Neural Implants as Gateways to Digital-Physical Ecosystems and Posthuman Socioeconomic Interaction

Abstract

For many employees, ‘work’ is no longer something performed while sitting at a computer in an office. Employees in a growing number of industries are expected to carry mobile devices and be available for work-related interactions even when beyond the workplace and outside of normal business hours. In this article it is argued that a future step will increasingly be to move work-related information and communication technology (ICT) inside the human body through the use of neuroprosthetics, to create employees who are always ‘online’ and connected to their workplace’s digital ecosystems. At present, neural implants are used primarily to restore abilities lost through injury or illness, however their use for augmentative purposes is expected to grow, resulting in populations of human beings who possess technologically altered capacities for perception, memory, imagination, and the manipulation of physical environments and virtual cyberspace. Such workers may exchange thoughts and share knowledge within posthuman cybernetic networks that are inaccessible to unaugmented human beings.

Scholars note that despite their potential benefits, such neuroprosthetic devices may create numerous problems for their users, including a sense of alienation, the threat of computer viruses and hacking, financial burdens, and legal questions surrounding ownership of intellectual property produced while using such implants. Moreover, different populations of human beings may eventually come to occupy irreconcilable digital ecosystems as some persons embrace neuroprosthetic technology, others feel coerced into augmenting their brains to compete within the economy, others might reject such technology, and still others will simply be unable to afford it.

In this text we propose a model for analyzing how particular neuroprosthetic devices will either facilitate human beings’ participation in new forms of socioeconomic interaction and digital workplace ecosystems – or undermine their mental and physical health, privacy, autonomy, and authenticity. We then show how such a model can be used to create device ontologies and typologies that help us classify and understand different kinds of advanced neuroprosthetic devices according to the impact that they will have on individual human beings.

Full text

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Matthew E. Gladden
Institute of Computer Science, Polish Academy of Sciences
Neural implants as gateways
to digital-physical ecosystems
andposthumansocioeconomic
interaction
Introduction
For many employees, "work" is no longer something performed while sitting at
acomputer inan oce. Employees inagrowing number of industries are expected to
carry mobile devices and be available for work-related interactions even when beyond
the workplace and outside of normal business hours. In this article it is argued that
afuture step will increasingly be to move work-related information and communica-
tion technology (ICT) inside the human body through the use of neuroprosthetics, to
create employees who are always "online" and connected to their workplace’s digital
ecosystems. At present, neural implants are used primarily to restore abilities lost
through injury or illness, however their use for augmentative purposes is expected to
grow, resulting inpopulations of human beings who possess technologically altered
capacities for perception, memory, imagination, and the manipulation of physical
environments and virtual cyberspace. Such workers may exchange thoughts and
share knowledge within posthuman cybernetic networks that are inaccessible to
unaugmented human beings.

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INNOVATIVE AND DIGITAL ECONOMY SOCIETY INTHE DIGITAL AGE
Scholars note that despite their potential benets, such neuroprosthetic devices may
create numerous problems for their users, including asense of alienation, the threat
of computer viruses and hacking, nancial burdens, and legal questions surrounding
ownership of intellectual property produced while using such implants. Moreover,
dierent populations of human beings may eventually come to occupy irreconcilable
digital ecosystems as some persons embrace neuroprosthetic technology, others feel
coerced into augmenting their brains to compete within the economy, others might
reject such technology, and still others will simply be unable to aord it.
In this text we propose amodel for analysing how particular neuroprosthetic devices
will either facilitate human beings’ participation innew forms of socioeconomic
interaction and digital workplace ecosystems–or undermine their mental and physi-
cal health, privacy, autonomy and authenticity. We then show how such amodel can
be used to create device ontologies and typologies that help us classify and under-
stand dierent kinds of advanced neuroprosthetic devices according to the impact
that they will have onindividual human beings.
From Neuroprosthetic Devices to Posthuman
Digital-Physical Ecosystems
Existing Integration of the Human Brain with Work-Related
Digital-Physical Ecosystems
In recent decades the integration of the human brain with work-related digital eco-
systems has grown stronger and increasingly complex. Whereas once employees were
expected to use desktop computers during "working hours," for agrowing number of
employees it is now expected that they be available for work-related interactions at all
times through their possession and mastery of mobile (and now, wearable) devices
(Shih 2004; Gripsrud 2012). Along this path of ever closer human-technological
integration, an emerging frontier is that of moving computing inside the human
body through the use of implantable computers (Koops & Leenes 2012; Gasson 2012;
McGee 2008).

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The Potential of Neuroprosthetic Implants for Human
Enhancement
One particular type of implantable computer is aneuroprosthetic device (or neural
implant) designed to provide ahuman being with some sensory, cognitive, or motor
capacity (Lebedev 2014). Such neuroprostheses are currently used primarily for
therapeutic purposes, to restore abilities that have been lost due to injury or illness.
However, researchers have already developed experimental devices designed for pur-
poses of human enhancement that allow an individual to exceed his or her natural
biological capacities by, for example, obtaining the ability to perceive ultrasonic
waves or store digitized computer les within one’s body (Warwick 2014; Gasson
2012; McGee 2008).
Toward Posthuman Digital-Physical Ecosystems
e use of neuroprosthetics for purposes of human enhancement is expected to grow
over the coming decades, resulting inasegment of the population whose minds
possess unique kinds of sensory perception, memory, imagination, and emotional
intelligence and who participate insocial relations that are mediated not through the
exchange of traditional oral, written, or nonverbal communication but byneurotech-
nologies that allow the sharing of thoughts and volitions directly with other human
minds and with computers (McGee 2008; Warwick 2014; Rao, Stocco, Bryan, Sarma,
Youngquist, Wu, & Prat 2014).
Until now, communicating athought to another mind has required the thought to
be expressed physically as asocial action that is audible, visible, or tangible innature,
however future neuroprosthetics may facilitate the exchange of ideas directly at the
level of thought (Warwick 2014; Rao et al. 2014; Gladden 2015d), thereby allow-
ing the creation of human networks that can be understood as either "supersocial"
or "postsocial" innature. Not only might such posthuman (Ferrando 2013) digital
ecosystems be inaccessible to those who lack the appropriate form of neural augmen-
tation, but even their very existence may be invisible to unmodied human beings.
In this text, we will oen refer to such ecosystems as "digital" to emphasise the fact
that they may utilize an immersive cyberspace or other articial environment as
avirtualized locus for socioeconomic interaction. However, it should be kept inmind

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INNOVATIVE AND DIGITAL ECONOMY SOCIETY INTHE DIGITAL AGE
that any such virtual reality is always grounded inand maintained bythe computa-
tional activity of electronic or biological physical substrates; thus technically, digital
ecosystems should always be understood as "digital-physical" ecosystems.
The Need to Analyse Neuroprosthetics from Cybernetic,
Phenomenological, and Existentialist Perspectives
As abidirectional gateway, a neural implant not only aids one’s mind to reach out to
explore the world and interact with other entities; it may also allow external agents or
systems to reach into one’s mind to access–and potentially manipulate or disrupt–one’s
most intimate mental processes (Gasson 2012: 15–16). is makes it essential that
manufacturers who produce such devices, policymakers who can encourage or ban their
adoption, and users inwhom they will be implanted be able to understand the positive
and negative impacts of particular neuroprosthetic devices onindividual users. is calls
for the development of device ontologies and typologies for classifying and understand-
ing neuroprostheses that do not simply focus onthe devices’ technical characteristics
but which also consider auser’s lived experience of aneuroprosthetic device and which
integrate acybernetic analysis of "control and communication" (Wiener 1961) with phe-
nomenological and even existentialist perspectives (Gladden 2015d).
Existing Ontologies and Typologies of Neuroprosthetic Devices
Existing typologies for neuroprosthetics are primarily functional. For example,
aneuroprosthetic device can be classied based onthe nature of its interface with
the brain’s neural circuitry [sensory, motor, bidirectional sensorimotor, or cognitive
(Lebedev 2014)], its purpose [for restoration, diagnosis, identication, or enhance-
ment (Gasson 2012: 25)], or its location [non-invasive, partially invasive, or invasive
(Gasson 2012: 14)]. Typologies have also been developed that classify aneuropro-
sthesis according to whether it aids its human user to interact with areal physical
environment using his or her natural physical body, augments or replaces the user’s
natural physical body (e.g., with robotic prosthetic limbs), or allows the user to sense
and manipulate some virtual environment (Gladden 2015b).

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Formulating Our Model for an Ontology of
Neuroprosthetics
Here we propose a model for classifying and understanding neuroprosthetic
devices especially intheir role of integrating human beings into digital ecosystems,
economies and information systems. e model comprises two main dimensions,
of which one (impact) is further subdivided into two sub-dimensions (new capaci-
ties and detriments).
Roles of the Human User
A neuroprosthetic device aects its human user as viewed onthree levels: 1) the
human being as asapient metavolitional agent, aunitary mind that possesses its
own conscious awareness, memory, volition, and conscience–or "metavolitionality"
(Gladden 2015d; Calverley 2008)–2) the human being as an embodied organism
that inhabits and can sense and manipulate a particular environment through
the use of its body; and 3) the human being as asocial and economic actor who
interacts with others to form social relationships and to produce, exchange, and
consume goods and services.
Impact: Potential New Capacities and Detriments
At each of these three levels, aneuroprosthetic device can create for its user either
new opportunities and advantages, new threats and disadvantages, or both. Typi-
cally aneuroprosthetic device creates new opportunities for its user to participate
insocioeconomic interaction and informational ecosystems byproviding some new
cognitive, sensory, or motor capacity. Disadvantages may take the form of a new
dependency onsome external resource, the loss of apreviously existing capability,
asecurity vulnerability, or some other detriment. Because aneuroprosthetic device’s
creation of new capacities can be independent of its creation of detriments, these ele-
ments comprise two dierent dimensions; however, it is simpler to treat them as two
sub-dimensions of asingle larger dimension, the device’s "impact".

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INNOVATIVE AND DIGITAL ECONOMY SOCIETY INTHE DIGITAL AGE
Figure 1. Amultidimensional model of the impacts of neuroprosthetic devices onindividual users
oLoss of ownership of body and IP
oFinancial, technological, and social
dependencies
oSubjugation to external agency
oSocial exclusion and employment
discrimination
oVulnerability to hacking, data theft,
blackmail, or other crime
oNo control over sensory organs
oNo control over motor organs
oNo control over other bodily systems
oOther biological side-eects
oLoss of agency
oLoss of conscious awareness
oLoss of cognitional info security
oConating real and virtual experience
oConating true and false memories
oOther psychological side-eects
oEnhanced memory (engrams)
oEnhanced creativity
oEnhanced emotion
oEnhanced conscious awareness
oEnhanced conscience
oSensory enhancement
oMotor enhancement
oEnhanced memory (exograms)
oNew kinds of social relations
oCollective knowledge
oJob exibility and instant retraining
oEnhanced management of
technological systems
oEnhanced business decision-making
and monetary value
oQualications for specic roles
...sapient
metavolitional
agent
Impacts on the
human being
as...
...embodied
embedded
organism
...social and
economic actor
Potential Detriments Potential New Capacities
Impacts Captured byOur Model
Below we present specic capacities and detriments that neuroprosthetics are
expected to create for their users at the three levels of the human being as 1) sapient
metavolitional agent, 2) embodied embedded organism, and 3) social and economic
actor. ese items constitute abroad universe of expected possible impacts identi-
ed byscholars; any one neuroprosthesis may generate only asmall number of these
eects, ifany.
Impacts onthe User as Sapient Metavolitional Agent
Neuroprosthetic devices may aect their users’ cognitive processes inways that posi-
tively or negatively impact the ability of such persons to participate insocioeconomic
interaction and informational ecosystems.

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New capacities provided byneuroprosthetics may include:
oEnhanced memory, skills, and knowledge stored within the mind (engrams). Build-
ing oncurrent technologies tested inmice, future neuroprosthetics may oer hu-
man users the ability to create, alter, or weaken memories stored intheir brains’
natural memory systems inthe form of engrams (Han, Kushner, Yiu, Hsiang,
Buch, Waisman, Bontempi, Neve, Frankland, & Jossely 2009; Ramirez, Liu, Lin,
Suh, Pignatelli, Redondo, Ryan, & Tonegawa 2013; McGee 2008; Warwick 2014:
267). is could potentially be used not only to aect auser’s declarative knowl-
edge but also to enhance motor skills or reduce learned fears.
oEnhanced creativity. Aneuroprosthetic device may be able to enhance amind’s
powers of imagination and creativity (Gasson 2012: 23–24) byfacilitating pro-
cesses that contribute to creativity, such as stimulating mental associations be-
tween unrelated items. Anecdotal increases increativity have been reported to
result aer the use of neuroprosthetics for deep brain stimulation (Cosgrove 2004;
Gasson 2012).
oEnhanced emotion. Aneuroprosthetic device might provide its user with more de-
sirable emotional dynamics (McGee 2008: 217). Eects onemotion have already
been seen indevices used, e.g., for deep brain stimulation (Kraemer 2011).
oEnhanced conscious awareness. Research is being undertaken to develop neuro-
prosthetics that would allow the human mind to, for example, extend its peri-
ods of attentiveness and limit the need for periodic reductions inconsciousness
(i.e.,sleep) (Kourany 2013: 992–93).
oEnhanced conscience. One’s conscience can be understood as one’s set of metavoli-
tions, or desires about the kinds of volitions that one wishes to possess (Calverley
2008; Gladden 2015d); insofar as aneural implant enhances processes of memory
and emotion (Calverley 2008: 528–34) that allow for the development of the con-
science, it may enhance one’s ability to develop, discern, and follow one’s conscience.
New impairments generated byneuroprosthetics at the level of their user’s internal
mental processes may include:
oLoss of agency. Aneuroprosthetic device may damage the brain or disrupt its ac-
tivity inaway that reduces or eliminates the ability of its human user to possess
and exercise agency (McGee 2008: 217). Moreover, the knowledge that this can
occur may lead users to doubt whether their volitions are really "their own"–an
eect that has been seen with neuroprosthetics used for deep brain stimulation
(Kraemer: 2011).
oLoss of conscious awareness. Aneuroprosthetic device may diminish the quality
or extent of its user’s conscious awareness, e.g., byinducing daydreaming or in-
creasing the required amount of sleep. Aneuroprosthesis could potentially even
destroy its user’s capacity for conscious awareness (e.g., byinducing acoma) but

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INNOVATIVE AND DIGITAL ECONOMY SOCIETY INTHE DIGITAL AGE
without causing the death of his or her biological organism (Gladden 2015d).
oLoss of information security for internal cognitive processes. Aneuroprosthetic de-
vice may compromise the condentiality, integrity, or availability of information
contained within its user’s mental activities (such as perception, memory, volition
or imagination), either byaltering or destroying information, making it inaccessi-
ble to the user, or making it accessible to unauthorized parties (McGee 2008: 217;
Gladden 2015d; Gladden 2015c).
oInability to distinguish areal from avirtual ongoing experience. If aneuroprosthe-
sis alters or replaces its user’s sensory perceptions, it may make it impossible for
the user to know which (if any) of the sense data that he or she is experiencing cor-
respond to some actual element of an external physical environment and which
are "virtual" or simply "false" (McGee 2008: 221; Gladden 2015d).
oInability to distinguish true from false memories. If aneuroprosthetic device is able
to create, alter, or destroy engrams within its user’s brain, it may be impossible for
auser to know which of his or her apparent memories are "true" and which are
"false" (i.e., distorted or purposefully fabricated) (Ramirez etal. 2013).
oOther psychological side eects. e brain may undergo potentially harmful and
unpredictable structural and behavioral changes as it adapts to the presence, ca-
pacities, and activities of aneuroprosthesis (McGee 2008: 215–16; Koops & Leenes
2012: 125, 130). ese eects may include new kinds of neuroses, psychoses, and
other disorders unique to users of neuroprosthetics.
Impacts onthe User as Embodied Embedded Organism
Interacting with an Environment
Neuroprosthetic devices may aect the ways inwhich their users sense, manipulate,
and occupy their environment through the interface of aphysical or virtual body. New
capacities provided might include:
oSensory enhancement. Aneuroprosthetic device may allow its user to sense his or her
physical or virtual environment innew ways, either byacquiring new kinds of raw
sense data or new modes or abilities for processing, manipulating, and interpreting
sense data (Warwick 2014: 267; McGee 2008: 214; Koops & Leenes 2012: 120, 126).
oMotor enhancement. Aneuroprosthetic device may give users new ways of manip-
ulating physical or virtual environments through their bodies (McGee 2008: 213;
Warwick 2014: 266). It may grant enhanced control over one’s existing biological
body, expand one’s body to incorporate new devices (such as an exoskeleton or vehi-
cle) through body schema engineering (Gladden 2015b), or allow the user to control
external networked physical systems such as drones or 3D printers or virtual systems
or phenomena within an immersive cyberworld.

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oEnhanced memory, skills, and knowledge accessible through sensory organs (exog-
rams). Aneuroprosthetic device may give its user access to external data-storage
sites whose contents can be "played back" to the user’s conscious awareness through
his or her sensory organs or to real-time streams of sense data that augment or
replace one’s natural sense data (Koops & Leenes 2012: 115, 120, 126). e ability
to record and play back one’s own sense data could provide perfect audiovisual
memory of one’s experiences (McGee 2008: 217).
New impairments generated byneuroprosthetics at the level of their users’ physical
or virtual bodily interfaces with their environments might include:
oLoss of control over sensory organs. Aneuroprosthetic device may deny auser di-
rect control over his or her sensory organs (Koops & Leenes 2012: 130). Techno-
logically mediated sensory systems may be subject to noise, malfunctions, and
manipulation or forced sensory deprivation or overload occurring at the hands of
"sense hackers" (Gladden 2015c: 201–02).
oLoss of control over motor organs. Aneuroprosthetic device may impede auser’s
control over his or her motor organs (Gasson 2012: 14–16). e user’s body may
no longer be capable, e.g., of speech or movement, or the control over one’s speech
or movements may be assumed bysome external agency.
oLoss of control over other bodily systems. Aneuroprosthetic device may impact
the functioning of internal bodily processes such as respiration, cardiac activity,
digestion, hormonal activity, and other processes that are already aected byex-
isting implantable medical devices (McGee 2008: 209; Gasson 2012: 12–16).
oOther biological side eects. Aneuroprosthetic device may be constructed from
components that are toxic or deteriorate inthe body (McGee 2008: 213–16), may
be rejected byits host, or may be subject to mechanical, electronic, or soware
failures that harm their host’s organism.
Impacts onthe User as Social and Economic Actor
Neuroprosthetic devices may aect the ways inwhich their users connect to, partici-
pate in, contribute to, and are inuenced bysocial relationships and structures and
economic networks and exchange. New capacities provided might include:
oAbility to participate innew kinds of social relations. Aneuroprosthetic device may
grant the ability to participate innew kinds of technologically mediated social rela-
tions and structures that were previously impossible, perhaps including new forms
of merged agency (McGee 2008: 216; Koops & Leenes 2012: 125, 132) or cybernetic
networks with utopian (or dystopian) characteristics (Gladden 2015d).

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INNOVATIVE AND DIGITAL ECONOMY SOCIETY INTHE DIGITAL AGE
oAbility to share collective knowledge, skills, and wisdom. Neuroprosthetics may link
users inaway that forms communication and information systems (McGee 2008:
214; Koops & Leenes 2012: 128–29; Gasson 2012: 24) that can generate greater
collective knowledge, skills, and wisdom than are possessed byany individual
member of the system (Wiener 1961: loc. 3070., 3149.; Gladden 2015d).
oEnhanced job exibility and instant retraining. By facilitating the creation, altera-
tion, and deletion of information stored inengrams or exograms, aneuropros-
thetic device may allow auser to download new knowledge or skills or instantly
establish relationships for use inanew job (Koops & Leenes, 2012: 126).
oEnhanced ability to manage complex technological systems. By providing adirect
interface to external computers and mediating its user’s interaction with them
(McGee 2008: 210), aneuroprosthesis may grant an enhanced ability to manage
complex technological systems, e.g., for the production or provisioning of goods
or services (McGee 2008: 214–15; Gladden 2015b).
oEnhanced business decision-making and monetary value. By performing data min-
ing to uncover novel knowledge, executing other forms of data analysis, oering
recommendations, and alerting the user to potential cognitive biases, aneuropros-
thesis may enhance its user’s ability to execute rapid and eective business-related
decisions and transactions (Koops & Leenes 2012: 119). Moreover, by storing
cryptocurrency keys, aneuroprosthesis may allow its user to store money directly
within his or her brain for use ondemand (Gladden 2015a).
New impairments generated byneuroprosthetic devices at the level of their users’
socioeconomic relationships and activity might include:
oLoss of ownership of one’s body and intellectual property. Aneuroprosthetic device
that is leased would not belong to its human user, and even aneuroprosthesis that
has been purchased could potentially be subject to seizure insome circumstances
(e.g., bankruptcy). Depending onthe leasing or licensing terms, intellectual prop-
erty produced byaneuroprosthetic device’s user (including thoughts, memories,
or speech) may be partly or wholly owned bythe device’s manufacturer or pro-
vider (Gladden 2015d; Gladden 2015c: 164).
oQualifications for specific professions and roles. Neuroprosthetic devices may in-
itially provide persons with abilities that enhance job performance in partic-
ular fields (Koops & Leenes 2012: 131–32) such as computer pro-
gramming, art, architecture, music, economics, medicine, information
science, e-sports, information security, law enforcement, and the military;
as expectations for employees’ neural integration into workplace systems
grow, possession of neuroprosthetic devices may become a requirement for
employment in some professions (McGee 2008: 211, 214–15; Warwick 2014:
269).

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oCreation of nancial, technological or social dependencies. e user of aneuropro-
sthetic device may no longer be able to function eectively without the device
(Koops & Leenes 2012: 125) and may become dependent on its manufacturer
for hardware maintenance, soware updates, and data security and onspecial-
ised medical care providers for diagnostics and treatment relating to the device
(McGee 2008: 213). Auser may require regular device upgrades inorder to re-
main competitive insome jobs. High switching costs may make it impractical to
shi to acompetitor’s device aer auser has installed an implant and committed
to its manufacturer’s digital ecosystem.
oSubjugation of the user to external agency. Instead of merely impeding its user’s
ability to possess and exercise agency, aneuroprosthesis may subject its user to
control bysome external agency. is could occur, e.g., if the user’s memories,
emotions, or volitions were manipulated bymeans of the device (Gasson 2012:
15–16) or ifthe user joined with other minds to create anew form of social entity
that possesses some shared agency (McGee, 2008: 216).
oSocial exclusion and employment discrimination. e use of detectable neuropro-
sthetics may result inshunning or mistreatment of users (Koops & Leenes 2012:
124–25). Users of advanced neuroprosthetics may lose the ability or desire to
communicate with human beings who lack such devices, thereby fragmenting hu-
man societies (McGee 2008: 214–16; Warwick 2014: 271) and possibly weakening
users’ solidarity with other human beings (Koops & Leenes 2012: 127). Possession
of some kinds of neuroprosthetic devices may exclude their users from employ-
ment inroles where "natural," unmodied workers are considered desirable or
even required (e.g., for liability or security reasons).
oVulnerability to data the, blackmail, and extortion. Ahacker, computer virus, or
other agent may be able to steal data contained inaneuroprosthesis or use it to
gather personal data (potentially including the contents of thoughts, memories,
or sensory experiences) (McGee 2008: 217; Koops & Leenes 2012: 117, 130; Gas-
son 2012: 21; Gladden 2015: 167–68) that could be used for blackmail, extortion,
corporate espionage, or terrorism.
Applying the Model: Toward aNew Typology of
Neuroprosthetics
As atest case, we can use this model to analyse one kind of neuroprosthetic device that
is expected to become available inthe future: acochlear implant with audio recording,
playback, upload, download, and live streaming capabilities (Koops &Leenes 2012;
McGee 2008; Gladden 2015d). Everything that its user hears would be recorded for
later playback ondemand. Instead of simply conveying the "real" sounds produced

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INNOVATIVE AND DIGITAL ECONOMY SOCIETY INTHE DIGITAL AGE
bythe physical environment, those sounds can be augmented or replaced byother
audio that is stored inor transmitted to the device. Potential capacities and impair-
ments created for the user of such adevice are identied inFigure 2 below.
As can be seen from this example, the model does not yield asingle quantitative
"impact score" for each of the three levels but rather uses qualitative descriptions
to capture acomplex set of impacts. is model delineates adevice ontology that
can form the basis of further reection onand analysis of aneuroprosthetic device’s
impact from both cybernetic, phenomenological, and existentialist perspectives. By
allowing neuroprosthetic devices with similar characteristics to be identied and
grouped, it can also serve as the basis of new typologies for neurotechnologies.
Figure 2. The model applied to analyse impacts of aparticular auditory neuroprosthesis
oHackers can eavesdrop on live audio
from the user's implant or access
recorded auditory experiences
oUser could be forced to hear sounds
(e.g., voices) designed to produce
specic reactions or behaviors
oSome may refuse to speak with user
since all conversations are recorded
oUser will be suspected of receiving
secret aid or advice trough implant
oLoss of control over auditory sense
data to those directing the device
oDisruption of sensorimotor feedback
loops due to lack of real sense data
oConation of "real" sounds from the
environment, the playback of recorded
audio, and live streaming of audio
from a remote source
oPsychological eects of sensory
overload, deprivation, or manipulation
oA continuous internal "soundtrack"
of music or sounds can be created to
stimulate desirable cognitive activity
and supress undesirable activity
oPlayback ability grants perfect
auditory memory
oExtension of body by tapping into
audio from remote microphones
oAbility to receive live audio prompts
may aid politicians, actors, news
broadcasters, lecturers, etc.
oHands-free ability to play back audio
notes or download reference material
may aid surgeons, artists, drivers,
soldiers, police, athletes, etc.
oTwo or more persons can share
their inner speech for forging joint
experiences and communal decisions
...sapient
metavolitional
agent
Impacts on the
human being
as...
...embodied
embedded
organism
...social and
economic actor
Potential Detriments Potential New Capacities

97
DELab UW
Conclusion
Ongoing advances inneuroprosthetics are expected to yield adiverse range of new
technologies with the potential to dramatically reshape a human being’s internal
mental life, his or her bodily existence and interaction with the environment, and his
or her participation insocial and economic networks and activity. e new capaci-
ties and impairments that such technologies provide may allow human beings to
physically and virtually inhabit digital ecosystems and interact socially inways so
revolutionary that they can best be understood as "posthuman."
e model developed inthis text for understanding these impacts of neuroprosthetic
devices is already being elaborated inthe specic context of information security to
provide aframework for future research and practice inthat eld (Gladden 2015c). By
further rening and applying the model inother contexts, we hope that it will be pos-
sible for engineers, ethicists, policymakers, and consumers to better understand how
particular kinds of neuroprosthetic devices may contribute to the development of new
digital ecosystems that can be apowerful venue for the growth, liberation, and empower-
ment–or oppression and dehumanization–of the human beings of the future.
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