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The Potential Implications of a Brexit for Future EU Agri-food Policies
Abstract
This article examines the implications of a possible Brexit for the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and agri-food sector. Five potential ways in which these implications might be felt are discussed: (1) implications for the future orientation of the CAP in the absence of the UK; (2) implications for the EU budget and the share devoted to the CAP; (3) implications for the future regulatory environment for EU farm and food businesses; (4) implications for agricultural research; and (5) implications for future EU trade and trade relationships. Because the UK is a net contributor to the EU budget, a net importer of agri-food products from the EU, and punches above its weight in research terms, its withdrawal would have broadly negative effects for the EU farm and food sector. Whether the absence of the UK’s voice in the Council of Ministers when discussing future agricultural, trade and regulatory policies would be counted as positive or negative depends on one’s policy preferences in these areas. For those advocating a market-oriented agricultural policy and a regulatory regime strongly anchored in science its withdrawal would be a loss.
... En 2015 los subsidios agrícolas de la PAC al RU alcanzaron unos USD 3.500 millones (Reuters 2017) equivalentes a unos £ 300 por hectárea por año (Mathews 2016). Se destaca la gran importancia para algunas regiones como Gales e Irlanda del Norte, para las cuales la eliminación de estos subsidios implicaría pasar de ingresos netos agrícolas positivos a negativos (Swinbank 2016). ...
... 31 Los subsidios de la PAC representan el 40% del presupuesto de la UE http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/common--agricultural--policy . 32 El bache fiscal que representa el Brexit para el presupuesto de la UE seria aportado principalmente por Alemania, Austria y Holanda (Mathews 2016 mantengan los subsidios se encuentran los poderosos lobbies agrícolas asociados a "The Tenants Farmers Association" y el "National Farmers Union" que reclama con fuerza que el gobierno del RU "…guarantees that the support given to our farmers is on a par with that given to farmers in the EU who will still be our principal competitors" (Mathews 2016) 33 . ...
... 31 Los subsidios de la PAC representan el 40% del presupuesto de la UE http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/common--agricultural--policy . 32 El bache fiscal que representa el Brexit para el presupuesto de la UE seria aportado principalmente por Alemania, Austria y Holanda (Mathews 2016 mantengan los subsidios se encuentran los poderosos lobbies agrícolas asociados a "The Tenants Farmers Association" y el "National Farmers Union" que reclama con fuerza que el gobierno del RU "…guarantees that the support given to our farmers is on a par with that given to farmers in the EU who will still be our principal competitors" (Mathews 2016) 33 . ...
Este trabajo presenta discusiones sobre los siguientes temas relacionados al impacto del Brexit sobre las exportaciones agroindustriales de Argentina. La sección II ofrece una revisión de varios trabajos que han cuantificado los efectos macroeconómicos del Brexit sobre el RU. La sección III discute las metodologías con las que se han pronosticado los impactos agregados que podría tener un hard Brexit sobre el comercio exterior del RU. La sección IV describe las principales tendencias del comercio entre la Argentina y el RU mientras que la sección V estima a nivel de capítulo del sistema armonizado (SA), los impactos de un hard brexit sobre la estructura del comercio. La sección VI hace lo mismo para una muestra de 10 productos agroindustriales de interés exportador para Argentina. Finalmente, la sección VII analiza otros temas de interés incluyendo: i) los requisitos multilaterales para lograr un ALC y sus posibles impactos agregados; ii) el futuro de los actuales subsidios agrícolas que actualmente son financiados por la política agrícola común (PAC).
Estimamos que un hard Brexit reducirá el comercio bilateral de productos agroindustriales en un 50% lo que abrirá oportunidades de exportación para terceros países en la UE pero principalmente, en el Reino Unido. Concluimos sugiriendo líneas de política económica para la Argentina.
... Yet, at a time when ambitious action is required to steer the CAP on a new course, the ability of the EU to take decisive steps towards this end has been stifled by a number of converging political developments in recent years. For instance, the decision by the UK to leave the EU following a 2016 referendum has since overshadowed most other political issues and resulted in a major financial shortfall that makes increased funding for environmental measures unlikely to be prioritized during the 2021-2027 budgetary period (Matthews 2016). Along with growing EU-skepticism and nationalism in other MSs, it would appear that the EU's ability to take bold and transformative action to address the ecological pressures stemming from agricultural, has consequently been limited by the risk of further alienating citizens and public opinion. ...
... Despite initial claims by the EU Commission regarding the potential for these measures to improve the environmental dividends of the CAP, implementation appears to have fallen short in a number of ways (Matthews 2013). For instance, implementation of the greening measures has been significantly restricted by exceptions to the general rules and minimum standards that were originally intended to have the broadest possible application (Hart and Menadue 2013). ...
... First, it should be noted that all aspects of EU decision-making and governance have been affected by the decision of the UK to leave the EU, following a 2016 referendum. The CAP is no exception and stands to be impacted more than other policies as it loses funding from the UK, which has long been a net-contributor to the CAP budget (Matthews 2016). Consequently, the economic uncertainty brought about by the so called 'Brexit' is not likely to stimulate the EU's willingness to commit to major spending obligations in the near term. ...
Sustaining ecological integrity is recognized worldwide as a strategic objective (e.g. the 2015 Paris Agreement), but a general consensus on the overall methodology for assessing ecological integrity is still missing. This chapter presents a contribution to the method of ecological integrity evaluation, using simple and theoretically grounded method to calculate three holistic indicators: exergy capture, biotic water flows and abiotic heterogeneity, utilizing open access remote sensing data (Sentinel-2 and Landsat 8). Three variables are proposed as a representation of the respective indicators: NDVI (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index), brightness temperature (BT) and vegetation surface heterogeneity (HG). Forests and wetlands have obtained higher results in the selected integrity indicators, while arable lands and urban areas relatively lower. The relative distance between the potential peak and the lowest performance in a landscape context is obtained by calculating a composite Regional Index of Ecological Integrity (RIEI [%]). The proposed approach can be used for various purposes including localization of naturally valuable areas, estimation of ecosystem condition or performance of ecosystem management.
... Yet, at a time when ambitious action is required to steer the CAP on a new course, the ability of the EU to take decisive steps towards this end has been stifled by a number of converging political developments in recent years. For instance, the decision by the UK to leave the EU following a 2016 referendum has since overshadowed most other political issues and resulted in a major financial shortfall that makes increased funding for environmental measures unlikely to be prioritized during the 2021-2027 budgetary period (Matthews 2016). Along with growing EU-skepticism and nationalism in other MSs, it would appear that the EU's ability to take bold and transformative action to address the ecological pressures stemming from agricultural, has consequently been limited by the risk of further alienating citizens and public opinion. ...
... Despite initial claims by the EU Commission regarding the potential for these measures to improve the environmental dividends of the CAP, implementation appears to have fallen short in a number of ways (Matthews 2013). For instance, implementation of the greening measures has been significantly restricted by exceptions to the general rules and minimum standards that were originally intended to have the broadest possible application (Hart and Menadue 2013). ...
... First, it should be noted that all aspects of EU decision-making and governance have been affected by the decision of the UK to leave the EU, following a 2016 referendum. The CAP is no exception and stands to be impacted more than other policies as it loses funding from the UK, which has long been a net-contributor to the CAP budget (Matthews 2016). Consequently, the economic uncertainty brought about by the so called 'Brexit' is not likely to stimulate the EU's willingness to commit to major spending obligations in the near term. ...
... The main objectives of the EU were centered on promoting common and unified market where member states could transact at fair and equitable rates, the strength of the EU to uphold its thematic goals is strengthened by her membership [96]. The United Kingdom's decision to exit the EU has brought numerous changes and has made the future uncertain for both the UK and the EU on Green energy and sustainability on many fronts. ...
... The UK is one of the nations that contribute a greater percentage of the EU budget, compared to other EU economies, the costs it incurs and the benefits it derives from EU common resources [96]. The amount of money the UK received from the EU budget in 2016 was 7 billion euros, whereas the country's contribution in the same year was 13.46 billion euros [50]. ...
... In fact, the CAP was a particular object of criticism from the United Kingdom [55,59], which proposed 50% cuts in this policy [59]. Matthews (2016) [60] noted that the United Kingdom was not only a net contributor, but also a net importer of agri-food products from the EU. Hubbard et al. (2018) [61] stated that the British agri-food sector will be severely affected by Brexit because it is just subsidized and regulated under the CAP and it is also dependent on migrant labor. ...
... In fact, the CAP was a particular object of criticism from the United Kingdom [55,59], which proposed 50% cuts in this policy [59]. Matthews (2016) [60] noted that the United Kingdom was not only a net contributor, but also a net importer of agri-food products from the EU. Hubbard et al. (2018) [61] stated that the British agri-food sector will be severely affected by Brexit because it is just subsidized and regulated under the CAP and it is also dependent on migrant labor. ...
About three-quarters of food exports from European Union (EU) countries goes to the common market in which the free movement of products is ensured. Therefore, it is important to examine from which EU countries the food is exported, what food products they are, and what hazards may be present in these products. The data for research were obtained for 1999–2018 from the Eurostat database (according to the Standard International Trade Classification—SITC) and the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) database. Then, cluster analysis was performed using joining (tree clustering) and two-way joining methods. The main food exporters were the following countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. They exported: cereals, fruits and vegetables, beverages and feeding stuff (in quantitative terms) and fruits and vegetables, meat, dairy products, and cereals (in terms of value). In turn, the most frequently notified hazards in food originating from these countries were: pathogenic micro-organisms, microbial contaminants, metals, composition, foreign bodies, allergens, and pesticide residues. The increase in the number of alert notifications in the RASFF is particularly noticeable in recent years. The results of the research may be useful for activities related to food traceability, changes in the European law, and encouraging the use of extensive methods in agriculture.
... The second theme is farm regulations. The EU has long been critiqued for overly burdensome regulation and form filling. Campaigners in favour of Brexit argued that once outside the EU the UK could relax its farming rules, increase access to new technologies and avoid the ban on key agrochemicals (Matthews, 2016). Counter to this, there is concern among environmental groups about how environmental legislation affecting agriculture will apply once Brexit happens (as much of the legislation was brought into UK law as secondary legislation under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972) (Grant, 2016). ...
... The consensus is that it is unlikely that any future UK-EU trade agreement will be as profitable as the current arrangement (i.e. membership of the EU) (Matthews, 2016). If a trade agreement is reached between the EU and the UK trade costs are still likely to rise, even if the reintroduction of tariffs on agri-food trade is avoided. ...
... Swinbank (2016) carried out an analysis of the assumptions and possible alternatives for GB agricultural policy and the EU Common Agricultural Policy. Matthews (2016) also carried out studies on the impact of Brexit on future EU agricultural and food policies, and in particular on the future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), including the impact on the EU budget, as well as regulations in the scope of CAP environment, regulations of the EU agri-food business, indications for trade and trade relations (Matthews, 2016). Brexit and the level of direct charges to British farmers, in the context of changes in the EU-GB regulatory regime (under the conditions of the free trade area or basing the trade on the most-favoured-nation clause) were investigated by Jongeneel, Van Berkun & Vrolijk (2016). ...
... Swinbank (2016) carried out an analysis of the assumptions and possible alternatives for GB agricultural policy and the EU Common Agricultural Policy. Matthews (2016) also carried out studies on the impact of Brexit on future EU agricultural and food policies, and in particular on the future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), including the impact on the EU budget, as well as regulations in the scope of CAP environment, regulations of the EU agri-food business, indications for trade and trade relations (Matthews, 2016). Brexit and the level of direct charges to British farmers, in the context of changes in the EU-GB regulatory regime (under the conditions of the free trade area or basing the trade on the most-favoured-nation clause) were investigated by Jongeneel, Van Berkun & Vrolijk (2016). ...
Competition, competing and competitiveness are manifested both when the business operates on the domestic market and on the international market, while international competitiveness may also manifest itself vis-à-vis domes-tic firms that are forced to compete on the local market with foreign competi-tors, or even global players. This is determined. Both competition and com-petitiveness can be considered not only at different levels, but also due to different analytical criteria. Actors involved in this competition are business-es, transnational corporations, industries, local governments and regions, as well as states or economies. Most often, there are three analytical levels – macro, meso and micro levels. The notion of competitiveness may refer ei-ther to the assessment of the national or global economy (competitiveness of the economy, macroeconomic competitiveness), but it can also refer to the firm (competitiveness of the business, microeconomic competitiveness), as well as to the industry (competitiveness of the industry, international mesoeconomic competitiveness).
It is very crucial that the possibilities, which are created for Central and Eastern European (CEE) as well as South and East European (SEE) econo-mies and businesses by the process of political and economic integration in the frame of the European Union (EU), became fully used. The Europeanisa-tion processes include a wide range of behaviours from simple foreign trade transactions to undertaking independent productive activities in a host coun-try. The Europeanisation processes resulted from the introduction of the Sin-gle European Market (SEM), which guarantees equal rights for all businesses (including small and medium-sized enterprises) in all Member States of the European Union (that means mostly the annulment of national protection-ism). The European market became “local” market offering national entre-preneurs new chances and possibilities. This helps economies and businesses to grow and to be competitive.
On one hand, no doubt there is obviously a regional specifics of interna-tional trade and especially of international business and in widely recognized Central Europe including both CEE and SEE countries. On the other hand, there is a theoretical and empirical gap in the literature, thus this monographic book is a kind of the answer trying to fulfil this niche.
This monograph presents current research findings of various authors from different parts of the world making a hopefully valuable polyphonic contribution to the puzzle of international competitiveness and trade from the growth perspective in Europe, mainly the European Union.
The book consists of 11 chapters written by 14 various scholars coming from 3 different countries (Poland, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina).
... During the agglomeration each object is represented by a group of various variables which describe features of the objects, as writes e. g. Řezanková, Húsek, Snášel 21 . In our work the indicators of external imbalances (which are defined in Alert Mechanism Report 2017 and others) are such variables. ...
The aim of the article was to evaluate the synchronization of the external macroeconomic imbalances in the United Kingdom with the EU countries before its withdrawal from the EU. The cluster analysis and five indicators of external macroeconomic imbalances were used for the evaluation. Only in 2007 did the United Kingdom show a relatively high degree of synchronization. In 2010, 2014 and 2017, the United Kingdom was always evaluated as a separate cluster, when it could not be put together with any other EU country based on the values of the indicators, and therefore no mutual similarity was found. The results prove a different development of the indicators in the United Kingdom in the long term in comparison with their development in other EU member states.
... Por ejemplo, en un escenario práctico, algunas empresas pueden abandonar las relaciones y el intercambio mercantil con el Reino Unido, tal es el caso de las empresas del sector pesquero (Garza & Amigo, 2019). También se suman algunas afectaciones o riesgos en sectores específicos de la economía: el turismo (Castellote, 2017), el precio del petróleo (Silveiro, 2017), la cadena de suministro de las empresas (Castillo, 2017a), sector agrícola y seguridad alimentaria (Matthews, 2016), energía (Pollitt, 2017), entre otros. ...
El objetivo de este artículo de investigación es analizar las implicaciones económicas y geopolíticas del Brexit para la Unión Europea y Gran Bretaña. Corresponde a una investigación cualitativa con alcance descriptivo, enmarcada en el paradigma interpretativo. Se consultaron fuentes documentales para el logro de los objetivos, y la información recolectada fue sometida a un proceso de codificación y categorización a través del software Atlas Ti. Los resultados del análisis permiten exponer los hallazgos en dos apartados: 1) las causas y el proceso del Brexit, haciendo especial alusión a las razones políticas y a los resultados del voto del 2016; 2) los impactos del Brexit de acuerdo con el análisis de la literatura, los cuales se codifican y categorizan para una mejor comprensión del fenómeno. Aunque existe una importante literatura sobre los múltiples y variados efectos del Brexit, solo en los próximos años se podrán reconocer las implicaciones de este fenómeno para los grupos de interés.
... Because the UK is a net contributor to the EU budget, a net importer of agri-food products from the EU, and punches above its weight in research terms, its withdrawal would have broadly negative effects for the EU farm and food sector. [147] As farmers rely on a substantial proportion of income from the CAP, any reduction may have a detrimental impact on farm animal welfare in the EU. In his presentation to the European Parliament the Political Adviser to the NGO EuroGroup for Animals Jo Moran has claimed that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU may over time have a significant impact on animal protection as a result of a reduced CAP budget [97]. ...
The British people voted in a 2016 referendum to leave the European Union (EU). Brexit presents both threats and opportunities to animal protection in the United Kingdom (UK), EU and internationally. This paper discusses threats to animal protection in terms of five criteria. These are first, political context; second, regulatory changes; third, economic and trade factors; fourth, institutional and capacity-related factors; and fifth, EU and international considerations. The EU has the most progressive animal welfare laws in the world. The Conservative Government delivering Brexit has a mixed record on animal protection. Major time and resource constraints inherent in Brexit risk negatively impacting animal protection. Brexit is projected to have a negative economic impact, which is generally associated with lower animal welfare standards. The development of Brexit policy suggests there to be a substantial risk that the major threat of importing lower welfare products to the UK will materialise. Brexit will reduce the political influence of the progressive animal protection lobby in the EU. Post-Brexit, the politically and economically weakened EU and UK risks a detrimental impact on animal protection on an international scale. Brexit poses substantial threats to animal protection, with a high risk that many threats will materialise. Further research is needed to assess the opportunities presented by Brexit to judge whether Brexit will be overall positive or negative for animal protection.
... It should be noted that since these interviews were conducted, the UK has left the European Union, and as of 31 January 2020 is no longer an EU member (though partnership negotiations are ongoing) [84]. The Brexit debate has heightened concerns about EU cohesion, which could have wider implications for European food systems in the future [85]. The current pandemic has also thrown into sharp relief many of the concerns about EU cohesion and integration [86], though the implications are yet to be fully understood as the pandemic is still underway [87]. ...
Transitioning agri-food systems towards increased sustainability and resilience requires that attention be paid to sustainable food consumption policies. Policy-making processes often require the engagement and acceptance of key stakeholders. This study analyses stakeholders' solutions for creating sustainable agri-food systems, through interviews with a broad range of stakeholders including food value chain actors, non-governmental organizations, governmental institutions, research institutions and academic experts. The study draws on 38 in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted in four European countries: France, Iceland, Italy and the UK, as well as three interviews with high-level EU experts. The interviewees' solutions were analysed according to a five-category typology of policy tools, encompassing direct activity regulations, and market-based, knowledge-based, governance and strategic policy tools. Most of the identified solutions were located in the strategic tools category, reflecting shared recognition of the need to integrate food policy to achieve long-term goals. Emerging solutions-those which were most commonly identified among the different national contexts-were then used to derive empirically-grounded and more universally applicable recommendations for the advancement of sustainable food consumption policies.
... According to Roederer-Rynning and Matthews (2019), there is no reason for Brexit to impact on the CAP reform or the rate of change in this area, although the United Kingdom's being absent from the EU forum might lead to weaker support for the more innovative aspects of the European Commission's proposal relating to CAP reform. As noted by Matthews (2016), whether the United Kingdom's absence from the Council of Ministers during the debate on the future agricultural, trade, and regulatory policies, will be perceived as positive or negative, depends on the political preferences in these spheres. Severe market disruption which might follow from a disorderly Brexit in a "no deal" scenario would also strengthen the hand of those itching to pull the CAP back to a more interventionist policy of market management. ...
Having evaluated the situation in agriculture and rural areas, and having assessed the significance of new external and internal conditions, the European Commission has decided to reform the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union. This article presents the essence of the part of the reform plan which affects the direct support system. The author of the article also examines the impact of the reform on the system’s capacity to achieve the set goals, and on its efficiency. The research showed that the new legal framework proposed by the Commission would not directly improve the efficiency of the system, but the increased decision-making authority it grants to Member States provides an opportunity to reduce administrative outlays on the functioning of the scheme. Likewise, the effectiveness of a reformed direct support system in achieving the set goals will largely depend on decisions made by Member States, i.e. on the appropriate choice of instruments, and the accuracy of their form, as well as the equitable distribution of the available funds.
... It is important to note that the timing of the survey was such that, Brexit and its implication for food supplies and regulation in the UK could be a confounding factor which need to be taken into account when comparing UK consumers with the other EU countries and their trust profiles (Matthews, 2016). ...
Introduction
As the globalisation of the food market continues, consumer trust in the food supply chain and the related actors are vital for the functioning of the food industry. While past research has primarily focused on consumer trust within countries and how it can be increased, studies on cross country differences and the comparison between trust and distrust are limited to review articles. To address this gap, this study investigates the levels of trust and distrust in food products and organisations across four European countries (Finland, Germany, Greece and the UK).
Methods
Using a previously validated consumer Trust Toolkit (Benson et al., 2020), an online cross-sectional survey explored consumer's trust in food and in food supply chain actors. In addition to this toolkit measuring trust and distrust constructs, the questionnaire for the current study also included relevant sociodemographic, household, and psychological items. The data was analysed using ANOVAs, descriptive statistics and regressions using SPSS v26.
Results
Overall, consumers (n = 1027) had a high level of trust in an EU food product (beef burgers; mean = 3.981; SD = 1.353) and the organisations involved in creating and certifying the product (organisations; mean = 4.263 SD = 1.129, food chain; mean = 4.434, SD = 1.177). The data found that Finnish and UK consumers had the highest levels of trust overall, while German and Greek consumers had lower trust in their food and food-related organisations. Interestingly, Finnish consumers reported the highest levels of distrust in food-related organisations, which indicates that food-related distrust is more nuanced than simply being the opposite of food-related trust. These findings are discussed in relation to the cultural context of each country and risk practises.
Conclusions
The levels of food trust and distrust differs across countries highlighting the need for developing different business and organisational strategies to market products in different countries/cultures. Understanding consumers’ trust in food and in food-related organisations is the first step in benchmarking and improving consumer trust across Europe.
... One of the arguments for exiting EU is that the UK will cease to contribute huge net amounts into the EU budget (Kotlinski, 2018). The UK is one of the countries that allocates the largest amunt of money to the EU budget, compared to expenses and benefits it receives from the EU's common resources (Matthews, 2016). The funds that the UK received from the EU budget in 2016 amunted to 7 billion euros, while the UK's contribution was 13,46 billion euros in the same year (European Commission, 2018). ...
The integration of countries and the formation of the common market, represent a desirable form of trade development and improving the level of development of individual economies. An example of a common market on the territory of Europe is the European Union, which has a unique legal and economic system applied by all member countries, as well as a unique system of customs and non-tariff barriers to non-member countries. After the referendum held in June 2016, when the UK began the exit from EU, it turned out that not all countries shared the same views on the benefits from economic integration. Approximately 52% of citizens voted for exiting the EU when the withdrawal of this island country from the economic and political community of the European countries began. The aim of this paper is to identify the potential reasons for and effects of abandoning economic integration, based on Brexit case, as well as an assessment of the economic trends and effects that will occur in this particular case. Based on the results of the analyses carried out and collected secondary data, we can conclude that the causes and positive impact of Brexit will be felt only if the UK finds the best way for exiting the EU, which will almost certainly require a high degree of liberalization and maintenance of economic relations with the EU. This will enable the reduction of adverse effects, provide chances for the emergence of positive effects and justify the purpose of disintegration.
Key words: Brexit, European Union, Great Britain, economic integration, economic disintegration, common market, effects, reasons.
... What Brexit means for the future of debates around these issues in the CAP remains a largely unexplored question. The sparse literature on this topic highlights the potentially large impact of Brexit for the CAP, mainly owing to the implications of the 'Brexit-sized hole in the EU budget' and the weakening of the liberal-environmental coalition in the Council (EP, 2017;Matthews, 2016). Taking this argument one step further, we examine in this article not only the effects of Brexit that are directly related to the 'withdrawal factor' itself, but also those that are related to the responses and adjustments of EU actors and institutions (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019). ...
Suppose we were in 2028: what would the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) look like then? Would it be significantly different from the policy we know today? How, and why? And to what extent would Brexit have catalyzed these changes? The CAP is one of the founding policies of the EU and a strategic lever to address critical 21st century challenges such as climate change and the rising demand for food at the global level. It also has an important role in Europe to address the growing urban-rural divide and its potentially destabilizing impact on European politics. In this article, we examine the impact of Brexit from a political-economic perspective emphasizing the multi-level context within which the CAP is embedded. As an EU member state, the UK found a way to partly accommodate the CAP to its needs even though this policy was a source of intense UK dissatisfaction with the EU. Post-Brexit, the budgetary and market implications of the UK’s departure may favour positions that support a return to a more traditional policy of farm income support. On the other hand, more radical farm policies in England and Wales could partly offset these effects by setting the agenda for continued CAP reform, if they are seen to be successful.
... In spite of the aforementioned measures, budget allocated for the CAP is to shrink. Such a perspective is being discussed by a wide range of agricultural economics scholars, such as: Boulanger & Philippidis (2015); Matthews (2016); Nunez-Ferrer & Rinaldi (2016); Haas & Rubio (2017); ; Bateman & Balmford (2018). There have been different estimates of decrease in the CAP budget following the Brexit. ...
... In spite of the aforementioned measures, budget allocated for the CAP is to shrink. Such a perspective is being discussed by a wide range of agricultural economics scholars, such as: Boulanger & Philippidis (2015); Matthews (2016); Nunez-Ferrer & Rinaldi (2016); Haas & Rubio (2017); ; Bateman & Balmford (2018). There have been different estimates of decrease in the CAP budget following the Brexit. ...
This paper examines the possible Brexit scenarios and their impacts on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) with particular focus on Lithuania. The paper outlines the scientific discourse on the imminent modifications of the CAP after the Brexit along with changes in the EU budget. The paper was prepared during the beginning of Brexit negotiations, with withdrawal terms not being publicly disclosed. Thus, the most likely assumptions have been accepted in order to model the scenarios. The possible effects of Brexit on the agriculture of the small EU Member States are discussed taking the case of Lithuania as an example. The empirical analysis showed that, in the case of three different Brexit-induced CAP modifications, Lithuanian agricultural sector may lose 1% to 20% of financial support under the CAP direct payment mechanism. The corresponding loss under these scenarios is quantified for agricultural sectors of all the EU Member States. JEL Classification:Q14, Q18
... In the context of changing trade relationships with global trading partners under Brexit, understanding indirect costs will become even more important. The UK is a net importer of agri-food production from the EU, which could have implications for EU farming and food sectors (80). The anticipated price and production changes will vary depending on trade agreement considered and whether the UK is a net importer or export of individual commodities concerned (81). ...
Traditionally, cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) focus on the direct costs of animal disease, including animal mortality, morbidity, and associated response costs. However, such approaches often fail to capture the wider, dynamic market impacts that could arise. The duration of these market dislocations could last well after an initial disease outbreak. More generally, current approaches also muddle definitions of indirect costs, confusing debate on the scope of the totalities of disease-induced economic impacts. The aim of this work was to clarify definitions of indirect costs in the context of animal diseases and to apply this definition to a time series methodological framework to estimate the indirect costs of animal disease control strategies, using a foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in Scotland as a case study. Time series analysis is an econometric method for analyzing statistical relationships between data series over time, thus allowing insights into how market dynamics may change following a disease outbreak. First an epidemiological model simulated FMD disease dynamics based on alternative control strategies. Output from the epidemiological model was used to quantify direct costs and applied in a multivariate vector error correction model to quantify the indirect costs of alternative vaccine stock strategies as a result of FMD. Indirect costs were defined as the economic losses incurred in markets after disease freedom is declared. As such, our definition of indirect costs captures the knock-on price and quantity effects in six agricultural markets after a disease outbreak. Our results suggest that controlling a FMD epidemic with vaccination is less costly in direct and indirect costs relative to a no vaccination (i.e., “cull only”) strategy, when considering large FMD outbreaks in Scotland. Our research clarifies and provides a framework for estimating indirect costs, which is applicable to both exotic and endemic diseases. Standard accounting CBAs only capture activities in isolation, ignore linkages across sectors, and do not consider price effects. However, our framework not only delineates when indirect costs start, but also captures the wider knock-on price effects between sectors, which are often omitted from CBAs but are necessary to support decision-making in animal disease prevention and control strategies.
... The initial (and partly continuing) aim of LFA payments has been, since the launch of the LFA scheme in coeval Member States in 1975, to ensure stability for farmers' incomes by adding to their direct farm subsidies in response to the context of variable market factors and environmental conditions and thereby prevent a cessation of agriculture in such areas. Outwardly, societal concern with stagnation of rural economies and the role of support policies in social innovation has not only been studied by academics (Dwyer, 2016), but has also been shown as a factor in the unfolding of Brexit (Matthews, 2016a). LFA measures are important for maintaining public goods as cultural assets in relation to agricultural landscapes with their socioeconomic aspects (Vrolijk et al., 2009), next to biophysical factors (Cooper et al., 2006 andMadureira et al., 2013;Santos et al., 2016;Wrbka, 2004). ...
Subsidy to less favoured area (LFA) farms is central to rural development policy in the EuropeanUnion. Here, three categories of LFA support are assessed: farm competitiveness measures, LFAmeasures, and agri-environment measures. These categories of measures are complementaryto safeguarding land management and delivering ecosystem benefits. Based on historical datafor the Czech Republic, this paper endeavours to illustrate potential methods for assessing the LFAsubsidies. In sum, rigorous methods to evaluate LFA evidence are still at their very starting point,even as they are necessary in order to ascertain the Community’s capability, alongside the local,regional, or national institutional capability. A positive trend has been identified with regardto stabilizing the available rural development budget for the policy priority “Restoring, preservingand enhancing agroecosystems”.
... Also according to Matthews (2016), the absence of the UK in future discussion of CAP would boost those voices among European parliamentarians and member states who wish to roll back some of the recent reforms and to focus more upon supporting farm incomes through strengthened public safety-nets and greater public intervention on agricultural markets. As concerns excessively high import tariffs on CAP agricultural commodities and associated food products, it seems questionable that the challenges posed by the UK departure would prompt the EU to unilaterally reduce them (Swinbank, 2017a). ...
... Also according to Matthews (2016), the absence of the UK in future discussion of CAP would boost those voices among European parliamentarians and member states who wish to roll back some of the recent reforms and to focus more upon supporting farm incomes through strengthened public safety-nets and greater public intervention on agricultural markets. As concerns excessively high import tariffs on CAP agricultural commodities and associated food products, it seems questionable that the challenges posed by the UK departure would prompt the EU to unilaterally reduce them (Swinbank, 2017a). ...
... Also according to Matthews (2016), the absence of the UK in future discussion of CAP would boost those voices among European parliamentarians and member states who wish to roll back some of the recent reforms and to focus more upon supporting farm incomes through strengthened public safety-nets and greater public intervention on agricultural markets. As concerns excessively high import tariffs on CAP agricultural commodities and associated food products, it seems questionable that the challenges posed by the UK departure would prompt the EU to unilaterally reduce them (Swinbank, 2017a). ...
The two-year Brexit process formally initiated in March 2017 is coming to an end, thus intensifying public discussions and concerns about the future of the European Union, its budget, and its policies, including the Common Agricultural Policy. This study applies a political economy approach to analyze the possible implications for CAP resulting from the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU. It focuses on Brexit's effects on other EU member states concerning budgetary and agricultural trade dimensions. The European Commission’s proposal to reduce the CAP 2021-2027 budget by 5% is one of the first Brexit outcomes which threaten farm incomes. The leaving the single market and customs union by the UK, usually taking a liberal market position, will possibly affect not merely the CAP but additionally agricultural policies amongst WTO and G20 member states. With the lack of some kind of free-trade agreement between the UK and the EU, the EU27 agri-food net exports to the UK would decrease.
... In relation to this potential, some attempts have been made to quantify the potential impact of Brexit within particular sectors or industries. Examples include the marine environment (Boyes and Elliott 2016), the agriculture or food sector (Swinbank 2016;Grant 2016;Matthews 2016) and the pharmaceutical industry (Song 2016;Baker et al. 2016). Similarly, the focus of the work presented herein is the automotive sector and, more specifically, the fundamental objective is to assess the potential impact of Brexit on the volume of passenger cars exported from Germany to the U.K. ...
The objective is to forecast the impact of potential Brexit scenarios on the export volume of passenger cars from Germany to the UK. Based on Germany’s total export volume of passenger cars, a double-logarithmic gravity model is specified and estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. The final estimated model has strong explanatory power, with all variables significant at the 5% level. This is used for forecasting future export volumes under different Brexit scenarios. Diagnostic tests suggest that the model is robust and efficient. All tested Brexit scenarios are found to negatively impact passenger cars export volumes from Germany to the UK. The level of tariffs is found to have the most significant effect, but lower GDP due to Brexit is forecast to offset the benefits of trading with lower tariffs. The most pessimistic scenario for 2030 forecasts is a reduction of 15.4% compared to the ‘no Brexit’ base-case scenario.
... Matthews (2016) produced a study to look at the potential impacts of Brexit on CAP and suggested that the UK could implement a new policy based on CAP. On the other hand, there is the possibility that no new policies will be implemented after Brexit which could disadvantage the UK agricultural industry leaving the UK more at risk to cheaper imports from the rest of the world not to mention the EU, which is already an issue even with the CAP in place (Matthews, 2016; AHDP, 2016). ...
The purpose of this study is to examine price transmission between the producer and retail in the UK pork industry. It aims to find the direction of causality in the long and short-run, and whether there is a long-run relationship between producer and retail prices. This study used monthly time series data for producer and retail prices ranging from 1988-2016. Econometric tests were used such as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) and Phillips-Perron (1988) Unit Root tests; Bai-Perron (1998) Unit Root test allowing for multiple structural breaks; Johansen (1991) and Engle-Granger (1987) Co-integration tests; Granger (1988) Causality, and the Error Correction Model showing the speed of recovery in the long-run after a shock. The results of the Unit Root tests found both producer and retail prices to be integrated of order one I(1). Three structural breaks were found occurring in the years of 1996, 2002 and 2012. The Co-integration tests found that there is one long-run relationship between producer and retail prices. The Error Correction Model showed the return to a new equilibrium after a shock was 9% per month totalling over 11 months for a full recovery from a shock. The Granger (1988) Causality test indicated that producer prices do Granger cause retail prices in the short-run. In this study the latest econometric techniques were used including structural breaks which some previous studies overlooked. This study into the producer and retail prices in the UK pork industry is the latest study of this kind since the Brexit decision.
... Wielka Brytania była drugim co do wielkości wkładu (po Niemczech) płatnikiem do WPR. Przykładowo składki uiszczane przez Wielką Brytanię wyniosły 1166 mld euro w 2014 roku i 3066 mld euro w roku 2015 (Matthews, 2016b). Według szacunków Matthewsa, gdyby zapadła decyzja o utrzymaniu budżetu WPR w niezmienionej wysokości, to brak składki brytyjskiej skompensowany zostanie przede wszystkim przez czterech największych płatników netto: Niemcy, Holandię, Francję i Włochy. ...
... Trade facilitation costs on UK-EU27 trade are incorporated within this scenario to reflect additional trade costs associated with exporting and importing, e.g. border administration paperwork, sanitary and phytosanitary inspections and delays at ports (Matthews, 2016). Note, these costs do not include wider non-tariff barriers. ...
The analysis in this report quantifies the sectoral impacts on UK agriculture of alternative trade agreements following Brexit using a partial equilibrium modelling framework; the FAPRI-UK model in combination with the FAPRI-EU model (GOLD). The modelling system captures the impacts on commodity markets as a result of changes in trade flows with the EU and the rest of the world. It has been substantially updated to account for the fact that in the case of Brexit the UK and EU markets would no longer be fully integrated. In this study we examine three Brexit trade scenarios:
• Bespoke Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU;
• World Trade Organisation (WTO) default Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs; and
• Unilateral Trade Liberalisation.
... The territorial structure of the foreign agrarian trace is continuously concentrating on the EU-Single Market, both in terms of exports and imports (Smutka et al., 2016). Potential implications of Brexit for the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and agri-food sector will have broadly negative effects for the EU farm and food sector (Matthews, 2016). ...
Paper provides synthesis of knowledge and empirical research on selected determinants of agricultural production and verifies the applicability of the methods of hierarchical and non-hierarchical clustering in the agricultural sector. It identifies and categorizes the EU Member States in order to their clustering based on the similarity of common features in the context of direct (gross value added, support for agriculture, agriculturally utilized land) and indirect factors (employment, gross fixed capital) affecting the total agricultural production. The aim of the paper is creation of the economically meaningful groups of the EU countries that would confirm or reject the classification of old and new member states. The results of cluster analysis divided countries into three clusters, and confirmed that second cluster was represented by the new member states, and third by the old member states. Clusters were mutually different in the indicators of labour force in agriculture, support for agriculture, and agriculturally utilized land.
EU policies have directly influenced UK food supplies and prices, the profitability of farm businesses, and the rural environment and land use, in at least four ways. First, through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), considerable transfers of taxpayer funds have supported the farm sector and paid for the delivery of environmental services. Second, very high import taxes (known as tariffs or duties) on many agricultural commodities and processed foods and drinks, coupled with preferential access to the EU market from many developing countries, have helped determine the UK’s agri-food trade flows and food prices. Third, many of the regulatory conditions relating to agricultural production, and food and drink processing, are currently based on EU provisions. Finally, the horticultural sector and dairying, and food processing and catering, are often heavily dependent on migrant labour.
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie opinii polskich migrantów w Wielkiej Brytanii na temat skutków brexitu dla Unii Europejskiej, Wielkiej Brytanii, Polski oraz samych respondentów i ich rodzin. Ustalono ją na podstawie analizy wyników sondażu przeprowadzonego wśród nich, a zaprezentowano na tle wyników badań opinii publicznej na temat członkostwa Zjednoczonego Królestwa w Unii Europejskiej. Badania takie w Wielkiej Brytanii prowadzone są regularnie od lat siedemdziesiątych ubiegłego wieku. W artykule analizowane są przekonania migrantów zarobkowych deklarujących swoje zaangażowanie (bądź jego brak) w organizacje polonijne działające w Wielkiej Brytanii. Postawiono tezę, że osoby zaangażowane w działalność organizacji polonijnych częściej aniżeli osoby niezaangażowane dostrzegają negatywne skutki brexitu dla Unii Europejskiej, Wielkiej Brytanii, Polski oraz ich samych i ich rodzin. W odpowiedziach na pytania dotyczące ewentualnych pozytywnych bądź negatywnych skutków brexitu przeważały te drugie. W dyskusji poszukuje się odpowiedzi na pytanie, dlaczego migranci z Polski częściej obawiają się negatywnych skutków brexitu dla Wielkiej Brytanii i Unii Europejskiej, a rzadziej dla Polski, dla nich samych i ich najbliższej rodziny.
La salida del Reino Unido de la Unión Europea (en adelante, UE) se formalizó a principios de 2021, con consecuencias aún por evaluar. Aunque, es evidente de que probablemente se trata de uno de los sucesos de más envergadura en décadas en lo referente a la Unión Europea. El impacto real de la retirada británica puede afectar enormemente tanto al Reino Unido como a la Unión Europea, pese a que actualmente se está realizando una transición ordenada sin catástrofes ni consecuencias apocalípticas. Al respecto, el temido efecto arrastre que hubiera inducido a otros países a abandonar la organización europea no se ha cristalizado, pese a los persistentes y graves problemas con Polonia y Hungría. No se ha producido ninguna disrupción económica de significa-ción y el mercado ha afrontado las nuevas barreras con normalidad. Cierto es que han habido protestas pesqueras, pero que no han generado una tensión excesiva, más allá de protestas pun-tuales y el uso populista del asunto, especialmente por Francia y el Reino Unido en la zona del canal de la Mancha. Por otra parte, la actitud del gobierno británico, no respetando lo negociado tras un largo proceso con la UE, puede generar problemas graves. Su impacto más importante, aunque no el único, hace referencia a la renegociación del protocolo de Irlanda del Norte, que puede tener con-secuencias muy relevantes para la UE, RU y la República de Irlanda. La cancelación unilateral del protocolo por parte del gobierno británico podría desencadenar el fin de los acuerdos con la UE en todos los campos e impactar muy negativamente a las relaciones comerciales entre ambas áreas. Asimismo, podría significar el resurgir de la violencia sectaria en el Ulster debido a la crea-ción de una frontera dura entre ambas partes de Irlanda, ya que la libre circulación de personas y mercancías entre ambas zonas supuso una reducción de la tensión interna que durante tantos años azotó a este territorio. Incluso si el protocolo se respeta, la creación de una barrera entre Irlanda del Norte y el resto del Reino Unido, unido a la creación de un espacio común
The study sought to explore the implications of Brexit on the EU budget. The study is significant because of the very undeniable rhetoric surroundings of the EU budget playing a role that is indeed crucial to the debate of Brexit. So as to say Brexit will have a very significant implications for the EU budget considering that the UK is the second largest net contributor. The consequences of Brexit will affect not only the EU and its budget but the UK too, as they have to pare for the implications of this change.
An alternative course to Brexit for the UK is evaluated. The purpose of the study is to determine whether the UK would have been better off had, instead of Brexit, remained in the EU and joined the Eurozone. The model specification is based on the neoclassical theory of growth extended to include human capital accumulation. Counterfactual analysis in terms of the difference-in-differences methodology is applied to evaluate the effect in UK’s per capita income if the UK had joined the Eurozone when the Eurozone was formed. The dataset is a balanced panel of annual observations for fifteen countries and covers the period from 1980 to 2017. The analysis reveals that had the UK joined the Eurozone, UK’s per capita income would have been 15.48% higher on the average for the period after the formation of the Eurozone. This effect increases to 24.98% if Eurozone’s less performing economies of the southern periphery are excluded from the analysis. The study shows that Brexit is a move toward the wrong direction. The UK should have sought further integration with the EU in terms of presence in the Eurozone than pursue Brexit and leave the EU.
In this work, we study the impact that the withdrawal of institutions from the United Kingdom caused by BREXIT has on the European research collaboration networks. To this aim, we consider BREXIT as a targeted attack to those graphs composed by the European institutions that have collaborated in research projects belonging to the three main H2020 programs (Excellent Science, Industrial Leadership, and Societal Challenges). The consequences of this attack are analyzed at the global, mesoscopic, and local scales and compared with the changes suffered by the same collaboration networks when a similar quantity of nodes is randomly removed from the network. Our results suggest that changes depend on the specific program, with Excellent Science being the most affected by BREXIT perturbation. However, the structure of the integrated collaboration network is not significantly affected by BREXIT compared to the variations observed after the random removal of institutions.
Brexit poses a significant challenge to the future governance of the UK agri-food sector. Policy decisions that will be made in the next few years will initiate a major new phase of agrarian change and regulation. We are seeing signs of this already in agri-food policy discourse, including scenarios related to food and farming futures post-Brexit. Academic representations of Brexit and agriculture are also mostly futures-orientated. This is important analysis; however, Brexit processes are active now, rather than simply in the future, influencing the lives of farming families, farm employees, food chain actors and local communities. This paper examines how Brexit is being discussed now in two key agricultural sectors: cereals and horticulture. Regional newspaper articles are used to provide initial insights into the ‘present realities’ of Brexit and agriculture, by which we mean how producers, associated food chain actors and the public are engaging with Brexit now in terms of changes they are making to their livelihoods and expectations about future uncertainty in the present day. We conclude by making recommendations for future research to contextualise every-day, lived experiences of Brexit in agri-food governance.
Motivation: In a referendum on June 23, 2016, the British people voted to leave the European Union. No nation state has ever left the EU. The theory and practice of European integration is rich, but scientific studies considering the opposite situation thus far do not exist. So the question of economic consequences caused by Great Britain leaving the European Union is very pertinent.Aim: The aim of this article is to identify and discuss the direct economic consequences of Great Britain leaving the European Union. The analysis was performed for the United Kingdom and for the European Union. Poland is a part of the EU. Therefore, among the effects on the EU side of the research there is an emphasis on the results for Poland. The effect of budgets, trade and migration has been analyzed.Results: The effects of the United Kingdom leaving the EU will be more unfavorable for the UK than for the EU. The amount of losses depends on the type of Brexit. A soft Brexit means a relatively slow negotiation designed to retain as close as possible a relationship with the rest of the EU. Access to the EU’s single market will reduce losses due to having as few tariffs as possible. A hard Brexit would mean getting out of the EU quickly, having no institutional or political relationship with the union, and regaining full control of UK borders. Therefore, a negotiated free trade deal with the EU would seem to reduce losses for everyone.
Brexit (the UK's exit from the European Union) will have important repercussions for the agri-food trade of developing countries because of the UK's size (it is the sixth largest economy in the world) and its important role as an importer of agri-food products (it accounts for 12% of the EU's imports from developing countries). These effects will occur through a variety of different channels: the consequences of higher trade costs on UK-EU27 trade; possible changes in future UK tariff and trade policy after Brexit; possible changes in UK and EU27 agricultural policy; impacts on UK agricultural production capacity; and macroeconomic channels such as changes in future UK economic growth and the value of sterling. This paper reviews the potential significance of these changes, and makes recommendations as to how developing countries might respond to these changes. JEL: F13, F63, Q17
The prospect of exit from the European Union faces UK farmers with a number of additional challenges to add to those they are already coping with in terms of income and price volatility and increases the uncertainties that they face. It is difficult to predict the consequences of Brexit for agriculture with any precision, given the absence of contingency plans by the UK Government and the uncertainties that would follow a vote to leave. However, it is difficult to see that they would, on balance, be advantageous. CAP Pillar 1 farm subsidies would be placed in jeopardy and there would not be a substantial reduction in the level of regulation. The availability of plant protection products could become more restricted and firms would be reluctant to develop distinctive products purely for the UK market. Brexit would serve as a distraction from the many practical challenges facing the UK farming sector. It will not eliminate many of the structural and competitive challenges facing UK and other European farmers such as relationships with supermarkets and processors, the scale of operations and the Russian import ban. © 2016 The Agricultural Economics Society and the European Association of Agricultural Economists.
Whether the UK should hold a referendum on continued membership of the European Union (EU) is one of the issues in its general election to be held in May 2015. A possible British withdrawal, or Brexit, would have profound implications for Ireland and particularly for its agri-food sector, given the extensive trade links between the two economies and the role played by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. This paper examines the consequences of a possible Brexit for the Irish agri-food sector. Much would depend on the nature of the trade arrangements that would be put in place between the UK and the EU following Brexit, and the paper contains an extensive discussion of the various options. The paper concludes that Brexit would be unambiguously negative from the perspective of both Irish producers and consumers, and recommends various ways in which the inevitable disruption might be minimised.
The outcome of the UK's referendum on continued EU membership is at the time of writing uncertain, and the consequences of a vote to remain ('Bremain') or leave ('Brexit') difficult to predict. Polarised views have been voiced about the impact of Brexit on UK agriculture, and on the nature and level of funding, of future policy. Policymakers would not have the luxury of devising a new policy from scratch. WTO rules and commitments, the nature of any future accord with the EU, budget constraints, the rather different perspectives of the UK's devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the expectations of farmers, landowners and the environmental lobby, will all impact the policymaking process. The WTO dimension, and the UK's future relationship with the EU, are particularly difficult to predict, and - some commentators believe - may take years to resolve. Brexit's impact on the future CAP is also unclear. A vote to remain within the EU would not necessarily assuage the Eurosceptics' criticisms of the EU, or the UK's perception of the CAP. Whatever the outcome, future agricultural, food and rural land use policies will remain key preoccupations of European governments. © 2016 The Agricultural Economics Society and the European Association of Agricultural Economists.
If the Conservative party wins Britain's General Election in 2015 the incoming Government intends to negotiate a new settlement with the EU, and then hold an in-out referendum. Opinion polls suggest a narrow majority would vote to leave. To exercise an informed choice the electorate would need to know what feasible alternatives are available, so that these can be assessed and debated. Furthermore, in the event of a No vote the Government must be ready to implement its alternative strategy: Plan B. This implies that both a new EU settlement, and Plan B, need to be negotiated concurrently. There has been no serious attempt to explain what Plan B would mean for UK farm policy. Would, for example, British farmers continue to receive the level of support that they currently enjoy; would support be more focussed on environmental objectives? WTO rules on most-favoured-nation treatment and regional trade agreements would apply. Could a WTO compatible agri-food trade agreement be negotiated with its former EU partners, or would Irish and Brazilian beef face the same tariff barriers on imports into the British market? For the EU, the loss of a major net contributor to EU finances could result in a re-examination of the CAP budget. © 2014 The Agricultural Economics Society and The European Association of Agricultural Economists.
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