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IDPR, 38 (2) 2016 doi:10.3828/idpr.2016.9
James Thomas McQuilken
‘Ethical gold’ in sub-Saharan Africa:
a viable empowerment strategy?
This paper reflects critically on the potential of four parallel ethical gold certification schemes to empower
people engaged in poverty-driven artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) activities in sub-Saharan Africa.
It reviews the literature on empowerment to broaden understanding of which groups of miners these
certification schemes are targeting and capable of supporting. The industry-led schemes implemented to
date seem ideally-suited for multinational companies, whilst NGO-led schemes appear neither capable
of breaking down the institutional structures that marginalise ASM operators nor readily adaptable to
the African context. No scheme seems truly focused on – and capable of – empowering miners who are
suffering extreme hardship and struggling to accumulate earnings. None of the ethical gold certification
schemes reviewed here appears capable of sufficiently altering the social dimensions of power, agency
and the institutional environment needed in order to empower artisanal and small-scale miners.
Keywords: empowerment, fairtrade, gold, certification, small-scale mining, sub-Saharan Africa, power,
development, ethical minerals
Introduction
There is now a burgeoning body of literature which draws attention to the many
problems facing individuals engaged in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). In
sub-Saharan Africa, this – at times, poverty-driven – activity provides direct employ-
ment to as many as ten million people, and supports many millions more in the
downstream industries it spawns (Perks, 2011). But whilst most countries in the region
now have regulatory frameworks in place for ASM, for a variety of reasons, ranging
from the cost of securing such licenses to the unavailability of land and highly bureau-
cratic polices, the vast majority of people engaged in ASM operate without the requi-
site permits (Hilson and Van Bockstael, 2011).
Failure to secure a license and therefore legitimise themselves in the eyes of the
law has, in turn, prevented operators from accessing support services (Tschakert
and Singha, 2007; Tschakert, 2009). As has been extensively discussed (ILO, 1999;
Banchirigah, 2008; Childs 2008), without such assistance, particularly financial
support, African small-scale mine operators have remained, for extended periods,
in the informal economy, where they have been forced to use outdated, inecient
technologies; borrow money from middlemen, often on unsustainable terms; and have
James McQuilken is a PhD Researcher at Surrey Business School, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of
Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH; email: j.mcquilken@surrey.ac.uk
James Thomas McQuilken
180
struggled to identify viable economic mineral deposits. In their battles to accumulate
earnings, a range of negative impacts, including extensive environmental damage,
health and safety concerns and disease, have emerged (Hentschel et al., 2002; Taylor
et al., 2005).
In response to these issues, a plethora of NGO and industry-sponsored ‘ethical’
mineral schemes have emerged in recent years. Despite being projected by their
designers as eective and capable of alleviating the hardships of ASM operators,
a number of concerns, analogous to those directed at Fair Trade certified agricul-
tural schemes, have been raised about their appropriateness and impact (Childs,
2008; Hilson, 2008a; Hilson, 2014). These include elite capture due to the strin-
gent requirements that preclude many producers from accessing certification; a
‘watering-down’ of standards through the attraction and domination of larger
multinational corporations (Blackman and Rivera, 2011; Phillips, 2014); monitoring
and enforcement challenges; a reliance on inputs from Western organisations and
catalytic bodies such as the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (Renard, 2005), and; a
general overabundance of schemes on the market (Giovannucci, 2001; Giovannucci
and Koekoek, 2003; Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005). Additional concerns include
the growing complexity of certification markets, centralisation of regulation bodies
and a general unbalance of power relations between governments and smallholders
(Renard, 2005).
Surfacing against the background of these shortcomings, the certification schemes
under review here are unsurprisingly, much like the broader Fair Trade movement itself,
being shaped by a global development agenda – in this case for mining – that is now
fixated on transparency and accountability (Hilson, 2014). Most of the ethical mineral
schemes implemented to date focus on gold, a reflection of its economic importance
to governments and the jewellery sector (RJC, 2014). This should bode well for the
impoverished African artisanal miner because it is the most popular mineral commodity
extracted on a small scale. Often intersecting the production networks of large-scale
operations at various points, the ASM sector currently accounts for an estimated ten per
cent of global gold production (UNECA, 2011; Fold et al., 2013; Hilson and McQuilken,
2014).1 There are, at present, four ‘operational’ gold certification schemes: the Alliance
for Responsible Mining’s ‘Fairmined Gold’; Faitrade Foundation UK’s ‘Fairtrade Gold’;
the Swiss Better Gold Association (SBGA) and the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic
Aairs (SECO)’s ‘Better Gold Initiative’; and the World Gold Council (WGC)’s ‘Conflict-
Free Go ld Stan dard’.
1 The concept and term ‘global production network’ or ‘production network’ is used here in place of ‘supply chain’
or ‘value chain’ in recognition that ASM production and distribution processes are more accurately conceptu-
alised as highly complex network structures with intricate horizontal, vertical and diagonal linkages that form
multi-dimensional and multi-layered lattices of socio-economic activity, with key dimensions of value, power and
embeddedness (Henderson et al., 2002).
‘Ethical gold’ in sub-Saharan Africa: a viable empowerment strategy? 181
Proponents of ethical gold argue that such schemes help to connect impoverished
small-scale mine operators to Western jewellers, in the process removing ‘unscru-
pulous middlemen’ from production networks; ensuring these producers receive
fair payments, which in turn leads to improved living standards; and guaranteeing
production processes meet acceptable social and environmental standards (Maldar,
2011; WGC, 2012a; ARM, 2014c). Indeed, on the surface and based on the material
presented in a host of glossy brochures, each seems to recognise the importance and
significant contribution of the largely informal ASM sector and the (much reported and
studied) concomitant socio-political and environmental issues surrounding produc-
tion (Hinton, et al., 2003; Jennings, 2003; Seeling, 2003; Hilson, 2008c; Hilson, 2012,
Hirons, 2013; Hilson and Gatsinzi, 2014). The designers of each of these schemes claim
to be working to develop transparent and traceable supply chains, and – the focus of
this paper – in the process also claim, variously, to empower artisanal and small-scale
miners. This is clear from the impassioned marketing straplines utilised. Examples
include ARM’s ‘When you buy FAIRMINED gold you empower responsible ASM
miners and protect the environment’ (ARM, 2014a); Fairtrade International’s ‘Miners
have the opportunity to empower themselves through their organization’ (Fairtrade
International, 2014); and ‘Empowering responsible artisanal and small-scale miners’
(Maldar, 2011, 1) – the original Fairtrade and Fairmined Gold certification strapline.
The purpose of this paper is to oer initial reflections on the aforementioned four
parallel gold certification schemes, with special emphasis on their potential applica-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa. Relying primarily on the certification documents and
associated secondary literature, supplemented anecdotally with insights from personal
communication with key stakeholders, the analysis critically examines these schemes
through a ‘lens’ of empowerment. It questions what impact each can have on the
livelihoods of the tens of millions of artisanal and small-scale miners straddling the
poverty line in the region. At first glance, certification schemes appear to be a part
of the long-awaited solution to many of ASM’s ongoing and mounting problems.
Academics have, for over thirty years and in a variety of ways, called for the agency
of operators to be engendered through an enabling opportunity structure capable
of facilitating empowerment (Hilson and McQuilken, 2014). But to what extent are
dierent certification schemes likely to empower artisanal and small-scale miners, if
at all? Operators’ continued lack of ‘voice’ and input into key policymaking processes
could be due to the complexity of the empowerment process itself, and to the fetishisa-
tion of such terms as buzzwords all too often used in the international development
lexicon without any tangible application in practice (Cornwall and Brock, 2005).
In the business literature, emphasis has been on employee empowerment, a recur-
rent and salient theme popularised in management circles during the 1990s. A number
of authors report similar rhetoric and diculty around operationalising the concept
of empowerment, questioning whether it is a management ‘fad or fab’ (Wilkinson,
James Thomas McQuilken
182
1998; Maynard et al., 2012). Others have criticised its ambiguity and scarcity of
definitions (Conger and Kanungo, 1988; Honold, 1997). Given these very significant
concerns with the complexity and prescriptive (mis)use of the term empowerment,
it must first be fully understood before the potential of the four mineral schemes to
empower small-scale miners can be compared. The first section of the paper, there-
fore, critically reviews and synthesises the literature on empowerment – building a
framework for analysis. The section that follows outlines the background and origins
of the ‘ethical’ gold certification schemes, highlighting the dierent approaches used,
interconnections and overlaps (Hilson, 2008a; 2014; Childs, 2008; 2014). Finally, each
of the schemes and associated secondary data are critically reviewed through a lens
of empowerment. The focus of this discussion is sub-Saharan Africa, a region where,
inter alia, ASM has – as noted – been observed to be largely populated by people
suering extreme hardship and struggling to accumulate earnings; is now being
targeted for several promising ethical mineral pilot projects; and continues to be the
main geographic focus of conflict-free, chain-of-custody mineral legislation and inter-
national guidelines. In line with analysis presented by Hilson (2008; 2014), Childs
(2008) and others, the paper questions whether, in their current format, any one of
these schemes is capable of empowering the impoverished artisanal and small-scale
miners they claim to be targeting.
Conceptualising empowerment
The origins of empowerment, as it is articulated in the international development
literature, date back to the 1970s. Its initial conceptualisation is rooted in the notion
of power: specifically, as a relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor, their
agency and the opportunity structure that may or may not exist in order to exercise it.
Freire’s (1970) seminal work deconstructs the (de)humanisation process, which can be
interpreted as the ability to gain empowerment. Although Freire’s thought-piece does
not fully account for the multiplicity of expressions and echelons of power, it remains
a fundamental cornerstone in later conceptualisations of empowerment. However,
it was not until the 1990s that a significant body of development literature began
building on Freire’s work, largely in response to the damaging eects of World Bank-
financed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and associated neoliberal reforms
implemented during the previous decade. The 1980s global economic crisis, blamed
largely on protectionist government policies, sparked the implementation of more
robust neoliberal reforms (Fridell, 2004). Many developing countries were left unable
to service their debts, and in return for continued financial support from the interna-
tional finance institutions, had little choice but to adopt SAPs. These packages were
implemented from the ‘top-down’, in which poverty was defined mainly in economic
and material terms (Laderchi et al., 2003; Green and Hulme, 2005). Proponents of
‘Ethical gold’ in sub-Saharan Africa: a viable empowerment strategy? 183
SAPs maintained that economic ‘trickle-down’ would result, leading to eventual
poverty reduction and a distribution of benefits to all members of society. However,
the cuts to social services, deregulation, privatisation and tax breaks provided to
foreign multinationals under adjustment did nothing of the sort.
It is against this background that the literature began to deconstruct empowerment
further, part of a broader shift in focus at the time toward ‘bottom-up’ participatory
development (Hunt, 1989; Willis, 2011) – a re-conceptualisation of poverty in terms of
entitlements, human rights, social capabilities, freedoms and multiple dimensions (Sen,
1999). Examining the concept in relation to feminism and development in the 1990s,
Rowlands (1997) defined four categories of empowerment, each embedded within
the root concept of power: ‘power over’ (domination and control over others); ‘power
to’ (self-awareness to see possibility for change); ‘power with’ (collective action); and
‘power from within’ (the ability from within individuals to help oneself, encompassing
feelings of self-esteem and self-worth). The latter was also a key part of Freire’s concep-
tualisation of humanisation (Rowlands, 1997; Willis, 2011; Quaedvlieg et al., 2014).
Concurrent influential work by Sen (1989; 1999) moved the debate forward, shifting the
focus to the individual and welfare economics, subjects which had hitherto been largely
excluded from normative analyses. Sen’s capabilities approach includes conceptuali-
sations of agency and freedoms, now considered key constituents of empowerment.
Another important contribution, highlighted by Ibrahim and Alkire (2007), was that of
Oakley (2001), who dierentiated between the scenarios of ‘variable-sum’ and ‘zero-
sum’ in the process of gaining power. In the former, the marginalised can be empow-
ered without changing existing levels of power; in the latter, power can only be gained
as a result of a reduction of power held by others.
Building on this momentum, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) broached the
notion of empowerment in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), three-year
national development plans, which were a featured element of the Highly Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. A PRSP details a country’s macroeconomic objectives,
government spending targets and social policies aimed at facilitating development and
alleviating poverty (IMF, 2014). Replacing, and designed to counter the eects of SAPs,
PRSPs are prepared by recipient governments following a broadly participatory multi-
stakeholder approach. Given, however, that feedback is provided through an ‘advisory’
panel, and approval from the IMF and World Bank is required (IMF, 2014), the extent
to which PRSPs enable countries to determine their own development paths is open to
debate. Indeed, Fraser (2005, 1) argues that PRSPs are a technology of social control: a
subversive mode through which institutions can impose policy conditions (power over)
and shape domestic political space under the guise of participation. With the require-
ment that PRSPs be updated and re-approved every three years (IMF, 2014), there are
clearly interesting questions concerning the dynamics of power in this process of partici-
patory development.
James Thomas McQuilken
184
The shift in rhetoric in the 1990s toward ‘bottom-up’ development implied that
empowerment was embedded in development interventions. In 2001, the World Bank
made empowerment a central theme in its World Development Report Attacking Poverty
(World Bank, 2001) and later defined it as ‘the expansion of assets and capabilities of
poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold account-
able institutions that aect their lives’ (Narayan, 2002, 11). Empowerment has since
become a key part of the Bank’s rhetoric, and the manifestos of a number of other
donor organisations and NGOs.
As empowerment has gained currency as a theme in development, it has taken on
greater meaning and been applied in a wide range of contexts (Narayan, 2002). In an
attempt to create a shortlist of internationally comparable indicators, Ibrahim and
Alkire (2007) reviewed a staggering twenty-nine definitions of the many more avail-
able, and Alsop et al. (2006) reported that over 1,800 World Bank project documents
mentioned empowerment. Central to all of these interpretations, however, is the
interplay between two fundamental components: agency and opportunity structure.
This widely acknowledged interdependence (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007; Alsop et al.,
2006; Samman and Santos, 2009) is mirrored in business and management conceptu-
alisations that distinguish between psychological and structural empowerment respec-
tively (Maynard et al., 2012).
Agency can be considered as ‘an actor’s or group’s ability to make purposeful
choices’ (Alsop et al., 2006, 11) concerning what ‘they value – and have reason to
value’ (Sen, 1999, 18). An agent, in this sense, is ‘someone who acts and brings about
change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of [their] own values and
objectives’ (Sen, 1999, 19). Empowerment can therefore be viewed, in part, as the
ability of a group or individual to be agents of their own change. Agency is deter-
mined by an individual’s assets (land, housing, mining permits and equipment) and
capabilities,2 including human (health and education), social (belonging, sense of
identity, leadership and trust relations) and psychological (self-esteem, self-confi-
dence, the ability to envisage a better future); and by collective assets and capabili-
ties, such as civil society, political voice, representation and identity (Samman and
Santos, 2009). At the crux of Sen’s argument is the view that agency should also
be considered an end in itself, given that it enables the achievement of other devel-
opment outcomes, including economic empowerment. However, even if a person
has the assets and capabilities to bring about their own change, they cannot do so
unless institutional structures allow them to. For example, an unlicensed small-scale
miner may have the assets, capabilities and desire to secure a mining permit, but a
lengthy, bureaucratic registration process may impede and dis-incentivise any move
to acquire it (Hilson and Van Bockstael, 2011).
2 Capabilities are the combinations of ‘substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has
reason to value’ (Sen, 1999, 87).
‘Ethical gold’ in sub-Saharan Africa: a viable empowerment strategy? 185
Opportunity structure is the institutional context within which the agent is
embedded that inhibits or enables them to pursue its purposeful choices (Narayan,
2002; Alsop et al., 2006; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007). The institutional context deter-
mines whether or not a person can exercise their agency eectively. It includes both
formal and informal rules. The former comprise laws and regulatory frameworks that
ocially govern private organisations, markets and people at the local, national and
international level (e.g. tributer mining agreements (Hilson, 2008); national mining
codes such as Ghana’s Minerals and Mining Act 2006; and, conflict-free legislation
such as the Dodd-Frank Act 2010). The latter encompass the unocial norms that
govern relationships within and between networks of organisations and communities
(e.g. the non-legally binding OECD Due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of
minerals from conflict-aected and high-risk areas (OECD, 2011) and payments to facilitate
the receipt of small-scale mining licenses (Hilson and Van Bockstael, 2011)) as well
as the socio-political aspects, values and cultural norms of behaviour that operate
at the household level and among social groups and communities (e.g. child labour
(Hilson 2008c) and traditional land tenure (Hirons, 2013)). It is thus the inter-relation-
ship between the institutional opportunity structure (that enables or inhibits) and the
agency of an individual or group that collectively determines empowerment.
This conceptualisation of empowerment can also be adapted to evaluate the
extent to which a private sector organisation (such as a large-scale mining company)
may be empowered to be an agent of its own change. Peterson and Zimmermann
(2004) identify three key components of organisational empowerment: intraor-
ganisational, specifically the characteristics that determine the internal structure
and functioning (power within); interorganisational, which concerns the linkages
between organisations (power with); and extraorganisational (agency and opportu-
nity structure), or the ability of an organisation to take actions that aect the larger
environments they are embedded within. Another relevant area of the literature is
the body of business management research that emphasises ‘change capacity’ (e.g.
Wetzel and Van Gorp, 2014). Soparnot (2011, 641), who defines change capacity as
‘the ability of the company to produce solutions (content) that respond to environ-
mental evolution (external context)’, identifies three dimensions: context, relating to
the available resources to facilitate the process; process, which includes the princi-
ples of implementing change; and learning, which relates to the ability of an organ-
isation to be introspective.
The components of inter-, intra- and extraorganisational empowerment and
dimensions of change capacity have clear commonalities with the concepts of agency,
capabilities and opportunity structure, as well as Rowlands’ (1997) powers. Organisa-
tional empowerment, therefore, depends upon the agency of a company, which is,
in turn, related to the resources, assets and capabilities; elements of power available;
and the interaction with the opportunity structure in which a company is embedded.
James Thomas McQuilken
186
In sum, the empowerment of a private sector organisation is as equally complex and
multidimensional as that of an individual, and shares the same (albeit altered) funda-
mental components of agency and opportunity structure.
The discussion thus far has, crucially, highlighted the multidimensionality and
complexity of empowerment as a process, and emphasised the fundamental constit-
uents of power, agency and opportunity structure. Here the agency and opportu-
nity which comprise this framework are separated in order to highlight that even
if individuals have agency, they may be constrained by the institutional environ-
ment. This approach is critiqued by Samman and Santos (2009, 4) for potentially
‘confusing [empowerment] with the whole of the development process’. Instead, and
like Ibrahim and Alkire (2007), the authors focus on the individual by conceptualising
empowerment solely as the expansion of agency – given that agency encompasses
process and opportunity ‘freedoms’. For the purposes of this framework, however, the
distinction is maintained in order to enable a more complete analysis of ‘ethical’ gold
schemes, given that they operate at dierent levels, are implemented by a range of
NGOs, government and private institutions, and that miners are deeply embedded
within existing dynamics of global production networks.
The final part of this framework turns to illustrate how these conceptualisations
of empowerment are articulated implicitly in the ASM literature. Indeed, despite,
as mentioned, what are essentially calls to empower miners, the term has been little
used or reflected upon explicitly. Spiegel (2012) examines the empowerment poten-
tial of microfinance schemes for ASM. Identifying a lack of local decision-making
and power, the author advocates for ‘gold miners themselves – rather than donors’
(Speigel, 2012, 502) to take the leadership in developing microfinance groups, with
donors facilitating the process. Despite no explicit recourse to empowerment litera-
ture, Spiegel (2012) is advocating for miners to be their own agents of change and for
a power shift (cessation of power over and provision of power to) in the local oppor-
tunity structure that is inhibiting miners from empowering themselves. Banchirigah
(2006) makes clear the link between the empowerment, or rather marginalisation, of
small-scale miners from decision-making processes and the increased informality in
the sector. The author focuses on the institutional structures that have inhibited and
marginalised miners from engaging in policy reform debates, concluding that the very
reforms designed to formalise the sector have rather fuelled the growth of informal
ASM activity. Empowerment, then, although rarely referred to explicitly, is of implicit
concern in the ASM literature.
In the next section of the paper, the above conceptualisation of empowerment,
along with Rowlands’ (1997) typology, will be used to critique the four ‘ethical’ gold
schemes aimed at empowering miners.
‘Ethical gold’ in sub-Saharan Africa: a viable empowerment strategy? 187
An overview of ‘ethical’ gold schemes
The four schemes reviewed here are presently the only certification schemes in
existence that deal exclusively with the upstream sourcing and production of ‘ethical’
gold bullion. Before critiquing these eorts, each is described in turn. The first is
the Conflict-Free Gold Standard (CFGS). Launched in 2009 by the World Gold
Council, the market development organisation for gold mining, it was conceived,
in part, to align with the Dodd-Frank Act (2010). Section 1502 of the Act requires
manufacturing companies to annually disclose the origin and chain-of-custody of
‘conflict minerals’, including gold (OECD, 2011; SEC, 2012).3 Whilst mining activi-
ties are not covered by the Act, signatories of the CFGS commit to ensuring that
‘[the extraction of] gold does not cause, support or benefit unlawful armed conflict
or contribute to serious human rights abuses or breaches of international humani-
tarian law’, and thus assists manufacturers with supply chain reporting requirements
(WGC, 2012a, 2). In addition, it is claimed, the standard fosters recognition for
the contribution of gold mining to the ‘advancement of sustainable development’
(WGC, 2012b, 1), ‘economic growth, poverty alleviation and development’ (WGC,
2012a, 2). Ocials at the World Gold Council assert that the CFGS is ‘open’ to
any group engaged in gold production, including artisanal and small-scale miners,
although they do recognise that the demanding criteria would preclude many from
pursuing it.
The second is the Better Gold Initiative (BGI), a public-private partnership
between the SECO and the SBGA. It aims to develop the market for ethical gold
and implement neoliberal, market mechanisms to increase the supply of sustainably-
produced gold from small and medium-sized operations. Similar to other certification
schemes reviewed here, it demands adherence to minimum social, labour and environ-
mental standards. Currently a pilot project over three years, and with little formal
documentation, the initiative is attempting to develop a direct, traceable and linear
supply chain involving a Peruvian mining group and Swiss gold refiners. The initia-
tive, it is claimed, will remove middlemen and utilise existing certification schemes to
guarantee the origin and ethical extraction of the ore. The schemes BGI has identi-
fied to work with are Fairtrade Gold and/or Fairmined Gold and the Responsible
Jewellery Council’s ‘Code of Practices’ (RJC, 2014; SECO, 2014). By focusing on
refiners, the BGI marries both the top-down, industry-driven chain-of-custody with
the bottom-up, NGO-led standard setting at the producer end.
3 The term conflict minerals as defined by section 1502(e)(4) of the Dodd-Frank Act includes columbite-tantalite,
also known as coltan (tantalum ore); cassiterite (tin ore); gold; wolframite (tungsten ore); and any other mineral
and derivatives believed to be financing conflict in the DR Congo and neighbouring countries (SEC, 2012).
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act relating to the use of conflict
minerals was signed into law on 21 July 2010 and came into eect in November 2012. Institutions covered by the
act must be compliant by January 2013, with the first due diligence reports due 31 May 2014 (SEC, 2012).
James Thomas McQuilken
188
Finally, there are Fairtrade and Fairmined Gold. In 2006, the Colombian-based
NGO, the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM) and the internationally-recog-
nised Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO), collaborated to develop the Standard
Zero for Fair Trade Artisanal Gold, a set of draft principles adapted from Fairtrade
certification standards for agricultural producers. On the back of this development
phase, the joint Fairtrade and Fairmined Gold Standard (FFGS) surfaced in 2009.
Implemented solely in Latin America, the standard sought to facilitate market access
to artisanally-mined gold produced in a socially and environmentally responsible
manner (Maldar, 2011). In 2011, the first certified gold went on sale in the UK. Despite
claims made on the original website and in a subsequent press release that the FFGS
‘successfully brought about the empowerment of miner’s[sic] organisations, raised
awareness of the issues in the ASM sector and provided businesses with the first trace-
able source of certified gold’ (Fairtrade International, 2013a), in 2013 the partnership
came to an end. Although the split is portrayed as organic (Fairtrade Gold, 2014a),
coming at the end of a three-year pilot phase, the issue of mass balancing certainly
had an influence.4 Whilst ARM were in favour, to increase the demand for certified
gold, a number of Fairtrade stakeholders opposed the move, arguing that it under-
mined the ‘purity’ and image of the combined label in the ‘emerging ethical jewellery
market’ (Fair Jewellery Action, 2014).5 Since this time, however, the Fairtrade Gold
standard permits mass balancing provided that the final gold product is not labelled
‘Fairtrade in any consumer or public facing communication or marketing’ (Fairtrade
Gold Standard, 2013, 11).
Fairtrade Gold certified organisations receive a minimum payment of at least
ninety-five per cent market value for their gold and a ten per cent social premium for
community development; the price is fixed by the London Bullion Market Association
(LBMA). Mining organisations can also earn an additional ecological premium of five
per cent of the LBMA fix. The overarching aim of Fairtrade Gold is to create trans-
parent and traceable ‘supply chains’ and help mining organisations forge long-term
business relationships with their commercial partners. Proponents of Fairtrade Gold
argue that ‘middlemen’ trap miners in poverty through poor prices, and that linking
certified producers with Northern jewellers will resolve this problem (Hilson, 2008a;
Maldar, 2011; Fairtrade Gold, 2014b).
Focusing primarily on Latin American ASM, though with pilots launched in
Senegal and Burkina Faso, the Alliance for Responsible Mining defines itself as a
‘global pioneering initiative’ (ARM, 2014a). It is a network of experts and partners,
4 Mass balancing in this context refers to the purchase of Fairtrade and Fairmined Gold (and full payment of all
premiums) and the subsequent mixing or diluting with uncertified gold in order to increase the demand and
guarantee a market for the former.
5 Fair Jewellery Action is a network founded by two activists central to the development and implementation of
Fairtrade Gold.
‘Ethical gold’ in sub-Saharan Africa: a viable empowerment strategy? 189
established in 2004, working towards the sustainable development of ASM. Since
the 2013 split, it has used the Fairmined Gold Standard to fulfil its objectives. Like
Fairtrade Gold, certified mine operators receive a guaranteed price and premium to
be invested in community projects. Through the Fairmined Standard, ARM works
toward ensuring that minerals are extracted ‘responsibly’ – oering the jewellery
industry a guarantee of traceability and assurance of minimum production standards
(ARM, 2014b; ARM, 2014c).
The paper now turns to critically review each scheme thematically in accordance
with the empowerment framework developed above.
Initial reflections: empowerment for whom?
In this section of the paper, each scheme is reviewed in terms of the fundamental
components of agency and opportunity structure. The discussion questions the ability
of these interventions to truly empower and suggests that the overwhelming majority
of impoverished miners who are unlicensed are not the target group. Moreover, the
review draws on the typology of powers oered by Rowlands (1997) to question how
each intervention influences power and what impact this has on artisanal and small-
scale miners.
Are ‘ethical’ gold schemes empowering miners to be agents of their own
change, and addressing the institutional structures that inhibit them?
The ethical mineral schemes under review address agency and opportunity structure
to varying degrees. With significant assets and financial resources at the disposal of
large-scale gold mining companies, refiners and dealers, it is clear that WGC members
and those targeted by the BGI already have considerable agency. Both schemes, there-
fore, add to this agency, potentially empowering member companies to comply with
conflict-free legislation such as the Dodd-Frank Act and OECD guidelines.
Constrained by a change in the opportunity structure, namely the Dodd-Frank
Act, the CFGS assists member companies to manoeuvre through the institutional
landscape in order to continue business as usual and maximise profits. Working collec-
tively under these schemes, the intra- and interorganisational components of empow-
erment and the capacity of companies operating in the gold production networks
to change are increased. This enables these organisations to adapt and adhere to
changes in institutional structures – in this case, international law.
What, however, is being done to engender the agency of mining communities and
individuals? As noted, recognising that the scheme is not particularly accessible for
small-scale miners, the CFGS does little to create grassroots agency – nor claims to
do so. However, the BGI does address agency, although not directly, by way of using
James Thomas McQuilken
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existing certification schemes (such as Fairtrade Gold) that require minimum social
standards of production to be reached. But as the subsequent analyses of Fairtrade
Gold show, the degree to which miners are likely to be their own agents of change
and thus empowered through such certification schemes is questionable. Additionally,
the BGI seems to alter part of the opportunity structure that constrains many small-
scale miners from accessing legitimate production networks, specifically by forging
a direct chain of supply with a select group of small-scale miners regarded as being
‘low hanging fruit’ or easy to access. It does so at the cost of middlemen, and, it is
argued, is a symptomatic response that does not address the reasons why impover-
ished miners cannot access legitimate supply chains in the first place. Consequently,
neither the CFGS nor the BGI directly address national and institutional structures
such as the long, costly and bureaucratic process of obtaining a small-scale license
that, as mentioned, inhibits the majority of Africa’s impoverished miners. This lack of
attention is perhaps, in part, because there is simply no, or little, incentive for member
companies to engage with the wider structural issues, given that corporate image and
legal compliance are upheld through participation in the certification schemes, and
that gold from ASM sources represents a fraction of profits.
In terms of agency, one fundamental issue for miners is formality. As indicated, the
majority of miners operating in sub-Saharan Africa are informal (unlicensed) as they
lack the agency, specifically the financial assets, capabilities and ‘power’, to become
formalised. Yet, rather inexplicably, Fairtrade Gold only interacts directly with the
small number of miners who are already formalised, the ‘low hanging fruit’, and thus
through this legal standing already have considerable agency. The opportunity struc-
ture that inhibits miners from exercising the little agency they do have is not being
addressed – due not only to a lack of understanding of the dynamics of the sector
(Hilson and McQuilken, 2014), but also because of the requirement to demonstrate
feasibility of the scheme with a small, easily certifiable and readily governable elite
group (Welker, 2012).
To become formalised, miners have to acquire licences, which is not only a costly
and laborious process, but has also been criticised for further marginalising miners
and fuelling the growth of illegal activity (Banchirigah, 2006). This prevents individ-
uals, however well-intentioned they may be, from accessing a certification scheme
such as Fairtrade Gold. Essentially ignoring the fundamental issue of formalisation,
Fairtrade Gold instead opts to rely entirely on other organisations, such as the NGO
Solidaridad, to undertake the arduous task of helping informal miners meet stringent
minimum standards. Thus, the ability of Fairtrade Gold, in its current format, to
increase the agency of the majority of informal miners is limited.
This is where ARM’s Fairmined Gold scheme diers. One of the key objectives of
the organisation is to build the capacity of local NGOs and partners to help formalise
ASM. It claims to ‘work to support you in formalizing [...] through our collaboration
‘Ethical gold’ in sub-Saharan Africa: a viable empowerment strategy? 191
with local support organizations and other partners engaged in the sector’ (ARM,
2014e). This, at least on paper, suggests that there is more explicit recognition and
understanding of the need to increase the agency of informal miners and put them
in a position to become more eective agents of their own change. But despite the
rhetoric, there are still concerns as to whether the institutional structures that inhibit
the formalisation process are being addressed.
In summary, it appears that the CFGS and BGI are increasing the agency of
large-scale gold mining and refining companies, whilst Fairtrade Gold is falling short
of addressing the agency of ASM. Conversely, Fairmined Gold does appear to be
addressing the agency of small-scale miners, but as the following analysis demon-
strates it does not adequately address all dimensions of power that feature in the
empowerment process.
Are ethical mineral schemes redistributing elements of power?
Both the CFGS and BGI enable large-scale mining companies and refiners to mount
a defence and assert power over institutions, international and national regulators,
NGOs that are critical of their operations and the wider public, as their operations are
certified as ‘conflict-free’ – an example of increasing the extraorganisational capacity
of organisations. There is also the issue of the schemes enabling companies to wield
power over ASM operators who, due to their lack of resources and marginalised
position, are often unable to verify the ‘ethical’ credentials of their gold. Power over is
engrained further still by the BGI. Specifically, through a combination of NGO certi-
fication and simplifying supply chains, it prescribes minimum requirements for opera-
tors whilst simultaneously adding all value outside the country of origin, displacing
middlemen, altering existing production network dynamics and empowering refiners
to market certified traceable gold.
In terms of power to, both the CFGS and the BGI provide a mechanism for member
organisations to consolidate power and increase their domination of a sector that is
under increasing scrutiny. In addition, the BGI provides power to the refiners and
stakeholders downstream to market certified gold, at the same time legitimising their
activities by providing power with through the backing of the SECO. Similarly, the
backing of the WGC is a clear example of power with and interorganisational cooper-
ation, as collectively, large-scale mining companies are able to work together to share
best practice and resources when implementing and operationalising the standard.
The concept of power within is slightly out of context in relation to large-scale
organisations, but it seems that both industry standards enable mining companies and
refiners to see the clear market incentives for having transparent production networks
and being part of ‘ethical’ mineral schemes. This is particularly true of the BGI,
given that the market demand for sustainable and ethical gold is increasing and thus
James Thomas McQuilken
192
refiners will be able to respond with certified gold bullion. Most significantly, the overall
eect of the industry standards is that they appear to empower mining organisations to
identify both potential and actual sources of conflict gold in production networks. This
approach, therefore, disincentivises engagement with ASM, which is perceived as risky
and, as such, actively encourages mining companies and gold traders to remove ASM
from their production networks, further marginalising the sector and consolidating the
power of mining companies.
Through certification schemes such as Fairtrade Gold, the BGI appears to oer
greater empowerment options for small-scale miners than the CFGS. But whose
economic interests are the SECO really serving, and to what extent do the certifica-
tion schemes reviewed here alter the dynamics of power for the benefit of small-scale
miners? Fairtrade Gold does little to transfer power into the hands of miners, who
must work to meet certain minimum requirements before becoming certified. Like
Fairtrade agricultural producers, miners are required to pay to be certified. But given
that in sub-Saharan Africa ASM is often populated by individuals who are trapped in
poverty, it is unlikely that most of its participants will be able to meet initial certifica-
tion costs. The story is no dierent with Fairmined Gold. As the ARM documentation
concedes, ‘reaching the environmental, organizational, economic and social standards
required to get Fairmined certified can take everything from a few months to several
years depending on the organization[’]s level of formalization’ (ARM, 2014d). The
standard also recognises that the costs of formalisation vary considerably depending
on the starting point of the mining operation: in addition to expenses associated with
the initial certification audit, the costs of the annual audits thereafter must also be met
by the ASM party.
Furthermore, there are other significant barriers to entry and hidden costs associ-
ated with Fairtrade Gold. In particular, miners are required to be in cooperatives and
formalised before they can be considered for certification. The need, on the whole, for
participants to be ‘organised’ is something which several scholars question, given that
operations are already organised, in many cases in line with unique cultural contexts
(Hilson, 2008a; Childs, 2008).6 Fairmined Gold also requires miners to be formalised
(power with) in ‘organisations’, which hold the legal rights and environmental permits to
mine (ARM, 2014c). Although ARM does help with formalisation, it does so indirectly,
relying on its local partners and stakeholders to assist with covering the cost and engen-
dering capacity. Thus, the stringent requirements of both Fairtrade Gold and Fairmined
Gold are prescriptive and examples of power over, likely precluding the majority of
poor miners from becoming certified and forcing the formation of ASM organisations.
The concerns with Fairtrade Gold, therefore, also apply to Fairmined Gold.
6 A personal communication with a Fairtrade Gold spokesperson confirmed that for a pilot in East Africa,
Fairtrade-certified miners do not need to be in cooperatives, and that this change is making the project more
eective.
‘Ethical gold’ in sub-Saharan Africa: a viable empowerment strategy? 193
As neither scheme takes a direct lead and addresses the fundamental issue of
formalisation, small-scale gold miners are not given the tools or power to help
themselves. The lack of engagement on the topic also has the eect of reinforcing a
particular policy position: stressing to governments that they should only work with
formalised mining organisations, in the process entrenching a power over structure
regarding ASM. This mirrors many top-down approaches adopted in development
which, rather than better-positioning governments, communities and individuals to
determine what they require, prescribe ungrounded solutions that, in this case, seem
to suit Fairtrade Gold and Fairmined Gold criteria whilst simultaneously oering
consumers an alternative ‘clear conscience solution’. Despite this, ARM’s Fairmined
Gold scheme seems to fit with a more comprehensive model of power to, in which
mining communities are linked with potential beneficiaries, local partners and trainers
to provide the necessary tools to empower themselves. A review of ARM’s Fairmined
Standard (ARM, 2014c) also reveals a much more comprehensive approach to certi-
fication, in which the nuances and national and local contexts of ASM and existing
legislation are considered, perhaps constituting a lessening of power over. Further-
more, the partial uncoupling of certified miners from ethical consumers in developed
countries represents, perhaps, an attempt to alter wider power and informal insti-
tutional structures: a lessening of power over and a provision of power to that may
facilitate miners’ access to global markets for gold whilst still putting them in a position
to receive a guaranteed minimum market rate and social premium.
An additional layer of complexity in the context of power is the growth of Fairtrade
and similar producer schemes as brands and perceived panaceas for development.
The relative ‘success’ of Fairtrade itself has created greater complexity, which, in turn,
has necessitated greater international coordination.7 As a result, FLO – the umbrella
organisation responsible for certifying and guaranteeing the Fairtrade label – has
become more centralised and professional. This, Renard (2005) argues, accompanied
with changes in the production network, has meant that producers have lost power and
their place at the centre of Fairtrade. Linking mining organisations directly with jewel-
lers further entrenches this power over relationship, often to the detriment of miners,
who become reliant on Western consumers and the FLO itself for support. Through
‘developmental consumption’, the livelihoods of the poor are both connected to and
dependent upon the lifestyle choices of consumers (Goodman, 2010).
Finally, with regards to power within, there is no doubt that the people in ASM
have this capacity given their daily struggle in what, again, is largely a poverty-driven
industry. It therefore seems that there are far greater institutional and structural issues
concerning power over, power to and the need for miners to be a part of a coopera-
tive (power with) that Fairtrade and ARM are not, in the current guise, able to su-
7 Fairtrade certified products alone generated global sales of €4.9 billion in the financial year 2012–2013 (Fairtrade
International, 2013b).
James Thomas McQuilken
194
ciently address. Most worryingly, none of the schemes seem to fully engage with the
issue of formalisation and the power structures that prevent impoverished miners
from legalising their activities. The one scheme that does appear to be addressing the
dimensions of power the most, ARM’s Fairmined Gold, is largely based on experi-
ences in Latin America, where the opportunity structure and capabilities relating to
civil society and community empowerment are well established. Whether the same
standard can be adapted to fully enable power within and truly empower mining
communities in sub-Saharan Africa is open to debate.
Concluding remarks
This paper has reflected critically on the ability of four ethical mineral schemes to
empower ASM operators. It provides an adapted conceptualisation of empowerment
that encapsulates key theoretical work in international development, and constructs a
framework for the analysis of empowerment. Significantly, the paper highlights that
industry-led schemes, namely the World Gold Council’s CFGS, designed to facilitate
transparency and traceability, and the SBGA and the SECO’s Better Gold Initiative,
which aim to increase the supply of sustainably-produced gold and ensure traceability
from mine to market, appear to cater mainly to multinationals and refiners, not ASM.
Similarly, Fairtrade International’s Fairtrade Gold does not, ultimately, appear to
break down the institutional power structures that keep the majority of ASM opera-
tors – at least in sub-Saharan Africa – trapped in poverty. Although Fairmined Gold
does cede more power to operators, potentially increasing their agency and enabling
them to access additional markets, questions remain about how it could be adapted
for implementation in sub-Saharan Africa and its ability to empower.
This paper also highlighted the distinct dichotomy of approaches utilised by
organisations that implement ethical mineral schemes in the region: on the one hand,
top-down industry-led initiatives; and on the other hand, NGO-designed certification
standards. Neither appear to emphasise empowerment, nor are likely to facilitate
ASM operators becoming agents of their own change. Not only does the analysis
reinforce concerns raised by Hilson (2008; 2014) and Childs (2008; 2014) about mineral
certification schemes potentially leading to elite capture and providing few benefits to
poor miners; it also underscores the need for piloted mineral certification schemes to
be better adapted to the institutional environments and social dimensions of power
and agency in ‘new’ locations such as sub-Saharan Africa.
‘Ethical gold’ in sub-Saharan Africa: a viable empowerment strategy? 195
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Professor Gavin Hilson for his support in the prepa-
ration of this paper, the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful and compre-
hensive comments, and Professor Katherine Gough for her patience and guidance
throughout the review process. Financial support for this research was provided by the
Economic and Social Research council (ESRC). Needless to say, any errors this paper
may contain are the sole responsibility of the author.
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