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University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Arts - Papers Faculty of Arts
2003
Making censorship backfire
S. Curry Jansen
Muhlenburg College, Pennsylvania, USA
B. Martin
University of Wollongong, bmartin@uow.edu.au
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the
University of Wollongong. For further information contact Manager
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Recommended Citation
Curry Jansen, S. and Martin, B., Making censorship backfire 2003.
http://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/54
Making censorship
backfire
Published in Counterpoise, Vol. 7, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 5-
15. A few corrections to the printed text are indicated by
square brackets [].
Sue Curry Jansen
Muhlenberg College, Pennsylvania
Brian Martin
University of Wollongong, Australia
Go to
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"[C]ensorship may not suppress alternative views but
rather generate them, and, by doing so, undermine its
own aims." Antoon de Baets (2002, p. 23)
In the age of instantaneous global communications, overt
censorship is always a risky endeavor. Attempts to repress
'dangerous ideas' sometimes have the opposite effect: that is,
they serve as catalysts for expanding the reach, resonance
and receptivity of those ideas.
Judith Levine's book Harmful to Minors (2002), a scholarly
assessment of U.S. popular views and laws about sexuality,
came under heavy attack from the right for allegedly
promoting pedophilia and other evils. Although these
attacks must have been personally offensive to the author,
the controversy surrounding the book appears to have
generated far greater sales for this academic book than
anyone would [have] anticipated: it rose to number 25 on
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Amazon.com's bestseller list (Flanders, 2002).
An alert parent, Jeanne Heifetz, discovered that in recent
years the New York State Department of Education had
been systematically bowdlerizing classic literary texts for
use on the state-wide Regents examinations, which public
school students are required to take to graduate from high
school. In a case of political correctness gone mad, the test
preparers had expunged virtually any mention of race,
religion, ethnicity, sex, nudity, alcohol, and anything else
they thought might offend someone for some reason.
Heifetz took the story to the New York Times, which ran it
on the front page of its Sunday edition (June 2, 2002) under
the provocative headline, "The Elderly Man and the Sea?
Test Sanitizes Literary Texts." Public outrage was
immediate and vociferous. Writers, publishers, free speech
groups protested; anti-censorship groups held press
conferences; late night television comedians reveled in
parody; and the state's Education Department became the
laughing stock of the nation for its attempts to correct the
politics and manners of dead writers.
During the twilight years of the Soviet Union, censorship
and exile of Alexandr Solzenitsyn provided the U.S. and its
allies with a major propaganda victory. The Solzenitsyn
affair not only exposed the tyranny of the Soviet censorship
bureaucracy, it cast a global spotlight on the repressive
character of the entire Soviet system. Solzenitsyn's massive
three-volume work The Gulag Archipelago (1974, 1975,
1978) become an international bestseller; moreover, it
cultivated a market for The Oak and the Calf (1980), an
exhaustive account of the author's personal struggles with
the Soviet censors. The Solzenitsyn affair, the house arrest
of Andrei Sakharov, and the suppression of other dissident
Soviet intellectuals galvanized internal as well as external
opposition to the Soviet system. After years of exile in
America, Solzenitsyn had his [Soviet] citizenship restored in
1990; he returned to Russia in 1994; and his banned works
have now been published in his homeland. For a time the
aging author even hosted a talk show on Russian state
television; travel agencies now promote tours of Solovetsky
Island, the site of the gulag (Stanley, 1995; Tsygankov,
2001).
These are but a few of many examples that illustrate the
backfire effect described by Baets: in each case, attempts at
censorship led to far greater awareness of the target than
would have occurred without the interventions of censors.
Of course not all censorship backfires; some forms of
censorship remain quite effective even in a digital age. The
interesting question is, why do some censorship efforts
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backfire while others succeed?
Answering this question contributes to the advancement of
freedom of expression by identifying strategies that activists
can use to resist or counter censorship. To be sure, formal
legal protections against censorship remain necessary
cornerstones in all struggles against censorship; however,
neo-liberalism is rapidly eroding, abridging, and, in some
instances, eclipsing the effectiveness of the classic free-
expression franchises of the Western liberalism. Justice
today is neither blind nor swift; and it usually carries very
high price tags (Moyers, 1999; Soley, 2002). One practical
defense against attempts to suppress or marginalize
unpopular views is to develop an understanding of how
censorship works in order to understand what catalyzes
backfire. As more people learn how to activate this process,
overt censorship is less likely to occur; and when it does, it
is less likely to be effective.
The literature on censorship is vast, and continues to grow at
a very rapid pace. Much of it is devoted to history, legal
analyses, case studies, and theory; however, relatively little
is aimed at equipping free expression advocates with
strategies to arm themselves against censorship. Useful
information can be excavated from between the lines of
historical and autobiographical accounts of the methods of
censors; that is presumably one of the reasons why such
accounts are published retrospectively, for example,
Nikitenko, The Diary of a Russian Censor (1975) and
Curry, The Black Book of Polish Censorship (1984). Our
intent is, however, more direct and proactive: not merely to
describe censorship, but to identify ways of subverting it.
We begin by briefly outlining two relevant theoretical
approaches: one drawn from propaganda studies, the so-
called 'boomerang effect,' and the other drawn from
nonviolence theory, the concept of 'political jiu-jitsu.' We
then describe how these concepts can be extended to
provide insight into how struggles are waged between
censors and their opponents. We offer three short case
studies, which illustrate how these dynamics work: the
McLibel case, the Salman Rushdie case, and recent attempts
by partisans on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
to limit free exchanges of ideas. We conclude with some
tentative generalizations.
The boomerang effect and
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political jiu-jitsu
Propaganda - the systematic promotion of a particular point
of view, often through dissemination of selective or false
information - can be considered a face of censorship, since
contrary views are hidden or misrepresented. Propaganda,
like other forms of censorship, sometimes backfires,
generating antagonism rather than support for the view that
is being promoted. This has been dubbed "the boomerang
effect."
In a kind of double irony, the boomerang concept itself
boomeranged as it migrated from its origins in U.S. military
strategy documents into the annuals of critical sociological
theory and media activism. That is, the boomerang effect, a
concept developed by the U.S. Government during World
War II in an effort to ensure production of effective war
propaganda, created a template that has subsequently been
useful in criticizing and countering U.S. propaganda. The
boomerang effect has also gained some traction in critiques
of corporate propaganda: advertising and public relations.
In their classic formulation of the boomerang effect, Paul
Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton (1949) give four reasons why
people may respond "inappropriately" to propaganda: (1)
the authors of the propaganda may misjudge the
psychological state of the audience; (2) different people
respond differently to the same message, so some will
respond negatively; (3) different themes in a piece of
propaganda may send contrary messages; and (4) people's
personal experiences may be contrary to what is portrayed
in propaganda, leading them to reject everything that is said.
Published after the war, Lazarsfeld and Merton's account of
war propaganda entered sociological discourse at a juncture
when there was already a well-established critical literature
on propaganda analysis. Pioneered by Alfred McClung Lee
and Dorothy Briant Lee during the 1930s, critical
propaganda analysis was both a theoretical and activist
enterprise: an extension of the popular education movement
spearhead founded by educational reformer John Dewey.
The Lees sought to arm citizens against propaganda and
demagoguery by educating them in the "ABCs of
propaganda analysis;" their explications of the devices or
"tricks of the trade" that propagandists use to deceive the
public remain widely respected. Within the post-war
context, Lazarsfeld and Merton's account was typically read
and taught as a critical analysis of propaganda, not an
affirmation of its use. At worst, it was interpreted as the
work of reluctant propagandists recruited to the service of a
just war.
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"Blowback" is a related term that has been used to describe
a similar (or the same) dynamic in the realm of policy
studies. In fact, while U.S. commentators refer to foreign
policies that have unintended negative domestic
consequences as blowback, Israelis use boomerang effect to
describe the same phenomena (Cosmos, 2002). In the U.S.
context, the term has a strong critical edge; see, for example,
Simpson (1988) and especially Johnson (2000), whose
analysis is widely cited by the left to explain Al Qaeda's
2001 attacks on New York and Washington.
Nevertheless, critical media and policy analyses remain
minority and oppositional positions in the U.S. As a result,
there is a relative paucity of critical studies of government
or corporate censorship, qua censorship. To our knowledge,
the boomerang concept has never been directly applied to
censorship studies. Certainly, no one has systematically
examined how the backfire dynamic can be deliberately
used to advance free expression.
Nonviolence theory offers a more promising theoretical
entry point, because it is directly oriented to empowerment
of activists. Consider a group of peaceful protesters who
come under brutal assault by police. Many of those who
witness or hear about such an assault respond with outrage,
generating more support for the protesters and weakening
resolve among the police. For example, in 1998 Indonesian
students were active in protesting against dictatorial ruler
Suharto. On May 4th at Trisakti University, police opened
fire, killing four students and two others. Rather than
deterring protest, the killings generated enormous outrage
and overnight escalated the scale of protest immensely. This
was the turning point in the struggle that led to Suharto's
resignation.
In order for violence to backfire, it is vital that protesters are
not violent themselves. If there is perceived to be violence
on both sides, no matter how imbalanced, observers are less
likely to identify with protesters, even if they perceive their
cause as just. This is the reason that police try to provoke
protesters or use agents provocateurs to foment violence. If
even a few protesters are violent, violence against protest
movements is seen as more legitimate.
For violence against peaceful protesters to backfire, it is
necessary for others to be aware of what is happening. In
1930 in India, Gandhi led a march to the sea with the intent
of making salt, which was in violation of the British
monopoly. At the culmination of the march, many
satyagrahis - nonviolent activists - submitted without
resistance to brutal beatings by the police, with many of the
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satyagrahis sustaining serious injuries. British authorities
claimed that the protesters were faking their injuries. But
U.S. journalist Webb Miller independently reported the
events, helping to change opinion in Britain and the United
States. Gandhi's tactics generated massive support in India,
weakened British colonial resolve and garnered support
from third parties (Dalton, 1993; Weber, 1993).
Martin Luther King, Jr. and his associates consciously used
Gandhi's nonviolent tactics to model their leadership of the
U.S. civil rights movement during the 1960s. Participants in
civil rights marches were instructed not to retaliate even in
the face of overwhelming police brutality. The quiet dignity
of the black protesters, chronicled on the network television
news programs, evoked great public sympathy among both
blacks and whites while representations of the ignorance and
cruelty of Southern law enforcement officers like Bull
Conner incited revulsion, especially in the heavily populated
Northern and Western states. Nonviolence cultivated
sympathy among the eye-witness observers in the press,
who, in turn, created and disseminated sympathetic images
and narrative accounts of the struggles against segregation
in the South. Police violence helped to turn the tide of public
opinion against racial injustice. Conversely, white support
for the movement ebbed significantly after King's murder
when some black militant and black power advocates
espoused violent tactics, and images of rioting, burning, and
looting of businesses in ghetto neighborhoods of major U.S.
cities became part of the nightly television news reports
(Branch, 1989, 1999).
In November 1991 in Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East
Timor, hundreds of peaceful mourners were killed by
Indonesian troops. Western journalist Max Stahl recorded
the massacre on videotape and smuggled it out of the
country; when broadcast on television internationally,
images of the atrocities galvanized support for the East
Timorese liberation struggle (Kohen, 1999, pp. 160-187).
On a lesser scale, the same process can be seen in the
beating of Rodney King, which rebounded against the Los
Angeles police. Although there are numerous reports of
police beatings, the assault on King was captured on
videotape, making police denial far more difficult to sustain.
Gene Sharp, the world's leading nonviolence researcher,
coined the term "political jiu-jitsu" for the process by which
violent attack on nonviolent activists can backfire. As in the
sport of jiu-jitsu, the strength of the attacker is turned to
their disadvantage. Sharp (1973) documented nearly 200
different methods of nonviolent action, for example
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petitions, banners, mock awards, protest disrobings,
motorcades, teach-ins, social boycotts, sanctuary, peasant
strikes, prisoners' strikes, boycotts of elections, sit-ins,
guerrilla theater, selective patronage and alternative
markets. Political jiu-jitsu is part of what Sharp calls the
dynamics of nonviolent action, whose typical steps include
(1) laying the groundwork, (2) challenge that brings
repression, (3) solidarity and discipline in the face of
repression, (4) political jiu-jitsu, and (5) redistribution of
power. Sharp's framework is based on examination of large
numbers of struggles; political jiu-jitsu describes a process
that has been frequently observed in history. For example,
South African police on March 21, 1960 opened fire,
without warning, on black protesters, killing a number of
them; this event, called the "Sharpeville massacre,"
triggered outrage across the world, leading to sanctions and
greatly increased support for opponents of apartheid.
The idea of political jiu-jitsu can readily be applied to
struggles against censorship. Sharp divides nonviolent
action into three general categories: protest and persuasion;
noncooperation (such as strikes and boycotts); and
intervention (such as sit-ins). Many of the methods of
protest and persuasion are the simple exercise of free
speech, such as signed public statements, banners,
skywriting, symbolic lights, and skits. Nonviolent action is
defined as action that goes beyond ordinary political action
such as voting or handing out leaflets; a public speech is a
routine event in many countries but in a dictatorship it
would count as nonviolent action. Whether or not an action
is labeled "nonviolent," the process of political jiu-jitsu can
occur.
Within Sharp's framework, writing and publishing would
ordinarily be viewed as routine exercises of free speech in
liberal or post-liberal societies. They rise to the level of
nonviolent action when censors, with or without credentials,
intervene in these exercises either prior to or after a creative
work enters the public sphere. Under such conditions,
political jiu-jitsu may occur in reaction to censorship.
What are the keys to triggering political jiu-jitsu? Sharp
does not give a precise answer, but some elements in the
causal chain can be inferred. First, there is repulsion against
violence in itself. Second, there is a sense of injustice, as
when people are physically assaulted even though they have
not caused harm to anyone else. Or the injustice may be
manifest in flagrant discrepancies between official policies
and corrupt practices. Third, there is a marked disproportion
between an act - a peaceful protest - and the response to it, a
major assault. In the Sharpeville massacre, some protesters
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threw stones (without causing serious injury); lethal force by
the police was seen as an excessive response. Sharp (1973,
p. 660) points out that, "The extreme disproportion between
the repression and the demonstrators' behavior shocked
world opinion."
The same elements are present when censorship backfires.
Some observers are repulsed by the very fact of censorship.
Others are incensed by the injustice involved. Still others
respond to the disproportion between the acts - speaking,
writing, publishing, or creating works of art - and the heavy-
handed responses of those who would suppress these acts.
Most censors know that censorship can backfire. There are
many strategies that they use to inhibit or prevent backfire.
The first and most obvious method is to try to reduce
awareness that censorship has occurred: that is, censors
censor the fact of censorship. As in Orwell's 1984, the
rewriting of history is most effective when carried out in
secrecy. For example, when controversial works are
submitted to book publishers or film producers, it is easy to
reject them on the grounds that they are not of sufficient
caliber or that they will not sell. "Market censorship" (which
virually never operates under its own name) is considered a
legitimate form of censorship in capitalist societies - just
good business! Authors of works rejected as unworthy or
unprofitable are expected to accept their failure without
complaint. If an author is too prominent to be silenced this
way, a publisher may publish the book but privately ensure
that it disappears leaving few traces. Publishers in the U.S.
call this "privishing:" it is a tactic used "to kill off a book
that, for one reason or another, is considered 'troublesome'
or potentially so" (Colby, 2002, p. 16). Publishers do this by
cutting off the book's support system: reducing the initial
print run so it cannot make a profit, providing little or no
advertising, failing to send out review copies, and canceling
promotional tours.
Another way to censor the existence of censorship is
through threats, such as threatening to sue for defamation,
which may lead the writer to self-censor or the publisher to
bypass a book as too hot to handle. Many court settlements
of whistleblower cases include so-called gagging clauses,
enjoining all parties to say nothing about the details of the
settlement, including the existence of the non-disclosure
clause. Such clauses are typically imposed by the employer
as a condition of the settlement. Threats can be implicit too,
as when a scientist is instructed by the boss not to present a
paper to a conference, or to remove sensitive comments; the
implication is that refusal would lead to more serious
measures.
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To counter censorship of censorship, there are two key
components: documentation and publicity. Documentation
of the existence of censorship is essential, otherwise there is
little prospect of convincing anyone that censorship has
occurred. Without adequate evidence, claims of censorship
can be counterproductive, rebounding on the credibility of
the claimant. In many cases collecting evidence is difficult,
time-consuming or risky. Direct evidence may be
impossible to obtain, especially since the censor is bound to
cloak actions in legitimate terms and often believes in the
rationalizations offered. One way to reveal censorship is to
expose double standards. For example, CNN, which
routinely airs issue-oriented advertising, refused to accept
advertisements from non-profit groups opposing passage by
the U.S. Congress of the 1996 omnibus
Telecommunications Act. Similarly, other U.S. media
outlets systematically ignored or undercovered debates
about the bill, which was written at the behest of lobbyists
for major media and telecommunication conglomerates.
Activists, using alternative media, exposed the double-
standards, but the bill passed.
The second key component is publicity: a wider audience
must be informed about the censorship in order to mobilize
support. As in Gandhi's salt march or the Rodney King
beating, the combination of documentation and publicity
provide a powerful way of overcoming censorship of
censorship. Authors who already have some visibility can
sometimes use the mainstream media as a bully pulpit to
make their case; less well-known figures can use alternative
media or the internet to publicize their grievances. Western
supporters of Solzenitsyn, Sakharov, Pasternack and other
Soviet dissidents successfully used the ideological climate
of the Cold War to advance their work. Authors with strong
cases can appeal to anti-censorship groups, librarians'
associations, and professional organizations in their
particular areas of expertise for support. Attaching a
censorship case to established political causes can also
work. An author whose manuscript is considered potentially
'troublesome' because, for example, it contains damaging
information about the use of growth hormones in beef
production might align him or herself with campaigns
against breast cancer or for the environment.
Another standard method for justifying censorship is
attacking the censored. For example, a censored author
might be castigated as incompetent, immoral, disloyal,
unreliable, unstable, paranoid, or greedy. No work is ever
perfect; a trivial error, perhaps even the work of a careless
typographer or editor, may be used as a rationale for
discrediting an entire book. In some countries, censored
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authors and journalists are imprisoned, tortured, or killed.
Some attacks are directed against individuals, such as
denigration of Noam Chomsky, whose books, articles, and
talks are largely excluded from the mainstream U.S. media
(Croteau and Hoynes, 1994). Other attacks are generic, such
as media scapegoating of prisoners, homeless people,
anarchists, or drug addicts, while providing little or no
opportunity for representatives of these groups to express
their viewpoints in mainstream forums.
An effective response to attacks is valorization of the
censored, for example through documentation of quality,
evidence of good intentions, and endorsements from valued
sources. To counter attacks on a banned artist, it can help to
show previous favorable responses to the artist's work,
prizes received, endorsements by other artists, and evidence
of modest income or charity towards others. It is unfair, but
those who are censored are frequently held to a higher
standard of behavior than are others. The reality of political
jiu-jitsu is that nonviolent activists are expected to behave
far better than those who assault them: the slightest
breakdown in nonviolent discipline or evidence of self-
seeking behavior can be used to discredit an entire
movement. Likewise, those who complain about censorship
are often expected to be without blemish. Those who intend
to push boundaries should expect this sort of treatment and
be prepared. Nevertheless, living a flawless life is no
guarantee against personal attack: misrepresentations,
circulation of rumors, and manufacturing of evidence are
grist for the mills of censors.
Personal attacks can backfire. By revealing the attacks and
proving that they are groundless, the victim of the attack can
mobilize greater support. In responding to attacks, however,
it is usually better to avoid the temptation to counterattack.
Like violent retaliation, verbal retaliation or, even worse,
attempts to censor the censor, surrender the high moral
ground that those who have been unfairly attacked occupy:
it can open the victim up to the charge of holding double
standards.
The backfire effect can also be stopped or reversed if a
victim resorts to formal procedures such as grievance
hearings or litigation. An employer can claim that due
process was followed in dismissing an employee, even if the
dismissal occurred immediately after the employee had
released documents about corporate malfeasance to an
outside auditor, thereby challenging one of the most
pervasive forms of censorship, the legal or de facto ban on
employees revealing on-the-job information to outsiders. If
the employee decides to fight the dismissal in court, it is an
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unequal battle, since the corporation has far more money
and time to wage the case. Yet many people see official
channels - grievance procedures, auditors, ombudsmen,
courts, Congressional committees - as balanced venues for
seeking the truth. Therefore, once the matter enters such
channels, the prospects for invoking political jiu-jitsu are
minimal.
Dissidents are often encouraged to use official channels. In
the US, where television shows give the illusion that justice
is regularly and swiftly dispensed, courts are often an
avenue of first resort. Whistleblower laws encourage
disclosures to official bodies but not to the media, though
official bodies are quite unlikely to help and media exposure
is widely known to be more effective (De Maria, 1999;
Devine, 1997). Views may differ about the value of using
official channels. If, however, the primary goal is to invoke
political jiu-jitsu, then official channel should usually be
avoided or used strategically as forums for gaining wider
publicity about the injustice the plaintiff has suffered. Our
first case study illustrates how this kind of strategic use of
the courts worked effectively in a famous recent struggle
between two determined Davids and a corporate Goliath.
McLibel: a defamation suit
backfires
London Greenpeace is a small anarchist group independent
of the well-known environmental organization Greenpeace
International. In the 1980s, London Greenpeace produced a
leaflet called "What's wrong with McDonald's?" which
criticized, among other things, the nutritional value of
McDonald's food, the wages and working conditions of
employees, and the clearing of rainforest for beef
production.
McDonald's management had long taken a strongly
proprietary stance in regard to its name - for example suing
pre-existing family restaurants named McDonald's - and
taking aggressive action towards critics (Donson, 2000).
The company hired spies to infiltrate London Greenpeace. It
collected evidence and sued five individuals for defamation.
(It should be noted that British defamation law is much
harsher than U.S. law (Hooper, 2000).) Three of the targets
of the suit decided to withdraw, but two - gardener Helen
Steel and postman Dave Morris - chose to fight the case.
With little money, they ran the case themselves, learning the
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law as they went along. The case ended up being the longest
running legal action in British history. McDonald's won the
case: the judge ruled that some claims in the leaflet were
false and awarded £60,000 against Steel and Morris (they
have appealed). But for McDonald's, it was a public
relations disaster. Steel and Morris's defense generated
enormous sympathy, enabling them to obtain some free
legal advice and to call many witnesses at no cost to them.
The judge ruled that many of the damaging claims in the
leaflet had been proved true. More importantly, the case
generated enormous publicity, almost all of it hostile to
McDonald's. Worse still for McDonald's, supporters set up a
website called McSpotlight that grew like topsy and soon
contained masses of information critical of McDonald's. As
a consequence of all this activity, the original leaflet,
"What's wrong with McDonald's?" was read by millions of
people, far more than if McDonald's had ignored London
Greenpeace entirely. The case, commonly called McLibel
(Vidal, 1997), has become an object lesson to other
corporations on the dangers of suing critics.
The McLibel case illustrates how censorship can backfire.
McDonald's sought to censor its critics through the threat of
defamation action. This certainly had the potential for a jiu-
jitsu effect, given that the response by McDonald's was
grossly disproportionate to the action by London
Greenpeace: a high-powered lawsuit to stop limited
circulation of a leaflet by an obscure anarchist group. If
everyone in London Greenpeace had acquiesced, then only a
limited number of activists and supporters would have
known about McDonald's attempt to suppress criticism -
probably about as many people as had received the original
leaflet. By refusing to succumb, Steel and Morris took the
essential first step in making the censorship backfire.
The second essential step was making people aware of the
attack. In tandem with their legal efforts, Steel, Morris, and
their supporters publicized the case. We have argued that
official channels can serve censors; if Steel and Morris had
just gone to court without wider publicity, this would not
have been very damaging to McDonald's. Instead, McLibel
campaigners used the court process as the springboard for
publicity, making every legal step a negative for
McDonald's. Indeed, McDonald's sought to settle the case
on a number of occasions but Steel and Morris refused to
compromise on key points.
As members of an anarchist group, Steel and Morris might
seem obvious targets for denigration. What seems to have
protected them from attack was their commitment to
principle: they challenged McDonald's on substantive
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grounds - the matters in the leaflet - and grounds of free
speech. There is no evidence that they tried to benefit
personally from the case, for example to obtain money from
the media - if they had, this could easily have been used
against them. By sticking to their working class roles, they
emphasized the disproportionality between the rich,
powerful, and unscrupulous attackers and the poor yet
principled defenders.
It is important to note that Steel and Morris did not achieve
this on their own. The efforts of numerous supporters were
essential to making McDonald's legal action so
counterproductive. Mobilization of support is a key to
making censorship backfire.
The Satanic Verses
: book
censorship backfires
Publicity is a powerful means of triggering backlash, and
publicity in censorship cases is relatively easy to generate if
certain preconditions are met. First, the censored writer is
well established, well networked, or championed by
someone who is; that is, the writer can be presented to the
media as creditable, with a meritorious case. Second, the
cause celebre resonates in positive ways with larger
ideological agendas or with the perceived interests of media
organizations and/or the professional values of journalists.
No recent attempt at book censorship has received as much
global publicity as the case of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic
Verses. The story began in India when a Muslim member of
Parliament, Syed Shahabuddin, who admitted he had not
read Rushdie's book, petitioned the government of Rajvi
Gandhi to ban the novel on the grounds of blasphemy. The
Indian Government, sensitive to religious conflict, issued a
ban on October 5, 1988. After Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt,
and South Africa quickly followed suit, black marketed
copies of the forbidden fruit were soon doing brisk business
in the underground literary markets of all of those countries.
Conservative interests in Pakistan escalated the affair by
demanding that newly elected, Western educated, Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto force the United States to halt its
publication of The Satanic Verses. When this ill-fated
venture failed, anti-American riots broke out in Pakistan.
The Pakistani fundamentalists then turned to Iran for help.
In addition to irreverent, satirical, and salacious references
to Islam, The Satanic Verses contained a thinly disguised
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portrayal of Ayatollah Khomeini, which represented him as
the mouth of hell devouring his people. The Ayatollah was
therefore highly receptive to the Pakistanis' appeals.
The Fatwa issued by Khomeini and the Iranian Government
in February 1989 condemned the author of The Santanic
Verses to death: any editors or publishers who were aware
of the book's contents but knowingly participated in the
project were also included in the death sentence. Moreover,
Khomeini called on "all zealous Muslims to execute them
quickly, wherever they find them, so that no one will dare to
insult the Islamic sanctions. Whoever is killed on this path
will be regarded as a martyr, God willing" (Khomeini in
Appignanesi and Maitland, 1990, p. 68). A million-dollar
reward was offered for Rushdie's assassination, a bounty
that was doubled in 1997. The Indian-born Rushdie was a
naturalized citizen of the United Kingdom living in England
at the time the Fatwa was issued; the death threat forced him
into hiding for a decade.
In 1990, Rushdie published an essay, "In Good Faith," in
which he apologized and professed his respect for Islam; but
the Fatwa remained in effect. The Italian translator of The
Satanic Verses, Ettore Capriolo, was wounded in an
attempted assassination in Milan in 1991; and a week later,
Hitoshi Igarishi, the Japanese translator, was stabbed to
death in Tokyo. In 1993, William Nygaard, the book's
Norwegian publisher, was shot and severely wounded
outside of his Oslo home. Violent protests over the book in
India, Pakistan, and Egypt also caused several deaths. The
Fatwa was repealed by the Iranian Government in 1998. It
was, however, reissued by an Iranian state prosecutor,
Morteza Moqtadale; and, at that time, Ayatollah Hassan
Sanier promised a reward of $2.8 million. In February 2003,
Iran's elite fighting force, the Revolutionary Guards, re-
ignited the controversy by renewing the call for Rushdie's
death; and Ayatollah Sanier raised the bounty to $3 million.
While reformist and independent newspapers ignored the
14th anniversary of the edict, the February 14, 2003 issue of
the hard-line Jomhuri Islami featured a 16-page supplement
on the Rushdie case with a front-page cartoon of the corpse
of Rushdie in a coffin draped with the flags of the United
States, Britain, and Israel - countries seen as supporter's of
Rushdie's work (Dareini, 2003).
The Rushdie case was unprecedented; it was the first time
any state has ever publicly announced its intention to kill a
citizen of another country for a crime of ideas, as well as
anyone associated with the publication of those ideas.
Moreover, by authorizing and, in effect, deputizing all
Moslems to carry out the death sentence without regard to
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the sovereignty of the nation in which the execution might
take place, the Fatwa was in flagrant violation of
international law and of international human rights accords
(D'Souza, 1995).
International response to the Fatwa were immediate,
extensive, and multi-faceted: protests were issued by the
British and U.S. governments and the European Union;
international human rights and freedom of expression
groups like Article 19, Writers and Scholars International,
and P.E.N. championed the case; the Western press
expressed outrage and kept the media spotlight on the
Rushdie case for years; and prominent authors and other
public figures spoke and wrote eloquent pleas on Rushdie's
behalf. Britain broke off diplomatic relations with Iran.
Intense international diplomatic pressure was put on the
Iranian Government; this pressure eventually prevailed even
though religious hard liners refused to recognize the Iranian
Government's official lifting of the Fatwa.
For our purposes, the complex backfire the Rushdie case
produced is particularly instructive because: (a) it raises
questions about what qualifies as successful political jiu-
jitsu in censorship cases; and (b) it emphasizes the
importance of context in launching and assessing political
jiu-jitsu. Viewed from a Western perspective, the Fatwa
against Rushdie failed. Without the Fatwa, The Satanic
Verses would have been published without fanfare, received
mixed reviews, and would have been largely forgotten by
now. Instead the book became an international bestseller;
and its author, for a time, became a household name even
among people who do not read books (Shapiro, 1989). The
Rushdie case was a shining moment for many defenders of
free expression including the European Union, Article 19,
P.E.N., Writers and Scholars International (publishers of the
influential London-based of Index on Censorship), the
American Library Association, among other organizations
and individuals.
Rushdie himself became a virtual captive of the British
Government, which provided him with safe houses and
round-the-clock guards until he moved to the United States
in 2000. Rushdie reports that he suffered from depression
during his decade underground and that his marriage broke
under the strain. Yet, he continued to write and publish.
Even by his own assessment, however, his bitter sojourn has
been a triumph, albeit a dark one: as he puts it, "To live, to
avoid assassination, is a greater victory than to be
murdered" (quoted by McNamee, 1999, p. 5).
Nevertheless the Rushdie case revealed some significant
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fissures in the West's own support for freedom of
expression. Perhaps most striking was the cowardly stance
taken by chain bookstores, which typically portray
themselves as frontal troops in battles against censorship.
W.H. Smith, England's primary chain, withdrew the book
from some of its stores after a ritual book burning in a
Moslem neighborhood and fire bombings of some stores.
However, the U.S.'s major chains - Waldenbook, B. Dalton,
and Barnes and Noble - went much further. They pulled the
book from their shelves citing fears of terrorism, thereby
demonstrating that corporate conglomerates cannot always
be relied upon in censorship battles even when there is high
consumer demand. Several European publishers also
canceled their editions of the book, although most
subsequently reversed their decisions.
Politicians also proved to be uncertain allies. Many political
figures tempered their defenses of freedom of expression
with qualifications; some condemned the book while
defending its right to be published, whereas others agreed
that it was blasphemous and suggested it should not be read.
Canada, a liberal, book-loving democracy, began banning
procedures on the grounds that The Satanic Verses was hate
literature, only abandoning the effort because the book did
not meet the law's terms.
Newspapers were more reliable supporters, joining writers
and other intellectuals in exposing the book chains'
collective failure of nerve. The American Librarian
Association protested against the Fatwa and the book chains'
self-censorship. Librarians across the U.S. resisted pressures
to remove the book from circulation, with some taking extra
measures, including ordering more copies than usual, to
ensure that the book would be available to readers. Other
intellectual and cultural institutions, with few exceptions,
also proved to be staunch opponents of censorship:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), for example,
named Rushdie an honorary visiting professor, an honor that
the university had only conferred four other times in its
history.
Viewed from a radical Islamic perspective, however, it can
be argued that the Fatwa also succeeded to a significant
degree even though Rushdie survived and continued to
publish. Rushdie did apologize for writing The Satanic
Verses. A translator was executed. The book was in fact
banned in many countries throughout the world. Two
Muslim leaders in Belgium, who opposed Rushdie's death
penalty, were murdered. Many non-Moslems agreed that the
book was immoral and blasphemous. Radical Islam has
continued its rapid growth; and the Fatwa against Rushdie
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helped draw, reinforce, and widely publicize the lines that
separate the Muslim world from the secular values of the
West. The stern discipline of radical Islam was modeled for
its growing population of youthful followers; and the
sacrosanct status of the Qu'ran was defended. Khomeini
himself considered the Rushdie affair a success, claiming
that it had saved Iran "from a naïve foreign policy" (Watson,
1989).
What lessons can activists learn from the Rushdie case?
First, success and failure are 'both/and' terms rather than
mutually exclusive categories. Both sides won and lost some
ground in the Rushdie affair. In highly polarized contexts,
partial victories are sometimes all that are possible.
Second, when feasible - and it is often not in censorship
cases - activists should select their fights carefully. Despite
the praise of some world class literary figures, The Satanic
Verses and Salman Rushdie were not the ideal candidates
for valorization. That is, Rushdie does not stand on the kind
of high moral ground that Solzenitsyn occupied during the
Cold War. There are many thoughtful people who
campaigned against censorship of The Satanic Verses who
did not like the book or admire its author. Remember even
Rushdie apologized for the book. There are other writers
who have been targets of death threats by radical Muslims in
recent years whose cases might have generated more
unconditional support in the West; yet, these cases have
received little or no press in mainstream media. An example
is the Bangladeshi novelist Taslima Nasrin, who was
sentenced to death in 1994 for advocating the emancipation
of Muslim women and greater religious tolerance
(McNamee, 1999, p. 5).
Third, it is usually easier to rally positive media support for
cases of book or other forms of media censorship than for
other kinds of dissidence, protest movements or
whistleblowing. The reasons for this will be examined more
fully in the concluding section of the paper. Suffice to say
here that common membership in the fraternity of print
makes a writer who is censored, no matter how abhorrent
his or her views, a kindred spirit; whereas other dissenters,
no matter how just their causes, are routinely viewed with
professional skepticism by journalists. Rushdie certainly
benefited from membership in this fraternity. Moreover, the
obsession with celebrity that migrated from the tabloids to
the mainstream press in the early 1980s added cache to
Rushdie's case. The Fatwa made him famous; and his fame
made him a celebrity, whose surprise appearances at glitzy
London parties (which he wouldn't have been invited to
before The Satanic Verses furor) endowed Rushdie sightings
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with high news and cash value. In sum, understanding the
professional ideology of the press, news values, and the
economic and social structures of media organizations is an
indispensable asset in gaining support from the press that
can contribute to making censorship backfire.
Middle East Conflict: boycotts
and blacklists of scholars
backfire
The political conflict in the Middle East has recently incited
attempts by partisans on both sides of the hostilities to
censor, boycott, or blacklist scholars and their scholarship.
While all of the reverberations of these efforts cannot yet be
measured, it is clear that they have incited significant
backfire that has damaged partisans on both sides. The
academic boycotts are frequently referred to in the singular;
however, there were actually two, one initiated by Oxford
professors Colin Blakemore and Richard Dawkins and the
other by [Bradford University's Hilary Rose and the Open
University's Steven Rose], mounted on a joint web-site
(www.pipo.org). The boycotts became world news on April
6, 2002 when The Guardian (London) published a letter
signed by 120 university scholars, primarily mathematicians
and scientists, calling for a boycott of research and cultural
links with Israel by the European Union and the European
Science Foundation until Israel abides by United Nations
resolutions and opens serious peace negotiations with the
Palestinians. The petition was subsequently signed by many
more scholars (almost 300 by May 17th) including some
Israelis. A fierce debate ensued: the categorical
condemnation of all Israeli scholars invited and quickly
received charges of anti-Semitism. The controversy
escalated further when two Israeli scholars, Gideon Toury of
Tel Aviv University and Miriam Schlesinger of Bar-Llan
University, were dismissed from the editorial boards of
academic journals owned by Mona Baker of the University
of Manchester, who said she was honoring the boycott after
long and painful soul-searching reflection. Schlesinger's
case was particularly newsworthy because she is a former
chair of Israel's chapter of Amnesty International and a critic
of Israel's policies in Gaza and the West Bank.
Leonid Ryzhik, a Russian-born University of Chicago
mathematician, organized a counter-movement, "Don't
boycott Israel," launched a web-site (www.anti-boycott-
petition.org), and posted 2,200 signatures, including two
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Nobel Prize winners. The Ryzhik petition, which was also
published by The Guardian (May 22, 2002), described the
British petition as "immoral, dangerous and misguided" and
claimed that it "indirectly encourages the terrorist murderers
in their deadly deeds." The EU commissioner for research,
Philippe Busquin, dismissed the British-organized petitions
calling for the academic boycott as "counter-productive,"
citing scientific cooperation as a means of encouraging
dialog and negotiations in the Middle East (The Guardian,
May 27, 2002). Some of the signers of the call for the
academic boycott (including Dawkins) subsequently
withdrew their signatures from the original petitions. Yet,
Dr. Aaron Benavot of Hebrew University, who also
organized a counter-boycott petition, reports that there is
anecdotal evidence that the academic boycott is having an
effect (The Telegraph, May 16, 2002).
The very idea of boycotts in matters of the mind struck
critics, including some who oppose Israeli policy, as
untenable because they run counter to the professed norms
of academic freedom and scientific inquiry. One
consequence of the backfire generated by the calls for
academic boycotts of the Israelis is that they have made it
far more difficult to articulate and publish legitimate
criticisms of individual Israeli scholars and think tanks that
do actually function as propagandists for Israeli policy.
In a more recent case, Middle East scholars in the U.S. were
targeted by a pro-Israeli, Philadelphia-based think tank, the
Middle East Forum, which set up a web-site, "Campus
Watch" (www.campuswatch.org), and posted dossiers on
eight Middle Eastern studies professors because of their
views on Palestine and Islam. Calling these scholars
"hostile" to America, the web-site asks readers to report
other Middle East lectures, classes, and demonstrations to
the Forum's director, Daniel Pipes of the University of
Pennsylvania. Those listed on the site have been reportedly
received thousands of threatening and racist emails; and
they have been put in the position of having to defend their
intellectual integrity to the press as well as to their Jewish
students.
The site has, however, generated a nation-wide backlash.
Protesting against what they characterize as "blacklisting,"
hundreds of scholars have attempted to "turn themselves in"
to the Forum in an organized act of solidarity with the eight
scholars. Led by colorful University of California at
Berkeley scholar Judith Butler, who is herself Jewish, the
protest has migrated from the web to the mainstream press
where Butler's message - that there is "a very fundamental
mistake in assuming that any position critical of
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contemporary Israeli policy is anti-Semitic" - has reached
far beyond the academic audience originally targeted by the
web-site (San Francisco Chronicle, September 28, 2002).
It is an inconvenient fact of history that academics and
intellectuals, despite their professed commitments to
academic freedom and open inquiry, have often included
individuals and groups who have been as eager as tyrants to
silence opposing views. This is as understandable as it is
lamentable. No one has more passionate attachments to or
deeper investments in securing the futures of particular
ideas, theories, and paradigms than their authors; and no one
is more tenacious in rooting out, exposing, and condemning
what they sincerely regard as wrong-headed, inaccurate, or
dangerous ideas than scholars or intellectuals who hold
opposing views. However, given the fact that free and open
critical exchange of ideas is a constituent principle of post-
Enlightenment secular scholarship, those scholars and
intellectuals who move beyond vigorous criticism of
adversarial views to advocating boycotts or blacklists have
no moral ground to stand on. Boycotts or blacklists in
matters of mind invite and deserve backfire. Boycotts do, of
course, remain useful tactics in the David and Goliath
struggles in campaigns for justice in which grassroots
organizations find themselves pitted against the staggering
resources of governments and large corporations.
Conclusion
An examination of cases where censorship backfires
provides some valuable lessons in how to make this happen.
The first important point is that the censorship should be
exposed to audiences who will be outraged by the act of
censorship itself or by the disproportion between the act
(speaking out) and the censoring response (a heavy-handed
attack). It is essential to have solid documentation, which
means that only some cases of censorship can be exposed in
this way.
It is important not to be intimidated. Censorship is often
backed up by threats of what will happen if those who are
censored do not acquiesce. It can be rewarding to see these
threats as potential opportunities. By exposing the threats,
the backlash can be made all the stronger.
Targets of censorship need to be prepared for further attack -
including personal invective - should they challenge the
censorship. Once again, it is important not to be intimidated,
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because personal attacks can be made to backfire too. When
coming under fierce attack, the first instinct of many people
is to retreat, but a better response - both tactically and
psychologically - can be to expose the unfairness of the
attack.
The cases where the backfire effect has worked best have
been in the public sphere, where appeals can be made
directly to substantial audiences. When censorship is
challenged by using an official channel - a grievance
procedure or a court - then it is much harder to mobilize
support. Steel and Morris responded to McDonald's use of
defamation law by fighting a court case, but their real
victory occurred through extensive publicity. Rushdie
apologized, hoping to terminate the Fatwa through the
channels it had arisen, but this was unsuccessful. It was
massive publicity that turned the tide in his favor. In
challenging the boycotts and blacklists of scholars, publicity
again has been the key. Complaints to professional
associations would have been too little and too late.
Making censorship backfire is not a task for the faint-
hearted. It can require great energy and staying power, plus
the psychological strength to survive personal attacks. The
positive side is the support received from others, which can
make all the difference. In order for censorship to backfire,
lots of people need to express their concern. Those who
have come under attack and survived often say that
expressions of support kept them going. In this we all have a
role to play.
Appendix: Tips on dealing with
the press
Activists seeking to trigger backfire by valorizing victims in
the press require a basic knowledge of the work routines of
news organizations. They need to be aware of how the daily
press cycles work in print and electronic media (Jensen,
2001). For example, if activists want their cause covered by
a daily newspaper that is published in morning editions, they
need to know that reporters are much more likely to take
their phone calls and listen to their pitches early the
preceding day. Similarly, they need to be constantly and
acutely aware of the time pressures all news people work
under. They need to cultivate good rapport with journalists:
a cardinal rule in this regard is not to waste the journalist's
time.
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Prepare well in advance of making contact with journalists:
gather the facts for the journalist and do so using the
rhetoric of objectivity that journalists recognize and
consider credible. That is, cite facts using recognized
sources, e.g. statistics or citations from human rights
organizations, or endorsements of the victim's worthiness
from respected individuals or organizations. Present these
facts in clear and concise form; ideally in a one-page press
release that answers the standard journalistic repertoire of
questions: who, what, when, where, why, and how (Jensen,
2001). Well-written press releases submitted to newspapers
from credible sources at appropriate times during the daily
news cycle frequently appear in newspapers with only
moderate editing; in effect, they can function as free
advertising. But remember in many countries, especially the
U.S., all controversial stories must be vetted by lawyers
before they are published. Weekly publications, magazines,
journals, and newspaper supplements are, in many cases,
better outlets for such stories because the journalist has a
longer lead time to investigate the story, establish the
subject's credibility, and to clear publication with his or her
supervisors. Alternative media, web-sites, and specialized
publications like Index on Censorship are good places to
start since they now frequently are pipelines that feed
mainstream media. In dealing with electronic media, the
message must be reduced to two or three sound bites: they
must be dramatic and pithy, yet delivered in the cool
modulations that television and radio demand. With
television, visuals are also a must.
In cases of censorship, print media remain the first and best
target for activists seeking to valorize the censored. Few
journalists who cover controversial subjects - and
censorship is always controversial - have escaped the blue
pencils of excessive editorial caution or the nagging regrets
of self-censorship. Almost all seasoned journalists have had
stories killed or have had to abandon promising leads
because of management's fears of lawsuits or adverse effects
on advertising revenues. Journalists are therefore generally
sympathetic to the plight of others who are subjected to the
knife of censorship; and this solidarity is especially strong
when the censored are fellow writers. That is, journalists are
likely to frame them as 'victims' of oppressive states,
ruthless corporations, or reactionary clerics. Cases of
censorship resonate closely with what Peter Hamill (1998)
describes as the romantic tradition in journalism: the
identification with the underdog pitted against powerful but
corrupt forces in heroic struggles for justice.
Conversely, the framing conventions of news writing
conventionally categorize demonstrations or protests as
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public disturbances; therefore, crime reporters are typically
assigned to cover these events (Gitlin, 1980). Protest actions
are therefore likely to be covered, if they are covered at all,
using the same narrative formulas as crime coverage. Crime
reporting relies very heavily on official sources for
information, e.g. the police, and other representatives of
established authority. As lawbreakers, perpetrators are not
considered credible sources by journalists; their side of the
story is not typically reported. The views of protesters are
also typically framed as deviant views by crime reporters,
and rarely given a full or fair hearing. A similar dynamic
applies to whistleblowers. Like crime reporters, business
writers routinely rely on corporate sources (managers,
public relations personnel, etc.) for information. They do not
want to jeopardize their future access to information by
writing damaging stories about their sources. In the case of
whistleblowers, there are also legal liabilities. Corporations
will typically threaten lawsuits against newspapers and
individual reporters if they publish damaging information
even if the information is true. For many newspapers the
threat is enough to kill the story. Journalists learn not to
waste time on stories that have little probability of making it
into print or onto the air. Moreover, journalists, by the very
nature of their craft, are expected to be "team-players:" that
is, news production is an organizational process that
requires cooperation, collegiality, and at least minimal
levels of trust. Whistleblowers are, however, always
surrounded by a cloud of suspicion: employers will claim
they are disloyal, dishonest, self-seeking, and unreliable, all
vices abhorred by the professional ideology of journalism.
So, where a censored writer is a natural ally, a
whistleblower - even a whistleblower who serves a high
moral cause - is at best a suspicious character who has to
work very hard to achieve credibility with journalists and
other defenders of the oppressed.
References
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______ (1989). Parting the Waters: America in the King
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