Article

Locus of Control and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom: Locus of Control and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

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Abstract

Using data collected in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, this article examines the determinants of attitudes toward immigrants. In particular, we draw on the literature in social psychology to explore the role of locus of control in promoting more ethnocentric and restrictive attitudes towards immigration. We conceptualize control at three levels: (1) perceptions of individual locus of control (i.e., feeling that one can control one's own circumstances), (2) perceptions of societal control (i.e., feeling that one's country has control over immigration), and (3) perceptions of an outgroup's locus of control (i.e., feeling that an outgroup's social circumstances are attributable to dispositional rather than external factors). Results show that all three measures of control are important predictors of negative attitudes toward immigrants: Those who feel in control (personally or as a society) are less hostile towards immigrants, while those who attribute negative outcomes to immigrants' predispositions are also more hostile. Results also suggest that measures of control are related to, but distinct from, both partisanship and racial prejudice.

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... While anti-immigrant sentiment differs on state-level due to economic, cultural and political differences [27,32,33,42], concerns about immigration and perceived criminality seem to animate a broad public discourse. This is especially true after major events that impact a major segment of society. ...
... In addition, research has presented human trafficking as a security problem that unifies the public in their support for the prioritization of anti-trafficking efforts [15,25], yet anti-immigration sentiment may be anticipated to undermine this unity by making some people less supportive of anti-trafficking efforts if they think the response supports immigrants. As research has shown, anti-immigrant sentiment differs across ethnicity, gender and political ideology (see [27,32,33,42]), which may explain why specific segments of society think differently about anti-trafficking efforts. ...
... Recognizing that both immigration sentiment and concerns about human trafficking differ across geographic areas and segments of the population (see [27,32,33,42]), the present study also controlled for whether the role of anti-immigrant sentiment in public opinion about human trafficking varied across regions, race/ethnicities and political partisanship. Since evidence suggest that Democrats are more likely to see human trafficking as a social welfare issue, whereas Republicans are more likely to see it as an issue of crime [65], the models controlled for the role of Partisanship. ...
Article
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Prior research shows that anti-immigration sentiment affects public opinion about criminal justice problems and solutions. However, we know little about how these sentiments affect public opinion about human trafficking. This paper attempts to fill this gap by examining the role of anti-immigration sentiment in shaping public support for anti-trafficking efforts in the United States. Specifically, this research examines the effect of anti-immigration sentiment on the public’s understanding about vulnerabilities for human trafficking among migrant populations and corresponding support for policies directed at the protection of migrant trafficked persons. This is particularly important because public policies that safeguard migrant trafficked persons have been among the most difficult to pass despite strong support for the governmental prioritization of anti-trafficking efforts overall. Utilizing public opinion data from an original, nationally representative survey experiment of 2000 Americans, this study finds that anti-immigration sentiment (1) is associated with greater recognition of the vulnerability of immigrants to human trafficking victimization; (2) does not impact public support for a general governmental prioritization of human trafficking policies; yet (3) creates less public support for victim services for non-citizen trafficked persons; and (4) stems from differences in political views impacting support for services for immigrant victims. These findings contribute to an understanding of the role of anti-immigration sentiment in public opinion about crime and have implications for policies aimed at improving the identification of and outcomes for migrant trafficked persons.
... With respect to differences between males and females in their tolerance towards immigration, the literature has not reached a consensus. Some studies lend support to the hypothesis that women are more sympathetic to foreigners and perceive them as less of a threat (McLaren 2003;Stockemer 2015), others found that the opposite (Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar 2017) is valid, while a third category found no association between gender and anti-immigrant attitudes (Hayes and Dowds 2006). Gendered attitudes towards immigrants have been accounted for by differences in gender sensitivity and relative sex ratios (Abel and Magni-Berton 2013). ...
... Our outcome is a composite measure of the perceived immigrant threat by natives as an indication of their anti-immigrant sentiment. Similar approaches to gauge the anti-immigrant sentiment by using indexes made up of several items comprising perceived resource-based and cultural threats have been used by several scholars (Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar 2017;Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002;Schneider 2008). Our survey made possible the selection of three such variables: economic threat (the fear that the immigrants could take jobs away from the locals), cultural threat (the fear that immigrants could have a negative impact on cultural life) and criminality (the fear that immigrants increase the crime rate). ...
... The authors employed multiple linear regressions separately for each of the three threats included in the composite scale and found large similarities regarding the predictors and the signs of coefficients. These suggest that using the overall scale instead of separating out each component does not cause information loss and makes easier the interpretations of results, similar to decisions taken by other scholars (Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar 2017;McLaren 2003). We have deleted cases with missing values list wise. ...
This paper investigates the predictors of natives’ perception of the immigrant threat in Romania, an interesting site given immigrants’ marginal presence in the total population and the sizeable proportion of co-ethnic immigrants. Yet the interplay between nationalism and religion shapes an ideological frame that favours unwelcoming attitudes towards immigrants that challenge the Romanian identity forged along ethnic and religious ties. The authors used regression to analyse immigrant threat according to several dimensions: cosmopolitanism, group conflict and intergroup contact. In order to reflect specificities of this particular context, the latter dimension is conceptualized so as to include active and passive contact with immigrants. This distinction is relevant because of immigrants’ low presence in Romania. Findings suggest that variables from conflict theory explain more of the variation in the perceived threat, while indirect contact through mass-media exposure to immigrant content has the potential to reduce the perception of immigrant threat. Link to full article http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/P8QXxhxJQZVVx56ZIyJy/full
... In particular, people holding self-transcending values such as altruism, forgiveness, respect, and benevolence, as well as egalitarian views on division of resources, tend to be more concerned about climate change and support ameliorative action (Corner et al., 2014). In the context of welcoming climate migrants to one's own community, such values can be related to perceptions that climate migrants are not responsible for their own misfortune, but are migrating due hardship caused by external factors that are beyond their own control or are the result of randomness or fate (Harell et al., 2017); they may thus be perceived as more worthy of assistance (Marjanovic et al., 2009;Zagefka et al., 2011). ...
... In our case, the most highly exposed areas in Satkhira District tend to be poorer than the less exposed areas, and the poor and less-educated constitute the most vulnerable population segments within these areas Maki et al., 2019;McDonald et al., 2015Card et al., 2012Corner et al., 2014;Harell et al., 2017;Herreros andCriado, 2009 Just andAnderson, 2015;Lujala et al., 2015Lee et al., 2017McDonald et al., 2015P. Lujala, et al. ...
... Similarly, our findings on values and worldviews are mostly in line with previous studies on perceptions of climate change and immigrants (Corner et al., 2014;Harell et al., 2017;Herreros and Criado, 2009): those who see people more as makers of their own fate or hold people highly accountable for their actions tend to be more skeptical toward climate migrants while those with higher levels of social trust are more welcoming. In one respect, however, our results are perhaps surprising: we do not find evidence that stronger ingroup identity predicts more hostile attitudes toward internal climate migrants. ...
Article
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Climate change is predicted to cause voluntary and forced internal migration on an unprecedented scale in the coming decades. Yet, research on host communities that will be on the front lines in receiving the climate migrants has thus far been a neglected area within climate change research. Inspired by previous research on psychological distance's impact on people's behavior and attitudes, this article develops a conceptual framework proposing that spatial, attitudinal, experiential, and social proximities between migrants and host community members are central to understanding how attitudes toward internal climate migrants form and develop. Using multivariate regression analysis, the article applies the framework to a survey conducted among over 630 long-term residents in Satkhira District of Bangladesh, one of the most climate-exposed districts in the country. Supporting our hypotheses, we find evidence that host-migrant proximities shape attitudes toward internal climate migrants. Although the host community's capacity to receive migrants matters for attitudes toward them, the results for the proximity variables underscore that these attitudes are profoundly relational, positional, and complex. In particular, we provide evidence that shorter spatial distance to highly exposed areas and attitudinal distance to fellow citizens in terms of values and worldviews improve host community members' attitudes toward migrants. Further, the results for social proximity bring out the positional nature of attitudes, as they become more negative when socioeconomic differences to migrants increase.
... In that sense right-wing populism not only entails vertical distinction ("us" vs. elites) but also horizontal distinction ("us" vs. outsiders such as immigrants), facilitating the identification of scapegoats for grievances and injustices (Hameleers & de Vreese, 2018;Wodak, 2015). From a social psychological perspective, populism, therefore, involves both processes of in-group support and outgroup derogation, which have both been shown to serve as coping strategies to deal with frustration of the fundamental need for control (Bukowski, de Lemus, Rodriguez-Bailón, & Willis, 2017;Fritsche et al., 2013;Harell, Soroka, & Iyengar, 2017;Landau, Kay, & Whitson, 2015). The present research, therefore, aims to shed further light on control motivation and its consequences for populist thinking. ...
... Conversely, lacking personal control motivates coping strategies. For example, experiences of collective control were found to relate negatively to tendencies to blame immigrants for unfavorable economic conditions (Harell et al., 2017). ...
... While previous studies repeatedly showed that blaming immigrants increases the feelings of control Fritsche et al., 2013;Harell et al., 2017), the psychological pro- whether national identity affirmation suffices to instigate groupbased control processes. As immigration, ethnic diversity, and national identity are highly politicized issues, we tested in a second study whether political expression as an act of political in-group support bolsters feelings of control. ...
Article
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Blaming immigrants seems to be in part motivated by the need for control. However, three alternative explanations have been proposed as to why blaming bolsters feelings of control. First, blaming may restore a sense of an orderly world in which negative events can be attributed to a clear cause (causal attribution). Second, blaming others may strengthen in-group identities thereby facilitating group-based control (in-group identification). Finally, blaming low-status groups may enhance individuals' perceptions of dominance and superior status (hierarchy enhancement). Addressing these arguments, we conducted two survey experiments in the German context. In the first experiment, we examined the control-bolstering functions of causal attribution and in-group identification. Participants were primed with an economic crisis threat and then, given the opportunity to either blame out-groups (immigrants and managers), blame an abstract cause (globalization), or affirm their national identity. In the second experiment, we examine control enhancement in the context of political conflict and status hierarchies. Participants had the opportunity to either express prejudice toward low-status out-groups (immigrants and obese people) or indicate their opinion on the polarized issue of representation of the far-right. Both studies replicate earlier findings showing that anti-immigrant blaming and prejudice enhances the feelings of control. Neither mere causal attribution nor mere in-group identity salience produce similar control-bolstering effects. Instead, findings suggest that intergroup conflict and status differences benefit control the enhancement processes supporting accounts of both group-based control and social dominance. Findings are discussed with respect to social cohesion and the appeal of populist frames promoting antagonistic, unequal intergroup relations.
... In addition, according to the theory of 'locus of control', citizens of societies with stronger economic and social policies feel more in control of their personal life and less threatened by external factors such as immigration. The feeling of being 'in control' of one's own economic and social situation, in contrast with feelings of insecurity and unpredictability, causes lower fear of the unknown, and more openness to external challenges and change factors (Harell, Soroka and Iyengar, 2017;Messing and Ságvári, 2019). Consequently, women and men from countries that ensure equal rights should feel more secure about their acquired freedoms, and less concerned about real or imagined cultural invasions. ...
... 102-103;Giolla and Kajonius, 2019;Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009, p. 180). The GEPP's logic can be further justified as follows: favourable wealth, freedom, and equality conditions increase individuals' control over their lives and self-determination (Harell, Soroka and Iyengar, 2017), so wealth and human development encourage men and women to enhance values they 'inherently' care more about, for women, universalism/benevolence, for men, power/self-enhancement (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). In sum, the greater the social, economic, political empowerment for both genders, the larger the gender gap between masculine anti-immigrants attitudes, and feminine pro-immigrants tendencies (Davidov et al., 2014). ...
Thesis
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Although previous research has revealed the impact of individual and contextual elements on attitudes toward immigrants across Europe, a gender-focused study of European anti-immigrant attitudes is still lacking. This study examines the role of individuals' gender and macro structures of gender equality in shaping attitudes toward immigrants through the diffusion of benevolent and universalist human values. Drawing on the European Social Survey 2018 and the 2020 Gender Equality Index for 24 European countries, more gender-equal countries are found to be more tolerant toward immigrants, due to their higher self-transcendent values and lower conservation values. Also, no gender differences in attitudes toward immigrants have been found. These findings open the debate on the relationship between gender, gender equality, basic human values, and attitudes toward immigrants, suggesting new avenues for future research. 3
... And finally, a recent theory explains pro-and anti-migrant attitudes in terms of the perception of control. Harell et al (2017) argue that the feeling of control is one of the most important explanatory factors for attitudes towards and acceptance of migrants. They use the concept of locus of control, which refers to a set of beliefs about the causes of events (for example losing one's job) or conditions (for example being poor) to either internal or external sources (Lefcourt, 1991;Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982;Rotter, 1966). ...
... Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis And finally, a recent theory explains pro-and anti-migrant attitudes in terms of the perception of control. Harell et al (2017) argue that the feeling of control is one of the most important explanatory factors for attitudes towards and acceptance of migrants. They use the concept of locus of control, which refers to a set of beliefs about the causes of events (for example losing one's job) or conditions (for example being poor) to either internal or external sources (Lefcourt, 1991;Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982;Rotter, 1966). ...
Book
Full-text available
The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven, cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every two years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations. The main aims of the ESS are: • to chart stability and change in social structure, conditions and attitudes in Europe, and to interpret how Europe's social, political and moral fabric is changing; • to achieve and spread higher standards of rigour in cross-national research in the social sciences, including for example, questionnaire design and pre-testing, sampling, data collection , reduction of bias and the reliability of questions; • to introduce soundly-based indicators of national progress, based on citizens' perceptions and judgements of key aspects of their societies; • to undertake and facilitate the training of European social researchers in comparative quantitative measurement and analysis; • to improve the visibility and outreach of data on social change among academics, policy makers and the wider public. Summary of findings ▪ Based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) the analysis explores cross-national differences in perceptions of migration, and discovers factors that may lie behind the immense differences in the acceptance versus rejection of migrants across European countries. ▪ The results show how attitudes have changed from before to after the 2015 migration 'crisis', and also draw a wider picture of attitude shifts in 15 European countries between 2002 and 2016/17. ▪ Overall, the perception of migration in European countries remains neutral and stable-respondents see as many advantages as disadvantages of worldwide mobility. In terms of behaviour, roughly one tenth of surveyed Europeans would unconditionally reject migrants arriving from poorer countries outside Europe and settling in their countries. • Considering the immediate differences in attitudes before and after 2015 migration crisis, the overall level of unconditional rejection has decreased from 15% to 10%. People in the UK, Ireland and Portugal have become significantly more positive about migrants, while only Hungarians and Estonians became significantly more negative. Attitudes in other countries did not change in a significant manner. • In contrast to long-term democracies, in Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania negative attitudes are more likely to be turned into negative behavioural or policy expectations. It is suspected that the strength of norms as set by political and public discourse plays a decisive role in determining the degree to which negative attitudes are turned into explicit rejection and exclusion. • The conclusion of our previous study "widespread and homogenizing anti-migrant attitudes in some countries have little to do with migrants" has been further supported by the present analysis. Anti-migrant attitudes are strongest and are likely to increase further in countries where migrants are hardly present, where people don't have personal experiences with immigrants but where they lack the feeling of safety and control. • Looking into which values are associated with certain attitudes, two types of values show the strongest correlation: security and humanitarianism. Those who attribute great significance to security tend to be the most negative towards immigration, while those who value equality and respect of other people are least fearful of migrants. • In most countries (with four exceptions) humanitarian values are more dominant than security. Especially in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland), the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, humanitarian values are-in general-valued more highly than security. • Looking at how support for certain political parties is associated with attitudes towards migrants, left-wing voters generally tend to have a positive attitude towards migration, centrist voters are broadly neutral, while right-wings voters generally have a negative attitude. However, while those self-identifying with the left are equally positive about migration, irrespective of how left-oriented they feel, political right-wing extremism correlates with extreme anti-migrant attitudes. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 4 • Right-wing populist parties gather and feed that part of the population which is very negative towards migrants and migration in general. They seem to provide a terrain on which to openly express the rage fuelled by uncertainty, and to blame migrants. In almost all countries one or two such parties exist, the difference lies rather in how powerful they are. • When looking at the profile of those expressing homogeneously negative attitudes towards migrants we see that it is not the basic demographic profile that makes them unique from the rest of the population but rather their subjective perceptions. Those who feel politically disempowered, financially insecure and without social support are more likely to have homogeneously anti-migrant attitudes compared to the rest of the population. • The analysis of attitudes towards migration by supporters of right-wing populist parties demonstrates that although their perceptions of the consequences of migration are quite similar (very negative) across countries, the rejection of migrants is very different. These data show the degree to which dominant norms, set by mainstream politics, matter in terms of transforming aversion into extreme rejection of migrants. Hence, the political power such parties wield-whether in government or in opposition-plays a critical role in determining the degree to which anti-migrant narratives are allowed to become the norm within a society.
... And finally, a recent theory explains pro-and anti-migrant attitudes in terms of the perception of control. Harell et al (2017) argue that the feeling of control is one of the most important explanatory factors for attitudes towards and acceptance of migrants. They use the concept of locus of control, which refers to a set of beliefs about the causes of events (for example losing one's job) or conditions (for example being poor) to either internal or external sources (Lefcourt, 1991;Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982;Rotter, 1966). ...
... Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis And finally, a recent theory explains pro-and anti-migrant attitudes in terms of the perception of control. Harell et al (2017) argue that the feeling of control is one of the most important explanatory factors for attitudes towards and acceptance of migrants. They use the concept of locus of control, which refers to a set of beliefs about the causes of events (for example losing one's job) or conditions (for example being poor) to either internal or external sources (Lefcourt, 1991;Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982;Rotter, 1966). ...
Book
Full-text available
The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven, cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every two years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations. The main aims of the ESS are: • to chart stability and change in social structure, conditions and attitudes in Europe, and to interpret how Europe's social, political and moral fabric is changing; • to achieve and spread higher standards of rigour in cross-national research in the social sciences, including for example, questionnaire design and pre-testing, sampling, data collection , reduction of bias and the reliability of questions; • to introduce soundly-based indicators of national progress, based on citizens' perceptions and judgements of key aspects of their societies; • to undertake and facilitate the training of European social researchers in comparative quantitative measurement and analysis; • to improve the visibility and outreach of data on social change among academics, policy makers and the wider public. Summary of findings ▪ Based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) the analysis explores cross-national differences in perceptions of migration, and discovers factors that may lie behind the immense differences in the acceptance versus rejection of migrants across European countries. ▪ The results show how attitudes have changed from before to after the 2015 migration 'crisis', and also draw a wider picture of attitude shifts in 15 European countries between 2002 and 2016/17. ▪ Overall, the perception of migration in European countries remains neutral and stable-respondents see as many advantages as disadvantages of worldwide mobility. In terms of behaviour, roughly one tenth of surveyed Europeans would unconditionally reject migrants arriving from poorer countries outside Europe and settling in their countries. • Considering the immediate differences in attitudes before and after 2015 migration crisis, the overall level of unconditional rejection has decreased from 15% to 10%. People in the UK, Ireland and Portugal have become significantly more positive about migrants, while only Hungarians and Estonians became significantly more negative. Attitudes in other countries did not change in a significant manner. • In contrast to long-term democracies, in Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania negative attitudes are more likely to be turned into negative behavioural or policy expectations. It is suspected that the strength of norms as set by political and public discourse plays a decisive role in determining the degree to which negative attitudes are turned into explicit rejection and exclusion. • The conclusion of our previous study "widespread and homogenizing anti-migrant attitudes in some countries have little to do with migrants" has been further supported by the present analysis. Anti-migrant attitudes are strongest and are likely to increase further in countries where migrants are hardly present, where people don't have personal experiences with immigrants but where they lack the feeling of safety and control. • Looking into which values are associated with certain attitudes, two types of values show the strongest correlation: security and humanitarianism. Those who attribute great significance to security tend to be the most negative towards immigration, while those who value equality and respect of other people are least fearful of migrants. • In most countries (with four exceptions) humanitarian values are more dominant than security. Especially in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland), the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, humanitarian values are-in general-valued more highly than security. • Looking at how support for certain political parties is associated with attitudes towards migrants, left-wing voters generally tend to have a positive attitude towards migration, centrist voters are broadly neutral, while right-wings voters generally have a negative attitude. However, while those self-identifying with the left are equally positive about migration, irrespective of how left-oriented they feel, political right-wing extremism correlates with extreme anti-migrant attitudes. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 4 • Right-wing populist parties gather and feed that part of the population which is very negative towards migrants and migration in general. They seem to provide a terrain on which to openly express the rage fuelled by uncertainty, and to blame migrants. In almost all countries one or two such parties exist, the difference lies rather in how powerful they are. • When looking at the profile of those expressing homogeneously negative attitudes towards migrants we see that it is not the basic demographic profile that makes them unique from the rest of the population but rather their subjective perceptions. Those who feel politically disempowered, financially insecure and without social support are more likely to have homogeneously anti-migrant attitudes compared to the rest of the population. • The analysis of attitudes towards migration by supporters of right-wing populist parties demonstrates that although their perceptions of the consequences of migration are quite similar (very negative) across countries, the rejection of migrants is very different. These data show the degree to which dominant norms, set by mainstream politics, matter in terms of transforming aversion into extreme rejection of migrants. Hence, the political power such parties wield-whether in government or in opposition-plays a critical role in determining the degree to which anti-migrant narratives are allowed to become the norm within a society.
... A perceived increase in control over external threats can attenuate or even reverse out-group hostility (Rothschild et al., 2012;Greenaway et al., 2014). Within the migration literature, there is a consensus among scholars that anti-immigrant sentiments are galvanized when citizens are triggered to view immigrants as external threats (Sniderman et al., 2004;Brader et al., 2008;Hopkins, 2010;Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015), and there is evidence that these sentiments are softened by an increased sense of control (Harell et al., 2017). ...
... There are two ways that the Brexit referendum could have been channelled through a locus of control mechanism: by allowing citizens to feel a renewed sense in their personal control over political decisions or by transferring control to a trusted government. Theoretically, any increase in control over perceived threats -whether that control is attributed to the individual or to the state -would reduce out-group hostility (Harell et al., 2017). We operationalize personal control as external efficacy (see Judge et al., 2002), with the expectation that individuals who feel a greater sense of power over political processes would feel less inclined to scapegoat migrants and minorities. ...
Article
Recent political contests across Europe and North America have been propelled by a wave of populist, anti-immigrant resentment, and it was widely expected that these populist victories would further fan the flames of xenophobia. We implemented an experimental design around the Brexit referendum to test how populist victories shape anti-immigrant attitudes. We find that anti-immigrant attitudes actually softened after the Brexit referendum, among both Leave and Remain supporters, and these effects persisted for several months. How could a right- wing, populist victory soften anti-immigrant attitudes? We use causal mediation analysis to understand this ‘populist paradox.’ Among Leavers, a greater sense of control over immigration channelled the effects of the Brexit outcome onto anti-immigrant attitudes. But it is individuals’ efforts to distance themselves from accusations of xenophobia and racism that explains why we see a softening of attitudes towards immigration among both Leavers and Remainers.
... In par2cular, people holding self-transcending values such as altruism, forgiveness, respect, and benevolence, as well as egalitarian views on division of resources, tend to be more concerned about climate change and support ameliora2ve ac2on (Corner, Markowitz, & Pidgeon, 2014). In the context of welcoming climate migrants to one's own community, such values can be related to percep2ons that climate migrants are not responsible for their own misfortune, but are migra2ng due hardship caused by external factors that are beyond their own control or are the result of randomness or fate (Harell, Soroka, & Iyengar, 2017); they may thus be perceived as more worthy of assistance (Marjanovic, Greenglass, Struthers, & Faye, 2009;Zageva et al., 2011). ...
... Regarding our measure for religious a4tudes, we found that those who thought that "when people are displaced by climate change, that is the will of God, and there is lijle we can do", were more likely to welcome new migrants. It is possible that this is related to the strength of people's religious beliefs and/or related humanis2c values, but it is equally possible that the variable captures the effect of people feeling more empathy toward people who they believe cannot be blamed for their misfortune (Harell et al., 2017) or the effect of religious people perhaps being more inclined to accept other people of the same religious group (Bansak, Hainmueller, & Hangartner, 2016). ...
Research
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Countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa exposed to the environmental consequences of climate change are predicted to see voluntary and forced internal migration on an unprecedented scale in the coming decades. This will likely put a great strain on host communities receiving the internally displaced. In many communities, the long-term residents may be skeptical toward the internal climate migrants, creating grounds for heightened tensions and even violent conflict. To alleviate such tensions, it is important to understand how attitudes toward internal climate migrants among host community members form, an issue that has thus far received little attention in climate research. To promote research on host communities receiving internal climate migrants in developing countries, this article develops a conceptual framework which seeks to map key factors influencing attitudes toward climate migrants. It proposes that distance between migrants and host community members along multiple dimensions is central to understanding how such attitudes form. The framework categorizes the different dimensions of distance into spatial, attitudinal, experiential, and social proximity. The article applies the framework to a survey conducted among over 630 long-term host community residents in the climate exposed Satkhira District of Bangladesh and finds evidence that variables reflecting these categories of proximity shape attitudes toward internal climate migrants.
... For example, selective pro-immigration reforms that explicitly focus on advancing national interest (e.g., increasing high-skilled immigration) may have the most legitimizing impacts among those who currently oppose immigration (see Kustov, 2021). At the same time, some of the more controversial pro-immigration law enforcement policies that instead draw public attention to the lack of border control (Harell et al., 2017) may conversely generate backlash even among those who are not particularly hostile to immigration. ...
Article
Do significant pro-immigration reforms – that open legal pathways for labor and family immigration – increase populist voting? Despite the common assumption that such reforms would lead to counter-productive voter backlash informed by the literature on immigrant group threat, the extent to which immigration policy itself influences voters has been unclear. To address this question, this paper estimates the impact of immigration policies on (right-wing) populist voting and immigration attitudes by exploiting the timing of major changes to immigration legislation in a new dataset linking the best available public opinion and policy data across the last 40 years in 24 European countries. My analysis shows that while the absolute levels of immigration policy openness are associated with slightly higher populist voting across countries in a naive cross-sectional analysis, pro-immigration (or anti-immigration) policy changes do not affect populist voting or immigration concerns within countries. This suggests that pro-immigration reforms do not backfire due to voter backlash.
... When immigrants are perceived as threatening, U.S. Americans tend to have more negative perceptions of the immigrants, though interpersonal contact with immigrants leads to more positive perceptions of them (Ceballos & Yakushiko, 2014). People in the U.S., U.K., and Canada had more positive attitudes toward immigrants when the participants felt that they had control (via a strong internal locus of control) and when they felt that their society had control over immigration (Harell, Soroka, & Iyengar, 2017). People also prefer immigrants who they preceive as highly-skilled compared to those with low or no skillsand interestingly, this preference for highly skilled immigrants is true for people whether they themselves are wealthy or poor (Hainmmeuller & Hiscox, 2010). ...
Preprint
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The United States of America has a long history of discriminatory immigration and refugee policies that have resulted in disparities of health, education, employment and wages for many. This official discrimination is reflected in the personal prejudice of many U.S. Americans. In this study, we compare the social distance that participants desire from immigrants by randomly assigning participants (N = 616) a fictional vignette that alters the nation of origin (England, India, Syria), gender (man, woman) and occupation (doctor, teacher, janitor) of an immigrant. Participants demonstrated a preference for professional immigrants, women immigrants, and immigrants from England while controlling for age, though there were no significant interaction effects. These findings imply that U.S. American’s attitudes about immigrants and immigration are not objective. We believe that these prejudicial attitudes are reflected in policy and law, suggesting a need to construct processes to protect such policies from subjective and prejudicial attitudes.
... And finally, a recent theory explains pro-and anti-migrant attitudes in terms of the perception of control. Harell et al (2017) argue that the feeling of control is one of the most important explanatory factors for attitudes towards and acceptance of migrants. They use the concept of locus of control, which refers to a set of beliefs about the causes of events (for example losing one's job) or conditions (for example being poor) to either internal or external sources (Lefcourt, 1991;Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982;Rotter, 1966). ...
Book
The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven, cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every two years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations. The main aims of the ESS are: • to chart stability and change in social structure, conditions and attitudes in Europe, and to interpret how Europe's social, political and moral fabric is changing; • to achieve and spread higher standards of rigour in cross-national research in the social sciences, including for example, questionnaire design and pre-testing, sampling, data collection , reduction of bias and the reliability of questions; • to introduce soundly-based indicators of national progress, based on citizens' perceptions and judgements of key aspects of their societies; • to undertake and facilitate the training of European social researchers in comparative quantitative measurement and analysis; • to improve the visibility and outreach of data on social change among academics, policy makers and the wider public. Summary of findings ▪ Based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) the analysis explores cross-national differences in perceptions of migration, and discovers factors that may lie behind the immense differences in the acceptance versus rejection of migrants across European countries. ▪ The results show how attitudes have changed from before to after the 2015 migration 'crisis', and also draw a wider picture of attitude shifts in 15 European countries between 2002 and 2016/17. ▪ Overall, the perception of migration in European countries remains neutral and stable-respondents see as many advantages as disadvantages of worldwide mobility. In terms of behaviour, roughly one tenth of surveyed Europeans would unconditionally reject migrants arriving from poorer countries outside Europe and settling in their countries. • Considering the immediate differences in attitudes before and after 2015 migration crisis, the overall level of unconditional rejection has decreased from 15% to 10%. People in the UK, Ireland and Portugal have become significantly more positive about migrants, while only Hungarians and Estonians became significantly more negative. Attitudes in other countries did not change in a significant manner. • In contrast to long-term democracies, in Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania negative attitudes are more likely to be turned into negative behavioural or policy expectations. It is suspected that the strength of norms as set by political and public discourse plays a decisive role in determining the degree to which negative attitudes are turned into explicit rejection and exclusion. • The conclusion of our previous study "widespread and homogenizing anti-migrant attitudes in some countries have little to do with migrants" has been further supported by the present analysis. Anti-migrant attitudes are strongest and are likely to increase further in countries where migrants are hardly present, where people don't have personal experiences with immigrants but where they lack the feeling of safety and control. • Looking into which values are associated with certain attitudes, two types of values show the strongest correlation: security and humanitarianism. Those who attribute great significance to security tend to be the most negative towards immigration, while those who value equality and respect of other people are least fearful of migrants. • In most countries (with four exceptions) humanitarian values are more dominant than security. Especially in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland), the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, humanitarian values are-in general-valued more highly than security. • Looking at how support for certain political parties is associated with attitudes towards migrants, left-wing voters generally tend to have a positive attitude towards migration, centrist voters are broadly neutral, while right-wings voters generally have a negative attitude. However, while those self-identifying with the left are equally positive about migration, irrespective of how left-oriented they feel, political right-wing extremism correlates with extreme anti-migrant attitudes. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 4 • Right-wing populist parties gather and feed that part of the population which is very negative towards migrants and migration in general. They seem to provide a terrain on which to openly express the rage fuelled by uncertainty, and to blame migrants. In almost all countries one or two such parties exist, the difference lies rather in how powerful they are. • When looking at the profile of those expressing homogeneously negative attitudes towards migrants we see that it is not the basic demographic profile that makes them unique from the rest of the population but rather their subjective perceptions. Those who feel politically disempowered, financially insecure and without social support are more likely to have homogeneously anti-migrant attitudes compared to the rest of the population. • The analysis of attitudes towards migration by supporters of right-wing populist parties demonstrates that although their perceptions of the consequences of migration are quite similar (very negative) across countries, the rejection of migrants is very different. These data show the degree to which dominant norms, set by mainstream politics, matter in terms of transforming aversion into extreme rejection of migrants. Hence, the political power such parties wield-whether in government or in opposition-plays a critical role in determining the degree to which anti-migrant narratives are allowed to become the norm within a society.
... So beeinflussen Wohnsitzauflagen nicht die Zahl der Migrant*innen, sondern lediglich deren Verteilung innerhalb des Bundeslandes. Die sozialpsychologische Forschung zeigt allerdings, dass das Gefühl des Kontrollverlusts eine wesentliche Quelle migrationskritischer Einstellungen bildet (Harell et al. 2017). Wohnsitzauflagen können in diesem Sinne als eine Antwort der Politik auf das Gefühl des Kontrollverlusts aufgefasst werden. ...
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Zusammenfassung Mit der Änderung des Aufenthaltsgesetzes im Juli 2016 erhielten die Bundesländer die Möglichkeit, landesinterne Wohnsitzauflagen für Asylberechtigte zu erlassen. Der Artikel geht der Frage nach, warum ein Teil der Landesregierungen in der Folgezeit von der Möglichkeit positiver Wohnsitzauflagen Gebrauch machte, während andere Länder auf dieses Instrument verzichteten. Die auf einer Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) basierende Untersuchung zeigt, dass die parteipolitische Ausrichtung der Regierung einen wichtigen Erklärungsfaktor liefert. Linksgeführte Regierungen sind notwendig, damit Asylberechtigten eine freie Wohnsitzwahl gewährt wird. Darüber hinaus kommt es in Flächenländern mit migrationskritischer Bevölkerung unter rechtsgeführten Regierungen zur Anwendung positiver Wohnsitzauflagen, nicht aber unter linksgeführten Regierungen. In diesem Fall werden Wohnsitzauflagen nur angewendet, wenn das betroffene Bundesland eine hohe Zahl an Geflüchteten aufnehmen muss. In Verbindung mit vergleichbaren Studien verdeutlichen die Befunde, dass die Forschung zu Parteieneffekten in der Migrationspolitik von der Berücksichtigung policy-spezifischer Rahmenfaktoren profitiert.
... Latinx who use substances, living with HIV and OUD, experience additional forms of stigmatization manifested as systemic and interpersonal prejudice, rejection, discrimination, and violence against people who use substances and/or because of HIV status [19,[38][39][40][41]. Taken together, the additive effects of intersectional forms of stigma, in the absence of proper social support systems, result in experiencing high levels of minority and acculturative stress [37][38][39][40][41][42]. Minority stress refers to the continuum from distal to proximal stressors that derive from the personal embodiment of both internally and externally derived exclusionary processes, such as societal prejudice against people who use drugs, racial discrimination, antiimmigrant discrimination, and/or HIV stigmatization [39,[43][44][45][46][47][48]. Acculturative stress refers to the pressures of learning a new language, the reactions to language-related micro-aggressions, balancing differing cultural values, and having to broker between American and the culture of origin ways of daily living [49]. ...
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Background Clínica Bienestar is a comprehensive HIV primary care clinic for Spanish-speaking Latinx with opioids use disorders (OUD). This article describes the barriers and trajectories to HIV viral suppression for Puerto Ricans with a transnational profile and dual diagnoses (HIV and OUD), and the strategies applied to increase retention in care. Methods Case study methodology was used to select two patient life histories that illustrate the most common pathways to success in reducing HIV viral load to undetectable and achieving OUD long-term recovery. Results and Discussion Patients’ major challenges included: (1) Persistent migrating while seeking substance use treatment services with limited or no support from their sending and hosting communities; (2) Intersectional stigmas; (3) Untreated trauma; (4) Language and cultural barriers. Clínica Bienestar’s service model included ten strategies to retain patients in care (e.g., Case management to identify cases with high social isolation), six emerged as central to addressing transnational challenges.
... 4. Current and accumulative effects of systemic and interpersonal racism and intersecting forms of oppression can be overlooked by using a color blind approach (Feagin, 2000(Feagin, , 2014. The notion that racism is no longer relevant has been unequivocally challenged by the current antiimmigrant, anti-Muslim, anti-Semitic, and current racist rhetoric in the U.S. and other countries (Bobo, 2017;Hale, Calla, & Mullings, 2017;Harell, Soroka, & Iyengar, 2017;Meuleman, Abts, Slootmaeckers, & Meeusen, 2018). Everyday racial discrimination and violence, ethnic tensions, racial/ethnic forced migration, and stressors of allies witnessing racial/ethnic oppression may increase bisexual individuals minority stress levels; that must be specified and taken into account when conducting bisexual health research analyses. ...
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This commentary focuses on reflecting on how we, as bisexuality researchers, consider the effects of, and contribute toward addressing, systemic racism and ethnic discrimination affecting bisexual individuals in different global contexts. This commentary is intended to provoke critical thinking among bisexuality and other sex researchers on how we may best consider (or not) racism and ethnic oppression when dealing with ethnically, racially, or culturally diverse bisexual samples of individuals. In this commentary, I argue that current social and behavioral science researchers who focus on bisexuality tend to follow one or more of the following three approaches: a “color blind” approach, an inclusive approach or, a racially–ethnically specific approach. I will identify the advantages and considerations for taking one approach versus another.
... We test measurement invariance using MNLFA. MNLFA provides a generic method to test for measurement invariance and DIF by combining the rigor and flexibility of multigroup confirmatory factor analysis and the multipleindicator multiple-cause model, where the effects of multiple categorical and continuous covariates (i.e., grouping variables) on the measurement can be assessed (Bauer, Harell et al. (2017) 2017). In MNLFA, DIF (measurement noninvariance) is evaluated as a form of parameter moderation. ...
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People with different ideological identities differ in their values, personality, affect, and psychological motivations. These differences are observed on measures of practical and clinical importance and these differences are the central node tying together theories about the psychology of political ideology; however, they rest on a critical untested assumption: The measures are invariant across ideological groups. Here, we test this assumption across 28 constructs in data from the United States and the Netherlands. Measures are not invariant across ideological divisions. At the same time, estimates of ideological similarities and differences are largely similar before and after correcting for measurement noninvariance. This may give us increased confidence in the results from this research area, while simultaneously highlighting that some instance of noninvariance did change conclusions and that individual items are not always comparable across political groups.
... We measured anti-Muslim prejudice using the eight-item affective behavioural subscale of Lee et al.'s (2013) Islamophobia scale. Anti-immigrant attitudes were measured by four items from Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar (2017) and adapted to the Hungarian context. Items measuring identities and intergroup attitudes are presented in the Appendix S1. ...
Preprint
Anti-immigrant attitudes are not only widespread among Eurosceptic nationalists, but also among people who feel that immigration threatens European values and identity. We therefore assumed that the connection between nationalism and xenophobia can only partially explain the rise of hostile attitudes in the post-2015 period. In two online surveys (N = 1160) we compared how (a) glorification vs. attachment and (b) national vs. European identity can predict anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes in Hungary.In the first study, national and European glorification predicted higher anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim prejudice. However, attachment with Europe predicted positive, while attachment with Hungary predicted negative attitudes toward immigrants. We replicated this pattern in a second study, and found that the different predictions of national vs. European identities were mediated by attitudes toward the EU. Eurosceptic attitudes were associated with increased hostility toward both immigrants and Muslim people and reflected a perceived contradiction between the interest of the nation and that of the EU. We conclude that for a better understanding of intergroup hostility toward Muslim immigrants in Europe, we need to simultaneously consider the psychological phenomenon of ingroup glorification and the values and norms of the social categories with which people identify.
... The findings regarding causal attribution were also extended to the relationship between ingroup and outgroup members. Namely, people tend to explain their own group's negative outcomes based on external factors (e.g., unlucky), whereas they are more likely to explain failure associated with outgroup members via internal (e.g., laziness) characteristics (Harell, Soroka, & Iyengar, 2017). Interestingly, when attributing responsibility for the behavior of ingroup members, the severity of the outcome seems to matter less than individuals' level of identification with their ingroup (Burger, 1981;Doosje & Branscombe, 2003;Shaver, 1970). ...
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This study provides evidence for the independent and additive effects of story exploration and character customization induced by fictional narratives on causal attribution and support for marginalized groups. In Study 1 (N = 163), participants read a story about a trans-gender teenager. Story exploration influenced identification and narrative engagement, increasing external attribution for the character's negative actions, as well as engendering more positive attitudes toward transgender individuals. Study 2 (N = 116) replicated these results in the context of undocumented immigration. Study 3 (N = 230) focused on a story about a Muslim teenager. Analysis suggested that the strongest impact on causal attribu-tion is achieved by allowing readers to design the main character (i.e., customization) and control the narrative (i.e., exploration).
... In fact, evidence suggests that COVID-19 may create conditions that will lead certain people to hold more negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Of note, research suggests that generalized feelings of threat (Murray and Marx 2013) and feelings of a lack of control (Harell et al. 2017)-both of which may be heightened during the pandemic-predict negative attitudes toward immigrants. ...
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Canada has been seen globally as a leader in immigration and integration policies and programs and as an attractive and welcoming country for immigrants, refugees, temporary foreign workers, and international students. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed some of the strengths of Canada’s immigration system, as well as some of the fault lines that have been developing over the last few years. In this article we provide an overview of Canada’s immigration system prior to the pandemic, discuss the system’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities revealed by the pandemic, and explore a post-COVID-19 immigration vision. Over the next three years, the Government of Canada intends to bring over 1.2 million new permanent residents to Canada. In addition, Canada will continue to accept many international students, refugee claimants, and temporary foreign workers for temporary residence here. The importance of immigration for Canada will continue to grow and be an integral component of the country’s post-COVID-19 recovery. To succeed, it is essential to take stock, to re-evaluate Canada’s immigration and integration policies and programs, and to expand Canada’s global leadership in this area. The authors offer insights and over 80 recommendations to reinvigorate and optimize Canada’s immigration program over the next decade and beyond.
... For example, selective pro-immigration reforms that explicitly focus on advancing national interest (e.g., increasing high-skilled immigration) may have the most legitimizing impacts among those who currently oppose immigration (see Kustov, 2021). At the same time, some of the more controversial pro-immigration law enforcement policies that instead draw public attention to the lack of border control (Harell et al., 2017) or the issue of irregular immigration (Wright et al., 2016) may conversely generate voter backlash even among those who are not particularly hostile to immigration. ...
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Do significant pro-immigration reforms—that open legal pathways for labor and family immigration—increase populist voting? Despite the common assumption that such reforms would lead to counter-productive voter backlash informed by the literature on immigrant group threat, the extent to which immigration policy itself influences voters has been unclear. To address this question, this paper estimates the impact of immigration policies on (right-wing) populist voting and immigration attitudes by exploiting the timing of major changes to immigration legislation in a new dataset linking the best available public opinion and policy data across the last forty years in 24 European countries. My analysis shows that, while the absolute levels of immigration policy openness are associated with slightly higher populist voting across countries in a naive cross-sectional analysis, pro-immigration (or anti-immigration) policy changes do not affect populist voting or immigration concerns within countries. This suggests pro-immigration reforms do not backfire due to voter backlash.
... The resistance to crisis talk should not be seen as evidence that Canadians are somehow uniquely tolerant or rational. It is better explained by accidents of geography that radically diminish the possibility of large-scale, uncontrolled migration, and hence sustain a sense of control that is strongly connected to more positive attitudes (Kymlicka 2004;Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar 2017). 8. "Immigration tops the list of voter concerns in 22 of the 27 EU countries that will vote in European Parliament election in 2019-including Germany, France, Italy and Poland-for the fourth year in a row, according to an EU-wide survey conducted for the European Commission" (Heath and Pawelec 2018). ...
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Compared to other Western democracies, there has been relatively stable support for multiculturalism in Canada since its adoption in 1971, both amongst the general public and amongst the three main political parties. Conservative opposition to multiculturalism has, therefore, typically taken the form of “stealth” reforms to undercut its progressive potential, not direct frontal attacks. During the 2015 election, however, the Conservative Party campaigned on an explicitly anti-multiculturalist platform. This provided a clear opportunity to test “Canadian exceptionalism” in relation to public support for multiculturalism. In this article, I explore the Conservatives’ strategy, and its impact on the election. The evidence suggests that a significant part of the Canadian electorate was responsive to an anti-multicultural—and more specifically anti-Muslim—discourse. However, when this discourse was pushed too far, voters recoiled from what was perceived as an excessive, and indeed “unCanadian,” politics of distrust and division. The article explores different ways of understanding this tipping point, and what it tells us about the precarious resilience of multiculturalism in Canada.
... We measured anti-Muslim prejudice using the eight-item affective behavioural subscale of Lee et al.'s (2013) Islamophobia scale. Anti-immigrant attitudes were measured by four items from Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar (2017) and adapted to the Hungarian context. ...
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Anti‐immigrant attitudes are not only widespread among Eurosceptic nationalists, but also among people who feel that immigration threatens European values and identity. We therefore assumed that the connection between nationalism and xenophobia can only partially explain the rise of hostile attitudes in the post‐2015 period. In two online surveys (N = 1,160), we compared how (a) glorification versus attachment and (b) national versus European identity can predict anti‐immigrant and anti‐Muslim attitudes in Hungary. In the first study, national and European glorification predicted higher anti‐immigrant and anti‐Muslim prejudice. However, attachment with Europe predicted positive, while attachment with Hungary predicted negative attitudes towards immigrants. We replicated this pattern in a second study and found that the different predictions of national versus European identities were mediated by attitudes towards the EU. Eurosceptic attitudes were associated with increased hostility towards both immigrants and Muslim people and reflected a perceived contradiction between the interest of the nation and that of the EU. We conclude that for a better understanding of intergroup hostility towards Muslim immigrants in Europe, we need to simultaneously consider the psychological phenomenon of ingroup glorification and the values and norms of the social categories with which people identify.
... The findings regarding causal attribution were also extended to the relationship between ingroup and outgroup members. Namely, people tend to explain their own group's negative outcomes based on external factors (e.g., unlucky), whereas they are more likely to explain failure associated with outgroup members via internal (e.g., laziness) characteristics (Harell, Soroka, & Iyengar, 2017). Interestingly, when attributing responsibility for the behavior of ingroup members, the severity of the outcome seems to matter less than individuals' level of identification with their ingroup (Burger, 1981;Doosje & Branscombe, 2003;Shaver, 1970). ...
Article
This study provides evidence for the independent and additive effects of story exploration and character customization induced by fictional narratives on causal attribution and support formarginalized groups. In Study 1 (N = 163), participants read a story about a transgender teenager. Story exploration influenced identification and narrative engagement, increasing external attribution for the character’s negative actions, as well as engendering more positive attitudes toward transgender individuals. Study 2 (N = 116) replicated these results in the context of undocumented immigration. Study 3 (N = 230) focused on a story about a Muslim teenager. Analysis suggested that the strongest impact on causal attribution is achieved by allowing readers to design the main character (i.e., customization) and control the narrative (i.e., exploration).
... Although ethnic minorities and immigrants are usually not the target for housing inclusion per se, they are often the focus because of the history of racial discrimination and the intersections among race, immigration, and poverty. In particular, with the large numbers of immigrants, recent anti-immigrant sentiments, and the perceived material and cultural threats that immigrants pose to native citizens, the inclusion/exclusion of immigrants has gained much attention (e.g., Harell, Soroka, & Iyengar, 2017;Huber & Oberdabernig, 2016;McLaren & Johnson, 2004). According to Milliband (2006), immigrant exclusion is "wide social exclusion" as many people can be excluded because of one or two features, in this case their immigrant status. ...
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China is rapidly urbanizing, with hundreds of millions of migrants leaving villages for cities. Under the discriminatory Household Registration (Hukou) System, migrants have been denied urban welfare benefits. The Chinese government has been promoting inclusive urbanization with significant policy changes in recent decades, yet its impact on migrants is not clear. This article examines whether housing is becoming more inclusive to migrants in Chinese cities. A review of recent policy changes at both central and local levels shows that although central housing policy is becoming more inclusive of migrants, local governments have largely remained exclusionary and exercise selective inclusion—allowing only migrants who meet additional, strict requirements to access subsidized housing. The empirical analyses, using two waves of the China Migrants Dynamic Survey, reveal that few migrants have access to subsidized housing despite the policy changes. Institutional barriers continue to exclude migrants from subsidized housing, although many barriers have become less important over time. It is clear that housing discrimination persists, and housing inclusion remains a distant dream for most migrants in China. This research highlights exclusion based on an important but uncommon birth-ascribed status defined by the government and provides a multiscalar perspective on the inclusion of domestic migrants.
... favourable wealth, freedom, and equality conditions increase individuals' control over their lives and self-determination (Harell, Soroka and Iyengar, 2017), so wealth and human development encourage men and women to enhance values they 'inherently' care more about, for women, universalism/benevolence, for men, power/self-enhancement (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). ...
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Although previous research has revealed the impact of individual and contextual elements on attitudes toward immigrants across Europe, a gender-focused study of European anti-immigrant attitudes is still lacking. This study examines the role of individuals' gender and macro structures of gender equality in shaping attitudes toward immigrants through the diffusion of benevolent and universalist human values. Drawing on the European Social Survey 2018 and the 2020 Gender Equality Index for 24 European countries, more gender-equal countries are found to be more tolerant toward immigrants, due to their higher self-transcendent values and lower conservation values. Also, no gender differences in attitudes toward immigrants have been found. These findings open the debate on the relationship between gender, gender equality, basic human values, and attitudes toward immigrants, suggesting new avenues for future research. 2
... Second, the international migration literature is ahead in engaging with inclusion and exclusion of immigrants, focusing on when, how, and why states grant immigrants social rights, how this is influenced by migration policy, and different types of welfare and incorporation regimes (see, for example, Harell et al., 2017;Lucassen, 2016). This literature has studied the granting of social rights to immigrant populations (Joppke, 2012;van Hooren, 2011), and has analyzed comparatively the differences in welfare (poverty, employment, and social benefits) between immigrant and national populations (Castles & Miller, 2014;Carmel et al., 2012), noting variations across regimes with respect to the integration of immigrants (Castles & Miller, 2014;Freeman & Mirilovic, 2016). ...
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Access to public health has been, is, and will be a necessary right for any person in the world, motivating the proposal of universalist approaches as the best way to provide this service. However, we know that universalism is limited, at best, when it concerns immigrants. In this article, we focus on Costa Rica's and Uruguay's health systems, generally acknowledged as Latin America's most universal, to argue that there are important barriers that limit immigrants' access to public health insurance and health care. Applying a model based on the work by Niedzwiecki and Voorend (2019) that allows us to disaggregate the barriers to access into legal, institutional, de facto, and agency barriers, our analysis shows that migration and social policy interact to create barriers of different magnitudes, often conditioning healthcare access on migratory status, formal employment, and/or purchasing power. These limitations to universal social protection create important vulnerabilities, not only for the immigrants involved, but also for the health systems, and therefore for public health, highlighting the limitations of universalism.
... favourable wealth, freedom, and equality conditions increase individuals' control over their lives and self-determination (Harell, Soroka and Iyengar, 2017), so wealth and human development encourage men and women to enhance values they 'inherently' care more about, for women, universalism/benevolence, for men, power/self-enhancement (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). ...
Research
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Although previous research has revealed the impact of individual and contextual elements on attitudes toward immigrants across Europe, a gender-focused study of European anti-immigrant attitudes is still lacking. This study examines the role of individuals' gender and macro structures of gender equality in shaping attitudes toward immigrants through the diffusion of benevolent and universalist human values. Drawing on the European Social Survey 2018 and the 2020 Gender Equality Index for 24 European countries, more gender-equal countries are found to be more tolerant toward immigrants, due to their higher self-transcendent values and lower conservation values. Also, no gender differences in attitudes toward immigrants have been found. These findings open the debate on the relationship between gender, gender equality, basic human values, and attitudes toward immigrants, suggesting new avenues for future research. 2
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Although Canada and the United States share a many-centuries long tradition of receiving the world’s migrants, since the 1960s they have, in fact, moved along differing immigration policy paths. These differences have existed for a long time, but have become more obvious and pronounced since 2017, under the Trump administration. This paper compares immigration policy in the two countries, and finds the similarities to be few and the differences more numerous and substantive. As the United States moves towards clamping down on undocumented migration and, for the first time in decades, reducing legal immigration, Canada is accepting increasing numbers of refugees and raising annual immigrant admissions by over fifty percent. Finding common ground is likely to be more difficult than in the past. One commonality that exists, and is unlikely to diminish, is an increased concern about uncontrolled border crossings on each country’s southern border. Like it or not, Canadian policymakers will find themselves dealing with a number of repercussions as the result of the United States becoming less welcoming to foreigners.
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Right-wing populist parties often resort to a xenophobic rhetoric which both exploits and fuels existing illiberal anti-immigrant sentiments. Since populist anti-immigrant sentiments are at odds with fundamental liberal values and challenge the implementation of any liberal ethics of migration, this essay argues that states should adopt civic education policies to counter such sentiments and persuade citizens to develop liberal attitudes towards immigrants. Empirical evidence suggests that sentiments may be malleable, and there are already examples of local governments devising or supporting initiatives aimed at dispelling prejudices and promoting positive interactions. It might be objected that a government’s involvement in shaping sentiments and opinions conflicts with liberal democratic states’ commitment to individual autonomy and electoral fairness. However, I argue that civic education policies are not necessarily incompatible with such values and I provide five criteria to identify policies that liberal democratic governments may legitimately adopt to counteract anti-immigrant sentiments.
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Attitudes toward immigration have attracted much scholarly interest and fuelled extensive empirical research in recent years. Many different hypotheses have been proposed to explain individual and contextual differences in attitudes towards immigration. However, it has become difficult to align all of the evidence that the literature has produce so far. The present article contributes to the systematization of political science empirical research on public attitudes toward immigration in the last decade. Using a simplified combined-tests technique, this paper identifies the micro- as well as macro-level factors that are consistently linked to attitudes toward immigration. It reports findings from a meta-analysis of the determinants of general attitudes toward immigration in published articles in thirty highly ranked peer-reviewed political science journals for the years 2009 – 2019. The results warrant a summary of factors affecting attitudes to immigration in a systematic, measurable and rigorous manner.
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The migrant caravan is comprised of thousands of people traveling from Central America to the Mexico–U.S. border seeking refuge from their home countries. In news coverage, images of the caravan regularly portray large groups of immigrants walking toward the border. What are the consequences of this depiction on attitudes toward immigration? We suggest that images of groups of immigrants, in contrast with images of individual immigrants, will tend to decrease support for immigration. In 2019, we preregistered and ran a web-based survey experiment in the United States in which respondents read a news story with either an image of immigrants in a crowd setting, an image of an individual immigrant, or a control condition. The group treatment produces no systematic increase in anti-immigrant sentiment relative to the control. However, we do find differences in the group and individual treatments for respondents who are high in threat sensitivity. Findings are discussed as they relate to recent work on the roles of both fear and person positivity in attitudes about immigration, as well as the potential importance of editorial choices in the portrayal of immigration to the United States.
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Why do some people blame the political system for the problems in their lives? We explore the origins of these grievances and how people assign responsibility and blame for the challenges they face. We propose that individual differences in the personality traits of locus of control and self-esteem help explain why some blame the political system for their personal problems. Using responses from a module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we show that those with low self-esteem and a weaker sense of control over their fates are more likely to blame the political system for the challenges they face in their lives. We also demonstrate that this assignment of blame is politically consequential, where those who intertwine the personal and the political are more likely to evaluate elected officials based on pocketbook economic conditions rather than sociotropic considerations.
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Objective A key issue in Britain's referendum on European Union membership was the free movement of labor into Britain, with Brexit “Leavers” having more negative attitudes toward immigrants than “Remainers.” Such anti-immigrant attitudes are driven by feelings of threat. The coronavirus pandemic presented a new threat in the context of ongoing Brexit negotiations. This paper examines how the COVID-19 pandemic affected anti-immigrant attitudes and how these effects differ between Leavers and Remainers. Methods Using an online survey in Spring 2020 of 3,708 individuals residing in the UK, we experimentally test the effect of priming COVID-19 thoughts on anti-immigrant attitudes, and examine whether this effect varies by Brexit identity. Results We show that COVID-19 may exacerbate anti-immigrant attitudes among Leavers while having little effect on Remainers. Conclusion These findings support the idea that the coronavirus pandemic might have presented a new, viral, threat that heightened anti-immigrant attitudes among certain political identities.
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Attitudes toward immigration have attracted much scholarly interest and fuelled extensive empirical research in recent years. Many different hypotheses have been proposed to explain individual and contextual differences in attitudes towards immigration. However, it has become difficult to align all of the evidence that the literature has produced so far. The present article contributes to the systematization of political science empirical research on public attitudes toward immigration in the last decade. Using a simplified combined-tests technique, this paper identifies the micro- as well as macro-level factors that are consistently linked to attitudes toward immigration. It reports findings from a meta-analysis of the determinants of general attitudes toward immigration in published articles in thirty highly ranked peer-reviewed political science journals for the years 2009–2019. The results warrant a summary of factors affecting attitudes to immigration in a systematic, measurable and rigorous manner.
Article
When individuals evaluate policies, they consider both the policy’s content and its endorsers. In this study, we investigate the conditions under which these sometimes competing factors guide preferences. In an effort to combat the spread of COVID-19, American President Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau bilaterally agreed to close their shared border to refugee claimants and asylum seekers. These ideologically opposed leaders endorsing a common policy allows us to test the influence of a well-known foreign neighbor on domestic policy evaluations. With a large cross-national survey experiment, we first find that Canadians and Americans follow ideological positions in evaluating the policy, with right-leaning respondents offering the most support. With an experiment, we reveal how both populations shift their views when told about their neighboring leader’s endorsement. Our findings highlight ideologically motivated reasoning across an international border, with broad implications for understanding how individuals weigh a policy’s content against its political cues.
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This paper demonstrates that citizens in seven advanced industrialized democracies generally oppose more open immigration policies, but stand ready to admit individual immigrants. Using an experimental design, we demonstrate the applicability of the “person-positivity bias” to immigration and investigate the effects of economic and cultural “deservingness” on evaluations of individual immigrants. Our results show that immigrants from professional backgrounds elicit higher levels of support than unskilled workers. The bias against unskilled workers is enlarged among immigrants accompanied by families. In comparison with occupational status and the number of family dependents, the target immigrant’s cultural attributes—as measured by Middle Eastern nationality and Afrocentric appearance—prove relatively inconsequential as criteria for evaluating immigrants.
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This study analyses the relationship between attitudes toward immigration and deteriorating economic conditions in times of crisis. We examine three questions: First, how are a vulnerable position in the labour market and recent changes to an individual’s economic situation related to perceived ethnic threat? Second, what is the role of the nation’s economic and immigration context? Last, are relationships at the individual level between economic conditions and perceived ethnic threat affected by contextual variables? Data from twenty-three countries sampled in the fifth round of the European Social Survey (ESS-5, 2010) is used. At the micro level, unemployment, job insecurity and income deprivation during the three years prior to the survey affect perceived ethnic threat, as predicted by group conflict theory. These effects are, however, relatively small. Among the contextual variables, only growth in gross domestic product (GDP) shows an effect in the expected direction: perceived threat is higher in countries where GDP growth is lower. However, the study design does not allow the conclusion that changes in the economic context lead to changes in attitudes toward immigrants. The significant cross-level interaction for economic growth indicates that the threat-inducing effect of unemployment is stronger in contexts where the growth in GDP is high. This finding contradicts our hypothesis. One could explain this by the emergence of a generalized feeling of economic insecurity in countries severely hit by the economic crisis. In these countries, strong feelings of economic insecurity–and the resulting levels of perceived ethnic threat–might also be present among those who are employed, thereby diminishing the gap between them and the unemployed.
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The acceptance of migrant populations and the definition of an “appropriate” migrant are controversial issues in many countries. The present research focuses on the ideological determinants of how newcomers are evaluated by a host population in a Western country with a strongly rooted meritocratic ideology. We carried out two studies to examine how the expression of meritocratic beliefs by a male potential migrant affects the way he is evaluated by the host population. We measured the host population's perception of the potential migrant's ability to integrate into society, his tendency to adopt the host country's culture, and the general desirability of his world vision for all newcomers. We also noted the host population's judgments of the target's agency and communality. The results showed that a potential newcomer who expresses a strong (vs. weak) belief in a just world (Study 1) or an internal (vs. external) locus of control (Study 2) is evaluated more favorably by the host population. In addition, judgments of the target's integration capacity were only mediated by his perceived agency. We discuss these results in the light of work on the meritocratic ideology and intercultural relations.
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This article sets out to develop a classical theme of empirical research within group threat theory, namely the argument that the size of the minority population threatens the majority population. To be able to clarify the mixed empirical results within this version of group threat theory, the article focuses on the composition of the immigrant population. The article tests both objective sources of cultural threats (linguistic composition and the Muslim population) and economic threats (the proportion of working-class individuals and the unemployed among the immigrant population). The study concludes that, first, the composition of the immigrant population is of utter importance for the size argument to be valid for cultural threats (proportion of Muslim population), whereas for economic threats it does not matter. Second, compositional economic threats matter strongly to the group that genuinely competes for scarce resources – the working class is more xenophobic when the immigrant working class is large. Third, the study brings some clarity with regard to the cultural composition of the immigrant population: it is shown that the relationship between Muslims and European majority populations mirrors the relationship between whites and African-Americans in the US.
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Do African Americans, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic whites differ in their explanations of the socioeconomic divide separating blacks and whites in the United States? Have such explanations changed over time? To answer these questions, I use data from the 1977 to 2004 General Social Surveys (GSS) to map race/ethnic differences in support for, trends in, and the determinants of seven “modes of explanation” for blacks' disadvantage. Trends over time indicate the continuation of a long-standing decline in non-Hispanic whites' use of an ability-based (innate inferiority) explanation. Non- Hispanic whites' beliefs in a purely motivational and a purely educational explanation are increasing, however, along with the view that none of the explanations offered in the GSS explain blacks' disadvantage. African Americans and Hispanics also evidence increases in a purely motivational explanation, but they differ from non-Hispanic whites in demonstrating clear declines in structural beliefs—especially the perception that discrimination explains blacks' lower socioeconomic status. These conservative shifts in blacks' and Hispanics' beliefs result in greater similarity with non-Hispanic whites over time. Notably, however, significant “static” race/ethnic group differences remain: non- Hispanic whites score highest, and blacks lowest, on a purely motivational explanation, while African Americans are more likely than both non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics to endorse a discrimination-based explanation. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for racial policy support.
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Allport's The Nature of Prejudice is a social psychological classic. Its delineation of the components and principles of prejudice remains modern, especially its handling of cognitive factors. The volume's cognitive contentions are outlined, and then extended with an application from attribution theory. An "ultimate attribution error" is proposed: (1) when prejudiced peonle perceive what they regard as a negative act by an outgroup member, they will more than others attribute it dispositionally, often as genetically determined, in comparison to the same act by an ingroup member: (2) wlhen prejudiced people perceive what they regard as a positive act by an outaroup member, they will more than others attribute it in comparison to the same act by an ingroup member to one or more of the following: (a) "the exceptional case," (b) luck or special advantage, (c) hig,h motivation and effort, and (d) manipulable situational context. Predictions are advanced as to which of these responses will be adopted and under which conditions the phenomenon will be magnified.
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A full test of the Social Dominance Theory model addressed immigration as one of the most prominent current intergroup conflicts in Europe. The hypothesis that members of high status groups tend to discriminate members of low status groups because they are more prone to Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and refer more to legitimising myths such as prejudice was tested using representative samples from eight European countries (n = 1000 each), considering income and migrant background as social status indicators, SDO, anti-immigrant prejudice and diversity beliefs, and the intention to discriminate immigrants. The results confirm that individuals with higher SDO are more likely to discriminate immigrants, partly because of stronger anti-immigrant prejudice and partly because they believe less in diversity. However, the results question the role of social status. Contrary to the expectations of Social Dominance Theory, individuals with lower income are more prone to SDO and have stronger anti-immigrant attitudes and weaker diversity beliefs. The impact of migrant background was weak and ambivalent. We suggest reconsidering the role of social status to stress status maintenance and enhancement as general social motives. Regardless of their social position, people seemingly try to enhance their relative position by devaluing lower status groups.
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Proposes that individual differences in perceived control be partitioned into components associated with 3 primary spheres of behavior: (a) personal efficacy (control over the nonsocial environment as in personal achievement), (b) interpersonal control (control over other people in dyads and groups), and (c) sociopolitical control (control over social and political events and institutions). Assessment instruments are presented for measuring perceived control in each of these 3 spheres. Using data from 87 undergraduates, a 3-factor structural model was tested using confirmatory factor analysis, and the results are strongly supportive. The scales have impressive convergent and discriminant validity in relation to other individual difference measures. Evidence from several laboratory and field studies by the author and colleagues (e.g., see record 1981-01340-001) is reviewed to support the predictive validity of the 3 scales. (43 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Previous studies on the relationship between threat and right-wing attitudes have tended to focus on either internal threat, emanating from one's private life, or external threat, originating from society. However, these studies failed to examine whether these types of threats constitute two distinctive dimensions and which of these threats is most closely related to right-wing attitudes. In order to explore the dimensions underlying threat, a factor analysis on a variety of threat scales was conducted (Study 1; N = 300). Furthermore, in a meta-analysis (Study 2; total N = 22,086) and a questionnaire study in a large representative sample (Study 3, N = 800) the strength of the relationships of internal and external threat with right-wing attitudes were investigated. The present studies revealed that internal and external threat can be considered as two distinct dimensions underlying threat. Moreover, whereas external threat yielded strong relationships with right-wing attitudes, internal threat only explained a minor part of the variance in these attitudes. External rather than internal threat underlies the relationship between threat and right-wing attitudes.
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This paper tests hypotheses concerning the effects of economic factors on public opinion toward immigration policy. Using the 1992 and 1994 National Election Study surveys, probit models are employed to test diverse conceptualizations of the effects of economic adversity and anxiety on opposition to immigration. The results indicate that personal economic circumstances play little role in opinion formation, but beliefs about the state of the national economy, anxiety over taxes, and generalized feelings about Hispanics and Asians, the major immigrant groups, are significant determinants of restrictionist sentiment. This restricted role of economic motives rooted in one's personal circumstances held true across ethnic groups, among residents in communities with different numbers of foreign-born, and in both 1992 and 1994.
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Attribution theory was used to relate causal explanations for poverty to affect and behavioral intentions. In Experiment 1, student subjects rated 13 causes of poverty on importance, the attribution of controllability, blame, affects of pity and anger, and judgments of help-giving (personal help and welfare). Two individual differences, conservatism and the belief in a just world, were also assessed. A principal components analysis categorized the causes into three types: individualistic, societal, and fatalistic. Conservatism correlated positively with a belief in the importance of individualistic causes, controllability, blame, and anger, and it correlated negatively with perceptions of the importance of societal causes, pity, and intentions to help. No systematic effects of the belief in a just world emerged. A structural equation analysis revealed that personal help is emotionally determined, whereas welfare judgments are directly related to attributions of responsibility and political ideology. Experiment 2 revealed a similar pattern of results using a nonstudent sample.
Book
Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany explores the causes of public opposition to immigration and support for anti-immigrant political movements in the three industrialized Western countries. Combining sophisticated modeling of recent public-opinion data with analysis of the past 110 years of these nations' immigration history, the book evaluates the effects of cultural marginality, economic self-interest, and contact with immigrants. Though analysis partly confirms each of these three explanations, the author concludes that being a cultural outsider usually drives immigration-related attitudes more than economics or contact do.
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This chapter discusses the benefits of experimentation and looks at the future of political communication research, emphasizing the previous experimental work, as well as the creative manipulations, that have been conducted using online panels. It then studies two online election studies from 2008 in order to show the properties of the data and the samples, and, finally, reveals that Internet technology is currently redefining the methodology of political communication research and improving some of the basic weaknesses of the previous methods.
Article
Gallya Lahav's study examines the issue of immigration in the context of a Europe where the role of the nation state is in question, as the logic of the single market clashes with national policymaking. Immigration is a central issue in European politics since around a quarter of the world's migrants reside in Europe. Consequently, politicians throughout the continent are grappling with the problems this raises. Analyzing elite and public opinion, Lahav's book shows how support from both has led to the adoption of restrictive immigration policies despite the requirements of open borders.
Book
Part I. From There to Here - Theoretical Background: 1. From visiousness to viciousness: theories of intergroup relations 2. Social dominance theory as a new synthesis Part II. Oppression and its Psycho-Ideological Elements: 3. The psychology of group dominance: social dominance orientation 4. Let's both agree that you're really stupid: the power of consensual ideology Part III. The Circle of Oppression - The Myriad Expressions of Institutional Discrimination: 5. You stay in your part of town and I'll stay in mine: discrimination in the housing and retail markets 6. They're just too lazy to work: discrimination in the labor market 7. They're just mentally and physically unfit: discrimination in education and health care 8. The more of 'them' in prison, the better: institutional terror, social control and the dynamics of the criminal justice system Part IV. Oppression as a Cooperative Game: 9. Social hierarchy and asymmetrical group behavior: social hierarchy and group difference in behavior 10. Sex and power: the intersecting political psychologies of patriarchy and empty-set hierarchy 11. Epilogue.
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In the current climate of welfare reform, it is important to understand how perceptions of the poor affect policy decisions. This paper examines how people distinguish between the undeserving poor and the deserving poor, and how this differentiation affects policy decisions. Survey respondents rated each policy in a set of hypothetical policies on a liberal-conservative continuum. Analyses were then conducted to explore differences in the respondents' likelihood of recommending the most liberal and the most conservative of these policies. Study 1 demonstrated that liberal policies here more likely to be recommended and conservative policies were less likely to be recommended when the target group was perceived to be deserving rather than undeserving. Study 2 replicated this effect of perceived deservingness and demonstrated an effect of attribution of responsibility. That is, liberal policies were more likely to be recommended and conservative policies were less likely to be recommended when the responsibility for the target's poverty was attributed to society rather than to the individual.
Article
The theory of personal control predicts that women have a lower sense of control than men, but the evidence is equivocal. Inconsistencies in research results suggest that women's sense of control is lower than men's under some conditions, but not others. We hypothesize that the gender gap in perceived control is greater for older persons than for younger. Compared with their male counterparts, older women may face more educational, employment, economic, and health disadvantages than do younger women. To test the hypotheses that men have a higher sense of personal control than women, that the gap between men and women is larger in older age groups than in younger, and that education, work, economic conditions, and health account for the age-based effect of gender on perceived control, we use the survey of Aging, Status, and the Sense of Control (ASOC), in which a representative sample of U.S. respondents were interviewed in 1995 and again in 1998. We find support for the hypothesis that the gender gap in personal control is greater among older persons than younger, and that over time women's sense of control declines more than men's. Education, personal employment history, household income, and physical functioning account for some of the age-based effect of gender on perceived control. Work fulfillment, fairness of domestic labor, economic hardship, and self-reported health do not, however.
Article
In a sample of southern Californians, three questions were investigated: (1) Are there race/ethnic differences in beliefs about the causes of poverty? (2) Do two social psychological variables, namely internal and external self-explanations, significantly affect beliefs about poverty net of respondents' background characteristics? and (3) Do the determinants of beliefs about poverty differ for blacks, Latinos, and whites? Results indicate that in each case the answer is yes. First, blacks and Latinos are more likely than whites to view both individualistic and structuralist explanations for poverty as important Second, respondents' self-explanations have significant effects on poverty beliefs. Lastly, the patterns of effects of several variables that predict beliefs about poverty differ across race/ethnic groups. Results confirm, contradict, and extend current knowledge of beliefs about poverty.
Article
Claims that attributions and their related behaviors may reflect a type of perceived control that is generally overlooked. People attempt to gain control by bringing the environment into line with their wishes (primary control) and by bringing themselves into line with environmental forces (secondary control). Four manifestations of secondary control are considered: (a) Attributions to severely limited ability can serve to enhance predictive control and protect against disappointment; (b) attributions to chance can reflect illusory control, since people often construe chance as a personal characteristic akin to an ability ("luck"); (c) attributions to powerful others permit vicarious control when the individual identifies with these others; and (d) the preceding attributions may foster interpretive control, in which the individual seeks to understand and derive meaning from otherwise uncontrollable events in order to accept them. (5½ p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Perceptions of economic costs and benefits play an important role in determining attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. The Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict, and the correlational and experimental research supporting it, indicate that when immigrants are seen as competing with members of the host society for economic resources, negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration result. Yet measures taken to reduce this perceived competition and threat can have unforeseen consequences. Recent bills intended to reduce illegal immigration in U.S. states, such as Arizona's Senate Bill 1070 and Georgia's House Bill 87, have been framed by supporters as intended to reduce the economic costs of illegal immigration. Their consequences, however, have been increased economic hardship in the form of economic boycotts and lost farm production. We suggest that recognizing the mutual dependency between immigrants and members of host societies may be a first step in reducing support for harsh measures against illegal immigration, to the benefit of all.
Article
The U.S. Census Bureau projects that racial minority groups will make up a majority of the U.S. national population in 2042, effectively creating a so-called majority-minority nation. In four experiments, we explored how salience of such racial demographic shifts affects White Americans' political-party leanings and expressed political ideology. Study 1 revealed that making California's majority-minority shift salient led politically unaffiliated White Americans to lean more toward the Republican Party and express greater political conservatism. Studies 2, 3a, and 3b revealed that making the changing national racial demographics salient led White Americans (regardless of political affiliation) to endorse conservative policy positions more strongly. Moreover, the results implicate group-status threat as the mechanism underlying these effects. Taken together, this work suggests that the increasing diversity of the nation may engender a widening partisan divide.
Article
Why does public opinion change over time? Much debate on this question centers on whether it is caused by the replacement of people or by individuals changing how they think. Theoretical approaches to this question have emphasized the importance of birth cohort succession, generational differences, and changing macro-economic conditions. In this article, we consider the extent to which these processes can account for changing attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. We use a new approach to the study of time trends in public opinion to analyze over 20 years of data on attitudes in Canada. This approach uses multi-level analysis to split attitudinal change into its cohort and period components. We find that most attitude change is the result of changing macro-economic conditions. In contrast, birth cohort succession has little effect. While there is modest evidence of generational differences in attitudes, these differences do not comprise a major part of the overall trend.
Article
Two studies examined whether social explanations—causal frameworks used to make sense of a group’s status and behavior—are associated with prejudice-related compunction. In Study 1, based on Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliott, (1991), participants who endorsed external explanations (e.g. low socioeconomic status of Blacks stems from historical maltreatment) showed a particularly strong tendency to experience compunction in response to prejudice-related discrepancies. Study 2 involved a novel paradigm. Participants were induced to admit that they would discriminate against Black males. Conceptually replicating Study 1, endorsement of external explanations was positively associated with compunction in response to this imagined discrimination. Across both studies, there was also evidence that the effects of external explanations are not explicable in terms of internal motivation to avoid prejudice, global prejudice, or global positive evaluation of African Americans. Discussion centers on the importance of explanations in shaping intergroup emotions and how the concept of explanation links the intergroup emotion literature to other emotion literatures.
Article
Past research suggests that citizens' attitudes toward immigration are driven by perceptions of immigrants' (a) economic status and (b) ethnicity. In this study, we use an online survey conducted with a representative sample of Canadians to test to what extent economic and cultural cues influence support for individual immigrants. In particular, by drawing on a parallel US survey, we explore whether Canadians' relatively unique (positive) attitudes toward immigration make them more immune to economic and cultural threat manipulations than their American counterparts. The analysis is based on an experimental design embedded in a series of immigrant vignettes that vary the ethnoracial background and social status of an individual applying for immigration. We examine overall support for immigration, as well as the extent to which both ethnic and economic status cues affect support for individual immigrants. We also explore variance within Canada, specifically, in Quebec versus the rest of the country. Results offer new and unique information on the structure of attitudes on diversity and immigration in Canada. Most importantly, they suggest the relative importance of economic cues in support for immigration in both countries.
Article
Following the work of Blumer (1958), I extend and test a theory of prejudice based on perceived threats to dominant racial or national groups by subordinate groups. Perceived threat is hypothesized to be a function of economic conditions and of the size of the subordinate group relative to the dominant group. I test the group-threat theory using a multilevel model that combines population data with survey results on attitudes towards immigrants and racial minorities from Eurobarometer Survey 30. "Group threat" explains most of the variation in average prejudice scores across the 12 countries in the sample and has a small but statistically significant effect on the influence of certain individual-level variables on prejudice. These results demonstrate the importance of perceived intergroup threat in the formation of prejudicial attitudes and suggest a re-interpretation of past findings on the relations between individual characteristics and expressions of prejudice.
Article
This article introduces the theoretical approaches of contact, group conflict, and symbolic prejudice to explain levels of exclusionary feelings toward a relatively new minority in the West European context, the immigrant. The findings indicate that even after controls for perceived threat are included in the model, intimate contact with members of minority groups in the form of friendships can reduce levels of willingness to expel legal immigrants from the country. A contextual variable, level of immigration to the country, is also introduced into the model because it is likely that this variable affects both threat perception and exclusionary feelings. While context does not seem to directly affect levels of willingness to expel or include immigrants in the society, it does have a rather powerful impact on perceived threat. Perhaps even more importantly, the findings suggest that contact mediates the effect of the environment, helping to produce lower levels of threat perception in contexts of high immigration.
Article
A study was designed to test the idea that ingroup-outgroup differences in attributional processes play an important part in the origin of stereo-types. Specifically, it was hypothesized that ingroup members would make more dispositional attributions to positive behaviors and fewer dispositional attributions to negative behaviors than outgroup members would. A questionnaire including items on attributions to positive and negative behavior and interethnic attitudes was given to a triethnic sample of 750 fifth and sixth grade students. The hypothesis was well supported for the evaluation of the Chicanos' behavior, partially supported for the evaluation of Anglos' behavior, and unsupported for the evaluation of Blacks' behavior. Other results indicating that all three groups attribute positive behavior to the actor and negative behavior to the situation and that Anglos make more dispositional attributions than the other groups were also discussed.
Article
In this article, I review the diverse ways in which perceived self-efficacy contributes to cognitive development and functioning. Perceived self-efficacy exerts its influence through four major processes. They include cognitive, motivational, affective, and selection processes. There are three different levels at which perceived self-efficacy operates as an important contributor to academic development. Students' beliefs in their efficacy to regulate their own learning and to master academic activities determine their aspirations, level of motivation, and academic accomplishments. Teachers' beliefs in their personal efficacy to motivate and promote learning affect the types of learning environments they create and the level of academic progress their students achieve. Faculties' beliefs in their collective instructional efficacy contribute significantly to their schools' level of academic achievement. Student body characteristics influence school-level achievement more strongly by altering faculties' beliefs in their collective efficacy than through direct affects on school achievement.
Article
This study examined the extent to which Social Dominance Orientation and Right-Wing Authoritarianism were correlated with Alienation and Spheres of Control. The findings demonstrated that Social Dominance Orientation correlated with many of the scales but Right-Wing Authoritarianism correlated with none of them, emphasizing their distinctiveness. Although Social Dominance Orientation correlated negatively with Powerlessness, it correlated positively with numerous other Alienation subscales and with Sociopolitical Spheres of Control suggesting that those scoring high on Social Dominance Orientation also have greater feelings of alienation and less perceived control over political and social affairs.
Article
A theory of control in interdependence and power relations is supported by a program of laboratory research. Control needs are basic and predict information-seeking in social relationships. Those without social power typically seek the most diagnostic information, making individuation more likely. Those who do have social power seek less diagnostic information about others and are vulnerable to stereotyping them. Moreover, feelings of control not only reflect individual power positions but also group power positions. Remaining challenges include the impact of outcome expectations on information-seeking and continuing to remedy the power lacuna in social psychology.
Article
Comparative European research has established that public opposition to immigration is widespread and politically important. However, most existing research has suffered from a serious methodological shortcoming: it employs aggregate measures of attitudes to immigrants, which do not distinguish between different migrant groups. This paper corrects this shortcoming by examining disaggregated British attitudes to migration from seven different regions. I find evidence for a consistent hierarchy of preferences between immigrant groups, with white and culturally more proximate immigrant groups less opposed than non-white and culturally more distinct immigrants. The differences in attitudes to the various migrant groups are very large, calling into question the reliability of analyses which employ aggregate measures of attitudes to immigration. Both total opposition to migration and discrimination between migrant groups decline during the period examined. This is the result of large generational differences in attitudes to immigrants, which are in turn the consequence of cohort differences in education levels, ethnic diversity and, in particular, value orientations. Younger Britons, who are on average less authoritarian and ethnocentric, oppose immigration less and regard different immigrant groups more equally.
Article
Tested D. M. Taylor and V. Jaggi's (see record 1975-05049-001) hypothesis of ethnocentric attribution, which states that group members make internal attributions for the positive behavior of other ingroup members and external attributions for their negative behavior, while the reverse holds true for attributions to outgroup members. In Exp I, 34 Malay and 34 Chinese male Malaysan university students were asked to ascribe to internal or external causes the behavior of ingroup and outgroup members performing socially desirable or undesirable acts. The hypothesis was supported only for the Malays, whereas the Chinese favored the outgroup. These results were consistent with a limited analysis of auto- and heterostereotypes. Exp II, with 60 Singaporean male university students, revealed ingroup favoritism for the Malays once again, although the Chinese no longer favored the outgroup. These less extreme results mapped onto the stereotypes and mirrored the more multicultural environment in Singapore. Differences between the studies are discussed in terms of wider sociostructural and cultural influences that indicate that ethnocentric attribution is not a universal tendency. (33 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Reviews 19 studies that examine causal attributions for acts by ingroup and outgroup members and focuses on (1) explanations for positive and negative outcomes, (2) success and failure, and (3) group differences. The evidence provides limited support for T. F. Pettigrew's (see record 1981-05426-001) "ultimate attribution error." There is evidence of intergroup attribution bias in all 3 types of studies reviewed, but this bias is limited to specific dimensions in a given study. Methodological shortcomings in studies of the ultimate attribution error are discussed, and suggestions for future research concerning Pettigrew's predictions are offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Addresses the centrality of the self-efficacy mechanism (SEM) in human agency. SEM precepts influence thought patterns, actions, and emotional arousal. In causal tests, the higher the level of induced self-efficacy, the higher the performance accomplishments and the lower the emotional arousal. The different lines of research reviewed show that the SEM may have wide explanatory power. Perceived self-efficacy helps to account for such diverse phenomena as changes in coping behavior produced by different modes of influence, level of physiological stress reactions, self-regulation of refractory behavior, resignation and despondency to failure experiences, self-debilitating effects of proxy control and illusory inefficaciousness, achievement strivings, growth of intrinsic interest, and career pursuits. The influential role of perceived collective efficacy in social change and the social conditions conducive to development of collective inefficacy are analyzed. (21/2 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved). © 1982 American Psychological Association.
Article
The present investigation examined how individuals higher in social dominance orientation (SDO) react to experimentally induced intergroup threat in terms of support for helping immigrants. Participants read editorials describing an incoming immigrant outgroup posing realistic threats (to tangible resources and well-being), symbolic threats (to values and traditions) or no threats. Participants higher in SDO exhibited greater resistance to helping immigrants upon exposure to realistic, symbolic, (Experiments 1 and 2), or combined realistic–symbolic (Experiment 2) intergroup threats, but not when the same immigrants posed no threats. In Experiment 2, SDO exerted indirect effects on modern prejudice through both heightened infra-humanization and intergroup anxiety, with modern prejudice itself predicting greater resistance and indifference to helping immigrants. Moderated mediation analyses revealed strongest SDO-infra-humanization relations under conditions of symbolic threat. Implications for prejudice-reduction interventions are considered. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Article
Specific beliefs pertaining to wealth and poverty emanate from metatheories about socioeconomic inequalities. As cognitions, these metatheories filter social perceptions and generate beliefs about the specific causes of wealth and poverty. Four metatheories coexist in American culture and compete for public support. The four are individualism, culturalism, structuralism/situationalism, and fatalism. Using public opinion data on beliefs about 38 often-mentioned causes of wealth and poverty, the degree of support for each metatheory was determined. Individualism was the metatheory of choice in specifying the causes of poverty, whereas culturalism and individualism vied for superiority in identifying the causes of wealth.
Article
In recent times, many nations are experiencing an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes on the part of natives. Most papers only explore one or two sources of anti-immigrant attitudes at a time, which provides an incomplete picture of the effects at work. This paper tests eight different explanations for anti-immigrant attitudes: cultural marginality theory, human capital theory, political affiliation, societal integration, neighborhood safety, contact theory, foreign investment, and economic competition. Analysis is conducted using combined data from the European Social Survey and Eurostat/OECD and individual-, regional-, and national-level predictors. Results indicate that key predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes are regional and national interpersonal trust, education level, foreign direct investment, and political variables.
Article
Recent theoretical frameworks assume that the ideological attitudes of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) predict individuals’ attitudes toward immigrant groups, and that these predictive relations are affected by contextual factors. Based on these assumptions, we conducted a meta-analysis of the relations between ideological attitudes and anti-immigrant attitudes in 155 samples from 17 countries (totalN= 38,522 participants). As potential correlates of cross-national differences in these relations, socioeconomic indices, cultural worldviews, and collective perceptions of immigrants were considered. RWA was a particularly strong predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes in countries where immigrants were perceived as increasing the crime rate and as not being beneficial to the economy (e.g., Germany, Italy); and SDO was a particularly strong predictor in countries with a higher relative unemployment rate of immigrants (e.g., Belgium, Sweden). We discuss the interplay of individual and sociocultural factors and offer directions for future research.