The broadcasting industry, the telecommunications industry and the image processing part of the computing industry (the Internet/World Wide Web) are converging towards a single multi-media market in which TV operators supply voice telephony, telecommunications companies supply video images, and where the Internet is delivering both basic voice telephony and moving pictures on a commercial basis. Moreover, this convergence is expected to accelerate over the coming decade. At the same time as this process of convergence, technical and regulatory barriers to entry in both telecommunications and broadcasting markets have been falling, and are likely to continue to do so. Telecommunications markets around the world have been liberalized, following the examples of the United Kingdom and United States in 1984, and basic voice telephony in the EU was officially liberalized in January 1998. In broadcasting, shortage of effective spectrum created perceived barriers to entry. Consequently, specific prior structural regulation was instituted to prevent abuse of monopoly power, integrated in Europe with positive content regulation in the public interest . However, the development of multi-channel service provision and the anticipated use of digital technology have essentially removed the spectrum barrier to entry. As the UK 1998 Convergence Green Paper states: "The presumption that broadcasting and communications should be regulated should therefore in general be reversed." The regulatory implications of convergence are both the substantive issues of access to technical services, and the question of institutional design of the regulatory framework. Historically, the commercial separation of telecommunications and television has been mirrored with separate regulatory authorities, but with convergence, the commercial distinctions are being eroded and the rationale for multiple regulation is being questioned. In particular there is a view that the convergence of the markets 'requires' a merger of the sectoral regulators, to form a single communications regulator. The European Commission Green Paper in part addressed the issue of the appropriate regulatory structure. The results of the consultation were released in March 1999, including 'Key Messages' of which two were: * "Sector-specific regulation complementing case-by-case application of the competition rules * Separation of transport and content rules, with recognition of the links between them for possible competition problems. This implies a more horizontal approach to regulation with: * Homogenous treatment of all transport network infrastructure and associated services, irrespective of the types of service carried; * A need to ensure that content regulation is in accordance with the specific characteristics of given content services, and with the public policy objectives associated with those services; * A need to ensure that content regulation addresses the specificity of the audiovisual sector, in particular through a vertical approach where necessary, building on existing structures; * Application of an appropriate regulatory regime to new services, recognizing the uncertainties of the marketplace, and the need for the large initial investments involved in their launch while at the same time maintaining adequate consumer safeguard." In this paper, we examine the complex issue of regulatory structure in the broadcasting industry as it stands today, and in the broadly defined multimedia market of the near future, as best as we can envisage it. We focus on the questions raised in the Consultation Results as to the appropriate regulatory structure in the multimedia industry. We attempt to stand back from the 'turf wars' between threatened regulators that has heavily influenced the debate within the UK, and even from the discussion of the suitability of existing regulatory institutions for multimedia regulation. Rather, we approach the issue from first principles. First, we inquire as to the particular regulatory functions that need to be undertaken in the multimedia market. Secondly, possible synergy between regulatory functions, which might suggest that they should be jointly exercised, are analyzed and, finally, we project as to the sort of institutional arrangements which are likely to emerge. We do not offer, however, definite views on institutions. Moreover, following a survey of national communications regulators, based upon recent legislative and judicial developments in the European Union, we caution that the road to convergence may be obstructed by inefficient policy trade-offs made in the public or at least legislator interest. It is therefore a subject for continuing debate whether regulatory convergence will be shaped by first principles or policy trade-offs in a second-best solution.