The third task of the Court of Justice lies in the search for practicability. It arises, as has already been discussed,1 from the continuing tension in the law between the almost infinite multiplicity and complexity of social facts and patterns and the need to develop clear and general guides of conduct. Without an appreciation of this tension and of the demands which it places on the articulation of legal rules, the Court runs the danger of oversimplification or, at the other extreme, of a dissolution of the law into the casuistry of an endless line of cases. Both extremes signal a loss of legal control. The one because high levels of abstraction, however profound or logical or systematic, tend to lose contact with social realities and do not meet the practical needs and expectations of an ongoing society. The other because highly individualized rules are of little predictive value and the law loses accordingly in the certainty it can offer legal relationships. Negatively speaking, therefore, the search for practicability requires the judicial avoidance of these two extremes.