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Eckhart and the Will of God: A Reply to Stump
Abstract
To ‘will as God wills’ is expected of Christians: ‘Thy will be done.’ But does this imply that one is expected to be content, even pleased, with whatever happens, since whatever happens is in some sense what God wills? Eleonore Stump labels such an expectation a ‘stern-minded attitude,’ and she claims to find it in the work of Meister Eckhart. Contrasting it with the positions taken by Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas Aquinas, Stump rejects sternmindedness as too harsh on natural human feeling and based on a faulty concept of the will. I argue that Stump fails to situate some of Eckhart's admittedly extreme claims in the framework of his metaphysics and the larger context of his writings, which show he is clearly not stern-minded. Finally, I offer an explanation of Eckhart's injunction to ‘live without why/will.’
This paper shall explore the human will in the context of Meister Eckhart's understanding of deificatory event. Contrary to Eckhart's view that deificatory event does somehow need no will, I shall argue that willing is required in the said event. The reason for this is that any intentional act necessitates the operation of the will. Second, in connection to the first, taking cue from Heidegger, Gelassenheit or letting-be or releasement as a condition for deification remains within the domain of the will. Third, in post-deificatory event, a deified person still functions as divinely human creature and so thus the will remains operative. This is because the will serves, as this paper argues, as a 'hinge' where any form of human act is informed by the will.
I discuss Eckhart’s and Aquinas’ conception of human-divine union with reference to what I call the problem of intrinsic goods, a problem concerning how to reconcile the pursuit of actions which are prima facie sought for their own sake (e.g. pursuing justice for the marginalized, listening to a work of music) with the pursuit of God as the ultimate end of every action. I introduce the problem with the help of Germain Grisez’s critique of Aquinas’ account of union with God, and I suggest that Eckhart’s alternative conception of union may be understood as an attempt to resolve (or dissolve) the problem.
(Forthcoming, Medieval Mystical Theology) I discuss Eckhart’s and Aquinas’ conception of human-divine union with reference to what I call the problem of intrinsic goods, a problem concerning how to reconcile the pursuit of actions which are prima facie sought for their own sake (e.g. pursuing justice for the marginalized, listening to a work of music) with the pursuit of God as the ultimate end of every action. I introduce the problem with the help of Germain Grisez’s critique of Aquinas' account of union with God, and I suggest that Eckhart's alternative conception of union may be understood as an attempt to resolve (or dissolve) the problem.
Can one hold consistently both that there is suffering in the world and that there is an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God? This book argues that one can. The opening section presents current research related to autism spectrum disorder to contend that some philosophical problems, including the problem of evil, are best considered with the help of narratives. Then the book investigates the moral psychology and value theory within which one typical medieval theodicy - that of Thomas Aquinas - is embedded. It also makes use of recent work in developmental psychology to illuminate these views. In the third section, the book presents detailed, innovative exegeses of the stories of Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary of Bethany, each of which is exemplary of a different form of suffering. In the context of the interpretations of these stories and the previous examination of Aquinas's views, the book then argues that an extended Thomistic theodicy can constitute a consistent and cogent defence for the problem of suffering.
This article first presents an overview of the arguments on behalf of a passible and so suffering God. These arguments are: 1. The experience of immense suffering over the past century, especially the Holocaust. In the midst of such suffering, God must himself suffer in solidarity with those who suffer. 2. The Bible, especially the Old Testament, bears witness to a suffering God. Also the cross is the revelational icon of the truth that God always suffers. 3. The impassibility of God is a remnant of Greek philosophy within the Christian notion of God. In the light of contemporary philosophy, especially with regards to Process Philosophy, a more Christian understanding of God is now offered, a notion that entails a passible and so suffering God. The author argues against a passible and suffering God by examining the Bible and the Christian tradition. He argues that the Christian notion of God, both by way of revelation and by way of philosophy, demands that God be impassible and so does not suffer. He believes that only an impassible God is truly loving. Moreover, he argues that it is precisely the human suffering of the Son of God that is truly redemptive.
(Trans.) and (Ed.) by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Second and Revised Edition
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Trans.) and (Ed.) by Fathers of the English Dominican Province
- Thomas Aquinas
) and (Ed.) by Fathers of the English Dominican Province
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