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India and China Relations
Historical, Cultural and Security Issues
UGC Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies
Sri Venkateswara University
seaps
Edited by
G. Jayachandra Reddy
© Copy rights 2016 by the editor
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior
written permission of the publisher.
Layout & Printed at: D&Dee - Designing and Creative Production,
Nallakunta, Hyderabad - 500 044.
Ph No: +91 9440 726 907, 040 - 2764 3862.
ii iii
India and China Relations:
Historical, Cultural and Security Issues
Published by
UGC Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies
Sri Venkateswara University
Tirupati-517502
Andhra Pradesh, India
Email: director.cseaps@gmail.com
First Edition: 2016
ISBN: 978-81-926904-8-3
Foreword
The India-China engagement is the defining relationship in building
the much awaited Asian century. These two countries are Asian
giants in every sense of the term; physically huge, demographically
massive, economically resurgent and strategically most powerful,
compared to any of their other Asian neighbours.
There are two dominant narratives of India-China relationship. One
seeped into civilization, history and culture that speaks of harmonies
and creativity. Scholars and statesmen carrying rich and diverse
threads in all these walks of life exchanged visits, carrying pleasant
and empowering impressions of each other for centuries. They
shared the world's most prominent “peace religion”- Buddhism and
learnt human values, social norms and statecraft from each other.
They together dominated the world's economic growth and
prosperity between 1st to the eighteenth century; India being ahead
th
until the 15 century and then the Chinese taking over until the rise of
the West. And during all this period, they had peaceful competition
and co-existence, even possibly occasional minor friction, but never
any major misunderstanding or war between them. Thanks to the
spread of Buddhism from India to China, the latter looked towards
the former as a source of inspiration and guidance. Even after being
interrupted by the sour experiences of British and other European
colonial control, the civilizational threads of constructive co-
existence continued to inform their respective approaches towards
each other in the form of Panchshila. Nehru's India and Mao's China
were together wary of the persisting Western dominance of World
politics during the initial decade of the Cold War. They were keen to
preserve their autonomy and strategic space from the encroachment
of new global divisions and rivalries. The deeply rooted historical
nostalgia within these two Asian giants prompt them even today to
construct Asian century on the foundations of peace and coexistence.
This narrative was however seriously breached by rather unexpected
breakout of conflict between them when China launched its military
misadventure in the Himalayas against India in 1962. This military
aggression no doubt inflicted a serious humiliation on India but in no
way it immersed China in glory. There are several explanations of the
Chinese unexpected behaviour, but the one most appealing, should
be the disconnect between China's new Communist revolutionary
State and leadership from its civilizational and cultural moorings. In
© Copy rights 2016 by the editor
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior
written permission of the publisher.
Layout & Printed at: D&Dee - Designing and Creative Production,
Nallakunta, Hyderabad - 500 044.
Ph No: +91 9440 726 907, 040 - 2764 3862.
ii iii
India and China Relations:
Historical, Cultural and Security Issues
Published by
UGC Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies
Sri Venkateswara University
Tirupati-517502
Andhra Pradesh, India
Email: director.cseaps@gmail.com
First Edition: 2016
ISBN: 978-81-926904-8-3
Foreword
The India-China engagement is the defining relationship in building
the much awaited Asian century. These two countries are Asian
giants in every sense of the term; physically huge, demographically
massive, economically resurgent and strategically most powerful,
compared to any of their other Asian neighbours.
There are two dominant narratives of India-China relationship. One
seeped into civilization, history and culture that speaks of harmonies
and creativity. Scholars and statesmen carrying rich and diverse
threads in all these walks of life exchanged visits, carrying pleasant
and empowering impressions of each other for centuries. They
shared the world's most prominent “peace religion”- Buddhism and
learnt human values, social norms and statecraft from each other.
They together dominated the world's economic growth and
prosperity between 1st to the eighteenth century; India being ahead
th
until the 15 century and then the Chinese taking over until the rise of
the West. And during all this period, they had peaceful competition
and co-existence, even possibly occasional minor friction, but never
any major misunderstanding or war between them. Thanks to the
spread of Buddhism from India to China, the latter looked towards
the former as a source of inspiration and guidance. Even after being
interrupted by the sour experiences of British and other European
colonial control, the civilizational threads of constructive co-
existence continued to inform their respective approaches towards
each other in the form of Panchshila. Nehru's India and Mao's China
were together wary of the persisting Western dominance of World
politics during the initial decade of the Cold War. They were keen to
preserve their autonomy and strategic space from the encroachment
of new global divisions and rivalries. The deeply rooted historical
nostalgia within these two Asian giants prompt them even today to
construct Asian century on the foundations of peace and coexistence.
This narrative was however seriously breached by rather unexpected
breakout of conflict between them when China launched its military
misadventure in the Himalayas against India in 1962. This military
aggression no doubt inflicted a serious humiliation on India but in no
way it immersed China in glory. There are several explanations of the
Chinese unexpected behaviour, but the one most appealing, should
be the disconnect between China's new Communist revolutionary
State and leadership from its civilizational and cultural moorings. In
the name of building a new and powerful modern state, this
Communist leadership has perhaps been driven towards
reconstructing its imperial and expansionist ethos. Why else the
Chinese would have moved military into Tibet at a time when
China's own economic and social reconstruction had not even been
initiated. Why would they hound out a Buddhist Lama who has been
pleading only for the religious and cultural autonomy for his
community? Why would they attack India just to show-off their
prowess to the world? Why would they inflict a punitive war on a
small and self-respecting former ally Vietnam to boost a degenerated
inhuman regime of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia? It is this
civilizational disconnect uneasily mixed with the imperial mind-set
that accounts for China's assertive and aggressive stance towards its
neighbours in East and SE Asia.
If China wants to see the rise of a peaceful and creative Asian century,
it will have to seriously and demonstratively deviate from the
present course. It will have to deal with peacefully and sensitively
with Tibet and the Dalai Lama and his people so as to accommodate
their aspirations and culture. Once that is done, a great deal of the
resolution of India-China border dispute will fall in place through
confidence building and peaceful negotiations. It has every right to
compete with India and any other country economically. China has
both the will and the capability to become a major contributor to
Asia's development and prosperity. But no economic relationship
can become a one way traffic, be it trade or harnessing of natural
resources. Nor should the economic engagement be dictated only by
strategic intents such as propping up one neighbour against the other
as being done in relation to Pakistan and other South Asian
neighbours against India, and camouflaging strategic assets creation
and military presence under economic projects and cooperation.
Maritime Silk Route cannot be a vehicle for transporting and moving
submarines and aircraft careers. If and when China gives up its
assertive and expansionist stance in Asia, India or any other Asian
neighbour of China will not have any reason to hobnob with other
global players to keep regional balance and stability in Asia intact.
Everyone will then take care in reassuring an internally insecure
China that its legitimate core concerns will not be offended.
The simultaneous discourse on both these narratives, of constructive
cooperation and uneasy conflict, suggest that we are still far from a
proper understanding of the constraints and prospects inherent in
India-China relationship. This Volume is a modest but sincere
attempt in this direction. It is the result of a seminar organised by the
Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies of Sri Venkateswara
University, Tirupati, under the committed and able leadership of the
Centre's Director, Prof. G.J Reddy. The papers contributed to this
Volume cover a wide range from civilizational and cultural aspects to
the diplomatic, strategic, economic and energy related issues
involved in India-China relationship. The authors of these papers
have put in serious efforts to raise relevant issues, provide possible
answers and generate a healthy debate on the present and future
prospects of Asia's most critical relationship. I have no doubt that this
effort will receive the due acknowledgement and appreciation from
scholars, commentators, policy makers and all those who are
interested in a stable and prosperous Asia and a harmonious and
mutually advantageous India-China relationship.
S.D. Muni
iv v
the name of building a new and powerful modern state, this
Communist leadership has perhaps been driven towards
reconstructing its imperial and expansionist ethos. Why else the
Chinese would have moved military into Tibet at a time when
China's own economic and social reconstruction had not even been
initiated. Why would they hound out a Buddhist Lama who has been
pleading only for the religious and cultural autonomy for his
community? Why would they attack India just to show-off their
prowess to the world? Why would they inflict a punitive war on a
small and self-respecting former ally Vietnam to boost a degenerated
inhuman regime of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia? It is this
civilizational disconnect uneasily mixed with the imperial mind-set
that accounts for China's assertive and aggressive stance towards its
neighbours in East and SE Asia.
If China wants to see the rise of a peaceful and creative Asian century,
it will have to seriously and demonstratively deviate from the
present course. It will have to deal with peacefully and sensitively
with Tibet and the Dalai Lama and his people so as to accommodate
their aspirations and culture. Once that is done, a great deal of the
resolution of India-China border dispute will fall in place through
confidence building and peaceful negotiations. It has every right to
compete with India and any other country economically. China has
both the will and the capability to become a major contributor to
Asia's development and prosperity. But no economic relationship
can become a one way traffic, be it trade or harnessing of natural
resources. Nor should the economic engagement be dictated only by
strategic intents such as propping up one neighbour against the other
as being done in relation to Pakistan and other South Asian
neighbours against India, and camouflaging strategic assets creation
and military presence under economic projects and cooperation.
Maritime Silk Route cannot be a vehicle for transporting and moving
submarines and aircraft careers. If and when China gives up its
assertive and expansionist stance in Asia, India or any other Asian
neighbour of China will not have any reason to hobnob with other
global players to keep regional balance and stability in Asia intact.
Everyone will then take care in reassuring an internally insecure
China that its legitimate core concerns will not be offended.
The simultaneous discourse on both these narratives, of constructive
cooperation and uneasy conflict, suggest that we are still far from a
proper understanding of the constraints and prospects inherent in
India-China relationship. This Volume is a modest but sincere
attempt in this direction. It is the result of a seminar organised by the
Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies of Sri Venkateswara
University, Tirupati, under the committed and able leadership of the
Centre's Director, Prof. G.J Reddy. The papers contributed to this
Volume cover a wide range from civilizational and cultural aspects to
the diplomatic, strategic, economic and energy related issues
involved in India-China relationship. The authors of these papers
have put in serious efforts to raise relevant issues, provide possible
answers and generate a healthy debate on the present and future
prospects of Asia's most critical relationship. I have no doubt that this
effort will receive the due acknowledgement and appreciation from
scholars, commentators, policy makers and all those who are
interested in a stable and prosperous Asia and a harmonious and
mutually advantageous India-China relationship.
S.D. Muni
iv v
Historically, India and China have had relations sustained for more
than 2,000 years, but the era of modern relationship began in 1950.
The first records of contact between China and India were written
during the 2nd century BCE. China and India have also had some
contact before the transmission of Buddhism from India to China in
the 1st century CE. References to a people called the Chinas, now
believed to be the Chinese, are found in ancient Indian literature. The
Indian epic Mahabharata (c. 5th century BCE) contains references to
"China", which may have been referring to the Qin state which later
became the Qin Dynasty. Chanakya (c. 350-283 BCE), the prime
minister of the Maurya Empire and a professor at Takshashila
University, referred to Chinese silk as "cinamsuka" (Chinese silk
dress) and "cinapatta" (Chinese silk bundle) in his Arthashastra. Vijay
Gokhale, Indian Ambassador to China, also observed that “even
before the transmission of Buddhism, the Shang-Zhou civilization
and the ancient Vedic civilization in 1500-1000 B.C. showed some
evidence of conceptual and linguistic exchanges.” For instance,
"wumingzhi" (nameless finger) in Chinese is called "anamika"
(nameless) in Sanskrit and Pali.
In the Records of the Grand Historian, Zhang Qian (d. 113 BCE) and
Sima Qian (145-90 BCE) made references to "Shendu", which might
have referred to the Indus Valley (the Sindh province in modern
Pakistan), originally known as "Sindhu" in Sanskrit. When Yunnan
was annexed by the Han Dynasty in the 1st century, Chinese
authorities reported an Indian "Shendu" community living there.
Therefore, China and India are two of the world's oldest civilisations
and have co-existed in peace for millennia. Trade relations via the
Silk Road operated as economic contact between the two countries.
The Silk Road not only served as a major trade route between India
and China, but is also credited with facilitating the spread of
Buddhism from India to East Asia. That India and China are not mere
societies/countries, rather they are civilizations is testified by
sufficient evidences as to when and how they started exchanging
their cultural elements, but from the practices in both countries that
existed and grew in parallel and shared their cultural traits since the
beginning of human history, a tradition that has ever since
continued.
Preface
vii
Historically, India and China have had relations sustained for more
than 2,000 years, but the era of modern relationship began in 1950.
The first records of contact between China and India were written
during the 2nd century BCE. China and India have also had some
contact before the transmission of Buddhism from India to China in
the 1st century CE. References to a people called the Chinas, now
believed to be the Chinese, are found in ancient Indian literature. The
Indian epic Mahabharata (c. 5th century BCE) contains references to
"China", which may have been referring to the Qin state which later
became the Qin Dynasty. Chanakya (c. 350-283 BCE), the prime
minister of the Maurya Empire and a professor at Takshashila
University, referred to Chinese silk as "cinamsuka" (Chinese silk
dress) and "cinapatta" (Chinese silk bundle) in his Arthashastra. Vijay
Gokhale, Indian Ambassador to China, also observed that “even
before the transmission of Buddhism, the Shang-Zhou civilization
and the ancient Vedic civilization in 1500-1000 B.C. showed some
evidence of conceptual and linguistic exchanges.” For instance,
"wumingzhi" (nameless finger) in Chinese is called "anamika"
(nameless) in Sanskrit and Pali.
In the Records of the Grand Historian, Zhang Qian (d. 113 BCE) and
Sima Qian (145-90 BCE) made references to "Shendu", which might
have referred to the Indus Valley (the Sindh province in modern
Pakistan), originally known as "Sindhu" in Sanskrit. When Yunnan
was annexed by the Han Dynasty in the 1st century, Chinese
authorities reported an Indian "Shendu" community living there.
Therefore, China and India are two of the world's oldest civilisations
and have co-existed in peace for millennia. Trade relations via the
Silk Road operated as economic contact between the two countries.
The Silk Road not only served as a major trade route between India
and China, but is also credited with facilitating the spread of
Buddhism from India to East Asia. That India and China are not mere
societies/countries, rather they are civilizations is testified by
sufficient evidences as to when and how they started exchanging
their cultural elements, but from the practices in both countries that
existed and grew in parallel and shared their cultural traits since the
beginning of human history, a tradition that has ever since
continued.
Preface
vii
Cultural exchanges between India and China continued during the
days of India's struggle for self-governance. In early 20th century,
Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore visited China twice, in 1924 and
1929; while scholars and intellectuals since 1911 have been visiting
and revisiting Tagore's life, works and philosophy. This is all about
the history and cultural ties between India and Chin, but on the other
side of the coin, China and India viewed as the 'Emerging Giants'
have stood facing security challenges-- 'old' and 'new' tensions, the
former stemming from historical territorial disputes and the latter
from mounting economic, military and political rivalries. China has
more clout than India in Southeast Asia, as could be discernible from
the intensification of China's ties with Myanmar. However, India is
gradually making its presence felt in this sub region. To enhance its
influence, India launched in the 1990's its 'Look East' policy that has
increasingly focussed on security issues in Southeast Asia
notwithstanding China's prominence. In South Asia, India has
wielded more influence than China which has however been making
inroads into countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh.
There are some 'Old' tensions are rooted in territorial disputes. These
relate to conflict over Tibet in the 1950's and deep suspicion over rival
claims-- India's over Aksai Chin and China's over Arunachal
Pradesh. Despite the rhetoric of friendship, the mutual suspicions
and anxieties can frustrate their long term relationship. Alongside,
surprises and doubts arise from India's relationship with Pakistan,
and China's support for the latter along India's Kashmir and China's
claims over Xinjiang province and Arunachal Pradesh, along India's
North East and Tibet's South. Sadly, the war between China and
India in 1962 and the breakdown of relations between the two
nations shattered Jawaharlal Nehru's 'Asian dream.' This was based
on his vision of both nations facilitating the rediscovery of Asia's
pride of place after years of living in the shadow of the West. After the
1962 war India moved close to the Soviet Union while China
reinforced its ties with Pakistan.
'New' tensions stem from mounting economic, military and political
rivalries. This, however, has been mingled with the desire to
cooperate. This was intensified from the early 1990's onwards with
the onset of 'liberalisation', marked by a move from state to market
viii ix
led policies and more exposure to the world economy. This approach
was initiated in China in 1978 and in India in 1990. Despite growing
economic and strategic ties, India and China need to overcome
several hurdles in order to establish favourable relations. Though
bilateral trade has continuously grown, India faces massive trade
imbalance. These conjoined twins at Himalayas have failed to resolve
their long-standing border dispute which the Indian media outlets
have repeatedly reported as Chinese military incursions into Indian
Territory. Both countries have steadily established heavy military
infrastructure along border areas. Additionally, India remains wary
about China's strong strategic bilateral relations with Pakistan, while
China has expressed concerns about Indian military and economic
activities in the disputed South China Sea. Beyond regional rivalries,
China and India are keen on bolstering their economic and political
prowess on the international front. Though this is bound to be
competitive, there is much scope of joining forces to confront major
shared concerns. This rests on their vision of a 'new world order' by
reshaping the nature of 'global governance' which centres on
collective international policies.
This volume, “India-China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security
Issues,” contains 25 articles, contributed by eminent scholars in this
field of specialization. This compendium focuses on India-China
historical ties with the strong cultural relations on one the side and
the different dimensions of security challenges between two nations
on the other side. The facts and figures provided in different articles
of this book are a valuable source of information for the scholars
concerned with the India-China relations with special reference to
historical, cultural and security issues.
On the capacity of being the Director of the Centre for Southeast
Asian & Pacific Studies, I had the privilege of organizing the
International Conference on “India-China Relations: Implications for
Peace and Prosperity of Asia” on 11-13 October 2014. Consequently, as
the editor of this volume, I am deeply indebted, among others, to
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan, Former Ambassador, Ministry of External
Affairs, New Delhi and Prof. S.D. Muni, Former Ambassador to Lao
PDR, New Delhi for guiding and extending their scholarly support in
organizing the conference. I am equally grateful to my predecessors,
the former directors of our Centre -- Prof. A. Lakshamna Chetty, Prof.
Cultural exchanges between India and China continued during the
days of India's struggle for self-governance. In early 20th century,
Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore visited China twice, in 1924 and
1929; while scholars and intellectuals since 1911 have been visiting
and revisiting Tagore's life, works and philosophy. This is all about
the history and cultural ties between India and Chin, but on the other
side of the coin, China and India viewed as the 'Emerging Giants'
have stood facing security challenges-- 'old' and 'new' tensions, the
former stemming from historical territorial disputes and the latter
from mounting economic, military and political rivalries. China has
more clout than India in Southeast Asia, as could be discernible from
the intensification of China's ties with Myanmar. However, India is
gradually making its presence felt in this sub region. To enhance its
influence, India launched in the 1990's its 'Look East' policy that has
increasingly focussed on security issues in Southeast Asia
notwithstanding China's prominence. In South Asia, India has
wielded more influence than China which has however been making
inroads into countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh.
There are some 'Old' tensions are rooted in territorial disputes. These
relate to conflict over Tibet in the 1950's and deep suspicion over rival
claims-- India's over Aksai Chin and China's over Arunachal
Pradesh. Despite the rhetoric of friendship, the mutual suspicions
and anxieties can frustrate their long term relationship. Alongside,
surprises and doubts arise from India's relationship with Pakistan,
and China's support for the latter along India's Kashmir and China's
claims over Xinjiang province and Arunachal Pradesh, along India's
North East and Tibet's South. Sadly, the war between China and
India in 1962 and the breakdown of relations between the two
nations shattered Jawaharlal Nehru's 'Asian dream.' This was based
on his vision of both nations facilitating the rediscovery of Asia's
pride of place after years of living in the shadow of the West. After the
1962 war India moved close to the Soviet Union while China
reinforced its ties with Pakistan.
'New' tensions stem from mounting economic, military and political
rivalries. This, however, has been mingled with the desire to
cooperate. This was intensified from the early 1990's onwards with
the onset of 'liberalisation', marked by a move from state to market
viii ix
led policies and more exposure to the world economy. This approach
was initiated in China in 1978 and in India in 1990. Despite growing
economic and strategic ties, India and China need to overcome
several hurdles in order to establish favourable relations. Though
bilateral trade has continuously grown, India faces massive trade
imbalance. These conjoined twins at Himalayas have failed to resolve
their long-standing border dispute which the Indian media outlets
have repeatedly reported as Chinese military incursions into Indian
Territory. Both countries have steadily established heavy military
infrastructure along border areas. Additionally, India remains wary
about China's strong strategic bilateral relations with Pakistan, while
China has expressed concerns about Indian military and economic
activities in the disputed South China Sea. Beyond regional rivalries,
China and India are keen on bolstering their economic and political
prowess on the international front. Though this is bound to be
competitive, there is much scope of joining forces to confront major
shared concerns. This rests on their vision of a 'new world order' by
reshaping the nature of 'global governance' which centres on
collective international policies.
This volume, “India-China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security
Issues,” contains 25 articles, contributed by eminent scholars in this
field of specialization. This compendium focuses on India-China
historical ties with the strong cultural relations on one the side and
the different dimensions of security challenges between two nations
on the other side. The facts and figures provided in different articles
of this book are a valuable source of information for the scholars
concerned with the India-China relations with special reference to
historical, cultural and security issues.
On the capacity of being the Director of the Centre for Southeast
Asian & Pacific Studies, I had the privilege of organizing the
International Conference on “India-China Relations: Implications for
Peace and Prosperity of Asia” on 11-13 October 2014. Consequently, as
the editor of this volume, I am deeply indebted, among others, to
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan, Former Ambassador, Ministry of External
Affairs, New Delhi and Prof. S.D. Muni, Former Ambassador to Lao
PDR, New Delhi for guiding and extending their scholarly support in
organizing the conference. I am equally grateful to my predecessors,
the former directors of our Centre -- Prof. A. Lakshamna Chetty, Prof.
G. Jayachandra Reddy
Y. Yagama Reddy, Prof. K. Raja Reddy, Prof. C. Ravindranatha
Reddy and Prof. P. Munirathnam Reddy -- for their scholarly
guidance. I profusely thank my colleagues in the Centre -- Dr. M.
Prayaga, Dr. G. Vijay Kumar Reddy, Dr. V. Ramesh Babu and Dr. M.
Padmaja -for giving me this opportunity to bring together a wide
range of view points on India-China relations at this movement of
rising Asia. I thank all the participants both from abroad and India
who participated in the conference; without their contribution this
volume could not be shaped into the present form. My thanks are due
in large part to the UGC, New Delhi, for its financial support to
organize the conference. Mr. K. Dayanandam and Mr. Ch. Dhamodhar,
D&Dee Designing and Creative Production, Hyderabad, deserve
appreciation for the taking pains in printing this volume in an elegant
manner. Finally, I wish to thank my office staff who extended their
support at ground level for the success of the conference.
x xi
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan Former Ambassador, Ministry of External
Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi
MD Afroz Student at Centre for South Asian Studies,
Pondicherry University, Pondicherry, India
C. Annapurna Ph.D, Research Scholar, Dept. of History,
S.V.University, Tirupati
Amit Kumar Research Scholar, Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies
(CIPS), School of International Studies (SIS),
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi
Atrayee Banerjee Senior Research Scholar, Human Rights,
Department of Anthropology, Ballygunge
Science College, University of Calcutta
I. Babu Rao Post Doctoral Fellow, Centre for SEAP studies,
S.V. University, Tirupati-517502..,A.P.
Bashir Ahmad Dar Department of Political Science, University of
Kashmir, Srinagar
Dalbir Ahlawat Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter
Terrorism, Macquarie University, Australia
Gaddam Venkata Ramana Ph.D Research Scholar, Dept. of History,
S.V.University, Tirupati
G. Geethanjali Senior Faculty member, Business Communication
& Soft Skills IBS, Hyderabad
G. Hannah Assistant Professor, Sree Vidyanikethan
Engineering College, Tirupati.
G. Jayachandra Reddy Professor and Director, Centre for Southeast
Asian and Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara
University, Tirupati
P. Kusuma Harinath Associate Professor, Department of English, S.V.
University, Tirupati
Madhurima Chowdhury Assistant Professor, South and South East Asian
Studies, Alipore Campus, University of Calcutta
Dr. K. Manjusree Naidu Associate Professor, Department of
Entrepreneurship, GITAM Institute of
Management, GITAM University
Olga Daksueva National Chengchi University, International
Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS),
Address: National Chengchi University, General
Building of Colleges, International Doctoral
Program in Asia-Pacific Studies, 12th Floor,
North Wing No. 64, Sec. 2, ZhiNan Rd., Wenshan
District, Taipei - 11605
Contributors
G. Jayachandra Reddy
Y. Yagama Reddy, Prof. K. Raja Reddy, Prof. C. Ravindranatha
Reddy and Prof. P. Munirathnam Reddy -- for their scholarly
guidance. I profusely thank my colleagues in the Centre -- Dr. M.
Prayaga, Dr. G. Vijay Kumar Reddy, Dr. V. Ramesh Babu and Dr. M.
Padmaja -for giving me this opportunity to bring together a wide
range of view points on India-China relations at this movement of
rising Asia. I thank all the participants both from abroad and India
who participated in the conference; without their contribution this
volume could not be shaped into the present form. My thanks are due
in large part to the UGC, New Delhi, for its financial support to
organize the conference. Mr. K. Dayanandam and Mr. Ch. Dhamodhar,
D&Dee Designing and Creative Production, Hyderabad, deserve
appreciation for the taking pains in printing this volume in an elegant
manner. Finally, I wish to thank my office staff who extended their
support at ground level for the success of the conference.
x xi
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan Former Ambassador, Ministry of External
Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi
MD Afroz Student at Centre for South Asian Studies,
Pondicherry University, Pondicherry, India
C. Annapurna Ph.D, Research Scholar, Dept. of History,
S.V.University, Tirupati
Amit Kumar Research Scholar, Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies
(CIPS), School of International Studies (SIS),
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi
Atrayee Banerjee Senior Research Scholar, Human Rights,
Department of Anthropology, Ballygunge
Science College, University of Calcutta
I. Babu Rao Post Doctoral Fellow, Centre for SEAP studies,
S.V. University, Tirupati-517502..,A.P.
Bashir Ahmad Dar Department of Political Science, University of
Kashmir, Srinagar
Dalbir Ahlawat Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter
Terrorism, Macquarie University, Australia
Gaddam Venkata Ramana Ph.D Research Scholar, Dept. of History,
S.V.University, Tirupati
G. Geethanjali Senior Faculty member, Business Communication
& Soft Skills IBS, Hyderabad
G. Hannah Assistant Professor, Sree Vidyanikethan
Engineering College, Tirupati.
G. Jayachandra Reddy Professor and Director, Centre for Southeast
Asian and Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara
University, Tirupati
P. Kusuma Harinath Associate Professor, Department of English, S.V.
University, Tirupati
Madhurima Chowdhury Assistant Professor, South and South East Asian
Studies, Alipore Campus, University of Calcutta
Dr. K. Manjusree Naidu Associate Professor, Department of
Entrepreneurship, GITAM Institute of
Management, GITAM University
Olga Daksueva National Chengchi University, International
Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS),
Address: National Chengchi University, General
Building of Colleges, International Doctoral
Program in Asia-Pacific Studies, 12th Floor,
North Wing No. 64, Sec. 2, ZhiNan Rd., Wenshan
District, Taipei - 11605
Contributors
Prabhakaran Paleri Former director general of Indian Coast Guard,
Presently an academician and research scholar
T.M.R Prasad Junior Lecturer in Civics, S.P.W. Jr. College,
Tirupati-517502.,A.P
D.S. Rajan Director, Chennai Centre for Chinese Studies,
Chennai
Rabindra Sen Professor, Department of International Relations,
Jadavpur University, Kolkata - 700 032, India
Saheli Bose School of International studies, JNU, New Delhi
M. Sasikala Research Scholar, Centre for Southeast Asian and
Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University,
Tirupati
J. Soundararajan Assistant Professor, Dept. of Ancient History &
Archaeology, University of Madras, Chepauk,
Chennai - 600 005. India.
Sourabh Chatterjee Lecturer in Chinese, Mody University of Science
and Technology, (Formerly Mody Institute of
Technology & Science), Lakshmangarh, Distt.
Sikar, Rajasthan-332311, India.
Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation,
Plot Number II, D/18, Major arterial road, Action
Area II, New Town, Rajarhat, Kolkata, West
Bengal - 700156, India
Tumtin Sonmang Koren Research Scholar, Department of Geography,
North Eastern Hill University (NEHU), Shillong,
(Meghalaya)
S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni Associate Professor, Department of Defence
Strategic Studies, University of Madras, Chennai
Dr. Varalakshmi M. Research Fellow, Centre for Gandhian Studies,
GITAM University
C. Vinodan Assistant Professor &Chair, Centre for Strategic
and Security Studies, School of International
Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi
University, Kottayam, Kerala, India
Vishnubhatala NVLNGSharma School of Electrical Engineering, VIT University,
Vellore, Tamil Nadu
Wang Dehua Professor and Director, Center for South Asian &
Central Asia Studies, Shanghai Municipal Center
for International Studies and Center for South
Asia Studies, Tongji University
xii xiii
CONTENTS
Foreword
Preface
Contributors
From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China
Relations
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan
A Retrospection of Sino-Indian War of 1962
Vishnubhatala NVLNG Sharma
Bilateral Engagements between India-China since 1988
Bashir Ahmad Dar
Impact of Bandung Conference on Sino-Indian Relations: A
Reappraisal
C. Annapurna and Gaddam Venkata Ramana
India-China Relations: A Sino-Indian Perspective
Atrayee Banerjee and Madhurima Chowdhury
Archetypal Scapegoats - India and China
G. Hannah and P. Kusuma Harinath
Lao Tzu and Gandhi on Self transcendence for Peace and
Human Development
Dr. K. Manjusree Naidu and Dr. Varalakshmi M.
Tagore (泰戈尔) and China (中国)
Sourabh Chatterjee
Cross Cultural Communication between India & China from
a Business Perspective: Snap shots
G. Geethanjali
Maritime Security and International Cooperation - Also on
the String of Pearls and the Maritime Silk Road
Wang Dehua
The Fallacy of String of Pearls Theory in India-China Relations
Prabhakaran Paleri
Coping with China in the Maritime Realm: Whither India?
S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni
iii
vii
xi
01
12
27
48
53
68
75
102
118
137
164
181
Prabhakaran Paleri Former director general of Indian Coast Guard,
Presently an academician and research scholar
T.M.R Prasad Junior Lecturer in Civics, S.P.W. Jr. College,
Tirupati-517502.,A.P
D.S. Rajan Director, Chennai Centre for Chinese Studies,
Chennai
Rabindra Sen Professor, Department of International Relations,
Jadavpur University, Kolkata - 700 032, India
Saheli Bose School of International studies, JNU, New Delhi
M. Sasikala Research Scholar, Centre for Southeast Asian and
Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University,
Tirupati
J. Soundararajan Assistant Professor, Dept. of Ancient History &
Archaeology, University of Madras, Chepauk,
Chennai - 600 005. India.
Sourabh Chatterjee Lecturer in Chinese, Mody University of Science
and Technology, (Formerly Mody Institute of
Technology & Science), Lakshmangarh, Distt.
Sikar, Rajasthan-332311, India.
Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation,
Plot Number II, D/18, Major arterial road, Action
Area II, New Town, Rajarhat, Kolkata, West
Bengal - 700156, India
Tumtin Sonmang Koren Research Scholar, Department of Geography,
North Eastern Hill University (NEHU), Shillong,
(Meghalaya)
S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni Associate Professor, Department of Defence
Strategic Studies, University of Madras, Chennai
Dr. Varalakshmi M. Research Fellow, Centre for Gandhian Studies,
GITAM University
C. Vinodan Assistant Professor &Chair, Centre for Strategic
and Security Studies, School of International
Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi
University, Kottayam, Kerala, India
Vishnubhatala NVLNGSharma School of Electrical Engineering, VIT University,
Vellore, Tamil Nadu
Wang Dehua Professor and Director, Center for South Asian &
Central Asia Studies, Shanghai Municipal Center
for International Studies and Center for South
Asia Studies, Tongji University
xii xiii
CONTENTS
Foreword
Preface
Contributors
From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China
Relations
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan
A Retrospection of Sino-Indian War of 1962
Vishnubhatala NVLNG Sharma
Bilateral Engagements between India-China since 1988
Bashir Ahmad Dar
Impact of Bandung Conference on Sino-Indian Relations: A
Reappraisal
C. Annapurna and Gaddam Venkata Ramana
India-China Relations: A Sino-Indian Perspective
Atrayee Banerjee and Madhurima Chowdhury
Archetypal Scapegoats - India and China
G. Hannah and P. Kusuma Harinath
Lao Tzu and Gandhi on Self transcendence for Peace and
Human Development
Dr. K. Manjusree Naidu and Dr. Varalakshmi M.
Tagore (泰戈尔) and China (中国)
Sourabh Chatterjee
Cross Cultural Communication between India & China from
a Business Perspective: Snap shots
G. Geethanjali
Maritime Security and International Cooperation - Also on
the String of Pearls and the Maritime Silk Road
Wang Dehua
The Fallacy of String of Pearls Theory in India-China Relations
Prabhakaran Paleri
Coping with China in the Maritime Realm: Whither India?
S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni
iii
vii
xi
01
12
27
48
53
68
75
102
118
137
164
181
Maritime Trade of Ancient Tamils with the East and West in
the special reference to the Trading conduct of India to China
J. Soundararajan
The Convergence Dilemma: Mapping India-China Strategic
Relations
Dalbir Ahlawat
India's China Policy: Quest for an Optimal Strategy
Rabindra Sen
India: Wanted a China Strategy
D.S. Rajan
Insurgencies in Northeast India and the Role of China
G. Jayachandra Reddy and M. Sasikala
Strategic Perspectives on India-China Relations: An Analysis
T.M.R Prasad and I.Babu Rao
Indian Ocean Region: A quest for supremacy between India
and China
MD Afroz
The Balance-of-Threat Theory: Implications for the South
China Sea
Olga Daksueva
Managing Security Environment in South China Sea: the Role
of India and China
Amit Kumar
India-China Entanglement in Myanmar: An Energy
Prespective
Saheli Bose
India-China: Energy Security and Environmental
Sustainability
Tumtin Sonmang Koren
India, China and the Asian Energy Security
C. Vinodan
Sino-Indian Energy Cooperation in the 21st Century
Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi
194
208
240
254
267
283
297
307
328
351
369
392
420
xiv
Former Ambassador
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi
Email: cvranathan@gmail.com
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan
From Conflict to Cooperation:
A Survey of India-China Relations
India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues 01
In 2012 the fiftieth anniversary of the armed conflict between
India and China was recollected in the media. Many items
appeared in the print media, and the electronic media held panel
discussions. Most of the coverage deal t almost exclusively with
the manifold failures of the then civil and military leaderships. In
2013 there was a reprise of the same when parts of the Henderson
Brooks Report on the 1962 conflict found their way into the Press,
reviving vociferous demands for the public release of the Report
which is still classified and unavailable to the general public.
What was missing in the Press and in the many panel discussions
was informed analysis of the reasons why the Peoples'
Republic of China, led by the charismatic Mao Zedong decided to
take armed actions against India. Its Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru, believed passionately that India and China living in
friendship would lead to Asian revival, would usher in peace
after the ravages of the Second World War and growth and
prosperity for India which had gained independence and for
China which had “liberated” itself from a century of domination
by foreign forces. This talk is an attempt to deal with the several
interconnecting and complex factors which played a role in the
Chinese leadership's decision to resort to war against India and
factors which influenced the Indian leadership to take reactive
actions to deal with the situation. The talk then turns to more
contemporary times where conflict has given way to an
environment of cooperation between India and China.
The two years 1950 and 1959 were crucial in the contemporary
history of India-China relations. The intervening years were
significant ones for the promise of warm friendship and
Maritime Trade of Ancient Tamils with the East and West in
the special reference to the Trading conduct of India to China
J. Soundararajan
The Convergence Dilemma: Mapping India-China Strategic
Relations
Dalbir Ahlawat
India's China Policy: Quest for an Optimal Strategy
Rabindra Sen
India: Wanted a China Strategy
D.S. Rajan
Insurgencies in Northeast India and the Role of China
G. Jayachandra Reddy and M. Sasikala
Strategic Perspectives on India-China Relations: An Analysis
T.M.R Prasad and I.Babu Rao
Indian Ocean Region: A quest for supremacy between India
and China
MD Afroz
The Balance-of-Threat Theory: Implications for the South
China Sea
Olga Daksueva
Managing Security Environment in South China Sea: the Role
of India and China
Amit Kumar
India-China Entanglement in Myanmar: An Energy
Prespective
Saheli Bose
India-China: Energy Security and Environmental
Sustainability
Tumtin Sonmang Koren
India, China and the Asian Energy Security
C. Vinodan
Sino-Indian Energy Cooperation in the 21st Century
Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi
194
208
240
254
267
283
297
307
328
351
369
392
420
xiv
Former Ambassador
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi
Email: cvranathan@gmail.com
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan
From Conflict to Cooperation:
A Survey of India-China Relations
India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues 01
In 2012 the fiftieth anniversary of the armed conflict between
India and China was recollected in the media. Many items
appeared in the print media, and the electronic media held panel
discussions. Most of the coverage deal t almost exclusively with
the manifold failures of the then civil and military leaderships. In
2013 there was a reprise of the same when parts of the Henderson
Brooks Report on the 1962 conflict found their way into the Press,
reviving vociferous demands for the public release of the Report
which is still classified and unavailable to the general public.
What was missing in the Press and in the many panel discussions
was informed analysis of the reasons why the Peoples'
Republic of China, led by the charismatic Mao Zedong decided to
take armed actions against India. Its Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru, believed passionately that India and China living in
friendship would lead to Asian revival, would usher in peace
after the ravages of the Second World War and growth and
prosperity for India which had gained independence and for
China which had “liberated” itself from a century of domination
by foreign forces. This talk is an attempt to deal with the several
interconnecting and complex factors which played a role in the
Chinese leadership's decision to resort to war against India and
factors which influenced the Indian leadership to take reactive
actions to deal with the situation. The talk then turns to more
contemporary times where conflict has given way to an
environment of cooperation between India and China.
The two years 1950 and 1959 were crucial in the contemporary
history of India-China relations. The intervening years were
significant ones for the promise of warm friendship and
anyone to cross it”. These were the first indications of the deep
suspicions which the new leaders of China harbored about India's
intentions over Tibet viewing them as a continuation of the
policies of British Imperialism. These suspicions only got
exacerbated in 1959 when wide differences between India and
China over the boundary became public and when The Dalai
Lama with his large entourage escaped to India and was given
humanitarian asylum by the Government of India. The reason
for his leaving Lhasa, notwithstanding a 1951 seventeen point
agreement between Lhasa administration and the Government
of China on internal autonomy was that the agreement was not
faithfully implemented, Tibetans living outside Tibet rose in
violent rebellion against the Chinese, which was suppressed by
force, and he felt that it was unsafe for him to continue in Lhasa.
India was wrongly accused by the Chinese of instigating events
in Tibet, and planning the arrival of the Dalai Lama in India. The
Government of India decided to give humanitarian asylum to
the Dalai Lama and his vast entourage which accompanied him,
on the condition that no political activities would be carried out
by him within India. This humanitarian action was in keeping
with the cultural and spiritual links between India and Tibetan
people over the centuries ever since Buddhism went to Tibet from
India.
By 1959, the deteriorating relations between India and China
began to feature in the worsening relations between the former
Soviet Union and China. Solidarity between the Chinese
Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
gave way to deep ideological differences over contrasting
opinions on the international situation and each others' external
and domestic policies. The Chinese Party felt that its Soviet
counterpart wanted to control the Chinese Party to make the
latter submit to the strategic needs of Soviet-USA cooperation
“for domination of the world”. In 1959 Soviet leader Kruschchev
met President Eisenhower in USA and referred to peaceful
coexistence between the capitalist and socialist world. This was
cooperation between India and China given prevailing
complexities in the international situation. However, 1950 and
1959 are landmark years because of events relating to Tibet, the
domestic situation in China under the leadership of Mao Zedong,
the deterioration of relations between the two major Communist
Parties of the Former Soviet Union and China and the continuing
bitter relations between China and the USA, following the Korean
War and the latter's support to the regime in Taiwan.
Cumulatively these developments had a baneful impact on India-
China relations. These worsened with the public revelation of
wide differences over the boundary between India and China
through the release of official correspondence exchanged
between the Governments of India and China on this question.
Within India, this release of the correspondence, accompanied by
armed incidents along the boundary regions , led to a big upsurge
of public opinion in Parliament and outside which had the effect
of constraining Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister, from
constructive negotiations on the boundary question.
Between October 1949 to October 1950, both before and after
diplomatic relations were established between India and the
Peoples' Republic of China(P.R.C.), the Government of India were
very concerned with clear indications that troops would be sent
into Tibet thus unsettling conditions across the hitherto peaceful
border between India and Tibet. Consequently, India
advocated in notes to the Chinese Government that Sino-Tibetan
relations should be adjusted through peaceful negotiations. In
October 1950, the reply from the Chinese Government was to
assert that Tibet was an integral part of China “and that the matter
was entirely a domestic problem of China”. Further it criticized
the viewpoint of the Government of India “as having been
affected by foreign influences hostile to China”. Such negative
and hostile reactions led Prime Minister Nehru to declare in
Parliament in November, 1950 that the boundary in the Eastern
Sector had been clearly defined by the McMahon Line of 1914. He
added, “map or no map that is our frontier and we will not allow
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China Relations
02 03
India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security IssuesIndia and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues
anyone to cross it”. These were the first indications of the deep
suspicions which the new leaders of China harbored about India's
intentions over Tibet viewing them as a continuation of the
policies of British Imperialism. These suspicions only got
exacerbated in 1959 when wide differences between India and
China over the boundary became public and when The Dalai
Lama with his large entourage escaped to India and was given
humanitarian asylum by the Government of India. The reason
for his leaving Lhasa, notwithstanding a 1951 seventeen point
agreement between Lhasa administration and the Government
of China on internal autonomy was that the agreement was not
faithfully implemented, Tibetans living outside Tibet rose in
violent rebellion against the Chinese, which was suppressed by
force, and he felt that it was unsafe for him to continue in Lhasa.
India was wrongly accused by the Chinese of instigating events
in Tibet, and planning the arrival of the Dalai Lama in India. The
Government of India decided to give humanitarian asylum to
the Dalai Lama and his vast entourage which accompanied him,
on the condition that no political activities would be carried out
by him within India. This humanitarian action was in keeping
with the cultural and spiritual links between India and Tibetan
people over the centuries ever since Buddhism went to Tibet from
India.
By 1959, the deteriorating relations between India and China
began to feature in the worsening relations between the former
Soviet Union and China. Solidarity between the Chinese
Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
gave way to deep ideological differences over contrasting
opinions on the international situation and each others' external
and domestic policies. The Chinese Party felt that its Soviet
counterpart wanted to control the Chinese Party to make the
latter submit to the strategic needs of Soviet-USA cooperation
“for domination of the world”. In 1959 Soviet leader Kruschchev
met President Eisenhower in USA and referred to peaceful
coexistence between the capitalist and socialist world. This was
cooperation between India and China given prevailing
complexities in the international situation. However, 1950 and
1959 are landmark years because of events relating to Tibet, the
domestic situation in China under the leadership of Mao Zedong,
the deterioration of relations between the two major Communist
Parties of the Former Soviet Union and China and the continuing
bitter relations between China and the USA, following the Korean
War and the latter's support to the regime in Taiwan.
Cumulatively these developments had a baneful impact on India-
China relations. These worsened with the public revelation of
wide differences over the boundary between India and China
through the release of official correspondence exchanged
between the Governments of India and China on this question.
Within India, this release of the correspondence, accompanied by
armed incidents along the boundary regions , led to a big upsurge
of public opinion in Parliament and outside which had the effect
of constraining Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister, from
constructive negotiations on the boundary question.
Between October 1949 to October 1950, both before and after
diplomatic relations were established between India and the
Peoples' Republic of China(P.R.C.), the Government of India were
very concerned with clear indications that troops would be sent
into Tibet thus unsettling conditions across the hitherto peaceful
border between India and Tibet. Consequently, India
advocated in notes to the Chinese Government that Sino-Tibetan
relations should be adjusted through peaceful negotiations. In
October 1950, the reply from the Chinese Government was to
assert that Tibet was an integral part of China “and that the matter
was entirely a domestic problem of China”. Further it criticized
the viewpoint of the Government of India “as having been
affected by foreign influences hostile to China”. Such negative
and hostile reactions led Prime Minister Nehru to declare in
Parliament in November, 1950 that the boundary in the Eastern
Sector had been clearly defined by the McMahon Line of 1914. He
added, “map or no map that is our frontier and we will not allow
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China Relations
02 03
India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security IssuesIndia and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues
vehemently opposed by China which had fought a bitter war
with USA in Korea and felt encircled by USA from Taiwan and
post war Japan. The ideological difference spilt over to state level
relations when the Soviet Union reneged on its agreement to
help China develop its own nuclear weapon and withdrew
hundreds of its technicians from China, who assisted China's
industrial recovery.
In August 1959, there took place an armed clash at Longju in the
Arunachal Pradesh sector between Chinese and Indian troops.
The Soviet Union which supported China during its
suppression of the Tibetan revolt earlier refused to support
China over this incident. Instead its official news agency TASS
called on both sides to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. This
was seen by the Chinese as support to a “bourgeois “ state
instead of support to a “socialist” state which played into the
hands of the imperialists who sought to drive a wedge between
China and the Soviet Union. In 1959 Kruschchev visited China
and made his displeasure over Mao's India policy known to Mao.
A long period of bitter confrontation between Soviet Union and
China followed, which lasted for almost three decades, and at
times marked by armed conflicts over territorial issues . For the
Chinese in the late fifties, India was not seen as a non aligned
country but as one which was doubly aligned to USSR and to
USA in their confrontation with China. Some western
academicians thus view the 1962 armed conflict between India
and China as one which was meant to serve a lesson to the USSR.
Two years before the armed conflict, in 1960, the Chinese Premier,
Zhou Enlai visited India to negotiate a solution to the boundary
question at the invitation of Prime Minister Nehru. Ever since the
correspondence between the Premiers showing the wide
differences between India and China over the boundary, the
revelation that China had built a road connecting Tibet to Xinjiang
through Ladakh and the Dalai Lama's entry into India, the Prime
Minister was attacked in Parliament and outside for what was
seen as a weak policy on China. Hence the visit of the Chinese
04 05
Premier was strongly opposed by certain political parties,
prominent personalities and sections of the Press. During his visit
the Chinese Premier in talks with the Indian Premier pointed out
that China was willing to take a realistic attitude towards the
McMohan Line in the Eastern Sector and he requested India to
take a similar position with respect to Chinese claims in the
Ladakh sector. He drew a parallel with China's approach to the
boundary dispute with Burma, where the Chinese decided to
follow a realistic approach by accepting the McMahon Line. In
the face of opposition by his Cabinet colleagues Nehru did not
agree with what was seen as a Chinese attempt at justifying claims
to a vast area in Ladakh. The talks ended with an agreement to
appoint officials on both sides to examine documents on which
each side based its claims. In the event the final report of the
officials only reinforced the positions of both sides which were
made clear in the earlier correspondence between the
Governments.
It can be seen from all this that from the fifties of the last century,
till the conflict in 1962, there were mutual misunderstandings,
misperceptions and missed opportunities to solve the boundary
question. From the Chinese side, India's reactions to events in
Tibet for which the Chinese were solely responsible, were
grossly misinterpreted as India having expansionist motives.
The wide differences over the boundary added to this view.
China's break with the Soviet Union caused by disputes over each
one's world view had its effect on India-China relations in the
backdrop of the Soviet Union seeking to establish good relations
with what was seen a progressive India under Nehru's
leadership. India was also seen as supporting American actions
to help Tibetans oppose the Chinese in Tibet.
From the Indian side also there were misperceptions of a
revolutionary regime, which came to power on a strong
nationalist platform bent on reunifying peripheral territories
through force. The belief that a show of military presence, which
was poorly equipped and unsupported by logistics, in areas
From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China Relations
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan
India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security IssuesIndia and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues
vehemently opposed by China which had fought a bitter war
with USA in Korea and felt encircled by USA from Taiwan and
post war Japan. The ideological difference spilt over to state level
relations when the Soviet Union reneged on its agreement to
help China develop its own nuclear weapon and withdrew
hundreds of its technicians from China, who assisted China's
industrial recovery.
In August 1959, there took place an armed clash at Longju in the
Arunachal Pradesh sector between Chinese and Indian troops.
The Soviet Union which supported China during its
suppression of the Tibetan revolt earlier refused to support
China over this incident. Instead its official news agency TASS
called on both sides to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. This
was seen by the Chinese as support to a “bourgeois “ state
instead of support to a “socialist” state which played into the
hands of the imperialists who sought to drive a wedge between
China and the Soviet Union. In 1959 Kruschchev visited China
and made his displeasure over Mao's India policy known to Mao.
A long period of bitter confrontation between Soviet Union and
China followed, which lasted for almost three decades, and at
times marked by armed conflicts over territorial issues . For the
Chinese in the late fifties, India was not seen as a non aligned
country but as one which was doubly aligned to USSR and to
USA in their confrontation with China. Some western
academicians thus view the 1962 armed conflict between India
and China as one which was meant to serve a lesson to the USSR.
Two years before the armed conflict, in 1960, the Chinese Premier,
Zhou Enlai visited India to negotiate a solution to the boundary
question at the invitation of Prime Minister Nehru. Ever since the
correspondence between the Premiers showing the wide
differences between India and China over the boundary, the
revelation that China had built a road connecting Tibet to Xinjiang
through Ladakh and the Dalai Lama's entry into India, the Prime
Minister was attacked in Parliament and outside for what was
seen as a weak policy on China. Hence the visit of the Chinese
04 05
Premier was strongly opposed by certain political parties,
prominent personalities and sections of the Press. During his visit
the Chinese Premier in talks with the Indian Premier pointed out
that China was willing to take a realistic attitude towards the
McMohan Line in the Eastern Sector and he requested India to
take a similar position with respect to Chinese claims in the
Ladakh sector. He drew a parallel with China's approach to the
boundary dispute with Burma, where the Chinese decided to
follow a realistic approach by accepting the McMahon Line. In
the face of opposition by his Cabinet colleagues Nehru did not
agree with what was seen as a Chinese attempt at justifying claims
to a vast area in Ladakh. The talks ended with an agreement to
appoint officials on both sides to examine documents on which
each side based its claims. In the event the final report of the
officials only reinforced the positions of both sides which were
made clear in the earlier correspondence between the
Governments.
It can be seen from all this that from the fifties of the last century,
till the conflict in 1962, there were mutual misunderstandings,
misperceptions and missed opportunities to solve the boundary
question. From the Chinese side, India's reactions to events in
Tibet for which the Chinese were solely responsible, were
grossly misinterpreted as India having expansionist motives.
The wide differences over the boundary added to this view.
China's break with the Soviet Union caused by disputes over each
one's world view had its effect on India-China relations in the
backdrop of the Soviet Union seeking to establish good relations
with what was seen a progressive India under Nehru's
leadership. India was also seen as supporting American actions
to help Tibetans oppose the Chinese in Tibet.
From the Indian side also there were misperceptions of a
revolutionary regime, which came to power on a strong
nationalist platform bent on reunifying peripheral territories
through force. The belief that a show of military presence, which
was poorly equipped and unsupported by logistics, in areas
From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China Relations
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan
India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security IssuesIndia and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues
06 07
claimed by the Chinese in Ladakh, would not be attacked
was sadly erroneous. Lastly Nehru's conviction that any armed
conflict between India and China would attract the intervention
of the major powers in the era of the cold war, was misplaced as
this did not happen except for moral(and later) material support
to India. As a result of the conflict, India is in full control of
Arunachal Pradesh and Chinese are in control of the areas in
Ladakh which they have claimed and occupied as a result of the
conflict. A major outcome of this conflict has been the growth of
China's relations with Pakistan, which in their origin and
development have a distinct anti-India bias.
From 1962 to 1979 relations between India and China had reached
a nadir. For a period of eleven years from 1965 to 1976, during the
last decade of the life of Mao Zedong, China itself was rocked by
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution launched by him to
immunize China from what he saw as revisionism in the Soviet
Union . He believed that this had also infected his own senior
colleagues, who were dismissed by him and ill treated. It was
only after 1978, when Deng Xiaoping announced reforms to the
autarchic system which prevailed under Mao, which included
opening up China to the outside world and better relations with
neighbors, that there was a turn for the better in India-China
relations. In 1979, A.B.Vajpayee visited China as Minister of
External Affairs on Chinese invitation. This was the first high
level exchange after the 1960 visit of the Chinese Premier to India.
The visit had some substantial results including a reiteration by
Deng Xiaoping of the earlier 1960 proposal under a “package
settlement”. This could not be followed up as the then
Government of India led by a coalition under the Janata Party
lost its majority in Parliament.
When Mrs. Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, the high
level communication with China was kept up when the Chinese
Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, visited India in 1981. A trade
agreement followed and a decision was taken that Vice
Ministerial level officials of the two sides would meet annually to
discuss the border question and promote relations in other areas
such as cultural and scientific exchanges. The major event which
led to a decisive turning point in the bilateral relations came in
1988, when the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited
China. This visit came 34 years after the last visit to China by
Prime Minister, Nehru, the long hiatus reflecting the abnormal
situation in the bilateral relations between India and China. By
this time, there were vast changes in China, its relations with
USA had normalized, the conflict with Soviet Union abated
under Gorbachev even before the end of the cold war, and its
relations with South East Asian countries were improving as a
result of China declaring to withdraw support to Communist
Parties who were fighting the established Governments in these
countries. Relations between USA and Soviet Union improved
because Gorbachev did not interfere in Eastern Europe where
Socialist Parties almost everywhere were overthrown by
popular uprisings. The Berlin Wall was brought down without
any countervailing actions by the Soviet Bloc. All this
culminated in the implosion of the Soviet Union when the
former Central Asian and European portions of the Union
broke away and declared independence.
In a continuum from the visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China, relations
between India and China have improved vastly. The momentum
of high level visits has been sustained with exchanges at the
levels of the Presidents, Premiers, Foreign, Defense and other
Ministers of the two countries. With no country as with China,
has India entered into as many signed joint declarations,
statements, agreements, memoranda of understandings on
diverse subjects, and institutionalized as many dialogue
mechanisms. The significant aspect in all this is that periodic
changes through general elections of ruling parties in India
have not affected the forward momentum thus reflecting the
consensus on India-China relations.
To briefly summarize the broad political parameters, which have
evolved as a result of the high level exchanges between India and
From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China Relations
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan
India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security IssuesIndia and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues
06 07
claimed by the Chinese in Ladakh, would not be attacked
was sadly erroneous. Lastly Nehru's conviction that any armed
conflict between India and China would attract the intervention
of the major powers in the era of the cold war, was misplaced as
this did not happen except for moral(and later) material support
to India. As a result of the conflict, India is in full control of
Arunachal Pradesh and Chinese are in control of the areas in
Ladakh which they have claimed and occupied as a result of the
conflict. A major outcome of this conflict has been the growth of
China's relations with Pakistan, which in their origin and
development have a distinct anti-India bias.
From 1962 to 1979 relations between India and China had reached
a nadir. For a period of eleven years from 1965 to 1976, during the
last decade of the life of Mao Zedong, China itself was rocked by
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution launched by him to
immunize China from what he saw as revisionism in the Soviet
Union . He believed that this had also infected his own senior
colleagues, who were dismissed by him and ill treated. It was
only after 1978, when Deng Xiaoping announced reforms to the
autarchic system which prevailed under Mao, which included
opening up China to the outside world and better relations with
neighbors, that there was a turn for the better in India-China
relations. In 1979, A.B.Vajpayee visited China as Minister of
External Affairs on Chinese invitation. This was the first high
level exchange after the 1960 visit of the Chinese Premier to India.
The visit had some substantial results including a reiteration by
Deng Xiaoping of the earlier 1960 proposal under a “package
settlement”. This could not be followed up as the then
Government of India led by a coalition under the Janata Party
lost its majority in Parliament.
When Mrs. Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, the high
level communication with China was kept up when the Chinese
Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, visited India in 1981. A trade
agreement followed and a decision was taken that Vice
Ministerial level officials of the two sides would meet annually to
discuss the border question and promote relations in other areas
such as cultural and scientific exchanges. The major event which
led to a decisive turning point in the bilateral relations came in
1988, when the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited
China. This visit came 34 years after the last visit to China by
Prime Minister, Nehru, the long hiatus reflecting the abnormal
situation in the bilateral relations between India and China. By
this time, there were vast changes in China, its relations with
USA had normalized, the conflict with Soviet Union abated
under Gorbachev even before the end of the cold war, and its
relations with South East Asian countries were improving as a
result of China declaring to withdraw support to Communist
Parties who were fighting the established Governments in these
countries. Relations between USA and Soviet Union improved
because Gorbachev did not interfere in Eastern Europe where
Socialist Parties almost everywhere were overthrown by
popular uprisings. The Berlin Wall was brought down without
any countervailing actions by the Soviet Bloc. All this
culminated in the implosion of the Soviet Union when the
former Central Asian and European portions of the Union
broke away and declared independence.
In a continuum from the visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China, relations
between India and China have improved vastly. The momentum
of high level visits has been sustained with exchanges at the
levels of the Presidents, Premiers, Foreign, Defense and other
Ministers of the two countries. With no country as with China,
has India entered into as many signed joint declarations,
statements, agreements, memoranda of understandings on
diverse subjects, and institutionalized as many dialogue
mechanisms. The significant aspect in all this is that periodic
changes through general elections of ruling parties in India
have not affected the forward momentum thus reflecting the
consensus on India-China relations.
To briefly summarize the broad political parameters, which have
evolved as a result of the high level exchanges between India and
From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China Relations
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan
India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security IssuesIndia and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues
08 09
China in recent years, the accepted rubric to describe the
relationship is that it is a “strategic partnership for peace and
prosperity” based on the Five Principles and mutual sensitivity
for each other's concerns and aspirations and equality. The
relationship is seen as transcending the bilateral scope, and has
acquired regional and global significance. Both countries view
each other as partners for mutual benefit and not as rivals
and competitors. The two sides take a positive view and
support each other's friendship with other countries. The two
sides agree to enhance cooperation on maritime security, and
work together to tackle non traditional security threats and to
safeguard the security of international sea lanes and freedom of
navigation. Periodic bilateral consultations on regional matters
such as Afghanistan , counter terrorism, non proliferation,
maritime affairs and other subjects of mutual interest have been
agreed to. These are important commitments drawn from the
context of the experience gained over the years in dealing with
each other and the response of both countries to the developing
international and regional situations.
By the early years of this century, China has become the second
largest economy in the world with a gross domestic product of
U.S. dollars 10 trillion in comparison to India's US dollars 2
trillion. The present leadership in China seems determined to
tackle the glaring deficiencies in social governance following its
prosperity. At the same time China is also following a very
robust policy in strengthening its defense capabilities.
Accompanied by assertive behavior with respect to its maritime
and territorial claims involving a number of its neighbors, across
the seas and over land, including India, it is inevitable that each of
them is adopting policies to strengthen itself, either by itself or
through foreign assistance. In view of the expansive claims of the
Chinese over areas in the South China Sea and with respect to
islands also claimed by Japan, the USA has frequently called for
peaceful resolutions of the disputes, early adoption of a practical
code of conduct and compliance with international norms as
prescribed by the Law of the Seas Convention. As of now there
are no signs of abatement over China's confrontation either with
other claimants in South East Asia to areas in the South China Sea,
such as notably Vietnam, and The Philipines or with Japan over
the Senkaku Islands. With Japan bitter historical memories
continue to bedevil Sino-Japanese relations.
Having said earlier that India-China relations have improved
vastly over the last two decades, we must now turn to the
challenges posed to the relationship, which is complex, marked
by cooperation and difficult problems which need to be faced
boldly. In the common perception of the relations the boundary
question is seen as the biggest problem. Ever since 1979, it has
been agreed by the two Governments that this question should be
solved peacefully , and in a fair manner, acceptable to both sides.
Importantly that pending a solution, peace and tranquility
would be maintained along the notional Line of Control which
marks the limits of each side's military presence. There have been
a series of formal agreements between the two sides which deal
specifically with measures on maintenance of peace and
tranquility from 1993 till the present. Mechanisms have also been
put in place with the participation of civil and military officials,
including places along the LOC where military officials of both
sides would meet periodically, hold flag meetings when required,
to ensure that crossings of the LOC are diffused peacefully. Since
both sides have differences of perceptions on the locations of the
LOC in certain areas there are intrusions. However at the highest
levels there is a consensus to” mange and handle differences in a
positive and forward looking manner, strengthen mutual trust,
jointly safeguard peace and tranquility in the border and not let
the boundary question become an obstacle to development of
relations between the two countries”. ( Statement by Chinese
Foreign Office after meeting between Prime Minister Modi and
Chinese President Xi Jinping at Brazil). As for an eventual
resolution of the boundary question, since questions of
sovereignty are involved over territorial alienations, it is bound
to take time.
Amb. C.V. Ranganathan From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China Relations
India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security IssuesIndia and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues
08 09
China in recent years, the accepted rubric to describe the
relationship is that it is a “strategic partnership for peace and
prosperity” based on the Five Principles and mutual sensitivity
for each other's concerns and aspirations and equality. The
relationship is seen as transcending the bilateral scope, and has