The phenomenological significance of Wittgenstein’s reminders assembled as “language-games” are presented here with those aspects relevant to interpreting the ancient idea of Logos by understanding how concepts with rules operate and picture the logic of thinking, meaning, naming, intending, showing anything significantly. That “thing” may be something like a means of representation as the Use of a naming sign, as well as the Use of something named as “object” which both signify their identity and difference as a “name” or an “object named” with the signifying Use of other signs in the manifest stream of phenomena, from which reminders assembled as “language-games” present cross-strips. What is elucidated as such is also the trans-historical significance of these reminders as they elucidate the ultimate internal connections of the use of pictures of historical-language-games with the manifest signifying stream of phenomena as the ultimate limits of saying, showing, meaning, representing anything in language.