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International Foundation for Electoral System

IFES-Nigeria

No 14 Tennessee Crescent

Off Panama Street,

Maitama, Abuja

Nigeria

Tel: 234-09-413-5907/6293

Fax: 234-09-413-6294

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of

relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place

without the written permission of International Foundation for Electoral System

First published 2008

Printed in Abuja-Nigeria by:

Petra Digital Press,

Plot 1275, Nkwere Street,

Off Muhammadu Buhari Way

Area 11, Garki. P.O. Box 11088, Garki, Abuja.

Tel: 09-3145618, 08033326700, 08054222484

ISBN: 978-978-086-544-3

ii

Acknowledgements

Preface

Introduction - Money and Politics in Nigeria: an Overview

-

V

icto

r

A

.O.

A

detul

a

Political Money and Corruption:

Limiting Corruption in Political Finance

-

M

a

r

cin

W

a

lec

k

i

Electoral Act 2006, Civil Society Engagement and the

Prospect of Political Finance Reform in Nigeria

-

V

icto

r

A

.O.

A

detul

a

Funding of Political Parties and Candidates in Nigeria:

Analysis of the Past and Present

- E

z

e

k

iel

M

.

A

de

y

i

The Role of INEC, ICPC and EFCC in Combating

Political Corruption

-

R

e

m

i E.

A

i

y

ede

Gender, Money and Politics in Nigeria

-

K

a

chollo

m

C.

B

est

Money Politics and Electoral Violence in Nigeria

-

S

a

m

O.

S

m

a

h

Godfather Politics in Nigeria

-

J

ohn

A

.

A

.

A

y

o

a

de

Money Politics, Political Corruption and

Local Government Elections in Nigeria

-

J

ide Ojo

Vote Buying in Nigeria

- E

mm

a

nuel O. Ojo

Vote Buying and the Quality of Democracy

- Dung

P

a

m

S

h

a

Notes on Contributors

Index

IFES in Nigeria

Tables and Figures

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Chapter 1-

Chapter 2 -

Chapter 3 -

Chapter 4 -

Chapter 5 -

Chapter 6 -

Chapter 7 -

Chapter 8 -

Chapter 9 -

Chapter 10 -

v

vii

ix

xi

xv

xxvii

1

13

29

39

53

65

85

97

109

123

134

135

iii

Table of Contents

This book drew on the 'Nigeria Election Support 2007' program especially its

components on party finance. IFES-Nigeria gratefully acknowledges the

generous support of UK - Department for International Development (DfID)

for the execution of the 'Nigeria Election Support 2007' program which ran

from March 2005 to March 2008. Most of the contributions in the book were

first presented at two seminars in May 2006. IFES - Nigeria is grateful to

Professor John.A.A Ayoade, mni and Professor Victor A.O Adetula for their

assistance in organizing the two seminars in Ibadan and Jos. Charles Lasham

and Rudi Elbling were Country Directors at different times during the lifespan

of the 'Nigeria Election Support 2007' program. Their special interest as well as

support for the 'Money and Politics' (MAP) program in Nigeria were of

tremendous benefit for the book project. Abigail Wilson- Program Manager,

IFES, West Africa, Marcin Walecki- IFES Senior Advisor on Party Finance,

Anna Wiktorowska and Jared Hays- former Project Managers, IFES-Nigeria,

provided most desirable backup support. Their efforts were commendable and

deserved to be mentioned.

Gratitude is also extended to colleagues at the Nigerian Field Office in

Abuja particularly Jide Ojo, Senior Program Officer and Joy Ogala, Junior

Program Officer for their contributions to the success of the publication. Special

appreciation goes to Susan Palmer who consulted for IFES on the book project

and substantially reviewed the 12 papers initially contained in the first

compilation.

IFES-Nigeria acknowledges the support of all the contributors to the book.

These include: Mrs. Kachallon C. Best; Dr Remi Aiyede; Professor Dung Pam

Sha; Dr. Emmanuel Ojo; Professor Sam Smah and Mr. Ezekiel Adeyi. Without

their contributions, this book project would have remained a mere dream.

Lastly, the opinions expressed in this book are those of the individual

authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of IFES-Nigeria or DfID.

Micheline Begin

Country Director

IFES-Nigeria.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

vii

Since its inception in 1987, IFES has earned the confidence of election

authorities, governments, and non-governmental organizations around the

world. IFES' approach is successful in large part because of the unparalleled

expertise of our technically-diverse team. IFES effortlessly mobilizes its expert

staff and senior consultants based in Washington, DC and throughout IFES' field

locations to ensure that our programs are carried out by the most qualified and

appropriate talent.

In Nigeria, IFES has worked with the Independent National Electoral

Commission (INEC) since 1998 to enhance the credibility of the electoral

process. In the run-up to the April 2007 elections, IFES worked with INEC and

other key election stakeholders to implement reform measures called for

following the last election cycle, as well as to establish systems for enforcement

of campaign finance regulations, monitoring and mitigation of electoral

violence, and education of voters. Some of the major achievements of IFES

under this program include: Stimulation of public discourse on a revised

election bill which was ultimately passed and signed into law in June

2006;Creation of an in-house Training Unit within INEC; Development of

standard voter and civic education materials for use by Nigerian schools, CSOs,

and the media; Adoption of a regulatory framework for political finance

disclosure under the auspices of INEC and with the buy-in of political parties;

Production of two nation-wide public opinion surveys on the April 2007 general

elections ; Fast-tracking of the election dispute resolution process through

collaboration with the Office of the President of Court of Appeal to train judges

of the Election Petition Tribunals as well as issuance of Practice Direction for

use of the Tribunals; Formation of the National Association for Peaceful

Elections in Nigeria (NAPEN) to monitor election-related violence; and

Provision of memoranda to the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) for the

consideration of the Committee as Nigeria contemplates the manner in which it

conducts elections.

Additionally, IFES has worked on political finance reform, anti-corruption,

and constitutional and electoral law reform. With a focus on political finance

reform, IFES established a Political Finance Monitoring Group (PFMG), which

includes representatives from nearly 50 organizations interested in clean

elections, including political parties, the Independent National Electoral

Commission, anti-corruption agencies, citizens' groups, academia and the

media.

The Group tracks violations of Nigeria's political finance laws and reports

them to agencies that prosecute such crimes. The Monitoring Group is working

IFES IN NIGERIA

with citizens' watchdog groups across Nigeria. These watchdog groups track

party finances in their local area and sending field reports back to the

Monitoring Group. The Monitoring Group then investigates the reports and

sends them on to the proper authorities should they document actual breaches of

Nigerian laws or regulations guiding campaign financing.

IFES has built an impressive network of partners in government and civil

society to focus on various issues of importance to Nigeria. This has provided

IFES with a foundation for long-term capacity development, and continued

cooperation with key players. Though a great deal of work has been

accomplished, a long road to reform and democratization remains. The road

ahead is not an easy one, yet IFES is committed to the networks that it has helped

to create as Nigeria moves on the way forward to democratic consolidation.

IFES - NIGERIA

viii

ix

Major types of political finance - related

corruption -5

A checklist of initiatives to limit corruption

in political finance -12

The distribution of female aspirants in the

2003 primaries by posts -57

Table and Figures

AC: Action Congress

ACB: African Continental Bank

AD: Alliance for Democracy

AG: Action Group

ANPP: All Nigerian Peoples Party

APGA: All Progressives' Grand Alliance

APP: All People's Party

ASP: Assistant Superintendent of Police

CAC: Corporate Affairs Commission

CCB: Code of Conduct Bureau

CDA: Civic Democratic Alliance

CEDAW: Convention on Elimination of Discrimination against

Women

CPP: Citizens Popular Party

DFID: Department for International Development

DPM: Director of Personnel Management

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

EFCC: Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

EO: Electoral Officers

ERC: Electoral Reform Committee

ERN: Electoral Reform Network

ETF: Education Trust Fund

EU: European Union

EUEOM: European Union Election Observation Mission

FCT: Federal Capital Territory

FGN: Federal Government of Nigeria

FOMWAN: Federation of Muslim Women Associations of Nigeria

FRSC: Federal Road Safety Commission

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GNPP: Great Nigeria Peoples Party

GRA: Government Reserved Area

HDR: The Human Development Report

HRW: Human Rights Watch

ICPC: Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related

Offences Commission

IFES: International Foundation for Electoral Systems

IGP: Inspector General of Police

IMF: International Monetary Fund

xi

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

INEC: Independent National Electoral Commission

ING: Interim National Government

IRI: International Republican Institute

JDPC: Justice, Development and Peace Commission

LG: Local Government

LGC: Local Government Council

MAMSER: Mass Mobilization for Self Reliance and Economic

Reform

MILAD: Military Administrator

NAFDAC: National Agency For Food and Drug

Administration and Control

NCNC: National Council of Nigerian Citizen

NDI: National Democratic Institute

NDP: National Democratic Party

NEC: National Electoral Commission

NECON: National Electoral Commission of Nigeria

NEPA: National Electric Power Authority

NEPU: Northern Elements Peoples Union

NGO: Non-governmental Organization

NNA: Nigerian National Alliance

NNDP: Nigerian National Democratic Party

NOA: National Orientation Agency

NPF: Northern Progressive Front

NPP: Nigerian People's Party

NRC: National Republican Convention

NUC: National Universities Commission

NURTW: National Union of Road Transport Workers

NYM: Nigerian Youth Movement

ODAG: Office of Democracy and Governance

OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PDP: Peoples Democratic Party

PFMG: Political Finance Monitoring Group

PHCN: Power Holding Company of Nigeria

PMC: Party Monitoring Committee

PRP: Peoples Redemption Party

REC: Resident Electoral Commissioner

Rtd: Retired

SIEC: State Independent Electoral Commission

SDP: Social Democratic Party

SSS: State Security Service

TMG: Transition Monitoring Group

UNPP: United Nigeria People's Party

xii

UPGA: United Progressive Grand Alliance

UPN: Unity Party of Nigeria

US: United States

USAID: United State Agency for International Development

WAI: War Against Indiscipline

WAIC: War Against Indiscipline and Corruption

WRAPA: Women’s Rights Advancement and Protection

Alternatives

xiii

The most populous country in Africa, Nigeria is a country of 140 million

inhabitants, broken into 250 ethnic/linguistic groups. Nigeria is often

characterized by poor governance, corruption and social injustice,

manifestations apparent in all facets of Nigerian society. This notwithstanding,

however, Nigerians always appreciated the importance of good governance.

However, long years of military rule slowed development of democratic values

and a culture of transparency and accountability in governance. Consequently,

corruption pervaded all spheres of public and private life with serious

implications for service delivery.

Nigeria returned to civil rule in May 1999 after four decades of military rule.

The 1999 elections marked the beginning of a transition from military to civil

rule. The country held three elections, including the April 2007 elections that

brought President Umaru Yar’ Adua to power following the victory of his party,

the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Political transition advanced to another

phase with successful conduct of the 2003 elections. In the lead-up to the 2007

elections Nigerians were considerably hopeful the elections would be free and

fair. But there were concerns in many circles about the poor state of readiness of

the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and law enforcement

agencies. The outcome of the April polls further betrayed peoples' confidence in

the electoral system.

Traditionally, elections in Nigeria provoke reactions ranging from verbal

attacks on the election management bodies to outright violent protests. From

testimonies of the general public which are corroborated in reports by domestic

and international observers, the 2007 elections were marred by irregularities.

There were some initial protests and agitations by a section of civil society,

including labour unions, over the outcomes and results of the elections.

However, perceptions of many Nigerians changed with the expectation that

President Umaru Yar’Adua's administration would move the country toward a

path of national reconciliation. Also, regular public pronouncements by

President Yar Adua in favour of “government of national unity” enhanced the

new administration's public image. The mood in many circles today is that of

“let us give peace a chance.” Not long ago President Yar Adua inaugurated a 22-

person Electoral Reform Committee, comprised of representatives of civil

society and labour. This action further endeared President Yar Adua to civil

society and a section of the international community who welcomed and

supported the reform agenda of President Yar Adua.

Although Nigerians are increasingly losing confidence in the electoral

system, their confidence in the judiciary is growing fast following several

xv

PREFACE

landmark judicial decisions by the Supreme Court on constitutional matters

regarding elections and decisions of some election tribunals over turning some

of the April 2007 election results. Also, the country's judiciary duly considered

lessons learned from previous election tribunals and generated timely

guidelines to enhance overall efficiency of the tribunals for the 2007 elections.

The tribunals were inaugurated timely and so far have worked with overt

determination to assert their independence from any form of interference.

Nigerian election tribunals are now set up to settle disputes arising from the

2007 elections and have recorded the highest numbers of over-turned election

results in the country's history.

Most of the decisions of the election tribunals justified the statements of

domestic and international observers on the 2007 elections pointing out

weaknesses in the Nigerian electoral system. The most notable thing about

these reports, particularly those by National Democratic Institute (NDI),

International Republican Institute (IRI), Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS), and the European Union (EU), is the similarity of

conclusions on the problems and difficulties of INEC in terms of lack of

autonomy, inadequate funding, and lack of appropriate organizational and

managerial capacities.

The EU statement is the most detailed and comprehensive review of the

entire election process. While statements of the observers provoked defensive

comments from INEC, many Nigerians are in agreement with the trends and

conclusions highlighted in the reports. On one hand there is a general lack of

confidence in the electoral system. On the other hand, Nigerians acknowledge

elections as a key democratic institution and prefer to use “regular, open and

honest elections” rather than “other methods” to choose leaders. These

responses no doubt signal to all vital stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral

process the need for broad-based electoral reforms targeting the country's

democratic institutions which at present are very weak, undeveloped, and

grossly incapable of positively influencing the direction of electoral politics in

the country. One critical area for reform is in the method of political financing

and unrestrained private funding of political parties and candidates.

Political corruption, in its several forms, including unregulated use of

money in politics, has not yet received adequate attention in the policy

environment, civil society circles or the research community in Nigeria. All

these platforms generally lack necessary information, skills and knowledge to

engage the issues. These challenges, coupled with the lack of political support

for anti-corruption initiatives in the country, have made the task of mapping

trends and patterns in 'money and politics' certainly not an easy one. The task is

further complicated since the activities and operations of many governmental

agencies and political parties in the country are shrouded in secrecy.

Nonetheless, the intellectual efforts that culminated in the production of this

xvi

book accepted from the onset that knowledge-driven advocacy and civic

actions against political corruption are possible in the country.

Discussions on ‘money and politics’ in Nigeria should address the

following broad questions: Where is the country today? How did it get there?

Where should it be? What are the strategic requirements to get the country to

where it ought to be? Who are the critical stakeholders in this calculation?

Attention should also be given to the following specific questions: Is the

existing legal framework for conducting elections adequate to address

problems of money in politics? Can the 2006 Electoral Act provide the

necessary foundation for party finance reform? What is the prospect of

electoral reform beyond rhetoric declarations and official pronouncements?

How can political parties and other critical stakeholders in the Nigerian

electoral process engage the issue of regulating the use of money in politics?

What is the extent of influence on environmental factors such as weak parties

and ‘godfatherism’ as major hindrances to current efforts at electoral reform?

What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for successful electoral

reform?

The above questions have become prominent in the discourse about money

and politics in Nigeria. These questions are asked today as part of an emerging

consensus in the country around electoral democracy; one that accepts

electoral reform is necessary for restoring public confidence in the democratic

experiment. Thus, generally there is a growing awareness on the need to review

the 2006 Act, reform political parties, redefine citizen eligibility to vote, ensure

safety of citizens votes, limit the influence of money in elections, control

election-related conflicts, and regulate financing to parties and candidates, as

key elements in the electoral reform process.

The most useful way of looking at the broad issues crucial to the

consolidation of democracy in Nigeria, including the electoral reform and other

related issues in the Nigerian democratic experiment, is from a historical

perspective. Over three decades of military rule distorted social values and

undermined democratic institutions in Nigeria, political parties and civil

society inclusive. It was worse for the development of the country's party

system. The political parties were in complete limbo, and almost near

extinction, courtesy of the numerous military coups and counter-coups that

punctuated Nigeria's political history. The rise and fall of the Nigerian military

is well documented in the literature on politics and development in Nigeria.

Suffice to say, however, that the military held all democratic institutions

captive between 1966 (when they first struck) and 1999 (when they retreated in

humiliation), except for their occasional ceremonious ”stepping aside.”

Although the country held three national elections since 1999, Nigeria's

democratic institutions remain largely weak and undeveloped. Looking at the

events of the past few years, one can reasonably argue the democratic system in

xvii

Nigeria is still in its infancy, and there are forces at work that could undermine

the foundations of a new democracy. One challenge is ensuring transparency in

the electoral process. The electoral system of a country is the critical institution

which shapes and influences the rules of political competition for state power

because it determines what parties look like, who is represented in the

legislature, how accountable these representatives are to the electorate and

above all who governs. It is good to know that the way an electoral system

operates determines the degree of public confidence and support for the

democratic system itself. An electoral system regulates elections and other

related activities. The weakness of the legal framework in controlling the use of

money in politics, the long-time indifference of Nigerians to the problem of

party finance, and the rent-seeking behaviour of political elites and their parties

constitute major challenges to the Nigerian electoral system.

Weak structures and ineffective operations of political parties made things

worse for the electoral environment in the country. Well-functioning political

parties are essential for the success of democracy. However, in the particular

case of Nigeria, there are limited opportunities for the development of political

parties. Political party activities resumed in Nigeria towards the end of 1998

after a long period of military rule during which party activities were banned.

Only three political parties Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Nigerian

Peoples Party (ANPP) and People Democratic Party (PDP) contested

elections in 1999. Although there were 30 parties in place in 2003, only two

parties PDP and ANPP dominated the Presidential and National Assembly

elections. It turned out many of the parties contesting the 2003 elections lacked

the required experience. For example, on the matter of transparency and

accountability in party funding, many political parties lacked expertise and

resources to maintain proper records. In 2005, a report by INEC on the audited

accounts of the 30 political parties for the years 1999 to 2003 shows “that most

of if not all 30 parties did not keep books and records along with significant

accounting failures, including the failure to account for vehicles, failure to

prepare a budget, and personalization of party funds… even the ruling Peoples

Democratic Part (PDP) whose members hold the office of president,

approximately 75% of the seats in the National Assembly, as well as most of the

1

seats of government in the states, had no proper accounting records.”

The 2003 general elections presented opportunities and challenges that

necessitated electoral reform in Nigeria. For example, former President

Obasanjo at various times publicly showed deep concern for the high cost of

election campaigns in the country. He drew attention to the option that political

parties, rather than individual office seekers, should canvass for votes in

elections. President Obasanjo, in an address at the INEC-Civil Society Forum

Seminar on 27 November 2003, also lamented the dangers associated with

xviii

1Amy M. Loprest,

T

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nsp

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ent

P

ublic

F

unding in

N

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:

R

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nd

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eco

mm

end

a

tions

, March

2005. p.4.

uncontrolled use of money during elections. Judging by the concerns expressed

from several quarters, the time appeared ripe for the re-examination of the very

foundation of Nigeria's electoral system.

The idea of comprehensive electoral reform received prominence only after

the 2003 elections. The early efforts in this direction culminated in the

enactment of the 2006 Act. The outcomes of the 2007 general elections further

raised awareness among various stakeholders for the need of an overhaul of the

Nigerian electoral system. One area that received wide publicity by INEC and

comments and reactions from the general public is the need to introduce reforms

to regulate monetary transactions by parties, politicians and candidates at all

levels of the electoral process. Also, there were concerns on how to emphasize

disclosure of information on political party finances with the understanding that

disclosure will curb political corruption, prevent inflow of funds from

undesirable sources and enable the public to know more about sources of funds

into the coffers of parties and candidates. There was marked dissatisfaction with

the provisions in the 1999 Constitution which many found incapable of

regulating party financing.

Under the 1999 Constitution, the Independent National Election

Commission (INEC) has constitutional responsibility to monitor finances of

political parties, conduct an annual examination and audit of the funds of

political parties and publish a report for the public information. Section 228(c)

of the 1999 Constitution gives power to the National Assembly to provide an

annual grant to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for

disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them in

their functions. Accordingly, the National Assembly approved a N600 million

budget for the 30 registered parties in the April 2003 general elections. INEC

disbursed N180 million to all political parties with N6 million each, in line with

Section 80(2)(a) of the Electoral Act 2002 stating “30% of the grant shall be

shared among the political parties participation in respect of a general elections

for the grant has been made.” In accordance with Section 80(2)(b) of the

Electoral Act 2002, N420 million was disbursed by INEC to seven political

parties including: the Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Nigerian Peoples Party

(ANPP), Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), All Progressives Grand Alliance,

(APGA), National Democratic Party (NDP), Peoples Redemption Party (PRP),

and United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP).

The responsibility to monitor the use of money in campaign activities of

politicians and their parties poses some challenges to the Commission. For

instance, during the 1999 elections there were complaints and allegations by

civic groups about large donations by influential political figures and

businessmen to some parties. The Transition Monitoring Group - a coalition of

civil society organizations, in a statement on the conduct of the PDP, ANPP,

UNPP, and NDP primaries in January 2003, complained “there was widespread

xix

bribery of delegates with sacks stuffed with money to influence their votes.”

Sarah Jibril, a presidential candidate in the 2003 elections, petitioned the

leadership of her party over alleged misappropriation of grants from INEC.

The Commission was able to investigate some reported cases and even

monitored party finances to some extent. For instance, following the reported

allegation of mismanagement of funds which was released to political parties

by INEC, the Commission in September 2003 ordered an account audit of the

four political parties. But for a very long time INEC was unable to perform

audits or issue reports on the finance of political parties due to lack of

cooperation from most political parties.

The problem of weak regulatory framework for the control of the use of

money in politics is not limited to the 1999 Constitution. In the 2002 Electoral

Act, used for the 2003 elections, Section 84(3) states “Election expenses of

Political Party shall be submitted to the Commission in a separate audited

return within three months after polling day and such shall be signed by the

party's auditors and countersigned by the Chairman of the Party as the case may

be and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit by the signatories as to the

correctness of its contents.” In the case of the 2003 elections the deadline for

submission of the audited report was 3 August; after the final polling day of 3

May 2003. Most political parties violated the deadline and by the end of 2003

only a few submitted their reports to the Commission.

Under the 2006 Act there are two main sources of funding for political

parties. Public funding comes from the government, as stated in Sections 90

and 91 of the 2006 Electoral Act. Private funding, on the other hand, has to do

with monies and material contributions made to the political parties. This

includes membership dues, levies, proceeds from lunching, fines, proceeds

from investments, interests on savings, voluntary donations, etc. (Sections 92,

93(9) of the Electoral Act 2006). In Section 226, the Constitution mandates the

INEC to submit the audited reports of political parties to the National

Assembly. These constitutional provisions are expatiated in Sections 88 to 95

of Electoral Act 2006. In spite of these provisions, there are problem areas.

First, Section 93(9) of Electoral Act 2006 contradicts the constitutional

provision in Section 221 of the 1999 Constitution as well as Section 308 of the

Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990, both which prohibit corporate bodies

from making contributions to political parties.

Secondly, provisions on reporting and disclosure by political parties were

regularly breached. The INEC audit report on all political parties is yet to be

made public, even though it has been months after the 2007 elections. Despite

the extension of deadlines given to parties for submission of their financial

reports to INEC, only 26 out of 50 political parties submitted their reports.

Reasons for delay range from indifference to fraud as was the case in 2003. In

the words of Dr I. J Igbani, then INEC National Commissioner and Chairman

xx

of Political Party Monitoring Committee (PPMC), “During the audit of the

2003 accounts of the political parties, the Commission observed certain

shortcomings in the submissions by many political parties. These include: (a)

unaccounted political party expenditures; (b) unconfirmed and unidentified

sources of funds; and (c) poor financial record keeping.” A breakdown of the

report shows ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Nigeria

People's Party (ANPP) had no proper accounting records while the Alliance for

Democracy (AD) had no conventional record. Seventeen of the political parties

had no record of accounting at all. In addition to improper accounting records,

the ANPP, which happens to be one of the oldest parties, is said to have operated

without a budget. As a corollary to that, financial scandals have become

recurring decimals among the Nigerian political parties. This has increased

public disillusionment and undermined public confidence in the political

process.

The experiences from previous elections, and the last three since return to

civil rule, have demonstrated the need for electoral reform, including the need

for an adequate control mechanism for party finance. The outcomes of the 2003

elections drew the attention of many to the need to reflect on how politics is

financed and how to regulate political party funding in Nigeria. The rising high

cost of elections and its links to political corruption attracted comments across

the country. Many wondered why there were no effective laws to ensure

disclosure of expenditures and contributions to campaign activities. At the end

of the general elections in 2003, there was no argument regarding whether

electoral reform was long overdue in the country. Neither was there doubt about

whether Nigerians were willing to support the process. What was uncertain was

whether there was sufficient political will to begin and end the process without

allowing it to be clouded with personal, selfish interests. The administration of

former President Olusegun Obasanjo made some efforts in that direction before

it got swallowed up in the third term struggles.

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) with technical

support from development partners, took the lead in the electoral reform

process. Some civil society groups, notably the Electoral Reform Network

(ERN), received assistance from a section of the donor community for

advocacy activities. The submission of a Draft Electoral Bill to the National

Assembly in December 2004 began the electoral reform process. The original

bill can be categorized into five broad areas:

(I) Consolidation of various enactments (INEC Establishment Act,

INEC Establishment Amendment, Electoral Act 2002 and the

1999 Constitution);

(ii) Introduction of the INEC fund, into which all monies accruing to

the Commission except monies required for personal

emoluments of members and staff shall be paid;

xxi

(iii) Appointment of the Secretary to the Commission, who under the

2002 Act was appointed by the President from among serving

permanent secretaries;

(iv) Introduction of new provisions to deal with assistance to

disabled voters to enable participation, without hindrance, in the

Commission's activities; and

(v) Introduction of campaign finance provisions for both parties and

their candidates

Out of all specific areas for reform in the draft bill, those on political party

financing and related matters attracted the most attention. These provisions

included: Section 99 (1-7) Maximum election expenses for candidates to

various offices; Section 99(10) Maximum individual contribution to a

candidate; Section 101(2) Maximum expenses for election for a political party;

Section 102(1) Maximum donation by individual or other entity to political

party; Section 110(1) Limitation of campaign period to 45 days; Sections 134-

150 Punishments for electoral offences have been made more stringent; and

Section 167(2) Prosecution of certain electoral offences by legal officers of the

commission or other legal practitioners appointed by the commission.

The enactment of the Electoral Act 2006 was a very tortuous process for

INEC who holds responsibility for conducting general elections, and looked

forward to the benefits of conducting the 2007 elections with new electoral laws.

Electoral Act 2006 was passed by the National Assembly on 31 May 2006. The

delay in passing the bill by the National Assembly raised concerns among a few

civil society organizations that suspected deliberate attempts against the 2007

elections. The bill was eventually passed by the National Assembly. However, it

took the threats from some out-spoken members of the National Assembly

before the President signed the bill, giving it the power of law. The delay in the

process was due to lack of consensus among members of the political class on

the logic and contents of the on-going electoral reform.

In the 2006 Electoral Act, 27 Sections deal with political parties (Sections 78

to 105). It is interesting to note the Act pays considerable attention to the danger

of unregulated use of money in the electoral processes. Section 93 replaces

Section 84 of the 2002 Act along with 100 and 101, respectively. These

provisions limit the amount to be spent by the Presidential and Governorship

candidates to N500,000,000 and N100,000,000, respectively (Section 93 sub-

section 1-3 of the 2006 Electoral Act). The expenses incurred by candidates for

the senatorial seat are pegged down to N20,000,000, N10, 000,000 for the

House of Representatives, N5,000,000 for Chairmanship and N500,000 for

Councillorship election. Section 93 (Sub-section 8 paragraph a,b,c) disregards

“any expenditure incurred before the notification of the date fixed for the

election with respect to services rendered or material supplied before such

xxii

notification” in determination of the “total expenditure incurred in relation to

the candidature of any person at any election.” The 2007 elections were held

under the 2006 Act. It should be possible to assess the effectiveness of the

relevant provisions in the Act to regulate financial donations to a candidate's

electioneering campaign before they are nominated or even the notification of

the date fixed for elections.

Data on the cost of the 2007 election campaigns are still not available. The

laws state that INEC must report cases of contravention to law enforcement

agencies. Unfortunately, the law only requires disclosure of contributions after,

not before, elections. Even at that, both the parties and INEC failed to publicly

disclose financial reports of political parties as stipulated in the electoral laws.

INEC has never lived up to its responsibility in this respect since 1999 when it

first conducted national elections. Although there is a structure within INEC

with responsibility for party finance monitoring, not much has been

accomplished in terms of ensuring disclosure of sources of party funding or

even adequate reporting of campaign expenses. The Commission published a

political finance manual for use by political parties and appointed external

auditors. It is evident political parties and INEC are not working together in this

area. For example, majority of the political parties claimed to be unaware of the

existing political finance manual published and distributed by INEC. At the

end of an extended deadline for submission of financial reports by political

parties to 31 January, 2008 only 26 out of 50 registered parties submitted

anything close to financial reports. On the part of civil society, there is

significant growth in awareness of danger of unregulated use of money in

politics and its links with corruption. However, no organization seems to be

tracking campaign expenses. While political parties accuse one another of vote

buying during elections, there seem to be indifference as to the unregulated use

of money during party primaries. Worse still, disclosure is not yet part of the

dominant political culture in the country.

There are now 50 political parties in Nigeria with varying levels of capacity

to influence electoral politics. Most political parties in the country have not met

the standard criteria. They are confronted with lack of resources, inadequate

staffing, and lack of organizational capacity. But more importantly these

political parties manifest problems associated with the lack of internal

democracy in their structures and operations. For instance, in many political

parties, the decision making process, resources allocations, and the nomination

of candidates for political appointments are dominated by a few rich and

influential members; referred to as ‘godfathers.’ The prominence of the latter in

Nigerian electoral politics continues to complicate the electoral environment

with unrestrained private funding for political parties.

The ruling Peoples Democratic Party's (PDP) won a majority in the 2007

general elections at all levels of government. The new government was

xxiii

inaugurated at national and state levels on 29 May 2007. However, the 2007

elections were reported by both domestic and international observers as having

been riddled with a wide range of procedural “irregularities” and electoral

frauds. In the past, the period immediately after elections had been characterized

2

by violence, providing the military with rationale for intervention. Although

there were initial protests and agitations over the outcomes and results of the

elections which gave the PDP the presidency, a majority of state governors and

also majority seats in the legislative houses, perceptions of reconciliation by the

new administration of President Umar Yar’ Adua seemed to reduce tensions. The

announcement made by President Yar' Adua in favour of “government of

national unity” enhanced the public image of the new administration. The

friendly disposition of President Yar' Adua toward opposition parties, the desire

to make his government more inclusive, coupled with official pronouncements

in support of electoral reform attracted support from the opposition, notably the

All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP), and to some extent civil society. However,

principal actors in the recently held national elections - General Mohammdu

Buhari and the former Vice-president Atiku Abubarkar - remained resolute in

their commitment to legal action against the results of the presidential elections.

The situation in Nigeria appeared fairly stable during the first few weeks of

President Yar'Adua's administration, despite the fact, many Nigerians were

frustrated with the shortcomings of the election process that produced the Yar’

Adua administration. Setting up the Presidential Committee on Electoral

Reform under the chairmanship of Justice Uwais, a former Chief Justice of

Nigeria, further demonstrated the administration's commitment to reform the

electoral process. However, when some election tribunals began to over-turn the

results of many of the ‘victors’ in the 2007 elections, it dawned on many

Nigerians what went wrong in the process and outcomes of the 2007 elections.

Limited information still exists in the public domain on the cost of elections,

violation of party finance regulations and activities and operations of political

parties in Nigeria. As a result, there is rising consciousness about the dangers of

political corruption in the country and the need to control the influence of money

in politics as a part of the electoral reform process. This consciousness, however,

needs to be consolidated into concrete policy frameworks and programmes,

drawing upon global best practices. This requires a public advocacy component

to target behaviourial charge. In this calculation, the role of civil society is

paramount. Enacting laws and creating institutions will not, ‘per se’, achieve the

desired goals. For this to be achieved, there is need for a multi-track approach

xxiv

2Two particular cases suffice here for illustration: The military first intervened in Nigeria after the whole

country was thrown into civil unrest following the 1964 elections. In many parts of the Southwest it is still

difficult to wipe out sad memories of 'operation we tie' from its victims. Again, in 1983 the military junta

claimed they struck after the country became almost ungovernable from the effects and series of violent

reactions to the “landslide victory” of the ruling party, National Party of Nigeria (NPN), at the polls.

which entails strengthening the capacity of INEC to deal with the problem of

party finance, build capacity of political parties to keep proper records of

financial transactions, and support civil society organizations to monitor

expenditures on elections.

Civil society groups are critical stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral

process. Civil society groups in Nigeria got their first taste of organized

electoral participation in 1998-99. During the 1999 elections, the Transition

Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of civil society groups working to

promote democracy and good governance in Nigeria coordinated the activities

of many civil society groups that participated in the elections. By 2003 the

scope and quality of participation by civil society organizations extended

significantly: four large civil society groups the Labor Election Monitoring

Team; the Federation of Muslim Women's Associations of Nigeria

(FOMWAN), the Muslim League for Accountability (MULLAC); and the

Justice, Development and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church (JDPC)

joined TMG in election observation. Also, a number of smaller women's groups

and conflict mitigation networks participated. Apart from observing elections,

Nigerian civil society was also involved extensively in civic education with

support from donor agencies; notably the United States Agency for

International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International

Development (DfID) and the European Union (EU). This admittedly reflects

the newly emerging trend in development assistance which sees political party

reform as a major area requiring systematic intervention.

By 2007, not much improvement was recorded in the area of civil society

engagement with issue of political financing. Today, however, there exists a

network of civil society groups and other stakeholders -the Political Finance

Monitoring Group (PFMG). Members of this network meet periodically to

discuss methods for developing solutions to problems of political finance. The

expansion of groups involved in this network and its consolidation is desirable.

It will measure the ability of the Nigerian civil society to watch over the

electoral process, accounting for the influence of money in politics.

There is a section of vital stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral process that

think the electoral processes initiated by President Yar’Adua holds great

prospect for democratic consolidation in the country. The attention of Nigerians

is regularly drawn to the commitment of the new administration, the favourable

disposition towards and support of the international community for electoral

reform and the personality and pedigree of the members of the Electoral

Reform Committee. There is the sense in which these variables add value to the

process, however, much depends on the existence of an appropriate political

culture that supports the enterprising nature of members of the Electoral

Reform Committee.

Electoral reform has several political ramifications demanding complex

xxv

structural and institutional reform as well as extensive political will. The

success of the reform depends largely on sufficient commitment and

participation of all the stakeholders - government, civil society, development

partners, donors etc. Without sufficient involvement and participation of all

stakeholders in the reform process, efforts and initiatives aimed at changing the

electoral behaviour in the country stand the risk of sabotage.

Finally, elements of electoral reform, including political finance reform,

definitely require further research to precisely identify and define issues.

Efforts at electoral reform should consider the importance of scientific research

which entails data and information gathering, analysis and re-analysis. There is

a need to generate a lot of information and data on different aspects of party

finance in the country. Research programmes are needed to generate reliable

and regular flow of data on other areas of money and politics and its effects on

electoral politics. There is the sense in which it can be said that this book

represents a step in this direction.

xxvi

1

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:

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uption

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esults ,

2003, p. 3

This book is a product of two seminars on the theme of ‘money and politics' held

by IFES at the University of Jos and the University of Ibadan in May 2006. It

addresses the dimensions of political corruption in Nigeria that has begun to

attract the attention of various stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral process.

Since the return to electoral politics in 1999, and particularly after the 2003

general elections, Nigeria's political parties have been criticized by the media,

academics, observers and the electorate for corrupt and unbridled use of money

in politics. The anti-corruption initiatives of the administration of Chief

Olusegun Obasanjo provided a suitable environment for some civil society

groups to engage governments and other stakeholders on the issue of corruption

and its effect on governance. There exists an awakened consciousness in

Nigeria about the danger of political corruption including political finance

malpractices. However, the question remains whether the rise in consciousness

translates into new social values and attitudes for stakeholders government,

election management bodies, political parties, civil society in the electoral

process and in the way they interact with money and politics.

In a nation-wide survey on the perceptions of Nigerians regarding

corruption and governance conducted in 2001 by a consortium of experts from

Nigerian universities, over 80% of the sampled population regarded corruption

as “serious.” Respondents also ranked political parties among the most corrupt

1

institutions in the country. The details of the findings from the survey listed the

30 top most corrupt institutions in Nigeria with the police as number one. In

ranking government agencies and parastatals according to their levels of

involvement in corrupt practices, the first and second most corrupt government

agencies in Nigeria are the police and the National Electric Power Authority

(NEPA) (now Power Holding Company of Nigeria, PHCN), respectively. The

third, fourth, fifth and sixth most corrupt institutions of government are political

parties, the executive arm of federal, state and local governments, members of

the national and state assemblies and the court. The Customs and Exercise

Department, Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC) offices of the

Accountant-General at federal and state levels and Water Boards are also

among the top ten corrupt governmental agencies.

xxiii

xxiiixxiiixxvii

MONEY AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA: AN OVERVIEW

Vic

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o

r

A.

O

. A

d

e

t

u

l

a

INTRODUCTION

Other surveys conducted by IFES in 2007 reveal public perceptions on

“corruption in the realm of politics.” The report reveals that a majority of

Nigerians think it is wrong for an ordinary person to sell a vote in return for

goods or money. However, more than a third of the sampled population thinks it

is understandable to do so. Furthermore, “most think it is wrong for political

parties to offer money to people in return for their vote, but a third think it is

understandable for them to do so. A quarter of Nigerian adults admit someone

2

tried to offer them a reward or gift to vote for certain candidates in the election.”

Today in Nigeria, money politics, vote buying, godfatherism and “share the

money” are regular household phrases and slogans portraying moral decadence

of politicians. These usages adequately describe rent-seeking behaviour of

politicians, political parties and voters. Such practices include accepting bribes

from patrons and distributing money to buy votes. This has implications for

good governance processes, including political participation. A portion of the

Communiqué issued by the Nigerian Political Science Association at the end of a

one-day round-table on “Understanding the Electoral Process in Nigeria” in 1

February 2007 states: “The role of money in politics is strong. 'Godfathers,'

'money bags' and incumbents use police orderlies and state security

paraphernalia to intimidate voters and undermine elections.”

Money politics is quickly shrinking the political space, becoming a key

variable in determining who participates in electoral politics and how. For

example, nomination fees for party members seeking elective positions have

become so high that only the rich and daring “political entrepreneurs” can

participate in party primaries. In 1992, for example, presidential hopefuls spent

over one billion naira during the primaries while other not-so-rich contenders

had about 120 million naira as a budget for primaries. Although the reckless

‘abiku’ political transition programme of General Ibrahin Babangida's

administration was aborted, this trend of unrestrained use of money for political

influence persists to date. Women and youth are the most vulnerable in this

situation because of their little or lack of access to wealth.

Today, money drowns votes and voices in Nigeria as ‘godfathers’ openly

confess about shady deals, funding or sponsoring elections for 'godsons' and

purchasing electoral victory. Businessmen and women are not left out in this

illegitimate and illicit use of money for political influence. In a recent interview

General T.Y Danjuma admitted, “I helped to finance his (President Olusegun

Obasanjo) first term election. I raised $7 million. Slightly more than half of it

came from my business associates.” General Danjuma also added, “Not once

2

IFES, “ A Nigerian Perspective on the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections: Results From Pre-and

Post Election Surveys” (August 2007)

xxviii

did he (Obasanjo) find out from me where this money came from. Was it from

me, from my business associates, whether l stole it or whatever he didn't ask

3

me!” There are many such as the aforementioned in the political apocrypha of

Nigeria and on the conscience of many political merchants.

H

ow

d

i

d

Nige

r

i

a

ge

t

o

t

h

is

p

oi

n

t

?

The problem of unregulated use of money in politics did not begin today. There

are antecedents in the history of modern Nigeria, beginning with the politics of

nationalism in the 1950s, similar to rent-seeking behaviours of parties,

politicians and voters. For example, the absence of strict legislation to regulate

party finance made it possible for politicians and political parties to engage in

illegal party financing and corruption in the Nigeria's First Republic. The

electoral laws under which elections were conducted in the 1950s and 1960s

were derived from the provision of the British Representation of the Peoples Act

of 1948/9 and its regulations. The 1959 elections were conducted under the

provision of the Nigeria (Electoral Provisions) Order-in-Council, LN 117 of

1958 enacted by the British Parliament. During this period, there was no clearly

defined regulatory framework on party finance and political party funding was

primarily carried out through private parties since candidates were responsible

for election expenses. Two cases of corruption involving political parties were

judicially investigated. In 1956, the Foster Sutton Tribunal of Enquiry

investigated allegation of impropriety in the conduct of some politicians from

the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) with business interests in the

African Continental Bank (ACB). Similarly in 1962 the Coker Commission of

Inquiry was set up to look into the affairs of six Western Nigeria public

corporations allegedly involved in corruption with the leadership of the Action

Group.

During Nigeria's Second Republic (1979 -1983), a combination of private

and public funding was used for the first time. Political parties occupied the

central position in politics of the Second Republic. The 1979 Constitution of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria clearly stated, “No association other than a political

party [was allowed to] canvas for votes for any candidate at any election or

contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election expenses of any

candidate at an election.” The 1979 Constitution in Section 205 empowers the

National Assembly to make laws “for an annual grant to the Federal Electoral

Commission from disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis

to assist them in the discharge of their function.” The government rendered

financial assistance to political parties by way of subventions. In addition,

private funding, except from outside Nigeria, was allowed, according to Section

205 of the 1979 Constitution. There was no limit on how many corporate bodies

xxix

3

See

T

he Gu

a

r

di

a

n,

Sunday, February 24, 2008, p.7

1

and individuals could contribute to political parties. Apart from the ban on

political parties receiving external funds as in Section 205 of the 1979

Constitution, and the prohibition of associations other than political parties from

making contribution to the funds of political parties or the election of any

candidates at any election, as in Section 201 of the 1979 Constitution, there were

no stricter constitutional or statutory regulations on the use of party financing

such as those of disclosure of donations. The result was illegal use of money to

influence decision making in political parties and the political process in

general.

Although the 1979 Constitution provided some form of check especially

with respect to external control of political parties, but even that was not

achieved in the 1979-1983 elections. The loopholes were exploited by the

financially and politically ambitious few who were able to use their wealth to

hijack political parties of their choice. With unbridled use of money, little or no

attention was paid to political mobilization by those seeking elective positions.

Politicians attached much importance to money which they used to buy the votes

of the electorates. One example was the occasion in Lagos in 1982 where ten

members of a political party donated N5 million at a fund-raising ceremony. The

experiences of the 1979 and 1983 elections were such that political parties and

politicians had unrestricted freedom to use money from both legal and illegal

sources to finance their campaigns and other activities associated with their

election expenses. During the Second Republic, the role and activities of

'contractors' in government and political parties and other cases of political

'patronage' became very rampant. The reports of the various special tribunals

that tried politicians and office holders revealed gross abuse of public office and

impropriety in dealing with political parties.

The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria basically

reproduced the 1979 Constitution with some substantive amendments. Under

the 1999 Constitution, the Independent National Election Commission (INEC)

has constitutional responsibility to monitor the finances of political parties,

conduct an annual examination and audit of the funds of political parties and

publish a report for public information. Section 228(c) of the 1999 Constitution

gives power to the National Assembly to provide for an annual grant to the

Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for disbursement to

political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them with their functions.

Accordingly, the National Assembly approved a N600 million budget for the 30

registered parties in the April 2003 general elections. INEC disbursed N180

million to all political parties at N6 million each in accordance with Section

80(2)(a) of the 2002 Electoral Act: “30% of the grant shall be shared among the

political parties participation in respect of a general elections for the grant has

been made.” In accordance with Section 80(2)(b) of the 2002 Electoral Act,

N420 million was disbursed by INEC to seven political parties which include:

the Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP), Peoples'

xxx

Democratic Party (PDP), All Progressives’ Grand Alliance, (APGA) , National

Democratic Party (NDP), Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) and United Nigeria

People's Party (UNPP).

The responsibility to monitor the use of money in campaign activities of

politicians and their parties poses some challenges for the Commission. For

instance, during the 1999 elections there were complaints and allegations by

civic group about large donations by influential political figures and

businessmen to some parties. The Transition Monitoring Group - a coalition of

civil society organizations, in a statement on the conduct of the PDP, ANPP,

UNPP, and NDP primaries in January 2003, complained, “there was widespread

bribery of delegates with sacks stuffed with money to influence their votes.”

Also, Sarah Jibril, one of the presidential candidates in the 2003 elections

petitioned the leadership of her party over alleged misappropriation of funds.

The Commission was able to investigate some of the reported cases and even

monitored party finances to some extent. For instance, following the reported

allegation of mismanagement of funds released to political parties by INEC, the

Commission in September 2003 ordered an audit on four political parties. But

for very long time INEC was unable to perform audits or issue reports on the

finance of political parties due mainly to a lack of cooperation from most of the

political parties.

Section 84(3) of the 2002 Electoral Act states, “Election expenses of

Political Party shall be submitted to the Commission in a separate audited return

within three months after polling day and such shall be signed by the party's

auditors and countersigned by the Chairman of the Party as the case may be and

shall be supported by a sworn affidavit by the signatories as to the correctness of

its contents.” In the case of the 2003 elections the due date for submission of the

audited report of political parties was 3 August after the final polling day of 3

May 2003. Most political parties violated the deadline and by the end of 2003

only a few submitted their reports to the Commission.

Admittedly details of subventions to political parties are not readily

available. There are no available record on the exact amount of money spent by

candidates and political parties in Nigeria. However, there are indications of

heavy reliance on private funding in all the three elections in Nigeria since 1999;

more so that virtually all parties lack organizational capacity to generate their

own income through legitimate means. According to former President

Obasanjo, “the parties and candidates together spent during the last elections,

more than would have been needed to fight a successful war.” This view of

President Obasanjo is corroborated by a perceptive writer who observed, “More

than any election in Nigeria's chequered political history, the 2003 national

elections was determined by how much money candidates had. The electoral

process has become so expensive that only the rich or those dependent on rich

backers can run.” The writer also noted, “There is also the disturbing trend of

xxxi

questionable business people backing candidates with grey money.” The

increasing influence of ‘godfatherism’ in contemporary Nigerian politics can be

linked to uncontrolled party financing as witnessed in both Anambra and Oyo

States where State Governors had to negotiate and renegotiate peace with

‘godfathers’ and money-bags politicians who claimed to have helped them win

elections by all means! The absence of effective regulation of the amount of

private funding that political party can receive from private sources made all

forms of political mercantilism attractive and possible.

For the 2003 general elections, political parties received funding from the

public purse via grants approved by the National Assembly in pursuant of

Subsection (1) of Section 80 of the 2002 Electoral Act. This money was

insufficient to sustain parties and therefore they obtained funding from private

sources. One source of funding for political parties during the 2003 elections

was the Nigerian business community. For example, Corporate Nigeria was the

chief fundraiser of the Obasanjo/Atiku campaign. While there was no law

against political donations by private individuals, the Companies and Allied

Matters Act (1990), Section 308, prohibits corporate bodies from making

political donations. Some have spoken about the contradictions in the two laws

and suggested the need to set an explicit reference to permitted sources of

funding (including corporate donors, state owned companies, state institutions).

The 2007 general elections were conducted with the 2006 Electoral Act, a

hallmark of the electoral reform process led by the Obasanjo administration.

However, many unresolved issues around party finance and corruption still

exist. Public funding is guaranteed for political parties in Section 228(c) of the

4

1999 Constitution as well as Sections 90 and 91 of the 2006 Electoral Act.

Section 90 of the 2006 Electoral Act states that the National Assembly may

approve a grant for disbursement to political parties contesting elections. Also,

Section 91(1) says the National Assembly may make an annual grant to INEC

for distribution to political parties to assist them in their operations. These

funds, according to Section 91(2) (a & b) are to be shared on a ratio (10:90) in

favour of parties that have representation in the National Assembly. However,

following the decision of an Abuja Federal High Court on the case filed by the

5

Citizen Popular Party (CPP) and nineteen other opposition parties, INEC was

left with no other option but to share funds among political parties equally.

Apart from public funds, electioneering campaigns and other party activities,

the 2007 elections were supported through private sources including monies

and in-kind contributions made to political parties or candidates from:

xxxii

4

Electoral Act 2006 was signed into law on 6th June 2006 and was amended February 2007 by the National

Assembly

5 The judgment was delivered 15 December 2006 by Justice Abimbola O. Ogie of Federal High Court, Abuja

6

subscriptions, fees and levies from party membership, fines, proceeds from

investments made by the party, subventions and donations, gifts and grants by

individuals or groups of individuals as authorized by the law, loans, interests on

7

savings, and sale of party nomination forms, etc.

Reliable data on the costs of election campaigns and other related activities

in Nigeria is difficult to obtain. Research in the area of party finance is

underdeveloped in the country; hence, advocacy for policy change are rarely

based on adequate information and good knowledge of the various dimensions

of the problem. These notwithstanding, there are growing concerns about high

costs of election campaigns and other related activities and the implications for

political corruption in the country.

This publication is one of the pioneering efforts to bridge the gap in

knowledge production and best practice in advocacy around the theme of

money and politics, party finance and political corruption in Nigeria. Different

aspects of the problem in Nigeria are addressed in this book. Marcin Walecki's

contribution-“Political Money and Corruption: Limiting Corruption in

Political Finance”- conceptually introduces corrupt and illegal political finance

and frames a checklist of initiatives to limit corruption in political finance. The

issues raised in most of the other contributions can be viewed against this

checklist which was derived from experiences elsewhere. The all-embracing

issue of political finance reform is addressed by Victor Adetula in his

contribution “Electoral Act 2006, Civil Society Engagement and the Prospect

of Political Finance Reform in Nigeria.” This chapter analyzes the ravaging

effects of money and the salvaging efforts of civil society. Unfortunately, much

needed reforms are too slow to arrive and party funding still remains confused

and problematic.

In Nigeria, money-bags own political parties and deploy them at will. They

donate party secretariats and huge funds and in return dominate the party

decision process. The independence and supremacy of the party is

compromised. A definition of ‘godfathers’ is given in the contribution by John

Ayoade - “Godfather Politics in Nigeria.” The chapter indicates the negative

and pernicious role and effect of ‘godfathers’ in Nigerian politics. Reading

through the contribution, it is easy to see how ‘godfathers’ strangulate

democracies. ‘Godfathers’ are, among other things, merchants of violence and

fear. They operate private military armies and obstruct good governance. The

chapter by Emmanuel Aiyede - “The Role of INEC, ICPC and EFCC in

Combating Political Corruption” reviews the performance of the newly

inaugurated institutions in Nigeria for combating corruption and proving two

xxxiii

6

T

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newspaper of 4 July 2007 reported that PDP has asked members of the party in the National Assembly

to contribute N500million towards the building of the multi-billion party secretariat in Abuja

7 See Sections 92, 93(9) of the Electoral Act 2006 and Article 18 of the 2001 Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)

Constitution as amended in 2006

xxxiv

things. First, corruption persists not for lack of efforts and second it persists

because good laws and/or intentions are not enough as deterrents. The efficacy

of any law lies in its enforcement. Culprits are never known to enforce any law

against them. The contribution by Ezekiel Adeyi -“Funding of Political Parties

and Candidates in Nigeria: Analysis of the Past and Present”- examines the

problem of illicit party funding in the political history of Nigeria. It is indeed

useful to see the parallels and common elements that cut across different

historical periods. The contribution by Kachollon Best “Gender, Money and

Politics in Nigeria” examines the financial and political handicap affecting

women in Nigeria.

Other pathologies like vote buying and violence are also addressed in the

book. This volume is a modest wake-up call for Nigeria to address a monster

preventing democracy from taking root. That awareness is a ‘sine qua non’ to

the solution in order to prevent the whispers of discomfort from cumulating into

arrears of anger in search of a pay day.

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Political finance is influenced by, and influences, relations between parties,

politicians, party membership and the electorate. Money matters for democracy

because much of democratic political activity simply could not occur without it.

Narrow definitions of political finance tend to focus on 'campaign and party

1

funding'. In fact, many extra-party actors are involved in political competition

with the objective of shaping public policy agenda, influencing legislation or

electoral debates and outcomes. A primary example was the Fujimori-

Montesinos case in Peru. In mid-September 2000, a videotape was released that

showed Vladimiro Montesinos, the head of Peru's National Intelligence

Service, apparently engaging in vote-buying by handing some US $15,000 to

opposition congressman Luis Alberto Kouri to switch sides and give the

government a majority in parliament. The scandal led to the resignation of

Alberto Fujimori as President of Peru.

According to a typology developed by Vifredo Pareto, there are three

motives for providing political funds: 1) idealistic or ideological, 2) social,

aiming at social honours or access, and 3) financial, striving for material

2

benefits. The latter comes as no surprise, but it can have major political

consequences: in Germany, in July 2002, Rudolf Scharping, Germany's defense

minister, was replaced after the magazine Stern reported that he had taken DM

140,000 from Moritz Hunzinger, a PR consultant with links to the arms industry.

German cabinet members are prohibited from earning anything other than their

salaries. Scharping admitted to taking the payments, but said most of the money

3

had gone to charity or had been used for 'political work'. In another case,

Kimitaka Kuze, head of the Japanese Financial Reconstruction Commission,

was forced to step down in July 2000 following revelations he had received

nearly US $2.1 million from Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Corp. between 1989

4

and 1994.

POLITICAL MONEY AND CORRUPTION:

LIMITING CORRUPTION IN POLITICAL FINANCE

1 A full list of activities related to political finance might include:(1) Election campaign funds; (2) Political

party funds; (3) Grants to elected officials; (4) Political organisation funds; (5) Pressure and interest group

funds; (6) Political lobbying funds; (7) Litigation funds in politically relevant cases; (8) Partisan mass media

funds; (9) Corrupt political funds; (10)Unofficial payments to elected officials; (11) Unofficial payments to

civil servants; (12) Unofficial payments to the mass media; and (13) Payments intended to improve the

electoral process as a whole.

2Vifredo Pareto,

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Vol. 4 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935).

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(United Kingdom), 19 July 2002.

4

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, 1 August 2000.

1

Chapter 1

111

Problems of political finance are at the heart of the debate on political

corruption. Yet the meaning of political finance-related corruption is often

unclear. In general, 'corrupt' political finance involves behaviour on the part of a

candidate or a party, in which they improperly or unlawfully conduct financial

operations for the gain of a political party, interest group, or of an individual

candidate.

First, against the general perception among public opinion, it should be

stressed that political finance and political corruption are separate notions. Only

when their valences overlap does the zone of corrupt political funding emerge.

Second, the narrow definitions of political corruption, such as “the use of public

office for unauthorized private gain”, do not include many forms of political

finance-related corruption. Mainly because high positions within political

parties are often not included into definition of public office and the abuse of

money as a political resource can often benefit parties or organizations as well

5

as individuals.

Thirdly, there is an important difference between political finance

regulations and actual practices, and the meaning of 'corrupt' political financing

should not limit itself to the term 'illegal political finance'. Illegal political

finance refers to contributions or use of money that contravene existing laws