No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
The Fundamental Ontological Interpretation of the Original Essence of Revelation as Affectivity
Abstract
The conditions for manifestation in general and, first of all, for the manifestation of a being have been shown. A being, as we have seen, does not manifest itself, its encounter can take place only within a horizon which itself must present itself in the form of an effective phenomenological ‘offering’. Insofar as a being manifests itself, it is capable of affecting us. “All affection,” says Heidegger, “is a manifestation by which a being already on hand gives notice of itself.”1 Insofar as the manifestation of a being implies the manifestation of the horizon, every affection by it, every ontic affection presupposes an ontological affection and finds in it its foundation. This is why the concept of affection must be drawn forth from the uncertainty where philosophy too often leaves it. What we [574] call an affection, the immediate arising of a datum and more specifically its passive pre-giveness, such as takes place prior to every operation of knowledge, to every activity to grasp it explicitly or spontaneously, is not simple; it is not something original if, as is usually the case, we reduce it to that which in it excites us or affects us.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
EXPERIENCE is something of which we are conscious. It is the first result of our comprehension, but it is not the limit of our understanding, since it stimulates our faculty of reason, but does not satisfy its desire for knowledge. While all our knowledge may begin with sensible impressions or experience there is an element in it which does not rise from this source, but transcends it. That knowledge is transcendental which is occupied not so much with mere outward objects as with our manner of knowing those objects, that is to say, with a priori concepts of them. All our knowledge is either a priori or a posteriori. That is a posteriori knowledge which is derived from sensible experience as including sensible impressions or states; while a priori knowledge is that which is not thus gained, but consists of whatever is universal or necessary. A complete Transcendental Philosophy would be a systematic exposition of all that is a priori in human knowledge, or of 'all the principles of pure reason.' But a Critique of Pure Reason cannot include all this. It can do little more than deal with the synthetic element or quality in a priori knowledge, as distinguished from the analytic elements. We perceive objects through our sensibility which furnishes us, as our faculty of receptivity, with those intuitions that become translated into thought by means of the understanding. This is the origin of our conceptions, or ideas. I denominate as matter that which in a phenomenon corresponds to sensation; while I call form that quality of matter which presents it in a perceived order. Only matter is presented to our minds a posteriori; as to form, this must inevitably exist in the mind a priori, and therefore it can be considered apart from all sensation.
The Critique of Practical Reason is the second of Kant's three Critiques, one of his three major treatises on moral theory, and a seminal text in the history of moral philosophy. Originally published three years after his Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, the Critique provides further elaboration of the basic themes of Kant's moral theory, gives the most complete statement of his highly original theory of freedom of the will, and develops his practical metaphysics. This new edition of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason – prepared by an acclaimed translator and scholar of Kant's practical philosophy – presents the first new translation of this work to appear for some years. A substantial and lucid introduction by Andrews Reath places the main themes of the Critique in the context of Kant's moral theory and his critical system.
Nacido y muerto en París (1871-1922), el escritor francés Marcel Proust presentó su primera obra, Los placeres y los días, en 1896 y trabajó durante los siguientes ocho años en Jean Santeuil, novela publicada póstumamente y bosquejo de la que sería su obra más importante. A partir de 1906 y hasta su muerte, Proust se consagró al ciclo monumental de siete novelas que forman En busca del tiempo perdido: Por el camino de Swann (1913), A la sombra de las muchachas en flor (1919 y Premio Goncourt del mismo año), El mundo de Guermantes (1921-1922), Sodoma y Gomorra (1922-1923), La prisionera (1925), La fugitiva o Albertina desaparecida (1927), y El tiempo recuperado (1927). Agudo observador del medio burgués y aristócrata en el cual se desenvolvió, En busca del tiempo perdido es por igual un amplio fresco de ese ambiente, que una obra fuertemente anclada en el acontecer vital de Proust y en la preocupación filosófica por el transcurrir del tiempo.
Aletheia-Heraklit, fragment 16
- Martin Heidegger
Heidegger’s commentary on Hölderlin’s verse: “We are a sign devoid of meaning” in Was heisst Denken?
- Cf
Grasset, 1945) 276. [Henry’s italics
- Franz Kafka
Existentialism is a Humanism Wisdom Library, s.d
- Jean-Paul Sartre
Phenomenology of Perception, tr
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty
The Sickness unto Death
- Søren Kierkegaard
- S Kierkegaard
Selected Treatises and Sermons, tr: Collins-The Fontana Library, 1963) 233; cf. supra, chapter
- M Meister Eckhart James
- John V Clark
- Skinner
Überwindung der Metaphysik, in Vorträge und Aufsätze. I. 3 ed. Pfüllingen: Neske
- Martin Heidegger
Was heisst Denken? in Vorträge und Aufsätze, II, 3 ed. (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1967) 9. [Henry’s italics
- Martin Heidegger
The same remark is made about fear: “The specific ecstatical unity which makes it existentially possible to be afraid, temporalizes itself primarily out of the kind of forgetting characterized above… as a mode of having been…
- Cf
- Ibid
Scheler’s fine analyses, The Nature of Sympathy, tr
- Cf
Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 262; The Nature of Sympathy, 2–3; Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis
- Max Scheler
Michel Henry, Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps
- Cf
Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis, in Vom Umsturz der Werte
- Max Scheler
Dichterisch wohnt der Mensch, in Vorträge und Aufsätze
- Martin Heidegger
- M Heidegger
Überwindung der Metaphysik
- Martin Heidegger
- M Heidegger
The French translation of aufgebraucht reads réunis instead of épuisés
- Ibid
The Works of George Berkeley, I
- George Berkeley
- G Berkeley
Collins-The Fontana Library, 1963) 233; cf. supra
- Meister Eckhart
The Phenomenology of Mind, tr
- G W F Hegel
- GWF Hegel
On the Essence of Truth, tr. R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick
- Martin Heidegger
- M Heidegger