Chapter

Intellectual Virtue

January 2009

DOI:10.1007/978-1-4020-9567-2_9

In book: A Theory of Epistemic Justification (pp.161-177)

Authors:

My theory does not require for one’s justification of a belief that one possess a general capacity or faculty for discriminating truths from falsehoods across a range of propositions to which the belief belongs. Such a faculty is a kind of intellectual virtue. It abstracts away from particular cognitive states or acts to an abiding feature of intellectual life, much as moral virtue abstracts away from particular right acts to stable traits of moral character. This chapter explains why some philosophers require intellectual virtue for justification, and why it is a mistake to do so.

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ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.

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