Book

Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe. Into the Mainstream?

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Abstract

Radical right-wing populist parties, such as Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom, Marine Le Pen’s National Front or Nigel Farage’s UKIP, are becoming increasingly influential in Western European democracies. Their electoral support is growing, their impact on policy-making is substantial, and in recent years several radical right-wing populist parties have assumed office or supported minority governments. Are these developments the cause and/or consequence of the mainstreaming of radical right-wing populist parties? Have radical right-wing populist parties expanded their issue profiles, moderated their policy positions, toned down their anti-establishment rhetoric and shed their extreme right reputations to attract more voters and/or become coalition partners? This timely book answers these questions on the basis of both comparative research and a wide range of case studies, covering Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Analysing the extent to which radical right-wing populist parties have become part of mainstream politics, as well as the factors and conditions which facilitate this trend, this book is essential reading for students and scholars working in European politics, in addition to anyone interested in party politics and current affairs more generally.
... Of particular interest regarding RRPPs' development is the issue of moderation. While these parties are by definition radical, at least some of them have undergone processes of moderation (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008;Akkerman et al., 2016;Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). Moderation is a "a process rather than a category [and] entails change that might be described as movement from radical to moderate" (Schwedler, 2011: 352), that is, as movement towards a less radical and/or populist position. ...
... Finally, following an office-seeking strategy, RRPPs might moderate when they are electorally successful. In this case, moderation would be an appeal to potential future coalition partners insofar as RRPPs indicate that they are willing to take part in negotiations and find compromises (Akkerman et al., 2016;Krause & Wagner, 2019;Rooduijn, 2014). ...
... However, the literature is divided on the implications of these responsibilities. On the one hand, RRPPs in government are confronted with the harsh reality of realpolitik and hence can no longer maintain their radical attitudes and rhetoric (Akkerman et al., 2016;Heinisch, 2003). On the other hand, taking over government also means acquiring political power. ...
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en More and more Western European radical right-wing populist parties participate in the governments of their respective countries. At least some of these parties moderate—that is, become less radical—once they join the government; others, however, do not. Although the literature has addressed such moderation, the conditions that lead to it have not been analyzed comprehensively. In this paper, we use a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA, N = 14) to determine what conditions are consistently associated with moderation across cases. We find that the degree of governmental responsibility a party takes over is as important as its internal dynamic. In a ruling coalition, compromises must be found, which can create high internal tensions within the radical right-wing populist party. Joining government can thus have its price: a crisis of party identity and a strong compulsion to moderate. Zusammenfassung de Immer mehr westeuropäische rechtspopulistische Parteien beteiligen sich an den Regierungen ihrer jeweiligen Länder. Zumindest einige dieser Parteien mässigen sich, d.h. sie werden weniger radikal, sobald sie der Regierung beitreten; andere hingegen nicht. Obwohl sich die Literatur mit dieser Mässigung befasst hat, sind die Bedingungen, die dazu führen, nicht umfassend analysiert worden. In diesem Aufsatz verwenden wir eine qualitative vergleichende Fuzzy-Set-Analyse (fsQCA, N = 14), um festzustellen, unter welchen Bedingungen eine Mässigung konsistent auftritt. Wir stellen fest, dass der Grad der staatlichen Verantwortung, die eine Partei übernimmt, ebenso wichtig ist wie ihre interne Dynamik. In einer Regierungskoalition müssen Kompromisse gefunden werden, die zu hohen inneren Spannungen innerhalb der rechtspopulistischen Partei führen können. Ein Regierungsbeitritt kann daher seinen Preis haben: eine Identitätskrise der Partei und ein starker Drang zur Mässigung. Résumé fr De plus en plus de partis populistes de droite d’Europe occidentale participent aux gouvernements de leurs pays respectifs. Si certains de ces partis deviennent modérés et donc moins radicaux une fois qu’ils ont rejoint le gouvernement, ce n’est pas le cas pour d’autres. Bien que la littérature ait abordé cette modération, les conditions qui y conduisent n’ont pas été analysées de manière exhaustive. Dans ce papier, nous utilisons une fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA, N = 14) pour déterminer quelles conditions sont systématiquement associées à la modération dans tous les cas. Nous constatons que le degré de responsabilité gouvernementale assumée par un parti politique est aussi important que sa dynamique interne. Dans une coalition au pouvoir, il faut trouver des compromis, ce qui peut créer de fortes tensions internes au sein de partis populistes de droite. L’entrée au gouvernement peut donc avoir son prix : une crise identitaire du parti et une forte contrainte à se modérer.
... Moreover, these parties are not necessarily treated as pariahs. In fact, they have been in office in Austria, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, and have provided regular and reliable parliamentary support to minority governments in Denmarkand all this in spite of the fact that they have not, as many expected them to, become somehow more moderate over time (see Akkerman 2015a; Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 2016;Wagner and Meyer 2017;Twist 2019). ...
... Of course, nothing is immutable in the long term, and there is considerable debate in the academic literature about the extent to which mainstream right parties and far right parties move and morph over time. Recent work on the populist radical right shows that, in spite of some adaptation and modification of its programmatic profile (Rovny 2013;Eger and Valdez 2015), it continues to be located at the far end of the political spectrum and shows limited commitment to liberal democracy (Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 2016). At the same time, there is research on the transformation of mainstream right parties in response to the populist radical right: depending on the countries included, parties studied, methods employed and time frame considered in the analysis, some scholars find that mainstream right parties have been radicalizing (e.g., van Spanje 2010;Han 2015;Wagner and Meyer 2017; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020), others do not detect huge changes (e.g., Alonso and da Fonseca 2012; Rooduijn, de Lange and van der Brug 2012;Mudde 2013;Akkerman 2015b), and some claim that there is significant variance across cases (e.g., Bale 2003;Odmalm and Bale 2015;Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016). ...
... Subsequently, the ÖVP and FPÖ formed a government from 2000 to 2005 and aligned quite closely in terms of socioeconomic positions. However, the FPÖ was paying a high price in the polls (Figure 4.1) both for becoming more of a mainstream party (Heinisch 2003;Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 2016) and for its support for specific welfare retrenchment measures designed to weaken organized labour. Thus, even though the FPÖ moved away from its previously fairly neoliberal positions, it was still nearly always located to the socioeconomic right of the other parties. ...
Chapter
The chapter explains how the centrist Christian democratic Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) has responded to the challenges of the Silent revolution and counter revolution by demonstrating a selective willingness to cooperate with the populist radical right Freedom Party (FPÖ). Polling and manifesto data show how the ÖVP has shifted from dismissive to accommodative approaches when it was polling behind the FPÖ. Sufficient electoral distress led to the installation of new leaders who were able to change the strategic status quo. In the first instance in 1995 Wolfgang Schüssel emphasized policy-seeking and in the second case Sebastian Kurz pursed vote-seeking. Both strategies resulted in a positional alignment and eventually a coalition with the FPÖ, which at the time was pursuing office. Changes in the ÖVP depended on shifts in the balance of power among important intra-party groups, specifically, hardline conservatives and market liberals viewing cooperation with the FPÖ as advantageous for their respective interests. Analysis of the supply side reveals the close programmatic alignment of ÖVP with FPÖ positions since 2002. Demand side analysis suggests that the programmatic shifts by the ÖVP coincide with changes in the profile of its electorate toward a composition more typical of a far right party. Overall, the chapter concludes that while the ÖVP has been affected by massive voter dealignment since the 1980s, it responded to the counter revolution and the resulting surge of nativist populism mainly by means of emulation and cooperation.
... Nevertheless, there are similarities. Akkerman et al. (2016) define a group of parties as right-wing in their rejection of individual and social equality (p. 5). ...
... The AfD conveys the impression that it is doing so solely to evade legal action, demonstrating once again that the AfD is acting strategically. This work builds on the broad framework established by Akkerman et al. (2016). They whether or not established radical right-wing populist parties have moved from the margins to the mainstream in Western Europe, and if so, why. ...
Research
Under review.
... , zu Westeuropäischen Parteien (T.Akkerman et al., 2016) oderDowns (2012) zu einigen Europäischen Parteien,Capoccia (2007) zu historischen Fällen und verschiedenen Arbeiten zur Reaktion auf populistische Regierungen(Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013;Aslanidis & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2016;Batory, 2016;Katsanidou & Reinl, 2020; ist bisher kein systematischer und über zeit-und länderübergreifender Datensatz vorhanden. Daher musste im Vorfeld der Bearbeitung dieses Vorhaben zuerst ein eigener Datensatz erstellt werden. ...
Thesis
Im Gegensatz zum Verhältnis von Demokratie und Populismus, werden die Reaktionen etablierter Parteien auf populistischer Herausforder:innen und ihre Implikationen für die Demokratiequalität kaum systematisch analysiert. Diese Arbeit widmet sich der Frage; welche Reaktionen auf Populismen beeinflussen unter welchen Bedingungen die Qualität der Demokratie? Mithilfe einer fuzzy QCA von sechs Bedingungen und 202 Fällen wurden hinreichende bzw. notwendige Bedingungen für die theoretischen Resultate der positiven, negativen Veränderung und der Nullveränderung analysiert. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass akkommodative Reaktionen auf Parteien hohen Populismusgrades mit negativen Demokratieentwicklungen einhergehen. Ferner treten repressive Reaktionen auf diese Parteien mit positiven Demokratieentwicklungen auf. Außerdem gehen akkommodative Reaktionen eher mit negativen als mit positiven Veränderungen einher. Nullveränderungen treten am häufigsten mit repressiven Reaktionen auf. Schließlich kann jedoch ein kausaler Mechanismus nicht mit Sicherheit aufgezeigt werden, da mögliche Kausalitäten zwischen Konditionskombinationen und Outcome über nachgeschaltete (vergleichende) Fallstudien nachgezeichnet werden müssen. Als typische und atypische Fälle für eine Post-QCA-Analyse konnten Palmer United Party, La France Insoumise, Smer – sociálna demokracia, Democratic Labour Party, Magyar Polgári Szövetség und Fremskrittspartiet identifiziert werden.
... However, very little is known about their indirect impact (for an exception, see Morgan 2017), which is commonly reported when exploring other types of policies (Biard 2019). Demarcation through banning PRRPs or pushing for their marginalization by establishing a cordon sanitaire (Casal-Bertoa and Rama 2021) has become rather uncommon (Akkerman, De Lange, and Rooduijn 2016). Emerging research agendas stress that policy influence is related to the inclusive approaches of the mainstream parties, which help to normalize PRRPs. ...
Article
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Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) are generally considered detrimental to democracy. Research on their damaging potential tends to focus on their influence in triggering policy backsliding but leaves the promotion of gender equality out of the equation. This study explores the case of Vox in Andalusia, a southern region of Spain, to show how PRRPs also contribute to de-democratization through their capacity to erode the equality framework. We demonstrate how they can effectively dismantle and reframe crucial policies, even when not in office. This opens new analytical pathways for studying the role of PRRPs in undermining democratic systems.
... Populisme en radicalisme zijn bovendien sterk verbonden in West-Europa (Rooduijn en Akkerman 2017). De radicaliteit van deze partijen heeft daarbij voornamelijk betrekking op hun kernthema's en niet zozeer op andere kwesties die niet centraal staan in hun linkse of rechtse ideologie (Akkerman, de Lange en Rooduijn 2016). Op basis hiervan worden de volgende hypotheses geformuleerd: ...
... With this in mind, we argue that the case of Australia is externally valid for both empirical and theoretical reasons. Empirically, Australia's combination of a diverse populace together with a party landscape in which a PRR party 4 has had both relatively longlasting electoral success and agenda-setting success in terms of shifting the policy positions of the centre-right (Mondon 2013) means that it is comparable to several Western European countries in similar situations (Van Spanje 2018; Akkerman et al. 2016). Pauline Hanson's limited but long-lasting success, can be seen both as a product of the demand for nativism in Australia (Kefford and Ratcliff 2021), and her ability to adjust who was the focus of her exclusionary nationalism. ...
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Nativism is one of the defining phenomena of the contemporary era. Yet, we know little about how malleable citizen attitudes associated with nativism and nationalism are to priming effects when media frames which deal with key issues such as immigration are introduced. In this article, we present the findings from a survey experiment fielded to a nationally representative sample of voters in Australia in May 2019. In it, we explore whether the attitudes of voters for different political parties can be primed by introducing two contrasting media frames to measure these effects. We find positive and negative frames have no effect on the attitudes of voters for Australia’s populist radical right party, but that the former has an effect on centre-right voters in Australia. Such findings have important implications for our understanding of political communication and the malleability of political attitudes.
... Populisme en radicalisme zijn bovendien sterk verbonden in West-Europa (Rooduijn en Akkerman 2017). De radicaliteit van deze partijen heeft daarbij voornamelijk betrekking op hun kernthema's en niet zozeer op andere kwesties die niet centraal staan in hun linkse of rechtse ideologie (Akkerman, de Lange en Rooduijn 2016). Op basis hiervan worden de volgende hypotheses geformuleerd: ...
... While there is an increasing list of PRR parties, only some have ever entered into government. Since the mid-1990s, PRR parties from seven Western European countries (Austria, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland) have entered into a steady stream of national government coalitions (Akkerman et al. 2016) (Table 1), most generally at the expense of centre parties (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Of these seven countries, two (Austria and Italy) have also seen PRR governmental coalitions form on the subnational level. ...
Article
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Although the research surrounding PRR parties has increased over the years, health policies , an important part of the welfare system, have generally been neglected. Using an in-depth case-study approach, this article analyses the health policy consequences of PRR parties in Austrian and Italian subnational governments over time, thereby expanding the units of analysis while also looking at an understudied level of government. The findings indicate a propensity towards neoliberalism, combined with accents of welfare chau-vinism in Austria and a strategy of shutting down the Freedom Party of Austria. In the case of Italy, both regional cases mark a desire for welfare chauvinism but an inability to restrict healthcare access directly. In all four cases (except Burgenland), the PRR parties are consistently chauvinistic (despite seeming to prefer welfare to liberal chauvinism, they typically implement the latter for health policies) and any factor of generosity comes from a social democratic coalition partner or not at all.
... This has additionally helped PiS enact an image of a renewed challenger distinct from "politics as usual," without impeding the party's primary vote-maximizing strategy. These first insights invite further comparative research into the diverse ways by which parties try to de-demonize and broaden the appeal of their leadership and organisations without necessarily shifting their positions-an aspect particularly relevant to the analysis of the radical right (Akkerman et al., 2016). Future studies should also explore the impact of communicative strategies on political conflicts and party organisation itself. ...
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The article analyses the organisation of the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [PiS]) in Poland. The case of PiS does not only allow us to explore the organisational features of a strongly institutionalized, incumbent party which uses populist radical right (PRR) politics. PiS, we argue, is also an ideal case to contrast what such parties might rhetorically declare and substantively do about their organisational features. Using party documents, press reports, quantitative data, and insights from the secondary literature based on interviews with activists, we evaluate the extent to which PiS has developed a mass-party-related organisation, and centralized its intra-party decision-making procedures. We find that while PiS made overtures to some aspects of mass-party-like organisation for electoral mobilization, the party remained reluctant to actively expand its membership numbers and put little effort into fostering the integration and social rootedness of its members through everyday intra-party activities. Furthermore, despite attempts to enact organisational reinvigoration, in practice PiS continued to revolve around strongly centralized structures and, in particular, the absolutist leadership style of the party's long-time Chair Jarosław Kaczyński. The analysis contributes to assessing the variety and functions of organ-isational features and appeals within the comparative study of PRR parties. Most particularly, it invites further research into the still relatively under-researched interactions between PRR party organisation and active party communication.
... The latter are characterized by maintaining either a difficult relationship with the liberal democratic system (e.g., PRR and PRL parties) or by openly rejecting the democratic system (e.g., far right and far left parties). Therefore, it is possible to argue that the difference between mainstream and extremist parties lies in their attitude toward the democratic system (Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn 2016;Bale and Rovira Kaltwasser 2021;Mudde 2007;. While the former support existing norms and values as well as refrain from calling for an overthrow of the democratic system, the latter take radical positions and adopt either an ambivalent relationship towards liberal democracy (in the case of populist forces) or are openly undemocratic (in the case of extremist parties). ...
Article
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Three different constituencies are becoming increasingly common across Western European electorates: mainstream voters, non-voters and populist voters. Despite their distinct behaviours in electoral politics, we have limited empirical knowledge about the characteristics that distinguish these three groups, given the typical underrepresentation of non-voters in surveys and the relative recency of large-scale research on populist voters. To address this gap, we analyse novel survey data from contemporary Germany that oversamples non-voters and includes a sizeable share of both populist radical left and populist radical right party supporters. Two main findings with broader implications stand out. First, populist voters resemble their mainstream counterparts in their expectations about democracy but correspond more closely to non-voters regarding (dis-)satisfaction with democracy. Second, non-voters and populist voters seem to reject mainstream democratic politics in distinct ways, throwing doubt on the (further) mobilization potential of abstainers for populist projects.
... ex. Akkerman, de Lange et Rooduijn 2016). Ceci nous amène à formuler deux hypothèses : H3a : L'électorat du VB fait état de préférences politiques plus radicales sur les questions de migration que les électorats des autres partis traditionnels et le PTB-PVDA. ...
... In developing our theory and hypotheses we have drawn on the extant literature which suggests that populist attitudes are very common (Hawkins and Riding 2010, 21;Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012), and that the populist radical right has been mainstreamed (Mudde 2004;Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn 2016;Mondon 2016;Mondon and Winter 2020). We theorise that in cases which differ significantly in terms of their institutions and macro-political conditions, the way these attitudes affect voting behaviour should also vary significantly. ...
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Populism is widely considered to be one of the most significant political phenomena of the past decade. Yet for all the scholarly and media attention it receives, how important it is in driving support for populist radical right parties is debatable. Scholars have long theorised that nativism and authoritarianism are likely to be equally if not more important than populism in driving support for populist radical right parties, but the empirical evidence to support this argument has been limited. We conduct a cross-national analysis on a representative sample of voters from the United States, United Kingdom and Australia (n = 4650) to test this proposition. We demonstrate that rather than populism, it is primarily nativism driving support for populist radical right parties. Populism is, therefore, shown to be less important than often suggested.
... Second, it analyses partisan positions on either European integration or immigration issues, without comparing the two and trying to understand what discursive tread, if any, links them (with the notable exception of Odmalm & Super, 2014). Third, the literature of party politics focuses on populist radical right-wing parties (see, for example, Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, Arzheimer, 2009, and Hernández & Kriesi, 2016, while far less attention is devoted to comparative studies on the dynamics of political competition between populist and non-populist parties (with some notable exceptions, such as Akkerman et al., 2016, Wolinetz & Zaslove, 2018. Fourth, the existing specialised literature on party competition studies either parties' positions in the national political arena or the European Parliament (EP), but it rarely compares them. ...
Chapter
European politics is increasingly contested along two dimensions: the economic left-right dimension and a relatively new dimension focused on European integration and immigration. This chapter aims to compare the strategies adopted by mainstream and populist parties to compete on EU issues in national parliaments. The analysis reveals that support for the EU is no longer unconditional, even for mainstream left parties of both countries, which criticise certain aspects of the functioning of the EU, although they do not dispute the European horizon towards which their country needs to move. On the contrary, mainstream right parties, both in Italy and in the UK, express principled Eurosceptic positions towards the process of EU integration and towards EU institutions, mainly criticising the legitimacy of EU institutions. Populist radical right parties (LN and the UKIP) hold principled negative stances towards all the EU targets and link closely anti-immigration attitudes with anti-EU attitudes using both legitimacy and sovereigntist frames. Conversely, the M5S holds much more nuanced positions towards the EU. The chameleonic nature of the M5S is explained by its nature as a ‘pure’ populist party.
... Radical right-wing parties have been getting increasingly extreme in their speeches for the last 20 years, without showing any tendency towards moderation (Akkerman et al., 2016). With or without the direct control of the executive branch, they exert real effects on policy through interaction with established actors (Minkenberg, 2001). ...
Conference Paper
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This exploratory paper aims to better understand how Latin Americans perceive their political knowledge, and how this perception impacts their democratic attitudes. It revolves around three main questions: Are Latin Americans overconfident about their political knowledge? If so, what are the socioeconomic factors determining this phenomenon, and how it impacts their democratic attitudes? By analyzing 18 countries of the region, using data from The AmericasBarometer (LAPOP), we tackle the first question by looking at the years of 2008, 2012 and 2014. We find that Latin Americans, on average, perceive themselves as more knowledgeable than they really are. For the second question, we measure the impact of several socioeconomic factors on a dummy variable for overconfidence, for the year of 2014. As a result, being interested in politics is associated with an increase of 109% in the odds of being overconfident, while being right-wing and having sympathy for a political party increase in 18% and 12% the odds, respectively. Education and high income are negative correlated with the phenomenon. Finally, for the last question we employ this same dummy, but now as an independent variable alongside several controls, also for the year of 2014. Being overconfident is associated with an increase in the odds of endorsement of authoritarian measures in 13%, and of ideological extremism in 19%.
... In this debate, however, with few exceptions Schimpf 2016a, 2016b;Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016;Spittler 2018), comparatively less has been said about the role of populist parties in government and their impact on the qualities of democracy. As populism is growing electorally and several populist parties have gained access to government (Akkerman et al. 2016), it is worth investigating their impact on the political regime in which they operate. The research questions that this article aims to answer are: (1) whether populism impacts (negatively or positively) the qualities of (liberal) democracy; (2) whether the impact changes depending on the role that populists have in government; and (3) whether a specific type of populism is more harmful than others. ...
Article
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Scholars have long debated whether populism harms or improves the quality of democracy. This article contributes to this debate by focusing on the impact of populist parties in government. In particular, it inquires: (1) whether populists in government are more likely than non-populists to negatively affect the quality of democracies; (2) whether the role of populists in government matters; and (3) which type of populism is expected to negatively affect the quality of liberal-democratic regimes. The results find strong evidence that the role of populists in government affects several qualities of democracy. While robust, the findings related to (2) are less clear-cut than those pertaining to (1). Finally, regardless of their role in government, different types of populism have different impacts on the qualities of democracy. The results show that exclusionary populist parties in government tend to have more of a negative impact than other forms of populism.
... Their programmatic and ideological evolution in the last few years has made them prominent members of the populist radical right (PRR) party family in Europe, combining ideational elements of nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007;Rooduijn et al. 2019). As in other countries, both actors have been progressively mainstreamed (Akkerman, De Lange and Rooduijn 2016) since the 1990s. In fact, both partiesin the case of FdI its predecessor National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN)-profited from the deep rupture in the political system that occurred in the 1990s, which led to the first and more profound restructuring experienced by the Italian party system. ...
Article
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In this article we analyse the gender politics of the League and Brothers of Italy, the most relevant PRR parties in Italy.
... The umbrella term for all these forms of right-wing politics that is becoming more and more popular in the contemporary literature is "populist radical right" (Mudde 2017, Pirro 2015, Akkerman et al. 2016. Mudde (2017) argues that the populist radical right shares an ideology that has at least three main components: nativism, authoritarianism and populism. ...
... In recent decades, there is evidence that a "counter-revolution" is happening in high-income and highly secular countries, wherein populist right-wing and conservative political parties are taking power and repealing gender promoting policies (Ignazi 1992;Oesch 2008;Lange et al. 2016;Rydgren 2005). ...
Preprint
This article investigates how cultural and material factors can explain disparities observed in different forms of gender inequality between and within nations. Using data from multiple sources, I construct a panel dataset that includes 150 country-year observations nested in 70 countries, covering 23 years from 1991 to 2013. Through estimating hybrid panel models, this article discovers that more secular countries have lower maternal mortality ratios, higher female labor force participation rates, greater shares of parliamentary seats held by women, higher rates of women with completed secondary education, and smaller shares of the total population who adhere to inequitable gender attitudes. Moreover, from a longitudinal perspective, secularization is the only predictor of declined maternal mortality ratios and increased female parliamentary representation within a country. Interactive models suggest that further secularization within high-income nations can increase maternal mortality ratios. Furthermore, secularization’s equalizing effect on parliamentary representation moderates as countries become more affluent.
... Populisme en radicalisme zijn bovendien sterk verbonden in West-Europa (Rooduijn en Akkerman 2017). De radicaliteit van deze partijen heeft daarbij voornamelijk betrekking op hun kernthema's en niet zozeer op andere kwesties die niet centraal staan in hun linkse of rechtse ideologie (Akkerman, de Lange en Rooduijn 2016). Op basis hiervan worden de volgende hypotheses geformuleerd: ...
... Populisme en radicalisme zijn bovendien sterk verbonden in West-Europa (Rooduijn en Akkerman 2017). De radicaliteit van deze partijen heeft daarbij voornamelijk betrekking op hun kernthema's en niet zozeer op andere kwesties die niet centraal staan in hun linkse of rechtse ideologie (Akkerman, de Lange en Rooduijn 2016). Op basis hiervan worden de volgende hypotheses geformuleerd: ...
... Internationally, the last two decades have witnessed an upsurge in intercultural tensions, xenophobia and social disharmony, in particular inter and intra-state conflicts driven by religious, sectarian and ethno-cultural disagreements (Berry, 2013;Kymlicka, 2015). Indeed, since 9/11, new forms of extreme ideologies, radicalization, populism and estrangement have dominated national and global agendas (Akkerman et al., 2016;Cesari, 2010). Migrants, especially adherents of the Islamic faith, have become the focus of some of these debates in Western cities, in particular as they relate to global terrorism, rising insecurity, increased urban segregation and lack of social integration (Mansouri, 2015). ...
Chapter
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The impetus for this book emerged out of an upsurge of interest in interculturality, both as a concept and as a policy articulated in different ways as the basis for managing diversity and dealing with a broad understanding of the ‘rapprochement of cultures’
... Internationally, the last two decades have witnessed an upsurge in intercultural tensions, xenophobia and social disharmony, in particular inter and intra-state conflicts driven by religious, sectarian and ethno-cultural disagreements (Berry, 2013;Kymlicka, 2015). Indeed, since 9/11, new forms of extreme ideologies, radicalization, populism and estrangement have dominated national and global agendas (Akkerman et al., 2016;Cesari, 2010). Migrants, especially adherents of the Islamic faith, have become the focus of some of these debates in Western cities, in particular as they relate to global terrorism, rising insecurity, increased urban segregation and lack of social integration (Mansouri, 2015). ...
Book
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Today most societies across the world are witnessing rising levels of social and cultural diversity brought about by globalisation and in particular increased human mobility and significant advances in information and communications technologies. The dilemma, therefore, has been how best to manage the resultant diversity and what optimal social policy paradigms to adopt towards this end. Assimilation, multiculturalism and presently interculturalism have all been proposed as possible policy conduits for managing socio-cultural diversity. This book, in focusing on the latter concept, and in particular in its intercultural dialogue manifestation, offers at once theoretical examinations, policy discussion and practical explorations of its uptake across the world. The core argument connecting the book’s three distinct sections is that whilst assimilation in its racist manifestation is no longer a viable option in today’s world, intercultural dialogue within existing multicultural settings has much to offer.
... The Brexit referendum in 2016 and the UK's subsequent withdrawal from the EU is perhaps one of the most striking examples of this trend. Furthermore, Eurosceptic parties, often with a populist and right-wing inclination, have gained electoral support in various EU member states, such as Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (Akkerman et al. 2016). Typically, these parties depict the EU as deeply undemocratic since bureaucrats rather than elected politicians are said to control the policymaking process in the EU and to marginalize the interests of 'ordinary people' in favour of 'the elite' in Brussels (Müller 2016;Norman 2017). ...
... The Brexit referendum in 2016 and the UK's subsequent withdrawal from the EU is perhaps one of the most striking examples of this trend. Furthermore, Eurosceptic parties, often with a populist and right-wing inclination, have gained electoral support in various EU member states, such as Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (Akkerman et al. 2016). Typically, these parties depict the EU as deeply undemocratic since bureaucrats rather than elected politicians are said to control the policymaking process in the EU and to marginalize the interests of 'ordinary people' in favour of 'the elite' in Brussels (Müller 2016;Norman 2017). ...
... The Brexit referendum in 2016 and the UK's subsequent withdrawal from the EU is perhaps one of the most striking examples of this trend. Furthermore, Eurosceptic parties, often with a populist and right-wing inclination, have gained electoral support in various EU member states, such as Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (Akkerman et al. 2016). Typically, these parties depict the EU as deeply undemocratic since bureaucrats rather than elected politicians are said to control the policymaking process in the EU and to marginalize the interests of 'ordinary people' in favour of 'the elite' in Brussels (Müller 2016;Norman 2017). ...
... Yet, research found significant country differences between the extent and framing of anti-elitism also among actors sharing far-right ideologies (Caiani and della Porta, 2011;Staykova et al., 2016). Neither are RRPs in Europe a homogeneous block (Akkerman et al., 2016b) nor is the structural power position sufficient for understanding varieties of anti-elitism across RRPs. In fact, studies show counter examples against such unidirectional trends (Bernhard and Kriesi, 2019) and emphasize the importance of the specific opportunity structure in which populist communication is strategically employed (Ernst et al., 2019a;De Bruycker and Rooduijn, 2021). ...
Article
To better understand the communication of anti‐elitism in contemporary politics, this study conceptually differentiates between specific anti‐elitism geared toward specific, materially powerful elites (‘Angela Merkel’) and general anti‐elitism referencing broader discursive constructs (‘the elite’). The study analyses the online communications of radical right parties in the 2019 European Parliament elections from six countries (Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Poland and Sweden). This more fine‐grained analysis of anti‐elitism highlights some areas of transnational convergence, such as a tendency to focus on specific political elites, rather than other sectors such as the media or discursive constructs. The findings also reveal stratification according to parties' position in national power structures: opposition parties tend to target national‐level elites while governing parties focus on the European level. The findings highlight that anti‐elitism is used in a highly instrumental way, and help us to better understand the intersection between anti‐elitism and the multilevel politics of EP elections.
... For the major center-right parties, findings from secondary sources along with a series of preliminary empirical observations suggest, with variations, a symbiotic relationship. On the one hand, the religiously framed progressive aura has allowed the far right to appear less extreme and discriminatory; on the other, electoral competition with the rising power of the populists has led the center right towards tougher positions on immigration and Islam (Akkerman et al. 2016). The political impact of the far right has been more direct in some countries than in others. ...
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Why and in what ways do far-right discourses engage with religion in geographies where religious belief, practice, and public influence are particularly low? This article examines religion’s salience in the rhetoric of leading right-wing populist parties in eight European countries: the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Based on a qualitative content analysis of various documents such as party programmes, websites, election manifestos, reports, and speeches of their leadership, the article offers insight into the functions that Christianist discourses serve for anti-immigration stances. The findings are threefold: first, they confirm previous research suggesting that while these parties embrace Christianity as a national/civilizational heritage and identity, they are also careful to avoid references to actual belief or practice. Second, the data suggests, their secularized take on Christianity rests not simply on the omission of theological content, but also on the active framing Christianity itself as an inherently secular and progressive religion conducive to democracy. Third, and finally, they starkly contrast this notion of Christianity with Islam, believed to be incompatible due to its alleged backward and violent qualities. Emphasizing religio-cultural hierarchies—rather than ethno-racial ones—plays an indispensable role in presenting a more palatable form of boundary-making against immigrants, and helps these parties mainstream by giving their nativist cause a liberal and enlightened aura. Preliminary comparisons with traditional conservative parties, moreover, reveal that while some of the latter partially embraced a similar nativism, variations remain across countries.
... In recent years, especially since the "refugee crisis" of 2015/2016, Europe as well as other areas around the globe have experienced a shift in the political climate. Right-wing parties are growing in popularity and are increasingly represented in regional and national parliaments (Akkerman et al., 2016). However, the change toward the political right is not only observed in the composition of the legislative bodies, it can also be detected in societal attitudes. ...
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Research on key determinants of negative attitudes toward immigration has often suggested that values held by individuals systematically explain such sentiments. Universalists appear to have more positive and conservatives more negative attitudes. So far, however, these insights are based on studies using adult samples. In our study, we analyze these relations among children and adolescents. For the analysis, we utilized a Swiss-Polish panel dataset (2015–2017, N = 5,332) with three time points collected among school children aged 8–19 years. We employed autoregressive cross-lagged models. The results indicated that while universalism decreased negative attitudes toward immigrants, the expected effect for conformity-tradition was not found.
... The transition from protest to institutional representation (with the consequent increase in institutional relevance) and, even more so, from opposition to the government (which involves a prior search for offices) could therefore lead to the reduction of the anti-establishment position and favor an adaptation behavioral to parliamentary procedures and customs (Akkerman et al. 2016), or remodeling of the character and intensity of their rhetoric. Ivaldi (2016) spoke in this regard of the external packaging of the message. ...
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Until the first decade of the 21th century, scholars and reporters have identified contemporary populism as an element of anti-systemic revolt; furthermore, they have also recognized an incompatibility between populist phenomenon and government function. However, some recent cases of populist parties in power seem to be able to put into crisis more than one certainty regarding the nature and scope of the populist phenomenon. This observation raises the questions of this work: what harmful effects does populism in government produce on liberal institutions, pluralism, and representation in constitutional democracies? Do these effects merely erode the liberal component, or do they extend to produce a degeneration of democracy as a whole? And finally: what are the risks for democracy? The article corroborates the diarchic theories of democracy and aims to demonstrate the lack of compatibility between the principles of liberal democracy and populist principles, which have a negative impact not only on the liberal component, but also on the quality of democracy in its entirety.
... In the literature on how mainstream parties have 'reacted' to the growing support for populist parties, analyses have shown a plethora of differing responses by centreright and centre-left parties (Akkerman et al., 2016;Bale et al., 2010;Meguid, 2005;Spanje, 2010). As Heinze clarifies, 'mainstream parties can select from reactions such as ignore, legal restrictions, cordon sanitaire, demonise, defuse, hold and collaborate' (Heinze, 2018: 287, original emphasis). ...
Thesis
This thesis examines and exposes how the heightened socio-cultural salience of immigration in contemporary Sweden affects the traditional party of power, the Social Democrats (SAP), and its understanding and response to the nationalist ‘populist’ party the Sweden Democrats (SD). Through extended ethnographic, survey and archival research in the year leading up to the September 2018 general election, I dissect how these dynamics manifested in Norrköping, a traditional SAP stronghold with a long history of immigration where support for SD has grown considerably. Based on my findings, I argue that the untranslatable Swedish concept of ‘trygghet’ functions as a powerful heuristic device for understanding the 2018 election campaign. Denoting an enveloping sense of safety and comfort, trygghet, and its antipode otrygghet, were increasingly mobilised by both the SAP and SD in the wake of the 2015 European refugee crisis. Among SD supporters and party members I illustrate the resentful power of a mythological nostalgia for a trygghet that is intimately tied to an imagined social democratic Sweden of yesteryear. Within the SAP, however, the aggravated socio-cultural politics of immigration exposed a different register of evocative nostalgias for what the fundamental precepts of social democracy are. Due to the heightened salience of immigration, these competing visions of trygghet came to a forceful head during the election campaign and ultimately proved contentious for the SAP. This thesis contributes original findings to the burgeoning literature on how immigration is reshaping traditional socio-political conflict dimensions. Adopting both ethnographic and geographic sensitivities, it adds to the growing scholarship which takes seriously the everyday contexts in which people make sense and meaning out of socio-politics. By doing so, it exposes the glaringly normative limitations common to both dominant academic and social democratic explanations for the rise of nationalist ‘populism’.
Chapter
This chapter presents the concept of the core executive as originally formulated and subsequently revised, drawing attention to the central questions ‘Who does what?’ and ‘With what resources?’. It then elaborates on the three main aspects of the definition: organisations and processes, coordination and conflict. Yet today’s societies are different to those that existed when the concept was unveiled, and so by way of providing a context for the rest of the book we also describe different societal trends that may have had a bearing on the shape and operation of contemporary core executives, including developments in the media, the recentring of the government apparatus, coalition dynamics and the rise of populism, as well as large-scale crises such as the global COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the chapter sets out the thematic framework that guides the eight country cases: the particular configuration of core executive actors and institutions; the resources at their disposal; the ways in which governing activities are coordinated and conflict is arbitrated; and the degree to which societal developments have changed the composition and functioning of the core executive.
Article
Canadians hold favorable views about immigration, at least compared to many countries. Was it always so? Two survey series, using Environics and Gallup/Canadian Election Studies (CES) data, respectively, show that opinion on immigration was historically rather negative, became more positive from 1995 to 2005, and then stabilized. Native-born Canadians are now almost as positive toward immigration as immigrants themselves. However, recent aggregate stability masks a sharp polarization post-2005. Panel data from 2004 to 2011 shows that respondents who want less immigration are more likely to shift their partisanship to the right. Conversely, there is no evidence that immigration opinion systematically changed to match partisanship. This suggests that the predominant mechanism is sorting, rather than opinion change, at least in the period examined. Finally, is immigration likely to become an increasing source of political conflict in Canada? It depends on how competition at both ends of the political spectrum structures the interests of the major parties.
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This essay argues that the illiberal anti-immigrant sentiments which lie behind the success of populist right-wing parties deserve the attention of political theorists working on the ethics of migration, even though such sentiments exceed the boundaries of admissible disagreement on justice in migration. Firstly, populist anti-immigrant sentiments hinder the implementation of liberal democratic immigration policies and thus they represent a feasibility constraint for any liberal ethics of migration, not only the most cosmopolitan ones. Secondly, there are legitimacy reasons why such views should be neither merely dismissed nor simply contained, since they are voiced by populist political parties which are admitted in the electoral competition and even participate in governments. The main upshot of this discussion is a methodological one: the article argues that, since political theory should deal with the feasibility and legitimacy issues raised by populist anti-immigrant sentiments, a realistic approach is needed. The last section shows that such a methodological change offers the opportunity to extend the scope of normative theorising. In particular, it illustrates how a realistic approach encourages theorists to focus on local-level policies, as well as to devote attention to non-governmental actors and to their role in tackling citizens’ hostility towards immigrants.
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The development towards the mainstreaming of extremism in European countries in the areas of immigration and integration has taken place both in policy and in discourse. The harsh policy measures that were implemented after the 2015 refugee crisis have led to a discursive shift; what is normal to say and do in the areas of immigration and integration has changed. Anti-immigration claims are today not merely articulated in the fringes of the political spectrum but more widely accepted and also, at least partly, officially sanctioned. This study investigates the anti-immigration claims, seen as (populist) appeals to the people that centre around a particular mythology of the people and that are, as such, deeply ingrained in national identity construction. The two dimensions of the populist divide are of relevance here: The horizontal dimension refers to articulated differences between "the people", who belong here, and the "non-people" (the other), who do not. The vertical dimension refers to articulated differences between the common people and the established elites. Empirically, the analysis shows how anti-immigration views embedded in processes of national myth making during and after 2015 were articulated in the socially conservative online newspaper Samtiden from 2016 to 2019. The results indicate that far-right populist discourse conveys a nostalgia for a golden age and a cohesive and homogenous collective identity, combining ideals of cultural conformism and socioeconomic fairness.
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The far right has launched its own particular crusade against gender-neutral language (GNL). In this article, I examine how the parties Rassemblement National, in France, and Vox, in Spain, instrumentalise discursively their opposition to GNL as part of their overall political strategy of confronting social change. By using a culture war framework, I critically analyse the connections between the polarised representations of language and those of other fronts of cultural conflict that the far right directs against adversary groups. I show that both political parties have co-opted language into the culture wars they pursue on other fronts, albeit with significant differences. I argue that in addition to the idea of a single overall struggle based on moral differences and cultural cleavages, culture wars are also to be understood as interconnected fronts in different spheres of contention that the far right strategically exploits.
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Semenjak tahun 1980an, kebangkitan pemikiran populisme kanan telah mewujudkan lanskap politik yang membimbangkan kerana ‘populis baru’ ini pada amnya telah dilihat sebagai ancaman terhadap demokrasi liberal. Terma populisme juga digunakan untuk menggambarkan dasar-dasar oportunis dengan tujuan (yang pantas) untuk membuat rakyat atau pengundi berasa senang dengan mereka–dan dengan demikian ‘membeli’ sokongan mereka–dan bukannya membuat ‘pilihan terbaik’ secara rasional. Secara umumnya, ‘Populisme adalah difahami sebagai suatu bentuk patologi (penyakit) demokratik atau pseudo-demokratik, yang dihasilkan daripada ideal-ideal demokratik yang telah korup’1 dan definisi ini disepakati oleh kebanyakan pengkritik. Di seluruh Eropah jelas, parti-parti populis sayap kanan, gerakan, dan calon-calonnya, telah mengidentifikasi ketidakpuasan meluas mengenai berbagai masalah politik, ekonomi, dan budaya. Oleh itu, isu-isu ini yang dimanfaatkan oleh populis kanan hampir sama di semua negara namun bergantung kepada kekhususan nasional yang jelas. Isu yang jelas dimainkan sebagai sentimen termasuklah imigrasi. Bagi penduduk bagi sebuah negara yang bersayap kanan, imigrasi ini merupakan ancaman terhadap identiti5 dan nilai tradisional mereka. Oleh itu, jelas di sini mereka ingin mempertahankan budaya mereka, agar imigran yang mendadak masuk tidak menghakis kedudukan penduduk asal. Prinsip lain populisme kanan juga adalah membina dan menonjolkan antagonisme, diterapkan secara seragam namun berbeza mengikut setiap keadaan khusus negara-negara tersebut. Selain itu, Islamofobia (jauh lebih menonjol daripada antisemitisme) juga mencirikan kedudukan populasi kanan mengenai imigrasi (dan integrasi) umat Islam di sekitar Eropah.
Article
This study presents a novel operationalization of pariah party status, conceiving of pariah status in terms of two continuous dimensions involving (1) a party's coalition potential, and (2) a party's legislative cooperation potential. Recent success of radical right parties has been identified as a common trend throughout Western Europe. Research has focused on mainstream parties' strategies toward these controversial challengers, as well as why some controversial challenger parties are involved in collaborations but others are not. Yet, an elaborate discussion—disentangling the status as pariah—has hitherto been absent in the literature. The article further demonstrates the usefulness of the suggested operationalization, using the Sweden Democrats as an empirical example. When entering parliament in 2010, the Sweden Democrats were a complete pariah party. Recently, however, the party's status has evolved and the Sweden Democrats are now to be regarded as partly pariah.
Chapter
Political conflicts over immigration and the European Union (EU) are seen as the sign of the emergence of a new transnational cleavage, which pits the ‘winners’ of globalisation against its ‘losers’ and which is mobilised mainly by populist and radical right parties. In recent years, a consistent bulk of contributions in the field of party politics has tried to assess the impact of this new transnational cleavage on the structure of party competition, in particular, on parties’ polarization. However, these studies are affected by some shortcomings. First, they mainly analyse partisan positions either on European integration or on immigration issues, without comparing the two and trying to understand what discursive tread, if any, links them. Second, these studies focus predominantly on radical right parties, while comparatively less attention has been devoted to study the competition strategies adopted by mainstream right and mainstream left parties. Finally, the existing specialized literature on party competition looks at parties’ positions either in national or in supranational political arenas, without comparing the two. This chapter presents the theoretical contribution of the book, in particular, an innovative operationalisation of party positioning that enable a fine-grained assessment of party competition in a multi-level political space.
Chapter
Although populism is a political phenomenon that originated out of Europe and emerged long before the start of European integration, in the post-World War II European context, it has developed in conjunction with Euroscepticism. Actually, since the creation of the European Union (EU) in the early 1990s, the two phenomena have gradually come to coincide. Nowadays, with few exceptions, all populist parties are also Eurosceptic and vice versa. This coincidence, far from being casual, can be explained by the core features of the populist (thin-centred) ideology and by the nature of both the integration process and the EU governance. Indeed, while populism has been commonly defined as an anti-elitist ideology, European integration and the EU system of governance are widely seen as quintessentially elitist. Under these conditions, opposition to/in the EU tends to be inherently populist. Nonetheless, this ‘populist/Eurosceptic compound’ can manifest itself in rather different shapes, depending on the types of populism (inclusive vs. exclusive) and the types of Euroscepticism (hard vs. soft) that are adopted by individual parties. The chapter highlights both conceptual and empirical overlaps between populism and Euroscepticism, also referring to intermediated concepts, such as ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘economic nationalism’, that work as traits d’union between the two phenomena.
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What does right-wing populism look like in Luxembourg, a small European state whose economy heavily relies on strong European integration and foreign and cross-border labor? This article explores this question by looking at the Alternativ Demokratesh Reformpartei (ADR), Luxembourg’s version of a right-wing populist party. It studies the ADR’s discourse during three discursive events: the debate over a burka law (2014–2018), the 2015 Refugee Crisis, and Luxembourg’s 2015 constitutional referendum. Much of the ADR’s discourse is right-wing populist, but with two specificities: the ADR’s embrace of multiculturalism and its use of the issue of the national language to appeal to cultural and economic interests. Both of these specificities reflect into a distinctive concept of the Luxembourgish ‘people’. The Luxembourg case demonstrates the chameleonic nature or populism, or its ability to adapt to its local circumstances, in this instance even adopting features that contradict much of the thinking on right-wing populism.
Chapter
The increasing politicisation of the EU in the last decade has further intertwined national and European politics. The progressive introduction of European issues into the national political debates has incentivised that national political leaders ‘use’ Europe in their political narratives when running for elections. One of the most salient political leaders that have emerged as unapologetically pro-European in this politicised context is Emmanuel Macron, former French finance minister and current French President since 2017. In order to contribute to analyse how ‘Europe’ is narrated in the current politicised environment, we analyse Emmanuel Macron’s discourse on Europe before and after his election as President. We will do so through a narrative analysis of documents (such as speeches, a public letter, and a media interview) in which Macron appealed not only to French citizens but to European citizens, from 2016 to 2019. Our findings suggest an appropriation of ‘Europe’ by Macron’s discourse, which, while attempting to increase the support for European integration, is laying the grounds for anyone that opposes Macron’s particular idea of ‘Europe’ to be understood as ‘anti-European’.
Article
Liberal democracy is being challenged by non-liberal democratic parties (NLDPs). The literature on ‘protecting democracy’ discusses what kind of legal, cultural, socio-economic and political measures are right for countering NLDPs. This article focuses on political measures such as exclusion, collaboration and policy co-optation, which seem particularly promising because in contrast to other measures, they do not rely on state coercion but on the voluntary reactions of mainstream parties to their political peers. Still, collaboration and co-optation may involve compromises with core principles of liberal democracy. Based on the ethics of compromise, the article therefore asks to what extent it is permissible and obligatory for mainstream parties to venture into compromises in order to safeguard liberal democratic principles. It investigates three scenarios, one in which NLDPs are in opposition and two in which they are in government and, respectively, have/have not (yet) altered liberal democratic institutions. It argues that the space for compromise is larger the greater the threat is to the latter, but also that certainty about the effects of compromise is essential to their permissibility. Where certainty is lacking, the default political measure should be exclusion due to the moral loss and responsibility involved in making compromises.
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Crises, as critical moments in the process of European integration, are particularly conducive to the increased politicisation of the European Union (EU) and its contestation. The year 2015 saw the peaks of the Greek and the refugee crises, the two crises that put the two flagships of the European project—the Euro and the Schengen zone—into imminent peril, causing a prolonged EU legitimacy crisis. Building on the literature that considers Euroscepticism as a context-dependent and discursive phenomenon, this study analyses Facebook debates that emerged in response to the Greek and refugee crises, trying to identify how the EU was evaluated and how these evaluations were justified. To answer this question, this study involved the qualitative content analysis of over 7000 Facebook comments related to the Greek and migration crises published in 2015 on the pages of the European Parliament and the European Commission. Contrary to the literature that explains popular Euroscepticism by utilitarian or cultural factors, the findings of this study show that the most recurrent justification for negative EU polity evaluations is the lack of democratic credentials. Furthermore, the commentators mostly assessed the EU’s current set-up and, to a much lesser extent, the principle and the future of European integration. Moreover, the Facebook public extensively commented on the level of inclusiveness, particularly bemoaning the lack of inclusiveness of “ordinary” people in EU decision making. Nevertheless, the commentators frequently referred to themselves as “we Europeans” or “we people”, opposing themselves to EU, national, or financial “elites”. Despite its populist elements, this sense of “we-ness” incepted in social media suggests the capacity of transnational online discussion to foster European digital demos.
Chapter
The original version of this book was published with incorrect affiliation for the 2nd author Dr. Simone Maddanu. It has now been changed from “University of Tampa” to “University of South Florida” in this revised version.
Article
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Newcomers to Ireland confront a context of reception shaped by large-scale historical emigration and more recent immigration defined by an increasingly diverse set of origin contexts, both within and outside the European Union (EU). How has the Irish population responded to these groups, and how openly do Irish residents express their views toward different immigrant groups? We test this response using a survey experiment, which offered respondents an anonymous way to express any negative attitudes to immigrant groups they may have had. Results from the survey experiment show that Irish residents’ support for Black and Polish immigrations is overstated when expressed directly. In contrast, their sentiment toward Muslim immigrants is notably insensitive to the level of anonymity provided, indicating little difference between overt and covert expression of support (or antipathy). In other words, when race/ethnicity or EU origin is made salient, Irish respondents are more likely to mask negative sentiment. When Islam is emphasized, however, Irish antipathy is not masked. We find that in-group preferences, instead of determining support in an absolute sense, shape the reluctance with which opposition to immigrant groups is overtly expressed.
Book
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Celem niniejszej publikacji jest ukazanie nie tylko owej różnorodności definicji i poglądów na status ontologiczny populizmu, ale także perspektyw badawczych oraz metod i narzędzi stosowanych w analizach populizmu ujmowanego jako zjawisko dyskursywne (Hawkins, 2009; Hidalgo-Tenorio, Benítez-Castro i De Cesare, 2019; Macaulay, 2019). Należy przy tym podkreślić, iż przedmiotem zainteresowania nie jest tutaj po prostu zjawisko populizmu, jego przyczyny, przejawy, efekty czy sieci zależności przyczynowo-skutkowych, w jakich pozostaje. Prace dotyczące tych kwestii są już zresztą obecne w polskiej i międzynarodowej literaturze przedmiotu. W przypadku tej książki chodzi przede wszystkim o rekonstrukcję strategii analitycznych oraz logiki badań służących analizie zjawiska. Dodać również należy, iż książka nie ma charakteru encyklopedycznego i z pewnością nie omawia wszystkich możliwych kierunków badawczych. Ze względu na dużą dynamikę tego pola badań i wielość publikowanych na bieżąco analiz byłoby to zresztą niezwykle trudne do zrealizowania.
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