No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Power, Organisational Issues in Judicature and the Administration of Courts
Abstract
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the organisational structure of the judiciaries, judicial power and various models of judicial administration practised in different legal systems. Focus is geared towards highlighting the relevance of organisational issues in judicature and the administration of courts to the fair trial principle and basic rights. A thorough examination is provided on the history, as well as the evolution and development of each different approach to judicial organisation, highlighting the role of judicial power and the courts. The role of politics is also addressed, especially in terms of the reform witnessed in the transition of post-communist states. Various approaches to reform in terms of judicial administration are discussed, including European examples, such as Belgium, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, as well as Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania, with a special emphasis on Hungary and its judicial reform in 2011.
... Nonetheless, there is research showing that the reality did not live up to these expectations, cf. e.g.Fleck (2014) andBadó (2014).9 Very likely based on stories about an alleged network of former Nazi officials in Germany, which was very popularly dramatised, e.g. in The Odessa File by Frederick Forsyth.10 ...
‘This important volume sheds new light on a great puzzle of the European integration project: What explains the successes of illiberal politics and anti-EU rhetoric in societies where public trust in EU institutions remains strong? The studies offer a rich spectrum of multidisciplinary perspectives by scholars from across the European continent.’
—Zsuzsa Csergő, Professor for Political Studies at Queen’s University, Canada
‘This timely volume offers an original, comprehensive and nuanced account of current illiberal trends and anti-EU and Euroskeptic politics in East Central Europe. It is a most welcome and informative read for anyone interested in rule of law and compliance challenges in the EU, their contextual frames, processes, conditions and consequences.’
—Andreas Maurer, Professor and Jean Monnet Chair for EU Integration Studies at Innsbruck University, Austria
This open access book provides an in-depth look into current illiberal trends and anti-EU politics in East Central Europe which have the potential to fundamentally change the EU. It helps to understand their domestic causes, context conditions, specific processes and consequences and contributes to empirically informed theory-building. The volume includes contributions from researchers from various disciplines and multiple perspectives on the topic. The case studies, comparative works and quantitative analyses provide a comprehensive picture of current societal, political and institutional developments in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Through studying similarities and differences between East Central European and other EU countries, the chapters also explore whether there are regional patterns of democracy- and EU-related problems.
Astrid Lorenz is Professor of Political Science at Leipzig University, Germany.
Lisa H. Anders is a researcher in the Institute for Political Science at Leipzig University, Germany.
... e.g. Fleck (2014) and Badó (2014). 9 Very likely based on stories about an alleged network of former Nazi officials in Germany, which was very popularly dramatised, e.g. in The Odessa File by Frederick Forsyth. 10 This was the conclusion of the recognised Hungarian political scientist, Péter Tölgyessy, see Bíró (2019) and Gergely (2017). ...
This chapter deals with shortcomings of the EU policies vis-à-vis Hungary and partially also Poland. Firstly, it depicts the argument that the EU’s diagnosis of illiberal backsliding is too narrow. When assessing the quality of democracy in Hungary and Poland, the Commission and the European Parliament almost exclusively focus on recent constitutional changes, and thereby overlook many other deficits which lead to a distorted picture. Secondly, there is a legitimate debate on the meaning of the basic values of the EU. Article 2 TEU contains many open-textured expressions, which might be understood differently. Thirdly, due to the incomplete diagnosis, the instruments currently being used to combat backsliding tendencies seem ill-suited on the one hand, and, on the other, the EU surprisingly does not seem to make best use of currently available tools. The chapter concludes by highlighting and discussing possible improvements of EU strategies towards backsliding states.
... Nonetheless, there is research showing that the reality did not live up to these expectations, cf. e.g.Fleck (2014) andBadó (2014).9 Very likely based on stories about an alleged network of former Nazi officials in Germany, which was very popularly dramatised, e.g. in The Odessa File by Frederick Forsyth.10 ...
Using historical institutionalism for a comparison of domestic processes around minority rights in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, this chapter shows that the European Union’s effect on the conflicts over minority rights is much weaker than suspected. While the EU and the Council of Europe provide a framework of LGBT rights and gender equality, the mechanics of the member states’ backlash against minority accommodation can be mainly attributed to the domestic clashes between progressive and conservative forces aided by their transnational allies. As a result of different domestic configurations, some European norms take root, while in other cases, domestic actors seek not only to prevent accommodation but increasingly to roll back rights. The 2006 registered partnership law and the law against domestic violence in the Czech Republic (2006) are examples of the former—the Slovak 2015 anti-LGBT referendum, the 2020 proposals of limiting abortion rights in Slovakia, and the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention in February 2020 of the latter.
... After Communist rule, constitutional changes raised the symbolic, political and legal importance of judicial independence, and guarantees were built into the system, although it was still burdened by serious organizational imbalances (Fleck 2012). These institutional problems (lack of accountability, dominance of regional court presidents, a shadowy judicial selection process etc.) provoked a complete institutional change after 2010, in which a strong centralization practically eliminated judicial self-government (Fleck 2014). During all these political and institutional transformations judicial culture changed much more slowly: depoliticization and bureaucratization survived all these changes, and this heritage has been efficiently built into the concept of independence. ...
In the case of judicial activity any measurement must have a clear concept of judgeship. Accepting H. Kritzer’s concept of craft, judicial qualities are a combination of relevant skills and attitudes which are present in argumentation and communication. Behind the measurement of the quality of judicial work there lies the theoretical question of justice and a sociological task. As for the theoretical question, one of the most complicated problems concerning the measurement of judicial quality is specifying the content, i.e. what aspects of this professional work can and should be measured. This essay concentrates also on the other issue, which may be an essential one if the organization is devoted to real amelioration. This issue is the organizational and wider social context of this process.
... Studies point out how specific the example of Hungary and Romania is among these versatile institutional solutions of post-socialist countries, where a monolithic judicial administrative function was generated as a result of the highly valued principle of judicial institutional independence, and the associated intra-group and nepotic judicial selection had a number of side effects as well. 54 Following a quarter of a century of "experimentation", a novel and not less surprising turn of events may now be taking place in one of the post-socialist countries, Hungary. Instead of restructuring the composition of the organisation carrying out central administration with external checks and balances, the Orbán government had no intention of providing a remedy for the doubtless problems of the former Central Administrative Council, but by overemphasising efficiency, it created a new central judicial administration vested with extraordinary powers to such an extent that no other professional order or branch of government is actually capable of exercising any control over it. ...
Hungarian judicial selection has been characterised by meritocratic and nepotic elements since the 1990 regime change which are indirectly distorted by change, albeit to a relatively reduced extent, to political aspects. Scores of Hungarian and foreign experts have evaluated the measures of the justice reform put in place after the 2010 change of government as being about a series of successive measures to politicise the judiciary from the creation of the new constitution to legislation regarding the justice system. In this study it has been demonstrated that regarding the initial phase of judicial selection the gradual strengthening of meritocratic elements may be observed, which continued after 2010 as well. First and foremost, it may be traced in the more objective system of evaluating judicial applications. The possibilities for discretionary decisions by heads of administration have been considerably restricted in the selection of judges. At the same time, however, the competences of heads of administration entitled to make appointments have been broadened upon filling court management positions.
The existence of a constitutional injury requirement since Constitutional Court Decision Number 006/PUU-III/2005 was strengthened by Constitutional Court Regulation Number 2 of 2021. In fact, 34 cases in the last 3 years have been ruled inadmissible due to the issue of not fulfilling the requirements of constitutional injury. Some of them are about the New Criminal Code and the Law on Villages, which are considered urgent to be tested but are hampered by the fulfillment of the constitutional injury requirement. This research will prove that the constitutional injury requirement has distorted the independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court. On the other hand, constitutional interests is a paradigm for restoring the independence, analyst and comparison have provided answers to the issues raised. The results of normative legal research with literature study show two important things. First, the requirement of constitutional injury undermines independence, so it must be eliminated and accompanied by a supporting paradigm that allows it to be eliminated. Second, applying the paradigm of constitutional interests as a condition for fulfilling legal standing. Systematically, constitutional interests are a manifestation of the independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court by removing obstacles for the public to achieve access to justice.
This paper explores the essential roles of management and administration in the judiciary, emphasizing the importance of leadership in these functions. It thoroughly discusses the relationship between judicial administration and the effective operation of courts, demonstrating how leadership is important for meeting current challenges such as technological advancements and increasing demands for transparency and judicial integrity. The research examines court administrators' wide-ranging responsibilities and emphasizes the critical role of competent leadership in ensuring the efficient and adaptable operation of courts. Through an analysis of international standards and practices across various jurisdictions, this paper identifies the key qualities and competencies that are essential for judicial leaders to effectively manage the complexities of modern judicial systems and ensure the rule of law.
There are two contrasting claims regarding the Hungarian judiciary. The Government asserts that it is in the best shape, while many other voices label it as captured or dependent. This article shows how both of these claims can be true, depending on the interplay between formality and informality and shows how a few small loopholes allow some actors to rig the judicial system. Therefore, the Hungarian judiciary is similar to Schrödinger’s cat, which is claimed to be dead and alive at the same time.
The synergy between formality and informality requires a network of a handful of trusted people in managerial positions to administer case allocation, promotion, and disciplinary systems, which seem to be very effective tools. Few small technical loopholes and some special remedies suffice to micromanage important cases precisely because key positions are captured which work as gatekeepers or emergency brakes. Most of these tools are legal in a very formal technical sense of the word because they rely on acts of Parliament. A formal legalism, a very thin understanding of the Rule of law, and a majoritarian mindset serve as a legitimizing ideology for the whole legal system.
To reduce delays and costs depends on the development of case management skills by the judiciary and magistrates and has a direct impact on justice initiatives. An important component to take into account is that the judicial training to implement these reforms has traditionally been jurisdiction-specific and knowledge-based rather than skills-based ; that is, court and case management depends on skills that are supported by knowledge. It is also worth noting the wide variations in judicial practice arising from local legal and cultural frameworks.
With unprecedented enthusiasm, the justice system is currently embracing case management, but courtship has a long history. To reduce delays and costs depends on the development of case management skills by the judiciary and magistrates and has a direct impact on justice initiatives. An important component to take into account is that the judicial training to implement these reforms has traditionally been jurisdiction-specific and knowledge-based rather than skills-based; that is, court and case management depends on skills that are supported by knowledge. It is also worth noting the wide variations in judicial practice arising from local legal and cultural frameworks.
Competition law is designed to promote a consumer-friendly economy, but for the law to work in practice, competition agencies - and the courts who oversee them - must enforce it effectively and impartially. Today, however, the rule of populist governments is challenging the foundations of competition law in unprecedented ways. In this comprehensive work, Maciej Bernatt analyses these challenges and describes how populist governments have influenced national and regional (EU) competition law systems. Using empirical findings from Poland and Hungary, Bernatt proposes a new theoretical framework that will allow the illiberal influence of populism on competition law systems to be better measured and understood. Populism and Antitrust will be of interest not only to antitrust and constitutional law scholars, but also to those concerned about the future of liberal democracy and free markets.
The demand for judicial attention will continue to exceed the supply of judicial time. Various solutions have been suggested to counter the rising caseload. Examples are a reduction of the number of court applications, an increase in the number of judges, and improving the efficiency of the courts with the introduction of appropriate case and court management instruments. Court management and case management are critical components within an efficient judicial system. They depend on the court structure and arrangements within and between the courts both from a horizontal and from a vertical point of view. The structural design of a judicial system depends on multiple factors, including legal culture and policy. This contribution explores, from a comparative perspective, the theories of case management, the role of managerial judges, and the interrelations between court structure, court management and case management. It is evident that case management is dependent on the structural arrangement of courts. In particular, the availability of specialized courts, the flexible composition of the tribunal that corresponds to the complexity and the importance of the case, and the interplay between superior and inferior courts are all critical in ensuring effective case management.
Resumen La atención que los tribunales de alzada en apelación pueden prestar a los casos que conocen se ha convertido en un “recurso escaso”. Aplicando la metodología del Análisis Económico del Derecho combinada con muestras del derecho comparado y examen dogmático se persigue validar en este artículo dos hipótesis: la primera relacionada con la necesidad de criterios discrecionales y objetivos de selección de casos apelables; la segunda, consecuencia de la primera, sostiene que solo así es posible un adecuado gerenciamiento de esos casos seleccionados en segunda instancia ex post. El derecho al recurso de apelación en material civil no es absoluto y puede ser limitado. Esta propuesta es como una tercera vía que optimiza la apelación y distribuye proporcionalmente las externalidades negativas y positivas del recurso. Con el argumento de que la apelación no está destinada únicamente a corregir errores que afectan a uno de los litigantes, esta parece ser una premisa necesaria de los beneficios infinitos para el sistema y los litigantes, que pueden proporcionar una apelación optimizada.
Many observers have noted that constitutional review spread rather fast after World War II. It has also been noted that the continental (or Austrian) model of constitutional review was spreading relatively faster than the U.S. American one. Various conjectures regarding possible causes for the spread of constitutional review have been discussed.This paper makes constitutional review comparable across countries by drawing on four variables and a composite indicator of constitutional review. It thus allows us to empirically test the various hypotheses regarding the diffusion of constitutional review. The variables have been coded on an annual basis for 100 countries over the period from 1950 until 2005. The data are used as dependent variables. We are, hence, interested in identifying the determinants of both the original choice of constitutional review and its change over time. This implies that both very stable variables such as geography and history are analyzed as well as more contemporaneous ones as constitutional choices made simultaneously with the choice of constitutional review.This paper is part of a larger project that makes many more aspects of judicial independence comparable across time and space. This not only allows more precise statements regarding determinants of judicial independence but also regarding its (economic) effects.
Judicial independence as a constitutional value and political programme has played a key role during the process of political transformation. The last Minister of Justice before the first free elections took great steps towards an independent judiciary. The minister declared that he had suspended general ministerial supervision over the administration of the courts. In 1989, the Parliament amended the Constitution so that political activity by judges became banned.
Following 20 years of transformation, Poland has an independent judiciary, in both the constitutional and practical sense. Guarantees of Polish law, although perhaps not perfect with respect to certain issues, provide a general guarantee of independence which is additionally reinforced by guardians of this principle, in particular the National Council of the Judiciary. The Polish judiciary has so-called institutional memory. In 1989 there was no radical clearing out of the justice system of judges who collaborated with the previous system. Thanks to this it was possible to stabilize a legal system immediately after the start of transformation and to make a natural shift in generations of judges and build the principle of independence on a long term basis.
This booklet is based on Martijn Hesselink's inaugural lecture on 27 June 2001 at the Universiteit van Amsterdam, also published in Dutch by Vossiuspers AUP, Amsterdam. He wrote it as a visiting scholar at Boalt Hall, School of Law, UC Berkeley, and as a visiting professor at the Université René Descartes (Paris V).
In the postcommunist countries' candidate to the European membership, the EU and the Council of Europe exercised a heavy pressure on domestic elite to promote the adoption of institutional guarantees of judicial independence and judicial capacity. Relying on a wide set of interviews with the key actors of the European and domestic institutions, this article will discuss the logic of action of the judicial reforms adopted in Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary in two policy subfields: the governance of the judicial branch and the governance of the court. The empirical evidence confirms that the processes of reform have been deeply influenced by the national actors who had been empowered during the democratic transition. They have been able to fully exploit the resources provided by the EU.
Given far-reaching changes in the legal systems of East Central Europe since the mid-1990s, one might expect administrative court judges to have modified the way in which they decide cases, in particular by embracing less formalistic adjudication strategies. Relying on an original dataset of over one thousand business-related cases from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, this article shows that – despite some variation across countries and time – judges have largely failed to respond to the incentives contained in the new constitutional frameworks. They continue to adopt the most-locally-applicable-rule approach and are reluctant to apply general principles of law or to rely on Dworkinian ‘policies’ in deciding hard cases. The analysis links these weak institutional effects to the role of constitutional courts, case overload and educational legacies.
An in-depth study, originally published in 2006, of the careers and roles of judges in France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and England, this book is based on original language materials and investigations of judges and judicial institutions in each country. On the basis of these detailed case studies, the book suggests factors that shape the character of the judiciary in different countries, focusing on issues such as women's careers and the relationship between judicial careers and politics. Bell's investigations offer lessons on issues which the English judiciary was having to confront in the period of reform at the time of this book's publication.
Great efforts at judicial reform have been made in Central-Eastern European countries (CEE) over the last 20 years. The earliest reforms were driven by the domestic need for foreign investment and the security of contracts and private property rights which investors expect. These domestic motivations were later complemented by those of international organizations, which throughout the 1990s lent money and granted funding to CEE countries on condition that they establish inter alia the rule of law. Externally motivated influence over judicial reform reached its height under the EU accession process and its conditionality, whereunder candidates aspiring to EU membership must meet the conditions enshrined in the Council of Copenhagen’s Criteria of 1993.1 These also include the rule of law, which is generally supposed to rely on the independence of the judiciary.
The independence of the judiciary in Estonia is an interesting case not only because over the last 20 years the country has emerged from being a former Soviet republic to a member of the EU, but in addition because of the constant discussions within the judiciary and society in general about how to organize the administration of the judiciary in a manner which would satisfy the requirements of both independence and effectiveness. From 1991 until 2002 the influence of the executive branch on the administration of the judiciary was quite strong (only the Supreme Court was institutionally independent).
Judicial independence has played an important role in building a democratic order in the Federal Republic of Germany since the end of the Third Reich.1 The Basic Law of 1949 (Grundgesetz) with its elaborate rights catalogue was a reaction to the Nazi dictatorship which had used the judiciary to pursue its inhuman policies.2 In order to protect these fundamental rights in the future the new constitution provided for the separation of powers and gave the judiciary an independent supervisory function. Since then judges have been entrusted with the role of defending the Basic Law, including its rights catalogue, against government encroachments.
As in many recent democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, in Romania the process of judicial reform and modernization is still ongoing. Judicial reform began de jure after the collapse of the communist regime, when a new Constitution (1991) and a new Law on the Organization of the Judiciary (Law no. 92/1992) were adopted. The new democratic Constitution condemned the basic principles of the communist regime “in an attempt to break away from the strong procuracy and weak judiciary that characterized the system under Ceausescu”.
Though the independence of the French judiciary has been discussed for decades, the concerns raised by this topic have changed tremendously over the years. For a long time, as a result of the so-called French concept of separation of powers,1 the debate revolved round the independence of the judiciary vis-a-vis the legislative and the executive branches: while the government and Parliament were deemed legitimate powers, the judiciary, on the other hand, was not elected and thus was not initially recognized as a power per se, but as a mere authority, the role of which was strictly limited to applying the law. Furthermore, in order to shield the legislative and the executive from any intrusion by the judiciary, courts were prohibited from adjudicating on Acts, Bills and any other documents issued by the government or Parliament.2 A parallel court system was thus created to resolve disputes arising out of administrative acts. This system, which has the Conseil d’Etat at its head, will not be discussed in this chapter as it is conceived as an autonomous system of adjudication with a different recruitment and career system for its judges, different types of relations between the different court levels, a separate budget, etc.
The independence of the judiciary lies at the core of Belgian thinking about the rule of law.1 Despite its fundamental character, it has re-mained an unwritten principle of constitutional law for more than 160 years. The written Constitution, as adopted when Belgium gained independence in 1830, did not make any literal reference to the independence of the judiciary. The only relevant provision seemed to be Article 40, the basic provision underlying the organization of justice, which stated (and to date, still states) nothing more than “[t]he judicial power is exercised by the courts”. Some other provisions of the Constitution, however, have always contained implicit applications of the principle of independence to more concrete situations. For instance, Article 152 contains the principle of lifelong tenure; Article 154 states that the salaries of members of the judiciary and the Prosecutor’s Office are determined by Act of Parliament; and Article 155 deals with the positions incompatible with the office of judge. Notwithstanding the absence of an explicit legal provision, the principle of judicial independence has always been considered to have supreme normative value in Belgium. Any doubt that could have risen about that, was dispelled when the concept of judicial independence was qualified by the Court of Cassation as a “general principle of law”,2 which under Belgian law is considered a category of binding sources of law. The binding character of that principle also stemmed from Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR, two provisions in human rights instruments to which Belgium is a party and which are self-executing in the Belgian legal order.
From a perspective of both separation of powers – or checks and balances – and peaceful settlement of disputes, impartial solution or settlement of disputes by official courts is an important ingredient of the rule of law. Impartial solution is enhanced if it is controlled by objective norms, laid down in statutes or other legislative or constitutional instruments. Furthermore it is facilitated if the judiciary – part of the public organization of the State – has a position independent of the government and the legislature. It must be said, however, that the relationship between impartiality and independence in general is not entirely unambiguous.1 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is very sensitive about the two notions, and has found violations of Article 6 ECHR by the Netherlands in two cases.
This chapter considers legal failure with reference to post-communist societies. Although recognizing that law fails for various reasons, the approach here is to concentrate on the relationship between law and social norms as an avenue of explanation. The analysis begins with a brief account of the notion of legal failure, which is then considered in relation to the functions of law. The next step is to examine the notion of social norms and their role and importance in post-communist societies. This leads to an image of modern law that has two parts, one construing it as an instrument at the discretion of state for achieving social goals, the other emphasizing the need for a framework of rules within which certain social needs can be met and functions performed. The issue of legal failure is then examined with reference to this image of law.
This article compares the performance of state institutions and compliance with EU law in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. The public institutions highlighted are of crucial relevance when it comes to enforcing EU social standards and include the court and legal systems as well as labour inspectorates and equal treatment authorities. Expert and practitioner assessments point to major shortcomings in their institutional performance. The procedural compliance pattern to which these shortcomings give rise closely resembles that found by previous studies in some Western European countries, notably Ireland and Italy. Thus, the four countries examined here fall within a ‘world of dead letters’ as far as their compliance with EU law is concerned. In this ‘world’, EU directives tend to be transposed in a politicised mode (although so far, this happened rather timely and correctly) and there is frequent non-compliance at the later stages of monitoring and enforcement.
While there is much research on the developmental trajectories of post-Communist state institutions and the external and domestic influences that have shaped their paths, much less is known about institutional performance, that is, the manner in which institutions operate and the extent to which they produce predictable patterns of effects. Academic analysis has been reluctant to shift attention from institutionalisation to effects, not least because of the fluidity of many formal institutions. The present article documents that over the last decade state institutions in East Central Europe have increasingly stabilized, especially at the macro-institutional level. The analysis highlights insights from institutional theory – notably how degrees, time, preferences and resources matter – to encourage further research in the field.
This paper discusses the notion of judicial accountability and argues that judicial accountability is as important as judicial independence for fostering the rule of law and effective judicial mediation of political transition. In the subsequent case studies, it focuses on the ‘large scale’ institutional design of administration of courts in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The aim of this inquiry into the ‘large scale’ institutional design is two-fold: (1) to test whether Slovakia, a country with a strong judicial council, has performed better than the Czech Republic, a country without a judicial council, and (2) to explore how both states fare when it comes to judicial accountability in general.The structure of this paper reads as follows. Part 1 places judicial accountability to the context of transitional justice, tentatively defines the notion of judicial accountability, and discusses its relationship with judicial independence with focus on period of transition to democracy. Part 2 focuses on ‘large scale’ institutional design of administration of justice in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. It starts with a brief overview of institutional models adopted in the former Czechoslovakia, a predecessor of both states, and then proceeds to the contemporary institutional design of administration of justice in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Part 3 first identifies the deficiencies and anomalies of the models of administration of justice in both countries. Subsequently, it provides assessment how both models fare when it comes to judicial accountability and draws tentative conclusions from the functioning of these models. Finally, Part 4 places the Czech and Slovak scenarios into the broader context of judicial reforms in the post-communist countries and identifies issues for further research.
This Article uses comparative evidence to inform the ongoing debate about the selection and discipline of judges. In recent decades, many countries around the world have created judicial councils, institutions designed to maintain an appropriate balance between judicial independence and accountability. Our Article has two aims. First, we provide a theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we test the extent to which different designs of judicial council affect judicial quality. We find that there is little relationship between councils and quality. We also offer a positive explanation for why judicial councils nevertheless remain attractive institutions.
This article focuses on the administration of courts in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The comparison of the recent developments and case law in both countries suggests that in post-Communist societies, the problems encountered in the area of the administration of courts are the same irrespective of the institutional design chosen, i.e. irrespective of the fact whether or not a country established a self-standing judicial council or not. Moreover, as the current developments in Slovakia show, the establishment of an independent judicial council in a politically immature environment may even lead to certain “hijacking” of a new institution by the old Communist judicial elites and the sealing off of the institution behind a veil of judicial independence.
Az igazságszolgáltató hatalom alkotmányos helyzetének és egyes alapelveinek összahasonlító vizsgálata
- A Badó
Jogállam és igazságszolgáltatás a változó világban
- Z Fleck
Judges and legal experts in the European policy of the rule of law promotion
- D Piana
Autonomy and responsibility of the council: Should it be accountable for its actions?
- C Guarnieri
2012. Judicial independence in transition-Strengthening the rule of law in the OSCE region
- A Seibert-Fohr
The drive for supremacy
- C Parau
Fighting for political freedom: Comparative studies of the legal complex and political liberalism
- M Feely