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Traditionally, research on the psychology of motivation has addressed two separate questions: the What of motivation and the How of motivation. The former concerns the nature of the various motives that propel human behavior, and the latter the general process whereby any motive exerts its effects. This essay reviews historical and contemporary research in each of the foregoing categories. We highlight cutting edge concepts and findings in motivation science and identify emerging trends and future challenges.
Motivation Science
Traditionally,research on the psychology of motivation has addressed two separate
questions: the What of motivation and the How of motivation. The former concerns
the nature of the various motives that propel human behavior, and the latter the gen-
eral process whereby any motive exerts its effects. This essay reviews historical and
contemporary research in each of the foregoing categories. We highlight cutting edge
concepts and ndings in motivation science and identify emerging trends and future
Following a relative lull during the 1970s and 1980s (Higgins, 2012) research
on motivation appears once again to be commanding attention from psycho-
logical researchers. Traditionally, the topic of motivation has been a mainstay
of the science of psychology. It has played a major role in early dynamic mod-
els of the mind (including psychoanalytic theory), and it was fundamental
to behaviorist theories of learning and action. The advent of the cognitive
revolution in the 1960s and 1970s largely eclipsed the emphasis on motiva-
tion, but in the past two decades, motivational research has been making
a forceful comeback. These days, motivational analyses of affect, cognition,
and behavior are ubiquitous across various psychological literatures. Moti-
vational research not only has conceptual implications for understanding
mind and behavior, but also has direct and pragmatic implications for daily
self-regulation, addiction, substance abuse, mental health, life at home and
the workplace, consumer behavior, and other areas of application as well.
Motivation is not just a “passing fancy” on the contemporary scene; rather,
it is rmly entrenched as a foundational issue in scientic psychology.
Generally speaking, motivational research in psychology has been of two
general kinds, addressing what one might call the What and the How of
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Kosslyn.
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motivation. Research in the What category concerns the contents of moti-
vation, including taxonomies of basic motives or needs and investigations
focused on singular motives/needs of particular interest. In contrast, the
How of motivation addresses general processes and structures that apply to
any motive whatsoever, irrespective of contents.
The prototypical sense in which people in general understand the problem
of “motivation” concerns the “What” category. Raising the question of moti-
vation (why did X commit Y?) inquires essentially into what specic motive
accounts for a given behavior. In this vein, widely known are Freud’s (1920)
distinction between the life (eros)anddeath(thanatos) drives, McDougall’s
(1932) list of 18 instincts, Murray’s (1938) list of 24 psychogenic needs, and
Maslow’s (1943) need hierarchy.
Beyond general taxonomies, a variety of specic needs singled out by
psychological researchers also belong in the motivational “What” cate-
gory. Historically, the most extensively researched needs have been the
three highlighted in the work of McClelland (1961): the need for achieve-
ment (Atkinson, 1964), for power (McClelland, 1961), and for afliation
(McClelland, 1961).
In contrast to the emphasis on motivational contents, a great deal of research
effort was invested in clarifying the workings of motives in general—dening
the How of motivation. In this vein, McDougall (1932) saw any instinct as
having three fundamental components (perceptual, behavioral, and emotional),
and Freud (1938) viewed “instincts” or “drives” as innate, universal, and con-
stantly felt. Similarly, Murray described a need as a “potentiality or readiness
to respond in a certain way under given conditions” (1938, p. 61).
Theoretical and empirical work on the How of motivation has been carried
out by theorists of the neo-behaviorist school, in particular Hull (1951)
and Spence (1937, 1956). The two central motivational constructs within
the Hull-Spence approach were Drive and Incentive. Primary drives were
assumed to originate in physiological needs and secondary drives were
assumed to derive from primary drives through conditioning. Incentives
were assumed to be environmental stimuli (e.g., food in the goal box)
capable of contributing to motivational readiness.
Motivation Science 3
The Hull-Spence formulation was articulated as a multiplicative model in
which habit (H) multiplies drive (D) and incentive (K) to produce the readi-
ness to act. Tolman (1955) in an early anticipation of the cognitive revolution
in psychology, has implied that the history of reinforcement (i.e., habit) actu-
ally represents an expectancy that a given behavior will result in drive satis-
faction. In this interpretation, then, “habit” acquires a strictly motivational
avor. The expectancy construct gured prominently in the work of Atkin-
son (1964); he too put forth a multiplicative model (Tr,g =Mg×Er, g ×Ig), in
which Tr,g is a tendency to enact the response aimed attaining a goal, Mgis a
stable motive to attain goals in a given class, and Er,g is the expectancy that a
response will lead to goal attainment.
Neobehaviorist theorists assumed that motivations ultimately derive from
physiological needs (which represent primary drives) and their deriva-
tives acquired via conditioning (representing secondary drives, such as
conditioned fear); McClelland (1987), Atkinson (1964), and their colleagues
postulated purely psychogenic needs, universal across the human species;
Lewin (1938), on the other hand, postulated an open array of quasi-needs
that could be specic to a given psychological situation. Within his topo-
graphic approach to personality Lewin (1938) further postulated that a need
gives rise to a state of tension that could spill over to neighboring regions
of one’s life space (e.g., a hungry person may also experience a degree of
The distinction between the What and the How of motivation is represented
also in contemporary motivational research. In the What category belong
general classications of basic motives proposed by Deci and Ryan (2000),
Fiske (2003), and Higgins (2012). A variety of singular needs or motives
also fall into this category, including the need for cognition (Cacioppo
& Petty, 1982) the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), the need
for closure (Kruglanski, 2004), mortality salience (Solomon, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 1991), promotion and prevention orientations (Higgins, 2012),
and locomotion and assessment modes (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, &
Higgins, 2013).
Work on the How of motivation includes research on goal-activation (see
Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007, for review), on the structure of goal-means
relations (Kruglanski et al., 2002), and on motivational energetics and the
dynamics of effort expenditure (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Brehm & Self,
1989; Wright, 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2012). We now briey touch on cutting
edge research in each of these categories.
A BUCET of Fundamental Motives. Fiske’s (2003) BUCET classication of
social motives (Belonging, Understanding, Controlling, Enhancing, and
Trusting) is a classication that covers most, if not all, of the social motives
that psychologists have found of interest. It seems plausible to view the
BUCET classication as a universally relevant taxonomy reecting the way
motivational functions of social signicance are hard wired in humans
across time and culture. For that reason the BUCET taxonomy has been
inuential, and has been cited often in the work of motivational theorists
(e.g., Hogg, 2000).
Truth, Value, and Control. Another motivational taxonomy with a universal-
istic intent is Higgins’ (2012) classication of basic human needs into those
for Truth,Value ,andControl.TheTruth motivation has to do with the desire to
have an accurate grasp on reality, the motivation for Value—with the quest for
good outcomes, and that for Control—with feeling personally effective, being
the “origin” of one’s attainments. A unique feature of Higgins’ (2012) work
is the discussion of how Truth, Value, and Control motivations interact. First,
activation can spread from one element in the truth-value-control structure to
the remaining elements. Second, separate elements in this overarching struc-
ture can support one another; for example, truth can be changed to support
value and control, and value can be changed to support truth. Finally, the
truth-value-control framework allows individuals to place varying levels of
emphasis (either low or high) on each of these three motives. As such, there
is much potential here for future research to examine how these three ways
of “being effective” (Higgins, 2012, p. 47) combine to create motivational pat-
terns that are more than the sums of their parts.
Self Determination Theory. Of the different classications of social motives,
Deci and Ryan’s (2000) Self Determination Theory (SDT) has engendered
the greatest amount of empirical research. The SDT identies three primary
human needs: autonomy,competence and relatedness. Three cutting edge
research domains in which recent SDT work has been carried out are: (i)
work on autonomy and mindfulness, demonstrating that various defensive
effects do not apply to people who are mindful and autonomous (e.g.,
Niemiec et al., 2010), (ii) differentiation between eudaimonic (based in satis-
faction of the three fundamental motives) and hedonic (pleasure-oriented)
well-being, showing that the former is more conducive to welfare and
happiness (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008), and (iii) cross-cultural research on the
three SDT motives, demonstrating their universality (e.g., Chirkov, Ryan,
Kim, & Kaplan, 2003).
Motivation Science 5
Beyond general taxonomies, considerable motivational research has focused
on specic motivations.
Regulatory Focus. Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between a promo-
tion focus (concerned with advancement, growth, and accomplishment) and
a prevention focus (concerned with responsibility, safety, and security); these
concerns can stem from chronic individual differences or can be situationally
induced (Higgins, 1998).
Regulatory Mode. Two general orientations toward actions referred to as reg-
ulatory modes have received appreciable amount of research attention in the
last decade (see Kruglanski et al., 2013, for a review). Locomotion is the ten-
dency to move in the psychological sense, and assessment the tendency to
carefully evaluate the importance of specic goals and means.
Specic Needs. The following specic needs have received considerable
amount of research attention: (i) Need for Closure (Kruglanski, 2004), (ii) Need
for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), (iii) Need to Belong
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and (iv) Fear of Death (Solomon, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 1991).
Recently, burgeoning research on the How of motivation has been proceed-
ing apace at numerous psychological laboratories. Cutting-edge work of this
kind has been carried out on phenomena of (i) goal activation, (ii) self-control,
(iii) the neuroscience of motivation, (iv) the structure of motivation, (v) moti-
vationally relevant mindsets, and (vi) issues of energy and effort.
Goal Activation. About quarter of a century ago (cf. Bargh, 1990), a fresh
movement changed researchers’ approach to motivation and goal-directed
behavior. This movement emphasized the cognitive perspective on motiva-
tion, whereby goals are mental representations of desirable end states that
can be consciously or unconsciously activated from memory (Bargh, 1990;
Kruglanski, 1996).
Self-Control. The idea that goals can be unconsciously activated and pur-
sued challenges the notion of free will and voluntary control of behavior.
The latter issue, the ability to resist sacricing superordinate concerns
for momentary temptations, has dened the recently thriving domain of
self-control research. The underlying principle is that of limited resources.
Thus, the greater the investment in pursuing a given goal, the fewer
resources should be available for alternative goals or means (Gailliot et al.,
2007; Kruglanski et al., 2012; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998).
Baumeister and Vohs (2007) suggest that ego depletion results from effortful
attempts to exercise self-control, with detrimental consequences for sub-
sequent cognitive activities. Recent research has investigated how such
depletion is affected by factors ranging from autonomy of choice to implicit
theories of willpower (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010; Moller, Deci, & Ryan,
2006). From the perspective of Cognitive Energetics Theory (Kruglanski et al.,
2012) resource depletion may be counteracted by increased goal importance.
However, if resources are completely depleted, no amount of motivation
can improve performance (cf. Vohs, Baumeister, & Schmeichel, 2012).
To deal with a limited resource pool, individuals have to allocate resources
strategically, in proportion to goal saliency and importance (Kopetz, Faber,
Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2011). Negative consequences of privileging
momentary temptation at expense of more important goals may prompt
people to develop strategies to refrain from doing so. Specically, individuals
may learn to automatically activate higher order goals (e.g., keeping a healthy
diet) in the presence of momentary allurements (e.g., the sight of an appe-
tizing chocolate cake; Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). They may
attempt to nd multinal means capable of satisfying multiple goals simul-
taneously (Kopetz et al., 2011), and may learn how to harmoniously integrate
their multiple goals (Belanger, Lafreniere, Vallerand, & Kruglanski, 2013).
Structural Effects: The Architecture of Goal Systems. The cognitive approach
to motivational phenomena views goals as mentally represented schemes
including congurations of goals linked to their means of attainment as well
as other goals (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Fundamental goal-means congura-
tions are those of equinality, in which a single goal is connected to several
means, and multinality, in which a single means is connected to several goals
(Kopetz et al., 2011).
Of interest also is the relation between the number of links between goals
and means and their strength. Zhang, Fishbach, and Kruglanski (2007) pro-
posed the dilution model, whereby the reduced link strength in multinal
(containing multiple links) versus uninal structures is construed as low-
ered instrumentality of each means with respect to the goal. A similar dilu-
tion effect was demonstrated in equinal structures, in which the number of
Motivation Science 7
means to the goal was negatively related to each means’ perceived instru-
mentality. Relatedly, the number of means to a goal was negatively related
to the commitment of the actor to each of those means (Kruglanski, Pierro, &
Sheveland, 2011).
The Neuroscience of Motivation. Affective neuroscience has played a growing
role in recent motivational research, shedding light on many areas of interest
to the scientic study of motivation. These have including research on the
difference between wanting versus liking (Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge,
2009) and on the difference between value and motivation (Roesch & Olson,
Researchers have come to believe that dopamine, a neurotransmitter in
the catecholamine and phenethylamine families, is critical to motivated
behavior (e.g., Wickens, Horvitz, Costa, & Killcross, 2007; Di Chiara &
Bassareo, 2007). In this domain, Wise (2004) distinguishes between “rein-
forcement” as a retroactive effect on learning and “reward” (or incentive) as
a proactive drive-like effect on behavior. Dopamine presumably plays a role
in reinforcement-based learning, but not in reward-based learning.
Mindsets. Dweck’s (2006, 2012) work on xed versus growth mindsets has
inspired considerable motivational research in recent years. A xed mindset
entails believing that things are as they are because of their immutable
essence. A growth mindset, in contrast, is premised on the assumption
that things are malleable and capable of amelioration. In general terms, a
growth mindset (but not a xed mindset) induces an expectancy that a goal
of improvement can be attained, thus augmenting the motivation to strive
for desired outcomes.
Action Phases and Implementation Intentions. Heckhausen & Gollwitzer (1987)
proposed an inuential model of action phases. These include the delibera-
tion phase, in which goals are decided and prioritized, and the implementation
phase, in which goals are actually pursued. The latter phase gave rise to a
fruitful research program on implementation intentions. An implementation
intention is an if-then plan which species when,where,andhow an individual
will strive toward a particular goal (Gollwitzer, 1999). Forming implementa-
tion intentions has been shown to increase rates of goal achievement (Goll-
witzer & Sheeran, 2006); much of the emerging research on implementation
intentions has focused on how that effect may be moderated by other vari-
ables. For instance, individual differences in perfectionism have been shown
to lessen the effect of implementation intentions on goal progress (Powers,
Koestner, & Topciu, 2005). The strength of the goal in question matters as
well: implementation intentions benet goal attainment more when the goal
strength is high (as compared to low; Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005).
Finally, the formation of implementation intentions can help overcome the
effects of ego depletion (Webb & Sheeran, 2003).
Energy and Effort. Another emerging trend in motivation research is the
emphasis on energy and effort as variables of motivational signicance.
Two conceptual contributions in this arena have been Motivation Intensity
Theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) and Cognitive Energetics Theory (Kruglanski
et al., 2012). Both theories identify factors which impact the mobilization of
resources toward motivated behavior.
Motivation Intensity Theory (MIT). Brehm and Self’s (1989) MIT distinguishes
between potential and actual motivation. Potential motivation concerns the
amount of effort, determined by motive strength, that an individual is pre-
pared to exert in service of that motive. Actual motivation describes the actual
amount of effort expended by an individual in order to attain a goal. Degree
of effort expenditure is determined by the difculty of the behavior nec-
essary to satisfy the motive, but only as long as success is viewed as both
possible and worth the difculty involved. Predictions from the MIT have
led to empirical ndings on the relationship between effort (operationalized
as cardiovascular reactivity), task difculty, and the justiability of effort (cf.
Gendolla, Wright, & Richter, 2012).
Cognitive Energetics Theory (CET). The CET (Kruglanski et al., 2012) is
a force-eld theory of motivated cognition which, similar to the MIT,
describes the distinction between potential and actual motivation. In
the CET, purposeful cognitive activity is propelled by a driving force and
opposed by a restraining force.Thepotential driving force is a product of goal
importance and the pool of available mental resources. The restraining force
(that must be matched by the effective driving force) is an additive function
of the individual’s general tendency to conserve cognitive resources, the
energy demands of the activity, and possible competing goals. To keep an
activity going, an increase in the restraining force (e.g., task demands) must
be met by a proportionate increase in the driving force (for instance, resource
availability or goal importance). CET’s predictions have received support
in recent research on motivated reasoning (Belanger, Kruglanski, Chen, &
Orehek, 2014) and retrieval induced forgetting (Pica, Pierro, & Kruglanski,
Motivation Science 9
The resurgence of motivational research over the last decades is impressive
and encouraging; the range of motivational topics investigated attest to its
vitality and holds promise of exciting discoveries in motivation science in
years to come. In the last section of this review we identify issues and chal-
lenges that motivation science may encounter going forward. Specically, we
suggest that advances in the eld may be afforded via a series of integrations
that lend focus and coherence to the free-wheeling and unwieldy manner of
inquiry that has characterized the eld of motivation science to date.
Concerning the “What” of motivation, it would seem advantageous to
integrate the various taxonomies of fundamental motivations (e.g., Deci
& Ryan, 2000; Fiske, 2003; Higgins, 2012). Possibly, a broad analysis of
the different measures may lead to arrival at a consensual structure of
basic human motives analogous to the way in which a similar effort in
the eld of personality yielded the broadly agreed on Big Five Personality
Factors (Costa & McCrae, 1992). It would also be helpful to have a thorough
discussion of the origin of fundamental human motivations, addressing the
issue of their universality and cross-cultural applicability.
As noted earlier, contemporary motivational research in the “How” cate-
gory has been predominantly guided by local, mid-range theoretical frame-
works. Yet important broad formulations in this domain of study have been
elaborated by past motivational theorists such as Lewin (1951), Hull (1951),
Atkinson (1964), McClelland (1987), and others. To avoid “rediscovering the
wheel” in motivation science, it would be useful to re-examine those past
formulations in light of the vast number of motivational ndings produced
in the last several decades. A cardinal aim of science is the theoretical inte-
gration of disparate results; the question, therefore, is how contemporary
ndings t within classic motivational frameworks—and whether novel the-
oretical integrations may be in order (for an attempt at such an integration,
see Kruglanski, Chernikova, Rosenzweig, & Kopetz, 2014).
Various subdomains of psychology have approached the study of motiva-
tion in different ways; others have largely neglected motivational concepts
altogether and omitted them from their analyses. In regards to the latter,
major psychological analyses eschewed the consideration of motivation and
went on to assume that people in general exhibit certain invariant tendencies
and behavior patterns (e.g., are risk-averse for gains, and risk-seeking for
losses; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), or tend to commit statistical errors and
neglect base rates (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). It now appears, however,
that people’s behavior in these domains may vary in accordance with their
motivational states. For instance, recent evidence (Zou, Scholer, & Higgins,
2014) suggests that risks are generally undertaken to advance the satisfaction
of a dominant motivation (e.g., regulatory focus) which may differ across per-
sons and situations. In the same vein, it has been demonstrated that the use
of heuristics isn’t universal, but rather depends on motivational states such
as the need for cognitive closure (Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, Spiegel, & Kruglan-
ski, 2005). To reiterate, cognition and behavior are motivated, and motiva-
tions vary. No universal generalizations concerning what “people in general”
think or do, without considering the motivational states they are in, seem
Motivational concepts are of considerable relevance to a variety of social
science disciplines, not only to psychology and neuroscience, but also to
economics, business, political science and social philosophy, among others.
Behavioral economists, for example, study individuals’ decisions and their
rationality given the actors’ objectives, as well as the effects of framing and
the impact of incentives. Political scientists are interested in the behavior
of political actors, including insurgents and terrorists. Philosophers study
the very concept of motivation (Peters, 1958) and its role in the explanation of
social phenomena. Thus, motivation denes a general theme that cuts across
diverse elds of inquiry in the social and behavioral sciences. It would seem
useful to create channels of communication through which those various
disciplines could interact and stimulate each other. A recent initiative has
been launched to create such mechanisms: the Society for the Study of
Motivation (SSM) was established in 2000, and its intent is to broaden the
scope of motivational research by reaching out to other disciplines with
a motivational interest. In that vein, the Society has recently launched an
annual publication, Advances in Motivation Science, and a quarterly journal,
Motivation Science, whose policy aims are interdisciplinary in nature. These
constitute potentially signicant developments in advancing the science
of Motivation and recognizing its crucial role in understanding human
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Arie W. Kruglanski is a Distinguished University Professor at the University
of Maryland, College Park. He is recipient of the National Institute of Mental
Health Research Scientist Award, the Senior Humboldt Award, the Donald
Campbell Award for Oustanding Contributions to Social Psychology from
Motivation Science 15
the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, The University of Mary-
land Regents Award for Scholarship and Creativity, and the Distinguished
Scientic Contribution Award from the Society of Experimental Social Psy-
chology, and is recipient of the Regesz Chair at the University of Amster-
dam. He was Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral
Sciences, and is Fellow of the American Psychological Association and the
American Psychological Society. He has served as editor of the Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition, editor of the
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and associate editor of the American
Psychologist. His interests have been in the domains of human judgment and
decision making, the motivation-cognition interface, group and intergroup
processes, and the psychology of human goals. His work has been dissem-
inated in over 300 articles, chapters and books and has been continuously
supported by grants from the National Science Foundation,theNational Insti-
tute of Mental Health,Deutsche Forschungs Gemeineschaft, and the Ford Founda-
tion. He has recently served as member of the National Academy of Science
panels on counterterrorism, and educational paradigms in homeland secu-
rity. Kruglanski has been a founding co-PI of START (National Center for
the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism), at the University of
Maryland, and is now a PI on 5-year MINERVA grant to study radicalization
and deradicalization in the Middle East and in South and South East Asia.
He also is the President Elect of the Society for the Study of Motivation.
Marina Chernikova graduated from St. John’s College, Annapolis, in 2011
with a bachelor’s in the history of philosophy and literature. She is now
a doctoral student in social psychology at the University of Maryland
College Park. She works with Arie Kruglanski on research in motivation,
self-regulation, and goal systems.
Catalina Kopetz is an Assistant Professor at Wayne State University. Her
research focuses on basic mechanisms of motivation and self-regulation
and their implication for risk behavior. Her work has been published in
several prestigious journals in social psychology (e.g., Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Review), clinical
psychology (Prevention Science; Experimental and Clinical Psychopharma-
cology), and high impact Journals that span both domains (Perspectives
in Psychological Science; Behavioral and Brain Sciences). She co-authored
several book chapters in major handbooks on self-regulation and self-control
as well as recent theoretical papers in the highly prestigious Psychological
Review. Her research has been funded by the National Institutes of Health.
Learning Across the Life Course (Sociology), Jutta Allmendinger and Marcel
Youth Entrepreneurship (Psychology), William Damon et al.
Resilience (Psychology), Erica D. Diminich and George A. Bonanno
Migrant Networks (Sociology), Filiz Garip and Asad L. Asad
Setting One’s Mind on Action: Planning Out Goal Striving in Advance
(Psychology), Peter M. Gollwitzer
Regulatory Focus Theory (Psychology),E.ToryHiggins
From Individual Rationality to Socially Embedded Self-Regulation (Sociol-
ogy), Siegwart Lindenberg
Culture as Situated Cognition (Psychology), Daphna Oyserman
Identity-Based Motivation (Psychology), Daphna Oyserman
Effortful Control (Psychology), Tracy L. Spinrad and Nancy Eisenberg
... Motivation psychology is concerned with two main questions: the what and the how of the direction and strength of behavior (Kruglanski, Chernikova, & Kopetz, 2015). The what represents the list of motives that people perceive as attractive, and the how focuses on the fundamental processes of attaining motives from the list. ...
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The behavioral approach system (BAS) has been shown to be important in everyday life. However, its putative evolutionary origins have not been extensively studied. The purpose of this study was to explore relationships between BAS processes and life history strategies, or lifestyles, within life history theory. The BAS scales were assessed by the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality Questionnaire (RST-PQ) and Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ-20), while lifestyles were measured by the Mini-K. Data from 457 participants (173 males) were analyzed by structural equation modelling, followed by set correlation to examine personality and Mini-K relationships. The structural model showed that RST-PQ Reward Interest, Goal-Drive Persistence and Reward Reactivity correlated with a slow lifestyle, while RST-PQ Impulsivity and (SPSRQ) Sensitivity to Reward (SR) did not correlate with the Mini-K. However, set correlation analysis revealed that SR correlated negatively with the Mini-K subscale Experience in romantic relationship and highlighted the importance of Insight, planning, and control in explaining the role of the BAS within slow lifestyle strategy. The findings are discussed in terms of possible evolutionary origins of the BAS.
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This paper surveys the most recent advances in the context of decisional processing with focusing on the parking behavior in entropic settings, including the measures and the necessary mechanisms for the interaction of the actors-players, and their connection to decisional processing theory. The aim of this article is to provide a critical review of the most fashionable models and methods in parking lot financial design: the first class of methods covers the approach of analysis with the random entropic model; the second class of methods is the decisional processing through rational choice models as rational individual evaluations. Both techniques are described in detail in sections; we illustrate them using the well-known and easy multimodal problem approach and then we present the advanced applications. Thus, it is possible to identify all strong and weak points of the models and to compare them for a best feasible solution for parking lot economic and financial design. Taking into account a close equivalence between the aggregate methods of entropy maximization and disaggregated microeconomic method of discrete choice models, based on random utility theory, we try to provide a critical approach of it through the rational choice models and to underline the possible benefit of it for the problem decision.
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Roy F. Baumeister’s 2014 presidential address to the Society for the Study of Motivation was a call to motivation scientists to address the lack of a grand theory of motivation and to encourage them to begin working on one. This commentary addresses some of the requirements of such a theory and discusses the relatively new action–trait theory of motivation as a viable candidate for such a grand theory of motivation. Action–trait theory is based on historic “purposive psychology” and incorporates the methods of individual differences psychology. It can be represented in eight falsifiable hypotheses, three of which have already received empirical support.
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Motivation theories have tended to focus on specific motivations, leaving open the intellectually and scientifically challenging problem of how to construct a general theory of motivation. The requirements for such a theory are presented here. The primacy of motivation emphasizes that cognition, emotion, agency, and other psychological processes exist to serve motivation. Both state (impulses) and trait (basic drives) forms of motivation must be explained, and their relationship must be illuminated. Not all motivations are the same, and indeed it is necessary to explain how motivation evolved from the simple desires of simple animals into the complex, multifaceted forms of human motivation. Motivation responds to the local environment but may also adapt to it, such as when desires increase after satiation or diminish when satisfaction is chronically unavailable. Addiction may be a special case of motivation—but perhaps it is much less special or different than prevailing cultural stereotypes suggest. The relationship between liking and wanting, and the self-regulatory management of motivational conflict, also require explanation by an integrative theory.
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Publisher Summary This chapter deals with terror management theory that attempts to contribute to the understanding of social behavior by focusing on the essential being and circumstance of the human animal. The theory posits that all human motives are ultimately derived from a biologically based instinct for self-preservation. Relative equanimity in the face of these existential realities is possible through the creation and maintenance of culture, which serves to minimize the terror by providing a shared symbolic context that imbues the universe with order, meaning, stability, and permanence. The theory provides a theoretical link between superficially unrelated substantive areas, and focuses on one particular motive that makes it distinctly human and, unfortunately, distinctly destructive. Theories serve a variety of equally important functions, all of which are oriented towards improving the ability to think about and understand the subject matter of discipline. The chapter discusses the dual-component cultural anxiety buffer: worldview and self-esteem, the development and functioning of the cultural anxiety buffer for the individual, and a terror management analysis of social behavior in great detail.
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On the basis of self-determination theory (R. M. Ryan & E. L. Deci, 2000) and cultural descriptions drawn from H. C. Triandis (1995), the authors hypothesized that (a) individuals from different cultures internalize different cultural practices; (b) despite these differences, the relative autonomy of individuals' motivation for those practices predicts well-being in all 4 cultures examined; and (c) horizontal practices are more readily internalized than vertical practices across all samples. Five hundred fifty-nine persons from South Korea, Russia, Turkey and the United States participated. Results supported the hypothesized relations between autonomy and well-being across cultures and gender. Results also suggested greater internalization of horizontal relative to vertical practices. Discussion focuses on the distinction between autonomy and individualism and the relative fit of cultural forms with basic psychological needs.
This book sets forth a provocative agenda for the scientific study of human personality. Blending no-nonsense empiricism with the humanistic desire to understand the whole person, the book is as relevant today as it was to its many readers seventy years ago. The book sets forth a full theory of human personality, illustrated with a bevy of creative methods for personality assessment, and presenting the results of a landmark study of fifty Harvard men. The book is one of the great classics in 20th-century psychology.
The fundamental phenomenon of human closed-mindedness is treated in this volume. Prior psychological treatments of closed-mindedness have typically approached it from a psychodynamic perspective and have viewed it in terms of individual pathology. By contrast, the present approach stresses the epistemic functionality of closed-mindedness and its essential role in judgement and decision-making. Far from being restricted to a select group of individuals suffering from an improper socialization, closed-mindedness is something we all experience on a daily basis. Such mundane situational conditions as time pressure, noise, fatigue, or alcoholic intoxication, for example, are all known to increase the difficulty of information processing, and may contribute to one's experienced need for nonspecific closure. Whether constituting a dimension of stable individual differences, or being engendered situationally - the need for closure, once aroused, is shown to produce the very same consequences. These fundamentally include the tendency to 'seize' on early, closure-affording 'evidence', and to 'freeze' upon it thus becoming impervious to subsequent, potentially important, information. Though such consequences form a part of the individual's personal experience, they have significant implications for interpersonal, group and inter-group phenomena as well. The present volume describes these in detail and grounds them in numerous research findings of theoretical and 'real world' relevance to a wide range of topics including stereotyping, empathy, communication, in-group favouritism and political conservatism. Throughout, a distinction is maintained between the need for a nonspecific closure (i.e., any closure as long as it is firm and definite) and needs for specific closures (i.e., for judgments whose particular contents are desired by an individual). Theory and research discussed in this book should be of interest to upper level undergraduates, graduate students and faculty in social, cognitive, and personality psychology as well as in sociology, political science and business administration.
This article distinguishes between hedonic and eudaimonic approaches to wellness, with the former focusing on the outcome of happiness or pleasure and the latter focusing not so much on outcomes as on the process of living well. We present a model of eudaimonia that is based in self-determination theory, arguing that eudaimonic living can be characterized in terms of four motivational concepts: (1) pursuing intrinsic goals and values for their own sake, including personal growth, relationships, community, and health, rather than extrinsic goals and values, such as wealth, fame, image, and power; (2) behaving in autonomous, volitional, or consensual ways, rather than heteronomous or controlled ways; (3) being mindful and acting with a sense of awareness; and (4) behaving in ways that satisfy basic psychological needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy. In fact, we theorize that the first three of these aspects of eudaimonic living have their positive effects of psychological and physical wellness because they facilitate satisfaction of these basic, universal psychological needs. Studies indicate that people high in eudaimonic living tend to behave in more prosocial ways, thus benefiting the collective as well as themselves, and that conditions both within the family and in society more generally contribute toward strengthening versus diminishing the degree to which people live eudaimonic lives.
How does motivation work? The classic answer is that people are motivated to approach pleasure and avoid pain, that they are motivated by "carrots and sticks." But to understand human motivation, it is necessary to go beyond pleasure and pain. What people want is to be effective in their life pursuits, and there are three distinct ways that people want to be effective. They want to be effective in having desired results (value), which includes having pleasure but is not limited to pleasure. They want to be effective in managing what happens (control) and in establishing what's real (truth), even if the process of managing what happens or establishing what's real is painful. These three distinct ways of wanting to be effective go beyond just wanting pleasure, but there is even more to the story of how motivation works. These ways of wanting to be effective do not function in isolation. Rather, they work together. Indeed, the ways that value, truth, and control work together is the central story of motivation. By understanding how motivation works as an organization of value, truth, and control, we can re-think basic motivational issues, such the nature of personality and culture, how the motives of others can be managed effectively, and what is "the good life".
The first sentence in the preface to Kohler's The Place of Value in a World of Facts proclaims boldly that the purpose of the book is philosophical. It is dedicated to Ralph Barton Perry, and ranges widely over areas which at the time most American psychologists would have feared to tread, perhaps because during their student days they had become infected by Titchener's pontifical proclamation that science has nothing to do with values or by the behaviorists' thumping insistence on facts, facts, facts, nothing but facts. Some twenty years earlier Kohler had published Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationiiren Zustand (1920), dedicated to Carl Stumpf, a brilliant work full of new facts which he and the other members of the triumvirate, Wertheimer and Koffka, and their students were bringing to light, all set in relation to a rigid framework of physical field theory. Gestaltpsychologie was already on the way to becoming Gestalttheorie, for Kohler insisted throughout his life that the phenomenal world is for science the only world open to inspection and that the initial data of this world are Gestalten no matter from what angle or branch of science they may be reported.