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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance of mission and vision in the process of state development. Using the case of Pakistan, it will be argued that state organizations do not develop and find the right direction without outlining a clear mission and vision which will be beneficial to all citizens, who are the real stakeholders. Design/methodology/approach – Yin (2003) and Baxter and Jack (2008) argue that case study is an enriched method to explore a complex relationship. The complex relationship may be understood better by qualitative methods than quantitative. Following their suggestion, case study method will be adopted to understand the relationship between the mission and vision and state development. In this study, Pakistan will be used as a case. Moreover, the technique of historical analysis will be employed to understand this relationship. Historical analysis is important because the repercussions of current actions can only be evaluated in the future. Findings – The paper shows the importance of “mission and vision” for state development. Using Pakistan as the case, it is argued that a state can lose its direction without having a clear mission and vision. It is further contended that it is not erection of institutions or verbal/written pronouncements and slogans, but a strong commitment to the mission and the vision brings the required change, which helps to develop a state. In the future research, the researcher can further examine the role of mission and vision in relation to state development. Research limitations/implications – The limitation of this study is that it has only focussed on the leadership and politics of Pakistan. In the future, a comparative study investigation may be useful. Practical implications – The research is useful for political leaders, political scientists and public management researchers. Originality/value – The research is unique and original that it evaluates the role of leadership and the development of the state from the perspective of mission and vision, which has not been done in the earlier research. Moreover, the paper elaborates the concept of state development.
Influence of mission and vision
on the state development: a case
of Pakistan
Nadeem Yousaf
Niels Brock, Copenhagen, Denmark
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance of mission and vision in the process
of state development. Using the case of Pakistan, it will be argued that state organizations do not
develop and find the right direction without outlining a clear mission and vision which will be
beneficial to all citizens, who are the real stakeholders.
Design/methodology/approach Yin (2003) and Baxter and Jack (2008) argue that case study is an
enriched method to explore a complex relationship. The complex relationship may be understood
better by qualitative methods than quantitative. Following their suggestion, case study method will be
adopted to understand the relationship between the mission and vision and state development. In this
study, Pakistan will be used as a case. Moreover, the technique of historical analysis will be employed
to understand this relationship. Historical analysis is important because the repercussions of current
actions can only be evaluated in the future.
Findings The paper shows the importance of mission and visionfor state development. Using
Pakistan as the case, it is argued that a state can lose its direction without having a clear mission and
vision. It is further contended that it is not erection of institutions or verbal/written pronouncements
and slogans, but a strong commitment to the mission and the vision brings the required change, which
helps to develop a state. In the future research, the researcher can further examine the role of mission
and vision in relation to state development.
Research limitations/implications The limitation of this study is that it has only focussed on the
leadership and politics of Pakistan. In the future, a comparative study investigation may be useful.
Practical implications The research is useful for political leaders, political scientists and public
management researchers.
Originality/value The research is unique and original that it evaluates the role of leadership and
the development of the state from the perspective of mission and vision, which has not been done in the
earlier research. Moreover, the paper elaborates the concept of state development.
Keywords Pakistan, Jinnah, Mission and vision, Nation building, State building, State development
Paper type Research paper
State building, nation building and state development are key words to evaluate the
progress of a state and governance. As argued below, these concepts do not stand in
isolation, but are interlinked. In this work, a concept of state development encompasses
all these elements instead of simply viewing it as an economic development. A state
development takes place when the system trickles down the benefits to all stakeholders
and not to an elite class only. To develop a state, political leadership needs a clear
mission and vision, which should be followed by developing and implementing the
policies and practices, which is a matter of governance. Mission and vision should not
be merely construed as catchy words or slogans rather they should be conceived as a
broad blueprint which lays down the foundations for the policies and practices.
Of course, a well-considered mission and vision should be developed based upon the
ground reality, which means analysis of available resources and environments (internal
and external).
International Journal of Public
Vol. 12 No. 1, 2016
pp. 52-72
© Emerald Group PublishingLimited
DOI 10.1108/IJPL-11-2015-0026
Received 5 November 2015
Revised 19 March 2016
Accepted 23 April 2016
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
Overall, the intent of this research is to examine the role of mission and vision and
underscore their importance and influence on state development. In this study, it will be
argued that a state does not develop when a clear mission and vision is not stated
or/and practices and process are not aligned with the mission and vision. While
searching the database, it is not found that the researchers have directly studied state
development from the perspective of mission and vision, therefore, it is expected that
this paper will provide the researchers another perspective to study state development,
state building, nation building and good governance. In order to study the stated intent,
the case study method will be applied and Pakistan will be used as a case. Using the
case example, the study will demonstrate how a lack of an appropriate mission and a
vision can hinder the development of a state.
State building refers to building up public institutions and political processes, which
may vary from state to state (Fukuyama, 2004). State or institution building should not
be merely seen as a transactional process in which a state outlines the laws and
establishes technocratic and bureaucratic institutions, but a process in which
formalization should be internalized in the stakeholders. Erecting public institutions
becomes a futile exercise if they are not trusted and accepted by the indigenous
communities in a nation state. The work of Quah (2013) regarding Singapore clearly
indicates that establishing institutions does not work effectively without the political will
of the leadership. A similar argument has been advanced in the review work of
Dellepiane-Avellaneda, (2010). Likewise, many researchers have also provided the
evidence that international intervention in the process of state building failed because the
process has not been accepted by the local communities (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2008;
Ottaway, 2002; Etzioni, 2010). Bogdandy et al. (2005) argue that a constitution does not
automatically lead to the habitus of obedience to law or enhance nationalism. Nation
building denotes to a process that strengthens state building by giving identity to
communities in a nation state (Bogdandy et al., 2005). According to Bogdandy et al.
(2005), nation state means that there can be different nations within a state. In order to
build a nation and foster nationalism in a nation state, it is important to bring different
nations together on an acceptable common agenda which provides them with an identity.
To have a common identity and nationalism, a country does not necessarily require a
homogenous social culture (Ottaway, 2002; Etzioni, 2010) provided formalization or state
building measures are accepted by the communities. Many countries are an amalgam of
different nations who ethnically and culturally differ from each other, such as Pakistan,
India, Norway, Sweden and so on. As a matter of fact, state building and nation building
are the processes which go hand in hand; and they are two sides of the same coin.
Similarly, a state development should not be seen in isolation, but an element that glues
the above mentioned elements together. State development is associated with good
governance. Governance means a process by which decisions are made and implemented
(Kamran, 2008), whereas good governance refers to credible rules of the game; and good
governance influences the distribution of a countrys wealth for the betterment of the life
of the citizens (Mhina, 2000; Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2010). In this work, a state
development is not merely seen in the sense of growth of GDP, technology or nuclear
development, but it is viewed in a broader sense. It is seen as: whether or not a state
overcomes the problems such as corruption, concentration of wealth and social and legal
injustice; whether or not national wealth has been distributed fairly to spread the benefits
at all levels of the social strata in order to bring overall economic prosperity to common
members of the state; whether or not a social and legal justice systems work in a fair and
trusted manner; whether or not public institutions strive to bring integration between
Mission and
vision on
the state
ethnic communities to promote national identity; and how far tolerance and acceptance
for diversity in terms of ethnicity, religion and gender are promoted. The nation building
and state building become meaningless if a state does not develop as explained above.
If a state follows Vilfredo Paretoprinciple of 80/20 (Sanders, 1987) in which 80 percent
wealth of a country is concentrated in 20 percent of the population, it reflects that
somewhere state institutions have failed to work effectively and have not served the
interests of all stakeholders. It is very legitimate to expect that the leadership not only
should develop a mission and vision that serves the interest of common people than the
20 percent elites only, but also implements policies and laws in its true spirit to achieve
the mission and vision of the state organization.
Mission and vision may not be common terms in political science, but they are
common in the literature of micro organizations. A number of studies show that a clear
mission and vision has a positive impact on the economic growth of organizations
(Lipton, 1996; Kantabutra and Avery, 2010). The function of mission is to identify the
purpose of existence of an organization, which differentiates it from others
(Raynor, 1998). It describes to whom an organization will serve and how it will
contribute to the stakeholders (Levin, 2000; Kelling, 2013). Communicating a mission,
clearly and eloquently, is important as it shows an intent of the organization to meet the
needs of the organization and its members (Kelling, 2013; Raynor, 1998). It broadly
outlines the primary duties and behaviors of the members (Raynor, 1998) and
leadership of an organization. Overall, it affects the value system of organization. Of
course, if a mission fails in providing the guidance, it might be due to a confusion
around the concept or a weak commitment (Kantabutra and Avery, 2010). Like a
mission, the research shows that a vision influences performance of an organization as
well (Baum et al., 1998). It outlines the future intentions and an image of an organization
which is more attractive and promising than the present (Levin, 2000).
A powerful vision is stable and indicates a long-term perspective and the future
environment in which it operates (Kantabutra and Avery, 2010). Its contents must
contain a prime goal and encompass all organizational interests (Kantabutra and
Avery, 2010) and should be desirable for all stakeholders. Investigations show that
the values and philosophies mentioned in mission and vision statements influence the
performance of firms in a long run (Williams, 2008; Lipton, 1996; Kantabutra and
Avery, 2010). It is an intellectual framework and a conceptual map for the future that
helps to design a strategic direction to move from the current to a promised position
(Mirvis et al., 2010), which galvanizes and inspires people during the time of change
and crisis. It enhances the level of commitment and brings people to work together to
achieve a common goal (Levin, 2000) because stakeholders can foresee the future
position of the organization and how they will be benefitted from the achieved position,
thus they can be more dedicated (Beardwell and Claydon, 2010; Baum et al., 1998);
whereas obscure vision leaves so much open to different interpretations (Levin, 2000)
and becomes a source of disintegration. Effective vision tells how the mission will be
advanced through setting the goals and adopting the required strategies (Levin, 2000)
that help to achieve the objectives. According to Kantabutra and Avery (2010), vision is
the starting point of any transformational process and it strengthens the strategy.
Similarly, Lipton (1996) highlights five functions of vision: it improves performance,
it provides a road map, it helps to design strategic plans, it provides focus and context
and it motivates people and connects them to the purpose. A clear vision is a belief that
lays the foundation for the shared values and organizational culture (or political culture
in a state organization). Both mission and vision affect strategy, direction, shared
values and behaviors of organizations (Slack et al., 2010; Bart, 1996). They are vital for
organizations to initiate and implement the strategy of total quality management,
which helps to ingrain values in the entire system in order to improve outputs of the
organizations (Oakland, 2011; Richards, 2012).
Mission and vision are not merely jargon of trendy concepts, slogans, buzzwords
and superfluous statements. The review of Baum et al. (1998) work shows that many
researchers indicated that clarity is among the major attributes of mission and vision.
Outlining mission and vision is not an end, but a means to reach the goals and
objectives of organizations. It is imperative that organizational processes and systems
not only align with each other to achieve the vision (Kantabutra and Avery, 2010) but
should also be implemented to achieve the desired outcomes. A stated mission and
vision becomes a futile exercise if steps are not taken to achieve the stated goals. Mirvis
et al. (2010) state that it is the implementations intent and the code of conduct that
changes the governance culture. Ambiguous mission and vision are surely more
difficult to implement than precise ones (Kahlifa, 2011; Levin, 2000). Likewise,
unimplemented mission and vision, whether ambiguous or clear, can cause huge
problems for the development of an organization and can be a source of creating
collective anxiety among stakeholders and a source of organizational learned
helplessness (Yousaf, 1993). Lack of vision and mission may lead to Garbage-can[1]
decision making (Cohen et al., 1972), which creates a situation for opportunists to
forward their vested interests in the name of an organization (Selznick, 1984) or a state.
Albeit, the role of mission and vision has not been so much emphasized in the
context of a state organization, nevertheless it has been flaccidly accepted in state
politics. When nations speak about their respective national values, such as Danish talk
about egalitarian values or the Americans employ the term a land of opportunitiesfor
the USA, they, somewhat, communicate the purpose of existence of their states.
A common slogan or a shared perception is a consequence of the mission and vision
that is promoted by the popular political leadership of a state. The first Prime Minister
of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, expressed indirectly the importance of mission and
vision when he spoke about the significance of a designin the context of a state
(Khan, 1948 in Afzal, 1967). Fukuyama (2004) argues that countriesposition can be
determined by placing them on the dimensions of strength of stateand scope of
state,which can also be seen as an aftermath of the mission and vision.
In this paper, it will be explicitly argued that the concept of mission and vision is as
important for a state organization as for a micro organizations. A well defined mission
and vision stimulates development of a state organization that helps state and nation
building, whereas an ill-defined and ambiguous mission and vision spreads confusion,
leads to organizational learned helplessness (Yousaf, 1993) and weakens the process of
nation building, state building and state development. In micro organizations, vision
and mission are drawn from the top or senior management (Slack et al., 2010), whereas
political leadership provides a framework in state organizations around which
governance revolves. Following the mission and vision, the leadership must design and
implement the policies in order to improve the condition of the common people that
strengthens their relationship with the state.
A case of Pakistan
Historical background
Pakistan came into existence on August 14, 1947 when the British separated the
Muslimsdominated areas from the rest of India, but the densely populated Muslim
Mission and
vision on
the state
princely states, such as Kashmir, were not incorporated into this plan. The division is
the result of the demand, which was put forward by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, popularly
known as Quaid-e-Azam, the then president of the All India Muslim League. Jinnah
declared division as an ideological on the grounds of the two-nation theory (Yousaf,
2015), therefore, a segment of historians propagated that the mission and vision for
Pakistan could be traced in the two-nation theory. The premise of the two-nation theory
was that Hindus and Muslims were two different nations who could not live together.
Yousaf (2015) contended Jinnahs argument that Muslims and Hindus were two
different nations on the basis of religion and could not live together in one country.
The theory of the two nations was adopted to promote limited nationalism among
Indian Muslims on the basis of religion, who were, otherwise, culturally different and
divided on the sectarian lines. Jinnah and the other proponents of the two-nation theory
hardly appreciated that Muslims were not one nation but many nations believing in
Islam. They excessively relied on one factor and considered that merely a religion
would turn Muslims into one nation, automatically, without designing and establishing
accepted practices and institutions that could lead to the desired outcomes.
The concept of the two-nation theory does not echo that the Indian Muslims had serious
problems in performing religious duties before the partition, rather it refers to the relative
economic and political deprivation in comparison with the Hindus. The
two-nation theory was not more than a demand seeking for special economic and
political concessions for the Muslim elite and the educated class living in the Hindu
dominated provinces ( Jalal, 1985). The Muslims of Hindu dominated areas had a complaint
that the British gave a preferential treatment to Hindus in comparison to Muslims. Thus,
Muslim elites, living in non-Muslim dominated urban areas, initiated movement of Muslim
nationalism whose main objectives were to secure political and economic interests, in which
religion was merely used to attain sympathies of the common Muslims. Sir Syed Ahmed
Khan[2] (popularly known as Sir Syed) was among the pioneers of the two-nation theory
(Yousaf, 2015). It was he who introduced the concept (Callard, 1957) and not Jinnah as
claimed by Umer (1973). The two-nation theory was quite nebulous, even at the time when
it was initiated. Initially, Sir Syed was more critical toward Muslims than Hindus; hence
argued that Muslims lacked sense of their own welfare and were more vindictive to each
other than Hindus; hence Muslims suffered owing to the false sense of pride (Bolitho, 1954).
Later on, he turned the guns toward Hindus to gain sympathy of both Muslims and the
British. All of Sir Syeds suggestions and demands were leading to political and economic
benefits to the Muslims living in the Hindu dominated areas. It was his idea that the
principal of universal franchise is not in the interest of Muslims as they were numerically
far less than Hindus (Malik, 1980 in Ganguly, 2009). The two-nation theory or economic
parity theory was opposed by Jinnah, when he was an active member of the All India
Congress and the proponent of anti-communal politics (Yousaf, 2015). In 1917, Jinnahs
well-considered opinion was that Muslims were in a position to compete with Hindus, thus
the British needed not to be worried about Muslims welfare (Umer, 1973). Jinnah stated
openly, if 70 million of Musalmans[3] do not approve of a measure, which is carried by a
ballot box, do you think that it could be enforced and administrated in this country?[4].
Nevertheless, he changed this stance and accepted the two-nation theory after resigning
from the congress and accepting the leadership of the All India Muslim League. He, further,
turned the economic parity demand into a religious sentiment to meet his political ends as
indicated by Glancy in his letter (see, Glancy to Wavell January 16, 1946 in Jalal, 1985;
Wolpert, 1984). After changing the stance, he propagated that the historical inspiration for
Hindus and Muslims is different on the grounds that they had their own historical heroes
and very often the hero of one was a foe of the other ( He further
argued that Muslims and Hindus differ from each other in their philosophies, customs,
norms, literature, language, art, architecture and history by virtue of differences in religions
( Jinnah to Gandhi, 1944 in Pirzada, 1977) ( Jinnahs assertion will be debated below).
The proponents of the two-nation theory blended religion and culture without appreciating
that both are the two distinct phenomena though they may influence each other.
Islam and Hinduism are, indubitably, two different religions and demand different
practices; however, the important question is: were (are) the United Indias Hindus and
Muslims really so much different from each other culturally as claimed by Jinnah and
his adherents? If we go by Jinnahs simplistic definition of nation(ignoring the
concept of nation-states), then Christians, Sikhs and so many other different religious
communities living in India should have demanded a separate state. As a matter of fact,
the people of the United India, though following the different religions, have been
culturally as close or different as the two communities could be; and this condition still
prevails in both of the countries after independence. Despite similarities, the
proponents of the two-nation theory are reluctant to admit the reality that culture plays
a more vital role than religion in integrating people; if this was not the case Bengali and
Punjabi provincial Muslim Leaguesleaders would have not endeavored behind the
doors for undivided provinces on the grounds of cultural similarity between the two
communities ( Jalal, 1985). Pilkington (2011) rightly pointed out that East Pakistanis
were culturally dissimilar to the West Pakistanis; and, the same can be said about now
Bangladesh Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans and Blauchies. Except religion, the people of all
these provinces were dissimilar on all those accounts that Jinnah narrated in relation to
Muslims and Hindus. He stated that Hindus had their own history, heroes, languages,
values and norms, which is not completely true[5]. Broadly speaking, Muslims
and Hindus were (and are) not so much different culturally as propagated by the
conservative nationalists. Jinnah misconstrued elements of culture. Religion is a part of
the culture, but not a culture as a whole. Aside from religious values, Muslims and
Hindus were (are) quite similar, if not the same: their cooking style, marriage
ceremonies (except a few practices and rituals[6]), clothing and general living style are
quite alike to each other. Similarly, Hindi and Urdu spoken version is almost the same,
except the written script. Muslims and Hindus have different and common heroes, for
example, the famous poet Mirza Ghalib is a common asset for both communities.
Culturally, it will be disadvantageous to both communities if any one disowns the
common heroes. Even if it is true that Muslims and Hindus do not marry with each
other this happens as well within Muslimssects; there are only countable examples of
intra-marriages between Shias and Sunnis. Likewise, only countable marriages take
place between different Muslimsethnic groups because each ethnic group prefers to
marry within its own group[7]. At the advent of Islam in India, Indians converted to
Islam without relinquishing their culture, completely. If there is any veracity in Jungs
(1970) concept of the collective unconscious, which means our ancestral life and the
cumulative experience of past generations influence us, the Hindu forefathers
transferred the culture to their by-birthIndians Muslim (including to the Pakistani
Muslims). Both groups lived together for so many centuries under the Muslim Moghul
rule and influenced each others social and moral values: if Hindus introduced
Dal-Rotito the Muslim invaders so the Kebabwas introduced by the invaders to
Hindus (see, Beg, 1986), which became common dishes for both communities. Owing
to a common social and cultural vision, both hated the invasion of the British and
fought the war of Independence together in 1857 (Beg, 1986). As a matter of fact,
Mission and
vision on
the state
Muslims and Hindus lived together for centuries in India and the Indian princely states
where they were either in the majority or minority and ruled either by a Hindu or a
Muslim ruler, nonetheless the two-nation theory only emerged under the reign of the
British rule. Beg (1986) and many others assert that the British had ruled India by
following the principle of divide and rule,which enhanced differences between
Hindus and Muslims. By arguing divide and ruletactic, they not only contradict
themselves, but also tacitly support Gandhis point of view when he discredited the
division of India by questioning how far really these two nations were culturally
different based on religion. In a letter addressed to Jinnah in 1944 Gandhi asked
(Gandhi to Jinnah in Pirzada, 1977), would India become one nationif the whole of
India had accepted Islam? Of course not. Moreover, if Hindus and Muslims of the
United India were so different why had the Muslim leaders of Muslim dominated
provinces not shown this concern or promoted the two-nation theory? Few proponents
of the two-nation theory answer this question. Despite the Muslim League propaganda,
the two-nation theory was not the hot concern in the Muslims dominating regions. For
example, the provincial leaders Fazal-e-Haq and Khizer Hayat of Bengal and Punjab,
respectively, never considered that Muslims and Hindus of Bengal and Punjab were so
different that they could not live together; on the contrary, they pointed out that
Punjabis and Bengalis shared a few cultural values with each other ( Jalal, 1985). When
the Cabinet Mission in 1946 came to find the strategy to give independence to India, the
provincial key leaders, Bengals Suhrawardy, Sinds Ghulam Hussain, and Punjabs
Khizer Hayat, had strong provincial sentiments without any reference to the two-nation
theory ( Jalal, 1985; Wolpert, 1984). Even at the time of the division in 1947, Suhrawardy
tried hard to get an intact and independent Bengal and the endeavor was supported by
Jinnah (Wolpert, 1984). The leadership of Muslim majority provinces hardly embraced
the concept of the two-nation theory, enthusiastically, therefore Wavell was of the
opinion that the idea of Pakistan was much stronger among Muslims in the Muslim-
minority provinces than the Muslims majority (Wolpert, 1984). Likewise, Jinnah was
not ignorant of the above fact, thus he stated, Dont forget the minority provinces, it is
they who have spread the light when there was darkness in the majority provinces;
it is they who had suffered for you in the majority province for your sake, for your
benefits and for your advantage(see, footnote 155 Jalal, 1985). The above evidence
from the history demonstrate that religion and culture were used as a gimmick to
market the political agenda by the then political leadership of the Muslims. As a matter
of fact, the emerged mission and vision from the efforts of Jinnah was to serve the
narrow political and economic interests of a specific Muslim class than giving a vision
and mission for a new Muslim nation-state. Although the campaign helped Jinnah to
become a sole Muslimsleader of United India (Yousaf, 2015), he hardly understood the
cultural environment that surrounded the Muslims areas.
To conclude, the All India Muslim Leagues mission of economic and political parity
under the theme of the two-nation theory might be more acceptable for the United India
than for an independent state. Although the demand of economic parity resulted in the
division of India, it did not serve the cause of Muslims, except a small elite group.
Approximately, a half of the Muslims population remained in India after independence
and the rest got the new masters in the name of independence who did not change the
quality of life of common people. The two-nation theory is such an ambiguous concept,
which can destroy integration of any country, if not interpreted properly. The said
theory could have some value in providing mission and vision for an independent state
if it was appropriately construed to advance the economic and political interests of
common Muslims and minorities. Unfortunately, it has not been interpreted in this
sense in Pakistan after independence.
Like the two-nation theory, it is completely absurd to argue that the All India Muslim
League under the leadership of Jinnah manifested mission and vision for Pakistan in the
1940 resolution. Again, the resolution was rather a bundle of economic and political
demands than a mission or vision for an independent state. The resolution demanded
that all cabinets in the center and local levels should have at least 1/3 representation of
Muslims; and Muslims representation in the central legislature assembly should have not
less than 1/3. Primarily, such demands were made to bring political benefits to the
Muslims residing in the minority areas than the Muslimsdominated provinces.
Similarly, other demands such as promoting Muslimseducation, language, religion,
personal laws and a due share in grants-in-aid were made to address social, political and
economic interests of those Muslims who were living in the areas where they were in the
minority. Furthermore, it was nowhere written in the resolution that the Muslims
dominated regions, such as North-West, Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan and Bengal, would
constitute a separate, autonomous and independent state (
Neither the resolution nor the attendees of the public meeting used the term Pakistan.
In fact, it was the Indian newspapers that changed the content of the demands by
printing sensational headlines in the newspapers, which pronounced the Lahore
resolution as a Resolution of Pakistan(Wolpert, 1984), which changed the course of the
history, to some extent. Before the resolution, the word Pakistanwas, for the first time,
used in the pamphlet Now or Never,written by Chaudhary Rehmat Ali in 1933, which
was hardly approved of by the then leadership of the All India Muslim League and
Jinnah; the proposal was rather ridiculed to a larger extent. The word Pakistan was
developed by using the acronyms of the regions: P for Punjab, A for Afghanistan[8], K for
Kashmir, S for Sind and Tan for Blauchistan. Interestingly, Bengal acronym[9] was not
even a part of the concept of Pakistanand Afghanistan acronym was added where the
British had no control; nor were the people of Afghanistan a party to the demand of
independent state. Kashmir[10] was hardly pursued during the movement of
independence and at the time of the partition. The resolution nowhere indicates that
the separation was even considered as a viable solution to address the problems of all
Muslims living in the United India. It was a vague document which was written to have
something to negotiate in the future. The resolution was so much confusing (Wolpert,
1984) that Jinnah was reluctant to explain it to Gandhi and Neru in his correspondence,
except mentioning that the objectives were self-explanatory (see, Jinnah Correspondence
with Gandhi and Neru in Pirzada, 1977). Moreover, when the resolution passed, there
were no signs of independence of India; and all the parties working to gain power around
the Act of 1935. The Act of 1935 was in favor of weak center and greater autonomy to
the provinces, which implied that Muslims were not insecure where they were in the
majority. So, the major issue was to secure more rights and privileges for the Muslims
living in the areas where they were in a minority; and, of course, the division of India was
not an upright solution for them.
The 1940 resolution had a completely different mission and vision than an
independent country. Accepting Pakistan as a separate and an independent entity
meant leaving millions of Muslims behind in India and a departure from the original
mission and vision of the All India Muslim League, which was economic parity between
Muslims and Hindus. The solution brought a few benefits to a few Muslims whose
nationality changed overnight from Indian to Pakistanibut hardly brought any
benefit to those Muslims who remained in India. According to Kishwar (2012), the
Mission and
vision on
the state
partition turned Indian Muslims into a mistrusted minority,which is quite true
because Hindu radical leaders time to time remind Indian Muslims that they should
move to Pakistan. The creation of Pakistan was not a result of a clear mission and
vision, but a product of circumstances that satisfied the three parties, namely, the
British, the All India Congress and the All India Muslim League[11] (Yousaf, 2015).
Jinnah used the resolution and the two-nation theory as a political stunt to increase
pressure on the British and the All India Congress party for gaining larger share in
political power and economic incentives for a specific Muslim-class, living in minority
areas in the United India, but failed. The leadership of the Muslim dominated area,
halfheartedly, supported Jinnah on different assumptions, only a few years before the
independence, though they were not very enthusiastic about having the separate
country ( Jalal, 1985). Jinnah did not bring them to support the agenda of the All India
Muslim League through political discourse or changing their political values and
culture, but by following the popular politics of the region of making and breaking
coalition for personal vested interests; and gaining the backdoor support of the British
during the Second World War (Yousaf, 2015).
The meticulous examination of the history reveals that the All India Muslim League
lost the real goal of having better political and economic terms for Muslims living in
Hindus dominated areas; and accepted the face saving solution in the shape of Pakistan
(Yousaf, 2015), which might have satisfied all the negotiating parties but did not bring
fruitful results for the real stakeholders the citizens of Pakistan (or to those Muslims
who remained in India). The resolution could have been construed as a mission and a
vision for the independent Pakistan if the common people of the newly independent
state were considered as the real stakeholders, which was not the case, unfortunately.
Pakistan has been testing different models of governance since 1947 without bringing
any real change because the leadership had no mission and vision before independence,
nor strived to create after the independence. All the changes that have been initiated
are, more or less, cosmetic and analogous to the old saying, an old wine in a new
bottle.The old wine has been sold with new labels such as Islamic democracy ( Jinnah
and Liaquat Ali Khan), Islamic secularism (Gen. Ayub Khan), Islamic socialism
(Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto), Islamization (Gen. Zia-ul-Haq) and an enlightened democracy
(General Pervaiz Musharraf). The regimes of Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Asif
Ali Zardari[12] did not even bother to take the support of any cosmetic ideology[13].
It demonstrates that it is not democracy or any form of government, but the intentions
are more important that are, usually, shown through vision and mission and
implementation (see: Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2010).
The mission and vision of the All India Muslim League before the pre-partition were
for the elite class, so the same legacy was followed after the independence. Historically,
Pakistans political class consists of upper class landlords (industrialists and military
generals joined the group at the later stage) who have no understanding of modern
concept of state building and nation building. Self and vested interests than a political
ideology galvanized them to enter into politics to gain monetary benefits. Their
collective unconscious was built upon Mughal emperors, who believed in Webers
(1978) traditional authority, and viceroys (also acted like emperors) who treated Indian
citizens as subjects. Overall, the political training they received from the British to
serve the British empire to gain personal benefits. So, they served the British to be
rewarded with lands and various titles such as Sir or Justice of Peace.The All India
Muslim League was a group of opportunists who followed the same tendency after the
independence and transferred the legacy to the younger generations, thus the modern
concepts of governance or/and politics remained alien to Pakistani leadership.
Their royal type collective unconscious does not allow them to pay attention to the
Weberian principle that differentiates between public and private property (Weber,
1978). It has been a common phenomenon since partition to misuse public resources
and properties as personal resources and properties. Lord Birkenhead, Secretary
of State for United India, had recognized this tendency long time ago and said in 1924:
To me it is frankly inconceivable that India will ever be fit for Dominion Self-
government(Bolitho, 1954). Pakistan and the other South Asian countries so far
proved that he was correct in his assessment. The establishment of honest
administration and the institutionalization of democracy had never been on the priority
list of any government since day one of the independence (Kamran, 2008).
After independence, the salient message of the two-nation theory and the 1940
resolution pushed away because it was no more suited to the elite class. Instead of
following the salient message or developing a new mission and vision for the newly
independent state, pre-partition tendency of promoting personal interests was
followed (Yousaf, 2015). India, Hindus and religion remained in the forefront as
political tools to divert the attention of the masses from the real issues. Pakistan
declared India as a number one enemy, especially after the Kashmir issue, and it is
still the main concern for the elite group, whereas the real issues such as corruption
and poverty pushed behind. The leadership diverted the attention of the people of
Pakistan by initiating meaningless debates, such as, whether or not Pakistan would
be a republic or an Islamic Republic without indicating how it would influence the
overall destiny of the people. Declaring Pakistan as an Islamic republic hardly
brought any positive change, except aggravating the problems of a common man,
minorities and women. A lack of a clear mission and vision created a vacuum and
turned each decision making situation into a garbage-can (see March and Olson,
1979), which gave opportunists a chance to promote their own subjective and vested
interests in the name of religion and security of the state (see Callard, 1957). Personal
privileges and facilities were on the top of the priorities, even in the days of economic
depression, instead of building and strengthening the institutions to serve the people.
Ironically, the government had sufficient funds, immediately after independence, to
buy the building for the Chancery in the USA, costing US$150,000 and the car and
airplane for Jinnah, when Pakistan was suffering from critical economic crisis to meet
daily expenses and seeking loans from the international financial institutions (see
Wolpert, 1984). Many historians indicate that Jinnah was told that an independent
country might not be a viable solution due to lack of economic resources; he not only
ignored the warning, but also he did not design any strategy to handle the economic
problems. Similarly, at the political level, Jinnah did not strive to strengthen the
institutions. His words were seen as the law of the country. The legislative assembly
and the government offices adopted merely as a rubber-stamping function under his
leadership (Ziring, 2003). Against the cannon of democracy, Jinnah arbitrarily
declared Urdu as the national language undermining the major regional languages:
Bengali, Pushto, Blauchi Shindi and Punjabi. Resentment to the decision, especially in
East Pakistan, was ignored, which laid the foundation for the separation of the
Eastern part. It was Jinnahs wishful thinking and ignorance of reality that all people
of Pakistan would, overnight, cease to be Muslims, Hindus and Christians as well as
Bengali, Pathan, Punjabi and Blauchi if not they were fifth columnists ( Jinnah in
Mission and
vision on
the state
Ali, 1967). Ignoring the ground reality of ethnic diversity, Jinnah adopted center-to-
periphery(Etzioni, 2010) approach to achieve the goal of nation building. The later
regimes, civilian and military, followed the same easy approach and failed.
After the demise of Jinnah, the first Prime Liaquat Ali Khan fancied to exert his
authority as powerfully as Jinnah without any vision. His struggle to put on Jinnahs
shoes was challenged by others, for example, Federal ministers like Malik Ghulam
Mohammad and Zafar Ali Khan were reluctant to follow Liaquat Ali Khan instructions
(Kiran, 2012). The other leaders of the Muslim League[14] also got busy in creating
factions in the party or establishing new political parties to weaken his authority.
Under the fragile authority, the frightened Prime Minister (Liaquat Ali Khan) was more
concerned about the security of his regime in the name of the state than building and
strengthening institutions. He took the actions that were opposed to his
pronouncements in which he uttered that Pakistan would protect fundamental
human rights and follow principles of democracy, equality, tolerance, freedom of
expression and social, economic and political justice where all people, irrespective of
gender, caste, color and religion, would be treated equally in the eyes of the state
(Khan, 1950). Within a short span of time, he diverted from his stated espoused values
regarding democracy and introduced the Act of Public and Representative Officer
Disqualification (PRODA) in 1949 to establish his hegemony on the system and to
control the opposition (Talbot, 2009; Callard, 1957). Like Jinnah, he called his opponents
either fifth columnistsor Indian agents.In order to provide a safeguard to his
authority, he looked for a support from other channels such as the armed forces and
religious elements. He excessively started to praise the armed forces and spent
75 percent of the budget on them (Liaquat Speech April 9 and April 15, 1948 in
Afzal, 1967) by developing a fear of India. Since then, the army has taken for granted to
be treated as a preferred and superior institution. Similarly, Liaquat played a card of
religion and passed the Objectives Resolution to gain the support from the religious
elements of the society. According to the Objective Resolution[15], sovereignty
belonged to God Almighty alone and the representatives of people would exercise
power and authority on the principles of democracy, freedom, equality tolerance and
social justice as enunciated by Islam. His argument was that the state would enable
Muslims to lead, individually and collectively, an Islamic way of life as mentioned in the
Quran and Sunnah. (Afzal, 1967; Khan, 1950). Apparently, the document appeared to be
virtuous, but it further spread the confusion by mixing democracy and religion. The
document, which had both a secular and an Islamic face, opened the room for so many
interpretations and widened the door to mix state politics with religion. While passing
the resolution, no one paid attention to the qualms of minorities, therefore, Bhim Shen
Sacher predicted that Pakistan would create more minorities in the system to satisfy
the dominant group of Muslims (Afzal, 1967). According to Callard (1957), the concerns
of the non-Muslims members of the Constitution Assembly were hardly addressed
while drafting the first constitution of Pakistan. The religious appearance of the
Objective Resolution has dominated all constitutions and laws at the espoused level.
The religious forces strengthened their political position due to the clauses of the
resolution, which were also incorporated in the 1973 constitution. It was the religious
pressure that made Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to declare Ahamdies as non-Muslims, who
indeed struggled in the movement for Pakistan side by side with other Muslim sects.
To worsen the situation, the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, in the name of Sharia, further
toughened the laws such as blasphemy and Hooded Act and introduced ambiguous
terms in the constitution like Momin[16].Overall, his Islamic initiatives have
escalated problems of people, including the depressed groups such as religious
minorities and women (Yousaf, 2003). At times, minorities were killed by people due to
religious intolerance or sentenced under the pretext of blasphemy. Recent news
regarding the Hindusstruggles of migration to India (Dawn News, 2012a, d, e) and
killing of non-Muslims by people[17] (Mail Online, 2014) are further evidence that the
situation has worsened for minorities in Pakistan. Since the Islamization policy of
military dictator, Zia-ul-Haq, the tension between Shia and Sunny Muslims has
increased. Owing to Islamization, started from the Objective Resolution, the tolerance
level for other religions and sects has considerably decreased in Pakistan. The
campaign for implementation of Sharia or Nizam-e-Mustafa in 1977 was not a
calculated mission and vision for the state, but a result of the vested interest politics of
the military and religious political parties. It was more a campaign to gain political
power than to address the issues of a common man.
All regimes strengthened the notion of the security of the governmentin the name
of the state to suppress the opposition instead of promoting the concept of a welfare
state. The trend of security of the governmentwas informally started by calling the
opponents the fifth columnistsor the Indian agentand formally by introducing
the laws as PRODA. Constitutions and laws have been either repealed, amended or
twisted according to the needs of the sitting government. Pakistan got three
constitutions, 1956, 1962 and 1973, but none of them could be implemented in its true
spirit. They have never been seen as documents that provide the mission and vision of
the state, but a piece of paper. All these constitutions hardly influenced and controlled
the behavior of military and civil leadership and institutions. Contrary to the spirit
of the abolished constitutions and the current constitution of 1973, the Pakistani
political and military leadership has always fascinated the role of the British Viceroy
(Ziring, 2003). Since independence, the leaders have taken it as their prerogative to defy
the constitution, rules and regulation or interpret them according to their own interests
and convenience. Except on a few occasions, the judicial verdicts have been more
political than fair and influenced by the doctrine of necessity[18].The viceroys
mentality of the elite ruling group became the reason for separation of East Pakistan in
1971. Despite, the sad incident of 1971, the mentality of the elite class has not been
changed. Still, the incumbents of the political and bureaucratic positions act brutally
toward masses to the extent that extra-judicial killing has become a norm of the day; it
has reached to the level where military, paramilitary forces and police can kill the
accused without producing to the legal court (Dawn News, 2012c). It is a failure of the
civil government and judicial system that the parliament passed the act to establish
military courts to handle cases of terrorism (Dawn News, 2015). Many argue that the
amendment in the constitution was made on the demand of the army. Overall, the state
laws are unable to control the actions and behavior of the powerful institutions and
individuals. Corruption mushroomed under all civil and military regimes and the
condition of civil liberties deteriorated. All powerful individuals and institutions merely
accuse each other of corruption without admitting their own corrupt deeds and
shortcomings. Consequently, Pakistan has become part of the most corrupt nations and
ranked 126 with score 29 among the 182 surveyed countries (Transparency
International Report, 2014); however the recent report shows some improvement and
the ranking improved from 126 to 117 (Transparency International Report, 2015)[19].
The findings of the transparency report suggest that nothing can be done without
employing unfair means. According to another report, wealth looted by the corrupt
methods, until 1999, has amounted to $36 billion (Khan et al. in Samad, 2008).
Mission and
vision on
the state
The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Chairman, Admiral (retd.) Fasih Bokhari,
alleged that Pakistan loses up to seven billion rupees (US$72 million) daily through all
types of corruption (Dawn News, 2012f ). Major beneficiaries of the corruption are
military and civil bureaucrats, politicians, religious leaders, industrialists and landlords
(see Samad, 2008; Taj, 2012). They have been making millions of dollars through bribe,
kickbacks and other illegal means by disregarding the process of accountability (Taj,
2012). By virtue of corruption, the most dishonest and corrupt people are holding top
level political and bureaucratic positions in the country, for example, the ex-President
Zardari has been accused in money laundry and other corruption cases; Nawaz Sherif,
the current prime minister, has been accused of similar charges. Recently, Panama
Papers exposed the huge investments of his children for which he failed to satisfy the
nation how they arranged the finances to invest overseas. The accusations are that it is
Nawaz Sharifs illegal money, which he transferred overseas, using unfair means. The
recent statement of the Prime Minister that he would clip the wings of National
Accountability Bureau (NAB)is construed by political analysts that he feared that
NAB might initiate a case against him and his relative, friends and ministers (see, e.g.
Tahir, 2016). The corruption of political leaders, military and civil bureaucrats and
judges is no more a secret to people due to vibrant electronic and print media, however,
exposure of their corruption hardly carries any effect on them. They escape from the
law without being punished. The corrupt and their sycophants shamelessly appear on
various TV channels and reject the hardcore evidence. Due to the high level of
corruption and other reasons Pakistan ranked 12 on the failed state index (Foreign
Policy Institution, 2011).
In short, Pakistan has established all sorts of institutions which is considered a
prerequisite for state and nation building, but the ground reality is that they proved to
be a futile exercise. They hardly function as they should be. In the process of state
building only the army emerged as the powerful institution, which unfortunately
served the institutions own interests more than the national. Overall, the performance
of the public institutions is poor; they bend the rules and follow the doctrine of
necessity to facilitate the powerful individuals and institutions.
Pakistan has not developed in the direction where the stakeholders (common
citizens) would be benefited, which led the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971.
The proponents of the two-nation theory are hardly willing to accept that the
emergence of Bangladesh has failed the two-nation-theory, which claimed that
communities could become a nation on the ground of religion. Similarly, ignoring the
implementation of the spirit of the 1940 resolution after independence has rather
weaken nationalism than strengthening it. The post-independence history of Pakistan
does not support the nationalists claim that if Muslims had not taken a separate land
they would have a worthless life under the dominance of Hindus because there are no
evidence that Muslims living in India envy Muslims of Pakistan. The current economic
conditions and injustice do not justify the propaganda of nationalists that a common
man enjoys a better quality of life after independence (Yousaf, 2004). Comparing
Jinnahs, 1946 observations, in which he observed that the Bengalis did not have food
once a day, with the current situation, only a little economic and social conditions have
been changed, so far, in Pakistan. Many people in Pakistan, reported or not, die due to
hunger or malnutrition and Tharparkar district is one of the examples (Ahmed, 2014;
Arisar, 2014). For common Muslims, Pakistan has not turned into a land of the pure
which lured ordinary Muslims during the movement of independence. Aesthetically, a
land of the pure reflects: a society based on equality, honesty, fair justice system,
abortion of the class system, honest administrative system, equal economic
opportunities for all and the government of the people serving the larger interest of
the community. Unfortunately, the aesthetic meaning has been espoused as a tactic by
the civilian and military leadership to gain power, but never implemented. Common
Muslims were subjectbefore the independence and they remained the same after
getting a new flag on August 14, 1947. Instead of becoming a land of pure it has become
a land of corrupts and corrupt practices. No one strived to change the pre-independence
political, bureaucratic and social high power distanceculture (see Hofstede, 1994).
Despite of independence, the masses have not discontinued giving high or better
protocolto the Masterswhose skin color is the same as theirs. Briefly, the leadership
of pre and post-independence failed to give a proper mission and vision for Pakistan,
where ordinary citizens could enjoy the fruit of independence. Consequently, it appears
that the mission and vision of the state is to serve the interests of the corrupt and
powerful individuals and institutions rather than the people of Pakistan.
Pakistans future
Pakistan lost its East wing in 1971 because of the arrogance and short-sightedness of
military and civil leadership. Sadly, the incident did not leave any strong imprints on
the political and bureaucratic leadership. Likewise, the declared nuclear state and the
vibrant electronic media have not changed the condition of Pakistan in a positive
direction. Nor is the condition of the national economy very promising. The current
Foreign exchange reserves of $21 billion (Dawn News, 2016) are not due to increased
economic growth, but the results of the loans that the state has borrowed from the
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. Albeit, the vision or
slogan of Sharif during the 2013 election campaign was that he would not take a loan
from the monetary institutions and eradicate corruption from the country, the current
situation is the opposite. The recent analysis is that Pakistan may default on its debt in
2016 (Mangi and Patil, 2016) due to the loans. The Pakistani analysts fear that the
overall debt will be so much around 2020 that Pakistan will be demanded to
compromise its nuclear program. The talk-shows on the private television channels
highlight the corruption, misuse and misappropriation of the public money of the past
and sitting governments, however, the state affairs are still not moving in the right
Politically and economically, smaller provinces have been showing dissatisfaction
with the center, the dominating role of the Punjab province (see Fuller, 1991) and the
military. Khyber Pukhtoonkhawa (old NWFP[20]) is dissatisfied with the center and
Punjab on various issues such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project
(Ali, 2016), electricity and so on (Ashfaq, 2015). The tribal areas in the North-West have
become a safe heaven for terrorists. The Sind province has similar grievances. Though
weak, the interior of Sind has its own nationalist movement. Bashir Qurashi of Jia Sind
National Front said in a public meeting on March 23, 2012 that the independence of
Sind and Baluchistan was inevitable because people of these provinces were deprived
of their rights ( Jang, 2012b). The disgruntled nationalist leaders of Baluchistan demand
independence from Pakistan. The situation in Baluchistan has further deteriorated
since Musharrafs Regime killed renowned Baluchi leader Akbar Bugti. Akhter Mengal
(2012 in Jang, 2012b), a Baluchi leader, argued, if Pakistan demands plebiscite in Indian
Occupied Kashmir so why it was not possible in Baluchistan ( Jang, 2012a). A bill was
tabled on Baluchistan in the US House of Representative stating that the Baloch nation
Mission and
vision on
the state
has a right to self-determination (Dawn News, 2012a). Regardless of internal and
external dangerous environments, leaders are busier with lip-service and turning each
decision making situation into a garbage-can situation to advance their vested interests
rather than sincerely addressing the real issues. Despite the fact that social, political
and legal ills and feelings of insecurity have mushroomed over the period, no one pays
heed to these issues, seriously.
There is no change in relation to what has been indicated by Yousaf (2012) that
political and bureaucratic leaderships (civilian and military), both at provincial and
national levels, have been serving vested interests in the name of religion, provincial
autonomy and national security[21]. Baluchistan political leader Nawab Akbar Bugti
(1997 in Sagar, 2005) rightly stated that Pakistan had a similar system which had been
successfully running in other countries, but it ruined us; because we did not apply it in
its true letter and spirit. The system is not working because it has not been built upon a
clear mission and vision in which interests of common people are incorporated. It is still
unclear in a real sense the purpose (mission) of creating Pakistan and where it wants to
be in the future (vision). It is very likely that Pakistan further disintegrates if a clear
mission and vision will not be developed and implemented, very soon.
The crux of the above discussion is that state building, nation building and state
development cannot take place without having a proper mission and vision and
implemented through governance. Merely, erecting the institutions, verbal/written
pronouncements and slogans will not be sufficient to develop a state. Moreover, it will
be a futile exercise if the stated mission and vision do not serve the interests of
80 percent of the stakeholders and trickled down the benefits of development to the
grassroots level.
The above debate on Pakistan shows that the leadership of pre and post-
independence of Pakistan failed to give a clear mission and vision and hardly showed
keen interest in implementing whatever they espoused in the public, whether in writing
and/or verbally. Studying the political history of Pakistan depicts, mission and vision
had always been ambiguous since the generation of the idea of securing rights for
Muslims in India. Religion, secularism, ethnicity and nationalism were blended in such
a way that blurred the picture, which created an identity crisis and chaos after
independence. Consequently, Pakistan is still struggling whether it is an Islamic or a
Muslim state or religious or secular state; and how these terms should be interpreted.
Due to the fuzzy mission and vision, no consensus has ever evolved, either in pre or
post-partition politics, as to what the country should achieve. Consequently, Pakistan
has been facing a huge problem in finding the right direction since its birth, though it
has tested different models of governing from democracy to dictatorship and from
secularism to Islamization. Since there was no clear mission and vision, consequently
all models of governance failed to give a direction to the country. Over the period, the
country has become a land of opportunity for all sorts of national and international
evils and conspiracies. A vacuum of an appropriate clear mission and vision has made
it easier for the opportunists to promote their vested interest agenda in the name of
people and the state. Due to vested interest politics, the leadership was unwilling to
develop solid and stable policies and practices, which could develop the state in a real
sense and strengthened the state and nation building process. The three constitutions,
more or less introduced a cosmetic change without bringing the required changes in the
behavior of political and bureaucratic leadership. Due to corrupt practices, all
institutions failed to deliver and serve the citizens and the state of Pakistan. Owing to
the absence of a clear mission and vision, Pakistani political and bureaucratic
leadership continued to act like a colonial government of viceroythan the local
leaders, where the laws of the country are not treated more than a tissue paper. The
current situation is not very promising because nothing is clear as to what Pakistan
wishes to achieve in the future. Hence, the level of dissatisfaction and feelings of
insecurity has been increasing at the mass level. A strong fear has generated that
Pakistan may experience a further disintegration or a chaos in the future around 2020,
if the political and civil and military leadership failed to give a clear mission and vision
and implement it with honesty and sincerity.
Implications and limitations
Although it is a limitation of the study that it is has only focussed on Pakistan,
the discussion may be valid for other developing countries such as India and
Bangladesh. In the future, it will be useful to conduct a comparative study to
understand further the role of mission and vision in the process of state development,
state building, nation building.
1. Garbage-can decision making refers to the situation where participants, opportunities,
solutions and problems are mixed in a way where the decision-making process does not
address the issue in hand.
2. He lived in the area where Hindus were in the majority and the representative of the middle
educated class of Muslims.
3. Muslims.
4. Jinnah speech at All India Muslim League session at Calcutta in December 1917.
5. If this is true for Hindus than it is also true for Blauchies, Sindhis and Pathans because they
have their own languages, customs, mores and norms.
6. For example, dowry and arranged marriages are common practices. Similarly, some
functions such as Mehendiprior to marriage ceremony are common in both communities.
7. Only a few marriages takes place between people of different ethnic groups such as
Blauchies, Pathans, Sindhis and Punjabis.
8. Including the area of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
9. East Pakistan and now Bangladesh.
10. Kashmir became bone of contention between Pakistan and India shortly after independence.
11. The All India Muslim League was completely controlled by Jinnah at the time of
12. Asif Ali Zardari held the office of the president (2008-2013), which was constitutionally
a ceremonial office, nevertheless the PPP government was not free to act without
his consent.
13. There are a number of corruption cases registered against them, however, either they were
set free from the charges when they came into the power or a little progress has been, so far,
made in those cases.
14. After independence, All India Muslim League changed to Muslim League.
Mission and
vision on
the state
15. Some researchers says that it was detrimental for the unity of people and leaders like Zia-ul-Haq
and religious-political leaders misused it in the later politics.
16. A true believer, who practices Islamic commandments with its true spirit.
17. Such incidents are not isolated cases in Pakistan. Everyday newspapers publish stories of
killing of common people in Pakistan, irrespective of their religious affiliations.
18. The Supreme Court legitimized all the military rules. Overall, the judicial courts give
verdicts in favor of the sitting government whether civilian or military.
19. The political analysts criticized and condemned the report and considered politically
motivated. The argument is that corruption has increased since Nawaz Sharif came
into power.
20. North West Frontier Province.
21. Aitzaz Ahsan, famous politician and lawyer, says that military dictators have
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About the author
Nadeem Yousaf is associated with Niels Brock, Copenhagen, Denmark. His teaching and research
interests fall within the area of management and public administration. Leadership, conflict
management and organizational development of micro and macro organizations are his key
research interests. He also worked in the corporate sector and held middle and senior
management positions in different countries. Nadeem Yousaf can be contacted at:
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... In organizations, the idealized influence in the sense of "role model" is almost non-existent, and if it exists, it is to the extent that close lieutenants desire to have the same power and authority that their leaders enjoy. For example, Liaquat Ali Khan wanted to have the same admiration, power, and authority by claiming a true disciple of Jinnah (Yousaf, 2016). The distant followers (who are not in an immediate and close contact with the leader) can have inspiration for a specific idea, but they do not necessarily imitate the lifestyle or admire the ideology, especially if it needs cognitive or/and behavioral change (see Howell and Shamir, 2005). ...
... Only an analysis of history can reveal how actions influenced the culture and effectiveness of the organization. A critical historical analysis provides rich information about the repercussions of the actions (Yousaf, 2016). Understanding the influences of history through the comparative historical analysis helps to improve the theoretical constructs (Mahoney, 2004). ...
... Leaders do not articulate the vision that is contradictory to the values and motives of the followers (see House, 1995in Ammeter et al., 2002. According to Conger andKanungo (1998 in Conger, 1999), the leaders may not be the sole nor the original source of the vision; however, their role in bringing clarity and working toward the vision cannot be ignored (Yousaf, 2016;Shamir, 1999). ...
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