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A Problem of Trust: Can Federalism Silence the Guns
Increasingly, an important—even central—issue in constitutional transitions is dealing with the diversity of populations in different regions, i.e., with territorial cleavages. When this territorial dimension is important, it can greatly complicate both the process of constitution making and the design of legitimate and stable constitutional institutions. Put simply, the theory and practice of constitution making often implicitly presupposes that there is a single people, and that the purpose of constitution making is for that entity to decide on the constitutional framework under which this people will govern itself. However, in many cases the very idea of a single people is not accepted—or is seriously qualified by deep diversity that creates a layered or composite national identity. Such demographic diversity can have serious implications for how constitutional processes are conducted and how constitutional institutions are designed, especially when it has a strong territorial dimension. This is an increasingly pervasive phenomenon in contemporary constitution making. In the last two or three decades, many countries that have engaged in constitutional debates have had to address (or are continuing to address) the territorial character and structure of the state. The diversity of these countries suggests that no single process or institutional design provides policy makers with a simple formula to address their different circumstances. This paper presents a framework for considering constitutional transitions that involve significant territorial cleavages. It is designed to assist political leaders, citizens and advisers engaged in a process of constitutional transition where the territorial character and structure of the state is an issue alongside other constitutional questions. After briefly discussing the significance of constitutions and the nature of constitutional transitions, it considers the political nature of territorial cleavages, the challenges they can present for constitutional processes that are not always framed with territorial issues in mind, and some options for constitutional design that may help manage or accommodate such cleavages.
This contribution deals primarily with the way that defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has been undertaken since 2002. In addition, it provides an overview of how intelligence and police reform have been approached. The success and failure of these efforts as well as the contribution of external actors are assessed, and some critical conclusions about the role of the international community in the reform process are drawn. It concludes that as the international community's role decreases, the onus will increasingly be on the local authorities to cooperate to complete the work that the external actors have initiated. This will be essential if BiH is to succeed in drawing closer to Europe.
This article questions the assumption that solutions to ‘complex political emergencies’ necessitate extended long‐term international regulation over the civil and political reconstruction process. One example where international peacekeeping has extended beyond the traditional remit of disarmament and the separation of combatants to civilian democratization and civil society development is that of Bosnia. The limited success of civil society development suggests that the extension of international supervision over the Bosnian state may risk institutionalizing division and political fragmentation. The comprehensive nature of new international peacebuilding mandates could become counter‐productive if they result in the marginalization of locally accountable solutions.