed to exciting and unfamiliar brew styles such as strong ales, pilsners,
steam ales, stouts, porters, and chilli beers (Deutsher, 2011, p.330-1). Within a year, the firm had
opened a dedicated off-site brew facility under the banner of Matilda Bay Brewing Company
(Holden, 2011). Over the subsequent five years the firm entered joint venture arrangements to
open further brewpubs in South Australia, Victoria and Tasmania, and secured national
distribution through the wine and spirits division of CUB.
Matilda Bay publicly listed in 1988, and was taken over by CUB in 1990, with a valuation of
A$50m.15 The brand continues to operate today as the faux craft arm of SAB Miller in Australia,
and one of their beers--Fat Yak--is among the mostly widely available premium-priced beers
nationwide. While the portfolio of offerings has changed considerably, Matilda Bay beers remain
the gateway introduction to non-mainstream beers for many Australian drinkers. Phil Sexton went
on to also play a crucial role in the second wave of Australian craft beer.16
Brewpubs predominated the craft beer scene during these early years, with all states boasting
at least one such operation by 1989. The rationale for this forward-integrated entry mode was
sound. The equipment was readily available, as several of the early players ran side businesses
as agents for foreign suppliers advising on design and aiding installation (Stubbs, 2015). Pubs
came with pre-existing licenses and customer bases, thus speeding up time to market. By selling
direct to customers and bypassing middlemen, brewpubs also secured greater margins. As
Stuckey and White argue (1993) vertical integration makes sense if it can overcome market
power of competitors. While tied contracts between pubs and brewers were no longer legal,
gaining tap access in existing hotels was difficult for new firms, with anecdotal evidence of the
407
macro players withholding product and threatening any publicans daring to offer these new craft
lines (Holden, 2011). Brewpubs at least had a chance to reach customers.
Running more than one such pub requires considerable repeated capital outlays, however,
and few of these new firms expanded beyond a single operation. Production and marketing of
packaged beer for retail distribution outside the pub itself was rare. The inability to scale up
output, achieve economies of scale and build broader brand awareness and distribution meant
most of these brewpubs operated for no more than a decade, or stayed very small. Several were
also over-leveraged financially, often forming part of ambitious property developments. One
noteworthy exception was New South Wales’ first craft start up, the Lord Nelson Brewery Hotel in
the historic Rocks precinct of harbourside Sydney. The brewpub still continues to brew in the
basement of Sydney’s oldest continually licensed hotel, 29 years after its first brew. However, in
the early 2000s Lord Nelson expanded into offsite packaged beer production through a contract
brewer, and has several beers nationally available.
The first generation of craft breweries were typically less successful than the brewpubs. Of the
20 new breweries opened before 1991, only five were still operational in 1996. Only two still
operate as independent breweries today. The problems appear to have been on the production
quality side as much as distribution. The requisite resources and capabilities to achieve
competitive parity, let alone competitive advantage were lacking (Barney, 1991, 1995). A
number of breweries used wort concentrate rather than all-grain brewing, resulting in a beer not
much better than home-brewed quality (Stubbs, 2015). This did little to reduce the perception of
these new brews as amateurish and non-premium. Attracting consumers was tougher in the late
1980s and early 1990s, as drinkers’ loyalties to their local regional macro brands was only just
being broken down by the efforts of the two consolidated giants to promoted national brands.
Without consistent quality, the scope to get these new craft beers into stores was limited.
Two new independent brewery ventures did make a substantial and immediate impact during
this period. Power Brewing opened an enormous, modern production facility in Queensland in
1988 with the explicit aim of competing with the big boys. Within two years the brewery had
408
expanded to an annual capacity of 120 million litres (Deutsher, 2011, p.323). This equated to
roughly six percent of the Australian market size.17 The firm was successful at winning over
mainstream beer drinkers in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria with a reliable lager and
backed by a story of independence. Such an audacious move was bound to grab the attention of
the acquisitive macro brewers. By 1993 Power had been acquired by CUB who shifted their
Queensland production into the acquired brew facility. That site has subsequently been
expanded such that it reportedly produces 25 percent of Australia’s beer annually, but the Power
brand has pretty much disappeared.
Even more significant for the eventual emergence of craft beer’s second wave, was the Hahn
Brewery which opened in Sydney in 1988. Founder Dr Chuck Hahn had extensive experience
brewing at Coors in the USA, as general manager of Tooths Brewery, and Technical Manager at
Lion in New Zealand. Brewing on German equipment he bought from a brewery he was charged
with closing in New Zealand, Hahn had a zealous focus on quality and innovation. His debut beer,
a pilsner, was a huge success, pitched as a premium beer to restaurants and high end hotels.
The firm was hard hit, however, by Australia’s 1990 recession and the associated sharp interest
rate rises. After several years of financial restructuring, the firm was sold to Lion Nathan in 1993.
Hahn stayed on as that firm’s new head brewer. In 1998 Lion Nathan rebadged his original
brewhouse as Malt Shovel Brewery and allowed Hahn free rein to produce premium craft-like
beers under the James Squire label. This arm of the Lion Nathan business operates to this day
with a broad portfolio of entry-level beers for craft beer drinkers. The firm has flirted also with
brewpubs using the Squire brand, further promoting different beer styles.
Ultimately, the outcomes of this first wave of craft beer start-ups were: (1) a recognition by the
macro brewers of the scope to charge premium prices to a segment of the drinking population for
more crafted beers, and the capacity to do so through acquired assets and brands; (2) some
exposure of consumers to the more diverse range of beer styles possible. There were some tough
business lessons for craft beer operators, however. Of the 41 independent beer ventures to
commence between 1979 and 1990, only nine were still operating independently in 2000, and
none of them would have been considered among the most successful at that point in time. As
409
Figure 15.1 shows, entries had hit a high water mark in 1988 which would not be passed until
2002. The nascent segment stalled at a firm count of 34 in 1990 which would not be surpassed
until 1998. A strong, sustainable business model for operating in the craft beer niche was not yet
apparent. No independent brewer had yet produced a reliable product of the quality that could
attract a premium price outside of a brewpub setting, and managed to stay independent.
15.5 The Slow Build (1991-2004)
The calm after the initial Australian craft beer storm lasted through the remainder of the 1990s
and into the new millennium. While 41 new ventures had launched between 1984 and 1990, the
decade 1991-2000 saw only 40 additional start-ups. As noted above, the churn from the first
wave was also considerable, such that only 43 ventures were in operation by 2000. There was a
slow upswing from 2001-4, with 38 additional entrants and a surviving population of 73 firms by
the end of 2004.
The mix of new venture types shifted during this period. Only 11 of the 40 start-ups between
1991 and 2000 were brewpubs. This included Canberra’s influential Wig and Pen Tavern, who
offered an extensive range of often single batch beers that tweaked traditional English ales and
other European styles. Another six commenced as brewing companies, outsourcing beer
production to existing brewers. Several of these were brand extensions by wineries (e.g., Pikes
Beer, Wineglass Bay, Boars Rock), or marketing exercises (Piss Beer), and it is likely in these
instances the recipes were primarily designed by the contracted brewer.
An important exception was Victoria’s Mountain Goat Beer, who utilized excess capacity at two
of the pioneering Victorian craft breweries to brew from 1997-99 before raising the necessary
capital to establish their own inner-Melbourne brewery.18 Founded by two homebrewers who
caught the craft beer bug while travelling in North America, Mountain Goat initially targeted pubs
410
associated with the vibrant local music scene. They sponsored public radio, and even advertized
at local independent cinemas. Mountain Goat built up a substantial local and eventually national
market, especially for their English amber ale. This is one of the earliest examples of a cool
brewery that captured the attention of what would become the core market for many in the next
wave of craft start-ups--hip, inner urban drinkers with adventurous palates and a leaning towards
independently produced products. The introduction of a steam ale and summer ale drove further
growth, and led Mountain Goat in the early 2010s to shift production of their major beers offsite
to a contract brewery that was subsequently acquired by Japanese macro Asahi. In 2015, Asahi
purchased Mountain Goat Beer thus shifting another of Australia’s most successful craft beer
start-ups into the macro sphere.
The most impactful start-up of this period occurred in the new millennium. Phil Sexton and his
Matilda Bay co-founders re-entered the independent craft beer scene with a new Western
Australian venture in 2000--Little Creatures Brewing. Inspired by his time in the US, Sexton
designed a flagship hoppy Pale Ale which used lager yeast for a secondary fermentation in the
bottle. The firm launched through a hangar-style waterfront brewpub (repurposing one of the
boatsheds from the 1987 America’s Cup series which had subsequently operated as a crocodile
farm). This cellar door experience proved hugely popular, as did the quality beer range. Soon the
brewery built up national distribution and expanded into an adjacent brew facility. The Little
Creatures founders had Lion Nathan as a silent partner (holding 20 percent) from the outset.
This stake had increased to 26 percent by the time the firm was publicly listed in 2005 as Little
World Beverages (LWB). Annual sales had reached A$15.8m at that stage, and the firm was
valued at A$59m (LWB, 2005). By 2011 the firm had grown to A$70m in annual revenue,
opened a second brewery in Victoria under the White Rabbit brand, and announced plans to open
a much larger Little Creatures Brewery in Geelong, Victoria to service east coast markets more
effectively (LWB, 2011). In 2012, Kirin/Lion Nathan announced a takeover of the company,
valuing the firm at A$382m. Following this acquisition, Kirin claimed to have almost 50 percent
411
of the Australian craft beer market, with LWB’s sales representing 13 percent market share, and
James Squire/Malt Shovel accounting for 33 percent (Greenblat, 2013).19
The LWB case highlights the capacity of a well-run, well-resourced craft beer start-up to make
inroads into the broader Australian beer market. The founders brought extensive experience, not
just in brewing, but also in the wine industry, coffee retailing and property management. This
points to some of the relevant core capabilities for firms seeking to position a new, differentiated
product up-market of the macro mainstream (Peteraf, 1993; Porter, 1996).20
A much less mainstream, but almost as influential Western Australian brewery launched in in
2002. Based in the Swan Valley wine region, and boasting a restaurant among the wineries,
Feral Brewing was a stickler for quality and sophistication from the outset. Its initial success was
with a Belgian-style witbier, and the portfolio soon included a farmhouse ale, an abbey ale and a
barley wine. Their flagship Hop Hog--a bold US IPA--attracted most attention, however. Feral
steadfastly refused to truck the beer to the Australian east coast (a 3,400km drive principally
through desert) until a completed refrigerated supply chain could be assured (Smith, 2014). This
ensured cult status for the beer among the emerging beer geek community. Feral’s beers are the
most awarded over the past decade at the Australian International Beer Awards, and Hop Hog
has been voted best craft beer in the country by a popular poll every year since 2012.
Feral and Mountain Goat serve as prime examples of the new, more audacious face of
Australian craft beer. The branding may have been irreverent, but the word of mouth messaging
was about quality and difference, with a strong nod towards the craft beer movement of the USA.
Perhaps more than any other emergent brewers, these two inspired the second big wave of
Australian craft brewers.
During this period a community of craft brewing began to emerge also. State microbrewing
associations were founded in Western Australia (2001), Victoria (2003) and South Australia
(2006). In 2005 the Victorian association secured funds from the state government for a Beer
Lover's Guide to Victoria's Microbreweries which appeared in tourist information centres. In 2006
they launched bi-annual Victorian Microbrewery Showcases which served as both trade fairs and
412
a chance for consumers to meet brewers and taste product. Each association had a charter of
education and publicity along with a mission to lobby for excise and licensing reform.21 An
educational pathway to craft brewing employment also developed with brewing courses at
universities in three states (Victoria, Western Australian and South Australia) up and running by
2007, each with their own in house brewery for student use (Stubbs, 2015). The scene was set
for the impending craft beer boom.
15.6 The Second Tidal Wave (2005-2015)
In 2005 25 new craft beer producers entered the market, the biggest annual gain since
1988. The number of new entrants annually would not fall below 19 over the following
decade, reaching 40 in 2013, 66 in 2014 and 55 in 2015. This wave has struck across the
country, with each state at least tripling its firm counts over the eleven-year period.
The explanations for this entrepreneurial explosion are several. Consumers were
becoming more sophisticated and adventurous off the back of the innovations of the
pioneering craft brewers, and also due to greater exposure to imported beers. As noted, from
the mid-1980s the macro firms had begun importing and brewing under license various
international brands. While many of these products were only subtle variations on the
Australian macro lagers, the diversity of brands fuelled an appetite for the new. By the late
1990s more traditional Belgian ales were appearing in some bottle shops, along with
occasional British ales and US craft efforts. While a real upsurge in imported craft product
would not happen until the latter part of the first decade of the 2000s (helped by a rising
Australian dollar), it was clear that the consumer base was growing and also actively seeking
out new and exciting flavours. There were parallels in adjacent gastronomic segments, with
consumers also embracing artisanal coffee, new cuisines and ever diverse wines (Frost et al.,
2010; Patterson, Scott and Uncles, 2010). This community of consumers were increasingly
cultivated and networked through events, festivals and, later, social media.
413
These consumers, along with many of the staff within the earlier generation of breweries,
also formed the pool of prospective entrepreneurs (Watne and Hakala 2013). Those looking
to make the entrepreneurial leap faced a less daunting start-up environment. As craft
brewing boomed in North America and parts of Europe, so too did suppliers of smaller scale
brewing equipment. For example, as Stubbs (2015) notes, Canadian specialist DME installed
more than 20 of its brewery systems in Australia from 2000 on. This contributed to increased
quality and consistency of end product. The increased range of equipment allowed for more
frequent and cost effective expansion in capacity. As breweries upgraded and expanded, a
second-hand market for brewery equipment developed.22 Not only were the physical
resources more readily available, willing and able employees could be recruited from the
existing breweries, the university brewing courses and the highly active homebrew
community.
Getting beer to market was easier by the mid-2000s also. The macro brewers’ stranglehold of
pub taps was slowly loosening, as consumers became used to seeing not just the regular national
brands, but also Coopers’ products, the macro pseudo-craft offerings and occasional foreign
labels. Various states loosened liquor licensing laws, opening up opportunities for smaller bars
and restaurants to sell alcohol. Many of these bars sought to differentiate themselves by offering
craft beers. Specialized distributors also started to push craft product into retail stores, bars,
restaurants and pubs. Many of these agents initially acted as importers of some of the larger US
and European craft brands, but also started to take on Australian clients.23 The new big box liquor
retailers with their extensive shelf space also offered new opportunities to get packaged craft
beer in front of larger numbers of customers across a greater number of locations (Sammartino,
2007).
Some of the most prominent and distinct craft brewers in Australia were founded during this
period, and quickly built strong followings. Tasmania’s most widely known craft brewer, Moo
Brew, sprang from the Moorilla Wine Estate in 2005 with highly distinct bottles featuring
commissioned labels from a prominent Australian artist. A 25-year-old with a wine-making
background opened Bridge Road Brewers in rural Victoria in 2005 brewing in his dad’s shed,
414
before moving to a high-street location in the coach-house of an historic pub. With a wide range of
beers including a chestnut pilsner, saison and biere de garde, this brewery has become a tourist
destination and a regular stop for international craft brewers looking to collaborate.24 One
drawcard has been the brewery’s access to experimental hop varieties from the local growers.
Bridge Road was the first commercial brewery to use the Vic Secret and Enigma hops, and they
have a nationally-distributed single hop IPA series showcasing Australian varietals.
Two New South Wales breweries launched in 2008 that have grown to be among the most
widely available and awarded. 4 Pines opened in Sydney with a highly approachable range of
traditional European beers, including Australia’s most successful kolsch. Meanwhile three former
Matilda Bay (and Fosters’) employees founded Stone & Wood Brewing Company in Byron Bay.
Unusually, Stone & Wood have maintained a tiny range of core beers, with their reputation resting
on their hugely popular Pacific Ale, a pale ale showcasing Australian hops. The beer won silver at
the 2012 World Beer Cup.
Unlike Stone & Wood, most craft brewers launched between 1985 and 2005 had tended to
build a broad and relatively predictable portfolio of offerings (e.g., a pale ale, a pilsner, a
porter/stout). Greater specialization was apparent among this second wave of craft start-ups,
however. As the organizational ecology literature argues, entrepreneurs may find niches in mature
markets to be less competitive and less prone to attack from much larger rivals (Baum and Singh,
Bhide, 1994). Indeed, the larger players may see little value in investing in the requisite resources
and capabilities to take on such challengers (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001; Carroll, 1985; Carroll,
Dobrev and Swaninathan, 2002).
The Australian craft beer scene now has brewers specializing in hop-forward IPAs (plus
imperial and black variants) such as Kaiju (Victoria, opened in 2013), Pirate Life (South Australia,
2015), Ekim (New South Wales, 2010), and Brewcult (Victoria, 2013). Two Metre Tall (Tasmania,
2006) focuses on sours, while La Sirèné (Victoria, 2011) concentrates on saisons. Boatrocker
(Victoria, 2009) have launched an ambitious barrel-aging facility.25 Both Bacchus (Queensland,
2011) and Moon Dog (Victoria, 2011) push the boundaries of extreme brewing (Bilger, 2008),
with a huge catalogue of beers that seek to mimic desserts, lollies, cocktails and savoury dishes.
415
Such adventurousness is encouraged by various beer festivals around the country, and
embraced by the more passionate pocket with the craft consumer segment. The most visible
festival is the annual Great Australasian Beer Spectapular, which started with a few hundred
patrons at a Melbourne bar in 2011 and now runs over four days in Melbourne and Sydney
with more than 20,000 attendees. Brewers must submit never-seen-before beers, and the
entries from Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere tend to push the boundaries in the quest
to attract drinkers’ attention. Many of these beers have become staples in these new
brewers’ line ups, further fuelling the diversity of product in the marketplace.
The other striking difference over this last decade is the rise of the brewing company
business model. Almost 44 percent of the entrants between 2005 and 2015 commenced
without brew facilities. This option became much easier, at least in Sydney and Melbourne,
with the opening of several contract only facilities, plus several other breweries that had a
sideline in contract production. As noted earlier, a number of these brewing company
entrants leave all of the brew design decisions to their production partner (and the brewing
itself), focussing instead on marketing. Many of these firms are more heavily targeted at the
fringes of the mainstream macro market.
During this second wave, a lot more brewers went down the Mountain Goat gypsy path,
however--physically engaging in the brew process utilizing fellow craft brewers’ equipment. For
example, La Sirèné, Boatrocker, and The Grifter Brewing Company (New South Wales, 2012) each
spent several years with such arrangements before finally investing in their own breweries. Taking
such an approach could be thought of as taking a real option of sorts (Li et al., 2007). By taking
an initial product to market without the considerable upfront investment in brew facilities, a
brewing company has the opportunity to assess consumer response to their beers before
exercising the option to build a brewery. The start-up costs of the gypsy model are limited--
confined to registering the business, designing a brand, securing a license and distribution. Much
of this is can be thought of as sweat equity of the entrepreneur, which should make it easier to
secure financing once there has been some proof of concept (Brush, Greene and Hart, 2001).26
416
Gypsy brewing can also be an ongoing business model. For example, Doctor’s Orders (New
South Wales, 2009) has brewed in at least four different breweries around Sydney over the
past six years. As this brewing company specializes in one-off releases, there is less need for
consistent throughput. Strategic flexibility is maintained in terms of being able to select the
appropriate facilities (and partners) for different brews (Ghemawat and del Sol, 1998).27 With
almost half (46 percent) of the new craft firms since 2014 commencing as brewing
companies, it may be that this more permanent approach will prevail.
Variations on the model have also emerged. Several breweries have opened with the
explicit strategy of leasing some of their facilities to fellow brewers and to new start-ups.
Cavalier Brewery (Victoria, 2011), Big Shed Brewing Concern (South Australia, 2014) and
Hawkers Beer (Victoria, 2015) have all set up as landlords of sort. Some of the tenants have
then moved on to their own facilities. Kaiju and Exit Brewing (Victoria, 2014) started at
Cavalier before themselves partnering up to co-own a brew facility. This co-ownership model
has also been used by Feral and Nail (Western Australia, operating 2000-4, 2006-) who
jointly invested in a 50 hectolitre brewhouse in 2012.28 In a period of such opportunity,
finding a means to get market quickly seems imperative.
15.7 Conclusion
After more than three decades craft beer has reached an exciting position in Australia. With more
than 350 craft beer firms up and running, and a new venture opening each week on average,
there is clearly a great deal of optimism. It is possible to make an impact quickly. For example,
Sydney brewery Modus Operandi opened in July, 2014 and by year end had won four awards at
the Craft Beer Industry Awards including Best Beer and Best Small Brewery. A year later they were
awarded Best Medium Brewery, indicating they already brew between 50,000 and 300,000 litres
per annum.
This optimism extends to the scale and source of some new investments. The aforementioned
Hawkers Beer spent A$3m opening a brewery with an initial annual capacity of 600,000 litres,
417
and scope to expand to 10 million litres. One of Hawkers’ founders is serial entrepreneur Mazen
Hajjar, who opened Lebanon’s (and the Middle East’s) first craft brewery. He sees the potential in
the Australian market. So too does Italian Leonardo Di Vincenzo (founded Birra del Borgo) who
partnered with his Australian distributors to open Nomad Brewing in Sydney in 2014. Such
exploitation strategies (as opposed to exploration) speak to a possible maturity in at least parts of
the market (Lavie, Stettner and Tushman, 2010; Levinthal and March, 1993) such that
experienced entrepreneurs can see long-term profit potential.
As the various examples I have profiled show, there are now a variety of business models for
new entrants to consider. The innovation of the brewing company modes, along with the ongoing
evolution of more fine-grained product niches, suggests exploration may also still be a viable
strategy (Lavie, Stettner and Tushman, 2010; March, 1991). One avenue for future research
would be assessing how the mid-to-large craft brewers manage to balance the efficiency (i.e.
exploitation) requirements of their broader product segments with the creative and courageous
experimentation expected in the more cutting edge niches of the market (i.e. exploration).
There also grounds for caution. However measured, craft is still a small segment within a large,
stagnant Australian beer market. The new, much larger pool of craft competitors may prompt
previously unseen battles for consumers and tap access. It seems unlikely that the macro rivals
will stand by and let craft brewers capture greater market share. History points to more macro
acquisitions of successful craft ventures. It is unlikely the market has reached bubble status or a
shakeout phase. Incumbent firms and new ventures will continue to reimagine the boundaries of
the segment and the industry. Lessons will be drawn from other more developed craft markets,
and greater engagement with such markets may also ensue. Great opportunities exist for
researchers to track and understand these entrepreneurial efforts.
418
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1 I use the term craft brewers to refer to smaller scale, independent beer-producing firms. These
contrast with large scale macro beer companies. The term craft beer is a recent affectation
(Hieronymus, 2015). Through much of the period of this study, such Australian firms have been
known as mini-breweries, microbreweries or boutique brewers. The key defining characteristic is
the independent ownership and control of the firm.
2 Estimates of the market share of craft beer in Australia in 2015 vary widely--from 4 to 8 percent.
This discrepancy reflects (1) uncertainty about how to delineate the product from the producer
(i.e. no requirement of independent ownership is consistently applied); and (2) a lack of any
cooperative collection of aggregate data from across the beer market (unlike in the US, for
example, where the Brewers Association collects and reports a league table of brewers). There is
consensus that the segment is growing at the same time that overall beer sales are in persistent
decline.
3 By 2014, Australia’s market ranking by volume had dropped to 22 (Euromonitor, 2015).
Australians are typically ranked number one outside Europe in terms of per capita beer
consumption (Colen and Swinnen, 2011), but this consumption has been in decline since the
1970s. Between 2009 and 2014, the per capita beer consumption dropped from 108 to 92.4
litres, the lowest level in over 50 years (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2015).
4 Australia is made up of six states and two territories plus several small administrative regions.
The eight brewers and their respective home states/dominant markets in 1979 were Carlton &
United (Victoria), Cascade (Tasmania), Castlemaine Perkins (Queensland), Coopers and South
Australian Brewing (both South Australia), Swan (Western Australia), Tooheys and Tooths (both
New South Wales). Carlton & United did have also footholds in southern Queensland and the
Northern Territory (Merrett, 1998).
5 Excise on beer is especially high in Australia. It represented the second largest source of indirect
tax revenue in Australia after petrol taxes in 2008. For lower priced packaged macro beers, taxes
can constitute almost half the retail price (IBISWorld, 2008).
6 Carlton & United (Victoria) had acquired Tooths by 1983 and Cascade in 1993. Tooths had
acquired Courage in 1978. Castlemaine Perkins, Swan and Tooheys were merged by 1985 and
acquired by Lion Nathan in 1990. Their Australian portfolio expanded to include South Australian
Brewing in 1993. A secondary Tasmanian brewer Boags was spun out of Cascade in 1994 and
run independently until acquired by Filipino brewer San Miguel in 2000. In 2007 Boags was sold
to Lion Nathan.
7 Low alcohol beers were partially a response to drink-driving legislation and shifting attitudes to
drunkenness. But equally important was the shift in excise structures in 1984 such that beers
below 3 percent alcohol (ABV) were taxed much more lightly. Australia has an unusually
aggressive system of ever higher tax payments based on alcohol level. At current rates, a 2.5
percent ABV beer sold in 50 litre kegs would incur A$0.11 per litre in excise, an 4.5 percent ABV
A$1.11, and an 8.5 percent ABV A$2.46. The rates are much higher for packaged beer (or beer
sold in kegs <48 litres), but the discount for low ABV is much less. The same beers above would
pay A$0.55, A$1.59 and A$3.49 per litre respectively.
8 Fosters’ was the first foreign brewer to enter India, for example, in 1998 (Arora et al., 2011)
9 As a tightly held private company (the majority of shareholders are from the multiple generations
of the Cooper family), Coopers was able to fend off a A$420m acquisition attempt by Lion Nathan
in 2005 (Byrom and Lehman, 2009).
10 The database underpinning the following figures and tables has been built up from a variety of
sources. All physical breweries in operation up until 2011 are listed in Deutsher (2012), while
those opening from 2012 are reported in the Small Breweries Updates at the Brew News website.
Further firms were identified from Beer and Brewer magazine, beer competition entry lists, social
media, beer rating websites and Simpson (2006, 2007, 2011).
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11 Exits here refer to (i) a company ceasing to operate or (ii) ceding independence to a macro
player (there have been no examples of mergers within the craft beer segment). Instances where
ownership changes but the business continues to operate are not treated as exits unless there is
a radical shift in the nature of the business.
12 It is possible there were more brewing companies in the 1980s and 1990s. As brewing
historians almost exclusively chronicle physical breweries rather than end product, it is very
difficult to track such entities.
13 Unfortunately it is not possible to readily distinguish between these two forms of Brewing
Company as firms are not consistently forthcoming in describing their level of involvement in the
brew process.
14 I have only included those Brew-on Premises who also retailed their own branded beer, thus
excluding around 75-80 percent of such businesses. While a number of breweries offered some
contract brewing services, only those without their own branded beer are included under the
Contract Brewer Only categorization.
15 This transfer of ownership is treated as an exit in this study’s database, as the firm was no
longer independent of the macro sector.
16 Sexton also had an impact in one of the homes of global craft beer. He designed the signature
India Pale Ale (IPA) at Bridgeport Brewing in Portland, Oregon in 1996. This influential brew is
believed to be Oregon’s first bottled IPA.
17 Total annual Australian beer consumption peaked in 1989-90 at 1.93b litres (ABS 2011). The
latest data (2013-4) show 1.74b litres consumed (ABS 2015).
18 The host locations for this gypsy brewing were first Steam Packet Brewing (founded 1996)
which used the dormant in-pub brewhouse at the Scottish Chiefs Tavern Brewery in Geelong
(which operated only in 1990), and then Grand Ridge Brewing (previously called Strezlecki
Brewing, founded 1988) in Mirboo North (Deutsher, 2011: 311, 316-7).
19 Kirin’s calculations are not clear. LWB had revenue of A$85.8m in 2012. If the brand had 13
percent market share, then total Australian craft beer market annual turnover would be
approximately A$660m. Yet the same statement indicates craft beer is only 3.2 percent of the
total Australian beer market. That would result in a total Australian beer market size of A$19.8b,
whereas the typically cited market size is approximately A$4.3b. While LWB presumably had
some small revenues from cider sales and hospitality, this cannot account for the huge
discrepancy.
20 In 2003 another new venture attracted macro attention. Bluetongue Brewery was the
brainchild of a winemaker, a hotelier and a former Toohey’s senior brewer based in Newcastle,
New South Wales. Within two years a prominent advertising identity bought a 50 percent stake,
as the firm’s flagship lager, light beer, pilsner and alcoholic ginger beer became available
nationally. The firm was quickly sold on to the new CCA/SAB Miller joint venture Pacific
Beverages, and in 2008 they broke ground on a new 50m litre brewery just outside Newcastle
(Simpson, 2011). The brand was sustained for several more years, while the brewery also brewed
several foreign beers under license. The 2012 SAB Miller acquisition of Foster’s and the
dissolution of Pacific Beverages saw the brewery move into CUB’s portfolio. By late 2013 the
Bluetongue brand had been shelved and the brewery shut down as part of a rationalization of the
firm’s operations. Again, this case shows the appetite of the macro players for acquisition,
especially of those rivals brewing on a significant scale with sufficiently mainstream beers.
21 Among the issues around excise have been: (i) the administrative and cash flow burden of
paying excise weekly (and at point of manufacture rather than sale); (ii) the very low threshold
level at which a small brewer could receive an excise rebate; (iii) the requirement that kegs be
>48 litres to incur lower excise rates; and (iv) the climbing ABV-excise link which severely
disadvantages high ABV styles such as imperial stouts in terms of price point. The associations
repeatedly argued that craft beer was getting minimal support at the same time that wine
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producers were getting up to A$500,000 each in excise relief annually. The lobbying had some
impact, as rebate levels for brewers were raised in 2012 to a maximum refund of A$30,000 a
year (versus the previous cap of $10,000 that was not available to any brewer producing
>30,000 litres annually).
22 For example, Mount Tambourine Brewery (founded in Queensland in 2008) sourced its
equipment from Bluetongue when that brewery had its huge upgrade. Riverside Brewery (New
South Wales, 2012) obtained their kit from Mountain Goat.
23 Australian brewers are not legislatively constrained from acting as distributors, but
nevertheless building a national sales force can be a large expense. Distributors have clear
economy of scope advantages. The increased dispersion of liquor sales across smaller bars and
restaurants also limited the market power of the macros in that space.
24 Among Bridge Road’s international collaborators have been Mikkeller and To Øl (Denmark),
Birra del Borgo (Italy), Nøgne Ø (Norway), 8 Wired (New Zealand) and De Struisse (Belgium).
25 This expansion was funded, in part, by an investment from four of the founders of Little
Creatures. This consortium now owns a 33 percent stake in Boatrocker. This may reflect an
emergent venture capital-type model in the Australian craft segment.
26 While gypsy brewers typically utilize existing excess brew capacity, they can also reduce the
uncertainty for breweries looking to upgrade to larger facilities.
27 The flexibility of the model can extend to location-flexibility, as demonstrated by globetrotting
gypsy brewers such Mikkeller, To Øl and Yeastie Boys (Maitland and Sammartino, 2012).
28 This ended a six year period of gypsy brewing by Nail, who had closed their brewery in 2004
after their founder had a serious injury.
