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Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government--And Why We Need a More Powerful Presidency

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Abstract

Our government is failing us. From health care to immigration, from the tax code to climate change, our political institutions cannot deal effectively with the challenges of modern society. Why the dysfunction? Contemporary reformers single out the usual suspects, including polarization and the rise in campaign spending. But what if the roots go much deeper, to the nation's founding? In Relic, William G. Howell and Terry M. Moe point to the Constitution as the main culprit. The framers designed the Constitution some 225 years ago for a simple, agrarian society. But the government they created, with a parochial Congress at its center, is ill-equipped to address the serious social problems that arise in a complex, postindustrial nation. We are prisoners of the past, burdened with an antiquated government that cannot make effective policy, and often cannot do anything at all. The solution is to update the Constitution for modern times. This can be accomplished, Howell and Moe argue, through reforms that push Congress and all its pathologies to the periphery of the lawmaking process, and bring presidents—whose concern for their legacy drives them to seek coherent policy solutions—to the center of decision making. As Howell and Moe reveal, the key to effective government for modern America is a more powerful presidency. Relic is a provocative and essential book for our era of political dysfunction and popular despair. It sheds new light on what is wrong with our government and what can be done about it, challenging us to reconsider the very foundation of the American experiment.
A Member of the Perseus Books Group
www.basicbooks.com
Jacket design by Chelsea Hunter
ISBN 978-0-465-04269-2
9 780465 042692
52699
$26.99 US / $34.99 CAN
© Robert Kozloff The University of Chicago© Betsy Palay
ADVANCE PRAISE FOR
POLITICAL SCIENCE
WILLIAM G. HOWELL is the Sydney Stein
Professor in American Politics at the University
of Chicago.
TERRY M. MOE is the William Bennett Munro
Professor of Political Science at Stanford University
and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.
They both have written extensively on the
presidency, American political institutions, and
separation of powers issues.
5-5/8 x 8-1/2
S: .89
B: .765
Basic-HC
Color: 4C
Finish: gritty over
pgs mylar w/ pgs
mylar showing
through
on all type and stars
on front cover only
2/4
12/10
HHH
HHH
HOWELL
&
MOE
Howell and Moe make the bold and trenchant argument that the
dysfunctions of American government lie squarely in the powers that the
Founding Fathers gave Congress, and that the solution is to dramatically
shift the balance of power to the executive. This book is sure to trigger an
important debate, precisely because its fundamental analysis is so correct.”
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, Stanford University,
and author of Political Order and Political Decay
“Clear-eyed and unapologetic, Howell and Moe argue that our nation’s
political woes stem not from our polarized political class but from an outdated
Constitution. Anyone interested in our nation’s political health will profit
from exploring their bracing vision of how that Constitution now protects
particularistic interests and propagates dysfunction.” PAUL PIERSON,
UC Berkeley, and coauthor of
the New York Times bestseller Winner-Take-All Politics
“Howell and Moe deserve immense credit for ‘connecting the dots’ between
our dangerously dysfunctional political system and an outmoded Constitution.
One can only admire their willingness to challenge the cult of the Constitution
that afflicts our political culture and hope that their book gets the widespread
attention that it so richly deserves.” SANFORD LEVINSON,
University of Texas Law School, and author of Framed:
America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance
“Howell and Moe deliver the most concise, devastating account of congressional
failure that I have ever read. In calling for a constitutional amendment
that would increase the president’s power over the legislative process, they
have set the terms of debate for years to come.” ERIC POSNER,
University of Chicago, coauthor of The Executive Unbound
HHHHHH
HHHHHH
HHHHHH
2/3
HHHHHH
$26.99 US / $34.99 CAN
Our government is failing us. From health
care to immigration, from the tax code to
climate change, our political institutions
cannot deal effectively with the challenges of modern
society. Why the dysfunction? Contemporary
reformers single out the usual suspects, including
polarization and the rise in campaign spending. But
what if the roots go much deeper, to the nation’s
founding?
In Relic, William G. Howell and Terry M.
Moe point to the Constitution as the main culprit.
The framers designed the Constitution some 225
years ago for a simple, agrarian society. But the
government they created, with a parochial Congress
at its center, is ill-equipped to address the serious
social problems that arise in a complex, post-
industrial nation. We are prisoners of the past,
burdened with an antiquated government that
cannot make effective policy, and often cannot do
anything at all.
The solution is to update the Constitution
for modern times. This can be accomplished,
Howell and Moe argue, through reforms that push
Congress and all its pathologies to the periphery
of the lawmaking process, and bring presidents—
whose concern for their legacy drives them to seek
coherent policy solutions—to the center of decision-
making. As Howell and Moe reveal, the key to
effective government for modern America is a more
powerful presidency.
Relic is a provocative and essential book
for our era of political dysfunction and popular
despair. It sheds new light on what is wrong with
our government and what can be done about it,
challenging us to reconsider the very foundation
of the American experiment.
HHHHH
WILLIAM G. HOWELL & TERRY M. MOE
HOW OUR CONSTITUTION
UNDERMINES EFFECTIVE
GOVERNMENT
AND WHY
WE NEED A MORE
POWERFUL PRESIDENCY
HHH
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