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Leadership in the Chinese Philosophical Tradition: A Critical Perspective

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Abstract

This chapter draws on the Chinese philosophical tradition two major schools of thought to reconstruct a notion of Chinese leadership. This notion combines the positive leadership elements from Confucianism (Ru Jia) and Legalism (Fa Jia). The strengths and weaknesses of both schools are examined. Absolving the positive elements while shunning the negative ones of the two schools, this third notion of Ru-Fa leadership has character and rules as its core constituents.
Leadership in the Chinese Philosophical
Tradition: A Critical Perspective
Po-Keung Ip
1 Introduction
This chapter critically examines conceptions of leadership drawing on the Chinese
philosophical tradition of the two dominant schools of thoughts: Confucianism and
Legalism (Fung 1948; Chan 1963; Hsiao 1979; De Bary and Bloom 1999; Yao
2003a,b; Mou 2009). From the time the First Emperor of Chin united China
(221 BC) to the demise of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), both schools had been
vital sources for furnishing ideas and sustaining practices of rulership for emperors
in imperial China over two millennia. Confucianism and Legalism offered diver-
gent visions about how a state should be ruled, with opposing assumptions about
human nature, spawning contrasting conceptions of leadership. Simply put, Con-
fucian advocated a morality-guided government led by moral elite motivated by
compassion and moral appropriateness, buttressed with ceremonial rituals and rites.
In contrast, Legalists, in contrast, championed a law-governed state which relied on
legal punishment and reward as behavioural motivator operated with effective
techniques of deploying power. Integral to these two visions of government are
two conceptions of leadership which is the focus of this chapter. After examining
the key concepts of leadership of Confucianism and Legalism, we identify both
their strengths and weaknesses. A third notion is conceived by assimilating the
strengths while severing the weaknesses of these two schools. Though the original
discourses focused primarily on political rulership, the ideas elaborated could
however be generalizable as generic ideas of leadership that go beyond the political
domain. We thus presume that it would hopefully serve as a notion of leadership
applicable not only in the political realm but in business and other domains as well.
P.-K. Ip (*)
Graduate Institute of Philosophy, National Central University, 300 Zhongda Road, Zhongli,
Taiwan
e-mail: pkipster@gmail.com
©Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
A. Habisch, R. Schmidpeter (eds.), Cultural Roots of Sustainable Management,
CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-28287-9_5
53
In what follows, the terms ruler-ship and leadership are used interchangeably, and
we assume that the principles and techniques of rulership in government can, given
proper adaptations, be translated as principles and techniques of leadership in
business or organizations. Rulership is thus conceived as proxy of leadership.
There are a host of different conceptions of leadership in the literature: transac-
tional, transformational (Burns 1978; Bass 1998; Bass and Steidlmeier 1999),
authentic (Rhode 2006; Price 2003), and ethical (Trevi~
no et al. 2000; Trevi~
no and
Brown 2007). We presume that insofar as a notion is consistent with either one
school, we could say that such a notion can be derivable from that school. For
example, Confucian leadership may contain transformational, authentic or ethical
implications, if it has the respective elements. This chapter takes a broad notion of
leadership, which is defined here as a process, relationship or state between leaders
and followers, as well as the agents and their conducts of leading (Ip 2011). Thus,
leadership means more than individual leaders as agents, their attributes and
behaviors. Leaders constitute only a part of the complex process, relationships,
and system that the concept of leadership covers.
2 The Confucian Conception of Leadership
Confucius (551–479 BC) and his followers Mengzi (372–289 BC), and Xunzi
(312–230 BC) founded the Confucian school of thought, popularly known as Con-
fucianism (Ru Jia) that has profoundly shaped and defined Chinese culture (Creel
1953; Schwartz 1985; Ames and Rosemont 1998; Cua 2003; Cua 2005;Li2007;
Tan 2005). It has three core elements: ren as compassion, yi as moral appropriate-
ness, and li as ceremonial rituals upon which a system of virtues are spawned. To
understand Confucian leadership, one should understand these elements. As well as
defining Confucianism, ren confers signature character to Confucian leadership.
Thus, it is vital to understand ren to understand leadership. Confucius gave elabo-
rate articulations of the meanings of ren in Lunyu
1
:
A man of ren/humanity, wishing to establish his own character, also establishes the
character of others, and wishing to be prominent himself, also helps others to be promi-
nent. (6:28)
A resolute scholar and a man of ren will never seek to live at the expense of injuring
humanity. He would rather sacrifice his life in order to realize humanity. (15:8)
Confucius also expressed the multi-layered meanings of ren through the acts and
manners of Junzi, an ideal person with superior morality, and contrasted them with
those of a conceived petty person, i.e., common man, who lived and endowed with
lesser morality:
1
All citations are from Chan (1963), with my alternative translations of some key terms. See also
De Bary and Bloom (1999), Yao (2003a,b), Mou (2009) for discussions on Confucianism.
54 P.-K. Ip
Junzi is broadminded but not partisan, the petty person is partisan but not broadminded.
(2:14)
Junzi brings the good things of others to completion and does not bring the bad things of
others to completion. The petty person does just the opposite. (12:16)
Junzi understands the higher things [moral principles]; the petty person understands the
lower things [profits]. (14:24)
Junzi is ashamed that his words exceed his deeds. (14:29)
Ren is the capacity of compassion or benevolence for fellow human beings,
which is principally expressed in complex web of social relationships. It manifests
itself in ren acts and thoughts and moral sentiments, which are also collectively and
individually referred to as de, which means virtues. Of equal importance in the
moral core is yi, which is both a principle and a de. As a principle, it designates
moral appropriateness in actions and human matters. As a de, it is the capacity or
character for moral appropriate acts and relationships. Li represents the institution-
alized rituals and ceremonial rites that prescribe and guide personal, social and
political lives. In its more generalized sense, it refers to norms and rules promul-
gated and sanctioned by political authorities and society. For Confucians, the
legitimacy of li is based on ren and yi, and people are only morally obligated to
comply with legitimate li. Though li is not in itself a virtue, complying with li is a
cardinal virtue.
As well as personifying the moral core—ren, yi, and li, Junzi symbolizes the
ideal ruler or leader. In addition to those stated earlier, other salient Junzi attributes
include
2
:
Junzi conducts extensive study (wen), and restrains himself with li. Thus he does not violate
the Way (dao). (6:25)
Junzi does not promote (put in office) a man on basis of his words; nor does he reject his
words because of the man. (15:22)
The way of Junzi is threefold, but I have not been able to attain it. The man of wisdom
has no perplexities; the man of ren has no worry; the man of courage has no fear. (14:30)
Junzi in dealing with the affairs in the world is without preconceived ways. He complies
with yi. (4:10)
Junzi understands yi, the petty man understands gain. (4:16)
Junzi regards yi as the substance of everything. He practices it according to propriety
(li). (15:17)
By virtue of these attributes, Confucian leadership is primarily moral in nature.
Secondly, as Junzi stands for a high ideal, few mortals have the capacity of
becoming one. Thus, Junzi is by and large, a moral elite, and Confucian leadership
entails moral elitism. This means that only those who have high moral accomplish-
ment and possess strong moral capacity and disposition are able and entitled to lead
or rule. Confucian, with the exception of Xunzi, believed in the innate goodness of
human nature that underlies the moral based leadership vision. Junzi, is the few who
could fully achieve robust moral goodness by relentless moral practice. This view
of human nature is, as shown later, in stark contrast to that of the Legalist.
2
See Chan (1963: 18–48), see also Ames and Rosemont (1998). For Li, see Cua (2003,2005). All
quotes are from Chan (1963: 18–48).
Leadership in the Chinese Philosophical Tradition: A Critical Perspective 55
In sum, leaders would lead by morality and by example, with the help of
legitimate rituals. Possessing the virtuous character, a leader would be resourceful
and wise enough to lead. As a result, this form of moral elitist leadership yielded
and sustained a rule-of-man political system, in contrast to a rule-by-law polity,
which was championed by Legalist. As said earlier, though Confucius primarily
conceived leadership attributes in the political context, it may as well as be adapted
to other contexts.
3 The Legalist Conception of Leadership
Unlike the Confucian moral elitism, Legalist (Fa Jia) advocated a vision of leader-
ship which is basically rule-based. The rule is in effect coercive law and legal
decrees. Leading Legalist thinkers like Guan Zhong (720–645 BC), Shen Dao
(c. 350–275 BC), Li Kui (455–395 BC) and Shang Yang (390–338 BC) championed
the importance and efficacy of law (Hsiao 1959,1979; Creel 1953; Duyvendak
1928; Schwartz 1985; Watson 1964; Hwang 2008; Goldin 2011). Hanfeizi
(281–233 BC), who inherited much of the Legalist thinking, offered an integrative
articulation of legalism that had deeply influenced the thinking and practice of
dynastic Chinese politics, albeit often in implicit ways. In fact, Confucianism as
state ideology had been officially endorsed and followed while Legalism covertly
dominated much of actual political practice, thus forming the famed “Confucian-
outside, Legalism inside” (ru biao fa li) two-tiered politics characteristics of
dynastic China.
Hanfeizi contended that statecraft, the way to rule a state, depends on three core
elements—fa,shu and shi. Fa refers to the coercive law, statues and decrees
enforceable by the monopolized power of the state. Shu denotes the myriad
techniques of applying power to achieve ones goals and asserting influences over
subordinates and underlings. Shi is the power position one occupies within the
political hierarchy of the state. Hanfeizi stated succinctly the meaning and primacy
of fa:
The law no more makes exceptions for men of high station than the plumb line bends to
accommodate a crooked place in the wood. What the law has decreed the wise man cannot
dispute nor the brave man venture to contest. When faults are to be punished, the highest
minister cannot escape; when good is to be awarded, the lowest peasant must not be passed
over. Hence, for correcting the faults of superiors, chastising the misdeeds of subordinates,
restoring order, exposing error, checking excess, remedying evil, and unifying the stan-
dards of the people, nothing can be compared to law. (Watson 1964: 28)
Several distinct features of fa make it formidable in running a country. Firstly, fa
is publicized norms of behavior promulgated and enforced by the state. By making
fa public, people are informed of their existence and the prescribed dos and donts
of their behaviors. Secondly, with the exception of the ruler, who stays above the
law, everyone is within the reach of the law. Fa is to be applied equally to all people
under the ruler without exception, including the imperial family and noble class, as
56 P.-K. Ip
well as ministers and state officials. In contrast, Confucian allowed the ministers
and the noble class to be exempted from the law. Thirdly, fa should be accessible to
common folks so that they can understand them and follow them. In other words, fa
has to be easily comprehensible and learnable. Fourthly, fa should be adaptable to
the ever changing environment, and responsive to new issues. The ruler should use
fa to shape and guide behavior to the effect that peace and order can be established.
Hanfeizi believed that human behaviors are motivated by self-interests, chiefly
among these are favor-seeking and punishment-avoidance. Thus, using favor and
punishment is the most effective way of exercising power to motivate and control
people:
The enlightened ruler controls his ministers by means of two handles alone. The two
handles are punishment and favor. To inflict mutilation and death on men is called
punishment; to bestow honor and reward is called favor. Those who act as ministers fear
the penalties and hope to profit by the rewards. (Watson 1964: 30)
These are the two formidable shu for achieving and maintaining dominance over
his ministers and officials and commanding from them respect and obedience, as
well as instilling in them fear and awe. Hanfeizi said, “The tiger is able to
overpower the dog because of his claws and teeth, but if he discards his claws
and teeth and let the dogs use them, then on the contrary he will be overpowered by
the dog. In the same way the ruler of men uses punishments and favors to control his
ministers, but if he discards his punishments and favors and lets his ministers
employ them, then on the contrary he will find himself in the control of his
ministers.” (Watson 1964: 30).
Furthermore, to be able to use shu, one should first have the shi, the power
position to own and exercise power. Hence, shi is critical for a ruler to exert his
influence and control.
For Legalist, rulership or leadership consists essentially of the principles and
techniques of exercising power to influence and control people, especially the
ministers and officials who work under the ruler. The main elements of rulership
include establishing standard and abide by it, allocating the right person for the
right position, and ensuring that the job is clearly defined and the division of labor is
properly arranged so that the responsibilities attached to different positions do not
overlap with each other. Doing these things right would create an effective admin-
istration to undertake tasks and implement policies. Being a pragmatist, Hanfeizi
favored a result-oriented management, which would demand ideas and opinions be
translated into practical policies that would produce concrete results. Lofty ideas
would serve little purpose if they could not produce substantive results meeting the
assigned objectives. Effective execution is what counts in conducting state affairs.
Those who successfully executed the policies would be rewarded, while those who
failed to do so would be punished. It is clear that Hanfeizi was a hard-nose
pragmatist who advocated getting concrete results as the hallmark of a successfully
policy, or governance in general.
In addition to the three elements of rulership, Hanfeizi also invoked the notion of
the Way as the primal force and principle that shapes and defines the order of things,
Leadership in the Chinese Philosophical Tradition: A Critical Perspective 57
natural and human. A ruler should observe and follow the Way to help establish the
right way of exercising power, and in general the art of statecraft:
The Way is the beginning of all beings and the measure of right and wrong. Therefore the
enlightened ruler holds fast to the beginning in order to understand the wellspring of all
beings, and minds the measure in order to know the source of good and bad. (Watson
1964: 16)
Follow the way of Heaven, reflect on the principle behind human affairs, investigate,
examine, and compare these things, ...Be empty, quiet, and retiring, never put yourself
forward. Trust others but never be like them, and then the myriad people will follow you as
one man. (Watson 1964: 36–37)
The invocation of emptiness, stillness, and inaction as the true nature of the Way
clearly demonstrates traces of Daoist influence on Hanfeizis thinking on the fine art
of statecraft: “Be empty, still, and idle, and from your place of darkness observe the
defects of others. See but do not appear to see; listen by do not seem to listen; know
but do not let it be known that you know. Hide your tracks, conceal your sources, so
that your subordinates cannot trace the springs of your action. Discard wisdom,
forswear ability, so that your subordinates cannot guess what you are about.”
(Watson 1964: 18).
Similar to the Confucian leadership, the Legalist leadership is primarily political
in nature, but may be applicable to the corporate and organizational context.
4 Confucian Strengths and Weaknesses
It is easy to see that these two notions of leadership are contrasting as they are
competing. Both have strengths and weaknesses. The strength of the Confucian
notion is its affirmation of morality as the core of leadership. Leaders should have
good character and the right values, and lead by morals (Koehn 2001; Romar 2002).
Junzi leadership would presumably provide inspirations for a concept of ethical
leadership that is now attracting more attention in the leadership literature
(Ip 2011). However, one apparent weakness of the Confucian notion is that no
enough attention has been paid to the importance of hard norms (i.e., law and
decrees) and system in shaping behavior. Confucian leadership would assign an
outsize role to moral elite in building good companies at the expense of other salient
institutional factors. Due to the rarity of leaders with Junzi-level morality, moral
elitism would turn out to be a liability rather than an asset for many organizations.
To develop and maintain sustainable companies or organizations requires more
than moral persons, let alone moral elite. Effective and practicable norms and
systems are imperative. Furthermore over-dependence on a single virtuous individ-
ual, or a small group of moral elites to manage an organization is a very perilous and
impractical business. The existence of moral elite with all his virtuous intentions is
no guarantee for making the right and balanced decision that requires rational
thinking that is based on logic and facts, as well as reasonableness. Being superbly
58 P.-K. Ip
moral would not give a leader the immunity from biases and prejudices, nor exempt
him from making fatal mistakes. Very often being staunchly virtuous could inflate
ones self-righteousness that easily delude oneself into thinking ones moral invin-
cibility and superiority over other lesser mortals, and thus blind one from seeing
things objectively or appreciating different viewpoints. Furthermore, moral elitism
is highly susceptible to subjectivism, capriciousness, or arbitrariness because the
ultimate source of what is right or wrong depends not on some publicly and
reasonably argued principles but solely on the subjective judgment, perception, or
sentiment of the person (Ip 2004,2009). Moral elitism would also reduce from other
people the chance to participate in making decisions, thus depriving them the
opportunity to learn and grow, therefore reinforcing the deception of the supremacy
and indispensability of the elite, while perpetuating the dumbing-down of the
masses. This would also help feed the self-fulfilling prophecy that only elites are
well-equipped to make major and important decisions. Moral elitism is in effect a
benign form of governance based on the rule-of-man with the weaknesses revealed
above.
5 Legalist Strengths and Weaknesses
The Legalist is right to recognize the crucial role norms played in shaping and
motivating peoples behavior. The Legalist sober and empirical analysis of power
and its functions gave them an advantage to frame a theory about the techniques of
exercising power, and in general, the way of leading, that has more direct relevance
to the real world.
3
This theory of power apparently inspired and directed many
rulers about the way of ruling during the imperial era and helped shape the real
Chinese body politics. In contrast, Confucian, inclined to exhort or theorize on the
idealistic side of human affairs, tended to make utopian and lofty recommendations
on policies and practices which even well-intentioned rulers would find hard to
implement. Furthermore, Confucian had little substantive things to say about
power, not to mention coercive law and decrees, and the art and techniques of
using them in running a country. But power matters much in politics. Confucian
apparently focused too much on morality at the expense of the law. Though
allowing soft norms (i.e. rituals) a supplementary role to play in shaping and
guiding behavior, Confucian failed to give sufficient weight to functions of coercive
law with its attendant punishments and rewards. Such a fateful neglect creates a
major disconnect between theory and reality. In contrast, Legalist leaders not only
would understand the nature and spirit of law, but would effectively use it to move
and control people to meet their objectives. They would strategically and tactically
3
This is apparently based on their experiences and observations of the real world of politics, as the
major early theorists of Legalism from whom Hanfeizi drew inspirations, were practitioners of
politics.
Leadership in the Chinese Philosophical Tradition: A Critical Perspective 59
deploy the two pillars of law: punishment and favors to rule and lead. Furthermore,
the elements of law: publicity, accessibility, and comprehensibility gave leaders
leverage to make people more governable by virtue of allowing them be informed
and helping them understand what would be expected of them.
The dark sides of the Legalist leadership are apparent. Firstly, one conspicuous
error is that the law would be applied to all except the ruler, making one person who
wielded the most power to be above the law. The undivided possession and
unbridled use of concentrated power would be a very dangerous thing, including
potentially causing extensive harm and massive human sufferings and miseries,
which has been borne out by much of the reality of autocracy in human history. The
law, or norm in general, is nothing but a tool for leaders to consolidate and maintain
his power, and to control and command, to intimidate and to punish. This is rule-by-
law and is worlds apart from being the rule of law as a system of good governance.
Secondly, being single-minded instrumentalist, leaders would merely concern
about the effectiveness of the law, and would show little or no regard for its
moral legitimacy. To meet objectives, leaders would use whatever means, including
using deceit, lies, manipulation, falsehood, pretense, slyness, to achieve their
objectives without any moral qualms. Thus, Legalist leadership would be thor-
oughly Machiavellian in heart and deeds. In the ceaseless bid to control, subjugate
and dominate, leaders would be in constant lookout for traitors or enemies who
would also use the same tactics against him. Thus, they would be locked in a
perpetual state of fear and apprehension of losing power or being violently
subverted by underlings. Leading would be, in addition to all those negatives just
stated, a stressful and precarious game of naked and cynical power play, which
would also have harmful and destructive consequences for society at large. The cost
of leading would be humanly unbearable.
6 The Third Notion of Leadership
Is there a way of leading that exploit the wisdom of both schools, while shunning
their un-wisdoms? One way for conceptualizing this possibility is to assimilate the
strengths of both virtue-based and rule-based leadership while minimizing, if not
eliminating, their weaknesses. What would such a construct be like?
Having character and rules as two pillars, this construct integrates both morality
and rules in the leadership core, and is referred to as Confucian-cum-Legalist
(Ru-Fa) leadership. Ru-Fa leaders, as well as possessing junzi-like character,
would take both morality and norms as the integral part of conducting business
and dealing with both internal and external stakeholders. Organizational values,
mission and objectives, would conform to reasonable morality and would serve as
the basis of firm policies and practices. Apart from valuing competence and
productivity, good moral character is equally valued. Not only would be required
to do things productively and creatively, organizational members would need to
self-develop their own moral character and to do the right things and to act in
60 P.-K. Ip
morally autonomous ways without relying on external moral authorities. Not only
having impregnable characters, leaders at various levels of the organization would
encourage and support subordinates to do the right things and support moral deeds
of co-workers. In other words, ethical leadership is far from elitist and concentrated,
but becomes multiple and diffused, with leaders displaying varied strengths of
character and performance pervading the whole organization.
Recognizing the crucial role that norms would play in shaping and guiding
behaviors as well as nurturing perceptions and cultures, leader would develop and
implement effective and morally legitimate norms to build and sustain transparent
and actionable procedures and systems to this effect. Legitimate and effective
norms not only could develop and sustain morally right behavior, it would also
create proper incentives for good behaviors and dis-incentives for bad acts. In
addition, they could also create a moral-friendly environment where people
would feel free to discuss or raise moral issues in the organization without fear or
embarrassment, and would be eager to report unethical conduct or other corrupt acts
as a matter of responsibility. Being public, explicit and transparent, norms would be
easier to understand and follow, making morality a more practicable and accessible
activity. They would also serve as some clear goal pole towards which people could
continuously and incrementally strive. Morality would no longer remain merely
some internal subjective practice which could be too opaque and mysterious to
comprehend and follow. Nor would it remain some mystical feat only saints are
endowed to achieve. The system of norms would produce an environment and
culture conducive to morality. Character and norms have a mutual reinforcing
effect on each other. As well as enhancing and sustaining morally right behaviors,
norms help strengthen and empower good characters. Good character in turn would
create and sustain legitimate norms, thus creating a virtuous cycle that would
protect and sustain the moral fabric and character of the organization and its
members. Organizations fashioned by this leadership would not be amoral, Machi-
avellian, or elitist; but would be principally moral-cum-rule based, participatory
and non-elitist. Last but not least, replacing the human nature assumptions of both
schools, this construct assume the plasticity of human nature, which broadly states
that humans have the potential to be good and bad contingent on how the factors of
nature and nurture play out.
7 Concluding Remarks
Leadership is intimately culture-bound. This means that its ideas and practices are
inevitably shaped and guided by culture, for better or worse. There is no such thing
as a culture-neutral leadership. The neglect of culture in framing leadership theory
will ultimately prove futile. However, inheriting culture has its benefits and risks.
Not all elements in culture are equally valuable, nourishing and empowering.
Inheriting the wrong elements will be burdening and harmful as well as obstructive
and destructive. It is unwise to blindly submit to the authority of culture and
Leadership in the Chinese Philosophical Tradition: A Critical Perspective 61
unquestioningly adopt all its elements as if they are timeless and absolute truths. It
is thus imperative to critically differentiate the good from the bad, and gingerly
select the better portions of culture and abandon its worse parts. What has been
constructed is a sketch of the essentials of a concept of Chinese leadership to this
effect. Not only should this notion be culturally coherent with the Chinese context,
it should also be relevant to the modern world as well. Thus, more detailed
articulations to flesh out the contents with regard to the organizational, business,
and other contexts are needed.
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Leadership in the Chinese Philosophical Tradition: A Critical Perspective 63
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A survey study was conducted to look into the effect of Confucian ethics and the psychological foundations of morality on business managers' perspectives on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using responses from 393 Chinese managers, we first conducted confirmatory factor analysis to assess the reliability and validity of the measurement model and then employed hierarchical regression to explore the relationships among Confucian ethics, moral foundations, and managers' shareholder value perspectives. The results indicate that both Confucian ethics and managers' moral foundations had significant influence on shareholder value perspectives. In fact, moral foundations and Confucian ethics interacted and jointly affected managers' positions on the shareholder value model of corporate responsibility. This study demonstrates the importance of psychological foundations of morality to managers' CSR orientations and substantiates the persistent impact of Confucian ethics/cultural traditions on today's business practices.
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This chapter reorganizes Hanfei's theory of leadership from the perspective of social science and explains its implications in contemporary Chinese society. It begins with a brief biography of Hanfei and the origins of his thought. His theory of leadership is then presented as a formal theory and its meanings are explained in terms of modern organizational theories. Based on Hwang's (1995; 2001) analysis of the deep structure of Confucianism, a conceptual framework is proposed to illustrate the dialectical relationship between Hanfei's theory and Confucianism. Finally, operation of the firm and state in Taiwan are used as examples to explain how this conceptual framework may be used to study Chinese organizational behavior. Introduction. Among the various Chinese indigenous leadership theories, the importance of Legalism is second only to Confucianism. Fa Jia (the Legalist school) emerged during the Warring States Period (403–222 BCE) and its main thoughts were refined against the cultural background of Confucianism, although its contents are in direct opposition to Confucianism in many respects. During the Han dynasty, Tung Jong-shu (179–104 BCE) proposed integrating the two systems with the idea of “making judicial sentence by the Confucian classic of Spring and Autumn” and “utilizing Legalism as an instrument to consolidate the Confucian social system.” (Chu, 1961). Rulers of China began to use Legalist methods to defend their power and position and to control people, but retained Confucian doctrine to educate and discipline people.
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This volume launches the translation of a work that describes the development of Chinese political thought from the time of Confucius in the late Chou era into the twentieth century. The author systematically treats leading thinkers, schools, and movements, displaying a consummate mastery of traditional Chinese learning, and of Western analytical and comparative methods. This first complete translation includes prefatory remarks by Kung-chuan Hsiao and notes prepared by the translator to assist the Western reader.
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A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy is a milestone along the complex and difficult road to significant understanding by Westerners of the Asian peoples and a monumental contribution to the cause of philosophy. It is the first anthology of Chinese philosophy to cover its entire historical development. It provides substantial selections from all the great thinkers and schools in every period--ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary--and includes in their entirety some of the most important classical texts. It deals with the fundamental and technical as well as the more general aspects of Chinese thought. With its new translation of source materials (some translated for the first time), its explanatory aids where necessary, its thoroughgoing scholarly documentation, this volume will be an indispensable guide for scholars, for college students, for serious readers interested in knowing the real China.
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Executives should not take a reputation for ethical leadership for granted. Based on interviews with senior executives and corporate ethics officers, this article reveals that a reputation for executive ethical leadership rests on two essential pillars: the executive's visibility as a moral person (based upon perceived traits, behaviors, and decision-making processes) and visibility as a moral manager (based upon role modeling, use of the reward system, and communication). Developing a reputation for ethical leadership pays dividends in reduced legal problems and increased employee commitment, satisfaction, and employee ethical conduct. The alternatives are the unethical leader, the hypocritical leader (who talks the talk, but doesn't walk the walk), and the ethically neutral leader (who may be an ethical person, but employees don't know it because the leader has not made ethics and values an explicit part of the leadership agenda). The article also offers guidelines for cultivating a reputation for ethical leadership.