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Dignity, Captivity, and an Ethics of Sight
... Others [16][17][18]) argue that in depriving animals of liberty and a natural way of life zoos are unable to furnish them a satisfying life. Finally, there are critics who claim that zoos are fundamentally oppressive in unauthentically offering up animals for display for human pleasure [19][20][21]. ...
... The zoo critic Lori Gruen [20], along with others [31,32], has more recently taken up the same hammer and wedge. Gruen argues that zoos deprive animals of autonomy and dignity. ...
... Gruen argues that zoos deprive animals of autonomy and dignity. Even the best zoos, those with naturalistic enclosures, are often dignity denying as they place animals under constant surveillance, deny them privacy or any hiding place to which they can retreat, and force them to be spectacles on display for humans ( [20], pp. 240-245). ...
Ethical concerns surrounding the existence of zoos have recently come to the fore. Some argue for the complete phasing-out of zoos, citing concerns about the limitations they impose on animal liberty and dignity, coupled with perceived minimal benefits to both humans and animals. However, these arguments tend to downplay the potential value that zoos offer in terms of human enjoyment, educational opportunities, research initiatives, and conservation efforts. Moreover, they overlook other significant benefits zoos provide such as the positive impact of human-animal interactions and opportunities to appreciate nature’s beauty. Finally, zoo critics often emphasize the negative effects of zoos on animals while neglecting the substantial efforts made by zoos toward animal welfare research and implementation. By accurately recognizing the multifaceted values that zoos can provide and ensuring the highest standards of animal care, a strong case can be made for their continued existence and importance.
... Often, animal dignity is considered to be important, but independently of welfare. Captivity may violate dignity through removing freedom to make autonomous choices, even where it does not harm welfare (70). We might also hold an aesthetic preference for wild over captive animals, an appreciation or awe for nature. ...
... This can be overcome in large part by appropriate environmental design and suitable conditioning programs. Animals that are unable to escape the gaze of the public may also experience stress (70). Some captive animals may show ongoing health problems as a result of chronic stress (84). ...
The keeping of captive animals in zoos and aquariums has long been controversial. Many take freedom to be a crucial part of animal welfare and on these grounds criticise all forms of animal captivity as harmful to animal welfare, regardless of their provisions. Here, we analyse what it might mean for freedom to matter to welfare, distinguishing between the role of freedom as an intrinsic good, valued for its own sake and an instrumental good, its value arising from the increased ability to provide other important resources. Too often this debate is conducted through trading intuitions about what matters for animals. We argue for the need for collection of comparative welfare data about wild and captive animals in order to settle the issue. Discovering more about the links between freedom and animal welfare will then allow for more empirically-informed ethical decisions regarding captive animals.
... Apesar das semelhanças que apresentam com os jardins zoológicos e outras instituições de reabilitação animal, nomeadamente a permanência dos animais em cativeiro (Gruen, 2014), os santuários distinguem-se pelo seu potencial para fomentar relações entre-espécies baseadas no cuidado, que desafiam a ideia de como os animais são usados e tratados na sociedade (Hua e Ahuja, 2013): em santuários, os humanos interagem com animais não-humanos cujas necessidades físicas e emocionais são determinantes dessas interacções (Abrell, 2019). Ainda assim, não estão isentos de dilemas e contradições e FoF nãoé exepção. ...
The person-animal relationship is a central topic in anthropology. The recent emergence of “more-than-human” approaches as a new form of ethnographic and anthropological research and production marks a new turning point in the way the relationship between different species and humans has been understood. Animal sanctuaries are places where animals are treated in a relational framework of friendship, not consumption. Due to this fundamental principle and the characteristics of its functioning, sanctuaries are privileged places to investigate what could be the basis of a positive relationship with animals, and eventually with nature in general. This is an ethnographic work that investigates the context, perception and experience of the relationship between animals and their caretakers in a animal farm sanctuary in rural Galicia. What can we learn from these experiences which can inspire a reflection about this relationship? As far as I know, this is the first work of its kind that poses and seeks to answer these questions. The participatory observation of life in the sanctuary and the analysis of the interviews carried out with the animal caretakers shows that, despite the dilemmas, contradictions and obstacles identified regarding the functioning of the sanctuary, the caretaker’s work can inspire affection and respect for rescued animals and eventually by animals in general. The analysis framed in the phenomenological perspectives of love and re-enchantment.
... On the contrary, broadening the moral vocabulary can do justice to the complex nature of the ethical issues at stake (cf. Donaldson and Kymlicka 2016;Feinberg 1974;Gruen 2014;Millar and Morton 2009). ...
... On the contrary, broadening the moral vocabulary can do justice to the complex nature of the ethical issues at stake (cf. Donaldson and Kymlicka 2016;Feinberg 1974;Gruen 2014;Millar and Morton 2009). ...
Bu çalışma, organik tarım ve gıda ürünlerine karşı Genetiği Değiştirilmiş Organizmalı (GDO) ürünler ile ilgili öğrencilerinin bilgi seviyelerinin, tutum ve tüketim davranışlarının karşı- laştırılması amacıyla yapılmıştır. Araştırmanın temel varsayımı GDO’lu ürünlere göre öğrencilerin organik tarım ve gıda ürünlerine karşı daha olumlu tutumları bulunmaktadır. Araştırmanın temel materyalini Samsun Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi’nde okumakta olan ve gayeli olarak seçilmiş ko- nuyla ilgili olabilecek farklı fakültelerin 15 farklı bölümünden 655 son sınıf öğrencilerinden 2018 yılında anket yoluyla elde edilen veriler oluşturmaktadır. Öğrencilerin sosyo-ekonomik özellikle- ri tanımlayıcı istatistikler ile sunulduktan sonra organik ve GDO’lu ürünlere ilişkin bilgi seviyeleri tutum ve tüketim alışkanlıkları Bilgi, Tutum ve Uygulama (BTU) analizi ile incelenerek karşılaş- tırılmıştır. Araştırma sonuçlarına göre öğrencilerin, organik ürün tanımı ve özellikleri konusunda yeterince bilgi sahibi olmadıkları belirlenmiştir. Benzer şekilde öğrencilerin çoğunluğu GDO’lu ürünleri çevre dostu olmayan, hormonlu, kimyasal ve katkı maddeler içeren ürünler olarak nitelen- dirmişlerdir. Öğrencilerin büyük bölümü organik ürün (özellikle yaş sebze ve meyve) tükettiklerini belirtmişlerdir. GDO’lu ürünler öğrencilere sorulduğunda ise mısır cipsi, domates, hazır çorbalar, patates ve bitkisel yağlar şeklinde cevaplar alınmıştır. Öğrencilerin organik gıdalara yönelik bilgi seviyesinin artması ile beraber organik ürün satın alma niyetleri olumlu olarak artarken; GDO’lu gıdalara yönelik satın alma niyetleri azalmaktadır. Öğrencilerin gıda güvenilirliği konusundaki bilgi seviyesi organik ürünlere yönelik tutumları olumlu yönde etkilenmekte iken GDO’lu ürünlere yö- nelik tutumları olumsuz etkilemektedir. Bu durum bilgi seviyesinin önemini ortaya koymaktadır. Dolayısıyla öğrencilerin ve bireylerin bu ürünler ve özellikleri konusunda bilinçlendirilmeleri son derece önemlidir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Organik tarım ve gıda ürünü, GDO, Bilgi, Tutum ve Uygulama (BTU) analizi
Behaviors of Students Against Organic and Genetically Modified
Organisms: The Case of Ondokuz Mayıs University
Abstract: This study was conducted to compare the knowledge levels, attitudes and consumption behaviors of the students about organic agriculture and food products versus Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO). The basic assumption of the research is that students have more positive attitudes towards organic agriculture and food products compared to GMO products. The main mate- rial of the research consists of the data obtained through a survey with scale in 2018 from 655 final students from the purposefully selected 15 different departments of different faculties who were studying at Samsun Ondokuz Mayıs University. After the socio-economic characteristics of the stu- dents were presented with descriptive statistics, their knowledge levels, attitudes and consumption habits regarding organic and GMO products were examined and compared with Knowledge, Atti- tude and Practice (KAP) analysis. According to the results of the research, it was determined that the students limited knowledge about the concept and characteristics of organic products. Similarly, the majority of students described GMO products as non-environmentally friendly products con- taining hormones, chemicals and additives. Most of the students stated that they consume organic products (especially fresh vegetables and fruits). When students were asked about GMO products, answers were given as corn chips, tomatoes, instant soups, potatoes and vegetable oils. With the in- crease in the knowledge level of the students about organic foods, their intention to buy organic products increased positively; while purchasing intentions for GMO foods were decreasing. The level of knowledge of the students on food safety affects their attitudes towards organic products positively, on the other hand their attitudes towards GMO products negatively affect them. This sit- uation reveals the importance of knowledge level. Therefore, it is extremely important for students and individuals to be made aware of these products and their features.
Keywords: Organic agriculture and food product, GMO, Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice (KAP) Anlaysis
... These critiques led to a posthumanist movement that reacts to anthropocentrism and human primacy and seeks mediation and reconciliation of existence from a non-hierarchical standpoint with other beings (See Ferrando, 2019). 3. Most academic works focus on human dignity, but dignity has also been applied to posthuman beings (Bostrom, 2005), non-human beings (Gruen, 2014), and the living environment (Huber, 1991). 4. Nussbaum recognizes the dignity of animals and other non-human beings, but unlike Kant, she sees our obligation to protect as not deriving from duties to ourselves. ...
ABSTRACT
Indigenous groups continue to experience injustices in relation to tourism development, management, and marketing despite calls for equity, justice, and fairness in sustainable tourism. Economic interests continue to dominate and, consequently, the social, environmental, and cultural wellbeing of minority and Indigenous groups tend to take a secondary position in tourism development plans. Progress has been made in developing frameworks to examine justice for Indigenous groups, but they do not take into account the concepts of dignity, which we argue is a core principle in a humanistic approach that seeks fairer outcomes for Indigenous and minorities groups. Drawing upon humanism and humanistic management theory, we examine the Mayan Train megaproject in southern Mexico, propose guiding principles and identify responsibilities for key actors that prioritize the restoration, protection, and promotion of the dignity of groups and prevent potential injustices resulting from tourism projects. We also suggest transformative actions that revalue the cultural identity and status of Indigenous groups, increase their capabilities and self-esteem, and promote their autonomy and wellbeing.
... It's less clear, however, whether pervasive captivity runs afoul of dignity. For a discussion of the relation between dignity and captivity, including of Nussbaum's account, see Gruen (2014bGruen ( , 2018. 13. ...
Animals who live in cities must coexist with us. They are, as a result, entitled to the conditions of their flourishing. This article argues that, as the boundaries of cities and urban areas expand, the boundaries of our conception of captivity should expand too. Urbanisation can undermine animals’ freedoms, hence their ability to live good lives. I draw the implications of an account of ‘pervasive captivity’ against the background of the Capabilities Approach. I construe captivity, including that of urban animals, as affecting a range of animal capabilities, understood as freedoms, and I address some tensions within Nussbaum’s treatment of human-animal conflicts. Using the Capabilities Approach as a guide, I will attempt to motivate a convergence between habitat preservation in urbanised environments, urban design guided by justice, and the individual freedoms of animals.
... These critiques led to a posthumanist movement that reacts to anthropocentrism and human primacy and seeks mediation and reconciliation of existence from a non-hierarchical standpoint with other beings (See Ferrando, 2019). 3. Most academic works focus on human dignity, but dignity has also been applied to posthuman beings (Bostrom, 2005), non-human beings (Gruen, 2014), and the living environment (Huber, 1991). 4. Nussbaum recognizes the dignity of animals and other non-human beings, but unlike Kant, she sees our obligation to protect as not deriving from duties to ourselves. ...
Indigenous groups continue to experience injustices in relation to tourism development, management, and marketing despite calls for equity, justice, and fairness in sustainable tourism. Economic interests continue to dominate and, consequently, the social, environmental, and cultural wellbeing of minority and Indigenous groups tend to take a secondary position in tourism development plans. Progress has been made in developing frameworks to examine justice for Indigenous groups, but they do not take into account the concepts of dignity, which we argue is a core principle in a humanistic approach that seeks fairer outcomes for Indigenous and minorities groups. Drawing upon humanism and humanistic management theory, we examine the Mayan Train megaproject in southern Mexico, propose guiding principles and identify responsibilities for key actors that prioritize the restoration, protection, and promotion of the dignity of groups and prevent potential injustices resulting from tourism projects. We also suggest transformative actions that revalue the cultural identity and status of Indigenous groups, increase their capabilities and self-esteem, and promote their autonomy and wellbeing.
... In defending this alternative approach to animal ethics, Crary writes of the case, recounted in Gruen [38], of a chimp who was raised in the entertainment industry and trained to pull a ridiculous and presumably funny face when in the presence of humans. Nowadays, even though the chimp lives safely in a sanctuary, he still pulls that same face whenever he meets a human, automatically and unknowingly making a spectacle of himself. ...
In this paper, we analyse the Wittgensteinian critique of the orthodoxy in animal ethics that has been championed by Cora Diamond and Alice Crary. While Crary frames it as a critique of “moral individualism”, we show that their criticism applies most prominently to certain forms of moral individualism (namely, those that follow hedonistic or preference-satisfaction axiologies), and not to moral individualism in itself. Indeed, there is a concrete sense in which the moral individualistic stance cannot be escaped, and we believe that it is this particular limitation that justified Crary’s later move to a qualified version of moral individualism. At the same time, we also argue that there are significant merits to the Wittgensteinian critique of moral individualism, which pertain to its attack on the rationalism, naturalism, and reductionism that characterise orthodox approaches to animal ethics. We show that there is much of value in the Wittgensteinians’ call for an ethics that is more human; an ethics that fully embraces the capacities we are endowed with and one that pays heed to the richness and complexity of our moral lives.
... P.L.G. has argued for a relational understanding of dignity, one that upholds social demands for recognition and respect. This conception of dignity brings into focus the relations between the dignified and the person or community being judged to be dignified in the appropriate context (Gruen 2014). The relational conception of dignity is compatible with a recognition of a range of values often connected to autonomy including: (1) being free from internal barriers to form a conceptions of a good life; (2) being free from external barriers to pursue one's conception of the good life; and (3) having both one's conception and one's action in pursuit of that life respected by one's community. ...
This volume considers the ethics of policing and imprisonment, focusing particularly on mass incarceration and police shootings in the United States. The contributors consider the ways in which non-ideal features of the criminal justice system—features such as the prevalence of guns in America, political pressures, considerations of race and gender, and the lived experiences of people in jails and prisons—impinge upon conclusions drawn from more idealized models of punishment and law enforcement. There are a number of common themes running throughout the chapters. One is the contrast between idealism and realism about justice. Another is the attention to harmful consequences, not only of prisons themselves, but to the events that often precede incarceration, including encounters with police and pre-trial detention. A third theme is the legacy of racism in the United States and the role that the criminal justice system plays in perpetuating racial oppression.
... Captivity is expressed and experienced differently by different beings, and as with many species that have been, or are in the process of being, 'brought in from the wild' , there are problems with return to the wild (Gruen, 2014b). Those who survive capture often cannot be returned to the wild because they have developed biological and social characteristics that are different from their wild conspecifics (Cochrane, 2014). ...
Scholarship recognizes the co-construction of space by humans and non-human animals (hence, animals), but the complex geographies of some animals whose lives depend upon human care remain under-studied. This article explores human–dolphin relations within the context of Dolphin-Assisted Therapy (DAT), a practice in which most dolphins are in human care. We trace a genealogy of dolphin–human relations in built environments, and draw on a DAT case study in Curacao, to understand how the entangled agencies of humans, dolphins and other actants have co-constructed spaces of mutual therapy and care. Our research highlights the circumstances of ‘legacy dolphins’ in DAT, dolphins whose lives depend on human care. We suggest that, while the services of dolphins are recommodified through DAT, the legacy dolphin is de-commodified through ‘relations of obligation’ built on mutual ‘caring for’ as both companion species and work colleague.
... Note that the argument presented does not exclude the possibility that there may be other valid reasons, unrelated to respect and unjustified discrimination, why we owe it directly to a particular animal to refrain from such action. For example, one could claim that such treatment is at odds with animals' dignity (Cataldi 2002;Gavrell Ortiz 2004;Nussbaum 2007;Gruen 2014). However, dignity is a notoriously unclear and well-criticised notion both in the case of humans (Macklin 2003;Cochrane 2010), and animals (Zuolo 2016;Schultz-Bergin 2017), and does not always lead to the conclusion that some harmless actions are morally problematic. ...
There is broad agreement that humans can be wronged independently of their incurring any harm, that is, when their welfare is not affected. Examples include unnoticed infringements of privacy, ridiculing unaware individuals, or disregarding individuals’ autonomous decision-making in their best interest. However, it is less clear whether the same is true of animals—that is, whether moral agents can wrong animals in situations that do not involve any harm to the animals concerned. In order to answer this question, I concentrate on the illustrative case of treating animals in a demeaning yet harmless way that would be disrespectful if humans were concerned. I discuss whether such actions are permissible or unjustifiably discriminatory from a moral point of view. I conclude that moral agents cannot directly wrong animals without harming them and thus do not owe it to a particular animal to refrain from such actions. However, if the actions increase the likelihood that animal abuse will occur, this presents a strong indirect reason against performing them. Thus, the reasons for refraining from such actions are merely indirect rather than direct.
... This is less clear. While there are compelling accounts of how we routinely violate the dignity of animals (Cataldi 2002;Gruen 2014;Humphreys 2016;Loder 2016), they tend to focus on specific contexts of public/visible degradation (such as circuses and zoos), 19 rather than the often invisible structures of exploitation on farms or labs that are the heart of animal oppression in our society. While some defenders of animal rights argue that dignity can operate as the general grounding for animal Downloaded by ["Queen's University Libraries, Kingston"] at 05:18 14 October 2017 rights (Bilchitz 2009), others argue that it is not a helpful register for grounding basic animal rights (Zuolo 2016), if only because dignity talk is saturated with the idea that dignity involves not being treated as an animal. ...
Early defenders of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights invoked species hierarchy: human beings are owed rights because of our discontinuity with and superiority to animals. Subsequent defenders avoided species supremacism, appealing instead to conditions of embodied subjectivity and corporeal vulnerability we share with animals. In the past decade, however, supremacism has returned in work of the new ‘dignitarians’ who argue that human rights are grounded in dignity, and that human dignity requires according humans a higher status than animals. Against the dignitarians, I argue that defending human rights on the backs of animals is philosophically suspect and politically self-defeating.
Social movements often appeal to the politics of sight, meaning that if people knew about a given injustice, political transformation would follow. Jasmine English and Bernardo Zacka articulate two central premises of the politics of sight: “(1) exposing morally repugnant practices will make us see them, (2) seeing such practices will stop us from acquiescing to them.” Considering the case of slaughterhouse workers, Timothy Pachirat and English and Zacka challenge the previous premises. This article complements their contributions by theorizing what I call Western conceptuality/language and the role this plays in forming our subjectivities not to recognize violence on the one hand, and to be sovereign masters over animals on the other. I conclude by discussing the political implications of these arguments for the politics of sight, including the role of concealment and exposure, and the conditions needed for humans to see animals in their full ethical weight.
1. Introduction
This commentary was largely written on unceded Lekwungen territory, now known as Victoria, BC, and was delivered at the Pacific APA on traditional Musqueam, Squamish and Tseil-Watuth land, known as Vancouver, BC. The material conditions that enabled me to write my commentary on this excellent and insightful book were made possible by the dispossession and genocide of Indigenous people – colonial practices that exemplified the phenomenon of dehumanization that is the subject of Making Monsters. It is largely because Indigenous people were not seen as genuine people by those who colonized their land that we are doing this work under these circumstances; this is just one among many reasons why dehumanization is not an abstract philosophical topic, but something that has shaped the circumstances of many of our lives.
My comments on Smith’s book have less to do with the internal coherence of the conceptual framework as a whole, and much more to do with the ways that conceptual framework can help us counteract the oppression related to dehumanization. To that end, I want to follow two primary threads. The first thread involves Smith’s emphasis on the psychological dimension of dehumanization and the places where that focus might result in strategic difficulties. The second thread pushes in the opposite directions from some of Smith’s other critics by pointing out some places where criticizing a practice as contributing to dehumanization might not go far enough.
Prisons are responsible for the social and biological death of the humans trapped within them, the animals whom it coerces prisoners to farm and slaughter, free-living animals displaced by prison building, as well as the ecosystems and waters destroyed by prison effluent which makes the lives of those dependent upon these systems and resources for survival, unliveable. In the context of the Sixth Extinction, the prison is at once one of the most resource intensive institutions contributing to Anthropogenic climate change and biodiversity loss, and paradoxically, in the last two decades, sometimes positioned similarly to zoos as an ecological saviour of threatened species. The most established example of this is the Sustainability in Prisons Project that operates in many United States prisons. Specific to conservation, it trains prisoners – often in partnerships with zoos – to captively rear endangered animals and plants. There is also a zoo located on the grounds of a Florida prison in which prisoners care for abandoned animals, which is open to the public for tours. This article argues that the current initiatives of prison zoos and prison conservation programs reflect the trajectory of animal zoo eras and human zoos, with unique implications: two institutions of captivity, the zoo and the prison, now reify each other under the auspices of ecological conservation – a project whose need and operation continues the racialized and anthropocentric projects that gave it rise.
In contemporary society, humans interact with nonhuman animals in a number of ways, many of which involve the captivity of the nonhuman animals involved. Nonhuman animals trained for sport (sled dogs, horses trained for dressage, etc.), nonhuman animals confined for human entertainment (zoos, aquariums, circuses, etc.), and companion animals are all held captive by the human beings who interact with them. However, the moral acceptability of these forms of captivity seems to vary widely; this variance isn’t only a function of the conditions of the captivity itself, but the reasons, attitudes, and intentions of the captors. Martha Nussbaum’s conception of species-specific flourishing allows for what she calls ‘respectful paternalism’ in the case of nonhuman animals, and in this paper, we will explore (a) Nussbaum’s account of ‘respectful paternalism’ as an aspect of justice that governs our interactions with nonhuman animals, (b) what the ‘respectful’ aspect of that paternalism involves by examining what it means for a captor to limit the autonomy of a nonhuman animal respectfully and (c) implications for our interactions with nonhuman animals in sport and entertainment environments.
Wildlife populations are plummeting worldwide and captivity, of at least some, species is increasingly being challenged from an ethical perspective. When captivity serves human entertainment, poor treatment as well as unequal power-relationships are problematic. Particularly for wildlife ecotourism then, we ask: is the future virtual? Taking a posthumanist approach, this conceptual manuscript considers whether presenting technologically created images to tourists can equitably foreground non-human rights, welfare, and agency. We highlight examples of tourism involving wildlife in virtual settings to explore possible advantages and disadvantages of this type of experience for human and non-human stakeholders. This enables us to explore how the virtual experience fits with the concept of ecotourism. The argument is made that the ideals of wildlife ecotourism can best, and perhaps only, be met virtually – but only if we use images of non-human animals who are represented with dignity and respect.
In this chapter, we will briefly examine the impact humans have on the other primates, particularly in the United States, and then explore different ethical frameworks that guide how we might exercise our responsibilities to nonhuman primates. We will examine the differences between an animal welfare position and an animal rights position. In closing we will advocate for the development of a sanctuary ethos that draws on both the welfare and the rights positions and urges us to re-examine our ethical agency in our relationships with other animals.
This essay examines the contributions of American short story writer Karen Russell to debates in Critical Animal Studies and philosophy about the ethics of animal domestication. Russell’s fabulist stories have often been interpreted through a speciesist lens, ignoring her representation of nonhuman animal consciousness. Although humanist critics have interpreted Russell’s animal subjects as allegories for systems of human oppression, I read her work as a critique of anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism. I analyze “St. Lucy’s Home for Girls Raised by Wolves” and “Madame Bovary’s Greyhound,” two stories that focus on the oldest domesticated animal species and the one that remains the most entangled with humanity – the domesticated dog, a descendent of the wild wolf. Featuring female protagonists who are dogs or wolf/human hybrids, these stories engage with ecofeminist and posthumanist arguments about the intersectionality of animal subjugation and the exploitation of women and disempowered racial groups. Echoing recent scientific studies of canine cognition and behavior, Karen Russell’s stories represent dogs as a domesticated species whose animal instincts have been routinely thwarted. While most people consider dogs to be a fortunate species, Russell’s canine stories defamiliarize the relationship between humans and dogs to invite cross-species empathy and ethical reflection about pet-keeping practices.
A hybrid theory is any moral theory according to which different classes of individuals ought to be treated according to different principles. We argue that some hybrid theories are able to meet standards of psychological plausibility, by which we mean that it’s feasible for ordinary human beings to understand and act in accord with them. Insofar as psychological plausibility is a theoretical virtue, then, such hybrid theories deserve more serious consideration. To make the case for this view, we explain what psychological plausibility is and why we might value it, why the human/animal divide appears to be an entrenched feature of human psychology, and why Robert Nozick’s hybrid theory doesn’t go far enough. Finally, we make the case that a more promising psychologically plausible hybrid theory, with respect to humans and animals, will be (at least) at tribrid theory—that is, positing three domains rather than two.
The COVID-19 crisis has left zoos especially vulnerable to bankruptcy, and the precarity of their financial situation threatens the lives and well-being of the animals who live in them. In this paper, we argue that while we and our governments have a responsibility to ensure the protection of animals in struggling zoos, it is morally impermissible to make private donations or state subsidies to zoos because such actions serve to perpetuate an unjust institution. In order to protect zoo animals without perpetrating further injustice, governments should subsidize the transformation of zoos into sanctuaries and then facilitate the gradual closure of most of these sanctuaries.
In this paper, I defend the claim that many sentient nonhuman animals have a right to privacy. I begin by outlining the view that the human right to privacy protects our interest in shaping different kinds of relationships with one another by giving us control over how we present ourselves to others. I then draw on empirical research to show that nonhuman animals also have this interest, which grounds a right to privacy against us. I further argue that we can violate this right even when other animals are unaware that we are watching them.
Consequentialism is thought to be in significant conflict with animal rights theory because it does not regard activities such as confinement, killing, and exploitation as in principle morally wrong. Proponents of the "Logic of the Larder" argue that consequentialism results in an implausibly pro-exploitation stance, permitting us to eat farmed animals with positive well-being to ensure future such animals exist. Proponents of the "Logic of the Logger" argue that consequentialism results in an implausibly anti-conservationist stance, permitting us to exterminate wild animals with negative well-being to ensure future such animals do not exist. We argue that this conflict is overstated. Once we have properly accounted for indirect effects, such as the role that our policies play in shaping moral attitudes and behavior and the importance of accepting policies that are robust against deviation, we can see that consequentialism may converge with animal rights theory significantly, even if not entirely.
Animal welfare concerns have plagued the professional zoo and aquarium field for decades. Societal differences remain concerning the well-being of animals, but it appears a shift is emerging. Scientific studies of animal welfare have dramatically increased, establishing that many previous concerns were not misguided public empathy or anthropomorphism. As a result, both zoo and aquarium animal welfare policy and science are now at the center of attention within the world’s professional zoos and aquariums. It is now possible to view a future that embraces the well-being of individual captive exotic animals, as well as that of their species, and one in which professional zoos and aquariums are dedicated equally to advancing both. Though the ethics of keeping exotic animals and animals from the wild in captivity are still a contentious subject both outside and even within the profession, this study argues. We argue that this path forward will substantially improve most zoo and aquarium animals' welfare and could significantly reduce societal concerns. If animal welfare science and policy are strongly rooted in compassion and embedded in robust accreditation systems, the basic zoo/aquarium paradigm will move toward a more thoughtful approach to the interface between visitors and animals. It starts with a fundamental commitment to the welfare of individual animals.
Prison reform policies in recent years have tended to emphasize “non-violent” offenders as more worthy of sentence reconsideration and alternatives to incarceration. This reinforces the distinction between violent and non-violent crime and strengthens negative attitudes and state sanctions against the so-called violent offenders. This chapter problematizes this facile distinction by exploring how violence operates in poor, black communities. In the first section it is argued that violence and dignity are not mutually exclusive. Violence can be understood as an expression of dignity in the state of emergency that obtains in many poor, black communities. In the second section, three types of violence are analyzed: retributive, pre-emptive, and destructive violence. The first two types are often deployed to protect dignity. In the last section, there is a discussion of what it would take to reach a non-violent state in black interstices, one that allows for the promotion and protection of dignity.
The Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola) is a site embedded with historical legacies of plantation slavery and settler colonialism; as the largest maximum security penitentiary in the United States, the prison also reflects the racial injustice of contemporary US mass incarceration. Situated on the site of an old plantation, the prison hosts the Angola Rodeo twice a year, an event that crystallises violent multispecies social relations in the merging of the US West and South as two distinct kinds of colonial projects. Whereas much scholarship and activism has worked against the wholesale dehumanisation inherent in chattel slavery, settler colonialism, and mass incarceration, this paper works to interrogate and disrupt the human–animal binary through which processes of dehumanisation are sustained. Drawing together postcolonial studies and animal studies, the paper centres empirical research on the Angola Rodeo to highlight how racialisation and anthropocentrism are intertwined logics of subordination and exclusion that carry forward into the present. Ultimately, the paper suggests the need for a mode of analysis and action that does not maintain the subordination of the animal, and instead, takes a de‐anthropocentric and decolonial approach to injustice.
p>Hay quien rechaza los derechos homínidos o simios afirmando que son fruto de una confusión conceptual. Sin embargo, aunque hay muchas disputas filosóficas acerca de si existen los derechos naturales o los derechos positivos, sobre la plausibilidad de las teorías del status y la elección, o sobre la concepción de los derechos como triunfos o constricciones, la opinión mayoritaria en todos esos debates es perfectamente compatible con el concepto de derechos simios. De hecho, los derechos homínidos pueden defenderse desde cualquier posición en esos debates e incluso desde cualquier combinación de posiciones en esos debates. Quienes están confundidos sobre los derechos son quienes niegan esta compatibilidad.</p
As the need for animal sanctuaries continues to grow, and the numbers of species being housed increases, there is a desire from both current and future sanctuaries for guidance. Guidance from those with experience in the sanctuary, ethics, and animal welfare communities is important and helpful to the founders of new sanctuaries as well as current sanctuaries that may struggle with their identity. I will discuss some of the many definitions of sanctuary, and encourage organizations to consider which definition is the best fit for them. The ethos and philosophy a sanctuary embraces are likely to guide best practices, and sanctuaries are encouraged to consider how this affects their daily operations. More broadly, there are many individuals concerned with the best way to care for animals in need of sanctuary and the information contained in the article will highlight some of these issues. I provide examples from Chimp Haven, a large chimpanzee sanctuary in the United States, as to how we approach and struggle with some of these issues as well as considering them in a broader context. Abstract: As the need for animal sanctuaries continues to grow, and the numbers of species being housed increases, there is a desire from both current and future sanctuaries for guidance. Guidance from those with experience in the sanctuary, ethics, and animal welfare communities is important and helpful to the founders of new sanctuaries as well as current sanctuaries that may struggle with their identity. I will discuss some of the many definitions of sanctuary, and encourage organizations to consider which definition is the best fit for them. The ethos and philosophy a sanctuary embraces are likely to guide best practices, and sanctuaries are encouraged to consider how this affects their daily operations. More broadly, there are many individuals concerned with the best way to care for animals in need of sanctuary and the information contained in the article will highlight some of these issues. I provide examples from Chimp Haven, a large chimpanzee sanctuary in the United States, as to how we approach and struggle with some of these issues as well as considering them in a broader context.
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