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STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
Russia and the Forging of Memory
and Identity in Europe
MARCO SIDDI1
Introduction
This article investigates the role played by Russia in collective memory and
national identity construction in European states. Three case studies have been
selected for investigation, namely France, Germany and Poland. These coun-
tries are representative of the narratives that characterise respectively Western,
Central and Central Eastern European memory discourses on the twentieth
century, particularly the year 1945 (Troebst, 2008: 69-70).2 This date, which
marks the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the postwar
order, plays a pivotal role in all European memory discourses. The analysis
intends to shed light on the historical and political roots of current discourses
on Russia in the countries under investigation. By comparing memory dis-
courses in the case studies, it attempts to explain why radically different per-
ceptions of Russia exist in European countries and how such discourses affect
prospects for the emergence of a shared European memory of the twentieth
century. Thus, the main research question is: how did historical interactions
with Russia affect national memory in the selected countries? A cross-country
1Marie Curie Research Fellow, University of Edinburgh.
2In this classification, „Western Europe” includes France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Luxemburg, namely the Western European countries that fought against Nazi Ger-
many or were liberated by the Anglo-American armies; “Central Europe” refers to Germany and Aus-
tria, the losers in the Second World War; “Central Eastern Europe” includes the states that were taken
over by the Red Army during the conflict and fell under the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold
War (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria) or were directly annexed to the Soviet
Union (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). A classification along the same dividing lines was adopted by
Konrad Jarausch (2010: 310-311) and Wolfgang Schieder (Nützendadel & Schieder, 2004: 7-24).
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78 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
comparison of the results of the investigation spurred by the main research
question allows the examination of a second research question: how do repre-
sentations of Russia in national memory discourses affect the prospects for a
shared European memory of the twentieth century?
The article hypothesises that Russia plays a significant role in all national
memory discourses under investigation due its deep impact on European twen-
tieth century history. Whether this role is portrayed positively or negatively in
national memory depends on the nature of Russia’s historical interactions with
the countries in question. Since France, Germany and Poland had radically
different relations with Russia during the twentieth century, we can expect that
the representation of Russia in their respective national memory discourses var-
ies significantly. This would constitute a significant obstacle to the emergence
of a shared European memory of the last century, as national memories would
not be reconcilable in their representation of a key actor.
The analysis starts with the definition of “collective memory” and “collec-
tive identity” and an investigation of how these concepts are constructed at
national level. The relationship between memory and identity is explored to
explain why and how questions of historical memory have played a central role
in the rise of identity politics. This conceptual framework is applied to the
study of memory politics in the selected countries and Russia. The examination
of Russia’s memory discourse is functional to the final comparative analysis,
which highlights the relationship among Western, Central, Central Eastern
European and Russian memory discourses.
Collective memories, collective identities and the
construction of the nation
Memory and identity are closely interrelated concepts. The term “collective
memory” refers to the shared memories held by a community about the past
(Hunt, 2010: 97), an image of the past constructed by a subjectivity in the
present (Megill, 2011: 196). Collective memory is a discourse about historical
events and how to interpret them based on a community’s current social and
historical necessities (Arnold-de Simine, 2005: 10; Pakier & Stråth, 2010: 7).
According to Andreas Huyssen, collective memory is essential to imagine the
future and give a strong temporal and spatial grounding to life (Huyssen, 2003:
6). As Maurice Halbwachs argued, collective memories are ‘socially framed’:
they form when people come together to remember and enter a domain that
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RUSSIA AND THE FORGING OF MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN EUROPE
transcends individual memory (Halbwachs, 1992). The concept of “collective
identity” refers to a group’s sense of sameness over time, sustained by memory
(Spohn, 2005: 2). The perception of a communal past is a defining element of
collective identity. Without shared narratives of the past, collective identities
do not develop or are only ephemeral (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi & Levy, 2011:
177; Hunt, 2010: 107; Smith, 1992: 58; Lebow, 2006: 3; Bell, 2006: 5).3
The study of collective memory is of particular relevance at institutional
level (Lebow, 2006: 13-14). Political elites adopt selective discourses of past
events to forge national identities that ensure social cohesion. National identi-
ties are a type of collective identities combining the attachment to a territory
with ethnic, cultural, economic and legal-political elements. Common historical
memories, myths and traditions are also essential components of national iden-
tity (Smith, 1991: 9-14). In the process of national identity construction, polit-
ical elites attempt to rearrange such memories, myths and traditions in an order
that suits their political objectives.
National memory is a type of collective memory shared by people who
regard themselves as having a common history and are bound by what they
remember and forget (Gillis, 1994: 7).4 It is a social framework through which
nationally conscious individuals organise their history and justify national
statehood (Müller, 2002: 3; Snyder, 2002: 50; Lebow, 2006: 16). National
memory is disseminated via political leaders’ official discourses and commemo-
rations in “realms of memory” (lieux de mémoire), namely historical or pseudo-
historical sites that are reminiscent of selected events in national memory
(Nora, 1992: 7).5 Political leaders play a fundamental role in the construction
and diffusion of national memory because they have easier access to mass
media, which makes them authoritative and persuasive. Richard Ned Lebow,
Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu call the selection and dissemination of dis-
courses on a country’s past “the politics of memory”. It involves actors who
use their public prominence to propagate narratives about the past that are
functional to their political goals (Lebow, 2006: 26).
3This study does not explore the relationship between collective and individual memories and identities,
nor the theoretical dispute on whether identities and memories can be “collective” or are only intrinsi-
cally personal. For a discussion of these issues, see Bell (2006). The analysis is based on the findings of
previous studies, according to which collective and individual memories and identities co-exist and influ-
ence each other (Lebow, 2006: 28).
4As Maja Zehfuss has noted, remembering always entails forgetting: discourses about the past are selec-
tive and leave out elements that cannot be reconciled with the dominant narrative (Zehfuss, 2006: 213).
5Larry Ray calls such places “chronotopes” – landscapes and monuments where time has been ‘con-
densed in a space symbolically arranged and invested with myth and identity’ (Ray, 2006: 139).
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80 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
Memory matters politically because it can be used by the political establish-
ment as a source of legitimacy for its power. For instance, policy-makers can
make reference to events that play an important role in national memory and
construct plausible historical analogies to obtain support for their policies
(Müller, 2002: 26-27; Gildea, 2002: 59; Olick, 2007: 122; König, 2008: 27-34;
Berger, 2002: 80; Bell, 2006: 20; Koczanowicz, 1997: 260). The inherent
ambiguity of collective memories, which are in constant flux, facilitates their
manipulation and mobilisation in the service of national identity formation
(Müller, 2002:21-22; Berger, 2002: 81; Ray, 2006: 144). As Jay Winter and
Emmanuel Sivan have noted, political elites have manipulated the past on a
massive scale during the twentieth century (Sivan & Winter, 1999: 6).
Manipulations of national history took place in particular after wars and
regime changes, when states and new political elites attempted to restore social
cohesion. In these circumstances, political elites tend to formulate and propa-
gate official narratives that reflect their view of history and exclude all events
and elements that do not fit therein (Hunt, 2010: 110). Furthermore, they con-
struct national histories as triumphant narratives, a selective retelling of the
past based on accounts that stimulate identification with the nation and are
thus functional to a selected type of national identity construction (Eder, 2005:
214-5).
Due to the constant influence of a multiplicity of political, historical and
social factors, collective memories and identities are not fixed; they undergo a
process of gradual change and adaptation. As Pierre Nora argues, national
memories are constantly constructed and reconstructed in a selective way; they
are “in permanent evolution, a perpetually present phenomenon” (Nora, 1989:
8). During the last 20-30 years, this process has been fuelled by a drastic
upsurge of public memory debates in North American and European societies
(Huyssen, 2003: 12-15). Politicians have attempted to intervene and guide
these debates in a way that suited and served both their political aspirations
and their conception of national identity (Gillis, 1994: 3; Müller, 2002: 23;
Smith, 2011: 235).
A widespread use of the politics of memory to forge the national identities
of the new states took place in almost all European countries immediately after
the Second World War and again after 1989 in most Central Eastern European
countries, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc (Assmann, 2006: 260;
Evans, 2003: 5; Judt, 1992: 96). Both in 1945 and 1989, the new political
elites that emerged from the ordeal of war and from regime changes needed
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RUSSIA AND THE FORGING OF MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN EUROPE
founding myths and collective memories to strengthen social cohesion at a time
of economic dislocation and transition from authoritarian to democratic forms
of government (Müller, 2002: 7-9). This political necessity led European coun-
tries to search a “usable past” in national history and reframe it in narratives
that propped present political goals (Moeller, 2003a; Torbakov, 2011: 215).
The national memories and myths that were constructed in the post-1945
period in Central and Western Europe and in the post-1989 years in Central
Eastern Europe constitute the core of current national identity discourses in
European countries. This is due to the fact that most of the founding myths of
today’s national political systems in Europe date back from these two historical
moments. The images of Russia that crystallised in national memories during
these periods, partly in continuity with previous perceptions of the country and
partly based on new elements, influenced the process of national identity con-
struction. Thus, a specific perception of Russia has become enshrined in
national consciousness and still affects European countries’ attitudes to Mos-
cow.
The article analyses perceptions of Russia in national rather than European
memory and identity because national memories and identities are still much
stronger than any type of European memory or identity. As Anthony Smith
argues, national identities are ‘vivid, accessible, well-established, long popular-
ised and still widely believed – all aspects in which European identity is defi-
cient’ (Smith, 1992: 62).6 Andreas Huyssen concurs with this view and argues
that memory discourses are tied at their core to the history of specific nations
and states (Huyssen, 2003: 16; Jarausch, 2010: 312-313). To become stronger,
European identity would need a shared European collective memory. However,
European institutions do not have the resources to reach a sufficiently wide
public and sustain a dominant European collective memory (Eder, 2005: 215).
Most importantly, the task of constructing a shared narrative of Europe’s past
is made extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, by the conflicted and
controversial nature of European history. Crucial historical events of the twen-
tieth century have been interpreted and internalised in different, at times
overtly conflicting ways at the national level.
The analysis will now turn to national memory and identity construction in
the selected countries, with a focus on the role played by discourses on Russia.
6A comparative analysis of European and national identities is beyond the scope of this article. For a
relevant discussion see (Spohn, 2005).
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82 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
National memories in Europe
France: la grande nation and its Russian partner
Of the three countries under analysis, France is the most remote from Russia.
Geographical distance has resulted in limited geopolitical clashes between the
two countries.7 Russia is thus a marginal factor in French memory discourses.
It plays a role mainly as an allied or partner country that was functional to the
perpetuation of France’s grandeur – an element which dominates the way the
French perceive their national history.
The discourse on France’s grandeur is based on the country’s revolutionary
origins and republican tradition. The year 1789, marking the beginning of the
French Revolution, features prominently in the current memory discourse.
Every year, on 14 July, the French celebrate the storming of the Bastille with
a grandiose military parade on the Champs-Élysées in Paris (Hewitt, 2003: 1).
Focusing on this historical period allows portraying France as a great power
that exported progressive ideas and values to the rest of the modern world.
Devotion to the revolutionary tradition and its three key values – liberty,
equality and fraternity – are inculcated in the minds of French citizens from
young age (Nora, 1992: 171). It is therefore no surprise that the Revolution is
the only event predating the twentieth century that features in the Presidency of
the Republic’s webpage on the topic of “national memory”.8
The other events referred to in the website – anti-Fascist Resistance, the
country’s liberation from the Nazis, the armistice at the end of the First World
War and the commemoration of Charles de Gaulle’s death – took place
between 1918 and 1970. This half-century left a deep impact on France’s self-
perception and role in the global arena. German occupation in 1940-1944, the
loss of the colonial empire in Indochina, the 1956 Suez crisis, the Algerian war
of independence and the subaltern role played in the US-USSR Cold War con-
frontation exposed the loss of great power status unambiguously. France’s self-
portrayal as a major power risked becoming anachronistic (Sonntag, 2008: 77-
78). To preserve its prestige and capability to act as an independent power in
7During the nineteenth century, Russia and France fought each other in the Napoleonic Wars and during
the Crimean War (1853-1856); in the twentieth century, direct armed clashes occurred only when
French troops intervened in the Russian civil war.
8http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-dossiers/memoire-nationale/memoire-nationale.9035.html, accessed 15
May 2012.
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RUSSIA AND THE FORGING OF MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN EUROPE
the international scenario, Paris made political and military choices that also
shaped its relations with and perception of Soviet Russia.
At the onset of the Cold War, France found itself anchored in the Western
camp. However, its ambition to be on a par with Washington was frustrated by
the United States’ economic and military superiority, as well as by its refusal
to share its nuclear deterrent with Paris. Tensions between the two transatlan-
tic partners became particularly evident during Charles de Gaulle’s Presidency
(1959-1969). France developed its own nuclear deterrent and withdrew from
NATO’s integrated command structure. In addition, Paris established a unique
relationship with the Soviet Union; De Gaulle travelled to the Eastern bloc and
denounced American imperialism. Later French Presidents, including Georges
Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, maintained a very friendly and prag-
matic approach to Moscow throughout their time in office (Gildea, 1996: 201-
205; Sutton, 2007: 102-104).
The partnership with Russia was not a novelty in historical terms. France
was in a political and military alliance with the Tsarist Empire from 1894 until
1917 and fought the First World War on the same side. After the proclamation
of the Soviet Union (1922), France was one of the first countries to recognise
the Bolshevik government (in October 1924). The Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935
partially restored the anti-German alliance between Paris and Moscow for four
years (until the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939), and from 1941 until 1945 both
countries found themselves fighting a common enemy, Hitler’s Third Reich
(Gildea, 1996: 131). The friendly relationship with the Soviet Union during
the Cold War allowed Paris to retain at least a semblance of its past grandeur
by having a policy toward the Soviet superpower which differed from that of
other Western countries and highlighted its independence from the United
States. France perceived the USSR as a relatively good factor in the interna-
tional scenario. The collapse of the Soviet empire and the subsequent reunifica-
tion of Germany greatly reduced both France’s leverage to stand up to the
United States and its relative power in Europe (Chafer & Jenkins, 1996: 2-4;
Gildea, 1996: 201).
Due to the changed political scenario, France has shifted toward a more
Atlanticist course, as exemplified by Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to rejoin
NATO’s integrated structures.9 In French foreign policy, Russia no longer
plays the pivotal role that it had during the Cold War. Nevertheless, Franco-
9
Washington Post
, 12 March 2009.
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84 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
Russian relations are still very good. French national memory does not consti-
tute a hindrance to bilateral relations: Russia’s role therein is only marginal
and partly positive, as the two countries have had common enemies or compet-
itors for most of their recent history. Paris’ and Moscow’s spheres of influence
have hardly ever overlapped, which prevented clashes and facilitated the com-
patibility of their respective national memory discourses. As evidence of the
current Franco-Russian partnership, in 2010 former French President Nicolas
Sarkozy defined France ‘Great Russia’s great friend’ (Delcour, 2012: 44-45).
‘Bitter enemies have become friends’: Russia in German
memory
Memory politics in Germany focuses primarily on the twentieth century, with
the Holocaust playing a dominant role (Fulbrook, 1999: 153). This is reflected
by the numerous monuments that commemorate the Shoah in the German cap-
ital, Berlin. The Holocaust memorial, the Jewish Museum and the Topography
of Terror – just to name some of the main buildings devoted to the commemo-
ration of Nazi crimes – are all in the new centre of the reunified city (Berger,
2004: 252-256; Ward, 2005: 291-297). Close to these sites, the scattered rem-
nants of the Berlin Wall and especially the large architectonic heritage of the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) are reminiscent of what is arguably the
second most important theme in German national memory today: the division
of the country between 1945 and 1990 (Fulbrook, 1999: 25-47).10 Recently, a
memory discourse emphasising German suffering during the Second World
War and its aftermath has also emerged. It focuses in particular on the agony
of German civilians during Allied bombing and the expulsion of 12 million
ethnic Germans from the territories east of the Oder and Neisse rivers after
1945 (Moeller, 2003b: 147-181).
Soviet Russia was a significant actor in the events that shape the three
dominant narratives in German memory politics. The Holocaust started in the
context of the war against the Soviet Union, which Nazi leaders considered as
a Fascist crusade against “Judeo-Communism”. After the war, Germany was
divided due to the presence on its soil of the Soviet military, which also pro-
vided a guarantee for the existence of the East German regime until the 1980s.
10 For an analysis of the effects of reunification on German national memory, see the essays in Arnold-de
Simine (2005). On the consequences of the country’s division for Holocaust remembrance, see J. Herf
(1997). On German national symbols, see Parr (2005: 27-48).
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RUSSIA AND THE FORGING OF MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN EUROPE
On the other hand, in 1990 Germany could be reunified mainly thanks to the
support of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the 12 million ethnic Germans who
left Central Eastern Europe after 1945 had either run away from the advancing
Soviet army or had been expelled by the authorities of Soviet satellite states.
Thus, the USSR is simultaneously the country to which Nazi Germany
inflicted the worst crimes during the war, the authoritarian regime that sanc-
tioned the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Central Eastern Europe and the
great power that allowed both the division of Germany for forty years and its
reunification in 1990.
The diversity of roles that Soviet Russia played in German history during
the twentieth century has generated different views in German collective mem-
ory. This multiplicity of opinions is consistent with the way Russia was tradi-
tionally perceived by Germans. As Hans-Henning Schröder has shown, the
perception of a backward state, inferior economically, technologically and in
terms of civilisation co-existed with the admiration of Russian literature,
music, art and of the allegedly deeper nature of the Russian soul. However, in
the realm of politics the predominant German view of Russia during the last
century was that of a threatening great power ruled with a despotic system
(Schröder, 2010: 99-100).
The idea of a threatening Russia is also one of the key concepts behind the
attempt of some German historians to portray the country as the actual instiga-
tor of the Holocaust. In the context of the Historikerstreit, a dispute among
West German historians on the interpretation of the Holocaust that occurred in
the late 1980s, Ernst Nolte argued that Nazi concentration camps were a
defensive reaction to the mass murder that had taken place in the gulags of
Stalinist Russia a few years earlier. According to Nolte, the gulags constituted
the original and worse evil; Germany’s turn to National Socialism was thus a
rational reaction to the greater Bolshevik threat (Nolte, 1986). Nolte’s argu-
ment has not influenced the dominant memory discourse on the Holocaust in
Germany (Berger, 2004: 233). Nevertheless, it is significant because it shows
how a prominent part of the German academic establishment perceived Com-
munist Russia and its influence on their country during the last century.
The arguments of Nolte’s camp in the Historikerstreit were also functional
to the memory politics advocated by a substantial part of German conservative
elites. According to this line of thought, Germans would not identify with their
country if no positive memory of national history existed; hence, without a
collective memory the forces of social integration would disappear. Both this
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86 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
political interpretation of collective memory and Nolte’s arguments met with
very harsh criticism from other German historians and intellectuals. Jürgen
Habermas stated that Nolte and his followers used spurious historical argu-
ments in the attempt to re-habilitate the neo-conservative heritage (Habermas,
1988: 45-48). The controversy highlighted diverging eminent views on the
essence of German collective memory and Russia’s role therein.
The latter has remained disputed also after the Historikerstreit petered out
in the late 1980s.11 In the 1990s and 2000s public debate on German-Russian
historic relations focused primarily on German crimes in the Soviet Union dur-
ing the Second World War. The exhibition on the Wehrmacht’s crimes on the
Eastern front organised by the Hamburg Institute of Social Research sparked
an unprecedented public debate, as a result of which German public opinion
became aware of the massive involvement of German soldiers (and not just of
SS and police battalions, as previously assumed) in war crimes in the Soviet
Union. The sixtieth anniversary of the German aggression of the USSR (in
2001) and of the war’s end (in 2005) were marked by joint commemorations,
which culminated in Chancellor Schröder’s plea for apology at the 9 May 2005
celebrations in Moscow (Morina, 2011: 243-252). An atmosphere of reconcili-
ation has prevailed ever since in German and Russian memory politics con-
cerning the war, which is epitomised in Schröder’s 2005 statement that ‘bitter
enemies have become friends and partners’.12
Russia omnipresent: Polish memory discourses
Poland’s official memory discourse stresses the country’s grandeur during the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569-1795), its subsequent partition by
neighbouring great powers (Austria, Prussia and Russia) in the late eighteenth
century and the long periods of foreign occupation and tutelage during the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. The contemporary political relevance and
power of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth provide a founding myth and a
source of pride. However, current Polish memory discourses focus primarily on
the subsequent periods of foreign occupation, particularly the Nazi and Soviet
domination during the Second World War.
11 Similarly, the debate on German national memory and identity and the role of intellectuals in shaping it
continued thereafter; on this, see Huyssen (1995) and Geyer (1996, 2001).
12
Spiegel
, 8 May 2005.
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RUSSIA AND THE FORGING OF MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN EUROPE
Even today, the Second World War and the people involved in it are con-
stantly present on Polish press, radio and television. The topic is often
addressed by literature, theatre, art, films and in the political debate. Only in
Warsaw, 300 monuments, memorial stones and plaques – what Pierre Nora
calls lieux de mémoire – are devoted to the Second World War (Orla-
Bukowska, 2006: 177). Surprisingly, the older and the younger generations
share the same perception of the war period: 73% of Poles believe that it is still
very relevant to today’s Poland (Ruchniewicz, 2007: 19).
Dominant and official narratives about the Second World War stress
Poland’s martyrdom and heroism. According to these narratives, Poland was
the first country to oppose Hitler; Poles never collaborated with the Nazi occu-
piers, despite being abandoned by the Allies in 1939, and kept fighting fiercely
both in their country and abroad until the end of the war (Loew, 2008: 87-90).
Polish narratives also emphasise that Poland proportionally suffered the great-
est human and economic losses in the conflict and was confronted with the
tragic fate of being chosen by the Nazis as the main site for the extermination
of European Jews (Orla-Bukowska, 2006: 179-180). The martyrdom argument
gained further popularity after 1989, when the Red Army’s occupation of East-
ern Poland in 1939-1941 and the ensuing repression could be discussed openly.
The question of the mass murder of more than 20,000 Polish officers by Sta-
lin’s secret police at Katyn in 1940 became the central theme in the debate on
Polish-Soviet relations between 1939 and 1941, particularly after the Gor-
bachev government admitted that the crime had been committed by the Soviets
and not by the Wehrmacht (Ruchniewicz, 2007: 19-20, 43-56). Post-Soviet
Russia’s reluctance to apologise and give full access to the relevant archives
has caused controversy in Polish-Russian bilateral relations until today.
The 1939-1941 occupation and the Katyn massacre are only two episodes in
the long history of Polish-Russian conflicts. Tsarist Russia’s occupation of
most of Poland in the nineteenth century, the brutal suppression of the 1830
and 1863 Polish uprisings, the 1920 Soviet-Polish war and, above all, tight
Soviet control over Poland’s domestic and foreign affairs in 1945-1989 consti-
tute a continuum in Polish perceptions of their country’s relations with Russia.
Dominant memory discourses stress particularly the fact that the Red Army did
not free Poland, but merely installed a new occupation regime in 1945. Accord-
ingly, the end of the Second World War is seen as the beginning of a new
yoke, from which the Poles bravely sought liberation in a series of uprisings in
1956, 1968, 1970 and 1981 (Loew, 2008: 87-95).
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88 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
In recent years the ‘Law and Justice’ party has constantly made use of
memory politics in Poland, both when it was in power (2005-2007) and as
main opposition party after 2007. The party leadership harbours a deep-seated
hostility toward Germany and Russia, which it seeks to justify with historical
arguments (Reeves, 2010: 519). In 2007 former foreign minister Anna Fotyga
publicly called both countries Poland’s “historic enemies” (cit. in Reeves,
2010: 522). Occasionally, a similar anti-Russian and anti-German attitude
was adopted by representatives of the leading Centre-Right party ‘Civic Plat-
form’. For instance, in 2006 former defence minister (and current foreign
minister) Radek Sikorski dubbed the Nord Stream gas pipeline connecting
Russia to Germany a “new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact” (cited in Castle, 2006),
alluding to a hypothetical German-Russian alliance that allegedly threatened
Poland.
Domestic public opinion’s receptiveness to historical or pseudo-historical
arguments encourages Polish political leaders to use memory politics in domes-
tic debates about Russia. Surveys made in 2006 and 2007 showed that a major-
ity of Poles drew a very negative assessment of the Polish-Russian historic
relationship. They argued that Russia should feel guilty for its past policies
concerning Poland. To justify their reasoning they quoted, in order of fre-
quency, the 1939-1940 events (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet inva-
sion and Katyn), the Soviet imposition of Stalinism in Poland after 1945, the
Tsarist Empire’s participation in the partitions of Poland and the Soviet
annexation of Poland’s former eastern territories in 1945 (Levintova, 2010:
1357). In this context, anti-Russian statements and historical parallels such as
those quoted above find fertile ground and constitute a powerful instrument to
gather political support.
Memory of empire(s): Putin’s Russia
The 2000s have witnessed an upsurge of memory politics in Russia. This is
due to the country’s attempt to consolidate its national identity and deal with
the historical legacy of the Tsarist and Soviet empires. Russia’s construction
of its post-Soviet national identity has drawn on selected elements of both the
Tsarist and the Soviet period. Putin’s decision to adopt the double-headed
eagle as Russia’s official emblem and the reinstatement of the Soviet-time
anthem (albeit with different lyrics) exemplify this policy (Trenin, Post-
Imperium, 2011: 212). The decision to emphasise the myth of the imperial
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past has inevitably led the country to construct an imperialistic identity,
namely one that glorifies the grandeur of the Tsarist and Soviet empires and
takes their international standing in the past as a model to emulate for today’s
Russia. It is in this context that Putin’s description of the Soviet Union’s
collapse as ‘a major geopolitical disaster’ (Putin, 2005) has to be understood:
Russia shall recover the status and prestige that was lost with the end of the
Soviet superpower.
In particular, post-Soviet Russia has inherited part of the Communist-
time patriotic commemorations and official historical discourse, clearing them
of the Socialist rhetoric and emphasising nationalistic elements. The removal
of Socialist rhetoric from the official historical discourse is also a response to
the aversion of today’s Russians toward ideology, which results from previ-
ous experiences in the hyper-ideological Soviet world (Greene, Lipman &
Ryabov 2010, p. 5). This “de-ideologisation” emerges with clarity in the way
most Russians view two key dates of the Communist period, 1917 (the year
of the Bolshevik revolution) and 1945 (the Soviet victory in the Second
World War). The myth of the Bolshevik revolution had already lost its
appeal during the Soviet period and has declined further in recent years. In
2004 the celebrations for the anniversary of the October Revolution (on 7
November) were replaced by those for the Day of People’s Unity (4 Novem-
ber), the commemoration of a popular uprising that expelled Polish-Lithua-
nian occupation troops from Moscow in 1612.
Conversely, the ‘Great Patriotic War’ (the term Russians tend to use to
refer to the Second World War) has survived from the Soviet time as the
main national myth and source of international prestige. In its own view,
Russia – as successor of the Soviet Union – can claim a fundamental contri-
bution to the defeat of Nazism and the construction of post-war Europe
(Mälksoo, 2009: 666; Kirschenbaum, 2010: 67-78). The memory of the
immense war sacrifice and suffering is still central in the historical view of
many ordinary Russians, who are proud of their country’s victory over Nazi
Germany and carry on the myth of Soviet heroism and endurance during the
war. The current Russian leadership has turned Victory Day (9 May) into
the main national holiday and has attempted to portray the event as a symbol
of unity for the countries that are members of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States. This approach to history serves geopolitical aims, as it
attempts to forge a shared memory and identity with the countries that Mos-
stud.diplom.2012-4.book Page 89 Thursday, April 18, 2013 2:33 PM
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90 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
cow considers as its sphere of influence (Trenin, 2011: 216; Merridale, 1999:
416).13
The official Russian narrative of the Second World War praises the unity
of the people and a strong state, implying that this is the model to be followed
in today’s Russia. This narrative underplays Stalin’s crimes against the citi-
zens of the Soviet Union and of its satellite states (Koposov, 2011). It has been
propagated through television programmes and popular school textbooks, such
as Alexander Filippov’s History of Russia 1945-2007, and has thus reached a
very broad audience. Stalin’s figure is closely associated with the war myth,
which explains why numerous Russians have a relatively good opinion of the
Soviet dictator. They see Stalin as a successful war leader and as an empire-
builder that created a strong state and kept it in quasi-perfect order. His crimes
are relativised with references to the historical context of the 1930s and the
argument that they do not overshadow his presumed achievements (Sherlock,
2011: 103-104; Trenin, 2011: 213).
The use of parts of the Soviet past in current Russian national identity
construction, together with Russia’s status as the USSR’s legal successor, have
pushed Moscow to take up the role of defender of the entire Soviet legacy. In
particular, Russia rejects the equation between Communism and Nazism that
was discussed in the Council of Europe in 2008 and enshrined in resolutions
passed by the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in 2009 (Torbakov,
2011: 211).14 According to former president Dmitry Medvedev, accepting this
equation would have meant making Russia morally, legally and materially
responsible for Soviet crimes. Moreover, it would have undermined the domes-
tic discourse that presents the Soviet Union as Europe’s liberator from fascism,
which Russian leaders consider important for their country’s claim to partici-
pate in European affairs (Laruelle, 2011: 239).
13 For instance, in his 2005 address to the Russian Federal Assembly, President Vladimir Putin argued
that Russia is ‘bound to the former Soviet republics – now independent countries – through a common
history […] It is clear for us that this victory [in the Great Patriotic War] was not achieved through
arms alone but was won also through the strong spirit of all the peoples who were united at that time
within a single state’ (Putin 2005).
14 European Parliament’s resolution ‘European Conscience and Totalitarianism’, 2009, available at: http:/
/www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-
0213+0+DOC+XML+V0 //EN, accessed 26 June 2012; OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s resolution
‘Divided Europe Reunited: Promoting Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the OSCE Region in the
21st Century’, 2009, available at: http://www.oscepa.org/images/stories/documents/activities/
1.Annual%20Session/2009_Vilnius/Final_Vilnius_Declaration_ENG.pdf, accessed 26 June 2012.
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RUSSIA AND THE FORGING OF MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN EUROPE
Therefore, Moscow acknowledges that the Baltic States were “annexed” in
1940, but not “occupied”; it talks of Soviet “crimes”, but not of “genocide”, in
order to avoid legal and material liabilities. Russia sees any attempt to revise
the significance of the Soviet victory in the Second World War as a hostile act.
This approach led to the establishment of a Commission to Counter Attempts
to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests in May 2009.15 Fur-
thermore, the Russian government dismissed the criticism of countries whose
national memory clashes with Russian official historical discourses, most nota-
bly Latvia and Estonia, and condemned their lenient attitude toward Nazi col-
laborators and war criminals (Trenin, 2011: 215-219; Assmann, 2006: 263).
European or national memories and identities?
National narratives of the Second World War epitomise the lack of a shared
interpretation of the past in Europe (Fogu & Kansteiner, 2006: 294). Since
narratives of the Second World War provide a founding myth for many Euro-
pean countries, their impact on any attempt to create a European identity is
particularly strong. Assessments of the role of Soviet Russia in the conflict
arguably constitute the most divisive issue across European memory discourses.
The main topic of disagreement concerns the significance of 1945. In West-
ern Europe (France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxemburg), this date symbolises primarily the defeat of Nazi Germany and
the final liberation of Europe from Nazi occupation; the Soviet Union is seen
as an important contributor to this struggle. The Russian perception of 1945 is
very similar, except for its even more intense glorification of the anti-German
struggle and the Soviet/Russian role therein. In Central Europe (Germany,
Austria), the year 1945 is reminiscent of defeat, but also of the end of dictator-
ship, the beginning of democracy and rapid economic recovery. A vast litera-
ture on German civilian suffering during the Red Army’s advance has been
published and the topic is mentioned in official discourses.16 However, the
Soviet Union’s positive contribution to ending the conflict and defeating
Nazism is not questioned. Conversely, in Central Eastern Europe (the former
Soviet satellites and the Baltic States) 1945 is seen mostly as the end of an
15 However, the Commission was disbanded in February 2012, most probably due to its lack of effective-
ness; see Kantor, I. (2012) ‘Without falsification’.
16 Norman Naimark’s, (1995)
The Russians in Germany: a history of the Soviet occupation zone 1945-
1949
provides the most comprehensive account of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Germany.
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92 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
occupation and the beginning of another one, the transition from Nazi to Soviet
dominance. Accordingly, the division of Europe in spheres of influence at the
Yalta conference in February 1945 epitomises the beginning of a new occupa-
tion (Troebst, 2008: 69-70; Torbakov, 2011: 214-215). This view is hardly
compatible with the Western European perception of 1945 and totally incom-
patible with the Russian narrative, which claims that the Red Army liberated,
and not occupied, Central Eastern Europe.
The Moscow celebrations for the sixtieth anniversary of the Soviet and
Allied victory over Nazi Germany (on 9 May 1945) clearly illustrated the dif-
ferent views that European states hold on the significance and symbolic value
of 1945. Russian President Vladimir Putin invited world leaders to join the
celebrations, which included a Soviet-style military parade on the Red Square.
The event also provided Russia with an opportunity to reaffirm its importance
in the international scenario and strengthen its national identity (Onken, 2007:
32). Western European leaders decided to participate without much domestic
discussion; French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder flanked Putin during the celebrations. However, Putin’s invitation
stirred a heated debate in the Baltic States and Poland, where memory politics
of the Second World War matters more than anywhere else in Central Eastern
Europe. The debate focused on whether it was appropriate to attend the cele-
bration of a date that had been stigmatised as symbol of Soviet occupation and
brutality. Eventually, the Estonian and Lithuanian presidents (Arnold Rüütel
and Valdas Adamkus) declined the invitation, while their Polish and Latvian
counterparts (Aleksander Kwasniewski and Vaira Vike-Freiberga) decided to
attend, arguing that their participation would draw attention to their countries’
view of events (Mälksoo, 2009: 665-667; Levintova, 2010: 1351).
The clash between the dominant Russian and Baltic-Polish narratives of
the Second World War became one of the dominant topics in the debate that
preceded and followed the celebrations. Positions were too different to be rec-
onciled What Russia sees as glory and victory against Fascism, the Baltic
States and Poland consider as humiliation, loss of independence and identity.
On the one hand, Russian memory politics focuses on the “Great Patriotic
War”, which started with the Nazi aggression of the Soviet Union on 22 June
1941 and ended with the Red Army’s conquest of Berlin. On the other hand,
narratives of the war in the Baltic States and Poland focus on the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 and the subsequent invasion of their territory by the
Wehrmacht and the Red Army. According to this view, if Stalin had not made
stud.diplom.2012-4.book Page 92 Thursday, April 18, 2013 2:33 PM
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RUSSIA AND THE FORGING OF MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN EUROPE
an alliance with Hitler, the Second World War might not have started; thus,
the two totalitarian tyrants share responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict
and for the crimes against humanity that were perpetrated during the war
(Mälksoo, 2009: 666).
The centrality of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was denied by the Soviet
Union, which refused to acknowledge the existence of the secret protocol on
the partitioning of Eastern Europe until August 1988, and relativised by post-
Soviet Russia. Current Russian leaders consider the Pact of the same nature as
and no more deplorable than the 1938 Munich agreement (Troebst, 2009;
Trenin, 2011: 216). In 2009, Putin condemned the Pact at the commemoration
for the start of the Second World War in Gdansk. However, he also argued
that British and French behaviour at the Munich conference, which took place
before the Pact was signed and without the participation of the USSR, had
already undermined efforts to build an anti-Nazi alliance.17
The controversy between Baltic/Polish and Russian narratives of the Second
World War is further complicated by the fact that many Soviet/Russian lieux de
mémoire (cemeteries and monuments of the Red Army) are located in Central
Eastern Europe, while some Polish and Baltic memory sites (work camps, mass
graves) are located on Russian territory (Greene, Lipman & Ryabov, 2010: 7).
Two recent episodes exemplify this: the clash between the Estonian and Rus-
sian governments over the relocation of a Soviet war monument in Tallin in
2007 and the debate following the death of former Polish president Lech Kac-
zynski near Smolensk in April 2010. The relocation of the Soviet war monu-
ment from central Tallin to a military cemetery in April 2007 led to clashes
between ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians in Tallin and to a one-week-long
siege of the Estonian embassy in Moscow by Russian demonstrators. The dis-
pute concerned the interpretation of the monument’s significance: for Russia
and ethnic Russians, it was a symbol of liberation from Nazi occupation, while
for many ethnic Estonians it stood for Soviet occupation and repression after
1945. The fact that the monument, a Russian lieu de mémoire, was on the terri-
tory of a state which has adopted a different war narrative caused a diplomatic
crisis between Moscow and Tallin, 62 years after the end of the conflict (Ehala,
2009: 139-156; Lehti, Jutila & Jokisipilä, 2008: 393-413).
In the debate following the death of Polish president Lech Kaczynski, who
perished in a plane crash in April 2010 while flying to a commemoration of the
17 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8230387.stm, accessed 25 May 2012.
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94 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
Katyn massacre, many representatives of the main Polish (right-wing) opposi-
tion party ‘Law and Justice’ blamed Russia for the accident (New York Times,
2011). Diverging Russian and Polish narratives of the 1940 Katyn massacre
constitute the background of this accusation. The ‘Law and Justice’ leaders
constructed a narrative connecting events in 1940 and the death of Kaczynski
in 2010, arguing that Russian authorities had orchestrated the accident, emu-
lating the policies of the Soviet NKVD 70 years earlier. The fact that the
Katyn site is on Russian territory and that the plane crash took place in Russia
served to corroborate the conspiracy theory propagated by the Polish Right.
Although the Centre-Right Polish government seems to have opted for pragma-
tism and reconciliation with Moscow on the Katyn issue (The Guardian,
2008), the debate following the accident shows that prominent political forces
in Poland base their current posture toward Russia on strongly anti-Russian
memory politics.
The alleged lack of focus on events such as the Katyn massacre, the Nazi-
Soviet Pact and the Yalta conference in Western political discourse constitutes
the main source of conflict also between the Western and the Central Eastern
European narratives of the Second World War. One of the main critiques made
by Vike-Freiberga in May 2005 was addressed to the Western democracies,
that in 1945 ‘accepted without protest the renewed subjugation of over a dozen
countries in Central and Eastern Europe by the totalitarian Communism of the
Soviet empire and its satellites’. Due to this, she argued, the Allied victory
over Nazi Germany was only a ‘partial victory’ (cited in Mälksoo, 2009: 666).
Dominant Western European political discourses do not accept the argument of
a ‘partial victory’ and marginalise the suffering of Central Eastern European
states during and after the war. Their main focus is on the glorification of
domestic resistance movements and the suffering of Western European civilians
(Onken, 2007: 30). In addition, Western European discourses reject the equa-
tion between Nazi and Communist totalitarianism, which is a leitmotiv in Cen-
tral Eastern European memory politics, not least because Communists consti-
tuted a considerable or dominant force in the French, Italian and Belgian
resistance movements (Kattago, 2009: 12).
The Communism-Nazism equation is based on the argument that the Com-
munist and Nazi ideologies were equally criminal and murderous (Onken,
2007: 30). This interpretation enables Central Eastern European politicians to
relativise their countries’ responsibility in the Holocaust and other war crimes
by focusing on domestic suffering, first under Nazi occupation and then under
stud.diplom.2012-4.book Page 94 Thursday, April 18, 2013 2:33 PM
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RUSSIA AND THE FORGING OF MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN EUROPE
Soviet domination. Central Eastern European nations’ self-description as vic-
tims of both the Nazi and Soviet totalitarianisms allows them to externalise
both experiences and present their own crimes as defensive actions in the con-
text of “national liberation struggles” (Torbakov, 2011: 215-216). In addition,
the emphasis on Communist crimes finds a receptive audience in Central East-
ern European societies, where suffering under Communist regimes and in
Soviet gulags tends to be a livelier and more personal memory than the Shoah
(Karlsson, 2010: 42).
The equation Communism-Nazism also challenges the singularity of the
Holocaust as the crime against humanity of the twentieth century, which con-
stitutes a central paradigm of current Western and Central European narra-
tives about the Second World War (Mälksoo, 2009: 656; Onken, 2007: 30).
The reluctance of Central Eastern European leaders to discuss their countries’
participation in the Holocaust resulted in several verbal clashes between the
local elites and Western historians, politicians and Jewish organisations
(Onken, 2007: 33-36).18 At European level, the conflict between different
interpretations of the significance of the Holocaust and of Stalinist crimes
became particularly evident when Central Eastern European politicians, sup-
ported by conservative political groupings, presented resolutions condemning
Communist and Nazi totalitarianism in the European Parliament. These reso-
lutions caused heated debates, especially between their proponents and the
Western European Centre-Left. Eventually, they were either rejected or
adopted in modified versions that maintained the uniqueness of the Holocaust
(Kattago, 2009: 11-12).
Furthermore, Central Eastern European narratives of the Second World
War and its aftermath became increasingly challenged by developments in Cen-
tral European historiography and memory politics. In the last 10-15 years the
debate on German suffering and victimhood during the Second World War
acquired unprecedented relevance in German society and academic research.19
Since post-war Central Eastern European states bear responsibility for the
18 One of the liveliest debates took place in Poland when the Polish-American historian Jan T. Gross
published a book blaming the Polish inhabitants of the small town of Jedwabne for the mass murder of
their Jewish ‘neighbours’. The study prompted the Polish parliament to order an investigation of the
Jedwabne pogrom. See Gross (2001) and Zimmermann (2003, ed.).
19 For an analysis of the recent public debate on the flight of Germans from Eastern Europe, see Ohliger,
R. (2005) ‘Menschenverletzung oder Migration? Zum historischen Ort von Flucht und Vertreibung der
Deutschen nach 1945’,
Zeithistorische Forschungen
, 2; Völklein, U. (2005)
“Mitleid war von niemand
zu erwarten”. Das Schicksal der deutschen Vertriebenen
(Munich, Droemer); H. Bömelburg, R. Stöss-
inger & R. Traba (eds.) (2006)
Vertreibung aus dem Osten: Deutsche und Polen erinnern sich
(Osna-
brück, Fibre Verlag).
stud.diplom.2012-4.book Page 95 Thursday, April 18, 2013 2:33 PM
MARCO SIDDI
96 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
expulsion of ethnic Germans from their territory at the end of the conflict, the
debate portrays them as perpetrators, thereby challenging discourses that focus
exclusively on victimhood. This challenge proved particularly irritating for
Central-Eastern European states, as previously all European narratives had
portrayed the Germans as perpetrators and culprits of all evils in the years
1939-1945. The question of German victimhood remains highly disputed20 and
has also transcended the boundary of memory politics, as shown by the Czech
opt-out from the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to
prevent potential German expellees’ claims for compensation (The European
Voice, 2009).
Conclusion
The analysis has shown that Russia’s significance in memory discourses in the
three selected European countries varies considerably. Russia plays an impor-
tant role in Polish national memory, which is profoundly influenced by the
hostile historical relationship between the two states. Conversely, Russia is not
a major factor in French memory discourses. During the Cold War, the Soviet
Union constituted an important partner for France to perpetuate a semblance
of its past grandeur. However, other narratives are much more important in
French national memory, most notably the anti-Nazi Resistance and the revo-
lutionary tradition. Russia’s role is more substantial in German memory dis-
courses, particularly those concerning the Second World War and the division
of Germany. In spite of the largely antagonistic German-Russian historical
relationship, Russia does not feature as a significant foe in German national
memory. This is due to the prevailing German sense of responsibility for Sec-
ond World War crimes, as well as to the process of reconciliation that took
place between two countries following the reunification of Germany. Thus, the
hypothesis formulated at the beginning applies fully only to the Polish case, in
which the historical relationship with Russia shaped most decisively and most
negatively national memory.
The comparative section of the article has shown that Russia’s representa-
tions in the three national memories under analysis are hardly reconcilable. In
particular, the negative role of Russia in Polish national memory has no equiv-
20 See for instance the dispute that followed the German government’s proposal in February 2011 to intro-
duce a commemoration day for the German victims of expulsion from East and Central Europe;
Spiegel
,
15 February 2011.
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RUSSIA AND THE FORGING OF MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN EUROPE
alent in German or French memory discourses. Post-1989 memory discourses
in Poland and other Central Eastern European countries have been functional
to the construction of national identities with a strong anti-Russian connota-
tion: Russia is portrayed as a non-European country, as Europe’s constitutive
‘other’ (Torbakov, 2011: 215-216). This constitutes an obstacle to the emer-
gence of a shared European memory. Moreover, differing perceptions of Russia
are not the only hindrance in this respect. Central Eastern European memories
cannot easily be reconciled with Western and Central European memories on
key events of the twentieth century such as the Second World War and its
aftermath, the singularity of the Holocaust and the significance of ethnic
cleansing in the late 1940s.
Thus, it is improbable that national narratives will converge toward an
integrated and harmonised European collective memory. The lack of a shared
memory will continue to be an obstacle to the emergence of a common Euro-
pean identity (see also Jarausch & Lindenberger, 2007: 1; Fried, 2001: 561-
593).21 In spite of the continent’s increasing economic and political integration,
the ‘frontiers of memory’ (Judt, 1992: 112) have remained firmly in place,
particularly with regard to perceptions of Russia’s role in European history
during the twentieth century. Although certain historical periods feature prom-
inently in most European national memories, their representation is considera-
bly different from country to country (Bell, 2006: 16). As Klaus Eder argues, a
European collective memory could probably be built only around a feeling of
collective responsibility concerning Europe’s ‘murderous past’, focusing on the
crimes perpetrated by Europeans during the twentieth century (Eder, 2005:
218). However, it is highly unlikely that any political group will attempt to
construct a European collective memory based on shared controversial experi-
ences such as colonialism or the Holocaust.22 (Pakier & Stråth, 2010: 12;
Jarausch, 2010: 316).
Furthermore, a European memory of responsibility would also conflict with
stronger national narratives, where negative or shameful experiences have been
marginalised to make room for those that encourage pride and identification
with the nation.
21 Johannes Fried, former chairman of the Association of German Historians, argued that Europeans will not
develop a collective identity as long as their national images of memory diverge (Fried, 2001: 561-593).
22 The attempt to turn commemorations of the Shoah into a foundation myth of the EU, most notably at
the 2000 Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, was not successful. Discourses on colonial-
ism do not play an important role in the national memories of the former colonising countries and are
ambivalent, combining admissions of guilt with pride about the alleged achievements of empire.
stud.diplom.2012-4.book Page 97 Thursday, April 18, 2013 2:33 PM
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98 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2012 • LXV-4
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