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Resolving the Meat-Paradox: A Motivational Account of Morally Troublesome Behavior and Its Maintenance

May 2016
Personality and Social Psychology Review 21(3)

DOI:10.1177/1088868316647562

Authors:

Brock Bastian

University of Melbourne

Steve Loughnan

University of Edinburgh

A majority of people the world over eat meat, yet many of these same people experience discomfort when the meat on their plate is linked to the death of animals. We draw on this common form of moral conflict—the meat-paradox—to develop insights into the ways in which morally troublesome behaviors vanish into the commonplace and every day. Drawing on a motivational analysis, we show how societies may be shaped by attempts to resolve dissonance, in turn protecting their citizens from discomfort associated with their own moral conflicts. To achieve this, we build links between dissonance reduction, habit formation, social influence, and the emergence of social norms and detail how our analysis has implications for understanding immoral behavior and motivations underpinning dehumanization and objectification. Finally, we draw from our motivational analysis to advance new insights into the origins of prejudice and pathways through which prejudice can be maintained and resolved.

An outline of the motivated account of moral reasoning.

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Article

The invisible and the non-existent look very much alike.

—Delos McKown (1993, p. 39)

Morally troublesome behavior is both common and frequent,

and the act of meat-eating provides a particularly salient

example. Most people the world over eat meat, yet a vast

majority of meat-eaters also find animal suffering offensive,

emotionally disturbing, and potentially disruptive to their

dietary habits. We term the apparent psychological conflict

between people’s dietary preference for meat and their moral

response to animal suffering “the meat-paradox” (Loughnan,

Haslam, & Bastian, 2010). Meat-eating, like other forms of

morally troublesome behavior, conflicts with deeply held

moral principles, yet people seek to justify these self-serving

behaviors so as to protect their own interests. We draw on the

act of meat-eating to understand this general process. By

grounding our analysis in cognitive dissonance theory, we

identify the motivational nature of such conflicts and pinpoint

triggers and resolutions to dissonance. Furthermore, we show

how the process of dissonance reduction itself can work to

embed immoral action within individual minds, and how it

can spread morally questionable behavior within local popu-

lations, shaping societies, institutions, and cultures in ways

that ultimately protect people from experiencing associated

discomfort. We argue that through the process of dissonance

reduction, the apparent immorality of certain behaviors can

seemingly disappear. To achieve this, we draw on new insights

into dissonance theorizing and link it to recent work on habit

formation. We show how both the motivation to resolve dis-

sonance and the formation of habits can enable the develop-

ment and spread of supportive social norms, casting a veil

over moral conflict. Our analysis aims to uncover the ways in

which morally troublesome behavior can become normal-

ized, go unrecognized, and become resistant to change.

In what follows, we first draw on dissonance theorizing to

identify key triggers and resolutions to dissonance in the

context of immoral action. Next, we demonstrate how the

process of dissonance reduction itself can embed morally

troublesome behavior within minds and cultures, thereby

revealing the ways in which individual responses to disso-

nance can form habits and shape social norms. Finally, we

draw out the broader theoretical implications of our account.

First, we identify how our analysis contributes to current

647562PSRXXX10.1177/1088868316647562Personality and Social Psychology ReviewBastian and Loughnan

research-article2016

1The University of Melbourne, Australia

2University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

3University of Edinburgh, UK

Corresponding Author:

Brock Bastian, Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of

Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia.

Email: brock.bastian@unimelb.edu.au

Resolving the Meat-Paradox: A

Motivational Account of Morally

Troublesome Behavior and Its

Maintenance

Brock Bastian1,2 and Steve Loughnan3

Abstract

A majority of people the world over eat meat, yet many of these same people experience discomfort when the meat on their

plate is linked to the death of animals. We draw on this common form of moral conflict—the meat-paradox—to develop

insights into the ways in which morally troublesome behaviors vanish into the commonplace and every day. Drawing on a

motivational analysis, we show how societies may be shaped by attempts to resolve dissonance, in turn protecting their

citizens from discomfort associated with their own moral conflicts. To achieve this, we build links between dissonance

reduction, habit formation, social influence, and the emergence of social norms and detail how our analysis has implications

for understanding immoral behavior and motivations underpinning dehumanization and objectification. Finally, we draw from

our motivational analysis to advance new insights into the origins of prejudice and pathways through which prejudice can be

maintained and resolved.

Keywords

meat, motivation, morality, prejudice, dissonance, emotion

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2 Personality and Social Psychology Review

work on unethical behavior, and how it relates to theories of

moral reasoning, objectification, and dehumanization. We

also examine how our account provides a valuable extension

on current theories of moral disengagement. Finally, we

establish links between our analysis and other work on preju-

dice, providing novel insights into where prejudice comes

from, how prejudice can be resolved, and the ways in which

prejudice may become embedded in minds and cultures. By

focusing on the micro-level process of dissonance reduction

and linking it to macro-level processes, such as the emer-

gence of social norms and social institutions, we aim to build

a broad picture of morally troublesome behavior and its

maintenance.

A Dissonance-Based Account of the

Meat-Paradox

In modern societies, the practice of meat-eating is very popu-

lar: Most people eat meat. Around 97% of Americans are

meat-eaters, a figure that only drops as low as 60% in India,

one of the world’s least meat-eating nations. Meat is popular

because it is an excellent source of protein and calories; it has

about 10 times the calorie content of broccoli. Accordingly, it

has been sought by humans for millennia (Rozin, 2004). As a

dietary strategy, meat provided a number of important bene-

fits: Meat-eating allowed ancestral humans to increase their

body size without losing mobility due to low energy from

poor quality diets, such as those derived from plant food alone

(Milton, 1999). Consuming meat also meant that less time

was spent foraging for lower quality foods and more time

could be allocated to activities that advanced other traits, such

as social and cognitive abilities (Stanford & Bunn, 2001). As

such, meat-eating has been credited with a central role in the

emergence of human culture (Leroy & Praet, 2015; Rose &

Marshall, 1996; Stanford, 1999). Today, stakeholders in the

practice of meat-eating are both consumers—those who ben-

efit from eating meat—and producers—those who benefit

from the sale of meat. In 2010, the U.S. meat industry pro-

cessed nine billion land animals with sales of US$155 billion,

and with salaries, taxes, and direct and indirect revenues

accounting for 6% of the U.S. GDP; approx. US$864 billion;

North American Meat Institute, 2013).

Meat consumption has many benefits; nonetheless, it also

causes animal suffering, a fact that a vast majority of meat-

eaters find offensive, emotionally disturbing, and potentially

disruptive to their dietary habits. Broadly speaking, prohibi-

tions against harming others are among the most widely and

deeply held moral beliefs (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; K.

Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012). Deliberately inflicted harm—

especially when directed toward weaker others—often evokes

anger, disgust, and contempt, which are powerful, aversive,

and action-oriented moral emotions (Haidt, Koller, & Dias,

1993). This represents a significant moral conflict—the desire

to eat meat versus concern over animal welfare—which peo-

ple are motivated to resolve. Although this may lead to a

decision to stop eating meat, the prevalence statistics, along

with the broad number of benefits associated with meat-eat-

ing, suggest that people are more likely to continue with their

meat consumption. Meat-eating is maintained because it

serves to benefit the eater: Not only is it a tasty source of pro-

tein for most, but in addition, it represents a practice from

which people and nations can derive their incomes and identi-

ties (Berndsen & van der Pligt, 2004, 2005; Loughnan,

Bastian, & Haslam, 2014; Rozin, 1996a, 1996b, 2006).

The meat-paradox can be understood from the perspec-

tive of dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones &

Harmon-Jones, 2007). Dissonance refers to a state of emo-

tional discomfort that people experience when they hold

inconsistent attitudes or engage in behavior that is inconsis-

tent with their attitudes or beliefs (Aronson, 1968, 1992;

Festinger, 1957; Stone & Cooper, 2001; Thibodeau &

Aronson, 1992). Applied to meat-eating, dissonance arises

when people experience conflict between the act of meat-

eating and the harm this culinary behavior inflicts on ani-

mals (cf. Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997; Ruby & Heine,

2012). At the heart of the tension between meat-eating and

concern for animal welfare is the experience of conflict

between two dissonant attitudes. To state this formally, my

belief that animals are morally relevant creatures that

deserve to be protected from harm (including death) is

inconsistent with my desire to eat their meat. The belief that

animals should not be harmed, on its own, would predict a

decision not to eat meat, yet when paired with a range of

beliefs about meat-eating—that it is enjoyable, nutritional,

or socially valuable—animal welfare concerns may have

little influence on behavior. Nonetheless, in the context of

meat-eating, animal welfare concerns create negative affect,

threatening peoples’ enjoyment.

The apparent attitudinal inconsistency between both

desiring meat and having concerns over animal welfare may

itself be a source of dissonance consistent with Festinger’s

(1957) original formulation: It is simply that these two atti-

tudes are dissonant, which creates the experience of negative

affect. In the case of the meat-eating, however, we argue that

more is at stake. It is not simply an expectancy violation

(Aronson, 1969; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012) of the form, “if

meat animals are morally relevant, why do I enjoy eating

them so much?” Rather, it is a morally significant conflict—

one that may threaten self-perception (cf. Barkan, Ayal, &

Ariely, 2015; Bem, 1967; Stone & Cooper, 2001). Bringing

harm to others is inconsistent with a view of oneself as a

moral person (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003).

As such, meat consumption leads to negative affect for meat-

eaters because they are confronted with a view of themselves

that is unfavorable: “How can I be a good person and also eat

meat?”1 We argue that dissonance arises when people fail to

resolve this perception, and therefore feel that their beliefs,

attitudes, and behaviors are at odds (see Festinger, 1957;

Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; for an account of ethical dis-

sonance, see Barkan, Ayal, Gino, & Ariely, 2012). It is the

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Bastian and Loughnan 3

associated negative affective state that motivates attempts to

resolve dissonance (Elliot & Devine, 1994).

Consistent with classic accounts, dissonance over meat-

eating has a number of strong motivational properties: (a)

Meat-eating represents a behavioral commitment (Brehm &

Cohen, 1962), (b) people are personally responsible for

meat-eating (Wicklund & Brehm, 1976), and (c) the recogni-

tion that the act of meat-eating brings harm to animals vio-

lates standards or expectations critical for the maintenance of

a positive self-concept (Aronson, 1968). Particularly salient

for understanding the application of dissonance to meat-eat-

ing is the action-based model of dissonance (Harmon-Jones,

Amodio, Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-

Jones, 2002, 2007; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn,

Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999).

This model highlights that the process of dissonance reduc-

tion is often motivated by the need to facilitate effective

behavior: When people are committed to morally question-

able behavior, they will find ways to resolve dissonance to

enable the effective pursuit of that behavior. Figure 1 pro-

vides an overview of our motivational account. A key predic-

tion of the action-based model of dissonance is that the

process of dissonance reduction leads to an increase in

behavioral commitment, thus providing an important insight

into the ways in which morally troublesome behaviors can be

reinforced and maintained.

In what follows, we detail three specific sources of dis-

sonance associated with morally troublesome behavior and

review three key strategies through which people may seek

to reduce dissonance to enable action. We then detail how the

process of dissonance reduction can lead to an increase in

behavioral commitment. Next, we turn to an account of how

these “active” dissonance reduction strategies may facilitate

“passive” dissonance avoidance by embedding morally trou-

blesome behavior within minds and cultures.

Triggers and Resolutions to Dissonance

We argue that there are three avenues through which sensi-

tivities to morally troublesome behavior may emerge as well

as pathways through which the immorality of such behaviors

may seemingly disappear: harm, responsibility, and identity

(see Figure 1). When people take responsibility, acknowl-

edge harm, and accept the identity relevant consequences of

their actions, they will experience dissonance and cease their

immoral behavior. In the context of meat-eating, this is con-

sistent with the observation that most vegetarians in Western

societies cite concerns about the ethics of raising and slaugh-

tering non-human animals for meat as major factors in their

dietary choice (e.g., Beardsworth & Keil, 1991, 1992, 1997;

Fox & Ward, 2008; Hussar & Harris, 2009; Jabs, Devine, &

Sobal, 1998a; Neale, Tilston, Gregson, & Stagg, 1993;

Santos & Booth, 1996). Yet, as we note above, most people

continue to eat meat. By minimizing harm, denying respon-

sibility, and diffusing the identity-relevant implications of

their actions, people reduce dissonance and enable their con-

sumption of meat.

Harm

Acting in ways that harm the interests of others is only psy-

chologically problematic to the extent that those others are

perceived to have the capacity to suffer. Harm is only aver-

sive when it is directed toward morally relevant others.

Smashing a rock, for example, is harmful to the rock’s integ-

rity but hardly aversive because rocks are not morally

Figure 1. An outline of the motivated account of moral reasoning.

Note. Passive dissonance avoidance structures reinforce immoral behavior; when these fail, dissonance triggers lead to either behavioral change or active

attempts at dissonance reduction. The process of reducing dissonance reinforces immoral behavior and passive dissonance avoidance structures.

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4 Personality and Social Psychology Review

relevant others—they cannot experience harm. In general,

the extent to which an entity is considered to possess mental

capacities (e.g., especially those that are tied to the capacity

to suffer: N. Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005;

Leyens et al., 2001), it is also considered to be morally rele-

vant and therefore worthy of protection from harm (H. M.

Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; K. Gray, Young, & Waytz,

2012; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). People will,

therefore, only experience dissonance to the extent that they

consider the target of their action to have the capacity to suf-

fer from harm.

On this basis, causing harm to others who have minds is a

source of dissonance. Critically, perceptions of others’

capacities for mental experience are surprisingly flexible

(Epley, Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008; Marcu, Lyons, &

Hegarty, 2007). In the case of animals, our perceptions of

their internal world shifts to fit the exclusion criteria for

moral concern de jour; when moral relevance was based on

having a soul, this is what animals lacked (Aquinas, 1976a,

1976b), and when it required the capacity to reason, animals’

cognitive inferiority became conveniently clear (Descartes,

1649/1989). These theories of animals’ morally relevant

qualities provided a useful justification for their instrumental

treatment within human societies. Perceptions of animals’

minds may also shift situationally, when we use them for our

own needs (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012;

Bilewicz, Imhoff, & Drogosz, 2011; Loughnan et al., 2010).

When animals are perceived to have a reduced capacity to

experience pain, suffering, or understanding, our concern for

their welfare generally decreases (Opotow, 1993; Plous,

1993, 1996, 2003; Singer, 1991; Westbury & Neumann,

2008) and eating them becomes less dissonance arousing.

Categorization is another process through which people

seek to reduce the perceived harmfulness of their behavior.

Categorization has a profound influence on how people per-

ceive and experience their social world (Rosch, 1999) and

may operate to reduce the perceived harmfulness of one’s

behavior. This is clear in the case of meat-eating, where only

a tiny fraction of edible animals make the socially and cultur-

ally defined category of “food animal” (Rozin, 2003, 2007;

Rozin & Fallon, 1986; Tambiah, 1969). Different societies

categorize different animals as food or non-food (for a

review, see Herzog, 2010; Schwabe, 1979); dogs are consid-

ered food in parts of Korea and China, but not in Western

societies. The category into which an animal falls can also

shift over time; whales and horses were once widely consid-

ered food animals by Europeans, whereas they are now con-

sidered wildlife and pets, respectively (Anthony, 2007;

Mawer, 2000). Direct evidence for the role of categorization

in reducing moral concern was provided by Bratanova,

Loughnan, and Bastian (2011). They found that when an

unfamiliar animal was categorized as food (i.e., it is cooked

and eaten), people attributed it significantly less capacity to

suffer. Belonging to the “food animal” category can serve as

a conceptual frame (e.g., Barsalou, 1990; Yamauchi &

Markman, 2000). Once an animal belongs to the “food” cat-

egory, category-relevant attributes are more central (e.g.,

tastiness, tenderness, fattiness) and category-irrelevant attri-

butes become less central. Importantly, because suffering is

not food-relevant for most consumers, placing an animal in

the food category may reduce its perceived capacity to suf-

fer, helping to reduce dissonance.

Another key way that people may obscure their harmful

behavior is through benevolence (e.g., Dixon, Levine,

Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Glick et al., 2004). For decades,

religions have professed that humans have stewardship over

animals (Webster, 1995). By casting ourselves as the custo-

dians of the animal kingdom, and the owners of our pets, we

feel it is our right and privilege to decide on their fate. Killing

therefore seems less psychologically problematic—they are

subordinate rather than equal. In the case of meat-eating, this

allows us to view our “humane” processing systems as

reducing harm, thereby offsetting the loss of life. As such,

when subordinates accept their place within the social hierar-

chy, it reinforces the perception that our actions are within

their best interests. This is perhaps why meat animals are

often portrayed as happy and smiling on restaurant menus or

on advertising billboards—they are happy and willing par-

ticipants in their subordination.

Responsibility

A sense of personal choice and responsibility is central to

dissonance-related processes. When people feel that they

have freely chosen their attitudes or behavior, they are likely

to experience a subjective state of dissonance when those

attitudes or behaviors are in conflict (Cooper, 1971). A key

way in which people seek to obviate their moral responsibil-

ity for adverse outcomes is to adjust perceptions of their

agency (Ritov & Baron, 1990; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron,

1991). As Bandura (1999) suggests, people may reduce

responsibility by viewing their behavior as dictated by

authorities or diffused through collective action. Following

orders or seeing ones actions as a mere drop in the ocean of

collective harm can obscure perceived agency and control.

Understanding how people share the burden of responsi-

bility with others is important for contexts in which people

disengage from actions that are clearly immoral. Here, how-

ever, we consider the ways in which morally troublesome

behavior itself can become seemingly justified and appear

relatively benign. We focus on three specific beliefs that may

serve to obscure personal responsibility for harm by chang-

ing how the act itself is understood. These beliefs relate to

viewing the behavior as natural, normal, and necessary (for

some ideas on this, see Joy, 2011) and they serve to frame

behavior as a given, rather than a choice, allowing people to

feel that their actions are not freely chosen, in turn reducing

dissonance (Cooper, 1971).

In the case of meat-eating, there is a longstanding argu-

ment that meat consumption is a natural state for humans.

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Bastian and Loughnan 5

Advertising campaigns have leveraged the idea that not only

is meat-eating primarily responsible for the development of

the human species and human society, but literally that

“humans were meant to eat meat” (Macleod, 2006; Peace,

2008). This “naturalization” of meat-eating draws on a view

of human behavior, including food selection, as driven by a

range of primitive instincts (Winston, 2002). It appears that

meat-eaters endorse this notion (e.g., Rothgerber, 2014). In a

recent study, Piazza et al. (2015) asked around 300 people to

report three reasons “why you think it is ok to eat meat.”

Across two studies, 17% to 23% of justifications stated that

meat consumption is natural (e.g., “Humans are carnivores”).

Furthermore, the more people endorsed the idea that meat-

eating is natural, the more meat they reported eating.

A reliance on social norms is also an avenue through which

people can obscure their personal responsibility. Meat-eating

is a normal behavior for a majority of the world’s population

and an everyday norm for the majority of people living in

developed nations. Meat-eaters can rely on the notion that

meat-eating is normal to justify their meat consumption. In

their study of meat-eating justifications, Piazza et al. (2015)

found that between 10% and 12% of justifications appeal to

the idea of normality (e.g., “Society says it’s okay”). Increased

normality beliefs were also associated with higher levels of

meat consumption (Piazza et al., 2015). This is consistent with

the notion that people often rely on social norms or external

pressures to provide a justification for their actions (Ayal &

Gino, 2011; Gino & Ariely, 2012; Gino & Pierce, 2009; Kulik,

Sledge, & Mahler, 1986; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009),

thereby reducing a sense of personal choice. Indeed, some

have interpreted Milgram’s (1963) study on obedience to

authority as demonstrating a reliance on social norms to justify

harmful behavior (see Reicher, Haslam, & Smith, 2012).

Finally, viewing a behavior as necessary can serve to

obscure personal responsibility. In the case of meat-eating, this

belief centers on the idea that we must eat meat to survive or

that we simply cannot get enough protein for healthy living

from a meat-free diet. Piazza et al. (2015) identified perceived

necessity as the major justification offered for meat-eating:

36% to 42% of all justifications stated that meat consumption

was necessary (e.g., “Humans need meat to survive”). In addi-

tion to capturing a large number of justifications, necessity

was also significantly correlated with higher levels of con-

sumption of beef, pork, lamb, chicken, fish, and seafood. It is

not difficult to see how perceiving a behavior as necessary

undermines perceived personal choice: By definition, actions

that are mandatory or essential are antonyms for choice.

Personal choice is a key ingredient in producing disso-

nance (Festinger, 1957), and by framing immoral behavior as

natural, normal, and necessary, people reduce the sense of

personal choice and agency associated with their behavior.

Furthermore, these beliefs also make the alternatives (i.e.,

not engaging in such behavior) appear abnormal and deviant,

casting doubt and suspicion over those who abstain (e.g.,

Jetten & Hornsey, 2011).

Identity

A critical determinant of dissonance is whether the moral

implications of behavior reflect on the self. The recognition

that one has freely chosen to engage in morally troublesome

behavior will conflict with a perception of the self as a good

person, a self-view that we are motivated to maintain (e.g.,

Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995;

Aquino & Reed, 2002; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Taylor &

Brown, 1994). As we argue above, people may obscure their

freedom of choice to avoid dissonance; however, they may

also find creative ways to buffer their identities from the

negative consequences of their behavior.

Research has uncovered a variety of ways in which peo-

ple may seek to protect themselves from their immoral

behavior. Perhaps the most straightforward is to hide the fre-

quency with which a particular behavior occurs. For instance,

research suggests that people lie and cheat much more often

than they care to admit (e.g., Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009;

Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, & Bazerman, 2010)

or they may behave dishonestly enough to profit, but hon-

estly enough to delude themselves of their own integrity

(Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Just so, people may under-

report how often they eat meat, limit their meat intake, or eat

only certain types of meat (Rothgerber, 2014, 2015a, 2015b),

thereby reducing dissonance by emphasizing “responsible”

behavior. Another strategy may be to judge others’ behavior

more harshly to present oneself as more virtuous and ethical

(Barkan et al., 2012). This strategy is consistent with a ten-

dency to become horrified over the consumption of dog meat

but to maintain that the consumption of cows has no moral

cost.

In sum, our dissonance-based account predicts that harm,

responsibility, and identity are key triggers of dissonance,

and resolving one or other of these factors will reduce dis-

comfort. It is possible that people may seek to resolve all

three factors; however, based on the principle of least effort,

we propose that these strategies operate as a “cascade of

denial.” When harm is sufficiently minimized, personal

choice and identity buffering may be unnecessary. When

harm becomes inconveniently apparent, obfuscating per-

sonal choice is likely to take place. Finally, as we note above,

when these two strategies have both failed, identity buffering

is likely to emerge. The order in which this cascade of denial

occurs is likely to depend on a range of contextual factors;

however, our analysis suggests that each strategy will work

in concert; when one fails others will take hold, activated by

the reappearance of discomfort associated with dissonance

and identity-protection concerns.

When Dissonance Reduction Increases

Behavioral Commitment

Our approach makes the prediction that the process of resolv-

ing each source of dissonance will not only reduce discomfort,

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6 Personality and Social Psychology Review

thereby enabling behavior, but will serve to increase behav-

ioral commitment, thereby reinforcing and maintaining mor-

ally troublesome behavior. This is a key tenant derived from

the action-based model of dissonance and is referred to as the

“spreading of alternatives” (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones,

2002, 2007; Harmon-Jones et al., 2009; Harmon-Jones et al.,

2008; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). Harmon-Jones and

Harmon-Jones (2002) showed that when people make difficult

decisions that are tied to action-oriented states, they become

more committed to their chosen behavior compared with when

decisions are easy and they are less action-oriented. In this

way, once people have decided to engage in a given behavior,

they become more motivated toward the goal of enacting that

behavior (cf. Beckmann & Irle, 1985; Gollwitzer, 1990;

Heckhausen, 1986; Kuhl, 1984) and they view the alternative

as a less viable option. This spreading of alternatives is espe-

cially likely in contexts where people are motivated to engage

in self-serving behavior (an action-oriented state) that is incon-

sistent with their own moral standards (a difficult decision).

By viewing the chosen behavior more positively, and the alter-

native more negatively, people are able to reduce dissonance

and enable effective and un-conflicted action. On this basis,

committing to the behavior and seeing it as the right thing to

do are powerful ways to reduce dissonance. We draw on this

specific characteristic below to understand how dissonance

reduction may embed immoral behavior within minds and

cultures.

An especially powerful example of how efforts to resolve

dissonance may reinforce harmful behavior comes from a

study by Martens, Kosloff, Greenberg, Landau, and

Schmader (2007) who found that when participants were

asked to engage in a task where they believed they had killed

bugs, they were more likely to go on and kill more bugs. This

was only the case for those who perceived some similarity to

bugs. To this extent, the more threatened people felt in

response to the act of killing bugs (due to perceived similari-

ties), the more likely they were to go on and kill more. This

increased killing was also associated with increased positive

affect and reduced negative affect. In short, feeling bad about

killing bugs to begin with led to increased killing, which in

turn made people feel better. This work suggests that further

engagement in harmful behavior served to reduce dissonance

associated with past harmful behavior.

We can see evidence for this same dynamic in the case of

meat-eating. By resolving dissonance associated with ani-

mal harm, meat-eaters not only reduce their levels of dis-

comfort, they also increase their commitment to eating

meat. As we note below, this is perhaps one reason that the

consumption of meat has become ritualized and symbolic.

Beyond personal commitment, the process of dissonance

reduction, and the spreading of alternatives specifically,

should lead meat-eaters to see the vegetarianism as both a

less viable option and a less desirable one. Consistent with

this is the long history of polarized beliefs around meat-

eating (cf. Ruby, 2012). Vegetarians were persecuted in

12th-century China and viewed as heretics by the Roman

Catholic Church during the inquisition (Kellman, 2000).

Little more than 50 years ago, they were characterized as

domineering and secretly sadistic (Barahal, 1946) and veg-

etarianism was proposed as the underlying cause of medical

conditions such as stammering (Dunlap, 1944). Negative or

stereotypical attitudes toward vegan’s and vegetarians also

persist today; they are often viewed as pacifists, hypochon-

driacs, drug users, weight conscious, feminine, and liberal

(Ruby & Heine, 2011; Sadalla & Burroughs, 1986). By cast-

ing vegetarianism and vegetarians as suspect, this further

reduces the experience of dissonance for meat-eaters while

reinforcing their own decision to eat meat.

Embedding Immoral Behavior in Minds

and Cultures

Our dissonance-based account provides important insights

into how a recognition of immoral behavior may emerge and

the avenues through which people will seek to reduce disso-

nance and protect their identities. This process of dissonance

reduction may also increase commitment to immoral behav-

ior as people come to view their chosen behavior more posi-

tively and the alternative more negatively. These “active”

strategies involve psychological effort to justify immoral

behavior, yet the process of effortful dissonance reduction

may itself foster the emergence of “passive” avoidance

mechanisms, by embedding immoral behavior within minds

and allowing it to spread and become entrenched within soci-

eties and cultures. To this end, we develop an analysis of how

the process of dissonance reduction may promote the forma-

tion of habits, which themselves shape cultures in ways that

ultimately protect people from feelings of dissonance associ-

ated with morally troublesome action.

We begin with the assumption that it is unlikely that peo-

ple engage in the process of dissonance reduction each and

every time they engage in morally troublesome behavior.

Rather, repeated dissonance experiences across a lifetime

may begin to shape how people chronically construe their

behavior, and absent salient triggers, less and less cognitive

dissonance is likely to accompany the enactment of this

behavior across time. Our analysis indicates that the process

of dissonance reduction can gradually shape individual

minds and cultures, and in this way shares similarities with

classic work that highlights a general tendency to avoid dis-

sonance-evoking information (Abelson et al., 1968; Frey,

1982; Mills, 1965), a process that shapes chronic beliefs and

perceptions. In effect, through repeated dissonance reduc-

tion, the immorality of a given behavior ultimately “disap-

pears.” We now turn to discuss this disappearing act by

examining three ways that dissonance may be gradually

reduced and ultimately avoided from the development of

individual habits, to the spread of supportive social norms

that protect people from experiencing discomfort associated

with immoral behavior (see Figure 1).

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Bastian and Loughnan 7

Dissonance Reduction as Habit

We argue that a major source of dissonance in response to

morally troublesome behavior is when people consciously

reflect on the harmfulness of their behavior, their responsi-

bility for that behavior, or the identity-relevant consequences.

Reducing the extent of conscious reflection is therefore a

powerful way in which people can guard against dissonance.

Habits are especially effective in achieving this aim because

they lead to relatively automatic behavior (Quinn, Pascoe,

Wood, & Neal, 2010). In fact, behavioral habits are relatively

independent of peoples’ goals or intentions and are instead

triggered by the contexts in which behaviors are learned

(Wood & Neal, 2009), meaning that habits can lead to the

initiation of behavior without intention and can run to com-

pletion without conscious reflection (Neal, Wood, & Quinn,

2006). Indeed, the ability of habits to facilitate “mindless”

food consumption has already been demonstrated. Neal,

Wood, Wu, and Kurlander (2011) found that when placed in

the appropriate context (i.e., a movie theater), habitual pop-

corn eaters ate equivalent amounts of popcorn regardless of

its quality—whether it was fresh or stale. In the case of meat-

eating, we might similarly expect that habitual meat-eaters,

when placed in the appropriate context (e.g., a burger restau-

rant), will be uninfluenced by the conditions of animal wel-

fare that led to their meal. This suggests that by developing

habits around meat-eating, people may be able to enact this

behavior with little conscious reflection on the consequences,

thereby reducing the likelihood that issues related to animal

suffering will become salient. Habits literally allow people to

engage in meat consumption without reflection and therefore

to avoid the experience of dissonance.

Meat-eating is a strong candidate for the development of

behavioral habits. Habits develop over time for behaviors

that are highly repetitive. Furthermore, habits are most likely

to form in stable contexts, where direct associations in mem-

ory between responses and contextual cues can form. The

high prevalence and frequency of meat-eating in the general

population and the stability of the context (e.g., meal times)

in which meat-eating occurs suggest that habits around meat-

eating should form relatively easily.

Although habits may form in cases where morally trouble-

some behavior occurs at high frequency and in stable con-

texts, our motivational analysis suggests that the process of

reducing dissonance may itself encourage habit formation. As

we note above, increasing commitment to one’s chosen

behavior and viewing the alternative as less viable (the

spreading of alternatives) is a way in which people reduce

dissonance and enable effective action. We suggest that this

may also be a key way in which habits can form. By reducing

the perception of choice, the process of dissonance reduction

also reduces the need for reflective awareness of behavior—if

there is only one option, reflecting on that option is of little

use. Over repeated episodes, the process of dissonance reduc-

tion can lead to the initiation of behavior without intention

and the completion of that behavior without conscious reflec-

tion. To illustrate, when a meat-eater walks into a restaurant,

his or her intention is only to “eat,” the act of “meat-eating” is

not a seen as a choice, and therefore, they order the steak

without consciously intending to “eat meat.” In due course,

they will eat the steak as they typically do with little con-

scious reflection that they have eaten meat. For the meat-

eater, eating food is intentional, but eating meat is simply a

habitual by-product of that process.

In sum, we suggest that dissonance reduction itself leads

to the development of habits, which once set in place reduce

awareness of morally troublesome behavior and protect

against dissonance.

Dissonance Reduction Goes Viral

Drawing on our dissonance-based account of morally trou-

blesome behavior, we argue that “active” strategies to resolve

dissonance may lead to the spread of such behavior within

local populations. One way in which this may occur builds

from our analysis of habit formation above. When a particu-

lar behavior becomes habitual, people are likely to engage in

it with little reflection and probably at a relatively high fre-

quency. Critically, this does not occur in isolation. Habitual

behaviors are enacted within social contexts and can quickly

spread through large populations. This has been shown in the

case of health behaviors, such as diet (obesity: Christakis &

Fowler, 2007), smoking (Christakis & Fowler, 2008), and

alcohol consumption (Rosenquist, Murabito, Fowler, &

Christakis, 2010). Meat-eating is also predicted by social

influence, with people more likely to eat meat when their

family or friends eat meat, and more likely to stay vegetarian

when such a diet is supported by their social network (Jabs,

Devine, & Sobal, 1998b; Ruby, 2012). Like health behavior,

meat-eating is likely to spread and to become stabilized

within a given population: A possibility that is supported by

the fact that 97% of Americans are meat-eaters, a figure that

does not drop appreciably in most other countries.

There are two reasons that habits are especially likely to

spread through cultures and influence the behavior of others:

Because habitual behaviors are likely to occur with a high

level of frequency and with a low level of reflection. People

tend to infer others’ attitudes from observation of their behav-

ior. When behaviors occur frequently and with little conscious

reflection, people will infer that those who enact them hold

attitudes that are consistent with that behavior. As we point

out above, the meat-paradox is a source of discomfort for

most meat-eaters; yet when those same people engage in the

act of meat-eating frequently, without reflection, and with

little-to-no discomfort, it would appear they are immune to

any moral conflict. Observers of habitual behavior will there-

fore view such behavior as normative and “agreed upon,” and

will engage in the same practice even if they are not person-

ally supportive (Miller & McFarland, 1991). For instance,

Prentice and Miller (1993) demonstrated that students

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8 Personality and Social Psychology Review

believed they were more uncomfortable with binge-drinking

practices than their peers at college, although they engaged in

the behavior to a similar extent.

Another step in our argument is that just as habits may

facilitate the spread of immoral behavior, once those habits

are writ large within a given population, their collective

enactment will further protect against the need for critical

reflection, and in turn dissonance. We argue that when mor-

ally troublesome behavior is not only embedded within indi-

vidual minds, but within entire populations, people will

rarely experience dissonance. The opportunity for conscious

reflection will simply not occur. Critical communication

around the implications of the behavior, or whether it aligns

with people’s broader goals or intentions, will likely be

absent. As an example, in cultures that are perceived to be

supportive of particular forms of bias, public communication

will be characterized by the expression of prejudice and peo-

ple will more readily accept these “prejudices” into their

self-concept (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In these contexts,

it becomes increasingly difficult to see that such attitudes or

beliefs may be prejudicial in the first place, further accelerat-

ing their acceptance and communication. So too, in cultures

where bribing public officials is widespread, the perception

that such behavior is corrupt or antisocial is unlikely to

emerge. Indeed, in such contexts, people may become rela-

tively brazen and even open about their engagement in such

practices.

Our argument so far is that dissonance reduction may lead

to the spread of immoral behavior because it fosters habit

formation, and such habits are interpreted and adopted by

those within the local social context. Yet, our motivational

approach suggests that dissonance reduction may play a

more direct role in spreading immoral behavior. According

to dynamic social impact theory (Latané, 1996; Nowak,

Szamrej, & Latané, 1990), persuasiveness, supportiveness,

and polarization are three factors that determine whether atti-

tudes or behaviors will spread throughout a given social con-

text. We suggest that the micro-level process of dissonance

reduction can lead to macro-level polarization and resistance

to change. As Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2002) note,

dissonance reduction leads to the spreading of alternatives,

making others’ choices seem less attractive. We suggest that

this individual-level polarization will feed into social polar-

ization. By defending their own behavior, casting it as the

preferred alternative, and derogating those who oppose it or

choose the alternative, these individuals will subtly (or per-

haps explicitly) recruit others to share in their point of view,

leading to polarization within society at large.

According to dynamic social impact theory, social influ-

ence will be catastrophic, as opposed to incremental, for

important issues (Latané, 1996). That is, rather than leading

to convergence, important social issues will be especially

likely to promote polarization and resistance to change. Our

analysis suggests that one reason issue importance may pro-

mote polarization is because important issues are more likely

to create dissonance. For those who are committed to their

self-serving biases, they will work harder to reduce disso-

nance, vigorously defending their behavior, and seeking to

recruit others. Indeed, one of the key ways in which people

may seek to resolve their own dissonance is to influence oth-

ers to share their views, thereby enabling increased social

support for their self-serving behavior and/or the status quo.

Our motivational approach to understanding immoral

behavior and its maintenance supplements the cognitive

account offered by Latané (1996), highlighting the role of

motivation in spreading and supporting such behavior.

Furthermore, we offer an account of how increased behav-

ioral commitment, arising from efforts at dissonance reduc-

tion and via its role in the production of habitual behavior,

may specifically achieve this. Our analysis suggests that the

experience of inconsistency may not only shape minds but

also shape cultures in ways that can effectively camouflage

the immorality of certain behaviors and protect individuals

from associated discomfort.

To turn to meat-eating, beliefs, behaviors, and habits asso-

ciated with meat-eating are prime candidates for these

dynamic processes to take hold. Given the value of meat in

the human diet, it is also an important issue on which people

are committed and are likely to resist opposing social influ-

ences (e.g., the views of vegetarians), leading to polariza-

tion. As we already note above, there is a long history of

derogating vegetarians, creating polarization between those

who eat meat and those who choose not to—a fact that also

fits well with our current analysis. This polarization further

supports the spread and maintenance of meat-eating by facil-

itating a supportive culture.

Dissonance Reduction Gets Outsourced

When people seek to reduce dissonance associated with mor-

ally troublesome behavior, this may lead to the formation of

habits that are spread and maintained within cultures.

Furthermore, by encouraging polarization around important

issues, dissonance reduction may directly spread immoral

behavior. We argue that beyond embedding immoral behavior

within people’s minds and spreading it through populations,

the process of dissonance reduction may also shape social

structures in ways that work to further avoid dissonance. We

start from the premise that highly visible cultural norms and

practices tend to develop around valued behaviors. As we

have detailed above, dissonance reduction leads to the spread-

ing of alternatives where people view their chosen behaviors

as more valuable, and in this way, they become more commit-

ted to them. It therefore follows that cultural norms and prac-

tices will tend to develop around behaviors that have the

potential to create dissonance, and which have become val-

ued as a result of dissonance reduction. Furthermore, the pro-

cess of embedding such behaviors within cultural practices

protects against dissonance by changing the value of such

behaviors.

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Bastian and Loughnan 9

A good example of this process is the almost ubiquitous

tendency for nations to build their identities around acts of

war (e.g., through remembrance days; Liu et al., 2005; Liu &

Hilton, 2005). One reason for this may be that acts of war

arouse high levels of dissonance—they involve morally

problematic behaviors. For this reason, such acts may

become highly valued, especially because they can no longer

be changed—valuing the act is a way of reducing dissonance.

Social rituals, therefore, develop around these acts both

because they become valued (through the process of disso-

nance reduction) and because ritualizing such behavior and

attaching it to cherished group identities serves to ensure that

the value attached to these acts is maintained. This, in turn,

continues to protect citizens from experiencing discomfort

associated with past atrocities (cf. Aquino, Reed, Stefan, &

Freeman, 2007) and in this same way may even facilitate

future atrocities (Paez & Liu, 2011).

We suggest that there are two key ways in which disso-

nance can be outsourced to societies at large: through institu-

tionalization and ritualization. Institutionalization refers to

the tendency for immoral behavior to become embedded

within social structures and practices, where government

bodies, companies, or other social structures operate in ways

that perpetuate such behavior. Here, however, we focus on

the ways in which institutions may operate to protect people

from dissonance associated with their immoral behavior. In

the case of meat-eating, this has been achieved by obscuring

meat production from the consumer. The production, mar-

keting, and sale of meat actively ensure that individuals can

eat meat without necessarily connecting it to the animals

from which it came (Hoogland, de Boer, & Boersema, 2005).

This disconnect between meat and meat animals has become

embedded within our social practices and institutions, in part

achieved though the remote location of farming and slaugh-

tering. Intensive farm operations and slaughterhouses are

typically located in remote or inaccessible places (Fox, 1997,

cited in Plous, 2003), often for good economic reasons. In

addition to physical distance, there is considerable informa-

tional distance; farm animals receive less media coverage

than wild animals (e.g., Singer, 1991). Indeed, the general

lack of media coverage of the process, scope, and impact of

meat production limits an individual’s access to information

about meat by mass media (e.g., Joy, 2011). Although there

may be good economic, health, and security reasons for iso-

lating meat production, we suggest that it also serves to avoid

consumer dissonance. This function, of the separation of pro-

duction from product, is evident in the apparent hesitancy of

large scale abattoirs and factory farms to engage with critical

inquiry and transparency (e.g., Foer, 2010). By making meat

production distant from the consumer, people need not think

about the path from paddock to plate.

The marketing of meat also plays a keen role in ensuring

that meat is cleanly separated from its animal origins. Meat

is generally packaged without reminders of the animal from

which it came. Body parts associated with life or personality

of an animal—such as eyes, face, or tail—are rarely included

on supermarket shelves (Plous, 1993). The simple act of giv-

ing meat products different names to the animals from which

they came (e.g., pigs to pork, cows to beef, calves to veal)

can help break the animal–meat association. We eat “beef”

but not “cows” and “pork” but not pigs (see also Mitchell,

2011). In this way, language is used to create distance and

legitimize the use of animals for meat (see Plous, 1993, 2003,

for a thorough discussion; Hyers, 2006; Leach, 1964;

Rasmussen, Rajecki, & Craft, 1993). This process of naming

meat is similar to “euphemistic labelling” as Bandura (1999)

highlighted in his theory of moral disengagement. In the

same way Bandura argued that people can commit immoral

acts by using language to obscure or change the meaning of

their actions, so too we suggest they can engage in meat con-

sumption without feeling dissonance by obscuring the ani-

mals killed to produce the meat.

The second way that dissonance reduction may become

embedded within social norms and institutions is through the

process of ritualization. Similar to habits, people engage in

ritualized behavior without questioning its logic or reflecting

on its direct causal consequences (Whitehouse, 2004). It is

for this reason that rituals spread through social contexts

over time and space and become embedded through develop-

mental and socialization processes (Legare, Wen, Herrmann,

& Whitehouse, 2015; Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, 2015).

Rituals are transferred through imitation and are performed

because “it is the way it is done.” Indeed, the practice of

meat-eating is highly ritualized. Whether it is the

Thanksgiving turkey in the United States, the Sunday roast

in Great Briton, Easter lamb for Orthodox Christians, the

backyard barbeque in Australia, or beef and mutton for the

Muslim holy day of Eid al-Adha, meat is central to these

treasured cultural traditions (Foer, 2010). The use of meat in

these contexts is rarely questioned and is taken as central to

the tradition itself. As with other rituals, the reason why we

eat roasts on Sundays or turkey for Christmas is not at all

clear; there is a high degree of casual opacity (see Whitehouse,

2004) meaning that we imitate these behaviors rarely asking

the question of why.

It is through this same process of ritualization that meat

becomes symbolic of a large number of cultural identities

(e.g., DeSoucey, 2010). For example, meat-eating is often

viewed as a sign of masculinity for men (Newcombe,

McCarthy, Cronin, & McCarthy, 2012; Rothgerber, 2013;

Ruby & Heine, 2011), and specific ethnic identities may be

linked to the consumption of specific types of meat (e.g.,

Greek with lamb; British with beef; French with ducks,

frogs, and snails; Korean with dog meat; Norwegian and

Japanese with whale meat). Ritualization means that people

begin to eat meat not only because they enjoy it but also

because it allows them to express valued social identities.

Ritualization serves to reduce dissonance because it

allows people to protect their personal identities through

embedding their behavior within the norms, ideals,

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10 Personality and Social Psychology Review

and manners of a group (see Turner, 1999). In the case of

meat-eating, it is often tethered to group meanings and

endowed with group significance. Compared with all other

foods, meat is vastly more likely to be the target of taboo

(Fessler & Navarrete, 2003). Consider, for example, reli-

gions’ classification of foods as edible and non-edible. Such

classifications almost exclusively relate to meat. Neither

Muslims nor Jews traditionally eat pork, with Jews addition-

ally abstaining from a range of seafood. Both Muslims and

Jews traditionally eat meat prepared in accordance to certain

customary practices (e.g., Halal, Kosher). Catholics tradi-

tionally do not eat meat on Friday, with traditional Hindu

taboos extending beyond eating beef to prohibit even touch-

ing cow flesh. Contravening these norms is often considered

a moral transgression, requiring atonement or even exclusion

(Wennberg, 2003).

The significance of meat-eating for group membership

may be defined not only by rejecting meat or meat prepared

a certain way, but also by consuming meat and meat prepared

a certain way. Meat-eating can allow individuals to assert a

positive and valued identity. For example, meat-eaters tend

to be viewed as more masculine than vegetarians (Rozin,

Hormes, Faith, & Wansink, 2012; Ruby & Heine, 2011;

Vartanian, Herman, & Polivy, 2007), an association that has

also been noted by a number of scholars (e.g., Adams, 1991;

Sobal, 2005; Twigg, 1979). Thus, eating meat—particularly

red meat—can be a powerful way masculine individuals can

exercise their identity and affirm themselves as members of

the group “real men” (Rothgerber, 2013). In other contexts,

especially poorer nations where meat is costly and animals

are of more use alive than dead, meat-eating may symbolize

wealth (Scholliers, 2001). Here, eating meat can confirm a

social class group membership, being one of the “rich.” In

these contexts, meat-eating is a symbol that is endorsed and

expected by other group members.

When meat-eating practices are ritualized and embedded

within tradition and ceremony, this act may be framed as a

pathway to showing commitment to the in-group. Sharing

the Christmas ham, Thanksgiving Turkey, or having a BBQ

is characterized as a way of engaging in “ingroup love.”

Meat-eating is framed as benefiting the group, as promoting

group cohesion and positive group identity, therefore detract-

ing from, or potentially justifying, the harm brought to ani-

mals. This in turn obfuscates identity-relevant consequences

and resolves dissonance.

From Disappearance to Reappearance

Our analysis shows the pathways through which people may

seek to “actively” resolve dissonance and how this may in

turn foster psychological and social structures that “pas-

sively” avoid dissonance. To this end, habits, institutions,

and rituals throw a powerful veil over immoral behavior. In

doing so, they protect people from the need to confront their

morally troublesome actions, and this in turn protects them

from the experience of cognitive dissonance and subsequent

motivation toward dissonance reduction. Given these disso-

nance-avoiding psychological and social structures, one

might wonder on what basis dissonance associated with such

actions would ever arise. We suggest these structures truly

operate like a veil; they are an imperfect cloak—at times

becoming transparent. Reminders of harm will pierce it; per-

haps a child asks us why we eat cows or we see a pig’s head

in a butcher’s window. Eating out with friends and having

one say, “I’m a vegetarian, could you take the meat off that

pizza?” will prick our sense of personal responsibility; we

choose to eat meat (see Rothgerber, 2014). In simple, banal

interactions such as this, the veil is pierced, the convenient

invisibility of immorality ends, and dissonance makes a

reappearance.

When confronted with their own immorality, people can

engage in a range of proximal, personal defenses to reduce

their dissonance. As we review above, derogating animals’

minds and moral standing can alleviate our negative emo-

tions (Bastian et al., 2012) and help resolve the dissonance.

Justification structures such as the “4N’s of meat eating” can

help reduce our perceived personal responsibility for the

immoral behavior (Piazza et al., 2015). In short, people have

a range of psychological defenses around their immoral

behaviors that serve to resist behavioral change. The per-

sonal and social structures that help render the immorality of

behavior invisible are useful but imperfect. They help people

avoid the mental and emotional labor of dissonance reduc-

tion, allowing them to engage in potentially troublesome

behavior without incurring the costs of doing so. When

immorality reappears, people are not lost for ways to defend

their psychological equanimity; they just seldom feel the

need to.

Our analysis also suggests that in the absence of social

and psychological structures for avoiding dissonance, people

may be especially effective at relying on more active strate-

gies. Whether it be farmers or abattoir workers, these indi-

viduals will be unable to rely on the sanitization of

supermarkets or media bans to avoid the experience of dis-

sonance. Moreover, their direct exposure to acts of harm will

provide cause for conscious reflection. Under such condi-

tions, a reliance on active strategies to avoid dissonance will

be apparent, and such strategies are likely to be especially

well honed.

Finally, our analysis also provides insights into the pro-

cess through which immoral behaviors that have become

embedded within a particular social context can be changed.

We would argue that due to the motivational pull of disso-

nance reduction, gradual change is unlikely. When individu-

als become aware of the immorality of a particular behavior,

they will experience dissonance. If strong enough, this expe-

rience of discomfort may lead to behavioral change. In such

cases, however, the influence of this behavioral change may

be like a drop in the ocean when habits, institutions, and ritu-

als provide a powerful anchor for people to avoid dissonance

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Bastian and Loughnan 11

over their own morally troublesome acts. Forerunners of

such change are, therefore, just as likely to be ostracized or

derided for their change of heart, and this response itself

could trigger stronger behavioral commitment within others.

If widespread change does occur, it is likely to be cata-

strophic, where acute circumstances raise the experience of

dissonance within large segments of a given population

simultaneously. As the process of social influence reverses

and collective soul searching leads to the deconstruction of

protective social norms, feelings of unresolved dissonance

will motivate a push toward prohibition and behavior change.

A broader example of exactly this process comes from

research practices within social psychology and the associ-

ated “crises” of recent times. Triggered by the downfall of

high-profile members within the scientific community, a new

awareness of data practices began to emerge, resulting in the

development of more explicit standards and expectations

within the community at large. Indeed, it is likely that even

those individuals who had allowed their practices to cross

over into wholly inappropriate behavior would have felt

somewhat surprised when the protective cultures within

which these practices had grown began to crumble. This also

demonstrates that catastrophic change is likely to occur when

examples of more extreme and less justifiable behavior

pierce the collective conscience. Such examples give rise to

change because they overwhelm available mechanisms for

both the “active” resolution and “passive” avoidance of

dissonance.

Broader Theoretical Implications

Drawing on the meat-paradox, we have aimed to develop a

motivational account of unethical behavior. In doing so, we

have attempted to construct an analysis that is not limited to

meat-eating, but which provides broader insights into the

ways in which individuals and societies justify and perpetu-

ate morally problematic behavior in general. At its broadest

level, our approach provides insights into contexts where

people are committed to certain behaviors because they pro-

vide a range of personal benefits, and letting go of such

behaviors would involve significant personal costs. Yet, at

some level, these same behaviors also conflict with one’s

personal moral standards. Our analysis details how the pro-

cess of justifying such behavior, and reducing the dissonance

associated with it, in turn serves to embed unethical behavior

within minds and cultures such that it no longer appears

unethical at all. Our approach provides a number of impor-

tant theoretical extensions, which we now detail below.

Implications for Understanding Unethical

Behavior

Our approach has a number of important implications for

current work on unethical behavior. There is now a body of

work focusing on the ways in which unethical behavior may

sometimes be motivated by factors such as social norms

(Gino et al., 2009), one’s goals (Schweitzer, Ordóñez, &

Douma, 2004), self-interest (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Mazar

et al., 2008), and the extent to which one’s behavior can be

rationalized or justified (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Gino & Ariely,

2012; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De

Dreu, 2011; Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011; Tenbrunsel et al.,

2010). In line with our approach, scholars in this field have

begun to draw on dissonance theorizing to understand the

motivational properties of unethical behavior (Barkan et al.,

2012; Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, & Ayal, 2015). This perspective

is also consistent with past work showing that cognitive limi-

tations and systematic biases operate outside consciousness

and limit people’s awareness of their misconduct (Banaji,

Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; Baumeister & Newman, 1994;

Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). These implicit processes

help people reframe unethical behavior, reinforcing a sense

of consistency between behaviors and desired moral stan-

dards, and sustaining a positive self-image (Kunda, 1990;

Lydon, Zanna, & Ross, 1988; Ross, McFarland, Conway, &

Zanna, 1983).

Our analysis adds to this work in a number of important

ways. Consistent with classic accounts of dissonance as

grounded in self-perception (e.g., Aronson, 1968; Stone &

Cooper, 2001), scholars of unethical behavior have tended to

focus on the ways in which people protect their self-image to

reduce dissonance (e.g., Ayal & Gino, 2011; Shalvi et al.,

2015). Our analysis adds to this recent work, by identifying

two additional avenues through which dissonance associated

with one’s unethical behavior can be reduced, by diminish-

ing harm and reducing responsibility.

In terms of diminishing harm, we link our analysis to work

identifying the importance of perceived harm for immoral

behavior (e.g., Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). Furthermore,

we draw on research in the field of social cognition showing

the various ways that people can adjust their perceptions of

the targets of their actions (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2010;

Gray, Knobe, Sheskin, Bloom, & Barrett, 2011; N. Haslam,

2006; N. Haslam et al., 2005; N. Haslam & Loughnan, 2014;

Loughnan & Haslam, 2007) and the role of categorization in

facilitating this process (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; see also

McGarty, 1999). Our analysis shows that people can reduce

the identity-relevant consequences of their harmful actions,

and any associated dissonance, by changing how they per-

ceive the morally relevant qualities of their victims. To this

end, our analysis links dissonance theorizing and prior work

on justifications for immoral behavior to research on the role

of dehumanization (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Jackson

& Gaertner, 2010; Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013) and

victim derogation (Imhoff & Banse, 2009) in reducing the

identity-relevant consequences of harmful acts toward others

in general. As such, our analysis also identifies the process

through which ongoing harmful and immoral behavior can be

perpetuated: When one’s victims are viewed as less-than-

human, objectified, or derogated, these perceptions can serve

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12 Personality and Social Psychology Review

to facilitate and justify future harm (e.g., Bastian, Denson, &

Haslam, 2013; Bernard, Loughnan, Godart, Marchal, &

Klein, 2015; Loughnan, Pina, Vasquez, & Puvia, 2013; Viki,

Osgood, & Phillips, 2013).

Another way that our analysis adds to past work in this

field is that it identifies specific ways in which people can

frame their actions to reduce perceived responsibility for

harm, by viewing their behavior as natural, normal, and nec-

essary. We note evidence for this in the various ways that

people understand the act of meat-eating; yet, this same ten-

dency is also apparent in other domains. For instance, it is

well-established that identifying the roots of behavior in

biology both increases the perceived naturalness of the

behavior and undermines personal agency and perceived

personal choice (see Dar-Nimrod, Cheung, Ruby, & Heine,

2014; Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Dar-Nimrod & Lisandrelli,

2012). Commonly termed biological essentialism, this belief

can serve to perpetuate a reliance on stereotypes (Bastian &

Haslam, 2006) in ways that may shape individual behavior

(Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2006) and intergroup relations

(Bastian & Haslam, 2008), and may be relied on to justify

inequity and other forms of unfair behavior (Keller, 2005;

Kraus & Keltner, 2013; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). So,

too, normalization is evident in certain forms of sexism,

where people fail to question the low numbers and tenuous

position of female political and corporate leaders, and why

women are more frequently cheerleaders rather than sporting

heroes or are scrutinized over their wardrobes more than

their policy making (Archer, Iritani, Kimes, & Barrios, 1983;

Aubrey, 2006; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Ryan & Haslam,

2005). Indeed, women are commonly portrayed in a narrow

and stereotypical way (e.g., Zurbriggen, Ramsey, & Jaworski,

2011), and gender inequality is implicitly viewed as accept-

able or justifiable (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002),

sometimes by women themselves (Williams & Wittig, 1997).

Finally, necessity has been invoked to understand the psy-

chology of evil, and how it is that even highly immoral

behaviors such as genocides can come to be seen a moral

necessity (S. A. Haslam & Reicher, 2007). Our analysis

shows how these three beliefs can resolve dissonance associ-

ated with meat-eating, yet it should be clear that the same

dynamic can be observed across a range of domains, thereby

adding to our understanding of the ways in which people

deny personal responsibility for unethical behavior and

reduce dissonance.

The similarities between our analysis and Bandura’s

model of moral disengagement are noteworthy. Bandura

(1999) argued that people have a “moral self,” which they

are motivated to protect in the face of their immoral actions

and they may do so by using similar strategies to those we

focus on here. Yet, moral disengagement theory details a pri-

marily cold, cognitive process, involving comparison,

knowledge, attribution, and intentionality. Our motivational

account goes beyond this, identifying hot, emotional path-

ways that motivate attitudes and behavior. Rather than a

more abstract perception of our moral self-image, we argue it

is the proximal emotional pressure to resolve dissonance that

shapes our behavior and beliefs.

In addition to identifying specific pathways toward dis-

sonance reduction, our analysis also provides for an under-

standing of how this process may increase behavioral

commitment. Previous accounts (including Bandura’s) have

focused on how people can reduce dissonance, thereby

allowing for the continuation of behavior uninhibited by

negative affect or moral conflict. Our analysis makes a sig-

nificant extension on this work by drawing on recent devel-

opments within the field of cognitive dissonance, specifically

the action-based model of dissonance (Harmon-Jones et al.,

2009). Based on this model, we are able to provide an analy-

sis of how dissonance reduction itself can serve to increase

commitment to immoral behavior. This can also shed new

light on old findings. As we note above, people became more

committed to killing bugs to justify their past bug killing

(Martens et al., 2007). This shares many similarities with the

tendency for participants in Milgram’s (1963) classic obedi-

ence studies to commit to increasingly harmful acts, possibly

motivated by the need to justify the previous harms they had

just perpetrated. Our motivational account does not require

concepts such as obedience to understand commitment to

harmful behavior.

Finally, perhaps the most important contribution of our

analysis is to show how the process of dissonance reduction

can begin to shape minds and cultures, through the formation

of habits, the spread of those habits, and finally, the forma-

tion of cultural rituals and social institutions. For the first

time, we build a theoretical link between the individual-level

outcomes of dissonance reduction (i.e., increased behavioral

commitment) and societal-level process (i.e., the spread of

morally troublesome behavior and its reinforcement through

social and cultural practices), showing how immoral behav-

ior can become embedded within minds and societies in

ways that hide its harmful effects.

Although speculative, our analysis provides an account of

how micro- and macro-level processes converge to justify

and perpetuate immoral behavior, thereby building on the

largely individual-level approaches developed in previous

work (e.g., Bandura, 1999; Shalvi et al., 2015).

Our approach sheds new light on a range of societal prac-

tices and how they may be motivated by the experience of

dissonance. Take, for example, the ways in which refugees

and asylum seekers are typically separated from the popula-

tion and kept in “processing areas” situated in remote loca-

tions; for example, in the case of Australia, literally on small

islands separated from the mainland (Fazel & Silove, 2006).

Like the location of abattoirs, there can be good security rea-

sons for this, but it also serves to make detention difficult to

see. The media can fail to report on the experiences of refu-

gees (Schimmel, 2009), sometimes through a government

ban on such reporting (Barns & Newhouse, 2015) akin to the

meat industries unwillingness to allow open media coverage

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Bastian and Loughnan 13

of livestock processing. When coverage and discussion do

occur, powerful institutions use euphemistic labels such as

“boat people,” “border-jumpers,” “illegals,” or “economic

migrants” to describe people who may well fall under the

UN definition of refugee or asylum seeker. This labeling

helps people reframe the victims of this discriminatory treat-

ment and obscures the rights and treatments to which they

may be entitled. By making the discriminatory treatment of

foreign minorities distant, difficult to see, sanitized, and

euphemistically labeled, institutions help their populations

avoid the experience of their participation in a system of dis-

crimination as immoral—in part because they do not experi-

ence the discomfort of dissonance.

Implications for Understanding Prejudice

Our dissonance-based account of meat-eating also has

much to offer research on prejudice. Indeed, there are many

parallels between our analysis of meat-eating and prejudi-

cial behavior. To draw out this connection, just as omni-

vores receive realistic (gustatory) and economic (meat

industry) benefits from their consumption of animals, peo-

ple can derive realistic or economic benefits from endors-

ing stereotypes that maintain status inequalities between

groups (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford,

1950; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Katz & Braly, 1935;

Lippmann, 1922; Tajfel, 1982). Meat-eating can serve an

important role in defining cultures and identities, just as

prejudice can serve to protect important cultural and group

symbols and identities (Altemeyer, 1981; Stephan &

Stephan, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). People may also

seek to justify their prejudicial behavior in similar ways.

They may seek to obscure the moral qualities of targets

(e.g., N. Haslam, 2006), they may seek to change their

understanding of their own behavior to reduce perceived

responsibility for harm (e.g., by viewing their behavior as

benevolent; Dixon et al., 2012; Fox-Genovese & Genovese,

2005; Glick et al., 2004), or they may seek to protect their

identities in other ways (e.g., judging others more harshly;

Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996).

Meat-eating provides many useful parallels for under-

standing subtle, stubborn, and culturally embedded forms of

prejudice that have become normalized and institutionalized.

In fact, prejudice may be the most prototypical of immoral

behaviors that becomes embedded in minds and cultures,

allowing it to slip under the veil of obscurity such that it

seemingly disappears. Just as few are comfortable with

appearing immoral, few are comfortable with being viewed

as prejudiced, instead seeking to justify their prejudices as

natural, normal, or necessary. Throughout history, when prej-

udice has become extreme and led to terrible outcomes, it has

generally occurred within a social context that justifies and

normalizes its existence—the Nazis were fighting for the

human race, the Hutus and Tutsis for their status and land,

and the Irish Republican Army for their independence.

Frequently, from an insider’s perspective, there does not

appear to be any prejudice at all.

In line with our analysis, prejudice may disappear, but

also re-emerge, with our understanding of what is consid-

ered “prejudiced” varying across time and space. During the

last century, many societies have become more sensitive to

blatant or more explicit forms of prejudice (Judd, Park,

Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995) especially when targeted at

racial, religious, or gender-based groups. Many centuries

ago, slavery was considered natural and was commonplace;

yet in 1865, it was abolished within America. In the past,

women were, in some contexts, considered mere commodi-

ties owned by fathers and husbands; yet today, gender equal-

ity is increasingly entrenched. In addition to the progress of

rights regardless of ethnicity and gender, increasingly more

groups are added to our scope of moral concern (Lecky,

1869; Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981) leading to the develop-

ment of new sensitivities to prejudice. Today, rather than

fighting for women or former slaves to be awarded moral

standing, some fight for non-human beings to be afforded

the same (Glendinning, 2008).

Our approach offers new insights into research on prej-

udice by providing a motivational perspective and detail-

ing how attitudes and behavior may become embedded

within minds and cultures. Indeed, there is now a large

body of work showing how prejudices can become implicit

(e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald,

Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009), a form of prejudice

that can be hard to control (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink,

& Elliot, 1991). One model of prejudice that shares some

similarities to our own approach is the justification–sup-

pression model (JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). This

model suggests that people have a genuine level of preju-

dice, but that they suppress their expression of that preju-

dice to meet social and personal goals. In this way,

individual levels of prejudice expression are influenced by

the social context, either by being suppressed or justified

and expressed. Despite these similarities, our analysis pro-

vides for a range of novel perspectives and extensions on

the JSM. First, the JSM presumes that people acquire prej-

udice early and firmly. Our approach adds to this by show-

ing additional sources of prejudice that are motivated by

people’s immediate as well as ongoing needs and desires.

Second, the JSM model argues that people are motivated to

justify and in turn express their prejudices. Our disso-

nance-based approach adds to this by showing how the

process of justifying prejudice not only releases prejudice,

but may also increase commitment to prejudice. This is

turn has novel implications for understanding how to

reduce prejudice. Finally, whereas the JSM model details

how social norms may affect individual-level prejudice,

our approach details the process through which individual

attempts to resolve dissonance may lead to the develop-

ment of supportive social norms. We review each of these

contributions below.

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14 Personality and Social Psychology Review

Where does prejudice come from? Our dissonance-based

analysis provides a novel perspective from which to under-

stand sources of prejudice. Although it aligns with a number

of existing approaches that view prejudice as arising from

self- or group-serving behavior (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950;

Allport, 1954; Ashmore & McConahay, 1975; Bar-Tal,

1989; Herek, 1986; Katz & Braly, 1935; Scully, & Marolla,

1984; Snyder & Miene, 1994; Sykes & Matza, 1957), it

introduces novel motivational drivers of prejudice. Specifi-

cally, compared with the more common view of prejudice as

arising from avoidance-motivated states (e.g., such as from

a range of threats, Greenberg et al., 1990; Neuberg &

Schaller, 2016; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012; Stephan &

Stephan, 2000, or disgust, Hodson & Costello, 2007), our

analysis highlights the role of appetitive or approach-moti-

vated states in driving prejudice. In the case of meat-eating,

the appetitive motivation is clear—people reduce disso-

nance and maintain prejudice so that they can engage in

untroubled meat consumption.

This same dynamic is also evident elsewhere. For

instance, objectification theorists have long struggled with

the reasons why people objectify others (see Loughnan &

Pacilli, 2014). Although multiply determined, one reason

may be to facilitate the satisfaction of an appetitive drive

towards sex. For heterosexual men, sexual appetite increases

a commitment to having sex with women, and this in turn

motivates perceptions of women that facilitate the effective

enactment of that behavior. Indeed, there is evidence that

men’s motivation toward sex increases their tendency to

objectify (although see Teng, Chen, Poon, & Zhang, 2015,

for an account of why this may sometimes backfire). Vaes,

Paladino, and Puvia (2011) subtly primed people with a sex

goal and measured their subsequent objectification of

women. They found that sex-primed men—but not women—

had more difficulty associating women with human charac-

teristics, indicating that active sex goals impede recognition

of women’s humanity. Objectification of women draws

attention to their sexual qualities, allowing for them to be

treated as objects of desire, and facilitating men’s untroubled

pursuit of sexual satisfaction. The tension between sex goals

and female humanity becomes more evident when consider-

ing men whose sex goals may be fulfilled in ways that violate

the moral rights of women. Rudman and Mescher (2012)

found that men with high rape proclivity and a high likeli-

hood to sexually harass women—indicative of an appetitive

drive that additionally causes harm or suffering—also report

higher levels of objectification, seeing women as similar to

animals or objects.

Although our example of objectification may not be

viewed as prejudice per se, our analysis provides novel

ground for developing new hypotheses regarding the role of

approach-motivational states in promoting prejudice.

Consider the role of economic motives in driving convenient

perceptions of people who are capable of providing cheap

labor. Just as prejudice toward Blacks allowed for the

continuation of slavery, prejudice toward those who work in

sweatshops around the world allows for the continuation of

profits. From this perspective, prejudice may arise not only

from the threats that “they” represent to “us,” but also from

the benefits that “we” can derive from “them.” Bringing an

understanding of approach-motivational states to bear on

prejudice, research has the potential to open new and insight-

ful lines of inquiry.

How can we resolve prejudice? There is now a long history of

applying dissonance thinking to work on prejudice. Almost

exclusively, however, this approach has been focused on the

ways in which arousing dissonance may help to resolve prej-

udice (Bierly, 1985; Eisenstadt, Leippe, Stambush, & Rauch,

2005; Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Leippe, & Eisenstadt,

1994; although see Rasinski, Geers, & Czopp, 2013). By

drawing on updated theories of dissonance (i.e., the action-

based model), our analysis shows the ways in which disso-

nance may serve to reinforce rather than resolve prejudice.

Whereas dissonance-associated discomfort may lead to a

change in prejudiced behavior, our analysis suggests that

when that behavior satisfies one’s personal (or group) needs

and desires, feelings of discomfort may just as readily

increase behavioral commitment. Furthermore, our analysis

highlights the ways in which this process may embed preju-

dice within minds, and spread that prejudice within societies,

fostering supportive cultures that camouflage prejudice.

In a recent review, Paluck and Green (2009) concluded

that prejudice interventions show considerable variability in

the likelihood, degree, and conditions of their success. Our

motivational approach provides a novel perspective from

which to understand this variability in success. Interventions

designed to reduce prejudice traditionally attempt to raise

awareness through experiential contact or the provision of

information and education, thereby lifting the veil of invisi-

bility. Yet, according to our analysis, when people are com-

mitted to their prejudicial behavior, but feel that their

identities are being threatened, they find ways to resolve

feelings of discomfort, and this process itself may increase

behavioral commitment. Indeed, in a field experiment,

Paluck (2010) found that prompting discussion around preju-

dice served to reinforce rather than resolve negative atti-

tudes, suggesting that rather than leading people to relinquish

their biases, the discomfort of openly discussing prejudices

may lead to motivated efforts to justify them.

Our approach also provides additional insights into the

sometimes ironic effects of intergroup contact. Barlow and

colleagues found that negative contact experiences with

another group can increase prejudice more than positive con-

tact experiences can reduce prejudice (Barlow et al., 2012).

When people feel discomfort, they are just as likely to

increase their prejudice against another group to resolve that

discomfort. Our analysis also fits with findings that high

prejudice individuals tend to avoid intergroup contact and

the discomfort that this may bring (Binder et al., 2009;

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Bastian and Loughnan 15

Pettigrew, 1998). Finally, intergroup contact theory origi-

nally posited the importance of cultural norms in determin-

ing the beneficial effects of contact (Ata, Bastian, & Lusher,

2009). Our approach adds to this understanding, by provid-

ing insights into where and when supportive or non-support-

ive norms might arise. Specifically, non-supportive norms

may be more likely to exist in contexts where intergroup

atrocities or inequalities have or continue to exist. For

instance, the past harms perpetuated against indigenous

Australians are likely motivators of salient norms and stereo-

types that impede positive contact experiences.

Our approach also adds to our understanding of prejudice

reduction. By highlighting the role of motivational drives

toward the satisfaction of needs and desires, our approach

suggests that if left unaddressed, these needs and desires may

continue to promote prejudice. In the case of meat-eating,

raising awareness of the harm associated with animal slaugh-

ter may do little when people believe that meat is the only

viable source of protein. Our analysis suggests that address-

ing this underlying need, by providing education around

alternative food sources, may be a more effective pathway in

changing this dietary practice. A similar approach may be

useful in addressing prejudice toward asylum seekers or

immigrants in general, where prejudice is often fostered by a

concern over economic resources as illustrated by political

rallying cries such as “they will steal our jobs” or “they will

overwhelm our welfare system” (e.g., Stephan & Stephan,

2000). Addressing these sources of realistic threat may be

more effective in reducing prejudice than confronting people

with images that aim to trigger empathy and compassion.

Although these emotionally arousing images may have the

desired implications for those who do not feel that their jobs

will be undermined by the arrival of immigrants, they may

have the opposite effect for those who do—leading them to

actively reinforce their prejudices. This analysis helps us to

understand why these approaches may be more polarization

than panacea.

How do supportive norms around prejudice develop? Our

approach to understanding the justification of immoral behavior

is largely grounded in the notion that this process directly serves

self- or group interests. To this extent, we detail how the pro-

cess of dissonance reduction may foster the emergence of

social norms that support those interests. In the case of meat-

eating, the ways in which entire societies characterize ani-

mals may shift to justify their exclusion from moral concern:

When reason was the basis of moral consideration, this is

what animals lacked (Descartes, 1649/1989); when it was

based on having a soul, they were viewed as little more than

automata (Aquinas, 1976a, 1976b).

In line with our primary focus on behavior, we have

detailed above how immoral behaviors may be enacted with

little reflection via the development of habits and the spread

of those habits. Yet, our analysis also lends itself to an under-

standing of how stereotypes may also spread. The process of

dissonance reduction will not only lead to increased behav-

ioral commitment, it will also lead to an increased commit-

ment to cognitions and attitudes that are consonant with that

behavior. In the case of meat-eating, such stereotypes would

be related to the mental capacities of animals. Indeed, it is

only via the notion of stereotypical thinking that we can

understand why objectively very similar animals—such as

cows and horses—tend to be afforded very different levels of

mental capacity. Moreover, evidence suggests that these ste-

reotypical differences in perceived mental capacity are pre-

dicted by whether or not a particular animal is viewed as

food (see Bastian et al., 2012), thus highlighting how these

consensual stereotypes serve to justify the status quo.

It is in this way that our approach shares some similarities

with system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), which

describes how stereotypes serve to maintain and justify the

existing social order. This palliative process reduces discom-

fort associated with ingrained inequalities and intergroup

harm. System justification theory was primarily developed to

explain why the targets of inequality also endorse justifying

stereotypes. It is suggested that they do this to defend and

maintain the status quo. Although our insight into justifica-

tion processes that may exist in the minds of animals is

clearly limited, the broader implications of our approach

suggest that our dissonance-based analysis may provide a

novel perspective from which to view system-justifying ten-

dencies within humans. Although the concept of dissonance

has been used to understand the motivation to justify the sys-

tem (especially in the case of those who are most disadvan-

taged by it; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Ni Sullivan, 2003), our

analysis provides new insights into this process. Specifically,

it suggests that when members of low-status groups seek to

justify the status quo and thereby reduce dissonance, beyond

simply reducing discomfort, this process itself may increase

commitment to system-justifying stereotypes. That is, by

seeking to justify the system, low-status groups not only

reduce dissonance associated with their own inequality, they

also commit themselves more strongly to that inequality. Our

analysis thus provides additional insights into how the status

quo can be perpetuated and become embedded, not only

within the minds and cultures of the powerful, but perhaps

especially the weak. Whereas system justification theory

explains how existing arrangements are maintained, ours

describes how those same arrangements can become deeply

embedded and even more entrenched.

Conclusion

When confronted with the harm our culinary choices cause,

we work hard to reduce our dissonance and in doing so, help

create a world where we need not experience that dissonance

at all. By focusing on a common, normative, and widely

accepted behavior that also creates moral dissonance for

many, our analysis of meat-eating sheds new light on the

question of why some immoral, unfair, and prejudicial

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16 Personality and Social Psychology Review

behaviors are seemingly deeply embedded in our psychology

and society. In this article, we have shown how morally trou-

bling behavior becomes “embedded” and how this process in

turn makes the immorality of that behavior appear to be

invisible, hiding it in our habits, our rituals, and our institu-

tions. When moral conflicts emerge, they are met with a suite

of convenient beliefs about our (lack of) responsibility, the

(lack of) harm it causes, and the (lack of) identity we would

experience without it. Critically, we have argued that these

forces interlock—the cognitive dissonance immoral behav-

ior creates for people nurtures a psychology and society that

can resolve and avoid the experience of the self as immoral.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Alex Haslam, Eddie Harmon-Jones, and Cindy

Harmon-Jones for helpful comments in preparing this article. They

would also like to acknowledge the helpful editorial feedback and

the comments from anonymous reviewers.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect

to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for

the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This

research was funded by a grant from the Australian Research Council

to Brock Bastian (FT130101177).

Note

1. We note here that dissonance may also arise due to a more

visceral response to harm (see Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, &

Mendes, 2012), which causes a mismatch between how we

would like to feel and how we do feel. In the case of the meat-

paradox, however, the act of meat-eating is generally discon-

nected from the harmful act, suggesting that negative affect

should be primarily driven by the inconsistent cognitive state

rather than immediate visceral responses to harm, for most

consumers.

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Meating of the Minds: Who Denies Animal Mind in Response to the Meat Paradox?

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Full-text available

Sep 2024

Most people abhor animal cruelty but choose to eat meat. To resolve feelings of conflict associated with this so-called “meat paradox”, meat-eaters appear to downplay the capacity of animals to think and feel. However, the strength of animal mind denial seems likely to vary between individuals—according to one’s concern for animal welfare or enjoyment of meat, for instance. Across two pre-registered studies (S1: N = 355, S2: N = 251), we examined personality traits, attitudes, and beliefs that may predict the strength of animal mind denial in relation to the meat paradox. Results suggest that those lower in openness/intellect or emotion regulation ability, or higher in meat-commitment, deny animal mind more strongly when reminded of the link between meat eating and animal suffering. We discuss the degree to which these findings align with dissonance-based explanations for animal mind-denial in response to the meat-paradox.

Second-Class Animals: Systematic Discrimination of Farm Animals in German Biology Textbooks

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Dec 2024
ANTHROZOOS

Nonhuman animals are perceived differently depending on their relative use for humans. While companion animals are anthropomorphized and assigned a high moral status, farm animals often do not receive such consideration. To investigate the development of these differing perceptions, we evaluated the depiction of farm and companion animals in German biology textbooks to identify and analyze inherent biases across nonhuman animal species. The varying moral considerations and treatment of nonhuman animals are solely determined by their species membership, reflecting a broader collective orientation toward nonhuman animals referred to as speciesism. Analyzing 35 German biology textbooks, we investigated whether the portrayal of companion animals (dogs and cats) versus farm animals (pigs, cows, and chickens) differentiates between them, manifesting in companion animal speciesism and belief in the emotional and cognitive capacities of animals (belief in animal mind). We developed a set of categories and examined differences in the frequencies of sentence allocation between companion animals and farm animals to test whether speciesism is embedded in German educational materials. The results of our tests indicate significant biases in the representation of companion and farm animals in German biology textbooks. Specifically, companion animals are attributed significantly greater intrinsic value (χ2 = 102.36, p < 0.001, φ = 0.152), concern (χ2 = 20.91, p < 0.001, φ = 0.069), and belief in animal mind (χ2 = 351.22, p < 0.001, φ = 0.269) compared with farm animals. These findings expose speciesist bias in textbooks, where companion animals are portrayed more favorably, while farm animals are depicted with indifference or as mere resources. This raises critical questions about perspectives on nonhuman animals and underscores the need to reevaluate their portrayal in educational materials.

Multisensory contextual cues and information affect plant-based food choices and taste perception

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FOOD QUAL PREFER

Changes in Attitudes Toward Meat Consumption After Chatting With a Large Language Model

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Oct 2024

Researchers have started to explore the persuasive power of large language models (LLMs) and initial results suggest that LLMs are at least as persuasive as humans, even for controversial and moralized topics. Here, we tested whether a brief, open-ended conversation with ChatGPT-4o can change attitudes toward meat consumption, given that reducing meat consumption has become an important goal of many institutions due to its negative effects on the environment, health, and animal welfare. In a preregistered study, we found that participants (n = 101) reported a weaker commitment to eating meat and weaker beliefs that eating meat is necessary and natural, but not weaker beliefs that eating meat is normal or nice, after (vs. before) their conversation with ChatGPT-4o.

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Article

Dec 2024
Bus Soc

To understand ethical consumer choice, it should be studied from a holistic, configurational perspective. We use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) ( N = 715) with a randomized experiment in the context of animal welfare to examine (a) the interdependencies of factors aiding or impeding ethical choice, and (b) whether ethical choices occur differently in a loss frame than in a gain frame. We identify several alternative pathways to ethical choice and non-choice, and within these pathways, we reveal substitution effects, complementarities, and contingencies, reflecting the complexities of consumer choice. Furthermore, we demonstrate how ethical choice results more easily in a loss frame, and non-choice more easily in a gain frame, but how framing can also be irrelevant in certain situations. We contribute theoretically to ethical consumer choice in general and to food choice in particular by showing how it is the interplay of several factors in complex configurations that determines whether the situation favors ethical choice or non-choice. We outline important management and policy implications of our findings.

Between Distributed Agency and Choice Architecture: Comparing Nudge and Practice Theoretical Approaches to Changing Consumption

Chapter

Dec 2024

The Future of Meat Analogues

Chapter

Dec 2024

Arnout R.H. Fischer

Since the early 2010s meat analogues, vegetarian or vegan products that mimic meat as closely as possible, have become an important part of the meat alternative assortment. In this chapter I consider the future of meat analogues. To do so, the timeline of meat analogues and competing alternatives is sketched. I then consider success and potential pitfalls of the meat analogue approach from the point of view of several consumer theories and approaches before arriving at the conclusion that meat analogues successfully address some consumer demands, in particular convenience, and the opportunity to use existing routines, but also hold some latent problems in regard to perceived naturalness and quality. I then outline three scenarios where meat analogues might be superseded, might remain the dominant meat alternative, or be relegated to a more modest role in a larger portfolio of alternatives. Regardless of the future, the role of meat analogues as catalyser for transition towards normalisation of eating meat alternatives cannot be denied.

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Oct 2024

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Article

Nov 2024

Objective Eating is often a social activity that can be influenced by others, particularly in close relationships when dietary preferences reflect underlying value differences. We sought to examine the personality traits of meat‐eating couples who differ in their preferences for meat. Method We recruited Swiss romantic couples in which one partner typically consumed more meat than the other ( N = 272, couples = 136). At baseline, participants completed survey measures of self‐ and informant‐rated personality traits at the domain (e.g., agreeableness) and aspect level (e.g., compassion) and meat consumption. Participants then completed 28 daily meal surveys about their meat consumption. Results Among high‐meat eating partners, those higher in openness/intellect and compassion ate less meat. Additionally, higher intellect among low‐meat eating partners predicted lower meat consumption among high‐meat eating partners. Conclusions These findings replicate evidence that personality plays an important role in meat‐eating and extend this evidence to meat consumption in a relational context.

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Article

Sep 2024

Consumer society has gradually disconnected consumers from the origin of their consumption, the real needs it truly satisfies, and its social and ecological impact. This research aims to study the phenomenon of consumer reconnection, through which consumers try to experience meaning by becoming mindful of their consumption experiences. We focus specifically on the consumption practice of mindful eating. Using an interpretative approach, we show how the reconnection process unfolds around three dimensions: self, nature, and society. We highlight the tensions related to reconnection in everyday life and examine the coping strategies that emerge to reduce these tensions. Finally, we discuss the implications in terms of education, health, and marketing practices.

Social Norms and the Expression and Suppression of Prejudice: The Struggle for Internalization

Article

Full-text available

Mar 2002

The authors studied social norms and prejudice using M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif's (1953) group norm theory of attitudes. In 7 studies (N = 1, 504), social norms were measured and manipulated to examine their effects on prejudice; both normatively proscribed and normatively prescribed forms of prejudice were included. The public expression of prejudice toward 105 social groups was very highly correlated with social approval of that expression. Participants closely adhere to social norms when expressing prejudice, evaluating scenarios of discrimination, and reacting to hostile jokes. The authors reconceptualized the source of motivation to suppress prejudice in terms of identifying with new reference groups and adapting oneself to fit new norms. Suppression scales seem to measure patterns of concern about group norms rather than personal commitments to reducing prejudice; high suppressors are strong norm followers. Compared with low suppressors, high suppressors follow normative rules more closely and are more strongly influenced by shifts in local social norms. There is much value in continuing the study of normative influence and self-adaptation to social norms, particularly in terms of the group norm theory of attitudes.

Inference Using Categories

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Full-text available

May 2000

How do people use category membership and similarity for making inductive inferences? The authors addressed this question by examining the impact of category labels and category features on inference and classification tasks that were designed to be comparable. In the inference task, participants predicted the value of a missing feature of an item given its category label and other feature values. In the classification task, participants predicted the category label of an item given its feature values. The results from 4 experiments suggest that category membership influences inference even when similarity information contradicts the category label. This tendency was stronger when the category label conveyed class inclusion information than when the label reflected a feature of the category. These findings suggest that category membership affects inference beyond similarity and that category labels and category features are 2 different things.

Relation of Threatened Egotism to Violence and Aggression: The Dark Side of High Self-Esteem

Article

Full-text available

Jan 1996

Conventional wisdom has regarded low self-esteem as an important cause of violence, but the opposite view is theoretically viable. An interdisciplinary review of evidence about aggression, crime, and violence contradicted the view that low self-esteem is an important cause. Instead, violence appears to be most commonly a result of threatened egotism—that is, highly favorable views of self that are disputed by some person or circumstance. Inflated, unstable, or tentative beliefs in the self’s superiority may be most prone to encountering threats and hence to causing violence. The mediating process may involve directing anger outward as a way of avoiding a downward revision of the self-concept.

Humans' Perceptions of Animal Mentality: Ascriptions of Thinking

Article

Full-text available

Sep 1993

On rating scales, 294 students indicated whether it was reasonable to say that a dog, cat, bird, fish, and school-age child had the capacity for 12 commonplace human mental operations or experiences. Factor analysis of responses indentified 2 levels of attributions, simple thinking and complex thinking. The child and all animals were credited with simple thinking, but respondents were much more likely to ascribe complex thinking to the child. (A pilot study with 8 animal-behavior professionals generally replicated these results.) Certain mental categories (e.g., emotion) were judged by students to be simple for all target types; others (e.g., conservation) were judged to be universally complex. Further factoring revealed articulate ascriptions for key mental categories. Play and imagine was seen as simple in the animals but complex for the child, but enumeration and sorting and dream were seen as simple in the child but complex for the animals.

Meat-Eating & Human Evolution

Article

Jun 2001

When, why, and how early humans began to eat meat are three of the most fundamental unresolved questions in the study of human origins. Before 2.5 million years ago the presence and importance of meat in the hominid diet is unkown. After stone tools appear in the fossil record it seems clear that meat was eaten in increasing quantities, but whether it was obtained through hunting or scavenging remains a topic of intense debate. This book takes a novel and strongly interdisciplinary approach to the role of meat in the early hominid diet, inviting well-known researchers who study the human fossil record, modern hunter-gatherers, and nonhuman primates to contribute chapters to a volume that integrates these three perspectives. Stanford’s research has been on the ecology of hunting by wild chimpanzees. Bunn is an archaeologist who has worked on both the fossil record and modern foraging people. This will be a reconsideration of the role of hunting, scavening, and the uses of meat in light of recent data and modern evolutionary theory. There is currently no other book, nor has there ever been, that occupies the niche this book will create for itself.

The Mind of the Master Class: History and Faith in the Southern Slaveholders' Worldview

Book

Jun 2012

The Mind of the Master Class tells of America's greatest historical tragedy. It presents the slaveholders as men and women, a great many of whom were intelligent, honorable, and pious. It asks how people who were admirable in so many ways could have presided over a social system that proved itself an enormity and inflicted horrors on their slaves. The South had formidable proslavery intellectuals who participated fully in transatlantic debates and boldly challenged an ascendant capitalist ('free-labor') society. Blending classical and Christian traditions, they forged a moral and political philosophy designed to sustain conservative principles in history, political economy, social theory, and theology, while translating them into political action. Even those who judge their way of life most harshly have much to learn from their probing moral and political reflections on their times - and ours - beginning with the virtues and failings of their own society and culture.

Categorization in Social Psychology

Book