A central assumption of human evolutionary psychology is that the brain is comprised of many specialized psychological mechanisms that were shaped by natural selection over vast periods of time to solve the recurrent information-processing problems faced by our ancestors (Buss, 1995, 1999; Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Gaulin & McBurney, 2000; Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000; Symons, 1995). Although this so-called “narrow” approach to evolutionary psychology1 shares many features with the broader meta-theoretical perspective of evolutionary biology, this approach can be considered just one application (among many) of the basic principles and knowledge of evolutionary biology, rather than the sine qua non of all “evolutionary psychology”. In this manner, the term “narrow” merely reflects a focus on a particular set of core assumptions (inclusive fitness, gene-centered selection, adaptationism), rather than a limited or necessarily myopic application of evolutionary biology. Paradoxically, some researchers have argued that what is referred to here as the “narrow” approach to evolutionary psychology actually represents the ascendent view in much of human evolutionary psychology (see Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000; Ellis & Ketelaar, in press). The aim of this chapter is to illustrate how researchers can evaluate competing evolutionary explanations at all levels of analysis ranging from the most basic assumptions lying at the hard core of the meta-theory to the strong and weak predictions lying in the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses that surrounds the hard core.