John Gerard Ruggie is Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.
For helpful comments, I thank Richard Betts, Edward Mansfield, Jack Snyder, Anders Stephanson, Steve Weber, and Mark Zacher.
1. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49.
2. Cited in Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 96.
3. Ibid., pp. 103-105.
4. Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 65.
5. Ibid., p. 250.
6. The final U.S. proposal in mid-1947—by then probably designed to be rejected by the Soviet Union—advocated a total of 20 ground divisions; 1,250 bombers; 2,250 fighters; 3 battleships; 6 carriers; 15 cruisers; 84 destroyers; and 90 submarines. See D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 12-18.
7. Cited in Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 365.
8. See Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 2, 1948-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 244-278.
9. George F. Kennan, letter to the editor, Washington Post, November 3, 1956, p. A8.
10. Eisenhower exhibited little awareness of the textbook model of collective security that drove the realists to despair, meaning by his occasional use of the term more generically cooperative, institutionalized approaches to dealing with security problems. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-61 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965).
11. Hans J. Morgenthau, letter to the editor, New York Times, November 13, 1956, p. 36.
12. He felt that all had ended well, however, because "the three 'aggressors' did the exceptional thing of restoring the status quo ante despite the absence of collective military sanctions." Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 187. Wolfers' logic is tortuous, and it also ignores the extensive economic sanctions the United States imposed on Britain. See Diane B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).
13. For a recent rendition of this refrain, see Ted Galen Carpenter, "A New Proliferation Policy," The National Interest, No. 28 (Summer 1992), pp. 63-72.
14. Cited in Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 220.
15. Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), chap. 1.
16. Thomas W. Graham and A.F. Mullins, "Arms Control, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Proliferation," paper presented at the conference on "Nuclear Deterrence and Global Security in Transition," University of California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, La Jolla, Calif., February 21-23, 1991.
17. Michael Howard, "Introduction," in Olav Riste, ed., Western Security: The Formative Years (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1985), p. 16. In an influential essay published a generation ago, Wolfers pointed out the difference between collective self-defense and fully-fledged collective security systems. Arnold Wolfers, "Collective Defense versus Collective Security," in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, pp. 181-204. NATO, to be sure, is an instance of the former, not the latter. It does not follow, however, as realists typically assume, that there is no principled difference between the NATO form of collective self-defense and an old-fashioned alliance.
18. See Anders Stephanson, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 140; David Mayers, George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 152-155; and Geir Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945-1949 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 172-173, 188-189. Kennan later recalled favoring a "dumbbell" arrangement, with the European countries cooperating on one side, the United States and Canada on the other, but in which they would have been linked, not by treaty and a permanent U.S. troop presence in Europe, but merely by a U.S.-Canadian guarantee of...