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6. Let’s get civil society straight: NGOs, the state, and political theory
... It is common in Uganda today to come across instances where civil society is equated with formalized organizations, as when the network NGO Forum refers to civil society as 'the CSO sector' (NGO Forum, 2013). As indicated above, this has historical explanations; influential actors in the international development arena became increasingly preoccupied with civil society in the 1980s, and then especially with NGOs (Whaites, 2000). These were often treated as key points of contact with civil society at large or even its 'organizational embodiment' (Harsh, Mbatia, & Shrum, 2010), which later has been criticized for incentivizing 'gap filling' NGOs that undermine the building of state capacity (Whaites, 2000) and fail to foster long-term social and economic transformation (Banks, Hulme, & Edwards, 2015). ...
... As indicated above, this has historical explanations; influential actors in the international development arena became increasingly preoccupied with civil society in the 1980s, and then especially with NGOs (Whaites, 2000). These were often treated as key points of contact with civil society at large or even its 'organizational embodiment' (Harsh, Mbatia, & Shrum, 2010), which later has been criticized for incentivizing 'gap filling' NGOs that undermine the building of state capacity (Whaites, 2000) and fail to foster long-term social and economic transformation (Banks, Hulme, & Edwards, 2015). ...
... Consensus movements emphasise multi-sector institutional support, and cooperation rather than conflict [21], [22]. Indeed, the most functional approaches to mobilising civil society typically aim to work co-productively with the state to improve governance through collaboration and mutual accountability [23], [24]. In many circumstances, government action supports mobilisation and civic action [24]- [26]. ...
... Indeed, the most functional approaches to mobilising civil society typically aim to work co-productively with the state to improve governance through collaboration and mutual accountability [23], [24]. In many circumstances, government action supports mobilisation and civic action [24]- [26]. ...
This paper examines ways that modern donor practices may challenge international volunteer cooperation organizations' (IVCOs) alignment with the interests of civil society in partner countries—particularly in circumstances where a strong focus on service delivery and poverty eradication limit support for grassroots movements aimed at transformational structural and social change. This thesis is presented within a wider context of IVCOs’ historic development beginning in the late 1950s. Discussion and recommendations focus on how modern IVCOs can balance donor priorities while maintaining alignment with the sometimes oppositional role of civil society as a transformational driver of social change.
... Under this circumstance, the institutions and agencies of the state are often hijacked by dominant social groups and used to satisfy specific ethnic, religious, class, and other special interests at the expense of less powerful social groups (Ekekwe 1986, Ibeanu 1999. Because the state in Africa is not able to assert its autonomy, which is the very essence of the liberal state, it is therefore considered as weak (Whaites 2000). ...
The study explores the basis and dimensions of the civil society's involvement in the electoral process, and examines the conditions that circumscribe civil society's push for democratic consolidation. It argues that the centrality of elections in liberal democracy and the weakness of the formal institutions established to administer elections in Nigeria have created a basis increasing civil society involvement in the electoral process. The study contends that state and democratic theories provide useful perspectives through which the involvement of the Nigerian civil society in elections can be understood. Based on the state theory, the study argues that the civil society has attempted to fill the gaps left by state institutions in the management of the electoral process. Drawing from the democratic theory, the study argues that the role of the civil society has been transformed from mobilizing pressures for democratic change during the transition stage to advocating for and supporting electoral reforms in the consolidation stage. The specific role played by civil society groups in the electoral process include promotion of popular participation in elections, provision of support to electoral administration, and impartial election observation.
... CSO is an organization that has the goal of advancing or expressing a common purpose through ideas, actions and demands on government (Gemmill & Bamidele-Izu, 2002). CSO is usually held to be the collective intermediary between the individual and the state, a realm in which society interacts constructively with the State -not to subvert and destroy it but to refine its action and improve its efficiency (Whaites, 2004 S-XX.YY-6 ...
When Soeharto's New Order dictatorship was ousted in 1998, Indonesia experienced a myriad of dramatic changes. These include a significant shift in 1999-from a highly centralized authoritarian system into a decentralized one. As a result, local governments, relatively inexperienced and unequipped for good governance and accountability, were all of the sudden put in charge for various issues, including natural resources management. To ensure effective performance of resource-rich districts and cities in Indonesia, civil society organizations (CSOs) operating in the local levels engage with them to promote sustainable development. One way to do so is through advocating revenue transparency gained from extractive industries to avoid 'paradox of plenty' – the paradox that areas with an abundance of natural resources obtained from oil, gas and mining tend to have worse development outcomes, due to mismanagement of resources, corrupt institutions and so forth. Through semi-structured interviews with CSO representatives, this preliminary, qualitative research aims to describe how they view and advocate revenue transparency and how they contextualize a global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI) standard to suit local situations and dynamics. It can be concluded that revenue transparency is important for fueling the future of the next generation through sustainable development. In advocating resource transparency, EITI as an international instrument is used as a perspective, alongside other national and local regulations. Challenges ahead based on CSO perspectives are numerous, including advocating this push for transparency with various stakeholders – some with contrasting and conflicting interests-to achieve institutional changes in the local levels.
... While community-based programmes are attractive for the above reasons, it is crucial not to shift the burden of care entirely onto communities that are already strained by the physical and financial impacts of HIV/AIDS. Indeed there is a wide literature challenging the notion of community-based development on the grounds that it provides an excuse for states to withdraw from the provision of essential services, while placing the burden of development on those sections of society that are already under-resourced (Pearce, 1998;Whaites, 2000). This underscores the importance of concurrently formulating national policies with adequate state and international support to develop and sustain childcare programmes. ...
Families provide most of the care to the tens of millions of HIV-infected and -affected in Africa. Little research exists on how care-givers balance the demands of holding a job with providing care for those who have become ill or orphaned by HIV/AIDS. Using data from a large survey administered to 1,077 working care-givers in Botswana, we compared the experience of HIV care-givers with non-HIV care-givers. Compared to non-HIV care-givers, HIV care-givers were more likely to worry about routine childcare (44% vs. 31%) and sick childcare (64% vs. 49%). Amongst those working far from home, more HIV care-givers were concerned that their children were not receiving adequate academic support (39% vs. 20%) and emotional support (57% vs. 33%). Parents who were HIV care-givers were less able to spend time with their own children. Children of HIV care-givers were more likely to have physical, mental and academic problems. While HIV care-givers were more likely to take leave from work for care-giving (53% vs. 39%), and for longer periods of time (13 vs. 7.6 days), this leave is more likely to be unpaid. Strategies to support those directly and indirectly affected by HIV and to avoid economic responsibility are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
... However, this is not simply a zero-sum relation, where more power for citizens means automatically less for the state, and vice versa. Depending on the aims and performance of state institutions, their strength can contribute to what is thought of as civil society (Whaites, 2000;Lister, 2000). ...
The paper analyses the roles of intermediary NGOs for linkages between government and rural communities in carrying out socio-environmental development programs as a mean of institutional development for good governance. In particular, the paper focuses on the Proambiente program that was carried out in Pará State, Amazonia, Brazil. This program was the first experience of a socio-environmental development program in Brazilian Amazonia that took into account local communities’ demands to link environmental conservation and small-scale family-based rural production. Methodologically, the research was based on qualitative analysis and used semi-structured interviews for data collection. The paper shows that NGOs as intermediaries between government and rural communities is a significant mechanism to promote the strengthening of the power of local communities, to create bridges between federal government and local communities; and to stimulate participatory processes by engaging rural communities’ culture and knowledge in socio-environmental development program as Proambiente.
... This will set out the context of participation in practice – how they are used to cloak a typical top-down development approach with the pretence of being bottom-up, as evidenced in the second part of this book. Since 1990, the concept of civil society has been 'grabbed' by NGOs as one relating closely to their natural strengths (Whaites, 2000). For Northern NGOs, this leads to an intellectual association between civil society and local 'partner' or implementing organisations. ...
About This Book This book analyses government relationships with international financial institutions by evaluating the role of citizen participation when national poverty reduction policies are formulated in low-income countries. Based on in-depth research from Bangladesh, the concept of participation is investigated from the contrasting perspectives of theory and practice. The first part of the book explores the rhetoric of participation in development policies, while the second part presents empirical evidence of participation in the formulation of Bangladesh’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper where, at local level, development brokers play an important role. It argues that participatory policies are not enough, that an overhaul is needed in the approach to poverty reduction which will require strong political commitment. This topical book will make essential reading for academics, students and researchers in international development studies and poverty-related fields. - See more at: http://www.policypress.co.uk/display.asp?k=9781447305699#sthash.lCce6wIN.dpuf
This is a second proof of the book which has been published from Policy Press UK (http://www.policypress.co.uk/display.asp?k=9781447305699)
... Civil society is usually understood to be the collective intermediary between the individual and the state. It exists outside the state, and is meant to exercise restraint on the state (Whaites 2000). Lewis and Kanji (2009, p. 128) observe that: Civil society groups exist on the outer edges of the institutional system through which state power is legitimized, but at the same time civil society forms an arena in which various social groups can organize in order to contest state power. ...
This article examines a new phenomenon in language activism variously called the multilingual education working group or the multilingual education network, and abbreviated as MLEN. After an analysis of the conceptual and organizational contexts for these activist groups, the six MLENs in existence as of 2013 are described. The groups are then analyzed for particular characteristics and trends which they demonstrate.
... Surely, if the main point of the concept of civil society is to understand the variegated impact of organisational activity on democracy, then there is no reason to leave out either realm. A more plausible notion of civil society is therefore, hinged on a scheme that divides the society into three sectors: the state, the market and the civil society (Whaites, 2000). Each of the sectors functions to make and enforce laws, provide avenue for exchange of goods and services, and serve as arena for debate and common endeavour, respectively. ...
This Paper explores the conceptual debate on civil society and argues that the 'conventional' notion of civil society overlooks much of what constitutes civil society in Africa because of its segregation of the constitutive elements of civil society into 'civic and non-civic', 'traditional' and 'modern' organisations. The paper contends that Western donors and international NGOs operating with this notion favour the development of modern civil organisations in Africa, without much regard to traditional organisations in African social formation. The implication of this situation to the development of civil society in Africa is that the task of building collective civil action becomes difficult. This paper therefore attempts to redefine the concept of civil society to embrace all civil activities in Africa. Based on the redefinition, it demonstrates with a historical analysis of Nigerian civil society that a more applicable notion of civil society in Africa is one that recognizes both the so-called civic and non-civic organisations in the civil society. In conclusion, it suggests that a viable strategy for forging effective collective action in support of democracy in Africa require increased effort by International NGOs to incorporate and strengthen all civil organisations in Africa. The idea of civil society has achieved prominence in political and developmental discourse over the past two decades, particularly in connection with successive waves of democratization, beginning in Latin America and Eastern Europe, and spreading across the developing world. In normative terms, civil society has been widely seen as an increasingly crucial agent for limiting authoritarian government, strengthening popular empowerment, reducing the unsettling effects of market forces, enforcing political accountability, and improving quality and inclusiveness of governance. In many countries, civic organisations have engaged in what some writers have described as "filling the gap" role (Whaites, 2000:134), by providing public goods and social services, either separately or in some kind of 'synergistic' relationship with state institutions.
... In 1996, the idea that development should be undertaken through civil society had become industry orthodoxy. Major studies had been completed, or were in progress, by bodies such as the World Bank and the DFID (Whaites, 2000). In supporting civil society, donor agencies pursue a combination of broad goals. ...
This article critically looks at the interfaces between the ideal notions of civil society and participation within the remit of Bangladesh’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) formulation process. On the one hand, the idea of civil society has been likened to a renaissance and is often considered to be the most likely route out of development ‘problems’, particularly in the poor countries. Dominant development discourses have scripted the liberal interpretation of civil society as the only game in town. However, on the other hand, as a consequence of growing criticism on the failure of top-down development approach in the late-1960s, and throughout most of the 1970s, there was a sudden upsurge of interest that ordinary citizens might have a part to play in the development process. A generalized consensus took shape that people’s participation in projects is an important component of development programmes and a means to their success and hence participation has turned out to be a ‘new paradigm’ of development. The PRSP framework, that precepts a romantic marriage between civil society and participation, was foisted by two major International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as a condition of further debt and other development assistance for all poor countries. Participation from ‘all relevant stakeholders’ including civil society was trumpeted as a significant policy shift from previous development prescriptions of these IFIs. This article presents observation from 36 semi-structured interviews with civil society representatives including key people who prepared and finalized the PRSP of Bangladesh and the review of six daily national papers (September 2004 to October 2005). This piece argues that, in theory, participation can be manifested as the ‘key’ for development, but in practice, participation can be an iron hand in a velvet glove. Participation can turn into parroting and often resemble similar views that are ‘expected’ and required to validate external framework. Moreover, through such process of mainstreaming participation, an interest group within the civil society can emerge who has the technical knack of producing development policy according to donor recipe with some flavour of participation. This work therefore asks whether civil society and participation should be used as technologies of social control or as anti-hegemonic and anti-clientelistic forces in order to empowering marginalized members of the society.
... In this sense, this 'harsh' attitude from the official institutions may, in fact, turn out to be a blessing in disguise. Following the logic of de Tocqueville (1835, cited in Whaites, 2000), civil society may function as a counterbalance to the increased capabilities of the modern state. But, as Whaites (2000: 132) notes, '[the] logical extension of de Tocqueville's view of civil society as a buffer against the state is that the latter must be capable of … acting as a safeguard against competing [rent-seeking] social groups'. ...
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are major players in development aid today. It is widely believed they represent civil society and that, for example, the UN and the World Bank would be strengthened if NGOs were given a larger influence over policy formulation and development. As one can hardly speak of an NGO community, the issue of representation is far from easily solved. NGOs often compete for visibility, clients and influence, and representation leaves a lot to be desired. Hence, governments' and inter-governmental institutions' reluctance to accept immediately NGOs as partners, may be necessary for NGOs to become representative and, paradoxically, for strengthening civil society as well.
... While community-based programmes are attractive for the above reasons, it is crucial not to shift the burden of care entirely onto communities that are already strained by the physical and financial impacts of HIV/AIDS. Indeed there is a wide literature challenging the notion of community-based development on the grounds that it provides an excuse for states to withdraw from the provision of essential services, while placing the burden of development on those sections of society that are already under-resourced (Pearce, 1998;Whaites, 2000). This underscores the importance of concurrently formulating national policies with adequate state and international support to develop and sustain childcare programmes. ...
Families provide most of the care to the tens of millions of HIV-infected and -affected in Africa. Little research exists on how care-givers balance the demands of holding a job with providing care for those who have become ill or orphaned by HIV/AIDS. Using data from a large survey administered to 1,077 working care-givers in Botswana, we compared the experience of HIV care-givers with non-HIV care-givers. Compared to non-HIV care-givers, HIV care-givers were more likely to worry about routine childcare (44% vs. 31%) and sick childcare (64% vs. 49%). Amongst those working far from home, more HIV care-givers were concerned that their children were not receiving adequate academic support (39% vs. 20%) and emotional support (57% vs. 33%). Parents who were HIV care-givers were less able to spend time with their own children. Children of HIV care-givers were more likely to have physical, mental and academic problems. While HIV care-givers were more likely to take leave from work for care-giving (53% vs. 39%), and for longer periods of time (13 vs. 7.6 days), this leave is more likely to be unpaid. Strategies to support those directly and indirectly affected by HIV and to avoid economic responsibility are discussed.
... However, there is little evidence that such a form of civil society is emerging or even likely in most African polities, where there notions of autonomy and a pluralist political culture flounder against the realities of 'straddling' and ethnicised political action. However, if one understands civil society not in the de Tocquevillian sense promoted within the aid industry (Whaites 2000) but in a Gramscian sense as a contested terrain over which the state and other actors seek to secure legitimacy for their political, social and economic project, then the alignment of different actors with regards poverty reduction becomes more apparent. Such an analysis allows for the fact that different elements within the media, civil society and even ministries can be lined up within and against each other in different configurations for different struggles. ...
This paper explores how political actors, processes, debates and institutions influence the reduction and reproduction of chronic poverty in Uganda. Uganda provides a particularly appropriate case study for such work, as the country's recent success in poverty reduction has been significantly related to 'getting the politics right'. However, findings here suggest that politics in contemporary Uganda holds as many threats as opportunities for reducing long-term poverty. The policy processes, debates and interventions that might challenge chronic poverty are steadily moving from the margins of the poverty agenda towards the mainstream. For example, the current review of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (Uganda's home-grown PRSP) has identified social protection - likely to be a key policy response to chronic poverty - as one of the key cross-cutting themes. However, arguments for targeting the poorest groups and regions currently lack political persuasiveness, as such programmes have tended to become highly politicised and subject to both national clientelism and local elite capture. There is a 'politics of inclusion' in Uganda that stretches to most groups of the chronically poor, although this has yet to be transformed into a 'politics of justice', in part because the institutional representatives of Uganda's chronically poor are currently marginal in terms of command over resources and policy influence. On a broader note, little effort has been made amongst development actors in Uganda to articulate the type of 'pro-poor' or redistributive growth that is likely to be required to alleviate chronic poverty. It might be argued that this reflects a 'global' politics of staying poor in Uganda, with the neo-liberal policy hegemony playing an important role in shaping the possibility of reducing chronic poverty. Many amongst the political elite perceive the rising inequality in Uganda as a potential threat to them, although only over the long-run. Many also see the poverty reduction agenda as externally imposed and profligate with resources, suggesting that if poverty reduction is to stay on the political agenda in Uganda for long enough to impact on chronic poverty, national ownership of the poverty agenda must be broadened and deepened beyond the current 'champions'. Ongoing political conflict in northern Uganda and the perennial threat of regional instability remains the greatest threat to both the chronically poor and the poverty reduction agenda. In addition, the debate over presidential succession and the potential move towards multi-partyism appears to have triggered an intensification of neo-patrimonial political practice, posing a significant threat to the poverty reduction agenda. However, the paper also finds that the policies and programmes likely to challenge chronic poverty can be usefully aligned with the most progressive aspects of political actors and policies in Uganda. These include certain civil society actors, participatory poverty assessments, the local government development programme and social sector ministries. Finally, it is proposed that a number of shifts are required within the ways in which politics is understood within poverty analysis. One example, is that we might need to reconceptualise the long term politics of commitment to poverty reduction in terms of a 'contract' rather than in terms of 'ownership'.
... Second, and more importantly, it shows the limits (and dangers) of equating NGOs with civil society. Despite the enormous confusion as to what constitutes NGOs (Vakil 1997), there is a tendency to view them as representing civil society (Whaites 2000). Moreover, the theoretical discussions on the relations between NGOs, civil society and the state are often presented in a normative manner, as Mercer (2002) notes, ignoring the politics of development as well as the nuances of day-to-day operations of NGOs. ...
NGOs have, of late, found some of their traditional domains, such as provision of micro-credit and participatory development, coinciding with or being taken away by the state. How do they position themselves and retain relevance vis-a-vis the state in the changed scenario? Tracing the trajectory of interventions of a local NGO in Kerala, India, this article shows that NGOs exhibit `multiple identities'—selective collaboration, gap-filling and posing alternatives—in the process of engagement with the state. The `strategizing' of such identities may hold the key to their relevance vis-a-vis the state.
... In brief, civil society is a defensive counterbalance to the increased capabilities of the modern state. It provides a realm in which society interacts constructively with the state, not to subvert and destroy it, but to refine its actions and improve its efficiency (Whaites, 2000 : Officers, and the provision of district facilities and services. Therefore, there is no doubt about the commitment of the highest echelons of the Government, now and as in the heyday when the Scheme was introduced. ...
... Most analyses tend to flounder around the assumption that these two institutional arenas should ideally be autonomous and distinct from each other (e.g., Brock et al., 2002), and promote the same liberal democratic notion of civil society promoted within international development more generally (Howell & Pearce, 2001). However, there is little evidence that such a form of civil society is emerging in most African polities, and observers are increasingly suggesting that it is more appropriate to conceptualize civil society in Africa not in the de Tocquevillian sense that is generally promoted within the aid industry (Whaites, 2000) but in a Gramscian (Gramsci, 1971) sense as a contested terrain over which the state and other actors seek to secure legitimacy for their political, social, and economic project (Howell & Pearce, 2001;Lewis, 2002). Through this lens, the alignment of different actors concerning how the poorest and poverty reduction are represented in Uganda becomes more amenable to analysis, and allows for the fact that different elements of state and civil society can be lined up with and/or against each other in different configurations around different struggles. ...
The growth of young, technology-based firms has received considerable attention in the literature given their importance for the generation and creation of economic wealth. Taking a strategic management perspective, we link the entrepreneurial strategy deployed by young, technology-based firms with firm growth. In line with recent research, we consider both revenue and employment growth as they reflect different underlying value creation processes. Using a unique European dataset of research-based spin-offs, we find that firms emphasizing a product and hybrid strategy are positively associated with growth in revenues. The latter strategy also has a positive influence on the creation of additional employment. Contrary to expectation, however, we find that firms pursuing a technology strategy do not grow fast in employment. Our study sheds new light on the relationship between entrepreneurial strategy and firm growth in revenues and employment.
The belvedere of literature on non-Government voluntary organisations from Latin America, Asia, Africa, Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa show that though there is a wide range of discourse on voluntary sector in the developing world, the rigidly structured scientific studies regarding ground-level impact of VOs in the rural community is very scant. Around sixty-five noted studies from South Asian nations namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Indonesia, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka dealt in the present chapter further substantiate this gap in the existing literature. The quantum jump in number of VOs and flow of the funds to them has not been concomitant with independent information on the impact of NGOs. There is very little scientific finding on the basis of which the social legitimacy of voluntary sector in delivery of developmental and statutory services can be carved beyond contradictions, and, can be universally accepted as the basis of decision-making and policy formulation. There are many missing links, which can be cumulatively bridged with the findings of micro-level studies. Of course, recently some assessment reports about NGO works have been brought to light in shape of booklets published by some Government departments and voluntary agencies. But these are hardly more than official documentations of the activities of the concerned departments or agencies. The present chapter while presenting the existing literature before the learned readers tries to arrange them under five analytical categories and capture the missing links and gaps for further research and development activities at sub-national, national and regional levels.
Around the world, there exist many organisations who claim a Christian motivation and whose work falls within the scope of the development sector. These organisations are distinctly different from local congregations, and whilst development as a field of theological study is becoming increasingly well-defined and established, there has been limited theological research and reflection on these organisations. Much about them remains unstudied and unclear, raising questions about their purpose, legitimacy and theological contribution. This in turn hampers a responsive and responsible engagement with them within the academy. Contributing to this oversight is the absence of an appropriate, commonly shared name and definition around which research and discourse can occur. This article reviews names and definitions currently being used and then proposes the name 'Christian developmental organisation' (CDO). It provides a rich definition, considering the CDO's organisational, societal, purpose, activity and faith dimensions. In addition, the history dimension brings an understanding of the origins and formation of the CDO whilst the relationship dimension positions the CDO within a web of relational dynamics. It is hoped that the name and definition offered in this article will promote research and engagement with the CDO as well as aid their self-understanding.
Within academic research, more and more scholars reveal the ambivalence of NGOs—the sometimes constructive, sometimes destructive role they play in solving societal problems. In this paper, we present a discourse analysis that illustrates how NGOs’ campaigning may undermine their reputation and advocacy function. We conclude that such discourse failures are frequently not merely an accidental by-product, but rather a not-intended consequence of deliberate NGOs’ campaigns. By applying ideas from political economy, we make particular note of probable discourse failures when campaigns attempt to deal with complex issues in an environment rife with wide-spread prejudices and where the NGO’s work is transparent. We present collectively institutionalized commitments for NGOs and commitment services enforced by political organizations as instruments that are suitable for increasing public accountability of the NGO sector. In conclusion, we argue that further research can benefit from systematically analyzing the interdependencies between discourses and institutions.
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDG's) represent the most ambitious global development agenda in history. Achieving them will require financing far beyond traditional aid, especially at a time where established donors are cutting or diverting aid budgets to meet refugee and security issues. Alternative sources of development financing such as the private sector, private foundations and the BRICS seem ever more critical. But what are in fact the interests and modes of operation of these actors, and to what extent do they align with the aims of the SDGs? And how do national governments of developing countries themselves perceive and approach these new sources of financing? This report examines the policies, mind-sets and interests of some of the many actors that will be playing a fundamental role in the complex and challenging task of financing sustainable development in the years to come.
In the last decades, NGOs have become an important participant in the work of political organizations (e.g., national authorities, the EU or the UN). This development brings many opportunities and also some challenges, including discourse failure which is one of the topics discussed in this paper. We present a case study that illustrates the interdependence of discourse failure and regulations failure. We conclude that discourse failure is frequently not merely an accidental by-product, but rather, a non-intended consequence of deliberate NGOs’ campaigns. We make particular note of probable discourse failure when campaigns attempt to deal with complex issues in an environment rife with wide-spread prejudices and where the NGO’s work is transparent. In this situation, regulation failure may be consequent upon discourse failure. We present collectively binding commitments for NGOs and binding services enforced by political organizations to prevent discourse failure. In conclusion, we argue that the field of political economy can benefit from this challenging environment if it systematically researches the interdependencies between discourses and regulations.
This article analyzes the role of civil society in promoting democracy and good governance in Africa. It begins by exploring the debate about what constitutes civil society in Africa. The article argues that the conventional notion of civil society, which restricts its constitutive elements to only western-type NGOs, is not useful for the analysis of civil society in Africa. Such notion of civil society undermines the contributions of traditional
organizations to the deepening of democracy and good governance in the continent. This article adopts an expanded notion of civil society that allows for the analysis of the role of both traditional and modern organizations in Africa. It shows the contributions of civil society to democracy and good governance
in Africa, focusing on the struggles for decolonization and demilitarization, the promotion of social justice, state performance, popular participation in policymaking and transparency in governance.
Support for the use of local languages for learning and communication is currently in fashion among national policy-makers in Africa. This position has been promoted by UNESCO and other local-language advocates for years; more recently it is being seen favourably by a range of influential international institutions.However, even positive language policy usually depends on local action to give it shape and sustain it. In many countries across sub-Saharan Africa, community-level institutions – language committees – are taking an active part in a wide range of processes for language development including orthography development, the production of local-language literature, literacy programmes, multilingual education programmes and advocacy at local and national levels. These institutions share a core commitment to seeing increased use and/or recognition of the language of the local community.This paper explores the defining dimensions of local-language committees in sub-Saharan Africa, including their place in the interplay between national policy and local practice.
A comparison of trade unions and NGOs in Iran demonstrates the diverse nature of their activities. Over the last 90 years, trade unions have played important roles in changing the political system in that country. However, unions are largely male-dominated organisations, which explains why some women have begun to organise women's trade unions. This article focuses, however, on the activities of women's NGOs, which are engaged in improving the socio-economic conditions of the most marginalised sectors of society. Their activities are limited and they are not engaged in structural change. However, they are challenging gender-specific access and influence over institutional power, matters that are crucial to the process of democratisation. It is argued that, since many trade unions and NGOs in Iran are strengthening community-based institutions in different ways, their collaboration would have a mutually transformational impact which would turn these organisations into more powerful forces in the process of democratisation.
The multilateral aid community has prioritised the development of "civil society", conceptualised as a social space separate from the state, since the 1990s. This is because it is seen as a space in which political checks and balances to the state can be nurtured, entrepreneurship can thrive and where assistance to the poorest can best be implemented. NGOs are seen as key "civil society" actors, promoting empowerment, enterprise and pro- poor development. This conceptualisation is problematic for many reasons. At the national level, it ignores the ways in which state and civil society can be said to be mutually constituting. At the global level too, it ignores the impact of globalisation on economies and the influence of international NGO transnational actors on the direction of southern NGOs. Previous studies of northern Ghana have considered some of these issues. This paper looks at the more neglected issue of the impact of transnational NGO actors on the direction of SNGOs. It does this through examining "actually existing" civil society, as Mamdani would have us do. It uses a case study of a service-providing Presbyterian NGO. The paper argues that the relationship between this NGO and its Northern counterparts can be captured using Rhenman's typology of organisational dependence, which also illuminates the SNGO's options for change. The implications of this for the notion of an independent NGO sector within a "civil society" characterised by freedom of social action are explored.
This article explores the interview narratives of six NGO directors working in Afghanistan regarding the holistic and multi-track nature of their NGO's project work. Data analysis revealed that NGO leaders believed that effective NGO project work relies extensively on purposeful coordination with other NGOs, and is dependent on non-NGO actors such as the military, the UN, local government structures, and local organisations. However, working in proximity with international military forces posed special challenges for NGOs in Afghanistan. While validating the military's security work, NGO leaders believed it necessary to assert their independence from security operations, and military reconstruction and development work.
Starting from the premise that donors lack a well-defined notion of civil society which obscures its conflictual nature, this article considers a range of potential problems that aid donors might encounter in relation to the process of democratic consolidation when supporting civil society organizations. It argues that since donors are not well-equipped to handle these types of interventions, they need to avoid undermining the autonomy and legitimacy of recipient organizations: their absorptive capacity is limited, only certain types of organization are able to contribute effectively to democracy promotion, and little is known about their impact. The objective of strengthening civil society may be laudable but since it is a difficult and potentially hazardous area for external intervention, donors should proceed cautiously and with modest expectations about what might be achieved. -from Author