aim of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to introduce the main argument in
Gontovnik's book about housing discrimination and cultural groups, while highlighting
its original contribution to the legal discourse on the issue. Gontovnik distinguishes
between permissible social fences, which are spontaneously created by a social process
of cultural exclusion, which is not facilitated by law, and
... [Show full abstract] impermissible legal walls,
which are created or facilitated by legal means such as statutes, by-laws and contracts.
Second, this paper aims to present criticism of Gontovnik’s book. It argues that
Gontovnik’s account deviates from the dominant literature that justifies legal
protection of cultural groups. While the dominant literature justifies legal protection
only of minority or other vulnerable cultural groups, Gontovnik assumes that all
cultural groups deserve legal protection. Gontovnik’s interpretation of the right to
culture therefore obstructs its rationale, which is protecting vulnerable or minority
cultural groups by providing them with material and symbolic resources that allow
them to compete with dominant majority groups under fair conditions. Gontovnik's
problematic account of the right to culture relates to another difficulty with his account
concerning the important conceptual distinction between the right to culture and the
right to freedom of association. The right to freedom of association protects every kind
of association and therefore offers broader protection than the right to culture. However,
it offers weaker protection than the right to culture in terms of its potential to outweigh the right to equality. Gontovnik fails to recognize these important differences and assumes that they are almost identical rights.