The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the Changing Geo-Political Landscape in Zimbabwe

Abstract

The rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 is one of the milestone changes in Zimbabwe’s political history. This paper argues that the rise of MDC had negative and positive impacts on Zimbabwe’s political landscape. The birth of MDC was made possible by socio-economic hardships that were caused by errors of omission and commission by the government of ZANU-PF. On the other hand, it is also argued that there was western infestation in the creation and/or funding of MDC, a position held by ZANU-PF. This created polarization in the country leading to widespread violence as there was the redefinition of patriots and puppets. The paper concludes that the rise of MDC challenges ZANU-PF ‘divine’ leadership perception and had to continually seek means to remain in power.

Full text

Chapter 6
The Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC) and the Changing Geo-Political
Landscape in Zimbabwe
Lucky Asuelime and Blessing Simura
Abstract The rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 is one
of the milestone changes in Zimbabwe’s political history. This paper argues that the
rise of MDC had negative and positive impacts on Zimbabwe’s political landscape.
The birth of MDC was made possible by socio-economic hardships that were caused
by errors of omission and commission by the government of ZANU-PF. On the other
hand, it is alsoargued that there was western infestation in the creation and/or funding
of MDC, a position held by ZANU-PF. This created polarization in the country
leading to widespread violence as there was the redefinition of patriots and puppets.
The paper concludes that the rise of MDC challenges ZANU-PF ‘divine’ leadership
perception and had to continually seek means to remain in power.
Introduction
Since gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic
Front (ZANU PF) had political dominance in the country. The liberation nationalist
party tried to turn the nation into a one party state when the issue had turned
fashionable in most of the African countries. Some ‘dissident members’ like Edgar
Tekere who left the party to form a distinct party known as Zimbabwe Unity
Movement (ZUM) thwarted the theory. However, all political parties that rose even
L. Asuelime (*)
History and Strategic Studies, University of Lagos, Lagos University Road, Akoka-Yaba,
Lagos 234-01, Nigeria
e-mail: lucky4real14@gmail.com
B. Simura
Social Sciences, Howard College Campus, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4001,
South Africa
e-mail: blessingsimura@gmail.com
L. Asuelime and S. Francis (eds.), Selected Themes in African Political Studies,
Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-06001-9_6, ©Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014
69

after the implementation of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)
failed to pose a real challenge to the political dominance of ZANU PF until the eve of
the new millennium when the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) became
popular as the candidate for such magnitude of opposition to the ruling party.
MDC rose at the crust of an unstable economy. It quickly moved in to challenge
the power of ZANU PF and managed to wrestle from it almost all the entire urban
vote in the following election. In its first elections, the MDC managed to win
52 parliament seats from the 120 contested. This drastically changed the political
landscape of the country. Power struggles increased since then and violence was
entrenched as a political tool during campaigns. Both sides of the camps labeled
each other as being violent political parties. While MDC called ZANU PF a corrupt
political party that had brought the meltdown of the economy, ZANU PF claimed
that MDC was an extension of British imperialism, a tool that was being used by the
neo-Rhodesian and the British to reverse the gains of independence.
This work discusses the political changes that took place in the country since the
rise of MDC. It explores the issue of violence and other major contentious issues
that took place until the formation of the Unity Government under the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC) sponsored Global Political Agreement
(GPA). The timing, motivation and the composition of the MDC is particularly
unique. Previous opposition groups did not suggest much significance. Therefore,
how may we understand the rationale, influence and impacts of the advent of the
MDC in Zimbabwean politics and the government’s perception of external contri-
bution in the changing political landscape?
This paper was reached at using basically desk research. The researcher consulted
books, articles, newspapers and official statements by influential political leaders in
Zimbabwe on the subject. Some of the information was incorporated from Blessing
Simura’s undergraduate thesis research of 2009 at the Midlands State University.
Given that the researcher (Blessing Simura) grew up in Harare, Zimbabwe at a time
when the MDC was launched, he witnessed the political upheavals and demonstra-
tions first hand from the land occupations in his rural home in Marondera District, the
1998 food riots, the final push, the 2007 flopped Zimbabwe Grounds prayer meeting
that culminated in Tsvangirai’s arrest and beating by the police and also the 2008
harmonized elections. While the processes took place mostly in Harare where
Blessing resided, such experience was only used to compound information from
systematic qualitative research using the discourse analysis method.
Rise of MDC
The rise of MDC has attracted some controversy among the Zimbabwean population.
The political party was officially born in 1999 with massive urban support that had
suffered the brunt of the beginning of the economic meltdown. It is no surprise
therefore that the majority of the opposition came from the trade unionist movement
in the name of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). Locally the roots of
the MDC were planted in the adoption of ESAP by the government in 1991. Structural
70 L. Asuelime and B. Simura

adjustment created a fertile ground for the MDC to later garner support in 1999. The
government and private sector retrenchments created a discontented population. As
noted by Mary Ndlovu, “Certainly the introduction of structural adjustment at the
beginning of the 1990s can be seen as the process which eroded the living standards of
Zimbabweans, and spawned the first broad-based opposition party” (Ndlovu 2004).
While ESAP created a fertile ground, it was economic ‘hara-kiri’ in the name of
awarding the War veterans ZW$ 50 000 gratuities which had not been budgeted for
that created economic chaos which led ultimately to the economic downturn. In a
single day the national currency plunged from ZW$ 14/US$1 to ZW$/US$26, the
national stock exchange plunged by 40 % (Munda 2007) and the impact on the
economy was far reaching. Living conditions beginning in 1998 dwindled and
the nation experienced massive urban uprisings that were mostly led by the ZCTU.
It was from these national strikes that the MDC managed to recruit its support
structures. The ZCTU is seen as the foster mother of the MDC. It created a rapport
with the urban masses that made it easy for the MDC to relate to the urbanites.
ZANU PF theorizes that the evolvement of the MDC is as a result of external
intrusions in Zimbabwean political economy. Accordingly, the theory holds that the
MDC is a British creation to counter the ZANU PF offensive on the land reform and
the policies of Black Economic Empowerment (Indigenization). Although some
credence may be accruable to this arguments when we consider the fall out between
ZANU PF and the West in general and Britain in particular began in 1996 when the
Zimbabwean government abandoned the Economic Structural Adjustment
Programme (ESAP) which had been prescribed for the country by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) since 1991. The Washington Consensus based mentality of
‘we know it all’ had led to the crumbling down of the Zimbabwean economy just as
it had done to other African countries that had adopted the IMF prescribed adjust-
ment programmes. The IMF could not swallow the bitter pill and so created an
antagonistic relationship with the Zimbabwean government.
In 1998, the Zimbabwean government with other SADC countries like Namibia
and Angola intervened in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on the side of
Laurent Kabila. They were against the invasion by Uganda and Rwanda, who were
being backed by the Western countries. The intervention saw Zimbabwe being
denied IMF support on the basis that it was involved in a war, which it could not
finance (Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act 2001). However, this
assertion turned to be hypocritical because the IMF extended support to Rwanda,
which was also engaged in the same war and was just coming out of a civil conflict
with an unstable economy. The third Chimurenga, (derived its name from the first
and second Chimurenga, which means a struggle for liberation) was just a spark to
blow up the volcanic antagonism that had been brewing for years. It is no surprise
therefore that the west started talking of the Gukurahundi
1
issue, which they had
ignored for more than a decade when the disturbances occurred.
1
The word Gukurahundi is a Shona word that refers to the first heavy rains of a summer season that
cleans the chuff on mountains, rocks, hills and roof tops. It was a code name for the war against the
6 The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the Changing Geo-Political... 71

ZANU PF’s view minimizes the role of the economic problems and some of its
mistakes to the rise of the MDC. After winning successive elections and without a
powerful contending opposition, ZANU PF became complacent on a number of
national issues. It can be argued that most ZANU-PF Members of Parliament and
the national leadership began to view itself as the divine leadership of the country
and cared little on constituency and national development in a period where
corruption in government officials became deepened.
While the ZANU PF theory on the rise of MDC is debatable, it is a historical fact
that the MDC has been a proxy of the USA and Britain to effect regime change in
Zimbabwe. The MDC survived on a sponsorship from Westminster Foundation for
Democracy (WFD). Seumas Milne notes that,
Now the British government (through the Westminster Foundation for Democracy) and the
Tories (through the Zimbabwe Democracy Trust) along with white farmers and corpora-
tions—are all funding the MDC, committed as it is to free market policies and the
restoration of white farms to their owners (Milne 2002).
This concurred with the MDC Policy Document of 2008 which deserves to be
quoted in full as it states that:
“The M.D.C. has always recognized the need for land reform and has since its inception
phase, called for reform and equity in land occupation and use....The M.D.C. will also
establish a system of compensation for displaced farmers that will address their rights,
make restitution for their losses, and ensure justice for those whose basic rights, including
the right to safety and security and life, were violated. Those farmers who have been
displaced and who no longer wish to resume production will be dealt with fairly and within
the same framework as all other landowners....Potential claims for losses by displaced
farmers are thought to exceeding US$ 8 billion and will, by the time the transition takes
place, be backed by several local and international court cases” (M.D.C. Policy Document
2008).
The MDC, also openly challenged the ZANU PF sponsored constitution in the
2000 referendum among other reasons because it supported compulsory land
acquisition against the MDC policy of open markets and glair alignment to Britain
and the white commercial farmers.
The Land Question
Land has always been a burning issue in many African countries. It has been the
fuel of the different liberation struggles. The liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was
driven by a number of reasons to which land was at the centre. Scholars like David
Lan, Norma J. Kriger, Terrence Ranger and Sam Moyo all concur on the central
role of land as a rallying point to gain peasant support during the liberation struggle
dissidents in the Matebeleland and midlands provinces that rocked Zimbabwe from 1983 to 1987
when the Unity Accord between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU was signed leading to the creation of a
single AZANU PF party.
72 L. Asuelime and B. Simura

in Zimbabwe. Many including the liberation fighters had expected a quick redress
of the situation at independence (Simura 2009).
The Lancaster House Agreement and the ceasefire charter in the name of the
Lancaster House constitution mostly influenced the country’s political terrain at
independence. The agreements at the Lancaster House were much influenced by the
British government’s need to preserve the white privileges. Hence the Lancaster
House agreement noted that any land reform in the country would be conducted on
a willing buyer—willing seller basis. The clause in the constitution was also
supported by the protection of private property clause in the same constitution.
The agreement also noted that any amendment to the clause would need a 100 %
majority in the parliament. Such a situation was impossible given that there were
20 seats that were reserved for the whites who had vested interest in land.
Sam Moyo points out that since the attainment of independence land occupations
by individuals and groups of individuals moved in different waves namely low
profile—high intensity to high profile—high intensity (Moyo 2004). The occupa-
tions were not exclusive to white owned farms but also to state farms as well, just
like in the case of the Gambuli occupations in 1996 (Simura 2009). Sam Moyo
rightly concludes the issue as he argues that, “The last phase of high intensity and
high profile land occupations began in 1997, although many scholars, political
analysts and some of the media seem to conveniently forget it by focusing on the
analysis of the Zimbabwe land conflict from the occupations that followed the
constitutional referendum” (Moyo 2004: 204).
Zimbabweans started to show signs of fatigue on how the government was
handling the late issue in late 1997. Even the government had noted the rising of
the tide and in 1997 President Mugabe announced that they had designated 1741
farms for compulsory acquisition (Alexander 2004: 54). In 1998, the Zimbabwean
government called for a donors’ conference to deal with the land issue. The donors
were not forthcoming and the amount that was pledged at the conference was far
less than 50 % of the total budget for the whole programme.
In 1998, people of Chief Svosve occupied the lands in Mashonaland. The event
sparked a spiral of land occupations across the country. The government, having
being ducked by the New Labor government of Tony Blair, which reneged from the
British colonial responsibility tried to cool the tempers of the masses by promising
them that after the passing of a draft constitution in 2000, they would have
constitutional powers for compulsory acquisition of land and redistributed to the
people. This was not the case as the constitution was defeated in the referendum.
This only increased the only boiling temperatures, especially given the fact that the
white commercial farmers played a significant role in the defeat of the constitution.
The War Veterans took over the reins from the people and led a quasi—militant
land occupation crusade, As noted by Wilbert Sadombo that, “Under war veterans
leadership the land movement became more militant, challenging settler capital, the
state, ZANU PF elites and President Mugabe from 1998. The unfolding drama of
Zimbabwe’s land occupations manifests sharp class conflicts in the politics of land,
state and social movements (Sadomba 2009: 2).
6 The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the Changing Geo-Political... 73

With no power to restrain the land occupations that were now being led by the
War Veterans, the government gave its support, incorporated the occupations into
the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Second Phase (LRRP II). The
programme was renamed the third Chimurenga and it brought an outcry from the
British government, which started talking about human rights and openly agitated
for ‘regime change’ in Harare. The debate on the third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe
has been marred by unjust analyses by the forgetful mind of the cheque book
intellectual community and the briefcase NGOs that compete for western funding.
The notion that ‘right is might was substituted by the notion of might is right’. A
number of issues were either arm-twisted to suit the western notion or totally
forgotten, as they served no interest to Britain and its allies. These issues include
the fact that Britain reneged from its international treaty responsibility, which was
time and again reminded to Zimbabwe by the same persons and institutions after the
controversial SADC Tribunal ruled in favor of the whites on the land issue in
Zimbabwe.
Blair denied issuing funds for the land reform to the ZANU PF government
basing on the notion that the funds would be used to enrich Mugabe’s cronies. Such
a statement was contradictory to what his government said in reference to the LRRP
I. It noted that the previous British governments had released the funds and
according to the British government, the resources had met most of the intended
beneficiaries (Clair 2007/2008). According to Blair, Britain and his government did
not renege from their colonial responsibility but chose to release the funds via
international institutions and the DFID and the Zimbabwean government refused
such an arrangement (Blair 2011).
Blair’s argument raises two important questions: the first is that if the issue of the
land reform in Zimbabwe was an arrangement between the Zimbabwean and
British government which was already underway, why the British government did
chose to switch hands at the middle of the way. Had there been any mishandling of
the funds by the government in Zimbabwe in the first phase, his argument could
have been factual. However, there was little of such mishandling and his govern-
ment also acknowledged that the first phase had met most of its targets. The
argument therefore fails to explain the change of the policy hence the Zimbabwean
government was justified in rejecting the arrangement that was driven by the
colonial mentality of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The second question pertains the letter written by Clair Short to the then Minister
of Lands, Didmus Mutasa, which explicitly noted that the New Labor government
was not part of the agreement of the previous Conservative governments. If Blair is
right in his claiming that his government did not renege from its colonial respon-
sibility, he should be able to interpret in better terms what Clair Short referred to
when she wrote that:
“I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet
the cost of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government from diverse back-
grounds without links to former colonial interest. My own origins are Irish and as you know
we were colonized not colonizers” (Clair 2007/2008: 17).
74 L. Asuelime and B. Simura

Another forgotten issue is that it was not President Mugabe who leapfrogged the
people to go and occupy the lands. A number of factors drove the people to occupy
the land and different sections of the masses occupied the land for different reasons.
The Svosve people occupied the farms claiming that the land historically belonged
to them and had to protect their heritage and the graves of their ancestors
(Mutyasira 2002: 19). Others joined in the struggle as they needed land to farm
and also to stay. According to Joseph Chinotimba, a prominent leader of the War
Veterans, the War Veterans occupied the farms as they found that the government
had failed to meet its wartime promise and so had to force the government just as
Smith was forced to sign the Lancaster House Agreement (Simura 2009).
Politics of Violence
Liberation political parties have been accused of using violence as a political tool in
Africa. Many analysts argue that the mentality of the struggle was not removed
from the psyche of the leaders of the struggles who are also accused of having a
mentality of claiming a divine control of the state in Africa. However, such an
argument does not do justice to the question of political violence in Africa and other
regions where violence takes place. The colonial states used violence and draconian
laws to keep themselves in power. This was done with the acceptance of the
Western countries that now stand as the custodians of democracy and politics of
inclusion.
Opposition parties have also proved that they can also be more violent than the
nationalist parties that they challenge. In Kenya, Raila Odinga employed politics of
ethnicity and violence to try and wrestle power from Mwai Kibaki. The post-
election violence in Kenya in 2007 was a war of the Luo of Odinga and the rest
against the Kikuyu of Kibaki (Roberts 2007). Analysts have noted that Odinga’s
Rainbow Party premeditated the violence and the ethnic card was at the centre of
Odinga’s campaign.
Political violence is not a monopoly of the party in power. Different factors force
either the ruling party or the opposition to use violence in order to gain power or
international sympathy. Such violence is not only restricted to inter party violence.
Intra-party violence is also a political tool that is used by many ambitious politi-
cians to silence their rivals. As noted earlier on, when the Rainbow Party in Kenya
saw violence working in its favor, it used it to catapult it into the power corridors of
Kenyan politics. In 2011, the rebels of Benghazi, masquerading as demonstrators
used violence against a de-facto government in Libya. The calculations were clear
that the all needed Western support would tip in their favor after the retaliation of
the government in Tripoli. However, such natures of violence do not attract
international outcry because of the belief that opposition or rebellious parties
deserve national and international sympathy.
In Zimbabwe, the MDC’s intra-party violence has been a cause of concern and
raises questions as to the claims by it that it is a party of peace and tolerance. Since
6 The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the Changing Geo-Political... 75

its creation in late 1999, the MDC and other media organizations and the NGO
sector have always brushed aside claims by ZANU PF that the MDC was perpe-
trating violence. Indeed there was no clear evidence to substantiate the claims until
in 2005 when the party broke up due to disagreements on the senate issue.
The MDC leader (now MDC-T) leader Morgan Tsvangirai also confessed to his
violence tendencies when he pronounced in 2002 that, “We want to tell Mugabe
that go peacefully or we will remove you violently” (The Insider 2011a). This
theoretical confession was practically manifested in the flopped ‘Final Push’ that
failed to materialize not because of MDC’s peaceful disposition, but the apparent
strength and principles of the Zimbabwe security forces.
In a broader perspective, the political violence in Zimbabwe cannot be fully
understood if analyzed outside the realm of liberation politics. The difference
between the MDC and other opposition forces that came on the Zimbabwean
political landscape was the foreign hand that drove or perceived to have been
driving the political party. While there has been unethical behavior within ZANU
PF in election times, violence was minimal to negligible levels. However, with the
advent of MDC with a full backing from the (former) white farmers and remnants of
the Rhodesian Front and the British government, violence became glaring mostly
from ZANU PF and the War veterans. It is important to decipher the reason why the
militant behavior of the struggle was reborn in the former freedom fighters if the
question of violence is to be truly understood. Daniel Branch, in his analysis of
the post-election violence in Kenya, notes that:
Participants in political violence ... act for very many more reasons than simply their
membership in particular social groups. Indeed, there can be as many combinations of
causes of violence as the number of individual perpetrators. Identifying just one cause of
the violence, be it corruption, ethnicity, inequality, demography or political ideology, is
unlikely to capture the complexity or reality of the nature of the violence (Branch 2009: 90).
While the statement was said in light of the political violence in Kenya, it suits
any case of political violence in any part of the Africa, Zimbabwe being not of any
exception.
In light of the support that came from the people who were regarded as the
enemies of the revolution, former freedom fighters saw a negation of their years of
struggle and hence the need to guard it rather than crying foul. An attack on those
who supported MDC during the Fast Track Land Reform Programme and other
later election times was equated to attacking a sell-out during the liberation
struggle. Tempers had been raised by the actions of the white commercial farmers
who set out to bank role the defeat of the 2000 draft constitution in a referendum.
The constitution held the British government responsible for the land reform in
Zimbabwe and provided ground for the Zimbabwean government to acquire land
compulsorily from the commercial farmers for redistribution to the landless.
Blessing Simura argues that the draft constitution lost in the referendum due to
the cast vote of the farm workers that was mobilized by the commercial farmers by
either coercion or persuasion due to the demographic set-up of the country (Simura
2009: 36). The demographic set up of Zimbabwe has the majority rural and
76 L. Asuelime and B. Simura

minority urban. Given that the MDC had not gained any notable support in the rural
areas, ZANU PF had a rural monopoly and also had a smaller fraction of the urban
electorate. In light of this set up, the 48/52 % loss of the draft constitution which
was sponsored by ZANU PF and opposed by the MDC and commercial farmers
proves that the white farmers played a king maker’s role in the elections. As both
the MDC and the white commercial farmers were seen as working for the same final
outcome (to derail the gains of independence) they all became equal targets in what
was viewed as another Chimurenga.
On the other hand, ZANU PF did not deny the use of violence by its supporters
but has denied having monopolized the use of violence in Zimbabwe. The govern-
ment also accused the MDC of the use of violence. Government evidence had
mostly been published through the public/state media which many people
discredited as the ZANU PF propaganda machine. The ZANU PF government
also silenced the public media from publicizing or broadcasting issues of political
violence that were alleged to have been perpetrated by its supporters.
To counter this offensive, the private media which were sympathetic or
supported MDC always concentrated on publicizing alleged ZANU PF violence
whilst turning a blind eye or dismissing as propaganda alleged violence by MDC
supporters. This led to national polarization and the media which are supposed to
play an informative role to the public only helped in making the whole situation a
myth wrapped in an enigma. In his address to a pass out parade of police officers
graduates at Morris Depot, Commissioner General Augustine Chihuri lamented the
notion that the private media turns a blind eye on opposition political violence even
when state security officers are brutalized or killed but make a lot of noise when the
police arrest the violence perpetrators (Chihuri 2011). The ZANU PF government
also came up with a counter offensive against the public media’s publication of acts
of violence which was attributed to it by enacting laws that protected senior
government official like the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
and the Public Order and Security Act (AIPPA and POSA respectively).
The ensuing argument notes that both ZANU PF and MDC have applied
violence as a political tool. The difference between the two is that ZANU PF is in
effective control of state security apparatus which it can use to bar MDC from
holding rallies, to fight back MDC violence and also to arrest MDC alleged violence
perpetrators while covering up for the violence perpetrated by its supporters. There
is also no substantive evidence to justify any claim that political violence as a
political tool has been a formal strategy premeditated from the highest party
structures. Quoting the sentiments of Mugabe that ZANU PF had ‘degrees in
violence’ cannot be used as a party policy. If it can be taken so, then one should
also accept Tsvangirai’s declaration that “if Mugabe does not go peacefully, MDC
would remove him violently” as a declaration of party violence leanings. Such
claims cannot be used to justify the violence of supporters and other overzealous
party members.
However, it is political intimidation from the high-ranking security officers that
can be read as a purely national strategy for ZANU PF to retain power in the major
elections since the historic ‘NO’ vote in February 2000. Notable military generals
6 The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the Changing Geo-Political... 77

and internal security chiefs like the late Vitalis Zvinavashe; police Commissioner
General, Augustine Chihuri, General Constantine Chiwenga and Brigadier General
Nyikayaramba have all noted explicitly that they would not salute any president
without war credentials or someone who is willing to surrender back the country to
the former colonial masters. This was seen as implementing a coup against
Tsvangirai before he comes into office.
While there are other politicians with war credentials in other political parties
including MDC, the most aspiring candidate who has been seen as having the steam
to dislodge Mugabe and ZANU PF is Morgan Tsvangirai and his faction of the
MDC. Tsvangirai has a war history which he will always wish to forget. He left the
struggle to return home and, as he says, to take care of his parents (Moyo 2011: 9).
What the utterances then mean is that Tsvangirai will never rule Zimbabwe if the
current national security set up is in place. This explains why the MDC—T has
always been pushing for what it calls security sector reforms in the Government of
National Unity (GNU).
While the military has an important role to play in national politics as well as the
formulation of different internal and external policies, their involvement in issues to
do with the civilian leadership of the state should be minimized inorder to give the
citizens open room for free choice. In a normal situation, the military leadership
should always submit to a leader who is chosen by the people in any national legally
endorsed elections according to the electoral laws and the constitution of such a
state. From this argument, it will be argued that the utterances of the Zimbabwe
security sector leadership nullified the will of the people and only gave the citizens
a single choice at a time when they are supposed to have open choices for their
leadership.
Be that as it may, it should be argued that the situation in Zimbabwe was not and
has remained abnormal since the creation of the MDC and the mingling into
national politics by the Western governments, particularly Britain and the USA.
What most of the military personnel pointed out, but which has been quickly
forgotten or unnoticed by the intellectual and NGO sectors that are anti-ZANU
PF is that the military noted that it would not allow anyone alleged to be a puppet to
rule Zimbabwe as that would be tantamount to returning the country to the erstwhile
colonial masters. The generals also noted that they would resign from their position
and only defend their pieces of land. Former General Vitalis Zvinavashe pointed
out that the army would support a national leader who, ‘pursue Zimbabwean values,
traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in pursuit of
Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national
interest. To this end, let it be known that the highest office on the land is a
‘straightjacket’ whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liber-
ation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute anyone
with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our
country and our people (The Insider 2011b).
That the MDC has been working with the Western governments to effect regime
change in Zimbabwe is no longer a gossip but an established fact. Tony Blair noted
that the British government has been working with the MDC to effect regime
78 L. Asuelime and B. Simura

change in Harare (Moyo 2011). George Bush (Jnr) also noted statements to that
effect hence only crystallizing what ZANU PF had been saying since the birth of the
MDC. According to the MDC, the third Chimurenga was illegal. This clearly put
the MDC at opposing poles with both the Service Chiefs and the War Veterans who
are among the hundreds of thousands who benefitted from the third Chimurenga.
The MDC has also, since its creation, been working with the former white
farmers and given the animosity and the mistrust between the government, the
War Veterans and the Service Chiefs who are also part of the War Veterans
community, the battle would be extended to MDC as it was viewed as a proxy by
ZANU PF and the nationalist writers.
Actions of the British and the USA government are tantamount to mingling in
the internal affairs of a sovereign nation, which has a right to self-determination
under international law. The slamming of Zimbabwe with sanctions
2
so that the
people would rise up against a legally elected government and to tip the scales in
favor of another contesting party is equal to electoral rigging. While there have
been celebrations that the March 2008 harmonized elections were the most free and
fair elections in Zimbabwe since 1980, the 2008 harmonized election were heavily
rigged in favor of the opposition, MDC—T given the fact that the USA sanctions
and the EU ‘Targeted Sanctions’ had destroyed the economy to the point that
people voted with their stomachs and not with their hearts and minds. When people
are subjected to unbearable hunger and starvation, reason will be substituted for
survival. In the March 2008 harmonized elections Zimbabweans did not vote with
their brains but they voted with their stomachs.
To add insult to injury, the cheque-book intellectuals and the Western funded
NGOs have continued to deny the existence of sanctions. Indeed there has been
great confusion of the nature of the sanctions by the West on Zimbabwe. While the
majority of the people are driven to think that there are only travel restrictions and
targeted sanctions on some members of ZANU PF and those who prop it up,
evidence on the ground point otherwise. A look on Zimbabwe Democracy and
Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) of the USA government proves that Zimbabwe
is under a blanket sanctions from the USA. The law (ZIDERA) empowers USA
representatives at international financial institutions to veto any extension of finan-
cial support, including budgetary or debt cancelation, to the Zimbabwean govern-
ment until there is democratic reform and democratic change in Zimbabwe and the
land issue has been resolved to the plans of the Zimbabwe Donors Conference of
1998 (ZIDERA 2001).
Related to the issue of political violence and sanctions is the notion that the
MDC called for sanctions to be slammed on Zimbabwe (Mpetiwa 2011). Such an
2
The topic of sanctions on Zimbabwe is a very broad subject that has allegations and counter
allegations on whether they are targeted and meant to correct democratic flaws in the country or
whether they are a subtle measure meant to whip public emotions against ZANU PF and effect
regime change. For a detailed study one can read Heather Chingono, “Zimbabwe sanctions: An
analysis of the “Lingo” guiding the perceptions of the sanctioners and the sanctionees,” in African
Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 4(2), February 2010
6 The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the Changing Geo-Political... 79

act should be viewed as under cover political violence. One can speculate on the
reasons why the MDC wanted Zimbabwe to be sanctioned by the west and
South Africa. The sanctions were meant to hurt the ordinary citizens and force
them to vote against ZANU PF. Calling for sanctions to influence electoral results
was both pre-electoral violence and also an electoral rigging mechanism. Even
though ZANU PF tried to counter the move by applying the Look East Policy, the
long attachment with the west could not go without repercussions and the Chinese
government was more cooperative diplomatically than financially. Hence, while in
its early years the MDC was not explicitly violent; it also pursued silent violent
politics that were meant to tip the results in its favour.
Conclusion
The rise of MDC has brought many lessons for the Zimbabwean population. Even
though the MDC failed to take over the country’s presidency, it brought positive
and negative changes to Zimbabwean politics.
Firstly, the rise of MDC awakened the slumbering ZANU-PF. After almost two
decades of unchallenged control of national politics, ZANU-PF was beginning to
see itself as the divine political party in the country. One can argue that most in
ZANU-PF saw the party as a de-facto monarchy in which Mugabe was the king and
the senior members as crown princes of the country. With each year, the account-
ability of Members of Parliament (MPs) came into question as they only visited
their constituencies during election times and disappeared until the next election.
The rise of MDC and the loss of some major seats, especially in the March 2008
harmonized elections breathed a new life in the party, which realized that
restructuring was necessary and MPs had to be accountable to those who gave the
mandate to be in the parliament. Zimbabweans were also showered with a choice in
which a failing party could be replaced, bringing in a new era of mature democracy.
Be that as it may, there were also negative developments. The rise of MDC,
allegedly ridding on the back of the former colonial masters, at a time of a new
struggle against the same erstwhile master who had reneged from his colonial
responsibilities, created a tense atmosphere of political polarization and violence
that had last been known either during the liberation struggle or the Matabeleland
disturbances. It is this element of violence which Zimbabweans, as they previously
did, should get rid-off, usher in an era of political tolerance in which unwanted
elements are told to go and hang through the ballot rather that by physical means.
The last, but not least, lesson is that both the politicians and the ordinary citizens
were awakened to the fact that imperialism against Zimbabwe did not die but only
changed the manner in which it sought to control the nation’s strategic resources in
a manner that suit the international political dispensation.
80 L. Asuelime and B. Simura

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