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CORRUPTION AS A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
... Hambatan implementasi belanja pemerintah daerah ( korupsi birokrasi terjadi ketika aparatur pemerintah berperilaku menyimpang atas aturan hukum dan prinsip sosial untuk kepentingannya sendiri dan mengabaikan kepentingan atasan atau masyarakat yang seharusnya mereka layani (Banfield 1975;Caiden 2001;Jain 2001;Klitgaard 1998;Rose-Ackerman 1978;dan Quah 1982 I 13 21 8 3 15 II 38 42 29 12 48 III 62 71 50 37 68 IV 94 94 90 92 95 2015 I 14 21 7 2 16 II 30 45 23 15 29 III 56 71 42 30 67 IV 90 94 90 85 89 2016 I 15 21 8 5 19 II 36 45 29 22 41 III 59 69 52 40 64 IV 88 89 85 82 93 2017 I II 38 46 33 24 41 III IV 93 91 98 93 90 2018 I II 38 47 31 20 44 III IV 100 95 102 90 106 Sumber: data diolah dari Kemenkeu berupa data anggaran dan realisasi belanja pemerintah pusat (Kemenkeu, diakses 2022) memiliki kewenangan yang lebih luas dalam pengelolaan keuangan. Kewenangan tersebut dimaksudkan untuk menyediakan layanan sesuai kebutuhan dan preferensi masyarakat daerahnya (Kim 2008;Mikesell 2007;dan Shah 2004). ...
... Perilaku anggaran dari agen yang tidak masuk akal disengaja untuk mengamankan permintaan anggarannya (Wildavsky 1984). Hal ini sesuai asumsi teori keagenan yang menganggap jika faktor lain ceteris paribus, maka individu sebagai makhluk rasional berusaha mencapai kepentingan pribadi mereka sendiri di dunia dengan sumber daya yang langka (Rose-Ackerman 1978). Dalam hubungan keagenan tersebut terjadi interaksi yang menautkan kepentingan antara principal, agen, klien beserta instrumen pendukungnya dalam satu jaringan. ...
... Aparatur pemerintahan dalam hubungan keagenan diasumsikan sebagai individu yang mementingkan diri sendiri dan tidak dapat dipercaya, hanya mengikuti aturan jika memperoleh keuntungan (Rose-Ackerman 1978). Mereka akan mempertahankan perilaku korup tersebut yang mereka nikmati di bawah deteksi hukum yang lemah (Rose-Ackerman 1978 dan Klitgaard 1998). ...
Studi ini mengeksplorasi dan menganalisis bagaimana dan mengapa aparatur pemerintah daerah (pemda) terlibat dalam korupsi yang menghambat belanja pemerintah daerah. Kajian ini berfokus pada belanja pemerintah daerah yang meliputi belanja barang/jasa dan belanja modal pada pemda Kabupaten Bantul, Kabupaten Sleman, dan Kota Yogyakarta di D.I. Yogyakarta. Penelitian ini menggunakan studi kasus berganda instrumental melalui wawancara mendalam, analisis arsip, observasi langsung, dan artikel media massa.
Hasil proses pengodean melalui triangulasi data menunjukkan empat tema. Pertama, tema tindakan aktor korupsi mengidentifikasi para aktor korupsi yaitu aparatur atasan menengah, aparatur bawahan, penyedia jasa, dan anggota DPRD. Aktor tersebut terlibat melalui pola dan jenis korupsi tertentu yang diidentifikasi berdasarkan prinsip perilaku korupsi. Kedua, tema potensi perilaku korup berkelanjutan pada birokrasi di organisasi pemda. Ketiga, tema hambatan kinerja menunjukkan dampak korupsi birokrasi menghambat implementasi belanja pemda melalui kinerja rendah dan pemborosan. Terakhir, tema penanganan korupsi menunjukkan potensi penanganan korupsi dengan mendorong kinerja baik aparat, memersepsikan anggaran untuk masyarakat, dan menindak korupsi secara tepat.
Studi ini berkontribusi pada literatur seputar korupsi dalam konteks belanja pemda. Selain itu, penelitian ini memberikan perspektif yang berbeda tentang prinsip hubungan keagenan bahwa perilaku korupsi merupakan hasil dari hubungan kompleks antar aparatur dan aktor lainnya yang melahirkan korupsi secara bersama-sama, yang mana menunjukkan tidak adanya kesenjangan informasi. Pada tataran implementasi, kajian ini menekankan bahwa diperlukan pendekatan terpadu untuk mengendalikan dan mengurangi hambatan dalam pelaksanaan belanja pemerintah daerah.
... Research into the topic of corruption took off in the late 20th century due to a growing public concern of the issue [1] and following seminal work such as Rose-Ackerman [2] and Klitgaard [3]. The Transparency International (TI) was then founded in 1993, a nongovernmental organization that aimed at raising awareness on the topic, and published the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 1995, ranking countries based on the public's perceived level of corruption in the public sector [4]. ...
... According to Søreide [7], microeconomic theories that explain corruption as the result of rational choice are based on the assumption that humans seek to maximize utility and was put forward by Rose-Ackerman [2]. An individual will therefore participate in corruption if the benefits involved are expected to be greater than the costs. ...
... Within the economic field, the principal-agent approach to theorize corruption by focusing on the role of incentives and rational choice of individuals has been covered by seminal scholars such as Rose-Ackerman [2], Klitgaard [3], and Lambsdorff [19]. Theories based on the principal-agent framework work under the assumption that the interests of the principals and the agents diverge and that there is an information asymmetry present in that relationship that favors the agent [20]. ...
The complexity and scale of the challenges posed by the climate crisis demand knowledge sharing and collaboration between a variety of academic disciplines to address them. In that regard, the way in which natural resources are used matters, and more information is needed on which regulatory framework and policy instruments foster their sustainable management. There is consensus that corruption can seriously obstruct social, economic, and political development. However, research on corruption has tended to be fragmented and investigating the concept itself is a challenging endeavor. Due to the complexity of corruption as a research subject, we argue that in seeking to explore and understand corruption, researchers would benefit from using a framework that facilitates an interdisciplinary and process-oriented approach. This paper suggests that the method of system dynamics can be applied to advance the academic discourse on corruption in relation to natural resources, since it seeks to improve understanding and learning in complex systems in an illustrative manner. More specifically, it offers a platform to explore feedback processes between the different social, economic, and ecological dimensions which ultimately produce undesirable behavior or patterns. The paper outlines how corruption has been approached previously in the academic discourse. It then offers a tool to bridge knowledge from different fields on natural resources, in a way that allows for research from different fields to be integrated, and thus gaps are better identified. A process-oriented approach to exploring corruption in natural resource systems based on qualitative system dynamics methods can inform new questions and thus improve understanding about the conditions under which corruption occurs or corrupt behavior thrives.
... Bribes here can circumvent the obstacles created by bureaucrats and act as a trouble-saving device which, in turn, raise efficiency and promote investment and growth (Méon and Sekkat 2005). However, Rose-Ackerman (1978) suggests that this 'speed money' may help the economy grow only when it is stuck in wide and deep corruption. Khan (2006), Morgan (1964), Mankiw (2000) are among many others who support the 'speed money' theory. ...
... Efficiency reducing strand advocated by Myrdal (1968), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and many others, finds corruption to be reducing economic growth. Rose-Ackerman (1978) opposes 'efficiency argument' as she finds that corruption help growth in some areas/sectors for a certain period of time but corruption would not be confined in those sectors. ...
... Efficiency reducing strand advocated by Myrdal (1968), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and many others, finds corruption to be reducing economic growth. Rose-Ackerman (1978) opposes 'efficiency argument' as she finds that corruption help growth in some areas/sectors for a certain period of time but corruption would not be confined in those sectors. It will rather spread over those areas/sectors and the whole economy would be stagnant and economic activities would slow down after a point in time. ...
We test the hypothesis that corruption has an impact on the growth of the manufacturing industry of Russia. An attempt was made to carry out an investigation on the impact of corruption collecting primary data from firm owners but we ended up with only a few firms— not enough for running regressions. Reluctance to reveal information about bribe payments indicates the culture of fear inherited through ages in Russia. Then we used the World Bank's Enterprise Survey data. An econometric exercise on the impact of the corrupt behavior of government officials on firm growth has been done. OLS, IV and GMM techniques have been applied to a panel dataset. To supplement the quantitative analysis and to have a better understanding of the issues, we also collected qualitative information through Focus Group Discussions (FGD) involving firm owners, bureaucrats and experts. The analysis of the World Bank data shows a positive impact of corruption on firm growth with a highly significant coefficient of the key variable of interest, which is bribe. The findings support the so-called speed money theory and the argument for this is that when bureaucracy is stuck in corruption, some extra informal payment would help to expedite the process. Most respondents in the primary survey and FGDs have not mentioned bribery as a barrier to growth, which means bribery helps them to speed up the firm growth.
... Esta distinción ha sido igualmente planteada para el caso colombiano por Eduardo Pizarro (2002). dirigido por Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978; además del galanismo o Nuevo Liberalismo, creado en 1982 por el senador Luis Carlos Galán, con lazos de continuidad con el llerismo. En el Partido Conservador la división era entre el alvarismo, liderado por de Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, senador e hijo del expresidente Laureano Gómez (1950Gómez ( -1953, y el pastranismo, bajo el mando de Misael Pastrana Borrero, último presidente del Frente Nacional (1970. ...
... La primera de ellas es una visión predominante en los estudios económicos tempranos (Rose-Ackerman, 1978;Klitgaard, 1988). Desde esta perspectiva, los principales son aquellos que delegan cierta función pública a un agente, esperando que este último cumpla a cabalidad con sus funciones. ...
El estudio de las élites políticas de un país ha sido, hace algo más de un siglo, un fértil terreno para la investigación política comparada. El Congreso habla es un modelo de trabajo colaborativo de investigadores vinculados a distintos centros de estudio y universidades colombianas y españolas, que tienen como preocupación común algunos aspectos de la democracia representativa. En su conjunto, este volumen analiza, con evidencia empírica, las trayectorias y el posicionamiento de los parlamentarios en Colombia durante las últimas tres décadas. ¿Quiénes son?, ¿qué hacen?, ¿qué piensan? son preguntas que ponen el acento en los recorridos, los comportamientos y las opiniones de los parlamentarios y de los partidos como fundamento de cuestiones más hondas sobre la política nacional y su perspectiva internacional.
... Esta distinción ha sido igualmente planteada para el caso colombiano por Eduardo Pizarro (2002). dirigido por Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978; además del galanismo o Nuevo Liberalismo, creado en 1982 por el senador Luis Carlos Galán, con lazos de continuidad con el llerismo. En el Partido Conservador la división era entre el alvarismo, liderado por de Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, senador e hijo del expresidente Laureano Gómez (1950Gómez ( -1953, y el pastranismo, bajo el mando de Misael Pastrana Borrero, último presidente del Frente Nacional (1970. ...
... La primera de ellas es una visión predominante en los estudios económicos tempranos (Rose-Ackerman, 1978;Klitgaard, 1988). Desde esta perspectiva, los principales son aquellos que delegan cierta función pública a un agente, esperando que este último cumpla a cabalidad con sus funciones. ...
El estudio de las élites políticas de un país ha sido, hace algo más de un siglo, un fértil terreno para la investigación política comparada. El Congreso habla es un modelo de trabajo colaborativo de investigadores vinculados a distintos centros de estudio y universidades colombianas y españolas, que tienen como preocupación común algunos aspectos de la democracia representativa. En su conjunto, este volumen analiza, con evidencia empírica, las trayectorias y el posicionamiento de los parlamentarios en Colombia durante las últimas tres décadas. ¿Quiénes son?, ¿qué hacen?, ¿qué piensan? son preguntas que ponen el acento en los recorridos, los comportamientos y las opiniones de los parlamentarios y de los partidos como fundamento de cuestiones más hondas sobre la política nacional y su perspectiva internacional.
... Political scientists such as Arnold J. Heidenheimer (2002) offer a broad discussion of various types of transactions in different societies, yet still study only what they call "political corruption". Susan Rose-Ackerman takes public choice theory a step further by potentially including both public and corporate corruption, yet corporate corruption, while being discussed in one chapter, is underplayed in Rose-Ackerman (1978) and all her subsequent works. Over the past two decades numerous schools and scholars/policy-analysts have implicitly or explicitly taken a much broader approach involving numerous sectors, heterogeneous agents and different styles of corruption. ...
... The 'standard argument' of corruption includes three main contradictions: the first relating to the forces of monopoly versus competition; the second being the forces of market versus state; and third total state control versus democracy. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978 is the most eloquent 'economic' advocate of this approach. In her system, there would be no corruption in the economic realm if markets were all perfectly competitive and knowledge widely distributed. ...
The purpose of this chapter is to apply some core general principles of institutional and evolutionary political economy to corruption as a global, regional and national phenomenon. We start with the principle of historical specificity, where the known history of corruption processes and concepts are examined. We follow the classical scholars of ancient Greece and numerous others who had a systemic view of the matter; through to micro views of Roman law, Adam Smith and others who took an individualist view of corruption; and onto the reemergence of corruption discourse through the 1970s–2010s, initially with a micro perspective but increasingly taking a ‘modern classical view’ of systemic corruption. The principles of innovation and policy/governance are applied to an innovative corruption analysis for academic and policy purposes. The principle of contradiction presents corruption as the promotion of the vested interests against the common good in the form of bribery, fraud, embezzlement, state capture, nepotism, extortion, etc. The principle of heterogeneous groups and agents utilizes social dominance theory vis-à-vis dominant and subordinate groups, and the styles of corruption activated by elites are surveyed as they gain resources, favors and economic surplus against the interests of the common people. We also Lastly, scrutinize the principle of hegemony and uneven development vis-à-vis four stylized facts about corruption throughout the world in relation to [i] development patterns, [ii] corporate corruption, [iii] key sectors/nations and [iv] inequality. The fourth stylized fact [iv] inequality uses the principle of circular and cumulative causation (CCC) to analyze “internal uneven developments” within nations. The principles provide a framework for reducing systemic corruption and modifying the structure of power to benefit the common good, socioeconomic performance and functioning of institutions.
... Path of FDI to Human Developmenthuman capital due to reduced government performance in the public sector.(Hanafi, 2018;Rose-Ackerman, 2013) Corruption generally indicates a structural weakness of institutions national authorities and an inability of public authorities to exercise rigorous control over the acts of civil servants and economic operators. It can lead to selflessness of the country's donors when it leads to the dissipation of aid to development and thus cause a decrease in financial assistance from the International community(Lemaire, 2003) As a symptom of deep institutional weakness, corruption leads to inefficient economic, social, and political outcomes. ...
... This finding is in line with other previous researches. Corruption reduces government efficiency in running businesses to improve human development and can cut budget allocations that affect human development(Akçay, 2006; Iamsiraroj, 2016;Reiter & Steensma, 2010;Rose-Ackerman, 2013;Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).-FDI Restrictiveness Index to Human DevelopmentIn the Random Effect Model test, the FDI Restrictiveness Index variable is significantly negative at the 10 percent real level of human development in 9 OKI countries which are the object of research. ...
This study aims to see the direct and indirect effect of FDI and corruption to Human Development in OIC Countries. Nine countries are selected representing the medium to very high human development category in OIC Countries (Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Tunisia). Using a combination of path diagram and panel data analysis, the result of this research indicates corruption has both direct and indirect effect through economic growth to human development in 9 OIC countries, while economic growth and FDI restrictiveness have a direct effect. Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Corruption, Human Development, OIC Abstrak. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melihat pengaruh langsung dan tidak langsung dari investasi langsung luar negeri (FDI) dan korupsi terhadap pembangungan manusia di negara-negara OKI. Dalam hal ini, 9 negara dipilih yang merepresentasikan kategori tingkat pembangunan manusia menengah dan tinggi di antara negara-negara OKI (Mesir, Indonesia, Yordania, Malaysia, Maroko, Kazakhstan, Kirgistan, Turki, dan Tunisia). Dengan menggunakan kombinasi diagram jalur dan analisis data panel, hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa korupsi berpengaruh terhadap tingkat pembangungan manusi di negara-negara OKI baik secara langsung maupun tidak langsung melalui pertumbuhan ekonomi. Sementara itu, pertumbuhan ekonomi dan pembatasan FDI memiliki pengaruh langsung. Keywords: Investasi Langsung Luar Negeri, Korupsi, Pembagunan Manusia, OKI
... The causes were often understood as a principal-agent problem. Corrupt individuals were seen as agents tasked with acting for the public good but who also engaged in rent seeking (Bhagwati, 1982;Klitgaard, 1988;Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Scholars thus focused on the incentive structures that could lead agents to behave in this way (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999. ...
... Corrupt individuals were seen as agents tasked with acting for the public good but who also engaged in rent seeking (Bhagwati, 1982;Klitgaard, 1988;Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Scholars thus focused on the incentive structures that could lead agents to behave in this way (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999. ...
Starting in 2014, Brazilian politics was shaken up by the lava jato (LJ) operation, a law‐centered anticorruption initiative. LJ unveiled a large corruption scheme in Brazil's national oil company Petrobras, which involved Petrobras directors, political party officials, and large construction companies. LJ was both disruptive and contentious. To some, it started a new chapter in Brazilian history, marked by greater respect for the “rule of law” and a collective “state of mind” concerned with “ending impunity” and building integrity in politics and businesses. To others, it contributed to undermining democracy and the rule of law, paving the way for an autocratic leader—the current Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro. This article sheds further light on those discussions by looking at LJ as a site of “legal consciousness” production. Empirically, the article focuses on conversations generated by lead LJ prosecutors on a major social media platform (Facebook) from 2017 to 2019. Considering this body of data, the article addresses the question: “When prosecutors and ‘the people’ talked about LJ, what did they talk about?” My findings support the more skeptical views of the operation. The exchanges between LJ prosecutors and their Facebook followers supported the co‐production of a cultural schema averse to the “rule of law.” These findings have implications for both legal consciousness and anticorruption research.
... As evidenced in fairly recent major scandals in the financial and political world, it has been argued that there is a connection between corruption, political illegitimacy and instability (Heywood, 2014). Often manifest at the interface of the public and private sectors (Rose-Ackerman, 1978), corruption causes intersectoral conflict, reduced investment and stunted economic growth (Mauro, 1995;World Bank, 1997). ...
Corruption is a social evil that resonates far and deep in societies, eroding trust in government, weakening the rule of law, impairing economic development, and exacerbating poverty, social tension, and inequality. Each phase of infrastructure development life cycle has peculiar vulnerabilities to corrupt practices. Pre-emptive identification of avenues for corrupt actions at each phase can serve as a starting point for new initiatives or for renewed reinforcement of existing corruption mitigation programs. The existing literature on corruption does not address the issue from an infrastructure life cycle perspective. The objective of this paper is to identify opportunities at each phase of the infrastructure life cycle where stakeholders and actors can help undertake specific actions to mitigate corruption. The paper’s methodology characterizes corruption and mitigation measures in a framework based on the phases of infrastructure development life cycle and then connects these measures to the relevant actors and stakeholders.
... stress varying aspects of corruption and favour different types of definition over others. Perhaps the most commonly cited definition is 'misuse (or abuse) of public office for private gain' (see e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1978). This definition is adopted by many empirically oriented economists and political scientists, as well as by anti-corruption organisations such as Transparency International and the World Bank. ...
Researchers have repeatedly found that corruption has a wide range of negative consequences, not least in developing countries where corruption typically constitutes an endemic part of people’s lives. However, much less is known about the prevalence and effects of corruption in mature democracies. While such states regularly find themselves at the top of anti-corruption rankings, they are not immune to corruption scandals related to, for instance, recruitment to public positions, procurement, the issuance of permits, etcetera.
Against this backdrop, some scholars have argued that the size of the corruption problem in mature democracies may be underestimated. One common and underlying argument is that corruption in these settings takes on hidden and ‘sophisticated’ forms that are difficult to expose, hard to prosecute, and therefore, difficult to measure. Accordingly, corruption in mature democracies has largely been downplayed or overlooked, and hence constitutes a blind spot for most practitioners and corruption scholars. That said, when scholars have paid attention to corruption in mature democracies, the tendency has been to focus on theoretical discussions rather than rigorous empirical research. As a result of measurement problems and data limitations, scholars have found it difficult to assess the extent of corruption in settings characterised by more sophisticated forms of corruption.
As a means of addressing this research gap, the overarching purpose of this thesis is to apply research strategies that allow us to quantify the prevalence and potential effects of corruption risks at the micro level in the context of a mature democracy – Sweden. This is achieved by employing large-scale administrative data combined with statistical methods that measure corruption risks at the granular level of individuals, firms, and processes. I maintain that the approaches employed in the thesis have at least two advantages vis-á-vis the lion’s share of existing corruption research: 1) it makes it possible to detect corruption risks in areas where the presence of corruption has previously been downplayed or unknown; and 2) it estimates corruption risks at the micro level, which allows for a more granular understanding of variations in corruption risks, between both municipalities and organisations.
Ultimately, the results of the thesis show the prevalence of corruption risks in the Swedish public sector in the areas of recruitment to public sector jobs, the rental housing market, and public procurement. Moreover, the thesis also shows that perceived corruption in Swedish municipalities is associated with lower levels of entrepreneurship. In line with a decent amount of previous research, the thesis’s main findings support the notion that subnational variations in institutional quality and impartiality are relevant even in mature democracies.
... While theories abound and while numerous case studies have examined the details of corruption in particular countries or regions, cross national comparative empirical research is much rarer. Especially the study of causes and consequences of corruption has a long history in economics, dating back at least to the seminal contributions to the rent-seeking literature by Bhagwati (1982), Krueger (1974), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Tullock (1967) and others. However, related empirical work has been rather limited, partly because the degree of efficiency of government institutions cannot easily be quantified. ...
In many countries, relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design. The topic of corruption was actively, openly and debated in Indonesia by government, its development partners, and a broadly based group of political and civil society leaders are engaged in meetings and exchange on a daily basis. In the ongoing debate on corruption a lot of attention is paid to the role of public sector salaries, particularly in the decentralization era. Based on this phenomenon, the authors want to analyze the relationship between corruption and decentralization. Using OSL model, we can find a very strong and consistent positive association between the two variables across a sample of region, thereby providing some support for theories of decentralization that emphasize its benefits. This association is robust to controlling for a wide range of potential sources of omitted variable bias as well as endogeneity bias. Keywords: Corruption, Decentralization, OSL Model Abstrak.Di banyak negara, hubungan antara desentralisasi pemerintah dan tingkat ekstraksi sewa oleh pihak swasta merupakan elemen penting dalam perdebatan baru pada desain institusional. Topik korupsi secara aktif, terbuka dan diperdebatkan di Indonesia oleh Pemerintah, mitra pembangunan, dan kelompok berbasis luas dari para pemimpin politik dan masyarakat sipil yang terlibat dalam pertemuan dan pertukaran setiap hari. Dalam perdebatan tentang korupsi banyak perhatian diarahkan untuk peran gaji sektor publik, terutama di era desentralisasi. Berdasarkan fenomena ini, penulis ingin menganalisis hubungan antara korupsi dan desentralisasi. Menggunakan OSL model, kita dapat menemukan hubungan positif yang sangat kuat dan konsisten antara dua variabel di seluruh sampel dari daerah, sehingga memberikan beberapa dukungan untuk teori desentralisasi yang menekankan manfaat. Asosiasi ini adalah kuat untuk mengendalikan berbagai kemungkinan potensial dari upaya menghilangkan sebagian variabel serta bias endogenitas. Kata Kunci: Korupsi, Desentralisasi, OSL Model REFERENCES,Ades, Alberto and Di Tella, Rafael, 1994, “Competition and corruption” Institute of Economics and Statistics Discussion Papers 169. University of Oxford.____, 1995, “National champions and corruption: some unpleasant competitiveness arithmetic”.University of Oxford. Photocopy.Barro, Robert, 1992, “Human capital and economic growth”. in policies for long run economic growth. 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... Fiscal decentralization triggers growth in the level of corruption in local governments because of the great potential to exploit the budget for the benefit of the apparatus (Alfada, 2019). The broad and monopolistic authority of the local government apparatus to offer bureaucratic services in government agencies is an open space for corruption (Klitgaard, 1998;Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Thus, bureaucratic corruption brings about spending in the regions is getting worse with exist broad powers through fiscal decentralization. ...
This study explores the network that raises the features of bureaucratic corruption in implementing fiscal decentralization. The analytical approach applies Actor Network Theory (ANT) to investigate a series of episodes of local bureaucratic corruption related to spending on public goods and services, the largest type of expenditure allocation in most local governments in Indonesia, which is packaged in the community sport program business in Bantul Regency. The analysis shows that corruption networks are increasingly spreading to the joints of the regency bureaucracy at the lowest level, obscuring the involvement of many actors through pressure on power and administrative sophistication within the framework of fiscal decentralization. This study develops a useful analysis to promote an anticorruption strategy by analysing the execution of public expenditures by Indonesian local governments within the framework of fiscal decentralization to address the expansion of corrupt behaviours of the actors involved. As such, this study provides relevant insights for policymakers and local and national institutions.
... In line with several authors who have studied the link that in Peru exists between corruption and human development (Bardhan, 1997;Rose-Ackerman, 1997), democratic quality and legitimacy (McMillan & Zoido, 2007;Seligson, 2002), social justice and human rights (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005;You & Khagram, 2005), Quiroz (2014) what stands out is that corruption is a structural problem. Therefore, it is analysed as a chronic problem, and, specifically, as one that the democratisation process initiated in 2000-2001 has not tackled. ...
This thesis focuses on the memory battles initiated after the publication of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission’s Informe Final in 2003 in the aftermath of the Peruvian
internal armed conflict (1980-2000). The central goal is to analyse the different forms of
violence these memory processes have unveiled: political, ethnic, social, and economic,
inflicted by Shining Path and the Peruvian State, especially during the Alberto Fujimori
government (1990-2000).
The Informe categorically states that the roots of the most extended and profound
cycle of violence in republican Peru can be found in racism, social discrimination, and
political centralism. This assessment is consistent with Aníbal Quijano’s earlier and
pioneering studies on “coloniality”, a theoretical line this thesis follows. Consequently, five
central processes are analysed. First, truthmaking strategies, their detractors and how the
State itself institutionally contests memory processes. Secondly, in line with the idea of truth,
the focus is placed on the mechanisms by which society and the State arrive at the definition
of victims and perpetrators, which opens the door to a new battle: access to justice and
reparation. Thirdly, close attention is given to the centrality of racism in marginalising or
denying certain identities and the legitimacy of their memories, therefore becoming
responsible for perpetuating structural forms of victimhood linked to la cuestión indígena.
Fourthly, a central place is given to how Fujimorismo implemented social and political
hegemony to construct a heroic narrative to cement a “Fujimorista legacy”. This is
instrumental to undergirding what this thesis describes as “Fujimorista totality”: a social,
political, and economic discourse built on market authoritarianism, which reproduces similar
anti-democratic practices that led to violence. Finally, the focus is on how the pre-eminence
of Fujimorismo, underpinned by its own memory narrative and by the normalisation of the
social form of control known in Peru as terruqueo, has been vehemently opposed by the civil
society on two fronts: claims about transparency and democratisation, and the emergence of
“cultural dissidences” that question the Fujimorista memory.
... There is no precise and common definition of corruption as it is considered a sophisticated worldwide phenomenon . A multitude of definitions have been advanced, but there remains an inability to offer an authoritative definition (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). To mention some commonly used definitions in the literature, the World Bank (WB) defined corruption as "the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development. ...
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the non‐linear relationship between corruption, imported innovation (imports of high technology), and economic growth in developing countries from 2009 to 2018. We used a sample of 38 countries divided into two sub‐samples. The first covers 21 African countries and the second covers 17 non‐African countries. Empirical results of the Panel Smooth Transition Regression model indicate that there is a threshold effect in the two relationships: corruption‐imported innovation and corruption‐growth. Precisely, we found that corruption exerts a significant effect only for non‐African countries. However, no significant effect was found for the whole sample and African countries. Furthermore, we found that below certain thresholds, corruption significantly decreases the level of growth for the whole sample and the two sub‐samples. Above these thresholds, the effect of corruption became positive and significant.
... Scholars have identified some theoretical platforms for the explanation of corruption in the public sector (Jancsics 2019). The first is the public choice theory, which considered corruption as a function of rational means-end calculation Rose-Ackerman 1978). Here, public officials ventured into exploring their official positions to exploit the state because they perceived that the private benefits derivable from illegal activities in government exceeded the perceived costs of the consequences. ...
... Scholars have identified some theoretical platforms for the explanation of corruption in the public sector (Jancsics 2019). The first is the public choice theory, which considered corruption as a function of rational means-end calculation Rose-Ackerman 1978). Here, public officials ventured into exploring their official positions to exploit the state because they perceived that the private benefits derivable from illegal activities in government exceeded the perceived costs of the consequences. ...
Public service delivery procurement and the economics of state-owned enterprises in Tanzania’, current reforms in the system are yielding positive results. Between the late 1960/70s, SOEs in Tanzania recorded positive results in terms of increased government revenues through profits and taxes. Apart from this, they boosted the provision of certain categories of basic services to the citizens. However, the economics of SOEs declined in the 1980s, and their capacity to deliver social services was on the lower side. From the 1990s to date, several reform initiatives have been implemented to improve SOEs’ economic performance and address corruption-related issues. It is therefore important to have concerted and multi-frontal efforts to deal with corruption-related issues and continue strengthening control measures, as well as increasing the avenues for citizen participation to enhance performance in service delivery.
... Corrupt practices arise due to weak public institutions and distorted economic policies, greed, and rent-seeking by public officials (Abed and Gupta 2002). Rose-Ackerman (1978), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), and Dabla-Norris (2002) adoption of the economic models of bureaucratic corruption to purchase loyalties of government agents is key in linking corrupt engagements between the IOCs and government agencies and politicians to piracy off the coast of Nigeria (Jain 2/2011). It is argued that when unchecked, corruption leads to misallocation of resources, pollution of the environment, economic stagnation, infrastructure underdevelopment, social and economic disparities, and, ultimately, political violence (Jain 2/2011). ...
Environmental pollution due to oil exploration leads to piracy. Hence, the International Oil Companies’ (IOCs) oil exploration activities contribute to Nigerian piracy. This paper uses theories, like economic theory, to analyze the linkages between the IOCs exploration activities and Nigerian piracy. It reveals that the IOCs’ oil exploration activities in the Nigerian oil industry contribute and sustain Nigerian piracy. Thus, from pollution to corruption, the theories, mostly determined by proxies, illuminate the IOCs’ penchant for disregarding due process in their activities, which leads to piracy. The paper suggests the adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) governance to encourage industry best practices, bolster accountability, and adopt Dahlsrud’s environmental dimension of CSR, similar to the environmental criminology theory that reiterates using the environment to curb crime, to eliminate Nigerian piracy.
... Bribery can be defined as a situation where "At least two actors are involved in this form of corruption: the receiver (public official) and the payer (in international business, a representative of a private organization)" (Getz and Volkema, 2001, p. 9). In such interactions, payments are provided by firms to public officials in return for preferential treatment in institutional processes or to gain access to valuable resources (Martin et al., 2007;Rose-Ackerman, 1997). ...
Purpose
By distinguishing between types of institutional constraints based on their susceptibility to bribery, this study aims to highlight the different mechanisms through which institutions influence bribery and export intensity. This work highlights the susceptibility of institutional constraints as a key consideration in understanding how bribery influences institutions and has implications for export intensity.
Design/methodology/approach
This study utilizes firm-level data from World Bank Enterprise Surveys using a fractional logit estimation method.
Findings
An analysis of firm-level data from 26 emerging economies shows support for a positive relationship between permit constraints and firm-level bribery payments. In addition, results provide partial support for a negative relationship between firm-level bribery payments and export intensity. Finally, this study finds partial support for the strengthening impact of financial constraints on the negative relationship between bribery payments and export intensity. However, contrary to our expectations, results indicate that tax rate constraints can weaken the relationship between bribery payments and exports.
Originality/value
This work contributes to international business literature by analyzing how home market institutions influence firms' export intensity. In addition, the study contributes to corruption research by highlighting the importance of heterogeneous susceptibility of formal institutional constraints to bribery. The focus on bribery responds to calls for work on firm misbehavior in international business.
... The lack of consensus as to whether party-system fragmentation is beneficial or detrimental for democracy extends to studies looking at more specific indicators of democratic quality. A vast literature has looked at whether the number of parties affects governmental stability (Taylor and Herman 1971;Somer-Topcu and Williams 2008;Warwick 1979;Grotz and Weber 2012;Hellström and Walther 2019;Best 2013), accountability (Powell and Whitten 1993;Whitten and Palmer 1999;Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci 2013), corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1978;Schleiter and Voznaya 2014;Chang and Golden 2007;Schleiter and Voznaya 2014), turnout (Boulding and Brown 2013;Couture, Breux and Bherer 2014;Franklin and Miño 1998;Geys and Heyndels 2006;Henderson and McEwen ner 1995;Lehoucq and Wall 2004;Radcliff and Davis 2000;Banducci and Karp 2009;Crepaz 1990), public goods provision (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004;Weitz-Shapiro 2012;Thachil and Teitelbaum 2015;Teitelbaum and Thachil 2010;Sáez and Sinha 2010), female representation (Norris and Inglehart 2001;Tremblay 2007;Lijphart 2012), and the representation of minorities (Lijphart 2012;Wilkinson 2006). Some authors argue that a higher number of parties will have a positive impact on the quality of democracy, while others argue the opposite. ...
Is the quality of democracy undermined or enhanced by party-system frag-mentation? Addressing this question would help us better assess norm-ative claims about electoral reforms. Yet, doing so is difficult because of endogeneity issues: party systems are endogenous to many other dynamics in a polity. We overcome this problem by putting forward an instrument for the number of parties in a system, based on the level of fragmentation added by parties that narrowly make it to parliament. We then test the effect of party-system fragmentation on the quality of democracy, drawing upon a large battery of outcomes. Running against previous literature, we find that a higher number of parties leads to more fractionalized governments , but has no impact on other democratic outcomes. Subsample analyses do suggest that fragmentation may have some effect in contexts of very high polarization, but we find no effect in other theoretically meaningful subsamples. Our results suggest that party-system fragmentation may have less normative implications than previously assumed.
... Most papers devoted to the modeling of corruption use Gary Becker's idea [1] that struggle with any crime is effective when the utility of prevention of the crime is greater than the respective costs. This economic approach was adapted to corruption by Susan Rose-Ackerman and other authors [2][3][4][5]. Good reviews are proposed in [6][7][8]. Most papers use static game theoretic models in normal form or multi-step games; some of them are based on dynamic control models with one or several agents [9]. ...
There is a great deal of literature devoted to mathematical models of corruption, including corruption in auctions. However, the relationship between the seller and the auctioneer is not studied sufficiently. The research aim is to analyze such relations in a game theoretic setup. We built a difference game theoretic model in normal form that describes possible collusion between an auctioneer and participants of an auction. The auctioneer acts on behalf of a seller. The seller can control possible collusions by administrative and economic mechanisms. The probability of detection depends on audit cost. We consider four cases of absence/presence of the collusion and those of the audit. The model is investigated numerically by simulation modeling using an original method of qualitatively representative scenarios. Several conclusions are made: factors of corruption are low probability of detection, small penalty, and big corruption gain of the auctioneer.
... But corruption tends to vitiate rules and basis of public and political conduct; consequently, social injustice is more likely to be associated with high incidence of corruption in the society (Mensah, 1986). This stems from the fact that corruption is an act of deviation from accepted standards of behavior in the society and it does not only impinge on efficiency and fairness in the society but undermines democracy and good governance (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). In Nigeria, corruption has not only been identified as the bane of development, but it is also the source of inequality in the distribution of wealth and administration of justice in the country (Musa, 2017). ...
Since the advent of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, hitherto long nurtured but suppressed feelings of neglect, marginalization, discrimination and domination by aggrieved communities, nationalities/sections of the society against the Nigerian state have burst in the open; and the political landscape has been inundated with separatist agitation movements, calls for resource control/true federalism and the restructuring of the polity. This has surreptitiously given vent to emergence of ethnic militia, escalation of youth restiveness, acts of kidnapping and hostage taking which have posed a threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria. This study is a modest contribution to the ongoing national discourse on governance and political instability in Nigeria. The study which is analytical adopts the rentier-state theory as its framework of analysis; it relies on secondary data sources and situates corruption at the epicenter of political instability in the country. The study argues that the clamour for restructuring of the Nigerian polity, separatist agitations and the crisis of governance in the country are a direct response to social injustice and the obstacles imposed on the nation’s development through acts of corruption. The study recommends among other things that corruption should attract severe penalty
... ruption and mismanagement among incumbents, and strengthens incumbents' incentives to monitor the bureaucracy to improve performance (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Montinola and Jackman 2002). In the logic of principal-agent theory, introducing elections should thus increase the likelihood that electoral victors will work to deliver public goods effi ciently, which requires mitigating corruption (Becker and Stigler 1974;Klitgaard 1988;Rose-Ackerman 1978). In short, democracy reduces both political monopoly and discre tion, both seen as conditions that allow the abuse of public office for private gain (Klit gaard 1988, 75). ...
Does democracy reduce corruption and improve quality of government? While the corrup tion-reducing effect of democracy may be seemingly self-evident in light of theoretical ex pectations, a wealth of empirical literature suggests that democracy is not always as ef fective as theories predict. Studies consistently demonstrate that newly democratized countries exhibit, on average, higher levels of corruption than more established democra cies but also than some autocracies. This chapter takes stock of recent advances in ef forts to understand how, whether, and when democracy contributes to weeding out cor rupt leaders and government corruption more generally. While research has made no table advances, we suggest that a closer examination of the underlying theory of change and assumptions upon which the beneficial effects of democracy rest can identify new ways forward. We point to a need for greater attention to how, for example, state capaci ty, transparency, and experiences with different forms of corruption influence civic and electoral engagement against corruption.
... The public choice theory that was made popular by Rose-Ackerman (1978), the theory opined corruption tends not to end so long as the benefit from corruption 6 africanscholarpublications@gmail.com 2022 out weights the consequences or punishment if caught. ...
The study is on the analysis of the effects of corruption and electricity access on economic growth in Nigeria covering 2002Q1 to 2018Q4 time series data. The unit root properties of the series were tested using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Philips Perron (PP) and Zivot-Andrews breakpoint unit root test. Chow test revealed presence of structural break in 2015 which was taken care of by the introduction of dummy variables and interaction terms. The results from Autoregressive Distributed lag (ARDL) and Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS) cointegrating regression revealed that control of corruption and access to electricity have positive and statistically significant long run effects on economic growth in Nigeria, but the short run ARDL results indicated that electricity access and corruption control harm economic growth in Nigeria over the study period, with slow speed of adjustment to long run equilibrium of 2.63% quarterly. This study concludes that corruption is sand in the wheels of Nigeria's economic prosperity and therefore recommends continued effort in control of corruption and increase in electricity supply for more economic growth among others.
... One of the most commonly used definitions of corruption is: "the misuse of public office for private gain" (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). A more recent definition -"abuse of entrusted power for private gain" is widely used by leading international anti-corruption institutions such as Transparency International 4 . ...
The overall objective of the study is to generate empirical data on the cost and extent of corruption in the Health Sector Uganda that can be used for dialogue with stakeholders to inform anti-corruption policy formulation, strategies, and programs in the sector. The baseline study shall provide a basis to understand and measure if an enhanced focus to curb corruption in the Health sector will have a positive impact over an extended period. The study will help to identify why citizens pay bribes to get services, but also why the health workers and staff in the Health sector asks for bribes.
... for private gain" (Rose-Ackerman, 1978) or the "abuse of entrusted power for private gain". Leading international anti-corruption institutions such as Transparency International 6 Corruption can occur at different levels. ...
The overall objective of the study is to generate empirical data on the cost and extent of corruption in the Education Sector Uganda that can be used for dialogue with stakeholders to inform anti-corruption policy formulation, strategies, and programs in the sector. The baseline study shall provide a basis to understand and measure if an enhanced focus to curb corruption in the Education sector will have a positive impact over an extended period. The study will help to identify why citizens pay bribes to get services, but also why the workers and staff in the Education sector asks for bribes. This report provides a detailed overview of the extent and costs of corruption in the education sector in Uganda. The study covers costs occurring due to various types of corruption in the sector, such as bribery, absenteeism, corruption in public procurement. Along with that, the study offers estimates of corruption costs for different groups of cost bearers – users of education services (families with children of school age), public budget, and society at large. The cost of corruption estimates are based on a variety of methods and data sources: a household survey and qualitative data gathered through in-depth interviews with experts and practitioners in the sector, as well government administrative data, secondary survey data, and the topical literature. Overall, our estimates should be considered as a lower bound estimate of the true cost of corruption given that some costs are in-kind while others are non-measurable due to lack of data.
... Indonesia initiated E-Procurement based (Svensson, 2005). Moreover, Klitgaard (1988) and Rose-Ackerman (1978) interpret corruption in public sector as a specific manifestation of the universal principal-agent problem where citizens are the principals, and public/government officers are the agents with discretion to carry out and/or authorize: government spending, licenses, taxes, quotas, and so on. ...
The huge spending on public procurement makes public procurement is very vulnerable to corruption. Many governments around the world have adopted Electronic Procurement (E-Procurement) to increase transparency, improve accountability, and reduce corruption with variable success. Government of Indonesia adopted E-Procurement in 2008, while Government of India introduced E-Procurement in 2012. Even though E-Procurement has been implemented for quite a long time in those two emerging countries, only limited research exist on the impact of E-Procurement in reducing procurement corruption. By using the combination between quantitative and qualitative methods, this study attempts to assess the extent to which the impact of E-Procurement implementation on procurement corruption cases in Indonesia and India. The findings suggest that Indonesian provinces with high capital expenditure ratio, are more vulnerable to corruption and implementation of E-Procurement was impactful on reducing the number of procurement corruption cases in such provinces. Meanwhile in India, the effect of E-Procurement was not impactful enough to reduce a notably large number of procurement corruption at the state governments because E-Procurement implementation at the state level in some degree was bothered by low competency and professionalization staff and also high political interference in state administrations. The study contributes to limited empirical research on the effect of E-Procurement on corruption.
... El Banco Mundial define la corrupción como el abuso del poder público para beneficio privado. Otros autores también definen la corrupción como una transacción entre actores del sector público y privado mediante el cual los bienes colectivos se convierten ilegalmente en bienes privados (Heidenheimer et al., 1989;Rose-Ackerman, 1978). ...
Este estudio analiza la relación entre corrupción ycrecimiento económico en una muestra de 19 países de AméricaLatina durante el periodo 1998-2018 mediante un análisis dedatos de panel. Se estiman los efectos directos e indirectos dela corrupción en la tasa de crecimiento del PIB. Después decontrolar por una serie de factores económicos y sociopolíticos,los resultados confirman la relación negativa entre corrupción y crecimiento económico.
This paper is designed to investigate the effect of corruption as a representative of institutional factors on environmental quality for a panel of Commonwealth of Independent States. Data is mostly from World Development Indicators of World Bank covering the period from 2003 to 2013. Corruption data is from World Governance Indicators of World Bank. Panel two-stage least squares considering the endogeneity problem between corruption and economic growth and panel generalized least squares analysis were conducted to estimate the direct and indirect effects of corruption on CO2. The result shows that corruption has been shown to increase CO2 directly while decreasing it indirectly by obstructing economic growth. The total effect of corruption on environmental quality for a panel of Commonwealth of Independent States is estimated to be negative. It confirms the severity of the corruption problem and the necessity for considerable efforts to overcome it for transitional economies to prepare for the low-carbon economy. Also, evidence of the N-shaped Environmental Kuznets Curve is confirmed, showing the possibility of re-degradation after reducing the CO2 level.
The narrative of Jesus’ resurrection in Matthew 28:11-15 implies an incident of bribery and corruption and its effects on injustice, misinformation, and suffering in society. Literature abounds on bribery and corruption based on Matthew 28:11-15. Studies have also been done on bribery and corruption in Africa. However, few studies comparatively have emphasized the bribery and corruption mentioned in Matthew 28:11-15 and its relations to the church in Africa. Therefore, a review of the implication of bribery and corruption in Matthew 28:11-15 for African religious leaders is in order. The church in Africa may take some precautions from the implications of the narrative. The following implications can be drawn from the analysis of the bribery and corruption narrative of Matthew 28:11-15:(1)working for God does not exclude a person from evil. (2) the dare influence of bribery and corruption can destroy lots of good in society. The study adopted the textual-syntactical approach to biblical interpretation. The main objective of the study was to determine how a textual study of Matthew 28:11-15 can serve as a warning to religious leaders in Africa. To ensure that the church champions the fight against bribery and corruption in Africa, the study recommended that: (1) the church should demand accountability from its leadership as an example to the broader society;(2) the church exposes and fires corrupt leaders, and (3) church leaders should lead bribery and corruption-free life as examples to members and the wider society. This research will be of benefit to the clergy and other church leaders who would perceive the dire consequences of bribery and corruption in the church, especially as it relates to the African context. Second, it has also added to the existing literature on the interpretation of Matthew 28:11-15 as it relates to bribery and corruption in the Bible. Keywords: Bribery, Corruption, Africa, the Church, Jesus Christ.
This chapter by Shah examines the grand corruption observed in oil and gas industries and discusses its root causes conceptually and empirically based upon special features of the oil and gas industry. Given the enormous complexity of the underlying transactions, uncovering corruption is an enormously difficult even in the most ideal public policy environment. To assist in this effort, creating an enabling environment for people’s right-to-know and freedom for investigative journalism to pursue all leads without fear of harassment, persecution, and risks to life and liberty should be the first order of priority for policymakers. A second order of priority is to establish an authorizing environment that holds powerful individuals and entities to account for corrupt practices through timely and fair dispensation of justice. International advocacy groups concerned with corruption in the oil and gas sector would be well advised to focus their activities on both the open government issues in resource rich countries as well as creating disincentives for stakeholders in bribe-paying countries to disengage them from corrupt practices to advance their economic and political agendas.
Data from surveys of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam from 2005 to 2015 were used in this paper to examine the effects of bribery on survival probability for firms that face market competition, credit constraints, and institutional limitations. Our baseline function was derived from three distributional assumptions: the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model (Cox), and two parametric specifications: Weibull and exponential. Two forms of bribery are investigated, including greasing and rent-seeking bribes. There were two categories of credit constraints we examined: those who have been denied formal loans (credit rationed) and individuals who have refrained from applying for formal loans because the application process is difficult or the interest rates are too high (discouraged borrowers). We use self-evaluations of firms to examine their responses to the uncertainty of government policy and the competitive environment. The results provided empirical support for the "greasing-the-wheels" theory of firm survival. Further, these effects were more pronounced for large firms, but they were only apparent for those that were formally registered, since they had greater bargaining power with public officials. The importance of bribery in reducing the risk to exit was only evident for firms facing no credit and institutional constraints and having low level of market competition.
Reading the newspapers and listening to the media news channels for the last decade, one makes the observation that cheating has increased, or at least accusations of such behaviour. This is commonly called “corruption”, but there are several kinds of cheating to be distinguished and analysed apart. Two approaches to cheating are conceivable. First, the micro approach attempts to account for why individual persons cheat – the reason and their calculation of benefits and costs. Here, we can now draw upon new results in game theory. Second, in the macro approach one tries to explain or understand why cheating seems to augment over the entire society, in both the public and private sectors. This paper looks at one form of cheating more closely, namely corruption, as well as suggests a few hypotheses about the increase in so-called “affairs” in several capitalist economies.
This article analyzes the relationship between Government size and corruption. Unlike the works in the way which suppose a linear relationship between the two variables, we estimate a panel with change of the modes to characterize the impact of the size of the Central Government on corruption, in the countries of the economic community and monetary of Central Africa (EMCCA). The results show that there is a non-linear relationship between these two variables. Indeed, a strong involvement of the Government in economic activity results in a significant increase in corruption when the Government exceeds a size of 13.5508% of the GDP.
Introduction/Main Objectives: This article investigates the efforts to control corruption in the capital expenditures by local law enforcement officialls (APH, Aparat Penegak Hukum), namely the police and the prosecutor officials at regencies and cities in Indonesia. Background Problems: The efforts to improve Indonesia's handling of corruption have yet to meet reform expectations and therefore have attracted the interest of scholars, but few prior studies have investigated the role of law enforcement officials in local government spending. Novelty: So far, it is unknown on depth the challenges faced by APH in districts/cities to control corruption in the use of regency/cities capital expenditures. Thus, this study attempts to fill the gap by concentrating on local capital expenditures. Research Methods: By adopting an instrumental case study strategy with an actor network theory (ANT) approach, this article investigates the implementation of local capital expenditures in Bantul Regency, Sleman Regency, and Yogyakarta City. Finding/Results: An analysis of document sources and the results of in-depth interviews, they depict that local APH experience limited access to corrupt activities in the use of capital expenditure. This is due to the presence of executive’s network complexity, in which the capacity of corrupt activities through orderly financial administration and abuse of power allows corruption to proliferate in the governance and the use of capital expenditures. Conclusion: The Paper develops an analysis that is useful to enhance the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies implemented by APH related to the execution of local capital expenditures. The paper also offers an insight for local and national policymakers to improve the role of APH dealing with the eradication of corruption in local governments.
This paper considers the genealogy of the “revisionist” approaches to corruption. The core of the approaches is the idea that practices deviating from formal rules or “accepted norms” with the objective of serving private ends may have a positive aggregate-level impact. No less important, the approaches are skeptic about anti-corruption attempts. In interrogating the revisionist approaches, the paper demonstrates that corruption studies have ignored important ideas, causing it to remain intertwined with moralism, despite proclamations otherwise. The paper thus argues that incorporating revisionist ideas might ease the discontent in corruption studies and improve public integrity.
Greater availability of firm‐level surveys in developing countries has enabled researchers to consider the effects of corruption at the firm level. One often overlooked issue with these surveys is nonresponse by firms. We examine the impact of corruption on firm investment and demonstrate that failing to account for nonresponse leads to an overestimation of the impact of corruption.
Aborda a judicialização de questões que envolvem políticas públicas, conflitos políticos e valores morais e políticos fundamentais, como um dos fenômenos mais significativos das democracias que atravessaram o século XX em direção ao século XXI. Sob o viés dos estudos da ciência política, os autores apresentam uma variedade de perspectivas sociojurídicas e empíricas sobre temas cruciais. São objetos de análise o papel dos tribunais e a ampla gama de instituições que fazem parte do sistema de justiça, como promotores e defensores públicos, além de outros atores, dispositivos e movimentos que atuam nesse contexto em que se articulam as decisões legais. A leitura instiga uma reflexão sobre o papel da justiça e das instituições judiciárias na América Latina, perante os desafios econômicos, sociais e políticos ou diante de contextos nocivos a direitos e práticas democráticas.
If economic elites are notorious for circumventing tax obligations, how can institutionally weak governments get the wealthy to shoulder a greater tax burden? This book studies the factors behind the adoption of elite taxes for public safety purposes. Contrary to prominent explanations in the literature on the fiscal strengthening of the state – including the role of resource dependence and inequality – the book advances a theory of elite taxation that focuses on public safety crises as windows of opportunity and highlights the importance of business-government linkages to overcome mistrust toward government from corruption and lack of accountability. Based on evidence from across Latin America and rich case studies from experiences in Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico, the book provides scholars and policymakers with a blueprint for contemporary state-building efforts in the developing world.
In recent years, there has been an exponential increase in the amount of foreign investment by emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs). While it has been debated whether EMNEs strengthen or weaken the institutions in host countries they invest in, the literature has paid limited attention to how EMNE investment impacts corruption in other emerging markets, one of the most significant destinations of EMNEs. Following Hoskisson et al. (2013), we categorize two types of emerging markets as targets of EMNE investment, a) low-income emerging markets and b) middle-income emerging markets, based on their institutional and market development. Building on the theory of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) and the institutional advantage (IA) of EMNEs, we reason that EMNEs enter foreign markets in accordance to where their skills and competencies can be effectively utilized, and this impacts corruption in the host country. We make two key arguments: (1) EMNEs predominantly use their IA in low-income emerging markets, which in the long term increases corruption in the host market, and (2) EMNEs predominantly use their FSAs to gain competitive advantage in middle-income emerging markets, which decreases corruption in the host market. Empirical analysis of Chinese outward FDI from the 2008-2018 period supports our hypotheses. Our research contributes to both the literature on EMNEs and corruption.
Although corruption has attracted researchers’ attention for more than
30 years, it remains one of the most significant political challenges all countries face. Even though corruption measures have improved, they lack reliability and clarity. Two aspects of corruption are examined in this paper: a) its measurement and b) its effects on the economic performance of 83 developing countries in the period 2012–2018 with AR (1) and FM-OLS data processing techniques. It provides an extensive reference for and critical assessment of different corruption index approaches, focusing on the already known and widespread indicators. Furthermore, it refers to the measures most suited for statistical analyses regarding perceptions and experiences. In addition, the study’s empirical results show that corruption hinders the economic growth of those developing countries. Different levels of corruption impact economic growth in different regions; specifically in Latin American countries, corruption impacts positively on economic growth or vice versa; in the other regions, it is negative. Finally, investment, human development, government growth, and institutional quality play essential roles in economic growth.
While some studies argue that a low level of corruption in the public sector is positively associated with a high level of firm performance, few studies investigate the impact of corruption on public organizations’ performance. Does corruption decrease performance in government agencies? Using the integrity assessment dataset and the government performance evaluation dataset, this study investigates 42 central public organizations in South Korea from 2014 to 2018. This study employs a probit model, a random-effects model, and time-lagged regression to capture the impacts of corruption. The findings show that a low level of corruption within public organizations is positively associated with a high-performance level under certain conditions. This outcome shows that fighting corruption might contribute to improved organizational performance in public organizations.
In this second chapter of the two-chapter review on corruption research, we start with a discussion of the consequences of corruption. We follow up with the fundamental causes of corruption that are identified in the literature, which also serves to anchor the subsequent section that examines the recent advances on the policy levers designed to fight corruption using experimental methods. We end with some thoughts on avenues for future research. JEL codes: C91, C92, D03
Corruption, militarism, and conflict are bedfellows, and their coexistence feeds a vicious circle of violence and instability. Every dollar spent on the military is a dollar not spent on welfare-generating services such as education and healthcare. Yet, military spending makes up a bulk of government spending in several countries, and it is often shrouded from public purview. Rent-seeking behavior fostered within corrupt practices incentivize public officials to accept bribes from military suppliers, while the secrecy surrounding defense procurements allows them to act with perceived impunity. In this paper, I conduct a quantitative study using panel data from 175 countries from 2000 to 2020 to argue that corruption causes a distortion in public expenditure distribution by diverting valuable resources from social spending to military spending. Highly corrupt countries tend to spend a higher percentage of their GDP on the military, freeing up less of the finite resources for investment in education and healthcare. I find that corruption drives up military spending causing a crowding out of social spending.
This research lays out the debates and contradictory findings regarding the impacts of corruption on forest loss in a cross‐national context, specifically in low‐ and middle‐income nations. After, I describe how these inconsistent findings may be due to difficulties in untangling the complexities of corruption definitionally and then operationalizing it in a cross‐national context. Then, I review the advances in corruption data collection and measurement. Finally, I discuss how these developments in data collection and operationalization have led to an expansion of research on corruption to other aspects of governance, bringing forward several avenues for future research, but also potentially conflating definitions of corruption with governance. Overall, I aim to capture how scholars are studying corruption and forest loss from a cross‐national context and what their findings tell us.
El presente trabajo tiene como finalidad observar la incidencia de la actividad turística en la desigualdad a través de las instituciones participativas y de transparencia, que permiten el acceso a rentas de dicha actividad. Se toma para el análisis diez (10) países de Latinoamérica durante el período de 2002-2019 y se utilizan modelos de datos de panel dinámicos con efectos fijos que corrigen por heterocedasticidad y por sesgo de Nickell, con el fin de observar la dinámica de corto y largo plazo en las variables de interés. Los resultados muestran consistencia con la literatura sobre los efectos mixtos de la actividad turística y la desigualdad en Latinoamérica. Asimismo, añade nueva evidencia sobre dos canales de transmisión por los que la actividad turística impacta en la desigualdad: 1) mediante instituciones participativas que no involucran a grupos vulnerables en la dinámica productiva del sector turismo en el corto plazo y que no generan un efecto redistributivo a largo plazo; y 2) a través de mecanismos de transparencia que no permiten un adecuado control de la corrupción en el sector turismo, tanto a corto como a largo plazo. Esto plantea serios retos en materia de reformas y cambios estructurales necesarios en lo que refiere a mecanismos de participación y de transparencia, para que las decisiones de política pública, especialmente en el sector turismo, estén más a favor del votante medio y de grupos vulnerables.
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