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Social norms and efficacy beliefs drive the Alarmed segment’s public-sphere climate actions
Abstract
Surprisingly few individuals who are highly concerned about climate change take action to influence public policies. To assess social-psychological and cognitive drivers of public-sphere climate actions of Global Warming's Six Americas 'Alarmed' segment, we developed a behaviour model and tested it using structural equation modelling of survey data from Vermont, USA (N = 702). Our model, which integrates social cognitive theory, social norms research, and value belief norm theory, explains 36-64% of the variance in five behaviours. Here we show descriptive social norms, self-efficacy, personal response efficacy, and collective response efficacy as strong driving forces of: voting, donating, volunteering, contacting government officials, and protesting about climate change. The belief that similar others took action increased behaviour and strengthened efficacy beliefs, which also led to greater action. Our results imply that communication efforts targeting Alarmed individuals and their public actions should include strategies that foster beliefs about positive descriptive social norms and efficacy.
... It can occur within the sphere of the state (e.g., through party volunteering, and contacting politicians), as well as outside the state sphere, either through collective advocacy for a cause (e.g., through signing petitions, and joining protests), or through seeking to personally change society (e.g., through political consumerism, and discussions with others face-toface or online 4,5 ). Activism is known to be a highly effective way of bringing about major systemic change 6,7 . In a statistical analysis of historical data on public resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006, non-violent campaigns were found to be twice as successful as violent ones, succeeding on 53% as opposed to 26% of occasions 8 . ...
... Despite the need for climate activism, rates of attendance at climate protests are low. In the US, even among those expressing 'alarm' (as opposed to mere 'concern') over climate change in attitudes surveys, protest attendance rates are estimated to be between 12% and 30% 6,9 . Rates of other forms of activism among the alarmed are also low, with estimates ranging from 4% for participating in political campaigns 9 to between 24% and 63% for donating money to political candidates supporting climate change mitigation policies 6,9 . ...
... A final limitation with associated future research directions has to do with how we conceived of motivators in the checklist we designed for participants. We sought simply to capture motives measured in previous studies of motivators and barriers to climate activism 6,21,26 (see Methods and Supplementary Notes 1), without reference to a psychological theory of motivation. A dominant perspective in psychology is self-determination theory 44 , according to which motives fall on a continuum from autonomous/internal to controlled/external. Autonomous motives are guided by an individual's identity, interests, and values, while controlled motives reflect external pressures, rewards, and penalties. ...
Since non-violent activism is known to be effective in achieving policy change, organisations seeking to encourage climate activism would benefit from an evidence base describing activism behaviours, motivators, and barriers among people higher, lower, and in between in terms of climate activism involvement. We surveyed 519 Australians alarmed by climate change regarding participation in 18 activism behaviours. A latent class analysis identified three activism levels: Least (23%), Moderate (55%), and Most (22%). The Most Active participants were at least 75% likely to engage in 13 behaviours. The only demographic difference between classes is that participants in the Least Active class were younger. Across classes, the most common reported motivators related to issue importance and action efficacy. Reported barriers were more behaviour-specific, with frequent references to lack of experience and knowledge for financial activism and engagement with climate organisations. Six practical applications for promoting climate activism are discussed.
... A powerful barrier to more ambitious environmental action might be that people feel like their personal actions do not have much influence on a global problem such as climate change. Low response efficacy (i.e., people's perception that their behavior can produce a certain outcome) has been repeatedly connected to reduced pro-environmental behavior and intention (e.g., Bostrom et al., 2019;Bradley et al., 2020;Doherty & Webler, 2016;Gulliver et al., 2020;Lubell et al., 2007;Rainear & Christensen, 2022). Increasing people's response efficacy, thus, seems to be a promising way to increase individuals' pro-environmental action. ...
... For example, a person has a high response efficacy regarding climate change if they believe that personal behaviors such as following a vegan diet or joining a protest for environmental protection will contribute to the desired outcome of protecting the environment. Environmental research further distinguishes between response efficacy at the personal and at the collective level (e.g., Bostrom et al., 2019;Doherty & Webler, 2016;Lubell et al., 2007). For example, while personal response efficacy refers to the conviction that my personal behavior can achieve a certain outcome, collective response efficacy refers to the conviction that the collective behavior of a group (e.g., a student group planting trees or activists raising awareness) can achieve an outcome. ...
... Past literature shows that response efficacy at both the personal and collective level is important for pro-environmental behavior. People with high personal response efficacy support environmental policies more (Lubell et al., 2007), engage and intent to engage in more private pro-environmental behavior such as recycling or driving less (Bradley et al., 2020;Hornsey et al., 2021;Lubell et al., 2007;Rainear & Christensen, 2022), and engage in more public pro-environmental behavior like protesting, voting, or volunteering (Doherty & Webler, 2016;Lubell et al., 2007). Similarly, people with high collective response efficacy show higher support for environmental policies (Bostrom et al., 2019;Lubell et al., 2007) and engage more private (Lubell et al., 2007) and public (Doherty & Webler, 2016;Lubell et al., 2007) pro-environmental behavior. ...
Climate change is a large-scale problem that might leave people paralyzed by feeling too small to make a difference. Indeed, low response efficacy has been shown to be related to low pro-environmental behavior. There have been some attempts to increase people’s efficacy. However, these have often been less successful than hoped. In the present research we suggest that response efficacy is informed by people’s more fundamental understanding of how the world functions (i.e., their lay beliefs about the world): whether they think the world is changeable or fixed. In three online experiments (on samples from Austria and the USA) we manipulated participants’ lay beliefs about the world and measured their response efficacy and different indicators of intentions and perceptions related to pro-environmental behavior (such as climate change belief, perceiving norms as changing and feelings of working together in pro-environmental behavior). People who were led to adopt the belief that the world is changeable (i.e., an incremental belief) reported higher response efficacy regarding climate change. There was also some indication that they had stronger pro-environmental intentions, felt more like working together with others when engaging in pro-environmental behavior, and perceived norms around pro-environmental behavior as more dynamic. These results indicate that people’s global understanding of the world plays a role in how they view and tackle large-scale social problems such as climate change. Supporting an incremental belief might foster an agentic approach to such problems and promote social change.
... Self-efficacy refers to people's beliefs about their ability to take specific actions [25]. Response efficacy-which Bandura (1986) called outcome expectancy-refers to people's beliefs about the effectiveness of a specific action in a response to a threat [19,22,23,25,26]. Drawing on the EPPM, the type of actions people take in response to a threat will depend greatly on both their self-and response efficacy [19,20]. ...
... Self-efficacy. We drew inspiration from Doherty and Webler (2016) for our measure of self-efficacy [26]. Participants were asked to indicate their level of confidence in their ability to engage in seven actions to reduce harm to science from Congress and the president (in 2017). ...
... Collective response efficacy. Like our measure of self-efficacy, we again used Doherty and Webler (2016) as a model for our measure of collective response efficacy [26]. Participants were asked to indicate how effective seven actions would be at reducing harm to science from Congress and the president (2017) if "many other people who share your views do it." ...
The 2017 March for Science was an international march organized in response to concerns over the Trump administration’s misuse of science that drew unprecedented numbers of supporters as well as attention from the media, celebrities, and political figures. The March’s turnout and publicity begs the question: what motivates people to defend science? Using data from a survey of March for Science listserv members in the US, we used a structural equation model to test posited relationships between self- and collective response efficacy, perceived threat, anger, fear, and the intention to engage in advocacy to defend science. We found that each of these constructs were associated with the intention to engage in advocacy, illuminating the motivators that lead to this intention and how individuals may be activated to engage on behalf of science in the future. These insights have both theoretical and practical significance, as advocacy is integral for both supporting and advancing fact-based policy- and decision-making.
... Finally, there are conflicting findings regarding how collective efficacy is associated with intentions to engage in political actions to address climate change. Although some research has found that individuals who feel a greater sense of collective efficacy are more likely to take political action (van Zomeren et al., 2008), other studies have found null results (Doherty & Webler, 2016). Given these conflicting findings, more research is needed to better understand how these constructs are associated with each other. ...
... The link between collective efficacy and political action is still an underresearched area (Fritsche et al., 2018), and studies examining this relationship have found mixed results regarding whether collective efficacy is a key determinant for political action. Although some studies provide empirical support for the positive association between collective efficacy and political behaviors related to climate change (Chen, 2015;Landmann & Rohmann, 2020;van Zomeren et al., 2008), others suggest a less robust relationship (Choi & Hart, 2021;Doherty & Webler, 2016;Hamann & Reese, 2020). Thus, we pose the following research question: ...
... Looking to downstream factors, risk perceptions had a positive association with perceived collective efficacy, which aligns with predictions from some motivated control literature, and collective efficacy, in turn, had a positive association with intended political action. In past literature, there has been mixed support for the robustness of the positive relationship between collective efficacy and predispositions for climate action (Doherty & Webler, 2016;van Zomeren et al., 2008). The positive association we find adds strength to the proposition that individuals who feel a greater sense of collective efficacy are more likely to engage in political action. ...
This study investigates how episodic and thematic flooding imagery and political party cues in climate change news stories influence risk perceptions, collective efficacy perceptions, and intended political action. We found that imagery and party cues had significant total effects on perceived flooding threat but not on perceived climate change threat. Specifically, episodic imagery (but not thematic imagery) increased perceived flooding threat, and party cues lowered perceived threat. Perceived threat was positively associated with collective efficacy, which, in turn, was positively associated with intended political action. Both imagery and party cues had significant indirect effects on perceived efficacy and intended action.
... Individuals who believe that their actions will yield positive outcomes (i.e., high response efficacy) are more likely to invest effort in initiating and sustaining those behaviors compared to individuals with low response efficacy. In public climate action, individual response efficacy was considered the perceived impact of one's cooperative behavior on the collective outcome (Doherty and Webler, 2016). When considering social interactions, the assessment of behavioral outcomes should encompass both personal and others' effects. ...
... Numerous studies have demonstrated that social norms, particularly descriptive norms, influence environmental behaviors such as public transportation use (Heath and Gifford, 2002), energy conservation (Nolan et al., 2008;Bonan et al., 2020), and recycling (Schultz, 1999;Liu et al., 2022). These findings support the hypothesis that people are more likely to participate in a behavior when they perceive others engaging in it (Doherty and Webler, 2016). According to Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1986), social norms provide evidence of others' efficacy beliefs when individuals face uncertain situations. ...
... According to Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1986), social norms provide evidence of others' efficacy beliefs when individuals face uncertain situations. While social norms are commonly categorized as descriptive, imperative, and dynamic (Schneider and van der Linden, 2023), empirical evidence suggests that descriptive norms have a stronger and more enduring impact (Doherty and Webler, 2016). In the context of climate change discussions, the behavior of others reflects their ability to engage in such discussions. ...
Public discussions on climate change, as a form of social interaction, are widely recognized as effective tools for promoting collective action. However, there is limited research on examining the factors that influence climate change discussions from a social interaction perspective. In the present study, we conducted a large sample (N = 1,169) survey to investigate personal (such as self-efficacy and personal response efficacy) and others' (such as perceived others' response efficacy and social norms) factors influencing climate change discussions from a social interaction perspective. The results showed that (i) for people with high climate change perceptions, personal response efficacy, self-efficacy, and social norms have positive effects on climate change discussions, but the effect of perceived others' response efficacy on climate change discussion is not significant; (ii) for people with low climate change perceptions, self-efficacy and social norms have positive effects on climate change discussions, but the effects of personal response efficacy and perceived others' response efficacy on climate change discussion are not significant; (iii) irrespective of individuals' high or low perceptions of climate change, social norm remains the most important predictor of climate change discussions. These findings make valuable contributions to the theoretical literature and intervention efforts regarding climate change discussions from a social interaction perspective.
... Looking at research that has assessed concepts related to action hope provides additional evidence that action hope would motivate climate engagement. While action hope refers to feelings of hope when considering taking action, self-efficacy refers to one's self-perceived ability to engage in a specific action, and (personal) response efficacy refers to perceptions of the extent to which one's action could make a difference (Doherty & Webler, 2016;Geiger et al., 2017). Previous work demonstrates that action hope can be distinguished from efficacy and both have unique predictive power on relevant outcome variables, yet, the states often tend to cooccur Geiger, Gasper, et al., 2019 1 ;Marlon et al., 2019), perhaps because empowering contexts may engender multiple states simultaneously, perceiving that oneself or one's group has efficacy can be part of an appraisal leading to action hope (e.g., Shani et al., 2024), and because feeling action hope could conversely also promote greater efficacy. ...
... Previous work demonstrates that action hope can be distinguished from efficacy and both have unique predictive power on relevant outcome variables, yet, the states often tend to cooccur Geiger, Gasper, et al., 2019 1 ;Marlon et al., 2019), perhaps because empowering contexts may engender multiple states simultaneously, perceiving that oneself or one's group has efficacy can be part of an appraisal leading to action hope (e.g., Shani et al., 2024), and because feeling action hope could conversely also promote greater efficacy. Thus, given the reliable and potentially bidirectional relationship between action hope and efficacy and robust evidence showing that efficacy is associated with greater climate action (Choi & Hart, 2021;Doherty & Webler, 2016;Geiger et al., 2017;Niemiec et al., 2021), we extrapolate that action hope would also likely promote engagement with climate change. ...
Hope is a future-oriented emotion that attunes people to the possibility of positive change, and thus could potentially catalyze societal engagement with climate change. A recent meta-analysis (Geiger et al., 2023) suggests that the relationship between hope and climate action is most robust when the target of hope is climate engagement (i.e., action hope) rather than climate change more broadly. Yet, this previous meta-analysis also suggests that fostering action hope and climate engagement may be challenging via typical short media messages used in many studies. Here, we consider an alternative source of action hope: receiving social support. Two studies tested whether social support motivates climate action via increased action hope. Study 1 (correlational online survey, pre-registered, N = 887) demonstrates that, as predicted, both instrumental and emotional support predict intentions to take civic action and these effects are explained by action hope. Study 2 (field study, Neducators = 84, Ncontacts = 520) mostly replicates and extends these findings in a field setting, demonstrating that social support recipients’ action hope is also associated with social support reported by support providers (here, environmental educators) and that this action hope again explains a possible relationship between social support and climate engagement.
... The finding also suggests that when training people to engage in CCA conversations, these programs may need to address and assess the level of comfort. Certainly, role-plays and positive feedback can enhance comfort [54][55][56][57]. Additionally, preparing people for how to address anticipated skepticism from others may serve to increase comfort. ...
... In line with prior research on social norms and climate change behaviors, perceptions of social network members' support of and engagement in climate change activism predicted CCA conversations [57,58]. However, we do not know if the conversations reported were with those network members who they perceived to be more supportive of climate change conversations. ...
It is critical to understand the determinants of climate change activism (CCA) and CCA communications (CCAC). Such information can help organizations that are committed to addressing climate understand and predict who will engage in CCA, identify barriers to CCA, and develop programs to address these barriers to diffuse climate change activism messages and behaviors through social networks and to mobilize action. This study longitudinally investigates psychosocial predictors of CCAC. Study participants were drawn from a randomized clinical trial of US adults (N = 622). Participants completed baseline and follow-up surveys between August to September 2022. Logistic regression models assessed psychosocial factors and implementation intention factors that predicted CCAC at follow-up. The multivariate logistic regression model baseline factors of positive social network norms related to CCAC (aOR: 1.25, 95% CI: 1.10–1.43), comfort encouraging others to engage in CCAC (aOR: 1.74, 95% CI: 1.01–2.88), and following a climate change social media account (aOR: 2.65, 95% CI: 1.74–4.02) were significantly associated with CCAC at follow-up. In a sub-analysis, plans on talking within a week and having in-person conversations versus texting/email were positively associated with CCAC. These findings suggest that strategies to improve comfort talking about CCA and implementation intentions may increase interpersonal CCAC.
... Diese Aktivitäten sind bedeutend, da Individuen nicht nur als Konsument*innen und Nutzer*innen, sondern auch als politisch Handelnde verstanden werden sollten (Becker et al., 2021). Dennoch wurde bislang relativ wenig zum Verhalten als Bürger*innen und Aktivist*innen geforscht (Schulte et al., 2020) und über die Determinanten dieser Verhaltensweisen ist noch wenig bekannt (Doherty & Webler, 2016). Daher lag der Fokus der vorliegenden Studie auf der Vorhersage nicht-aktivistischen öffentlichen Umweltverhaltens. ...
... Angesichts der relativen Stabilität soziodemographischer Merkmale kann vermutet werden, dass die persönliche Norm oder die politische Orientierung effektivere Ansatzpunkte für Interventionen darstellen. Klimakommunikation, Wahlkampagnen und Bildungsarbeit können an diesen ansetzen, um Mehrheiten für radikale Klimapolitik zu gewinnen(Chapman et al., 2017;Doherty & Webler, 2016). Hier scheint es hilfreich, Personen anzusprechen, die eine progressive und soziale politische Einstellung haben. ...
Broad political support for socio-ecological transformation
is needed in the face of the climate crisis. This study investigates non-activist public pro-environmental behaviour (PEB) in the form
of (a) support of radical climate policies, (b) sympathies, and (c) voting intentions for a newly founded climate party in Germany (Klimaliste) in relation to socio-demographics (age, gender, income,
and education level), environmental and social psychological predictors (personal norm, environmental identity, collective efficacy beliefs, and political orientation) as well as affective predictors
(fear, anger, guilt, and positive affect). Stepwise multiple regression analyses with data from an online survey (N = 622) showed significant influence of female gender and personal norm on all three types of non-activist public PEB. Furthermore, support of radical climate politics was predicted by an economically social and societally progressive political orientation, while Klimaliste sympathies were related to an economically social political orientation. Moreover, negative affect, consisting of fear, anger, and
guilt, could explain variance beyond the sociodemographic,
environmental and social psychological variables in all three types of non-activist public PEB. Additionally, party political attitudes were relevant, with Green Party sympathisers expressing strongest support. The results provide initial starting points to promote support for radical climate policies and advance sustainability transitions.
Eine breite politische Unterstützung für einen sozio-ökologischen Wandel ist im Angesicht der Klimakrise nötig. Nicht-aktivistisches öffentliches Umweltverhalten in Form von (a) Zustimmung
zu radikaler Klimapolitik, (b) Sympathien und (c) Wahlintentionen für eine neu gegründete Klimaschutz-Partei in Deutschland (Klimaliste)
wurde durch soziodemographische (Alter, Geschlecht, Einkommen und Bildungsgrad), umwelt- und sozialpsychologische (persönliche
Norm, Umweltidentität, kollektive Wirksamkeitserwartungen und politische Orientierung) sowie affektive Prädiktoren (Angst, Ärger, Schuld und positiver Affekt) vorhergesagt. Schrittweise multiple Regressionsanalysen mit Daten einer Online-Befragung (N = 622) zeigten einen signifikanten Einfluss von weiblichem Geschlecht
und umweltbezogener persönlicher Norm auf alle drei Formen nicht-aktivistischen öffentlichen Umweltverhaltens. Die Zustimmung zu radikaler Klimapolitik wurde zudem durch eine wirtschaftlich soziale sowie gesellschaftlich progressive politische Orientierung vorhergesagt, Sympathien für die Klimaliste wiesen Zusammenhänge
zu einer wirtschaftlich sozialen politischen Orientierung auf. Negativer Affekt, der sich aus Angst, Ärger und Schuld zusammensetzte, konnte über die soziodemografischen sowie
sozial- und umweltpsychologischen Variablen hinaus Varianz in allen drei Formen nicht-aktivistischen öffentlichen Umweltverhaltens erklären. Des Weiteren erwiesen sich parteipolitische Einstellungen als relevant, wobei Grünen-Sympathisant*innen die stärkste Befürwortung der Klimaliste äußerten. Die Ergebnisse liefern erste
Ansatzpunkte für die Praxis, um die gesellschaftliche Unterstützung radikaler Klimapolitik zu fördern und somit einen nachhaltigen Wandel
voranzutreiben.
... As mentioned above, efficacy may mediate the relationship between psychological proximity and collective action. Efficacy encompasses feeling able to take action ("self-efficacy" or "personal efficacy") and believing that the action will yield the desired results ("response efficacy" or "outcome efficacy") at both the individual and collective levels 32,33,[45][46][47] . Additionally, Van Zomeren, Saguy, and Schellhaas 48 link the personal and collective levels of efficacy through the concept of participative efficacy, or the belief that one's individual actions will make a difference in achieving group goals. ...
... J.C. Fine particular 32,50,51 . A larger body of literature has demonstrated that efficacy is correlated with intention to participate in collective climate action 33,[52][53][54][55][56][57] , as well as support for climate mitigation and adaptation policies 33,56,58 . ...
Many US residents are worried about the climate crisis, but few are involved in collective climate action. Relational climate conversations are a commonly recommended yet understudied means of encouraging action. This study examines the effects of conversations between US climate activists and non-activists they knew, most of whom were concerned about climate change. Non-activists reported increased knowledge, perceived efficacy, and intention to take action following the conversations, but did not participate in collective climate action more than control groups. Common barriers included low perceived efficacy, lack of knowledge about collective climate action, and psychological distance of action. Activists’ discussion of collective climate action was correlated with an increase in perceived efficacy among non-activists. Because perceived efficacy has been found to predict collective action, these results suggest that focusing on action, more so than solutions in the abstract, could enhance the effectiveness of relational climate conversations.
... That pro-environmental behaviour is contingent on efficacy beliefs is also consistent with Value-Belief-Norm theory, whereby people who believe their actions can help restore something they value will feel an obligation to respond both in their private-sphere behaviours and by engaging in civic action (Stern et al., 1999). Elsewhere, the perception that similar others are acting on climate change has been linked to increased levels of one's climate-relevant collective action via stronger efficacy beliefs (Doherty and Webler, 2016). Influencing beliefs about others' beliefs can also be consequential. ...
... From a Social Identity Theory perspective, the perceived norms of the ingroup are especially implicated in guiding people's behaviour, as people internalise the assumed norms of the groups they belong to (Tajfel and Turner, 1986;Rabinovich et al., 2011). Moreover, individuals who are geographically close impart stronger social influences on behaviour than those who are distant or unfamiliar (Doherty and Webler, 2016). However, where an outgroup represents an influential or numerical majority (e.g., people living in capital cities), or even a sizeable minority (e.g., immigrants to Australia), perceptions of outgroup concern may have a unique influence on levels of efficacy to combat climate change, which in turn may have flow-on consequences for behavioural engagement. ...
People tend to underestimate others’ environmental values, including when judging the values of minority-status groups. Using a large national sample (N = 5110), we test whether these misperceptions extend to concern about climate change in Australia, and differ depending on immigrant status, ethnicity, and where one is located (i.e., in or outside capital cities). We also examine the consequences of misperceptions for self-efficacy and pro-environmental behaviour. We find personal climate concern is high, but perceptions of others’ concern is lower. Immigrants and Australian-born participants have similarly high concern, but both groups underestimate how concerned immigrants are. Southern-Central-Asian identifiers are the most concerned; Australian identifiers relatively less so. All ethnic categories appeared to underestimate the concern of their own ethnicity. City-dwellers had slightly higher concern than those in regional or rural areas, but city-dwellers' concern was underestimated by people regardless of their location. Those who underestimated others’ concern had lower pro-environmental behavioural engagement compared to those who overestimated concern, and this was mediated by lower self-efficacy. We suggest that strategies to promote climate engagement and efficacy go beyond attempting to correct misperceptions, and encompass approaches that promote environmentally-relevant social interaction across different groups.
... These outcomes may also influence one another. For example, collective learning could result in strengthened relationships among participants, and undertaking adaptive actions could, in turn, contribute to enhanced feelings of efficacy (Doherty & Webler, 2016). Each outcome area is discussed in greater detail below. ...
... As participants experience shifts in their focus and understanding vis-à-vis climate adaptation and perceive the development of shared understandings among other attendees, they may also expand their reference group, which is the group with whom an individual shares cultural and normative commitments. In turn, this broadened reference group could contribute to the formation and reformation of norms around adaptation, buttress efficacy beliefs, and open new pathways toward adaptation solutions (Doherty & Webler, 2016;Stern and Coleman, 2015). This process could be especially effective in instances where climate change adaptation workshops include representation from a range of critical sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and the healthcare system. ...
... For example, only 52% of Americans rate dealing with global climate change as a top priority (Pew Research Center, 2020). Furthermore, even if people hold the opinion that climate change is a critical concern, they still may not engage with climate change initiatives (Leiserowitz et al., 2019) or take action to influence public policies (Doherty & Webler, 2016). A contributing factor to this lack of engagement is that people focus on the inherent uncertainty of climate change as a global issue, in terms of timeframe, severity of impacts, location, efficacy of action and more (Morton et al., 2011). ...
... Second, we considered separate dependent variables, which captured engagement with climate change initiatives across three separate domains. Specifically, we considered emotional distress following climate change messages, attitudinal support for climate change policies, and behavioural engagement with different initiatives (Doherty & Webler, 2016;Stern, 2000). ...
Objectives
As the threat of climate change continues to grow, bolstering individual‐level support for climate change initiatives is crucial. More research is needed to better understand how individual difference factors, such as climate change anxiety and intolerance of uncertainty (IU), may shape how people perceive climate change and respond to climate change messaging. To date, the majority of published studies have not taken these individual difference factors into consideration, and IU has been particularly neglected in the climate change literature. This study examined the independent effects of climate change anxiety and IU on three climate change‐related outcomes: climate‐related distress, support for climate change policies, and behavioural engagement.
Methods
Participants were Florida residents ( N = 441) who completed an online survey, including measures of climate change anxiety and IU. Participants then watched a video describing climate change consequences and completed three outcome measures: post‐video distress, climate change policy support, and behavioural engagement.
Results
Controlling for demographic covariates, both climate change anxiety ( β = .43, p < .001) and IU ( β = .27, p < .001) were associated with greater post‐video distress, but only IU independently predicted greater policy support ( β = .10, p = .034) and behavioural engagement ( β = .12, p = .017).
Conclusions
Our findings suggest that IU may be an important factor in promoting pro‐environmental behaviour and policy support, but climate change anxiety may increase emotional distress without boosting meaningful behaviours or support. Our findings highlight the potential influence of cognitive factors on climate change engagement and suggest that invoking uncertainty rather than anxiety may be more effective in catalysing effective environmental engagement.
... In the past, self-efficacy has been a predictor of pro-environmental behaviors [17][18][19][20] including recycling [21][22][23], reducing water use [18,21,24] and increasing conservation behavior [25,26]. A sense of collective efficacy has also been suggested as playing a key role [25,[27][28][29] by increasing a sense of self-efficacy [25,27]. Additionally, in most instances of environmental action, individuals have been more likely to participate in pro-environmental activities if they are supported and carried out by their community [29,30]. ...
... A sense of collective efficacy has also been suggested as playing a key role [25,[27][28][29] by increasing a sense of self-efficacy [25,27]. Additionally, in most instances of environmental action, individuals have been more likely to participate in pro-environmental activities if they are supported and carried out by their community [29,30]. However, emphasizing past personal action does not increase collective action [31]. ...
Individuals can act to mitigate climate change and its consequences by changing their own behavior, working with others to address community issues, or advocating for government action. However, little is known about what people are doing or the factors shaping their engagement. We surveyed 741 respondents in the United States to understand their current beliefs, motivations, and behaviors related to climate action. Our respondents report frequently taking everyday actions, such as talking to others about climate change and buying climate friendly products with less frequent, but still higher than expected, advocacy-oriented actions like signing petitions or contacting representatives. We find wide agreement on the importance of government action and the need for government to hear people’s concerns, with more variability in the importance assigned to community and individual actions. Lack of access to resources, social support, or fun approaches to addressing climate change represent obstacles to further action.
... Established scales used in research by Neumann, Martinez, and Martinez [68], and Nelson, Ira, and Merelender [69] aided in the measurement of both agency and self-efficacy. Two items from Doherty and Webler [40] were extracted to assist in the measurement of agency, whilst an item from Bostrom, Hayes, and Crosman [70] was utilised in the measurement of self-efficacy. A simple self-generated scale asking how likely participants were to shop at a thrift store in the future was used to measure intention. ...
... Our findings show that when actions are presented as doable and meaningful, the resulting agency and self-efficacy reinforce and increase the intention of individuals to engage with issues, such as those related to "wicked" problems like climate change [7,38,39]. This is backed up by the findings of Doherty and Webler [40], which show that people who demonstrate high self-efficacy have high intentions of adopting pro-environmental behaviours; this is, in turn, a strong predictor of actually adopting pro-environmental behaviours [41]. ...
Many of the major environmental problems facing society remain intractable because members of the public neither perceive the relevance to them nor how their individual actions might help the situation. Post-consumer textile waste is one such disregarded problem, whereby disposal of waste from the fashion industry, especially the discarding of functional but out-of-fashion garments, releases significant greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. Here, we used action-based storytelling as proof-of-concept of an innovative way to promote agency for climate action by showcasing pro-environmental behaviour through social modelling within stories. We evaluated the effectiveness of action-based storytelling in evoking agency, self-efficacy, and intention to increase second-hand clothing consumption. This research sought to identify if the choices faced by the story’s hero impacted these variables. The research is innovative in its use of a mixed-methods research methodology and community-based social marketing approach. Two focus groups identified consumer barriers to, and motivations for, second-hand clothing consumption in order to inform the development of three action-based storytelling videos (each with a different hero character: (i) a scientist, (ii) an influencer and (iii) students). A quasi-experimental survey evaluated how action-based storytelling and the different story heroes impacted participants’ levels of agency, self-efficacy, and intention. Results showed that participants’ levels of agency, self-efficacy, and intention significantly increased after watching the videos. Furthermore, the influencer hero was found to have the greatest effect on these variables. This research concludes that action-based storytelling can be an effective communication approach which demonstrates promising results in evoking agency and self-efficacy and increasing the likelihood that consumers will adopt pro-environmental behaviours.
... Typically, efficacy is defined as having two components: (1) self-efficacy, regarding one's ability to act, and (2) response efficacy, regarding one's confidence in the effectiveness of action (Bandura 1977;Witte 1992). Efficacy can be measured at the individual or collective level and has been found to predict behavioral change to reduce or avert climate change (see Doherty and Webler 2016;van Valkengoed and Steg 2019). Research examining fear-based appeals has consistently found that messages evoking fear can have a demobilizing effect unless accompanied by statements encouraging efficacy beliefs (Maddux and Rogers 1983;Witte and Allen 2000). ...
Partisan polarization on the issue of climate change has longed been attributed to the influence of media on public opinion. However, shifts in media coverage—including a general increase in coverage, greater acceptance of the scientific consensus, and an increase in catastrophic framing—highlight the importance of revisiting how exposure to climate change news shapes citizens’ attitudes. Drawing from a nationally representative survey of 2175 U.S. adults conducted in 2023, this study examines how partisanship is related to exposure to climate change news in six types of outlets. Further, it explores how exposure to climate change news influences climate change concern and efficacy beliefs. While partisanship does not influence general exposure to climate change news, Democrats and Republicans differ in the types of outlets they prefer. Additionally, increased exposure is associated with greater climate change concern and self-efficacy, though partisanship moderates the effect of exposure on climate change concern. Finally, exposure to climate change news in newspapers, radio, and podcasts is associated with reduced response efficacy and collective efficacy. These findings suggest that the media’s influence on public opinion related to climate change is, indeed, changing.
... Similarly, the belief that many individuals are capable of taking actions may lead to social loafing. However, the speculation requires additional research, as it contrasts previous findings of positive or null associations between these efficacy constructs and policy support (Bostrom et al., 2019;Choi & Hart, 2021;Doherty & Webler, 2016;Hamann & Reese, 2020). ...
Perceptions of efficacy play a central role in motivating people to engage in climate actions. However, there has been little investigation into how different climate efficacy beliefs are formed and how they may be associated with support for climate mitigation policies. This study, based on the motivated control framework, examines how risk perceptions may differentially be associated with four types of efficacy constructs (self‐efficacy, personal outcome expectancy, collective efficacy, and collective outcome efficacy). It also places the motivated control framework in the context of the partisan information sphere and examines how exposure to partisan news may influence mitigation policy support through the mediators of risk perceptions and the efficacy constructs. Results suggest that liberal‐ and conservative‐leaning news exposure, respectively, associate with higher and lower supports for policies. Overall, risk perception was a significant mediator, and the mediating function of efficacy varied depending on the specific construct being examined. For liberal news use, increased risk perceptions had a positive association with policy support through self‐efficacy and collective outcome expectancy but also had an unexpected negative association with policy support through personal outcome expectancy and collective efficacy. For conservative news use, decreased risk perceptions resulted in further decreased beliefs of self‐efficacy and collective outcome expectancy, resulting in lower levels of support for climate policies. We also find that political ideology is a significant moderator for the mediation model. Implications for climate change communication are discussed.
... Leaders efficacy: Self-efficacy and collective efficacy are established measures of the extent to which people think they are able contribute to tackling climate change, either individually or collectively (Doherty and Webler 2016). We adapted these concepts to measure "leaders efficacy", which encapsulates respondents' perceptions that leaders will act on climate change and how effective this action may be, with questions such as: "How confident or doubtful are you that politicians [celebrities/business leaders] will take the necessary steps to tackle climate change?" and "How confident or doubtful are you that climate change will be kept within safe limits?". ...
Behaviour change has great potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions quickly, helping to prevent dangerous global warming. Some of the most impactful changes are: flying less, eating less meat, driving electric cars, improving home energy efficiency, increased use of public transport and active travel. However, these choices have proved elusive at scale and are rarely encouraged or modelled by high-status individuals (“leaders”), despite established knowledge about the influence of leaders as role models. Applying theories of embodied leadership and credibility enhancing displays, our novel pre-registered survey experiment (n = 1267) reveals that visible leading by example from politicians and celebrities significantly increases the willingness of members of the UK public to make these high-impact low-carbon choices. In addition, leading by example greatly increases perceptions of leader credibility, trustworthiness, competence, and favourability. We find no significant effects of leading by example on people’s wider perceptions of climate change, but a strong “appetite for leadership” among the public is revealed. In light of these findings, we discuss how embodied leadership by way of visible low-carbon behaviour from leaders may provide a crucial “missing link” for climate change mitigation.
... We propose the DMCA (figure 1), which draws from prior empirical work and key theoretical models and frameworks, while embracing the dynamism and feedback processes inherent in decisions to act in response to climate change-related threats. This conceptual model is largely inspired and adapted from theoretical models such as the model of private proactive adaptation to climate change [7], climate change risk perception model [8], theoretical model of public-sphere climate action [9], and risk information seeking and processing model [10], which highlight the importance of cognitions, emotions, and socio-cultural context in shaping perceptions about climate change and motivating climate action. The DMCA also draws from a legacy of other theoretical models, such as the gateway belief model [11], underscoring the importance of the informational environment such as perceptions of scientific consensus and belief in human-caused climate change, and the protective action decision model [12], which suggests a feedback loop between behavior and information inputs such as environmental or social cues. ...
... Public opinion on global warming influences policy-making decisions [1] and public behavior [2]. Scholars and policymakers typically use representative surveys to measure and understand public opinion [3]. ...
Large language models (LLMs) can be used to estimate human attitudes and behavior, including measures of public opinion, a concept referred to as algorithmic fidelity. This study assesses the algorithmic fidelity and bias of LLMs in estimating public opinion about global warming. LLMs were conditioned on demographics and/or psychological covariates to simulate survey responses. Findings indicate that LLMs can effectively reproduce presidential voting behaviors but not global warming opinions unless the issue relevant covariates are included. When conditioned on both demographic and covariates, GPT-4 demonstrates improved accuracy, ranging from 53% to 91%, in predicting beliefs and attitudes about global warming. Additionally, we find an algorithmic bias that underestimates the global warming opinions of Black Americans. While highlighting the potential of LLMs to aid social science research, these results underscore the importance of conditioning, model selection, survey question format, and bias assessment when employing LLMs for survey simulation.
... However, strong public support for climate policies is crucial for them to be effective [3][4][5][6][7] . A growing body of research in the behavioral and social sciences highlights the potentially productive role of social norms and norm interventions in changing behavior toward support for more climate change action [8][9][10][11][12][13][14] . ...
Public support is crucial for the effectiveness of ambitious climate policies, and social norm interventions have been proven effective in fostering support. An open question is which norms should be communicated if support and estimated support for climate policies differ substantially between regions. In two studies, we investigate whether individuals accurately assess the existing support and then explore the impact of national and regional norms on public support. Our results show that the norm on climate policy support is generally misperceived, i.e., the norm is higher than expected. This misperception increases with policy ambition and varies substantially between sub-national regions. Information about the national norm increases support, mainly in regions with below or above-average support. In contrast, interventions with regional norms are ineffective and even backfire in low-support regions. This demonstrates that norm nudges need to consider the regional aspects of the reference and target groups.
... Studies offer varied perspectives on the efficacy of negative versus positive emotional framing [25] and the challenges of translating complex climate data into understandable concepts that are relevant to people's lives [23,33]. Recent studies have demonstrated that fear is ineffective in motivating [83], while hope [19,27] and action [32,38,51] can be catalysts for engagement. Such a complex communication challenge, allied with the urgency of engagement, demands further research and proposals of novel approaches. ...
... Embedding local knowledge and lived experience into projects from the start provides local context, fosters deeper connections to the issue, and most importantly, empowers communitiesshifting perspectives around who can meaningfully participate in and contribute to environmental research. Feelings that individual or collective actions can bring about change aligns with the psychological construct of "response efficacy"-an important driver of behaviour (Doherty and Webler 2016). In this study, direct links between selfefficacy and behavioural change were evident, with coresearchers reporting raising wider awareness, recycling, and reducing plastic use. ...
Addressing global environmental challenges and making progress towards the United Nations sustainable development goals (SGDs) requires transformative change in various aspects of coupled human-environment systems. Public participation and collective action at local levels through improved ocean literacy is an important part of achieving global targets. However, inequalities in who has access to opportunities to engage with science and connect with ocean environments persist. Here we explore the value of co-created citizen science with four diverse community groups using the value-creation framework. We utilize participatory evaluation processes with focused group discussions (n = 17) and surveys (n = 58) embedded throughout the research process. We evidence how co-created citizen science can facilitate transformative experiences leading to pro-environmental behaviors, community empowerment, shifts in perceptions, and community building. Our findings highlight the value of such approaches to elicit change and their potential to influence policy through behavioral change.
... Studies consistently find that higher levels of EFF are directly associated with more engagement in a wide range of PEBs [e.g., 47,58,71,76]. This direct effect approach is grounded in the TPB [12,15,77,78], social cognitive theory (SCT) [71,79], and protection motivation theory (PMT) [9,78]. ...
Pro-environmental behaviors are influenced by individuals’ pro-environmental attitudes and environmental efficacy, among many other factors. However, attitude-behavior models are inconsistent on whether and how attitudes, efficacy, and behaviors should match in specificity or generality, and on the moderation effect of efficacy. This study first tests a simple model including direct and moderating relationships between pro-environmental attitudes, environmental efficacy, and pro-environmental behaviors. Then it examines relationships among subscales matched or mismatched in their respective specific or general domain of environmental attitudes (concern, values), environmental efficacy (self, collective), and pro-environmental behaviors (private, public). Secondary data come from an overall sample of 11,000 respondents across 11 countries, with n = 1,000 from each country. Pro-environmental attitudes and efficacy have direct relationships with pro-environmental behavior, but efficacy has little moderation effect. Different combinations of (mis)matched measures produce slightly different results, with the most variance explained, counter to hypotheses, by two mismatched models. Results are generally consistent across countries.
... Overall, our findings about the consistent role of coping appraisal are consistent with much research on pro-environmental behaviours Doherty & Webler, 2016;Floyd et al., 2000;van Valkengoed & Steg, 2019), and highlight the importance of considering efficacy perceptions when engaging people in stewardship initiatives. The other side of efficacy relates to barriers. ...
Strengthening community engagement in stewardship can help to improve management of coastal and freshwater environments (blue spaces). Research suggests that recreational users of natural areas may be more willing to engage in stewardship. However, little research at a population scale has examine how recreation experiences shape psychological ingredients for stewardship.
We surveyed 3271 residents of South East Queensland, Australia and quantified willingness to engage in blue space stewardship. We then quantified frequency of different types of blue space recreation, perceptions about threats to blue spaces (threat appraisal) and protective actions (coping appraisal), and satisfaction with blue spaces. We then examined pathways from recreation to stewardship intentions using mediation analysis.
Results show that many types of recreation were associated with stewardship intentions. Specifically, higher frequency of social activities and nature‐appreciation activities were associated with greater intentions for individual stewardship (e.g. picking up litter, reducing use of household chemicals). Higher frequency of social activities, nature appreciation, exercise and fishing/boating was associated with stronger intentions for collective stewardship (e.g. attending a public meeting or riparian management event)
Mediation analysis showed that most forms of recreation did not influence perceptions about severity of threats to blue spaces. Rather, the relationships between recreation and stewardship were mediated by greater place satisfaction, perceived vulnerability to blue space degradation, and feeling more able to contribute to waterway protection (efficacy).
These findings indicate that many types of recreation (not just nature appreciation activities) can be a foundation for engaging in nature stewardship, and reinforce the importance of building efficacy when promoting stewardship. The finding that both place satisfaction and perceived vulnerability to environmental degradation suggests that there may be an optimal motivational window for stewardship: people need to connect a place with positive experiences, and have some recognition of a potential threat, but where the potential threat has not yet eroded the natural values of a place.
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... Recognizing that efficacy should be examined in the context of specific behaviors in specific situations (Maddux 1995), this study examined both collective efficacy and self-efficacy in the context of climate change mitigation behaviors. Research has shown that collective environmental efficacy is a predictor of pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., Chen 2015; Hamann and Reese 2020; Thaker et al. 2016), as is environmental self-efficacy (Abraham et al. 2015;Chen 2015;Doherty and Webler 2016;Hamann and Reese 2020;Huang 2016;Innocenti et al. 2023;Meinhold and Malkus 2005;Tabernero and Hernández 2011). Several authors have found that collective efficacy plays a more important role than selfefficacy in predicting pro-environmental behavior (Chen 2015;Homburg and Stolberg 2006). ...
Efficacy beliefs are important determinants of human behavior. In the context of social cognitive theory, the perception of collective efficacy is closely related to the individual perception of self-efficacy, which is influenced by socio-structural factors such as socioeconomic status (SES). Surprisingly, the relationship between these variables has received little attention in the literature on environmental issues. Within the framework of social cognitive theory, the aim of this study was to investigate whether SES has a direct effect on pro-environmental behavior and whether it has an indirect effect via perceptions of self-efficacy and collective efficacy, in relation to climate change mitigation behavior. An online cross-sectional study was conducted using a quota sample of 1075 participants (51.9% women) aged 18–79 years. Participants reported their SES using objective and subjective measures, perceptions of their own and collective efficacy in mitigating climate change, and the frequency of their pro-environmental behaviors. Structural equation modeling revealed that the model with serial mediation effects of self-efficacy and collective efficacy between SES (both objective and subjective) and pro-environmental behaviors showed a good model fit. As expected, both objective and subjective SES had no direct effect on pro-environmental behavior. Surprisingly, neither objective nor subjective SES had an indirect effect (via efficacy beliefs) on pro-environmental behavior. However, both self-efficacy and collective efficacy were associated with pro-environmental behavior. These findings have practical implications for the development of strategies aimed at enhancing pro-environmental behavior.
... Within the psychology literature, scholars typically differentiate between self-efficacy, or the belief that one can act, and response efficacy, or the belief that action will be effective in reaching a specified goal (Bandura, 1977;Witte, 1992). Studies examining the role of efficacy in climate action find that self-and response efficacy predict numerous behaviors to reduce climate change, including voting, contacting public officials, and protesting (see Doherty & Webler, 2016;van Valkengoed & Steg, 2019). As suggested by Patashnik & Weaver (2021), response efficacy in the form of the belief that a particular policy is likely to be successful may also be critical in ensuring policy durability. ...
The United States faces multiple political challenges to achieving the rapid cuts in carbon emissions called for by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Among these are the long-standing issue of partisan polarization and the newly emerging problem of climate doom and defeatism. These challenges are not only barriers to agenda-setting and enactment, but can also threaten the durability of policies over time. This study uses a survey experiment from a nationally representative sample (n = 1760) to examine the impact of partisan cues and fatalistic rhetoric on support for the climate provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act. We find that Republicans and Independents exposed to Democratic Party cues expressed less support for the IRA. We also find that Independents respondents exposed to a fatalistic message had reduced support for the IRA. These findings underscore the importance of framing in the post-enactment period and suggest that the IRA may be vulnerable to retrenchment or reversal.
... Having an advocate/activist in one's inner circle was most strongly related to the number of such actions scientists engage in, in line with research showing the importance of one's social network and similar other's actions (e.g., 91,92 ) in determining civic actions and lifestyle behaviours 93,94 . Those who are more informed on climate change and worried more about climate change also engaged in more climate actions, especially civic actions, confirming prior research on the importance of beliefs and emotions for climate engagement for engaging in climate action 95,96 . ...
Climate change is one of the biggest threats to humanity. Scientists are well-positioned to help address it beyond conducting academic research, yet little is known about their wider engagement with the topic. We investigate scientists’ engagement with climate change using quantitative and qualitative analyses of a large-scale survey (N = 9,220) across 115 countries, all fields, and all career stages. Many scientists already engage in individual lifestyle changes, but fewer engage in advocacy or activism. Based on our quantitative and qualitative results, we propose a two-step model of engagement to better understand why. Scientists must first overcome intellectual and practical barriers to be willing to engage, and then different barriers to actually engage. Based on this model, we provide concrete recommendations for increasing scientists’ engagement with climate change.
... Next to supporting a political initiative (akin to Study 1), we included protest behaviour and signing a petition to combat the climate change consequences as behavioural consequences. Finally, we included control variables that have been shown to reliably predict pro-environmental engagement, including political orientation, social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, belief in climate change, knowledge on climate change, perceived efficacy, and trust in the information source (e.g., Almassi, 2012;Doherty & Webler, 2016;Stanley & Wilson, 2019;Wong-Parodi & Berlin Rubin, 2022). ...
... In exploring the perceptions and policy support of individuals with high SES in a highincome country, we found that participants believed others in their social network engaged more in high-carbon behaviours than they themselves across all behavioural domains. Although we were unable to support previous research identifying the causal effect of descriptive norms on behaviour (Doherty & Webler, 2016;Sherman et al., 2021), we did find a notable correlation between descriptive norms and behaviour that mirrors the existing literature (Cialdini & Jacobson, 2021). In consideration of this relationship, our findings offer an insight into the societal context for which participants' perspectives are constructed and shaped. ...
Changing high-carbon lifestyles of individuals with high socioeconomic status (SES) is an important step toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions and ensuring social justice within climate mitigation. However, many high-carbon behaviours (such as frequent flying and car ownership) are also used to signal status within individuals’ social networks. Shifting consumption levels within high status individuals therefore may present a challenge, especially when individuals believe that engaging in high-carbon lifestyles is both normal and necessary. Here, we report the findings of a pre-registered online mixed-methods study in the UK (N = 511) that examined the associations of descriptive norms (i.e., perceptions of how often others engage in these behaviours) about high-carbon behaviours with policy support and with the likelihood to voluntarily reduce these behaviours for climate change mitigation. Contrary to our hypotheses, we found no meaningful association of descriptive norms with increased policy support, nor with decreased likelihood of voluntarily shifting behaviour. Participants showed high reluctance toward changing high-carbon behaviours through voluntary or policy action, but showed a slight preference for voluntary action that ran contrary to our initial predictions. This was mirrored within thematic analysis of our open-ended questions that revealed two main themes: (1) The desire for personal choice, which includes the option of not changing one’s behaviour, and (2) High-carbon lifestyles increase happiness. There was little awareness of the need to reduce personal greenhouse gas emissions to secure a liveable future. Overall, our findings show that individuals with high SES are unlikely to reduce lifestyle-related emissions, or support policy to this effect, when it requires them to make direct changes to high-carbon behaviours. To change high-carbon lifestyles of individuals with high SES, citizens should be supported in envisioning and creating pathways for sufficiency-focused lower-carbon lifestyles that can be desirable and fulfilling.
... Discussions about the climate may influence opinions and behaviors to become more salient, leading to descriptive norms that others are concerned about climate change and/or engaged in activities to address it. Evidence suggests that descriptive social norms are associated with climate change actions of voting, donating, volunteering, contacting government officials, and protesting [52]. Social norms may also impact why individuals refrain from climate change conversations. ...
Understanding everyday conversations about climate change may provide insights into framing the issue to promote climate change action. As part of a longitudinal online study in the US launched in June 2021, 805 respondents were asked if they had discussed climate change with a friend or family member in the prior month; if not, why not, and if yes, they were asked to delineate the conversation topic. Concurrent mixed methods were used to analyze the data. The majority (62.6%) of respondents reported not having a conversation about climate change in the prior month. Among those who indicated that they had discussed climate change, five themes were identified from the conversation topics, with many having reported discussing the impact of climate change on weather patterns. Very few discussed actions to address climate change, and most of these discussions focused on individual-level behaviors rather than collective actions. Among participants who had not recently discussed climate change, the most prevalent theme was that it was not a priority or an issue they cared about. Results suggest that conversations may not lead to collective actions and that policymakers and environmental organizations should provide guidance on effectively channeling climate change concerns into action.
... As expected, the results highlight the normative roles of public measures in heat protective behaviours during extremely hot weather. Although previous studies differ from our research scope, they have shown that social norms are a key driver of climate action (Doherty et al. 2016) and decisions about flood insurance (Lo, 2013). Public measures influence individuals' judgements of risk information and consequently elicit coping responses (Lo, 2013). ...
Individual actions can mitigate the consequences of extreme heat. Therefore, understanding the mechanism of protective behaviours against extreme heat is critical. Although extreme heat protective behaviours have been widely mentioned, the roles of psychological risk perception and public restraint are poorly understood. In this study, we developed a physical-measure-psychosocial model (PMP) to reveal the intrinsic motivation for protective behaviours during extreme heat based on a nationwide survey in China (n = 1791). The results showed that (1) high levels of physical risk perception promote outdoor, indoor, and traffic protective behaviours. Psychological risk perception is positively associated with outdoor and indoor protective behaviours but is not significantly associated with traffic protective behaviour. (2) There are differences in the main paths from heat exposure to outdoor, indoor, and traffic protective behaviours. The indirect effect controlled by physical risk is the main path from exposure to outdoor and traffic protective behaviours, while the direct effect of heat exposure is the strongest pathway for indoor protective behaviour. (3) Enhanced facility conditions are linked to reduced physical risk and psychological risk perception. Subsidies have a significant effect on traffic protective behaviour, and warnings significantly affect outdoor protective behaviour. The direct effect of warning systems on outdoor protective behaviour is greater than the indirect effect mediated by psychological risk perception. (4) Multigroup analysis based on structural equation models revealed a certain degree of robustness among the different gender, age, education level, and income level groups. This study enables us to understand the underlying mechanisms of extreme heat behaviours and support policy-makers in effective mitigation practices.
... Taking these factors into account, communicating the existence of scientific consensus should be done through media that is easily accessible and seen as largely reliable, as it is the case of radio and television 65 . As recent research has shown, if communicators using these media were to be able to show how individuals can contribute to solving the climate challenge, their messages may help drive public climate action (e.g., voting, donating, protesting) 66 . ...
The ability of climate skeptics to block climate action depends on prevailing beliefs among the public. Research in advanced democracies has shown skepticism about the existence, the causes, and the consequences of climate change to be associated with socio-demographic features and political ideology. Yet, little is known about climate-related beliefs elsewhere. We address this gap by mapping beliefs in climate change and their correlates in Latin America. We show skepticism over the existence and anthropogenic origins of climate change to be limited, but identify a high number of skeptics around the severity of its consequences. Furthermore, we show skepticism to be correlated with psychological rather than socio-political factors: individualistic worldviews in particular drive disbelief in the severe consequences of climate change, a worrying finding in contexts where social trust is low. These findings offer a starting point for better addressing the constraining effects of climate skepticism in the Global South.
... It is very important to measure public opinion about global warming, as these opinions can have considerable influence over policy-making decisions (Bromley-Trujillo & Poe, 2020) and shape public behavior (Doherty & Webler, 2016). A primary method employed by scholars and policymakers for measuring and assessing these opinions is through representative surveys (Berinsky, 2017). ...
Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated their potential in social science research by emulating human perceptions and behaviors, a concept referred to as algorithmic fidelity. This study assesses the algorithmic fidelity and bias of LLMs by utilizing two nationally representative climate change surveys. The LLMs were conditioned on demographics and/or psychological covariates to simulate survey responses. The findings indicate that LLMs can effectively capture presidential voting behaviors but encounter challenges in accurately representing global warming perspectives when relevant covariates are not included. GPT-4 exhibits improved performance when conditioned on both demographics and covariates. However, disparities emerge in LLM estimations of the views of certain groups, with LLMs tending to underestimate worry about global warming among Black Americans. While highlighting the potential of LLMs to aid social science research, these results underscore the importance of meticulous conditioning, model selection, survey question format, and bias assessment when employing LLMs for survey simulation. Further investigation into prompt engineering and algorithm auditing is essential to harness the power of LLMs while addressing their inherent limitations.
... 90 As recent research has shown, if communicators using these media were to be able to show how individuals can contribute to solving the climate challenge, their messages may help drive public climate action (e.g., voting, donating, protesting). 91 Last but not least, the current study is not without limitations. First, the cross-sectional nature of this analysis does not allow for the identification of causal relationships between variables, and there may be endogenous relationships that were not accounted for. ...
The ability of climate skeptics to block climate action depends on the set of beliefs about climate
change prevailing among the general public. In the Global North, research has shown that
people’s beliefs about the existence, the causes, and the consequences of climate change are
primarily associated with political orientation and ideology. However, little is known about
climate change beliefs in the wider world and its associated factors. To address this gap, we
provide a large-scale, systematic overview of climate change beliefs in Latin America and its
correlates. This study finds limited room for skepticism over the existence of climate change and
its anthropogenic origins, but identifies a high minority of skeptics around the severity of its
consequences. Furthermore, the study also finds that skepticism in this region is correlated with
psychological rather than political factors. Specifically, the study reveals that individualistic
worldviews are powerfully associated with disbelief in the severe consequences of climate
change, a worrying finding in a region featuring relatively low levels of social trust. By mapping
climate change beliefs and their correlates in Latin America, the study offers a starting point for
a more sophisticated debate on how to tackle the constraining effects of climate skepticism in the
Global South.
... It is also possible that different psychological processes might underlie connections between hope and different forms of climate engagement, potentially leading to hope promoting some forms of engagement more than others. For example, if hope is closely associated with personal efficacy (i.e., the perception that one can personally contribute to making a difference; Magaletta and Oliver, 1999;Feldman and Kubota, 2015), because personal efficacy is a robust predictor of climate action (Doherty and Webler, 2016;Geiger et al., 2017), but not necessarily policy support, hope might be more strongly associated with behaviors than with policy support. Conversely, if hope is more closely associated with societal efficacy (i.e., the perception that it is possible for society to address climate change), hope might be more strongly associated with policy support than behaviors. ...
Researchers are increasingly examining whether hope can motivate action on climate change, or conversely, whether it might demotivate such action. We present a meta-analysis (k = 46) of quantitative studies examining the relationships between measures and manipulations of hope with climate engagement. On average, measured hope was associated with greater climate engagement (r = 0.18); however, this effect differed based on the target of hope. Hope regarding the possibility of respondents taking action was particularly strongly associated with greater engagement (r = 0.40), while in contrast, hope grounded in climate change not being a problem was associated with less engagement (r = −0.40). Hope in response to climate change generally, and domain-general hope, were only weakly associated with greater engagement (rs = 0.13, 0.20). On average, hope manipulations fostered increased engagement, though the increase was small (Cohen’s d = 0.08). Subgroup analyses suggested two promising types of hope manipulations warranting future research: personal efficacy (k = 2, d = 0.18) and in-depth (k = 2, d = 0.49). In contrast, messages suggesting societal efficacy (i.e., providing a sense of possibility that climate change could be addressed) did not significantly or substantially boost (nor discourage) engagement (d = 0.05), and status quo-framed messages (i.e., messages highlighting that environmental conditions could stay the same if climate action is taken) had a marginally significant negative effect on engagement (d = −0.18). After excluding a single outlier, the extent to which manipulations increased hope were not correlated with increases in climate engagement, suggesting the possibility that hope might be incidental to the success of some manipulations rather than a necessary component for promoting engagement. Overall, our meta-analysis does not suggest that increasing hope decreases climate engagement, with the possible exceptions of denial hope and status quo framed messages. Conversely, however, results provide partial yet inconclusive evidence for the hypothesis that increasing hope increases climate engagement. Given the existing published literature, we argue that future researchers should consider study designs that align with theoretical perspectives on how hope promotes climate engagement (e.g., longitudinal designs) and also consider directly assessing populations of interest (e.g., climate activists).
... The benefit of the index is that, by pooling information across many measures, we produce a set of estimates that is more comprehensive than any single-policy measure would be. Our approach builds upon multi-disciplinary work using factor analysis and other dimension-reduction techniques to examine important concepts in governance [23][24][25][26] , public opinion [27][28][29][30][31][32] , individual and corporate behavior 33,34 , and ecology 35,36 that are relevant to climate change. Our modeling approach weights different policies according to the information each provides about the state's overall regime. ...
In the United States, state governments have been the locus of action for addressing climate change. However, the lack of a holistic measure of state climate policy has prevented a comprehensive assessment of state policies’ effectiveness. Here, we assemble information from 25 individual policies to develop an aggregate index of state climate policies from 2000-2020. The climate policy index highlights variation between states which is difficult to assess in single policy studies. Next, we examine the environmental and economic consequences of state climate policy. A standard-deviation increase in climate policy is associated with a 5% reduction in per-capita electricity-sector CO2 emissions and a 2% reduction in economy-wide CO2 emissions per capita. We do not find evidence that more stringent climate policy harms states’ economies. Our results make clear the benefits of state climate policy, while showing that current state efforts are unlikelyto meet the US goal under the Paris Climate Accord.
Scholars widely agree that to mobilize individuals to action, it is vital that interest groups persuade them of the efficacy of participation. Despite firmly establishing the relationship between efficacy and action, research tells us surprisingly little about what kind of messaging most effectively evokes feelings of efficacy. To address this gap in the literature, we conduct a pair of survey experiments, each with three manipulations. The experiments present messages by fictitious advocacy organizations that emphasize the individual (action by an individual can produce change), the identity group (action by a specific identity group can produce change), or the organization (action by our organization can political change). Each message is designed to increase self-efficacy, group efficacy, or organizational efficacy, respectively. We conduct a two-stage analysis to determine first whether each message is able to increase efficacy, and then whether those feelings translate to behavioral support of the campaign. We find that while motivational messages often increase the intent to support a campaign, they only induce behavioral change in limited contexts.
Recycling End-of-Use Medicines (REOUM) for reuse, which integrates circular economy principles, is a promising approach to reducing medicine wastage and improving access to medicines. This study presents an integrated theoretical model grounded in prominent theories, such as the Theory of Planned Behavior, Norm Activation Model, Value-Belief-Norm theory, and protection motivation theory, to explore the behavioral factors influencing End-of-Use Medicine (EOU-M) return intentions. The study investigates how antecedents like awareness of consequences, ascription of responsibility, social norms, and altruistic values affect EOU-M return intentions. In addition, the study examines the mediating effects of personal norms and attitudes, as well as the moderating effects of self-efficacy beliefs, response efficacy beliefs, and response cost. Perceptions concerning the behavioral intention to return EOU-M are recorded from urban residents (n = 238) using a structured questionnaire. A partial least square-structural equation modeling was used to analyze the variables’ linkages. Awareness of consequences and altruistic values were the most contributing antecedents of EOU-M return intention. Personal norms and attitudes were found to significantly mediate the effect of the antecedents on return intention. The findings suggest that policies enhancing awareness and promoting altruistic values can significantly boost REOUM efforts, contributing to sustainable medicine consumption practices.
Finding ways to encourage collective action in contexts where only a minority adopts the desired behavior is central to solving many of today’s global environmental problems. We study how correcting people’s beliefs about social norms and behavioral trends encourages collective action in a setting where the desired behavior is not yet prevalent. In a field experiment, we test whether low sign-up rates for a recycling program in urban Peru can be increased by providing information (1) that most people regard participation in the program as important, i.e., on the “injunctive norm”, (2) on an increasing recent trend in sign-up rates. We find that the effectiveness of the treatments depends on people’s prior beliefs: Correcting inaccurate beliefs increases sign-up decisions significantly among people who either substantially underestimate the injunctive norm or who underestimate the positive trend. As this sub-group of people is in the minority in our set-up, we do not observe statistically significant average treatment effects. We further find that the effects of the treatments increase in the level of underestimation. Our evidence demonstrates that belief updating can be used effectively to encourage collective action where it is weak as long as a meaningful number of people underestimates the relevant trends and norms.
Given the rising importance of sustainability in the marketplace, companies and consumers alike have recognised their responsibility. The study looks at green communication in the hospitality industry. Drawing on protection motivation theory and cognitive dissonance theory, the present study addresses how threat and efficacy influence message receivers’ pro-environmental attitude and intention. Cognitive dissonance and self-justification are found to significantly influence the formation of people’s pro-environmental intention. In addition, the results showed that the level of efficacy significantly increased people’s pro-environmental attitude and intention, whereas the effectiveness of threat was surprisingly not significant. Based on our empirical findings, we provide explanations and propose future research directions.
Die Klimakrise kann nicht gelöst werden, indem nur Einzelne ihr Verhalten ändern. Wir brauchen einen systemischen Wandel - einen Wandel im Kollektiv. Dieser beginnt mit engagierten Menschen: Personen, die Petitionen veröffentlichen, die eine Freiwilligengruppe organisieren oder zivilen Ungehorsam ausüben. Doch wie erhalten diese Menschen den Mut aufrecht, sich für einen sozial-ökologischen Wandel einzusetzen? Wie begeistern sie andere? Und wie entsteht daraus eine resiliente kollektive Bewegung?
Ausgehend von wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen aus der psychologischen Forschung wird praxisnah erklärt, wie Menschen zu Klimaprotest und Engagement motiviert werden und wie Klimagruppen widerstandsfähig, gesund und effektiv handeln können.
Climate change poses one of the most significant threats facing humanity, yet engagement in climate issues among American conservatives remains low. This study demonstrates the critical role moral foundations play in climate attitudes among conservatives. Analyzing survey data (n = 2188), we find that conservatives who score higher in compassion show greater belief in human-caused climate change, suggesting that appealing to shared humanity can persuade conservatives to accept the scientific consensus. However, ingroup loyalty is more pivotal for driving personal climate concern among conservatives. The more ingroup-focused, the less conservatives believe in climate change risk or worry about its impacts. These results highlight the nuanced interactions between morality and political orientation on climate views. The implications underscore the need to target specific moral foundations in climate messaging and policy to build conservative engagement. Appealing to compassion opens minds to climate concerns, but emphasizing impacts to local community rather than global effects is likely more effective for inspiring conservative action on climate change.
Der Klimawandel ist voll im Gange. Die Hitze macht uns allen zu schaffen. Sie macht gesunde Menschen krank, kranke Menschen kränker und fordert heute bereits tausende Hitzetote besonders bei den Ärmsten und Schwächsten unserer Gesellschaft. Spätestens jetzt sollte ein Staat seine Bürger schützen und Voraussetzungen dafür schaffen, dass sich Menschen überhaupt gesund und nachhaltig ernähren, bewegen und wohnen können. Die größte Herausforderung der Menschheit kann gleichzeitig auch ihre größte Chance werden, wenn der transformative Wandel gelingt und die Menschen daran teilhaben.
While the majority of adults across the United States report that they believe that global warming is happening, far fewer report discussing global warming (Howe et al., 2015, https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2583 ; Marlon et al., 2022, https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations‐data/ycom‐us/ ). One way to inspire further climate action and engagement is to increase individuals' capacity to confidently and effectively discuss climate change. Climate communication science highlights that such communication is most effective when it is anecdotal, narrative, tailored to the audience, and place‐based. To generate climate conversations and inspire action in a variety of communities, partners at the University of Minnesota Extension piloted a program to train community members from across the state of Minnesota in effective climate communication through a series of instructional workshops, coaching, and participant‐led communication activities. Following the training portion of the program, participants identified and hosted their own climate‐related communication activities in their communities. These “climate conversations” took place across Minnesota and included community events, dialogue with elected leaders, and conversations stimulated through literature, among other activities. In their communities, program participants sparked conversations, initiated long‐term climate action efforts, and improved their sense of efficacy in response to climate change. Participants also reported that they improved their climate conversation skills, increased their local climate knowledge, established a support network with fellow participants, had reduced anxiety around communicating, and increased their confidence in being able to communicate about climate change in their communities. This pilot program provides a framework for future cohort‐ and community‐based climate communication programs in the state and beyond.
This field experiment increased the frequency of curbside recycling among community residents using feedback interventions that targeted personal and social norms. My team of researchers observed curbside recycling behaviors of 605 residents of single-family dwellings for 17 weeks. Groups of contiguous houses were randomly assigned to 1 of 5 experimental conditions: plea, plea plus information, plea plus neighborhood feedback, plea plus individual household feedback, or the control condition. Interventions were implemented using door hangers delivered to each household over a 4-week period. Results showed significant increases from baseline in the frequency of participation and total amount of recycled material for the individual (i.e., personal norm) and the group feedback (i.e., descriptive norm) interventions. None of the interventions altered the amount of contamination observed. These findings are interpreted as consistent with recent research on personal and social norms and suggest a link between behavior change produced through norm activation and behavior change produced through feedback. Implications for research and public policy are discussed.
Presents an integrative theoretical framework to explain and to predict psychological changes achieved by different modes of treatment. This theory states that psychological procedures, whatever their form, alter the level and strength of self-efficacy. It is hypothesized that expectations of personal efficacy determine whether coping behavior will be initiated, how much effort will be expended, and how long it will be sustained in the face of obstacles and aversive experiences. Persistence in activities that are subjectively threatening but in fact relatively safe produces, through experiences of mastery, further enhancement of self-efficacy and corresponding reductions in defensive behavior. In the proposed model, expectations of personal efficacy are derived from 4 principal sources of information: performance accomplishments, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, and physiological states. Factors influencing the cognitive processing of efficacy information arise from enactive, vicarious, exhortative, and emotive sources. The differential power of diverse therapeutic procedures is analyzed in terms of the postulated cognitive mechanism of operation. Findings are reported from microanalyses of enactive, vicarious, and emotive modes of treatment that support the hypothesized relationship between perceived self-efficacy and behavioral changes. (21/2 p ref)
This report extends and updates an ongoing program of research analyzing Americans’
interpretations of and responses to climate change. The research segments the American public
into six audiences that range along a spectrum of concern and issue engagement from the
Alarmed, who are convinced of the reality and danger of climate change, and who are highly
supportive of personal and political actions to mitigate the threat, to the Dismissive, who are
equally convinced that climate change is not occurring and that no response should be made. The
Six Americas are not very different demographically, but are dramatically different in their beliefs
and actions, as well as their basic values and political orientations. The groups were first identified
in a nationally representative survey conducted in the fall of 2008, and were re-assessed in January
and June of 2010. The current report is the fourth in the series; in it we provide new insights into
the informational needs of the six groups, their understanding of the health impacts of global
warming, beliefs about current environmental impacts of global warming in the U.S., and support
for local adaptation and mitigation policies.
These results come from a nationally representative survey of 1,001 American adults, aged 18 and older. The
completion rate was 53 percent. The sample was weighted to correspond with US Census Bureau parameters
for the United States. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3 percent for the full sample, with 95 percent confidence. The survey was designed by Anthony Leiserowitz of Yale University, and Edward Maibach and Connie Roser-‐Renouf of George Mason University, and was conducted December 24 through January 3 by Knowledge Networks, using an online research panel of American adults.
In this national survey, we investigated four types of climate and energy-related behavior –
consumer, civic, household and transportation (energy use), and communication. This report
focuses on the first three types. Consumer behavior has become an important way Americans
express their values and concerns, leading to new products and services, creating and destroying
markets, and influencing the policies and actions of companies large and small. As citizens,
Americans also express their values and concerns to political and opinion leaders and government
officials, thereby influencing public policies and decision-making, from the local to global scales. In
this study, we also report key indicators of household and transportation energy use – how
Americans use energy at home and on the road. The final category of behavior – communication –
will be the sole focus of a subsequent report.
Climate change activism has been uncommon in the U.S., but a growing national movement is pressing for a political response. To assess the cognitive and affective precursors of climate activism, we hypothesize and test a two-stage information-processing model based on social cognitive theory. In stage 1, expectations about climate change outcomes and perceived collective efficacy to mitigate the threat are hypothesized to influence affective issue involvement and support for societal mitigation action. In stage 2, beliefs about the effectiveness of political activism, perceived barriers to activist behaviors and opinion leadership are hypothesized to influence intended and actual activism. To test these hypotheses, we fit a structural equation model using nationally representative data. The model explains 52 percent of the variance in a latent variable representing three forms of climate change activism: contacting elected representatives; supporting organizations working on the issue; and attending climate change rallies or meetings. The results suggest that efforts to increase citizen activism should promote specific beliefs about climate change, build perceptions that political activism can be effective, and encourage interpersonal communication on the issue.
This study joins a growing body of research that demonstrates the behavioral consequences of hostile media perceptions. Using survey data from a nationally representative U.S. sample, this study tests a moderated-mediation model examining the direct and indirect effects of hostile media perceptions on climate change activism. The model includes external political efficacy as a mediator and political ideology and internal political efficacy as moderators. The results show that hostile media perceptions have a direct association with climate activism that is conditioned by political ideology: Among liberals, hostile media perceptions promote activism, whereas among conservatives, they decrease activism. Hostile media perceptions also have a negative, indirect relationship with activism that is mediated through external political efficacy; however, this relationship is conditioned by both ideology and internal political efficacy. Specifically, the indirect effect manifests exclusively among conservatives and moderates who have low internal efficacy. Theoretical, normative, and practical implications are discussed.
This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the factors affecting U.S. public concern about the threat of climate change between January 2002 and December 2010. Utilizing Stimson’s method of constructing aggregate opinion measures, data from 74 separate surveys over a 9-year period are used to construct quarterly measures of public concern over global climate change. We examine five factors that should account for changes in levels of concern: 1) extreme weather events, 2) public access to accurate scientific information, 3) media coverage, 4) elite cues, and 5) movement/countermovement advocacy. A time-series analysis indicates that elite cues and structural economic factors have the largest effect on the level of public concern about climate change. While media coverage exerts an important influence, this coverage is itself largely a function of elite cues and economic factors. Weather extremes have no effect on aggregate public opinion. Promulgation of scientific information to the public on climate change has a minimal effect. The implication would seem to be that information-based science advocacy has had only a minor effect on public concern, while political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups is critical in influencing climate change concern.
In environmental literature it is argued that three different value orientations may be relevant for understanding environmental beliefs and intentions: egoistic, altruistic, and biospheric. Until now, the distinction between altruistic and biospheric value orientations has hardly been supported empirically. In this article, three studies are reported aimed to examine whether an egoistic, altruistic, and biospheric value orientation can indeed be distinguished empirically by using an adapted value instrument. Also, it is examined whether these value orientations are differently and uniquely related to general and specific beliefs and behavioral intention. Results provide support for the reliability and validity of the value instrument. All studies replicated the distinction into three value orientations, with sufficient internal consistency. Furthermore, when altruistic and biospheric goals conflict, they seem to provide a distinct basis for proenvironmental intentions. The value instrument could therefore be useful to better understand relationships between values, beliefs, and intentions related to environmentally significant behavior.
This study investigated environmental attitude as a mediator in the relationship between self-concept, environmental-self-efficacy and responsible environmental behaviour among residents of high-density areas in Ibadan metropolis. The sample consists of one thousand, three hundred and sixty participants that comprised five hundred and seventy six from Ibadan South East and seven hundred and eighty-four from Ibadan North East Local Government areas selected using a multi-stage sampling technique (purposive, proportional, and simple random). Data collection was through a self-reported questionnaire that measured demographic factors, selfconcept, environmental self-efficacy, environmental attitude and responsible environmental behaviour. Multiple regression statistical analysis is the technique of data analysis. Results indicate that self-concept, environmental self-efficacy, and environmental attitude jointly contribute 18% to variance in responsible environmental behaviour. Independently, self-concept (ß -0.16., t -4.82., p < .01) and environmental-selfefficacy (ß -0.11., t 3.08., p < .01) respectively contributed significantly to responsible environmental behaviour. Lastly, environmental attitude (ß -0.23., t -8.53., p < .01) significantly mediates the relationship between self-concept, environmental self-efficacy, and responsible environmental behaviour. Discussion focuses on the relevance of environmental attitude in the person-environment transactions. It was recommended that psychologists should design personally relevant environmental attitude change strategies to improve responsible environmental behaviour.
One of the first rules of effective communication is to ``know thy audience.'' People have different psychological, cultural and political reasons for acting - or not acting - to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and climate change educators can increase their impact by taking these differences into account. In this presentation we will describe six unique audience segments within the American public that each responds to the issue in its own distinct way, and we will discuss methods of engaging each. The six audiences were identified using a nationally representative survey of American adults conducted in the fall of 2008 (N=2,164). In two waves of online data collection, the public's climate change beliefs, attitudes, risk perceptions, values, policy preferences, conservation, and energy-efficiency behaviors were assessed. The data were subjected to latent class analysis, yielding six groups distinguishable on all the above dimensions. The Alarmed (18%) are fully convinced of the reality and seriousness of climate change and are already taking individual, consumer, and political action to address it. The Concerned (33%) - the largest of the Six Americas - are also convinced that global warming is happening and a serious problem, but have not yet engaged with the issue personally. Three other Americas - the Cautious (19%), the Disengaged (12%) and the Doubtful (11%) - represent different stages of understanding and acceptance of the problem, and none are actively involved. The final America - the Dismissive (7%) - are very sure it is not happening and are actively involved as opponents of a national effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Mitigating climate change will require a diversity of messages, messengers and methods that take into account these differences within the American public. The findings from this research can serve as guideposts for educators on the optimal choices for reaching and influencing target groups with varied informational needs, values and beliefs.
This field experiment increased the frequency of curbside recycling among community residents using feedback interventions that targeted personal and social norms. My team of researchers observed curbside recycling behaviors of 605 residents of single-family dwellings for 17 weeks. Groups of contiguous houses were randomly assigned to 1 of 5 experimental conditions: plea, plea plus information, plea plus neighborhood feedback, plea plus individual household feedback, or the control condition. Interventions were implemented using door hangers delivered to each household over a 4-week period. Results showed significant increases from baseline in the frequency of participation and total amount of recycled material for the individual (i.e., personal norm) and the group feedback (i.e., descriptive norm) interventions. None of the interventions altered the amount of contamination observed. These findings are interpreted as consistent with recent research on personal and social norms and suggest a link between behavior change produced through norm activation and behavior change produced through feedback. Implications for research and public policy are discussed.
We propose two models to explain why individuals participate in collective political action--a personal influence model and a collective rationality model. Each model overcomes the free-rider problem posed by conventional rational choice theory and left unresolved in previous research. The models are tested for legal and illegal protest behaviors, using data from a national sample and two samples of protest-prone communities in the Federal Republic of Germany. The personal influence model is supported for both forms of participation, while the collective rationality model is supported for legal protest. We discuss implications of the results for grievance and rational choice theories of collective political action.
In this article, we review concepts, measures, and strategies that can be applied to opinion-leader campaigns on climate change. These campaigns can be used to catalyze wider political engagement on the issue and to promote sustainable consumer choices and behaviors. From past research, we outline six relevant categories of self-designated opinion-leaders, detailing issues related to identification, recruitment, training, message development, and coordination. We additionally analyze as prominent initiatives Al Gore's The Climate Project and his more recent We campaign, which combines the recruitment of digital opinion-leaders with traditional media strategies. In evaluating digital opinion-leader campaigns, we conclude that there are likely to be significant trade-offs in comparison to face-to-face initiatives. The challenge for both scholars and practitioners is to understand under what conditions are digital opinion-leaders effective and in which ways can online interactions strengthen or build on real-world connections.
The growth and integration of social science research on climate change will be facilitated by careful, consistent measurement of its central constructs. In this pa-per, the relevant psycho-social literature is reviewed, with an eye toward enhanc-ing the quality of measurement. We find that risk perception, a focus of much climate change research, has multiple dimensions that may drive behavior in dif-ferent ways. Values and norms have been assessed by several indices that overlap conceptually, and study findings could be integrated if these overlaps were clari-fied and tested. Climate change knowledge has numerous components, only some of may be essential in the formation of risk perceptions and behavior. Effi-cacy has received little attention by survey researchers, but promises to help ex-plain behaviors and policy preferences. Climate-relevant behaviors are highly complex variables that will require further explication before we fully understand how they may best be measured. Policy preferences have been asked in terms of trade-offs between action and economic impacts, or in terms of specific regula-tions or tax incentives.
Climate communication approaches expend significant resources promoting attitudinal change, but research suggests that encouraging attitudinal change alone is unlikely to be effective. The link between an individual's attitudes and subsequent behavior is mediated by other influences, such as social norms and the “free-rider” effect. One way to engender mitigative behaviors would be to introduce regulation that forces green behavior, but government fears a resulting loss of precious political capital. Conversely, communication approaches that advocate individual, voluntary action ignore the social and structural impediments to behavior change. The authors argue that there are two crucial, but distinct, roles that communication could play in engaging the public in low carbon lifestyles: first, to facilitate public acceptance of regulation and second, to stimulate grass-roots action through affective and rational engagement with climate change. The authors also argue that using communication to stimulate demand for regulation may reconcile these “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches.
Past research has generated mixed support among social scientists for the utility of social norms in accounting for human behavior. We argue that norms do have a substantial impact on human action; however, the impact can only be properly recognized when researchers (a) separate 2 types of norms that at times act antagonistically in a situation—injunctive norms (what most others approve or disapprove) and descriptive norms (what most others do)—and (b) focus Ss' attention principally on the type of norm being studied. In 5 natural settings, focusing Ss on either the descriptive norms or the injunctive norms regarding littering caused the Ss' littering decisions to change only in accord with the dictates of the then more salient type of norm. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
In this paper, we contrast the value-belief-norm (VBN) model and the theory of planned behavior (TPB) for the first time regarding their ability to explain conservation behavior. The participants represent a convenience sample of 468 university students. Using survey data and adopting previously established compound measures, structural equation analyses revealed a remarkable explanatory power for both theories: TPB's intention accounted for 95% of people's conservation behavior and VBN's personal norms accounted for 64%. Compared to the VBN model, the TPB covered its concepts more fully in terms of proportions of explained variance. More importantly, the fit statistics revealed that only the TPB depicts the relations among its concepts appropriately, whereas the VBN model does not.
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This paper expands the relevance of the collective interest model of mass political action to explain collective-action behavior
in the context of global warming and climate change. The analysis is an attempt to answer Ostrom’s call for a behavioral model
of collective action that can be generalized beyond political protest to other collective-action problems. We elaborate, specify,
and empirically test a collective interest model approach to citizen policy support, environmental political participation,
and environmental behavior related to the issue of global warming. Key elements of the collective interest model—perceived
risk, personal efficacy, and environmental values—are found to be directly, and positively, related to support of government
policies and personal behaviors that affect global warming. We also discuss the links between the collective interest model
and other important approaches to political behavior.
This paper first reviews the various measurement model options for linking latent variables to indicators that are available to human resource management (HRM) researchers. A special emphasis is placed on the option of parcels, created by combining subsets of items to form indicators. Next, a review is presented of 27 articles from the major HRM journals that have used parcels, with a focus on conceptual/theoretical and empirical issues. Recommendations for HRM researchers for improved use of parcels are also provided.
The effects of fear appeals on persuasion were investigated in a factorial experiment that was designed to test a combined model of protection motivation theory and self-efficacy theory. As predicted, the probability of a threat's occurrence and the effectiveness of a coping response both had positive main effects on intentions to adopt a recommended preventive health behavior. More importantly, the findings provided support for self-efficacy expectancy as a fourth component of protection motivation theory: Self-efficacy had a direct influence on intentions and interacted with two other variables of protection motivation theory. The interaction effect was interpreted in terms of two new decision-making strategies that people use when confronted with a fear appeal: a precaution strategy and a hyperdefensiveness strategy. In addition, the results replicated previous findings on the relationship between self-efficacy expectancy and outcome expectancy. A model incorporating protection motivation theory and self-efficacy theory is presented as a possible general model of attitude change.
Achieving national reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will require public support for climate and energy policies and changes in population behaviors. Audience segmentation--a process of identifying coherent groups within a population--can be used to improve the effectiveness of public engagement campaigns.
In Fall 2008, we conducted a nationally representative survey of American adults (n = 2,164) to identify audience segments for global warming public engagement campaigns. By subjecting multiple measures of global warming beliefs, behaviors, policy preferences, and issue engagement to latent class analysis, we identified six distinct segments ranging in size from 7 to 33% of the population. These six segments formed a continuum, from a segment of people who were highly worried, involved and supportive of policy responses (18%), to a segment of people who were completely unconcerned and strongly opposed to policy responses (7%). Three of the segments (totaling 70%) were to varying degrees concerned about global warming and supportive of policy responses, two (totaling 18%) were unsupportive, and one was largely disengaged (12%), having paid little attention to the issue. Certain behaviors and policy preferences varied greatly across these audiences, while others did not. Using discriminant analysis, we subsequently developed 36-item and 15-item instruments that can be used to categorize respondents with 91% and 84% accuracy, respectively.
In late 2008, Americans supported a broad range of policies and personal actions to reduce global warming, although there was wide variation among the six identified audiences. To enhance the impact of campaigns, government agencies, non-profit organizations, and businesses seeking to engage the public can selectively target one or more of these audiences rather than address an undifferentiated general population. Our screening instruments are available to assist in that process.
Most climate change policy attention has been addressed to long-term options, such as inducing new, low-carbon energy technologies and creating cap-and-trade regimes for emissions. We use a behavioral approach to examine the reasonably achievable potential for near-term reductions by altered adoption and use of available technologies in US homes and nonbusiness travel. We estimate the plasticity of 17 household action types in 5 behaviorally distinct categories by use of data on the most effective documented interventions that do not involve new regulatory measures. These interventions vary by type of action and typically combine several policy tools and strong social marketing. National implementation could save an estimated 123 million metric tons of carbon per year in year 10, which is 20% of household direct emissions or 7.4% of US national emissions, with little or no reduction in household well-being. The potential of household action deserves increased policy attention. Future analyses of this potential should incorporate behavioral as well as economic and engineering elements.
Community gardens are viewed as a potentially useful environmental change strategy to promote active and healthy lifestyles but the scientific evidence base for gardens is limited. As a step towards understanding whether gardens are a viable health promotion strategy for local communities, we set out to examine the social processes that might explain the connection between gardens, garden participation and health. We analyzed data from semi-structured interviews with community gardeners in Denver. The analysis examined social processes described by community gardeners and how those social processes were cultivated by or supportive of activities in community gardens. After presenting results describing these social processes and the activities supporting them, we discuss the potential for the place-based social processes found in community gardens to support collective efficacy, a powerful mechanism for enhancing the role of gardens in promoting health.
Praise for the First Edition of Statistical Analysis with Missing Data “An important contribution to the applied statistics literature.... I give the book high marks for unifying and making accessible much of the past and current work in this important area.”—William E. Strawderman, Rutgers University “This book...provide[s] interesting real-life examples, stimulating end-of-chapter exercises, and up-to-date references. It should be on every applied statistician’s bookshelf.”—The Statistician “The book should be studied in the statistical methods department in every statistical agency.”—Journal of Official Statistics Statistical analysis of data sets with missing values is a pervasive problem for which standard methods are of limited value. The first edition of Statistical Analysis with Missing Data has been a standard reference on missing-data methods. Now, reflecting extensive developments in Bayesian methods for simulating posterior distributions, this Second Edition by two acknowledged experts on the subject offers a thoroughly up-to-date, reorganized survey of current methodology for handling missing-data problems. Blending theory and application, authors Roderick Little and Donald Rubin review historical approaches to the subject and describe rigorous yet simple methods for multivariate analysis with missing values. They then provide a coherent theory for analysis of problems based on likelihoods derived from statistical models for the data and the missing-data mechanism and apply the theory to a wide range of important missing-data problems. The new edition now enlarges its coverage to include: Expanded coverage of Bayesian methodology, both theoretical and computational, and of multiple imputation Analysis of data with missing values where inferences are based on likelihoods derived from formal statistical models for the data-generating and missing-data mechanisms Applications of the approach in a variety of contexts including regression, factor analysis, contingency table analysis, time series, and sample survey inference Extensive references, examples, and exercises Amstat News asked three review editors to rate their top five favorite books in the September 2003 issue. Statistical Analysis With Missing Data was among those chosen.
We present a theory of the basis of support for a social movement. Three types of support (citizenship actions, policy support and acceptance, and personal-sphere behaviors that accord with movement principles) are empirically distinct from each other and from committed activism. Drawing on theoretical work on values and norm-activation processes, we propose a value-belief-norm (VBN) theory of movement support. Individuals who accept a movement's basic values, believe that valued objects are threatened, and believe that their actions can help restore those values experience an obligation (personal norm) for pro-movement action that creates a predisposition to provide support; the particular type of support that results is dependent on the individual's capabilities and constraints. Data from a national survey of 420 respondents suggest that the VBN theory, when compared with other prevalent theories, offers the best available account of support for the environmental movement.
Citation Classic Commentary:Bandura A. Exercise of control through self-belief . Current Contents 20, p.14, May 15 1989
Conceptual and methodological ambiguities surrounding the concept of perceived behavioral
control are clarified. It is shown that perceived control over performance of a behavior,
though comprised of separable components that reflect beliefs about self-efficacy and
about controllability, can nevertheless be considered a unitary latent variable in a hierarchical
factor model. It is further argued that there is no necessary correspondence between
self-efficacy and internal control factors, or between controllability and external control
factors. Self-efficacy and controllability can reflect internal as well as external factors and
the extent to which they reflect one or the other is an empirical question. Finally, a case is
made that measures of perceived behavioral control need to incorporate self-efficacy as
well as controllability items that are carefully selected to ensure high internal consistency.
Using data from the 2000 National/Annenberg Election Survey, this study looks at the relationships between Internet access and online exposure to information about the presidential campaign and political efficacy, knowledge, and participation. Results show that Internet access and online exposure to information about the presidential campaign are significantly associated with these important political variables. Several of the associations between Internet access and exposure with political efficacy, knowledge, and participation are detectable even when taking sociodemographic variables, party identification, partisan strength, political interest, and other media exposures variables into account. Although statistically significant, these associations are quite small.
The authors present a brief inventory derived from Schwartz's 56-item instrument measuring the structure and content of human values. The inventory's four 3-item scales, measuring the major clusters called Self-Transcendence, Self-Enhancement, Openness to Change, and Conservation (or Traditional) values, all produce scores with acceptable reliability in two studies of pro-environmental attitudes and actions, and the brief inventory predicts those indicators nearly as well as much longer ones. The authors also present subscales of biospheric and altruistic values that can be used to assess whether Self-Transcendence values are differentiated in this way in special samples such as environmental activists. The brief inventory is suitable for use in survey research and other settings in which the longer instrument might be impractical.