No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
PROCESSING OF THE STIMULUS IN IMAGERY AND PERCEPTION
Abstract
This chapter explains the processing of the stimulus in imagery and perception. Perception is defined as an experience that occurs in response to a physical stimulus; however, an image or hallucination is defined as a qualitatively similar subjective experience that occurs when there is no physical stimulus. There is sharpness in the perception of edges and boundary changes, which gives the qualities of clarity and focus to perception. Attempts to compare imagery to perception have focused on the extreme situations. If an image is the same as a perception, then it should show the after effects. Many psychologists assumed that if an image was a weaker replica of a perception, it should have been possible to reinstate a total perceptual experience through imagery. Researchers have believed that hypnotized subjects could be induced to perform astounding feats. Attempts to induce an illusion by asking the subjects to image the inducing background around a real test figure, or vice versa, are sometimes successful.
... As Segal (1971) pointed out, imagery became a popular topic largely as a result of introspection. Due to the inherent difficulties of the introspective techniques, however, psychologists began to turn their interest to such methods as Watson's behaviorism and Bridgman's operationism. ...
... Moreover, he pointed out that within the fields of engineering psychology and cognitive psychology researchers began more serious investigations of imagery. Although renewed attention has been given to mental imagery since the early 1950's, it has only been in the last four or five years, according to Segal (1971)} that experimental psychologists have begun a systematic study of mental imagery. Current research has concentrated on such areas as defining mental imagery (Bugelski, I97I; Richardson, 1969)9 viewing imagery from a physiological perspective (Hebb, 1968), and the relationship of imagery to perception (Brooks, 1967;Haber, 1971;Segal, 1971;Sheehan, I966, 1967c), imagery to recall (Bower, 1970; Bugelski, Kidd, & Segman, I968; ...
... Although renewed attention has been given to mental imagery since the early 1950's, it has only been in the last four or five years, according to Segal (1971)} that experimental psychologists have begun a systematic study of mental imagery. Current research has concentrated on such areas as defining mental imagery (Bugelski, I97I; Richardson, 1969)9 viewing imagery from a physiological perspective (Hebb, 1968), and the relationship of imagery to perception (Brooks, 1967;Haber, 1971;Segal, 1971;Sheehan, I966, 1967c), imagery to recall (Bower, 1970; Bugelski, Kidd, & Segman, I968; ...
... Second, is the effect of imagery on perceptual processing at this level of representation best described by a criterion change, a sensitivity change, or both? Third, is this effect of imagery equivalent to the effect of faintly perceiving the imagined stimulus, as some authors (e.g., Finke, 1980;Kosslyn, 1983;Segal, 1971) have suggested? Fourth, is it, rather, equivalent to selectively attending to the imagined stimulus, as others (e.g., Neisser, 1976;Ryle, 1949) have suggested? ...
... One of the oldest ideas about the nature of mental imagery is that mental images are equivalent to weak, internally generated percepts (Hume, 1739(Hume, /1969. Several modern psychologists have also proposed that having a mental image is akin to perceiving a faint stimulus (e.g., Finke, 1980;Kosslyn, 1983;Segal, 1971). This suggests that the effect of projecting an image onto the visual field might be the same as perceiving the equivalent stimulus projected faintly in its place. ...
A number of different research findings have shown that mental imagery can affect the perceptual processing of stimuli. The present research was aimed at characterizing the representations and processes underlying imagery–perception interactions. In four experiments, subjects mentally projected images of letters into the visual field, and either detected or detected and localized point threshold stimuli that fell on or off the image. Stimuli falling on the image were detected more often than stimuli falling off the image, consistent with the hypothesis that the representations at the interface between imagery and perception have an array format. When the facilitation was analyzed in terms of signal detection theory, it was found to consist only of criterion lowering, and not of enhanced sensitivity. The local criterion-lowering effect of imaged letters was then compared with the effect of perceiving a letter and attending to a letter. Perceiving a letter had no discernible effect on stimulus detection, whereas attending to the letter caused the same local criterion lowering, without sensitivity changes, as imaging the letter. This is consistent with the claims of Neisser (1976) and others that imagery is an attentional state.
... The findings suggest that attention to or imagination of a stimulus in a particular modality is associated with specific activation in the cortical region specialized to process information from that modality. The results are consistent with literature on cognitive approaches to imagery (e.g., Neisser, 1967;Segal, 1971) in which it has been suggested that the mechanisms of perception and of imagery share the same basic underlying structure. These findings also have clinical relevance insofar as they suggest that since both overt and covert stimuli in specific modalities are processed in different cortical regions, the attenuation of anxiety occurring predominantly in one mode versus another might be most efficaciously accomplished by modespecific training programs rather than by more globally oriented therapeutic interventions. ...
... These predictions are based upon well-known psychobiological specificity and suggest that the generation of behavior in a particular mode or system will inhibit or attenuate other ongoing behavior in that particular system or mode more than in others. (For some examples of this principle, see Hicks, 1975;Kinsbourne & Cook, 1971;Segal, 1971;Segal & Fusella, 1970.) Table 1 presents a 2 X 2 matrix with the following four combinations of anxiety represented by each cell: (a) low-cognitive-low-somatic, (b) lowcognitive-high-somatic, (c) high-cognitive-lowsomatic, and (d) high-cognitive-high-somatic. ...
Illustrates parallels between global descriptions of internal states in clinical and personality psychology and notions of global arousal in autonomic and central psychophysiology. Such assumptions about the undifferentiated nature of internal states are questioned on the basis of recent psychophysiological research. Data are reviewed on cortical specificity and its implications for conceptualizing clinically relevant cognitive and affective processes. Principles of psychophysiological specificity are applied to the understanding and self-regulation of anxiety. General implications of this approach for the rationally based construction of therapeutic interventions are discussed. (41 ref)
... Perky's experiments are called into question in later replications of her experiments (Segal, 1971(Segal, , 1972. Segal, finally, concludes that the Perky effect does not show that mental images and faint percepts are inherently indistinguishable. ...
... Segal, finally, concludes that the Perky effect does not show that mental images and faint percepts are inherently indistinguishable. Rather, as Neigel (2014) puts it, 'the confusion between image and percept seems to occur because the processes involved in forming a mental image of the requested type interfere with the normal utilization of the mechanisms of perception, and raise perceptual detection thresholds' (Segal, 1971;Segal and Fusella, 1970). In recent psychological research, 'the Perky effect' has been redefined from its original meaning of confusing images with percepts. ...
The method of phenomenal contrast (in perception) invokes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as a means to discover its contents. The method implicitly takes for granted that ‘what it is like’ to have a perceptual experience e is the same as ‘what it is like’ to imagine or recall it; accordingly, in its various proposed implementations, the method treats imaginations and/or recollections as interchangeable with real experiences. The method thus always contrasts a pair of experiences, at least one of which is imagined or remembered rather than occurrent. Surveying all eighteen forms of implementing the method, I argue that in all of the proposed pairings, the substitution of imagination or recollection for perceptual experience in the method, is either inconceivable or impermissible. I identify four reasons why I think imagination cannot be substituted for real experience, and three reasons why recollection cannot be substituted for real experience. If my argument works, there is no form of implementing the method that is useful for discovering the contents of experience, and thus the method is not a well-functioning tool to study the contents of perception.
... A standard interpretation of what is going on is that subjects mistook their perceptual experience for visual imagery (Thomas 2008). Another interpretation is that subjects did not consciously perceive the image shone onto the wall because their carrying out the imagery task resulted in the image being below conscious visible threshold for the subject (Segal 1971and Segal and Fusella 1971, as reported in Thomas 2008. That is a plausible thought because some instances of high cognitive load are known to affect which stimuli reach consciousness. ...
... For example, when only the outline shape of a book was projected onto the screen, a subject reported imagining a book with writing on it; when only the outline shape of a leaf was projected, a subject reported imagining a leaf with veins on it. And in a twist on the experiment (Segal 1971and Segal and Fusella 1971, cited in Thomas 2008, an object unrelated to the object that the subject was instructed to visually imagine was projected onto the wall. A tomato was projected onto the wall while subjects were instructed to imagine the New York Skyline. ...
This chapter seeks to establish whether the cognitive penetration of experience is compatible with experience having nonconceptual content. Cognitive penetration occurs when one’s beliefs or desires affect one’s perceptual experience in a particular way. This chapter examines two different models of cognitive penetration and four different accounts of the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content. It argues that one model of cognitive penetration—‘classic’ cognitive penetration—is compatible with only one of the accounts of nonconceptual content that It identifys. The chapter then considers the other model of cognitive penetration—cognitive penetration ‘lite’. It provides reasons to think that this is compatible with three accounts of nonconceptual content. Moreover, it argues that the account of nonconceptual content that it is not compatible with is a spurious notion of nonconceptual content that ought to be abandoned. Thus, it claims that cognitive penetration lite is compatible with all reasonable specifications of nonconceptual content.
... Given such results, one might well wonder whether merely imagining a taste, or flavour object (Hollingworth & Poffenberger, 1917;Chapter 11;Olivetti Belardinelli et al., 2009), could also lead to the oral referral of olfactory stimuli, no matter whether they happen to be presented orthonasally or retronasally. More generally, though, it should be noted that it is also not always so easy to distinguish the effects of attention on perception from those of mental imagery (see Segal, 1971Segal, , 1972Segal & Fusella, 1970, 1971. ...
... Given such results, one might well wonder whether merely imagining a taste, or flavour object (Hollingworth & Poffenberger, 1917;Chapter 11;Olivetti Belardinelli et al., 2009), could also lead to the oral referral of olfactory stimuli, no matter whether they happen to be presented orthonasally or retronasally. More generally, though, it should be noted that it is also not always so easy to distinguish the effects of attention on perception from those of mental imagery (see Segal, 1971Segal, , 1972Segal & Fusella, 1970, 1971. ...
Oral referral is central to multisensory flavour perception. The phenomenon, first described a little over a century ago, is characterized by the mislocalization of food-related olfactory stimuli to the oral cavity. Many researchers believe that it contributes to the widespread confusion concerning which sense really provides the information that is bound together in flavour percepts. In this review, evidence supporting the role of a number of factors that have been suggested to modulate oral referral, including tactile capture of olfaction, the relative timing of olfactory and gustatory stimuli, and gustatory capture (possibly involving prior entry) is critically evaluated. The latest findings now support the view that the oral referral of orthonasal aroma (what some have chosen to call orthonasal location binding) is modulated by taste intensity, while for retronasal odours, it is the congruency between the odour-taste(s) pairing that is key. Specifically, the more congruent a particular combination of olfactory and gustatory stimuli, the more likely the component unisensory stimuli will be bound together as a flavour object (or Gestalt) and, as a result, localized together to the oral cavity. The possible roles of attention, attentional capture, and the nutritional significance of the taste in the phenomenon of oral referral are also reviewed. Ultimately, the suggestion is made that oral referral may reflect a qualitatively different kind of multisensory interaction.
... 130-131). Segal (1971) proposed that various factors lead to the ability to distinguish an image from a percept, including qualities of the sensory input, the context of the experience, and the presence of input from several sensory modalities. As will be seen, theory of reality monitoring incorporates these ideas. ...
... Regarding the ability to distinguish an image from a percept, Segal (1971) wrote. ...
... Insofar as there is room for disagreement, it appears terminological in origin. Byrne and other philosophers use 'the Perky effect' to refer to the mistaking of percepts for mental images, while psychologists (Craver-Lemley & Reeves, 1992;Segal, 1971) generally use 'the Perky effect' to refer to the interference of visual imagery with concurrent visual perception tasks (such as when active image formation causes subjects not to So, neither the Perky Effect nor the phenomenological and neurological similarities between imagination and perception weigh in favor of the as present view. Given that it also conflicts with any non-trivial account of the contents and correctness conditions of imaginings, it should be rejected. ...
... However there have been few if any duplications of the "Perky effect" as philosophers understand it. The closest are described by Segal (1971), who notes that she was forced to give subjects a placebo, which they were told would cause them to "relax", before some would claim that projected images were their own mental images. state that (i) is veridical only if p, and that (ii) moves you to believe that p, to find p conceivable [i.e. ...
The point of this paper is to reveal a dogma in the ordinary conception of sensory imagination, and to suggest another way forward. The dogma springs from two main sources: a too close comparison of mental imagery to perceptual experience, and a too strong division between mental imagery and the traditional propositional attitudes (such as belief and desire). The result is an unworkable conception of the correctness conditions of sensory imaginings—one lacking any link between the conditions under which an imagining aids human action and inference and the conditions under which it is veridical. The proposed solution is, first, to posit a variety of imaginative attitudes—akin to the traditional propositional attitudes—which have different associated correctness (or satisfaction) conditions. The second part of the solution is to allow for imaginings with “hybrid” contents, in the sense that both mental images and representations with language-like constituent structure contribute to the content of imaginings.
... The goal of the present research was to bring a new source of evidence to the question of whether imagery involves modality-specific visual representations of stimuli. Our research strategy is based on a paradigm pioneered by Perky (1910) and reintroduced into cognitive psychology by Segal (1971), in which the relationship between imagery and perception can be inferred by observing the ways in which concurrent imagination and perception affect each other. Imagery has been found to exert a systematic effect on perception in tasks in which a subject images while detecting faint signals. ...
Does mental imagery involve the activation of representations in the visual system? Systematic effects of imagery on visual signal detection performance have been used to argue that imagery and the perceptual processing of stimuli interact at some common locus of activity (Farah, 1985). However, such a result is neutral with respect to the question of whether the interaction occurs during modality-specific visual processing of the stimulus. If imagery affects stimulus processing at early, modality-specific stages of stimulus representation, this implies that the shared stimulus representations are visual, whereas if imagery affects stimulus processing only at later, amodal stages of stimulus representation, this implies that imagery involves more abstract, postvisual stimulus representations. To distinguish between these two possibilities, we repeated the earlier imagery—perception interaction experiment while recording event-related potentials (ERPs) to stimuli from 16 scalp electrodes. By observing the time course and scalp distribution of the effect of imagery on the ERP to stimuli, we can put constraints on the locus of the shared representations for imagery and perception. An effect of imagery was seen within 200 ms following stimulus presentation, at the latency of the first negative component of the visual ERP, localized at the occipital and posterior temporal regions of the scalp, that is, directly over visual cortex. This finding provides support for the claim that mental images interact with percepts in the visual system proper and hence that mental images are themselves visual representations.
... different from the imaged target and projected either on the same or the alternate visual field. The procedure is a lateralized version of the Perky (1910) procedure introduced at Cornell in 1910 and subsequently developed by Segal (1971). A reactiontime saving occurred when the imaged and projected symbols were the same, but only when the conjunction occurred in the LH. ...
This article describes and evaluates neurocognitive models that attempt to account for the contribution of the right (RH) and left (LH) cerebral hemispheres to the production of dreaming and other classes of sleep mentation. The review finds no support for early proposals that the RH is the primary location for dream production. A dream is much more than a sequence of visual images. A comprehensive neurocognitive model of sleep mentation assumes that the different qualities of sleep mentation are produced, or at least better articulated, in different cortical structures. Research from waking and sleep states suggests that most of these structures are located in the LH rather than the RH. Further research is needed to determine whether the RH generates any spatial information or visual imagery features that are independent of those produced by the LH.
... There is, in fact, a much older literature on the Perky effect (Perky, 1910), demonstrating the interaction of voluntary vivid visual mental imagery and faintly-presented visual stimuli. While Cheves West Perky's research illustrated how a very faint visual perceptual stimulus could be 'incorporated' into a participant's visual mental imagery, Segal and colleagues subsequently switched the focus to demonstrate that voluntary mental imagery (close, in fact, to the notion of voluntary attention) could also enhance a participant's perception within the same sensory modality (Segal, 1971(Segal, , 1972Fusella, 1970, 1971;Segal and Nathan, 1964). Recently, it has been reported that voluntary visual mental imagery can add stimulus-specific sensory evidence to perceptual detection (Dijkstra et al., 2022). ...
A number of perplexing phenomena in the area of olfactory/flavour perception may fruitfully be explained by the suggestion that chemosensory mental imagery can be triggered automatically by perceptual inputs. In particular, the disconnect between the seemingly limited ability of participants in chemosensory psychophysics studies to distinguish more than two or three odorants in mixtures and the rich and detailed flavour descriptions that are sometimes reported by wine experts; the absence of awareness of chemosensory loss in many elderly individuals; and the insensitivity of the odour-induced taste enhancement (OITE) effect to the mode of presentation of olfactory stimuli (i.e., orthonasal or retronasal). The suggestion made here is that the theory of predictive coding, developed first in the visual modality, be extended to chemosensation. This may provide a fruitful way of thinking about the interaction between mental imagery and perception in the experience of aromas and flavours. Accepting such a suggestion also raises some important questions concerning the ecological validity/meaning of much of the chemosensory psychophysics literature that has been published to date.
... The definition and indicators of the research instrument can be seen in Table 1. Perception is defined as an experience that occurs in response to a physical stimulus (Segal, 1971) (1) Absorption of stimuli from outside the individual on Green Space (2) Understanding of Green Space (3) Assessment or evaluation of Green Space (Walgito, 2010) 2. ...
Green space becomes the central awareness of higher educational institutions since it is expected to create a better atmosphere to study. This study aimed to examine the effects of students' perception of green space on their Academic Performance and pro-environmental behavior. It was a quantitative study; they were 705 students in the population, and 256 students were taken as the samples. The data were collected by distributing the questionnaires. After the questionnaire was tested for its validity and reliability, they were analyzed with SPSS version 21. The results showed that students' perception of Greenspace (X) had a positive but not significant effect on student Academic Performance (Y1). It can be seen from the X coefficient was 0.054, and the sig value count was 0.594. It means that students' perception of green space did not significantly influence their achievement. Furthermore, the Perception of Greenspace (X) positively and significantly affects pro-environmental behavior (Y2). It can be seen from the X coefficient was 2.746 with the sig value count was 0.000. It can be concluded that: 1) Perception of Greenspace (X) has a positive but not significant effect on student Academic Performance (Y1); 2) Perception of Greenspace (X) has a positive and significant effect on pro-environmental behavior (Y2). Therefore, it is recommended that educational institutions be concerned with green space and pay attention to other factors.
... In particular, imagery can also impair, to different degrees, the accuracy of concurrent visual perception. Initially coined the 'Perky effect' after its discoverer [104,105], the phenomenon has since been replicated and extended with different paradigms across multiple disciplines and has been reported on with different terms (e.g., [89,106,107]). The available neurophysiological evidence suggests that interference effects on hyperacuity should be associated with 'attenuation' or 'modulation' to the underlying neural changes in early visual processing and, in particular, V1 activity [108,109]. ...
We explored whether two visual mental imagery experiences may be differentiated by electroencephalographic (EEG) and performance interactions with concurrent orienting external attention (OEA) to stimulus location and subsequent visuospatial detection. We measured within-subject (N = 10) event-related potential (ERP) changes during out-of-body imagery (OBI)—vivid imagery of a vertical line outside of the head/body—and within-body imagery (WBI)—vivid imagery of the line within one’s own head. Furthermore, we measured ERP changes and line offset Vernier acuity (hyperacuity) performance concurrent with those imagery, compared to baseline detection without imagery. Relative to OEA baseline, OBI yielded larger N200 and P300, whereas WBI yielded larger P50, P100, N400, and P800. Additionally, hyperacuity dropped significantly when concurrent with both imagery types. Partial least squares analysis combined behavioural performance, ERPs, and/or event-related EEG band power (ERBP). For both imagery types, hyperacuity reduction correlated with opposite frontal and occipital ERP amplitude and polarity changes. Furthermore, ERP modulation and ERBP synchronizations for all EEG frequencies correlated inversely with hyperacuity. Dipole Source Localization Analysis revealed unique generators in the left middle temporal gyrus (WBI) and in the right frontal middle gyrus (OBI), whereas the common generators were in the left precuneus and middle occipital cortex (cuneus). Imagery experiences, we conclude, can be identified by symmetric and asymmetric combined neurophysiological-behavioural patterns in interactions with the width of attentional focus.
... In addition, cortical lesions in visual or auditory areas impact on imagery performance in a modality-specific way [36]. For example, visual imagery selectively interferes more with visual than with auditory perception [56]. Moreover, the loss of visual imagery due to cortical lesions is often accompanied by a general loss of dreams in all sensory modalities [57], speaking to common networks. ...
Within the broad field of human perception lies the category of stimulus-independent perceptions, which draws together experiences such as hallucinations, mental imagery and dreams. Traditional divisions between medical and psychological sciences have contributed to these experiences being investigated separately. This review aims to examine their similarities and differences at the levels of phenomenology and underlying brain function and thus reassemble them within a common framework. Using Edmund Parish's historical work as a guiding tool and the latest research findings in the cognitive, clinical and computational sciences, we consider how different perspectives may be reconciled and help generate novel hypotheses for future research.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.
... Could it be that such imagined odours are in some sense actually indistinguishable from the sensorially-induced version of that percept (Sugiyama et al., 2006; see also Gilbert et al., 1998). 18 More than a century of experimental psychology has, after all, revealed time-and-again how people sometimes fail to discriminate visual and auditory mental imagery from visual and auditory perception (e.g., Perky, 1910;Segal, 1971). Furthermore, neuroimaging studies have convincingly demonstrated that even reading a taste word such as 'salt' or 'cinnamon' can activate many of the same areas as when the actual taste or aroma is actually experienced in the mouth (see Barrós-Loscertales et al., 2012;Djordjevic et al., 2004;González et al., 2006;see Spence, 2016, for a review). ...
Many people talk admiringly about the complexity of wine. However, it is often unclear what exactly they have in mind when using the term. In this review, we summarize why the appealing notion of chemical complexity is presumably not what is being referred to. Instead, we argue that a more plausible explanation is in terms of perceived complexity. It would appear that some writers use the term ‘complex’ upon tasting a wine that exhibits a number of distinct, yet harmoniously-balanced, elements that may be experienced over the course of a single prolonged mouthful, over a glass, or over the lifetime of the wine as it ages in the bottle. However, another use of the term that has emerged from studies conducted on both experts and social wine drinkers relates to a single unitary perceptual experience of complexity. Perhaps, though, the latter account is better described as inferred rather than directly perceived complexity. Ultimately, according to the evidence that has been published to date, it would appear that different groups of consumers use the term ‘complexity’ consistently while, at the same time, describing something different in, or about, the wine. We focus, in particular, on differences in the usage of the term between wine experts and social wine drinkers.
... Moreover, they still reported having the experiences after the onset of the visual stimulus. Davies et al. argued that the participants' experiences were not imaginings by appealing to the findings of S. J. Segal and her colleagues, according to which deliberate imagining tended to reduce detection sensitivity and to be disrupted by verbal description (see Segal 1971Segal , 1972Segal and Fusella 1969;Segal and Gordon 1969). 17 Since Davies et al. did not observe such effects in their experiment, they rejected that the experiences were imaginings. ...
As an important view in the epistemology of perception, dogmatism proposes that for any experience (e.g. perceptual, memorial, imaginative, etc.), if it has a distinctive kind of phenomenal character, then it thereby provides us with immediate justification for beliefs about the external world. This paper rejects dogmatism by looking into the epistemology of imagining. In particular, this paper first appeals to some empirical studies on perceptual experiences and imaginings to show that it is possible for imaginings to have the distinctive phenomenal character dogmatists have in mind. Then this paper argues that some of these imaginings fail to provide us with immediate justification for beliefs about the external world at least partly due to their inappropriate etiology. Such imaginings constitute counterexamples to dogmatism.
... The interference of visual imagery with perception is a well-established phenomenon in experimental psychology [Perky, 1910;Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1992;Siegal, 1971]. Because visual imagery interferes with perception, visual imagery is incapable of conceptually categorizing presently given stimuli. ...
This essay examines the development of representational thought from two divergent perspectives: (a) Mandler's image-schema theory, and (b) an action-theoretical approach fundamentally derived from Piaget's theory. Juxtaposition of the two approaches highlights conceptual problems that are inherent in image-schema theory but become resolved through an action-theoretical approach. Empirical studies in the domains of early concept development, object permanence, causality, and memory are critically reviewed with emphasis on the question of the interpretive validity of findings suggesting an early onset of mental representation. It is concluded that the empirical findings fail to support the hypotheses of early onset, and that representational development is more adequately interpreted within the context of an action-theoretical approach. Finally, the analysis examines the role of the divergent metatheoretical assumptions that contextualize image-schema theory and action theory in the understanding of the development of mental representation.
... Thus, visual construction or interpretation seems to have occurred virtually simultaneously with feature extraction. In fact, if one allows that there is plentiful random background activity in the visual system, which may be recruited to form the nuclei of mental images (Richardson, 1969;Segal, 1971), then the faintly visible subjective contours in Figure 2 may actually have been produced by extraction aided by interpretation, rather than by interpretation alone. ...
Reviews the literature and deals, predominantly, with the issue of whether familiarity aids in the extraction of visual features or in the interpretation, either verbal or visual, of the features extracted. Familiar visual objects, such as normal letters and real words, are processed faster and more accurately than are unfamiliar objects. This fact is massively documented by a wide variety of studies, involving tachistoscopic recognition, visual comparison, and letter detection. Less clear is how and where familiarity has its effect. There actually appear to be several familiarity effects, some aiding the extraction and/or interpretation of visual information, others aiding nonperceptual processes (e.g., storing and reporting or comparing the information). (31/2 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).
... At least two factors contribute to this state of affairs: one is that while we are awake sensory input produces much higher levels of activation than imaginary input. Imagination interferes with perception in the same modality (Perky, 1910;Segal, 1971) and we may suppose the reverse is true as well. Another more speculative factor favoring perceptual processes over imagination in the waking state is the existence of a neural system to inhibit the activation (vividness) of memory images while perception is active. ...
Although we are not usually explicitly aware of the fact that we are dreaming while we are dreaming, at times a remarkable exception occurs, and we become conscious enough to realize that we are dreaming. "Lucid" dreamers (the term derives from van Eeden, 1913) report being able to freely remember the circumstances of waking life, to think clearly, and to act deliberately upon reflection, all while experiencing a dream world that seems vividly real (Green, 1968; LaBerge, 1985; Gackenbach & LaBerge, 1988). This is all in contrast to the usual past characterization of dreams as typically lacking any reflective awareness or true volition (Rechtschaffen, 1978). Lucid dreaming is normally a rare experience. Though most people report having had a lucid dream at least once in their lives, only about 20% of the population reports having lucid dreams once a month or more (Snyder & Gackenbach, 1988). In spite of the fact that most people have experienced lucid dreams, some theoreticians have considered them impossible and even absurd (eg, Malcolm, 1959). In the absence of empirical evidence bearing on the question, most sleep researchers were apparently inclined to accept Hartmann's "impression" that lucid dreams were "not typical parts of dreaming thought, but rather brief arousals" (Hartmann, 1975, p. 74; Berger, 1977). Schwartz and Lefebvre (1973) noted that frequent transitory arousals were common during REM sleep and proposed these "micro-awakenings" as the physiological basis for lucid dream reports. Although no one had put forward any evidence for this mechanism, it seems to have been the predominant opinion (cf. Foulkes, 1974) up until the last few years. Empirical evidence began to appear in the late 1970s suggesting that lucid dreams occur during REM sleep. Based on standard sleep recordings of two subjects who reported a total of three lucid dreams upon awakening from REM periods, Ogilvie, Hunt, Sawicki, and McGowan (1978) cautiously concluded that "...it may be that lucid dreams begin in REM." However, no proof was given that the reported lucid dreams themselves had in fact occurred during the REM sleep immediately preceding the awakenings and reports. What was needed to unambiguously establish the physiological status of lucid dreams was some sort of behavioral response signaling to the experimenter the exact time the lucid dream was taking place.
... The interference of visual imagery with perception is a well-established phenomenon in experimental psychology [Perky, 1910;Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1992;Siegal, 1971]. Because visual imagery interferes with perception, visual imagery is incapable of conceptually categorizing presently given stimuli. ...
This essay examines the development of representational thought from two divergent perspectives: (a) Mandler’s image-schema theory, and (b) an action-theoretical approach fundamentally derived from Piaget’s theory. Juxtaposition of the two approaches highlights conceptual problems that are inherent in image-schema theory but become resolved through an action-theoretical approach. Empirical studies in the domains of early concept development, object permanence, causality, and memory are critically reviewed with emphasis on the question of the interpretive validity of findings suggesting an early onset of mental representation. It is concluded that the empirical findings fail to support the hypotheses of early onset, and that representational development is more adequately interpreted within the context of an action-theoretical approach. Finally, the analysis examines the role of the divergent metatheoretical assumptions that contextualize image-schema theory and action theory in the understanding of the development of mental representation.
... EXPERIMENT 5: SIGNAL DETECTION Previous work on the effects of imagery on perception has shown that imagery can improve detection of similar signals (Peterson & Graham, 1974), although imagery reduces detectability under conditions in which the signals are quite different from the image (Segal, 1971;Segal& Fusella, 1970). Peterson and Graham found that subjects were more accurate in detecting pictures embedded in visual noise when they were shown the pictures and cued with the name of the picture prior to presentation than when they were not given advance information. ...
Categorizations which humans make of the concrete world are not arbitrary but highly determined. In taxonomies of concrete objects, there is one level of abstraction at which the most basic category cuts are made. Basic categories are those which carry the most information, possess the highest category cue validity, and are, thus, the most differentiated from one another. The four experiments of Part I define basic objects by demonstrating that in taxonomies of common concrete nouns in English based on class inclusion, basic objects are the most inclusive categories whose members: (a) possess significant numbers of attributes in common, (b) have motor programs which are similar to one another, (c) have similar shapes, and (d) can be identified from averaged shapes of members of the class. The eight experiments of Part II explore implications of the structure of categories. Basic objects are shown to be the most inclusive categories for which a concrete image of the category as a whole can be formed, to be the first categorizations made during perception of the environment, to be the earliest categories sorted and earliest named by children, and to be the categories most codable, most coded, and most necessary in language.
... In similar vein, Neisser (1967) suggested that imagery vividness is a continuum "loosely correlated with the extent to which scanning eye movements are involved ... Visual synthesis of an image without eye motion may be possible, but the better the image the more likely it is to involve some sort of scanning [po 153] ." That the processes of perception and imagery are continuous is clearly a theoretically attractive notion, and there is evidence that images and percepts in the same modality may share the same central processing mechanisms (Brooks, 1968;Atwood, 1971;Segal, 1971). ...
Groups of vivid and poor visualizers were given a picture memory task. and horizontal and vertical components of the electro-oculogram
were recorded. This allowed a detailed investigation of each S’s eye movements in the perception. imagery, and recall phases
of the task. The vivid visualizers gave a higher accuracy of recall Eye movement rate was lower in visual imagery than it
was in perception, especially in the goup of vivid visualizers. There was some evidence of scanning activity prior to recall,
but only if positional cues were provided or if recall was incorrect. No scanning occurred prior to accurate recall unprompted
by a positional cue. These results provide no support to the theories of image construction proposed by Hebb (1949, 1968)
and Neisser (1967). As suggested by Singer (1966), an absence of eye movement may be a necessary condition for vivid visual
imagery.
... Imagery proved to have powerful mnemonic effects (Paivio, 1971(Paivio, , 1986(Paivio, , 1991, and it appeared that an image could be smoothly rotated (Shepard & Metzler, 1971;Shepard & Cooper, 1982), and scanned across (Kosslyn, 1973(Kosslyn, , 1980. It also appeared that when inspecting their images, subjects could find subjectively large details more quickly than subjectively small ones (Kosslyn, 1975(Kosslyn, , 1980, and that imagery and perceptual tasks in the same mode would often mutually interfere with one another (Brooks, 1968;Segal, 1971;Craver-Lemley & Reeves, 1992). A theory of the nature of imagery was clearly needed. ...
Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents, developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination? Three extant views of mental imagery are considered: quasi-pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the “traditional” symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recent situated cognition and active vision approaches in robotics. This theory is developed and elucidated. Three related key aspects of imagination (non-discursiveness, creativity, and seeing as) raise difficulties for the other theories. Perceptual activity theory presents imagery as non-discursive and relates it closely to seeing as. It is thus well placed to be the basis for a general theory of imagination and its role in creative thought.
... To maximize the chance that participants would engage in odor imagery on odor imagery trials, participants closed their eyes and sniffed while trying to imagine the smell. Both procedures have been used before to maximize olfactory imagery and sniffing may be especially important in this regard (Bensafi et al., 2003;Bensafi, Pouliot, & Sobel, 2005;Segel, 1971). In addition, participants were allowed 15 s to form the image as many participants report great difficulty in doing so and we wished to offer them sufficient time to try. ...
This study examined the impact of odor naming and imagery ability on the capacity of female participants to form odor images, as indexed by a novel olfactory repetition priming task. Experiment 1 involved three conditions - olfactory and visual imagery priming, and a no-prime control. Odor imagery priming was only obtained in good odor namers. Experiment 2 used the same conditions, but altered the nature of the hit-rate trials to test how odor imagery might facilitate performance in good odor namers. Odor imagery priming was again obtained only in good odor namers and this effect appeared to result from generic activation of olfactory processing caused by trying to imagine a smell. Experiment 3 examined whether this latter effect might be generated semantically, but no evidence for this was obtained. Together, these findings suggest that trying to form an odor image can facilitate performance by producing a generic state of activation, which only benefits existing odor-name associations. While this effect is mediated via perceptual processes it may occur independently of a conscious image.
This paper introduces a novel conceptualisation of mental imagery; namely, that is grease for the mind’s gears (MGT). MGT is not just a metaphor. Rather, it describes an important and overlooked higher-order function of mental imagery: that it aids various mental faculties discharge their characteristic functional roles. MGT is motivated by reflection on converging evidence from clinical, experimental and social psychology and solves at least two neglected conceptual puzzles about mental imagery. The first puzzle concerns imagery’s architectural promiscuity; that is, its ability to assist diverse mental faculties and perform many different functions when doing so. The second puzzle concerns how to square imagery’s architectural promiscuity with its psychopathological relevance; that is, its being a maintaining cause, and possibly even a partial constituent, of several psychological disorders, including post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder. Mental imagery helps and harms human psychology to extreme degrees and this is something that calls for elucidation. MGT says that instead of facing perplexing heterogeneities here, we instead face a significant unity. On this score, MGT is argued to be superior to the currently dominant conception of imagery in the philosophical literature; namely, as a perception-like state of mind.
Aphantasia is characterised by the inability to create mental images in one’s mind. Studies investigating impairments in imagery typically focus on the visual domain. However, it is possible to generate many different kinds of internal representation, including imagined auditory, kinesthetic, tactile, motor, taste and other experiences. Recent studies show that individuals with aphantasia report a lack of imagery in modalities, beyond vision, including audition. However, to date, no research has examined whether these reductions in self-reported auditory imagery are associated with decrements in tasks that require auditory imagery. Understanding the extent to which visual and auditory imagery deficits co-occur can help to better characterise the core deficits of aphantasia and provide an alternative perspective on theoretical debates on the extent to which imagery draws on modality-specific or modality-general processes. In the current study, individuals that self-identified as being aphantasic and matched controls, performed two tasks requiring auditory imagery: a musical pitch-based and voice-based imagery task. The majority of participants with aphantasia self-reported significant deficits in both auditory and visual imagery. However, we did not find a concomitant decrease in performance on tasks which require auditory imagery, either in the full sample or only when considering those participants that reported significant deficits in both domains. These findings are discussed in relation to the mechanisms that might obscure observation of imagery deficits in auditory imagery tasks in people that report reduced auditory imagery.
A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self‐standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions, whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object—because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects—nonetheless need not differ qua emotion‐type. This leads to the same‐emotional attitude, different content claim: It is possible to have the same emotional attitude toward a range of (different) contents, as provided by different cognitive bases. This paper argues that this claim is mistaken. By appealing to the specific case of imagination, the same emotional‐attitude, different content claim is challenged. Drawing on phenomenological observations made by Jean‐Paul Sartre, supplemented with independently plausible considerations, I argue that we should recognize a distinct class of emotion types, which I call affective imaginings. Affective imaginings contrast with emotional experiences whose cognitive bases are sense‐perceptual experiences (affective perceptions). The contrast turns on the way the different contents across these cases modify the attitudinal character of the emotional experience, motivating the positing of two irreducible classes of emotional experiences.
Cognitive penetrability refers to the possibility that perceptual experiences are influenced by our beliefs, expectations, emotions, or other personal-level mental states. In this paper, I focus on the epistemological implication of cognitive penetration, and examine how, exactly, aetiologies matter to the justificatory power of perceptual experiences. I examine a prominent theory, according to which some cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences are like conclusions of bad inferences. Whereas one version of this theory is psychologically implausible, the other version has sceptical consequences. In the second half of the paper, I suggest an alternative theory, drawing on recent empirical research on imagining-perception interaction and the epistemology of imagining.
Fictions evoke imagery, and their value consists partly in that achievement. This paper offers analysis of this neglected topic. Section 2 identifies relevant philosophical background. Section 3 offers a working definition of imagery. Section 4 identifies empirical work on visual imagery. Sections 5 and 6 criticize imagery essentialism, through the lens of genuine fictional narratives. This outcome, though, is not wholly critical. The expressed spirit of imagery essentialism is to encourage philosophers to ‘put the image back into the imagination’. The weakened conclusion is that while an image is not essential to imagining, it should be returned to our theories of imagination.
A long tradition in the analysis of social institutions incorporates organismic analogies and metaphors as basic components into general conceptual frameworks which serve as the general conceptual context within which more specific theoretical propositions that can be empirically tested are derived. A part of this tradition involves the attempt to extend biocybernetic and general systems principles whose origin comes from research on natural systems, to the analysis of complex social institutions. To the extent that these general perspectives of social systems employ metaphors and analogies from natural systems, it is important to investigate the explanatory or theoretical benefit that they provide for a better understanding of social institutions.
The ratio between the amount of systematically studied phenomena and their commonly accepted theoretical integration is one main characteristic of the developmental stage of a scientific discipline. The younger a discipline, the more unexplained phenomena exist in its sphere. With respect to this — and not only this — criterion, psychology is surely still a young science. But there are some psychological phenomena which are far too old and well known to accept the developmental stage of psychology as the only valid explanation for their insufficient theoretical integration. One example which may trouble an untroubled belief in scientific progress is the domain of suggestion and hypnosis.
Three main trends of research on suggestion and suggestibility have prevailed over time: suggestion in connection with hypnosis, suggestion as a feature of personality, and suggestion as a psychosocial phenomenon. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss very selectively these lines of research. Selectivity is imperative not only because of the multitude of studies but also because there have already been frequent reports on them in recent years. This is particularly true of investigations of the effects of suggestion with respect to hypnotic phenomena or social influence. Consequently, those fields will be discussed here only as they relate to controversies of significance to the whole domain of suggestion. Fundamental aspects of suggestion and suggestibility are still relatively unexplored. This applies above all to suggestibility, which has been studied — independently of hypnosis and specific questions of social influence — for almost 100 years.
Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents,developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination! Three extant views of mental imagery ore considered: quasi-pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the "traditional" symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recent situated cognition and active vision approaches in robotics. This theory is developed and elucidated. Three related key aspects of imagination (non-discursiveness, creativity, and seeing as) raise difficulties for the other theories. Perceptual activity theory presents imagery as non-discursive end relates it closely to seeing as. It is thus well placed to be the basis for a general theory of imagination and its role in creative thought.
Hume said that to have a memory image of some individual, x, is to perceive a ‘faint copy’ of some prior perception of x. This classical view of memory images includes three distinct claims:
(1) Images and percepts are mental entities which serve as objects for a ‘direct’ or ‘non-inferential’ perception.
(2) A memory image of some individual, x, shares numerous properties with some prior perception of x. (’ … great resemblance … in every other particular, except their degree of force and vivacity.’)
Opinions diverge on the nature of visual mental imagery as a form of representation. Researchers adopting the pictorial position propose that visual mental imagery is concrete and pictorial in nature. Researchers adopting the propositional position believe that visual mental imagery is abstract and verbal in nature and deny images as an original form of information presentation. This chapter reviews the opposing theoretical stances and proposes that an acceptable resolution of the debate could be a dual representation position that takes visual mental imagery as a key representational format, suggesting complementary and integrating roles for verbal and pictorial representations in accounting for certain cognitive phenomena.
While researchers have long pondered over the nature (and even the very existence) of visual mental imagery, it is only in the last few decades or so that serious scientific research has been devoted to the study of this phenomenon in modalities other than vision. That said, the available empirical evidence now supports the view that mental imagery can occur in any sensory modality, though with widely varying degrees of vividness. It is at this point, then, that the question arises as to whether there might also be such a thing as crossmodal imagery. Crossmodal mental imagery has most commonly been reported under those conditions in which the presentation of a stimulus in one sensory modality results in the formation of a mental image in another modality. In this review, evidence supporting the existence of crossmodal mental imagery in neurologically normal adults is critically evaluated. Furthermore, similarities and differences with related phenomena such as crossmodal sensory forms of synaesthesia and crossmodal perceptual completion are also discussed. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. All rights reserved.
A well-known fact is that E. B. Titchener, a major figure in psychology in the first quarter of the 20th century, excluded women from the group known as the Experimentalists, which he formed in 1904. This fact provides the basis for depicting him as a misogynist. Less well known and publicized is that he was arguably the strongest advocate for women psychologists in the United States throughout his academic career. He supervised the graduate study of Margaret Washburn, the first woman to receive a PhD in psychology in the United States, directed more than 20 dissertations for women psychologists, most of which were published in The American Journal of Psychology, and influenced and befriended others who were not his PhD students. The purpose of this article is to make psychologists more aware of the prominent role Titchener played in the education of early women psychologists and to reconcile this contribution with his position that the Experimentalists should be restricted to men.
Visual short-term memory (VSTM) and visual imagery have been shown to modulate visual perception. However, how the subjective experience of VSTM/imagery and its contrast modulate this process has not been investigated. We addressed this issue by asking participants to detect brief masked targets while they were engaged either in VSTM or visual imagery. Subjective experience of memory/imagery (strength scale), and the visual contrast of the memory/mental image (contrast scale) were assessed on a trial-by-trial basis. For both VSTM and imagery, contrast of the memory/mental image was positively associated with reporting target presence. Consequently, at the sensory level, both VSTM and imagery facilitated visual perception. However, subjective strength of VSTM was positively associated with visual detection whereas the opposite pattern was found for imagery. Thus the relationship between subjective strength of memory/imagery and visual detection are qualitatively different for VSTM and visual imagery, although their impact at the sensory level appears similar. Our results furthermore demonstrate that imagery and VSTM are partly dissociable processes.
Reflecting the reemergence of interest in conscious experience that characterizes modern psychology, this article examines a range of issues that are part of the study of the private personality. It is proposed that in formulating a model of individual differences in ongoing conscious experience, we must consider the basic systems through which information is initially received and stored, since variations in processing styles may already lead to the structural and content variations that ultimately shape the unique sense of a private personality. The psychophysiological, affective, and cognitive systems are reviewed with reference to the kinds of input they provide. These include variations in response to bodily cues (e.g., repressive defensiveness and hardiness) or in the styles of cognitive complexity. Research possibilities for linking these stylistic variations at the receptive pole to centrally-generated stimulation by means of repeated measurements, psychometric instruments, and thought-samples of ongoing consciousness are considered with the ultimate aim of clarifying processes of schema formation.
Subjects made same/different judgments concerning the pitches of two successive tones. In Experiment 1, the two tones were played on either the same instrument (guitar, flute, trumpet) or on different instruments. When the two pitches were indeed the same, people were faster to respond "same" when the instrumental timbres also matched than when two different instruments played the tones. In Experiment 2, the first tone was always a sine wave and the second was one of the same three instrumental tones. Following the sine wave, but before presentation of the second tone, people were asked to form an image of what an assigned instrument
would have sounded like playing that pitch. A match between this imagined timbre of the first tone and the timbre of the second tone produced faster reaction times to identical pitches than a mismatch. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Reexamined U. Neisser and N. Kerr's (see record
1974-10465-001) study in an attempt to resolve an apparent contradiction in the literature concerning whether objects that are concealed in an image are less accessible in memory than objects that are not concealed. Neisser and Kerr found that concealed objects are just as memorable as pictorial objects; it is argued that this may be due to the failure of their Ss to construct images that actually concealed objects. In the present experiment with 36 undergraduates, 1 group of Ss received explicit instructions to conceal; a 2nd group, comparable to the Ss in Neisser and Kerr's study, received no special instructions. In the incidental memory test, concealed objects were recalled significantly less often than pictorial objects for the group receiving instructions to conceal, whereas the group receiving no special instructions replicated the results of Neisser and Kerr. Three explanations of the results show that in all cases it is necessary to assume that an imaginal representation is constructed; whether it is the imaginal representation or a propositional representation that is actually stored, however, cannot be determined from the present results. This is not because issues of internal representation are fundamentally undecidable. It is shown that J. R. Anderson's (see record
1979-22767-001) argument to this effect is wrong. (17 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Presents an information-processing approach to imagery effects in verbal memory tasks. A general model of the process of forming images from verbal input is developed, based on propositional memory representations like those used in computer simulations of sentence comprehension, visual scene analysis, and image processing. The general model is then refined in several classes of alternative models that attempt to account for imagery effects, with emphasis on sentence memory results, by using different mechanisms in the general model. The major division in the alternative models is whether the facilitation produced by imagery is due to the actual storage of image information or is just a by-product of image formation or the use of high-imagery materials. Some of the models are rejected on the basis of published data. Two of the remaining models would require substantial progress in the study of sentence memory and comprehension in a way not directly related to imagery. The models most likely to be successful are those that assume that the use of imagery results in the storage of redundant information that provides alternate retrieval routes. (2 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged cases. The case is one in which it seems subjects' beliefs about the typical colour of objects affects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generally sympathetic to the idea of cognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation of this plausible mechanism.
Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we
imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom.
Three different proposals are outlined, building on theories that link visualization to sensorimotor predictive mechanisms
(e.g., “efference copies,” “forward models”). Each sees visualization as a kind of reasoning, where its freedom consists in our ability to choose the topic of the reasoning. Of the three options, I argue that the approach many will find most attractive—that visualization is a
kind of “off-line” perception, and is therefore in some sense misrepresentational—should be rejected. The two remaining proposals
both conceive of visualization as a form of sensorimotor reasoning that is constitutive of one’s commitments concerning the way certain kinds of visuomotor scenarios unfold. According to the first, these commitments
impinge on one’s web of belief from without, in the manner of normal perceptual experience; according to the second, these commitments
just are one’s (occurrent) beliefs about such generalizations. I conclude that, despite being initially counterintuitive,
the view of visualization as a kind of occurrent belief is the most promising.
KeywordsVisualize–Imagination–Simulation–Mental imagery–Belief–Encapsulation
American psychologists have waxed hot and cold in their approach to mental imagery. An early tide of interest in the topic was stemmed to a large extent by the arguments of John B. Watson and by the decades of behavioristic dominance that followed. In the 1960s, however, psychologists in large numbers returned to discussing imagery and doing research on it. The construct became respectable again, probably in part because researchers were showing that rigorous research on imagery could be done in the area of human memory. Furthermore, this research indicated that imagery mediation could act as a powerful facilitator of learning and memory (Paivio, 1971). The transition was rapid. In 1964, Robert Holt was urging that imagery emerge from ostracism; by 1972, he could refer tO it as a vogue. By then much research was being stimulated by Paivio's distinction between visual (imaginal) and verbal coding systems. One year later, however, Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1973) wrote an influential critique of "What the Mind's Eye Tells the Mind's Brain," in which he leveled strong new arguments against the use of imagery as an explanatory construct and suggested the notion of a "propositional system" to replace it. He defined a proposition as an abstract representation, a "deep" statement that is either true or false and may often be asserted by language but is itself neither linguistic nor
If an image has the features of a percept it should be possible to demonstrate the existence of selective interference, that is, modality-specific disturbance of imagery by 4perception and vice versa. Two experiments were conducted in which this issue was investigated in a paired-associate learning setting. Ss memorized lists of noun pairs differing in abstractness-concreteness under auditory and visual perceptual interference. The main finding, obtained in both experiments, was an interaction between interference modality and abstractness—concreteness which followed the pattern defining selective interference.The absence of effects due to factors such as instructional set (imaginal versus verbal mediation) task orientation (incidental versus intentional learning) and individual imagery ability (high versus low) indicated that the processing strategy itself should be thought of as a control process which is independent of the type of material processed and which cannot be said to be perceptual in nature. This finding was also obtained in a subsequent experiment on free recall learning of single nouns.
A theoretical framework for perceptual representation is presented which proposes that information is coded in hierarchical networks of nonverbal propositions. The hierarchical structure of the representations implies selective organization: Some subsets of a figure will be encoded as integral, structural units of that figure, while others will not. A context-sensitive metric for the “goodness” of a part within a figure is developed, corresponding to the probability that the subset will be encoded as a structural unit. Converging evidence supporting this position is presented from four different tasks using simple, straight-line figures. The tasks studied are (a) dividing figures into “natural” parts, (b) rating the “goodness” of parts within figures, (c) timed verification of parts within figures, and (d) timed mental synthesis of spatially separated parts into unitary figures. The results are discussed in terms of the proposed theory of representation, the processes that operate on those representations, and the general implications of the data for perceptual theories.
Reviews clinical and anthropological studies, and indicates that social and cultural factors affect both the definition of, and the sensory systems involved in, hallucinations. It appears that the pejorative labeling of certain reported experiences as hallucinatory is dependent on linguistic factors as well as social and cultural beliefs (e.g., the consideration of hallucinations as an index of social maturity, social competence, and social conformity). It is noted that the degree of rationality in the culture is associated with attitudes, emotional response, and the attribution of pathology to hallucinatory experiences. The implications of social and cultural factors for the behavioral and psychoanalytical approaches to hallucinations are discussed. (3½ p ref)
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.