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Psychological Aspects of Suicide Terrorism
... On one hand, some group of researchers have argued that it is logical and safe to locate the rootedness of BH use of suicide bombers in religious fundamentalism (Federal Research Division-Library of Congress, 2005;Post, 2009;Adesoji, 2010;Stein, 2012;Aghedo, 2014;Okoro, 2014;Thurtson, 2016;Warner & Matfess, 2017). Others suggests in literature, that suicide bombings could be viewed as a form of psychopathological behavior and not as an outcome of rational calculations by the victimthe madman philosophy (Post, 2009;Ariel, 2010;Hassan, 2011;Enders & Sandler, 2012;Salaam, 2013;Korbi, 2017). ...
... The Madman Philosophy: Contrary to the above religious position, some psychological theorist hold that suicide attacks could be well understood from psychological perspectives precisely from what could be referred to as 'the madman philosophy' (De Mause, 2002;Post, 2009;Ariel, 2010;Korbi, 2017). The focus of this approach is primarily on the study of terrorists' minds. ...
... -could be deduced. Psychological theorist who subscribe to this approach assumes that persons who perpetrate violence such as suicide bombing, planting bombs on an airliner, detonating improvised explosives on a city street, tossing of hand grenade into a crowded cafe, beheading of victims are abnormal, mad or crazed individuals (Federal Research Division-Library of Congress, 2005;Post, 2009;Ariel, 2010;Korbi, 2017). It is precisely this kind of thinking that led to the framing of terrorism "as criminal violence perpetrated by individuals suffering from psychopathic and paranoid personality disorder" (Hassan, 2011, p. 28). ...
Boko Haram is an Islamist insurgent group that has orchestrated mayhem in northern Nigeria for years. In 2011, the group introduced the use of suicide bombers against targets in their operational bases. Since then, the activities of Boko Haram sponsored suicide bombings have reached a point of serious concern to security experts in the country and beyond. Despite the security threat posed by suicide bombers to the Nigerian state, the topic is often misperceived by researchers. While some researchers have argued that acts of suicide bombings in Nigeria and beyond could be explained in religious terms, others have portrayed suicide bombers in literature as deluded or crazed individuals with mental illnesses or under the influence of hard drugs. In contrast to these mainstream perspectives, this article seeks to demonstrate that suicide bombing is a tactic of war used by the leadership of Boko Haram terrorist group to achieve strategic goals. It was argued that terror organisations like Boko Haram who sponsor suicide bombers to their death engage in a strategic calculus. The article showed that the cheap cost implication of the tactic, tactical efficiency for reaching well-guarded or high value targets etc. are among the reasons why the group sponsor suicide bombers. The article concludes by arguing that until suicide bombings are viewed as a tactic, suicide bombing attacks may never cease to occur in the country. The article proposed some recommendations that could enable government officials reduce or eliminate the threats posed by Boko Haram suicide bombers in Nigeria.
... Based on the categorization of Durkheim, Pape argued that unlike being suicidal in the normal sense (egoistic), suicide bombers believe the behavior leading to their death to be altruistic (e.g., to liberate their country and people). Merari also expressed the same distinction between ordinary "egoistic" suicide (to escape pain) and bomber "altruistic" suicide (to serve the community) (Merari, 2010). Consistently, many scholars found that most suicide bombers originated from normal social conditions regarding financial, educational, and mental status (Crenshaw, 2007). ...
... Both Pape and Merari emphasized the importance of public support to the organizations and the acts of suicide bombing. While Pape focused on the public perspective related to nationalism, Merari pointed out that terrorists use the community's approval for moral justification (Merari, 2010;Pape, 2008). Additionally, Khosrokhavar presented the phenomenon of transnational communities of martyrs (Khosrokhavar, 2005). ...
... Third, regarding the psychological traits of suicide bombers, Pape based his arguments on the social exchange theory (Pape, 2008). Still, Merari disagreed on this point and emphasized the dependent-avoidant personality found in would-be suicide bombers (Merari, 2010). Both researchers pointed to the aspect of rationality, as they showed that the majority of suicide bombers do not present psychopathic characteristics (and terrorist organizers deliberately discard "candidates" with such personalities). ...
The book examines the psycho-religious mechanism behind the violent extremism of suicide attacks in the post-9/11 world. It employs the mindsponge concept, an original dataset, and original research results obtained from the authors' statistical investigations using the Hamiltonian Markov chain Monte Carlo technique. It provides insights and implications for policymakers and strategists in their efforts to engage in peace talks and reduce violent conflicts worldwide. ================================================================== Quan-Hoang Vuong, Minh-Hoang Nguyen, Tam-Tri Le. (2021). A Mindsponge-Based Investigation into the Psycho-Religious Mechanism Behind Suicide Attacks. Warsaw, Poland: De Gruyter / Sciendo. https://doi.org/10.2478/9788366675599 Online ISBN: 9788366675599 *Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/dp/8366675580/
... coercion, threat, crisis) or sudden impulse (Lankford, 2016;World Health Organization, 2023). Although family killers may sometimes lose their temper, kill their loved ones and then choose suicide to escape their crisis (Turanovic et al., 2022), public mass shooters and suicide terrorists are usually acting of their own volition and committing premeditated attacks, not impulsive ones (Lankford, 2018;Merari, 2010;Pape, 2005). Accordingly, when they die by suicide or express interest in that fatal outcome, their mental state may be similar to those of suicidal individuals with mental disorders. ...
... For example, mass shooters and suicide terrorists do not always die; sometimes they had suicidal intent but changed their mind at the last minute, or they were arrested before they attacked or before their attacks reached a suicidal conclusion (Peterson & Densley, 2023;Silva, 2022). In these cases, such individuals can potentially be interviewed and have their mental state directly assessed (Lankford, 2018;Merari, 2010). Those findings can be combined with the results from pre-attack diagnoses, retrospective assessments and psychological autopsies of other perpetrators of the same type, thus creating a fuller picture of the association between mental disorders and that form of violence. ...
Despite tremendous public and media interest in murder–suicide, scientific research that sheds new light on either the prevalence of mental disorders among perpetrators of mass murder–suicide or the role of mental disorders when they appear relevant has been rare. I outline several assumptions and challenges that may encumber scholarship in this area but also identify some promising avenues for future research. Greater scientific understanding of any associations between mental disorders and murder–suicide could lead to more evidence-based interventions that could help prevent these lethal attacks.
... This therefore implies why the group level analysis cannot be done in isolation of the social factors (Victor, 2003). Additionally, the fact that majority of the people that carry out suicide operations on behalf of a group are sometimes not members of the group, highlights the role of the group to include that of ideologue and organizers (Merari, 2010). Consequent upon the above, the group serves as a platform for the mobilization of recruits and social support for suicide terror campaigns, without which the campaign cannot succeed (Barbalet, 2006). ...
... In Pakistan where the Sunnis constitute the ruling majority, however militant Sunni groups have continuously launched Suicide attacks against the minority Shiites (Bloom, 2010). This same phenomenon exists in Iraq where the Sunni militant groupsmainly AQI, apart from targeting the coalition forces and the Shite led government and its security forces, launched over 160 suicide attacks against Shiite civilian targets between 2004 and 2008 (Merari, 2010). The targets in most of these attacks against the Shiites ranges from mosques, funeral mourners, weddings, pilgrims, Shiite community facilities, political leaders, and Shiite neighbourhoods (Michael & Scolnick 2006). ...
Suicide terrorism seemingly employed to settled conflicts between the Shiite and the Sunnis, mixed with the Salafis ideology of violence is also seen used for demand for State of Islam, national liberation, and propagation against democracies, mis-governance, and secularism amongst others. Terror cells groups could be seen aggravating suicide terrorism by substituting suicide for martyrdom. It was against this background that this study engage religious belief hypothesis to interrogate the roles of religion in garnering social support for suicide terrorism. The study decomposes roles of religion in suicide terrorism into crises between the Shiites and the Sunnis, substitution of suicide with martyrdom. The study employed desktop research design with reliance historical and secondary data from extant literature. The study concludes that the manipulation of the religious injunctions, extremist interpretation of religious teachings, as well as advancement of religion facade for economic gains stronger motivation for people who support suicide terrorism. Finding from the study showed that there would be no successful suicide terror campaign without the support of the society where the suicide terrorists reside and whose interest they claim to be defending. The study recommends that distorted ideology driven by religion can only be countered by respected Islamic clerics and leaders, especially from the Arab world with covert Western support to circumvent the perverted narrative of martyrdom as sacrifice for the good of the land, people or God, and rather brand it as common suicide and an honourless venture.
... However, even if the vast majority of terrorists are not similar to public mass shooters, two subtypes-suicide terrorists and lone actor terrorists (i.e., "lone wolves")-are more comparable. Most suicide terrorists were not experienced fighters prior to their attacks-they were community members who decided to commit murder-suicide before they joined the terrorist group that sponsored them and provided the explosive device (Merari, 2010;Pedahzur, 2005). And by definition, lone actor terrorists operate on their own-just like most public mass shooters. ...
... First, we recruited six heterogeneous hard-to-reach WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) and nonWEIRD samples of Muslims, including former Jihadists (Study 5), and examined associations between personality and behavioral intention across a number of countries, especially ones with many radicalized Islamist individuals per capita (Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, and Afghanistan). Exploring a common pattern of trait associations across these contexts addresses the current lack of comprehensive, transnational studies on Jihadism using standard, well-validated personality measures (see Merari, 2010). ...
Objective
Although violent extremism is often attributed to clinical (dysfunctional) dispositions, it is also possible that violent Jihadists might be clinically “normal” but bear certain personality signatures. This alternative view has yet to be tested.
Method
In six studies, employing hard-to-reach Muslim samples, including one study of former Mujahideen, we investigated the relationship between basic personality traits and violent extremism. We further used a known group paradigm to validate the personality signatures of violent extremism, comparing a sample of former Mujahideen with another sample from Afghanistan.
Results
These studies and an internal meta-analysis revealed that Lower Openness to Experience, lower Emotionality, and lower Altruism were associated with more violent intentions to support Muslims. Higher Altruism was associated with higher levels of nonviolent intention to support Muslims. Supporting the validity of the nonviolent intention measure, similar associations were found in Study 3 with overt behavioral support of Muslims (donations). More important, compared to the nonMujahideen, the Mujahideen sample scored lower on average on, for instance, Openness, indicating that these results go beyond self-reported, findings.
Conclusion
We demonstrated that personality predicts violent and nonviolent defense of Muslims among four general populations of Muslims living in the West and in Asia (including the Middle East), and a sample of Mujahideen in Afghanistan.
... It focuses its attention only on relevant risk factors in the domains of Motivation, Ideology, and Capability. The study eliminates several variables when examining terrorists, such as marital status, gender, and social class [32,[80][81][82][83][84][85][86] . ...
Psychological criminogenic factors for identifying terrorist offenders at risk of recidivism in Indonesia remain unclear; hence the adequate assessment to those involved with terrorism and measurement of effective terrorism rehabilitation are questioned. ‘MIKRA’ Risk Assessment was developed to identify individual criminogenic risk factors and needs of terrorist offenders in Indonesia. It is formulated to set up future parameters of effective terrorism rehabilitation. MIKRA study involved thirty-two eminent Indonesian counterterrorism experts and practitioners in semistructured interviews and qualitative data analysis. The study identifies 18 individual risk factors and needs of ideology-based terrorist offenders that are grouped into one of three higher order domains: Motivation, Ideology, and Capability.
... In the absence of useful comparison or, additionally, control groups (e.g. Merari, 2010), even unashamedly empirical analyses can at best offer largely descriptive (and as a result, partial) account of violent extremism. As LaFree (2013:60) notes, there has been a nascent research trend towards the development of "specialized data sets on specific subsets of terrorism cases" which represents the third major development in the empirical study of terrorism. ...
The study found little to distinguish these two violent offender types in their socio-demographic profiles. Their behaviors, on the other hand, differed significantly in the degree to which they had interacted with co-conspirators, their antecedent event behaviors, and the degree to which they lacked information prior to their attack. Unlike lone terrorists, mass murderers' violence was spontaneous due to unplanned physical or emotional conflicts. Lone terrorists, on the other hand, were motivated to commit violence due to ideologically based conflicts or differences with potential target victims. Regarding threat or risk, there are a number of overlapping questions that must be considered, including what type of action is most likely, under what conditions is a particular mass violence attack likely to be perpetrated, and what interventions are likely to be effective in preventing or mitigating the perpetration of violence. Lack of predetermined intent and strategy distinguishes mass murderers and lone terrorists. The lone terrorist tends to engage in more observable behaviors and planning than the mass murderer, which presents more of an opportunity to observe and assess preparatory actions and intervene to prevent the planned violence from occurring. 3 figures and approximately 100 references
... These few examples strikingly illustrate how incomprehensible radicalization into violent extremism seems to be. They stand besides many cases of individuals from various ideological and local backgrounds, whose development fails to be explained simply by mental illness (Crenshaw, 1981;Horgan, 2005;Merari, 2010;Monahan, 2017), a lack of education (Atran, 2003;Berrebi, 2009;Carson, 2017;Pape, 2005) or low socioeconomic status (Berrebi, 2009). Since terrorism is a highly complex phenomenon, it is difficult to identify general root causes (i.e., "factors that establish an environment in which terrorism may arise"; Davis & Cragin, 2009, p. xviii) or create a terrorist profile (Dean, 2007;Horgan, 2003). ...
From a psychological perspective, two aspects should be given special attention as factors of individual Islamist radicalization in the West: Criminal propensities leading to imprisonment, and religiosity. Imprisonment can lead to an intensification of perceived exclusion in young migrants. As a reaction, they realize themselves more strongly as part of their reference group (reactive ethnicity), which among Muslims is particularly clearly described in terms of religion. This can lead to negative emotions such as anger about imprisonment, the legal system, or the entire society, in which they do not feel accepted. Against the background of a heightened meaning of religion, these emotions are framed as religious emotions. However, specific criminogenic factors might play a very serious role in an escalation of the radicalization process: Substance abuse could be particularly problematic, as both alcohol and illegal drugs are highly unacceptable among religious Muslims and consequently in many Islamic societies. Thus, especially young Muslims are under great pressure when they find themselves in the Western correctional system after violent offences under the influence of alcohol or due to acquisitive crime. If they react to this by identifying more strongly with their Islamic religious affiliation, they feel it is obligatory to turn away from alcohol and/or drugs. While the strict rules of Islam and the fear of a punishing God may be a support for them in the beginning, failure can have fatal consequences. In such cases, martyrdom could be the last way to prove oneself to the religious community as a devout Muslim, and to avoid disgracing one's own family. Hence, more attention should be paid to the links between criminogenic factors and religiosity, as well as the role of contextual factors, both in academic contexts and in practical work. Especially for prevention work as well as for dealing with vulnerable and radicalized offenders, an awareness of details and a differentiated understanding of their significance can play a decisive role.
... We note that previous research focusing on personality and violent extremism has been criticized for (a) not using well-validated personality inventories to measure personality [25], (b) failing to report the methods by which personality was assessed [e.g., 26,27], and/or (c) relying on ad hoc trait measures [e.g., 28]. Other scholars have also noted that there is lack of studies linking violent extremism and personality using standard personality tests [29]. To address these shortcomings, we employed the HEXACO-PI-R inventory to provide a comprehensive mapping of human personality as it has proven to be a valid instrument across cultures [30]. ...
Previous work has often disregarded the psychological heterogeneity of violent extremists. This research aimed to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the psychological diversity of violent extremists. Based on qualitative work, we developed and validated the Extremist Archetypes Scale, identifying five distinct archetype dimensions: “adventurer,” “fellow traveler,” “leader,” “drifter” and “misfit.” Study 1 identified five dimensions among White majority members (N = 307), four of which were related to extremist violent intentions and which dissociated in terms of sociopolitical ideologies and intergroup attitudes. Preregistered Study 2 (N = 308) confirmed the scale’s five-factor solution in another sample of White majority members, replicated relationships with violent intentions, and demonstrated the dimensions’ distinct personality correlates. As in Study 1, the archetype dimensions had positive associations with extremist violent intentions and tapped onto different psychological profiles in terms of major personality traits. Study 3 (N = 317) replicated these results in a sample of Muslim minority members. Measurement equivalence was established across gender, age, political orientation, and ethnicity (majority and minority).
... The field of social psychology has also made significant advances by studying group dynamics and the potential benefits for an individual who joins a violent extremist group (4,5). Over the last decade, the number of psychology and psychiatry studies has increased; these studies have tried to portray the psychological characteristics of individuals engaged in violent extremism (6)(7)(8)(9). Two principal issues have emerged from the findings: 1) the links between mental health and radicalization and 2) the links between psychological characteristics and the trajectories of radicalized individuals. ...
Recent studies have shown higher rates of radicalization of adolescents than in the 2000s. Since 2015, radicalization prevention units have been implemented in child and adolescent psychiatry departments in France. We aimed to report on the psychopathology of adolescents who were followed up in a university department due to their “radical conduct.” Based on the available clinical data (from child psychiatry consultations, long-term family and/or individual therapy, and psychological testing) for 20 adolescents with “radical conduct,” we examined the nature of their radical conduct, their psychopathology, their family characteristics, and the existence or absence of traumatic experiences. Among the 20 adolescents, 4 had radical conduct associated with a delusional syndrome (schizophrenia or a psychotic episode after substance abuse). For the other 16, we found no psychotic conditions. The analysis of other data showed that the adolescents shared some characteristics, such as an important prevalence of intrafamilial violence, sexual abuse, imprisonment of family members, traumatic family histories, and significant psychological control or dependence phenomena occurring in divided families. This diversity of psychopathologies appears consistent with previous studies highlighting the relevance of diverse profiles depending on the presence of a delusional syndrome, the individual's gender and the individual's attraction to violence. Finally, we discuss some psychopathological hypotheses and make therapeutic recommendations. We believe that child and adolescent psychotherapy/psychiatry has a role to play in countering violent extremism by offering adolescents a way out of radical commitment.
... A deadline that is dependent on a deployment of the full military strength of the state basically fails to consider and tackle the societal pressures that influence and shape the operations of terror groups. A workable strategy must not only deploy state strength, but also tackle and alleviate the societal pressures that positively connect those who are willing to be suicide bombers and those who talk them into it (Merari, 2010). ...
As a qualitative research, this chapter examines governance failure as the roots of terrorism in Nigeria. It adopted the "gap framework" developed by Call (2010) which focused on three gaps that the state is not able to provide when there is the process of governance failure or state failure.
... Elsewhere, Atran and his colleagues argue that Hamas, like other Islamic movements, is a non-rational actor which place sacred values "at the heart of deep-seated political disputes" (ATRAN et al., 2007, p. 1040). While it is clear that Hamas used violence against Israel, what is disputed here is whether the group emphasizes violence over welfare, governance and civic restoration (LEVITT, 2006; DAVIS, 2014; ROY, 2011).As Davis mentions, several scholars study Hamas' methodology of violence,demonstrating the process by which young men are recruited, indoctrinated, provided with weapons and logistics in order to become suicide bombers(DAVIS, 2014, p. 46;CHEHAB, 2007;MERARI, 2010), noting that Hamas can restrain its violent activity when it suits its political interests.Both Khaled Hroub and Matti Steinberg mention that Hamas made the transition from attacking only soldiers and settlers in the occupied territories to attacking civilians inside Israel after the Hebron Massacre 94 under the credo of reciprocity بالمثل( الرد -al-rad bil-mithl )(HROUB, 2002;STEINBERG, 2016). ...
This dissertation examines in a comparative approach the similar shift made by Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Muslim national-religious movements since the 1990s, from the political and social margins to center-stage. This shift was generated on both sides by an objection to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and territorial and ideological compromise. This work examines this transformation from its historic and ideological roots through its institutional and political manifestations, by an ideological and thematic analysis of its contemporary discourse.The work is divided into three parts. In the first part, Chapter 1 lays down a theorical infrastructure on Strong Religious-Nationalism (SRN), a form of Religious-Nationalism in which both elements are equal, intertwined and interdependent. In Chapter 2 the theory of SRN is applied to the Israeli-Palestinian case by reexamining the conflict’s historical roots. This highlights both the special role of SRN in the mainstream national narrative and its centrality in the conflict. The second part of the dissertation deals with the shift from the margins towards hegemony through the process of politicization and institutionalization. It includes two chapters, examining first Hamas and then religious-Zionism (RZ) with a comparative reference to the previous chapter.The third part exemplifies how SRN becomes hegemonic through a dialectic of ideological discourse. Both RZ and Hamas advanced to center stage by posing a comprehensive ideological worldview. These SRN worldviews interact. The main interlocutors surveyed are Jewish and Muslim RN clergy, public intellectuals and politicians.
... Finally, Merari and colleagues carried out various psychological tests on a sample of suicide bombers and compared the results with various control groups (e.g. other terrorists and nonpolitical criminals) (Merari, 2009a(Merari, , 2009b(Merari, , 2010. These studies employed a range of techniques including clinical interviews, personality tests, the Thematic Apperception Test, and the House-Tree-Person Drawing test. ...
... It focuses its attention only on relevant risk factors in the domains of Motivation, Ideology, and Capability. The study eliminates several variables when examining terrorists, such as marital status, gender, and social class [32,[80][81][82][83][84][85][86] . ...
Psychological criminogenic factors for identifying terrorist offenders at risk of recidivism in Indonesia remain unclear; hence the adequate assessment to those involved with terrorism and measurement of effective terrorism rehabilitation are questioned. ‘MIKRA’ Risk Assessment was developed to identify individual criminogenic risk factors and needs of terrorist offenders in Indonesia. It is formulated to set up future parameters of effective terrorism rehabilitation. MIKRA study involved thirty-two eminent Indonesian counterterrorism experts and practitioners in semistructured interviews and qualitative data analysis. The study identifies 18 individual risk factors and needs of ideology-based terrorist offenders that are grouped into one of three higher order domains: Motivation, Ideology, and Capability.
... 2. Psychological Benets: Militants use terrorist tactics to maximize personal, psychological or social goals rather than political ones, based on personality traits (Post 1990;Victoro and Kruglanski 2009), social solidarity (Abrahms 2008) or revenge (Merari 2010). ...
Terrorism presents a fundamental paradox - groups that use terrorism are vastly weaker in terms of their capacity to inflict harm than the government they oppose, yet they often receive a tremendous amount of attention from the state. However, despite the widespread assumption regarding terrorism's 'terrifying' effect, there has been little systematic testing of the factors that make terrorism so emotionally and politically powerful for civilian populations, and how this impacts both state responses to militant violence and militant groups' tactical choices. In my dissertation, Risk or Retribution: The Micro-foundations of State Responses to Terror, I interrogate the emotional mechanisms motivating the mass public's response to terrorism, demonstrating how public anger in the wake of terrorist violence shapes state policies and incentivizes militant tactics. To examine the dynamics of the strategic interplay between civilians, militants, and political leaders, I test this theory with a combination of experimental, qualitative, formal, and statistical methods. In a series of pre-registered experimental studies in the United States, I find that, in contrast to the predominant narrative of terrorism's power to terrify, the dominant public response to such attacks is moral outrage and a desire for vengeance. I then develop a formal model that illuminates the dilemma this type of angry electorate creates for elected politicians. Namely, when an outraged public demands punishment of militant actors, retaliation becomes a uniformly more attractive option for politicians, even against relatively weak militant groups and even if this retaliation is not the best way to minimize future terrorism. Indeed, the model identifies a potential risk from retaliation,whereby effective counterterrorism can actually cause more terrorism by increasing weakened militants' instrumental motives to attack 'easier,' civilian targets. Content analysis of internal al-Qaeda communications confirms the prevalence of this problematic substitution effect. Moreover, analysis of these documents reveals the centrality of anger and moral outrage as mechanisms shaping militant tactics as well. Namely, desire for revenge in the wake of US strikes increased the intrinsic value militants placed on targeting civilian populations in order to punish the United States in kind for the collateral damage and perceived human suffering their actions had caused the so-called 'Muslim nation.' By identifying these parallel retributive motives driving the preferences of both the victims and perpetrators of terrorism, this project contributes to a deeper understanding of the distinct micro-foundations driving cycles of terrorism and counter-terrorism violence. Specifically, this work reconciles three central puzzles: 1) why groups that use terrorism rarely achieve concessions, and why they nonetheless continue to use it; 2) why democratic governments appear to 'overreact' to terror threats from weak actors; and 3) why this retaliation is often unsuccessful in reducing terrorist violence. Specifically, this work shows how terrorism and counter-terrorism violence are driven, not necessarily by fear, but by anger. By constraining elected leaders' policy options and encouraging them to retaliate, public outrage in the wake of terrorist violence can indirectly fuel an increasing reliance by militant groups on terrorism, as state retaliation and counterterror efforts increase both the instrumental and intrinsic motives of militants to further increase their reliance on terrorist tactics.
... Overall, their personality model explained between 11% and 27% of individual differences in violent and non-violent intentions, a figure which may provide insights into why some individuals, but not others in the same situations, become involved in extremist violence. By finding concording association patterns between personaity traits and support for violent Jihad across different contexts, they contributed to fill the lack of transnational studies on extremism using standard personality measures (Merari, 2010;Atran, 2021). Their claim for broader attention to non-clinical personality variables to improve insights into violent extremism was well deserved. ...
... Consequently, the changes in perception and attitudes of the Pakistani Muslim immigrants towards the labelling country included aggression, rejection, resentment, hatred, hostility and disdained which are considered as a normal reaction towards the perpetrators or in this case labellers as many researches have already established that labelling causes sense of such feelings in those who are labelled (Elman, 2019;Merari, 2010). ...
Abstract
Objectives. The primary objective of the present study was to identify various negative labels used against Pakistani Muslim immigrants in foreign countries by the natives of those countries and the changes that occurred in the attitudes of the labelled victims due to those labels. Additionally, the research also aims to investigate the consequent actions that the labelled victims performed as a result of those negative labels and extending the already established labelling theory even further.
Method. The final study sample comprised of eighteen Pakistani Muslim immigrants gathered before saturation point, using a theoretical sampling technique. A multiple grounded theory method was selected based on the objective of adding newer information to an already developed theory. A semi-structured interview protocol was used as the main tool for data collection which was completed in four phases, each phase consisting of five interviews with three in the last. A three-step coding including open, axial and selective coding, was used on transcribed data which was transformed into categories, themes and sub-themes using a thematic analysis method.
Results. The findings of the study included three main categories including the labels used, changes in attitudes and the consequent actions due to labelling; along with their respective set of themes and sub-themes. Additionally, the findings did proposed possible addition of newer perspective in the labelling theory.
Conclusion. This study not only achieved its study objectives but also highlighted an important prevalent issue of terrorist labelling against Pakistani Muslim immigrants in foreign countries. The study also successfully suggested newer areas for future researchers to conduct studies and further expand on the labelling theory.
Keyword. Negative labels, changes in attitudes, consequent actions, multiple grounded theory
... In Corner et al. 's universe of 153 Western-based lone-actor terrorists, 1.3% experienced traumatic brain injury, 0.7% drug dependence, 8.5% schizophrenia, 0.7% schizoaffective disorder, 2.0% delusional disorder, 0.7% other psychotic disorder, 7.2% depression, 3.9% bipolar disorder, 1.3% unspecified anxiety disorder, 0.7% dissociative disorder, 1.3% obsessive compulsive disorder, 3.3% PTSD, 0.7% unspecified sleep disorder, 6.5% unspecified personality disorder, and 3.3% ASD [23]. Ariel Merari's study of suicide bombers found 60% had avoidant-dependent personality disorder [26]. Gill et al. 's closed-source study of 49 UK lone-actor terrorists found that 12.2% experienced a mood disorder, 10.2% schizophrenia, 4.1% intellectual disabilities, and 2% an assortment of personality disorders [19]. ...
The relationship between violent radicalization and poor mental health is complex and multilayered. We use the principles of equifinality and multifinality to demonstrate this complexity. In terms of equifinality, we draw upon the existing evidence base to demonstrate that the end outcome of violent radicalization has many paths into it. Some individuals will be touched by different aspects related to poor mental health along this path. In terms of multifinality, we demonstrate trajectories to multiple outcomes originating from poor mental health problems, where violent radicalization is a low base rate outcome, of many. To do so, we draw on the evidence base from various systematic reviews and meta-analyses of other public/personal harms. We also draw upon illustrations of different individuals displaying similar symptoms/diagnoses and map the mechanisms through which their end outcome differed (e.g. because of exposure to different influences, opportunity, and so on).
... El nacionalsocialismo, el fascismo y el comunismo, estimularon la reflexión y los estudios en el terreno de la psicología social, tratando temas como el de la personalidad autoritaria (Adorno et al. 1965), la forma en que las personas asumen decisiones políticas (Eysenck 1964); y, recientemente, el terrorismo ha motivado estudios innumerables que tratan de entender su naturaleza y los rasgos psicológicos de quienes los practican (Merari 2010). La globalización, por otro lado, ha relativizado mucho del saber psicológico considerado como de validez universal, promoviendo los estudios transculturales. ...
Los orígenes de la psicología, las corrientes que influyeron en ella, sus relaciones con las artes y con las ciencias sociales, así como sus crisis son tratados brevemente en esta comunicación. La psicología científica no aparece en el aire sino es el resultado de un largo proceso de desarrollo, que es influenciado por los cambios sociales.
... Currently, research of terror organizations consists of designated important areas such as economy, security, cyber and media. In this regard, the advantages of understanding the psychological profiles of individual terrorists are widely recognized and accordingly the psychology of the individual terrorist is extensively researched (e.g., Borum et al., 2012;Gill et al., 2014;Lester et al., 2004;Merari, 2010). ...
Understanding the motivations, intentions, and capabilities of terror organizations is highly important to understanding and assessing the risk they present, and to implement effective counter-terror measures. Currently, research of terror organizations consists of designated areas such as economy, security, cyber, and media. Despite ample research on the psychology of the individual terrorist, research regarding the terror organization as a group entity is scarce. The present paper thus presents an exploratory typology, based on both individual and group psychology, which is designed to provide a psychological assessment of terror organizations. Applying a deductive thematic analysis approach, the profiles of three terror organizations: Hezbollah, Hamas, and IS, were analyzed using a five-dimension typology. The data relating to the three organizations was based on two main sources. First, academic journals and official releases by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and second, official publications in Arabic by the organizations themselves. Results show different profiles for the three organizations in terms of their psychological maturity. We propose that different approaches to countering terrorism may be considered based on each organization's unique profile.
... According to various literary sources, an extremist's personality in terms of social behavior and interethnic communication is characterized by an increase in aggressive reactions (which are manifested in various types of aggression) against the background of low individualpersonal and socio-ethnic tolerance [19,20,21,22,23,24]. ...
The article presents the results of a study of the relationship between aggressive behavior of an individual with the parameters of socio-ethnic intolerance and socio-psychological attitudes in the motivational-need-sphere of the individual, in the context of experiencing intense stress caused by a traumatic event. The study involved 118 people - representatives of the youth of the Chechen Republic in the age range from 18 to 25 years. The results of the study showed that aggressive forms of behavior are accompanied by an increase in the general level of social intolerance, which is one of the significant factors in the growth of tension in society, since the manifestation of disrespect and intolerance towards others in the context of interethnic and interfaith interaction is accompanied not only by the growth of conflict situations in society, but also provokes extremist ideas and forms of behavior. At the same time, certain forms of aggressive behavior tend to intensify when the individual experiences situations of a psycho-traumatic nature, associated with the development of intense stress reactions.
... »Die A uslöschung der Singularität und die A bsorption der Symptome durch die Radikalisierung verursachen möglicherw eise bei klinisch w enig ausgebildeten Beobachtern Beurteilungsfehler, w enn sie Radikalisierte als ›ohne psychologische Pro-bleme‹ und rein kognitiv gesteuert einschätzen« (ebd., S. 45). Letzteres vertritt die gleichfalls israelische Studie von A rielMerari (2010), der »Dutzende von Biografien von Suizidattentätern untersucht« habe (so auchReuter, 2002, S. 202ff.). Dass zw ei Drittel der Jihad-Terroristen 15-25 Jahre alt sind, bestätigt sicherlich die H ypothese von dem Zusammentreffen typischer A doleszenzkrise mit der sozialen Problematik(Benslama, 2017a, S. 38). ...
Der Aufsatz geht aus von einer Begriffsklärung und theoretisch-sozialkonstruktivistischen Verortung in der Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie von Bruno Latour. Im zweiten Teil wird eine empirisch vielfältig begründete Karriere-Theorie des deutschen Linksterrorismus in einer vorsichtigen vergleichenden Analogie dem islamistischen Terrorismus gegenübergestellt. Auf dieser Materialgrundlage wird im dritten Teil – vor allem auf der Basis von Fallrekonstruktionen – versucht, psychoanalytische Theorie in der Konkretion als interaktive Psychodynamik von Individuen, Gruppen und Gesellschaft mit den empirischen Befunden und dem sozialkonstruktivistischen Ansatz in Einklang zu bringen.
... Finally, Merari and colleagues carried out various psychological tests on a sample of suicide bombers and compared the results with various control groups (e.g., other terrorists and non-political criminals) (Merari, 2010;Merari et al., 2009aMerari et al., , 2009b. These studies employed a range of techniques including clinical interviews, personality tests, the Thematic Apperception Test, and the House-Tree-Person Drawing test. ...
This systematic review assesses the impact of mental health problems upon attitudes, intentions and behaviours in the context of radicalisation and terrorism. We identified 25 studies that measured rates of mental health problems across 28 samples. The prevalence rates are heterogenous and range from 0% to 57%. If we pool the results of those samples (n = 19) purely focused upon confirmed diagnoses where sample sizes are known (n = 1705 subjects), the results suggest arate of 14.4% with aconfirmed diagnosis. Where studies relied upon wholly, or in some form, upon privileged access to police or judicial data, diagnoses occurred 16.96% of the time (n = 283 subjects). Where studies were purely focused upon open sources (n = 1089 subjects), diagnoses were present 9.82% of the time. We then explore (a) the types and rates of mental health disorders identified (b) comparison/control group studies (c) studies that explore causal roles of mental health problems and (d) other complex needs.
In 2017 a meta-analytical review (Desmarais et al., J Threat Assess Manage 4(4):180–209, 2017) demonstrated that the criminogenic needs of the Risk-Need-Responsivity model (Bonta, Andrews, The psychology of criminal conduct, 7th edn. Routledge, 2023) were applicable to terrorist offenders. In 2018, Herzog-Evans conducted an analysis of forty individuals who carried out terrorist attacks on French soil. Twenty of these individuals had executed their attacks before 2012, a year generally recognised in France as marking a significant shift towards acts of terrorism committed by individuals with notably weak ideological beliefs and knowledge. To analyse the data, Herzog-Evans employed a grid measuring Bonta and Andrews’s Central Eight (The psychology of criminal conduct, 7th edn. Routledge, 2023) and the French translation of the specialised risk assessment tool from the United Kingdom, ERG 22+. The research confirmed that after 2012, a substantial shift had occurred: terrorists were notably less motivated by ideology and more driven by identity issues. Moreover, they exhibited significantly more criminogenic needs than in the years preceding 2012. This chapter replicates (Herzog-Evans, Eur J Probat 10(1):3–27, 2018) study, focusing this time on jurisdictions in the Western world in general, examining 81 case studies. The study reveals a broader spectrum of issues. It analyses approximately 81 terrorist attackers who committed their crimes on Western world soils over the last decades. This time, the picture is more nuanced, revealing a higher prevalence of criminogenic needs and identity issues. However, in some cases, other concerns emerge, including ideological or mental health factors.
Mutual influences and overlaps between religion, economy, and politics are a central part of modern societies. This edited volume takes a fresh look at the role of religion in present societies. From an inter- and transdisciplinary perspective, it provides fundamental knowledge and addresses current topics: Management and religion, identity and religion, climate change and religion, state religious policy, digitalization and religion, and radicalization and religion. Renowned authors offer profound, problem-oriented overviews. In joint discussions, they also shed light on further inter- and transdisciplinary perspectives. Anyone looking for in-depth overviews, new topics, and current approaches to research on religion should get hold of this book. With contributions by Dorothea Alewell | David Atwood | Reinhold Bernhardt | Katharina Glaab | Marianne Heimbach-Steins | Jens Köhrsen | Antonius Liedhegener | Elham Manea | Anastas Odermatt | Daria Pezzoli-Olgiati | Kerstin Radde-Antweiler | Johannes Saal | Thomas Schlag | Gotlind Ulshöfer
The paper analyzes the possible connection between mental disorders and terrorism/violent extremism. Mental health is a universal human right and it is important not only for personal but also for general social development. As this topic has been very little researched, and there is a significant scientific gap, the author came to several conclusions with the help of a comparative analysis of existing empirical studies. There is a great stigmatization of people with mental illnesses, which affects the creation of certain prejudices that associate the sick with violent behavior (which is mostly incorrect). Conversely, some studies claim that mentally ill people are victims of violent behavior. Some researchers have found a link between trauma and violent extremism. In fact, trauma is often a trigger for violent extremism, and it is known that violent extremism is the first step towards the emergence of terrorism. It is very important to distinguish between certain types of terrorism and the correlation of mental illnesses. In fact, scientists are of the opinion that the tendency to mental illness is even 13.5 times higher among terrorists who act individually as lone wolves, compared to actors who are part of a terrorist group. In addition, the prevalence rate of mental illnesses among terrorists does not differ significantly compared to the general population. Radicalization that leads to violent extremism and terrorism is not a mental disorder and we cannot see it that way. An additional problem in the research of this topic is that there is no adequate cooperation between the medical profession and practitioners and theoreticians dealing with P/CVERLT, and we need to work on connecting them in order to have reliable data from this area. The conclusion is that this is still an under-researched topic due to the small number of (publicly available) empirical studies, as well as the confidentiality of the medical data of patients. In this context, each terrorist should be approached individually when assessing the mental state, although certain types of mental disorders are more common in specific types of terrorism. Attention should also be paid to the gender approach when assessing the mental health of terrorists. because there are certain differences between men and women.
Terörün siyasete ve sosyal yaşama etkileri, 21. yüzyılın ilk günlerinden itibaren giderek daha çok etki etmeye başlamış ve özellikle 11 Eylül saldırıları başta Amerika Birleşik Devletleri olmak üzere Batılı devletlerde korku yaratmıştır. Avrupa’da ise Suriye İç Savaşı ve sonrasındaki süreçte terör eylemleri artmış ve köktenci hareketlere karşı mücadele edilmesi gerektiği fikri ön plana çıkmıştır. Bu bakımdan başta IŞİD olmak üzere köktenci hareketlerin Avrupa’daki terör eylemleri 2010’lu yıllara ağır izler bırakmıştır. Fransa’da gerçekleşen Charlie Hebdo saldırısı ve sonrasındaki saldırılar, Fransız savunma politikalarının teröre karşı gözden geçirilmesine neden olmuştur. Beşinci Cumhuriyet Dönemi'nde çeşitli terör olayları yaşansa bile uluslararası terörizmin etkisine 1985’te ve sonrasında giderek maruz kalan Fransa’nın günümüz terör örgütleri ve eylemlerine yönelik geliştirdiği politikalar ve önlemler bu çalışma kapsamında incelenecek, Avrupa’da baş gösteren terör eylemlerinin ülkelerin ve AB’nin nasıl tutum aldığı, nasıl önlemler geliştirdiği ele alınacaktır. Bu doğrultuda, Fransa özelinde olmak üzere AB’nin de nasıl ortak politikalar ürettiği ve üye ülkelerin savunma ve dış politikalarına yönelik evrimleri bu çalışmanın ana konusu olacaktır.
Terörizm ile mücadele "aklın akılla mücadelesi"dir ve bu mücadele öngörüye dayanır. Umutsuzluk ve yılgınlığa asla yer yoktur bu mücadelede. Kazanabilmek için bir adım önde olmanız gerekir. İstihbarat, teknoloji ve ideoloji üçgeninin tam oluşturulması, sonuca ulaşmada önemli bir adım anlamını taşıyabilir.
Terör sadece terör örgütlerinin gerçekleştirdiği bir eylem türü değildir. Devletler tarafından da kullanılan bir vasıta hâline gelmiştir. Devlet terörü denilen bu yaklaşımı kullanan devletler karşısında uluslararası hukuk yetersiz ve çaresiz kalmaktadır. Katledilen, sivil halk olmaktadır.
Terör örgütlerinin hedeflerini bir adım daha ileriye taşıyarak IŞİD örneğinde olduğu gibi devletimsi yapılar hâline geldiklerini de gördük. Ayrıca bugüne kadar kendi bünyeleri dışında dışarıya genel olarak kapalı olan terör örgütlerinin dünyanın birçok ülkesinden insanların katılması ile eleman temin sorunlarını da çözdüklerini gözlemledik.
Günümüzde terör örgütleri kadar tehdit yaratabilecek organize suç örgütlerine de ayrı bir yer açmak gerekir. Terörle mücadeleyi öğrenme konusunda belirli bir mesafe katetmişken bu yeni tip örgütleriyle mücadele de en az terör örgütleri ile mücadele kadar dikkate alınmalıdır.
Bu kitapta, terörü bir vasıta olarak kullanan devletlere ve örgütlere karşı yeni yaklaşımlar, farklı disiplinlerin bakış açısı ile ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır.
This paper will attempt to offer insights into the frequency of military conflicts between the nation of Israel and the geopolitical region of Palestine following the specific timeline of 1948 – 1998. The paper will use as data units military conflicts from the included academic sources and reviewed literature. The paper bases its frequency parameters on the aforementioned items of relevant selected data.
The self-sacrifice of suicide terrorists is subject to sophisticated models of altruistic sacrifice. Yet, a simpler account is that it reflects common suicidal tendencies. This paper offers new micro and macro evidence supportive of this hypothesis. At the micro level, the paper compares a sample of suicide and non-suicide terrorists in the United States from 1948 to 2017. Results indicate that suicide terrorists are more likely to display various established suicidal risk factors including history of child abuse, absent parent/s, and relationship troubles. Results from Bayesian Model Averaging indicate that suicide risk factors outperform other individual factors (e.g., ideology and lone-actor terrorism) in explaining suicide terrorism. At the macro level, the paper takes advantage of the cross-national variations in suicidal tendencies to explain the incidence of suicide and non-suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1991 to 2014. Results reveal that countries with higher share of deaths from suicide display higher incidences of suicide attacks but similar incidences of non-suicide attacks. However, other contextual factors such as the share of Muslims also predict the incidence of suicide terrorism. The decision of some terrorists to sacrifice their life may well have been subject to over-theorization.
This study discusses the questions of terrorism among the international communities. The threat of terrorism has affected international peace and security. Further, we have to study to elucidate the main roots of terrorism and how to save the world community from the danger of it. The study relied on the concept of collective security derived from the theory of bargaining and idealism to explain why states come together to fight terrorism. The authors use this method to search the result through empirical analyses. As a result of this study, the terrorist activities displaced the people and restricted sustainable development. The result also shows that due to the terrorist events, people suffered from many basic human rights. Thus, many parts of the world have been destabilised from the act of terrorism and are continually struggling to restore peace and security.
This chapter discusses the methodological challenges and possibilities associated with trying to uncover the changing motivations and experiences of jihadists through interviews. It argues that contacting potential interviewees, conducting the interviews, and analyzing the data are uniquely challenging when conducting research on jihadists, especially active ones. Interviewing as a method usually gives the researcher access to rich data, but the price of getting access can be a sense of disorder, for example, when the roles of the researcher and interviewee are reversed. Unlike in many other interview situations, the researcher is not in a position of power. Under these circumstances, the ideal of having minimal contact with the subjects of the interview study may have to be replaced with an approach that often borders on ethnographic research. Such interviews are probably the best method for gaining access to the processes of change or jihadiship.
Background
The link between mental health difficulties and terrorist behaviour has been the subject of debate for the last 50 years. Studies that report prevalence rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples or compare rates for those involved and not involved in terrorism, can inform this debate and the work of those responsible for countering violent extremism.
Objectives
To synthesise the prevalence rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples (Objective 1—Prevalence) and prevalence of mental health disorders pre‐dating involvement in terrorism (Objective 2—Temporality). The review also synthesises the extent to which mental health difficulties are associated with terrorist involvement compared to non‐terrorist samples (Objective 3—Risk Factor).
Search Methods
Searches were conducted between April and June 2022, capturing research until December 2021. We contacted expert networks, hand‐searched specialist journals, harvested records from published reviews, and examined references lists for included papers to identify additional studies.
Selection Criteria
Studies needed to empirically examine mental health difficulties and terrorism. To be included under Objective 1 (Prevalence) and Objective 2 (Temporality), studies had to adopt cross‐sectional, cohort, or case‐control design and report prevalence rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples, with studies under Objective 2 also needing to report prevalence of difficulties before detection or involvement in terrorism. For Objective 3 (Risk Factor) studies where there was variability in terrorist behaviour (involved vs. not involved) were included.
Data Collection and Analysis
Captured records were screened in DisillterSR by two authors. Risk of bias was assessed using Joanna Briggs Institute checklists, and random‐effects meta‐analysis conducted in Comprehensive Meta‐Analysis software.
Results
Fifty‐six papers reporting on 73 different terrorist samples (i.e., studies) (n = 13,648) were identified. All were eligible for Objective 1. Of the 73 studies, 10 were eligible for Objective 2 (Temporality) and nine were eligible for Objective 3 (Risk Factor). For Objective 1, the life‐time prevalence rate of diagnosed mental disorder in terrorist samples (k = 18) was 17.4% [95% confidence interval (CI) = 11.1%–26.3%]. When collapsing all studies reporting psychological problems, disorder, and suspected disorder into one meta‐analyses (k = 37), the pooled prevalence rate was 25.5% (95% CI = 20.2%–31.6%). When isolating studies reporting data for any mental health difficulty that emerged before either engagement in terrorism or detection for terrorist offences (Objective 2: Temporality), the life‐time prevalence rate was 27.8% (95% CI = 20.9%–35.9%). For Objective 3 (Risk Factor), it was not appropriate to calculate a pooled effect size due the differences in comparison samples. Odds ratios for these studies ranged from 0.68 (95% CI = 0.38–1.22) to 3.13 (95% CI = 1.87–5.23). All studies were assessed as having high‐risk of bias which, in part, reflects challenges conducting terrorism research.
Author's Conclusions
This review does not support the assertion that terrorist samples are characterised by higher rates of mental health difficulties than would be expected in the general population. Findings have implications for future research in terms of design and reporting. There are also implications for practice with regards the inclusion of mental health difficulties as indicators of risk.
Contemporary international terrorism differs a little from the acts of violence that took place in ancient history. The first known example of the use of political terrorism was Sicarii, a Jewish sect operating in Palestine and Egypt in the years 66–73 CE. Virtually all information about this group comes from Flavius Josephus, a first-century Romano-Jewish historian and military leader. The term sicarii itself has a Latin etymology and means murderers or assassins. It comes from the word sica, meaning dagger. It appeared in legal Latin in 81 BCE together with the Act Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis, which was one of the first legal regulations in the field of serious organized crime. The Sicarii, however, fought in their own country with the intention of liberating it from the rule of a foreign power, Rome. To this day, it remains unresolved whether the Sicarii and Zealots belonged to the same political group that used terrorism for political purposes: killings, arson, poisoning water supplies, and even the seizure of the mountain fortress of Masada, ending in mass suicide. And the myth of the desperate courage of the defenders of Masada became the glue of the national consciousness of the citizens of the modern state of Israel.
Purpose
There is a dearth of empirical data on the contributions of personality, psychopathology, and psychopathy to terrorism and its actors. Because of a fortuitous set of circumstances, we had access to a sample of men convicted of crimes against humanity (CAH) committed during the Pinochet regime, each rated by expert clinicians on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R). We also had PCL-R ratings for samples of general offenders and community participants.
Methods
We determined the psychometric properties of the PCL-R for these samples, performed structural equation modeling (SEM) to investigate the factor structure of the PCL-R, and conducted a latent profile analysis (LPA) of the obtained factors to identify classes or subtypes within the samples.
Results
The PCL-R's psychometric properties and factor structure were in accord with findings from other countries and settings. The PCL-R total scores of the CAH and general offenders were virtually the same but much higher than those of the community sample. However, the CAH group had extraordinarily high scores on the Interpersonal/Affective facets yet relatively low scores on the Lifestyle/Antisocial facets. LPA identified the expected four latent classes, with most CAH men located within the Callous-Conning class.
Conclusions
The results of this study provide unique information about the psychopathic propensities of a sample of state violators of human rights. Their pattern of PCL-R scores was consistent with an extreme disposition for self-serving, callous, and ruthless treatment of others, without guilt or remorse, and in the absence of a prior documented history of severe antisocial behavior.
Is terrorism effective as a tool of political influence? In particular, do terrorists succeed in affecting their targets’ attitudes, and how long does the effect last? Existing research unfortunately is either limited to small samples or does not address two main difficulties: issues of endogeneity and the inability to assess the duration of the effect. Here, we first exploit the exogeneity to the selection process of the success or failure of an attack as an identification mechanism. Second, we take advantage of the random allocation of survey respondents to interview times to estimate the duration of the impact of terrorist events on attitudes. Using survey data from 30 European democracies between 2002 and 2017, we find first that terrorism affects people's reported life satisfaction and happiness—a proxy for the cost of terrorism in terms of utility. However, we also find that terrorist attacks do not affect respondents’ attitude toward their government, institutions, or immigrants. This suggests that terrorism is ineffective at translating discontent into political pressure. Importantly, we also find that all effects disappear within less than two weeks.
This paper can be retrieved from here: https://encyclopedia.pub/14505 ====================================================================== The psycho-religious mechanism of suicide is an information processing mechanism of how the mind perceives the idea of self-killing, with a focus on the factor of trust as well as mortality-related information from religious sources. It can be considered an expansion of the new Mindsponge-based suicidal ideation mechanism.
Suicide terrorism, which has been prominent for generations by pro-violent non-state actors, is used by terrorist groups, guerrilla groups and insurgents. Particularly in the post-Cold War period, the human body has become the main object of terrorist activity. The suicide bomber has been used in a variety of ways throughout history, the preferred choices varied according to the aims of the attackers. Suicide bombers can walk to their destination using a suicide belt, explode their own bodies using different vehicles or public transport. Especially in the occupied territories of the Middle East, the possibility of reaching a paradise that offers a better life by humiliating both their religion and themselves is the last task that gives hope for many suicide bombers. According to research by Adam Fosson, the request of a Palestinian child who wants to become a martyr is almost the same as an American child who wants to visit Disneyland.
Extensive research shows that emotions influence social movement participation. Scholars argue that emotions like anger and pride generally activate – i.e. increase movement participation – whereas emotions like hopelessness and sadness generally deactivate. Organizational theory complicates this research by showing that the same emotions can produce varied outcomes, although the causes of variation remain undertheorized. This article brings together these disparate literatures to ask how boredom, an emotion underexplored in the social movement literature, shapes political participation in a rape crisis center. Drawing on three years of participant observation and forty in-depth interviews, the author shows that, while most volunteer victim advocates experience boredom while answering less ‘legit’ hotline calls and passing time during shifts, their boredom does not necessarily deactivate. Instead, the meaning volunteers attach to their boredom – specifically through a process this article terms ‘emotional attribution’ – shapes activation. Volunteers who blame their boredom on organizational conditions and service provision models often decrease their participation, whereas volunteers who understand boredom individualistically remain engaged. These findings advance social movement and organization theory by disrupting assumptions about the essential ‘good’-ness or ‘bad’-ness of emotions, and by theorizing emotional attribution as an interactional process predictive of variation in the consequences of emotions.
The issue of human bombing, which is popularly known as suicide bombing has become important in the Western world since the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks. Since then the issue of human bombing has become important to academia, the media, and security experts. This interest has resulted in much literature attempting to explain why human bombings take place and what motivates the bombers; for instance, the works of Gambetta (2006); Pape (2006); Merari (2010); Hafez (2006, 2007); Wright (2007); Bloom (2005, 2010); Friedman (2005); and Khosrokhavar (2005).
In this short paper I do not discuss why and how human bombing occurs, and instead argue three points. Firstly, that human bomber cannot be acting with sacred intention (in the path of God) because this intention is unknown to them and the groups that advocate such attacks; secondly, that the standard for sacred intention is impossible to uphold by the bombers; finally that, the bombers could be suffering from secondary trauma, therefore falling outside the criteria that legitimates human bombing because of the individuals illness. I contend that these points serve to dissolve the religious criteria and justification for human bombing.
Over the last decade, the diversified spectrum of hybrid threats forced security agencies around the world to refine the tools used by intelligence analysts in early warning tasks. Thus, in order to anticipate and prevent violent acts, law enforcement analysts from the departments responsible for prevention and countering terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalization that lead to terrorism are constantly striving to identify tools and methods that are capable to measure the psychosocial–behavioral characteristics of individuals in terms of mathematical probabilities. Therefore, risk assessment tools targeting terrorists and violent extremists are a major topic of interest for international security experts and law enforcement professionals. In such context, the present study proposes a tool to assess conditional probabilities, built on the Bayes’ rule, which is based on a subjective way of defining probability. Bayes’ rule allows analysts to correctly quantify their estimates, which are often qualitative, subjective, and based on a limited number of indices and observations. The risk assessment tools developed for common violent crimes and for members of the organized crime groups should not be used for assessing terrorists, violent extremists, or individuals suspected of engaging in ideologically motivated violent actions, nor vice versa. Specific risk assessments with relevant indicators should be used separately for regular violent offenders and for terrorists and extremists.
Research indicates that suicide rates decline during wartime. The most likely explanation for this decline is the greater social cohesion of societies during wartime, but changes in the economy during wartime, such as reduced rates of unemployment, may also play a role. The impact of civil wars on suicide rates is unclear since the data in the different reports are inconsistent. Prisoners of war who are treated harshly have higher suicide rates after release. The suicide rate of Jews was high during all phases of the Holocaust in the 1930s and 1940s. Whether suicide terrorists resemble typical suicides remains a subject for debate.
Max Edelbacher, Polizeihofrat i. R. und Direktor des International Police Executive Symposium (IPES), Albany (USA), beleuchtet Fehlverhalten sowohl in kriminellen Vereinigungen als auch im Polizeiapparat und zeigt Gegenmaßnahmen auf. Wir stellen dar, welche Systemstrukturen unethisches Verhalten auslösen können und wie das Einhalten ethischer Standards sowie sicherheitsbezogenes Verhalten in Organisationen gestärkt werden kann.
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