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EU Migrant Citizens, Welfare States and Social Rights
Cecilia Bruzelius, Constantin Reinprecht and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser
Oxford Institute of Social Policy, University of Oxford
Corresponding author: Martin Seeleib-Kaiser (martin.seeleib@spi.ox.ac.uk)
Research for this paper was funded through the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for
research, technological development and demonstration as part of the project bEUcitizen (grant
no 320294). Additionally, Cecilia Bruzelius and Constantin Reinprecht are recipients of ESRC
scholarships.
Paper prepared for presentation at the 23rd International Conference of Europeanist, Philadelphia, PA,
April 14-16, 2016.
2
EU Migrant Citizens, Welfare States and Social Rights
Cecilia Bruzelius, Constantin Reinprecht and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser
Abstract:
Existing accounts of the relationship between type of welfare state and generosity of welfare rights
granted to immigrants tend to be based on broad analytical categories, overlooking the specific
intricacies of welfare rights access and generosity within specific policy domains. It is often assumed
that EU citizens have the same access to social rights as national citizens, failing to acknowledge the
economically and geographically stratified nature of EU citizenship. Furthermore, differences in
national social protection systems of Member States can translate into differences in social rights for
EU citizens migrating to other Member States. This paper provides an analysis of EU citizens’ legal
and substantive rights, with a special focus on unemployment benefits, pensions and family benefits. It
demonstrates how EU citizens’ social rights are legally differentiated according to economic status
and substantively differentiated according to Member State of origin and destination. Finally, the
paper develops a European Index of Free Movement and Social Rights (EIFMSR).
Introduction
Previous research on the relationship between welfare states and immigrants’ social rights (for
an overview, see Römer, 2016) has emphasized the significance of immigrants’ legal status,
or ‘entry category’ (Morris, 2002: 19), for their welfare entitlement. In the context of
European welfare states, EU citizens make up one such category. This group has, however,
not received much specific attention in existing empirical analyses of migrants’ social rights
(Römer, 2016; Sainsbury, 2012); moreover, EU citizens are said to have by and large the
same social rights as nationals (Sainsbury, 2012; Joppke, 2010: 164). Social rights can be
examined from a legal and from a substantive perspective. Many researchers have focused on
the former and have argued that there is little difference between immigrants’ and citizens’
3
rights, since permanent residency has come to replace citizenship as the core criteria for
accessing welfare (Koopmans 2010; Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Kymlicka and Banting 2006;
Soysal, 1994). Those who have focused more on substantive rights have contested this finding
and have shown that access to welfare rights varies substantially between immigrants and
citizens (Sainsbury, 2012; Valenta and Bunar, 2010).
According to research on substantive rights, immigrants and citizens’ social rights are
said to differ by i) type of immigrant entry category and ii) type of welfare state. The first
aspect refers to the grouping of immigrants into different legal categories at the time of their
arrival – e.g. asylum seekers or labour migrants (Morris, 2002: 19; Geddes, 2003). EU
citizens are often portrayed as a homogenous group or category (Sainsbury 2012). Joppke
(2010: 164) argues that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its
interpretations of the EU Treaty has established two ‘fundamental novelties’ -- “a right to
freedom of movement and residence inherent in EU citizenship, regardless of previous EU
law that required a variant of economic activity as triggering factor; secondly, … substantive
social rights that accrue to EU citizens qua citizens, outside prior economic status categories”.
Theoretically oriented scholars have acknowledged the far from unified character of EU
citizenship (Morris, 2002: 14; Maas, 2009) and highlighted its stratified nature, with the
worker status at its core (Weiler, 1998).
However, EU citizens’ social rights are not only stratified according to economic
activity. We will show that EU citizens’ social rights in destination Member States1 are
differentiated in more subtle ways. Although EU citizens derive their access to social rights
through their supra-national membership in the EU, substantive social rights are defined by
the respective Member States of origin and/or destination. The ability to export benefits from
Member States of origin can be essential for substantive social rights in destination Member
1 We will use the terms ’Member State of destination’ and ’Member State of origin’ to refer first to the country
4
States. Hence, previous country of residence and employment can significantly amplify the
differentiation of substantive rights.
Looking at the specifics of national social policies allows us to consider how access
varies across types of welfare states. Existing empirical accounts suggest more inclusive
welfare states are more likely to grant social rights to immigrants2 (Römer, 2016; Koning,
2013) and tend to be more generous (Sainsbury and Morrisens, 2012) than residual welfare
states. In the debates regarding EU citizens the argument is at times made, whereby EU
citizens’ ease of access to social rights varies across Member States, depending on the degree
to which the welfare state is based on the principle of contributions or on universalism
(Economist, 2013)3.
To address the often-neglected differentiation of EU citizens’ rights, we first analyse
the formal rights of EU citizens and how the law creates different categories of EU citizens.
We then turn to look at effective rights; we discuss stylised rights relating to unemployment
benefits, pensions and family benefits, more specifically child benefits. We have selected
these benefit categories, as they are of high relevance to the major groups of economically
inactive intra-EU migrants, i.e. jobseekers and pensioners. We also include child benefits, as
the majority of jobseekers are young and the availability and generosity of child benefits can
have a significant impact on the welfare of a jobseeker and her/his reservation wage.
Moreover, unemployment and pension benefits are often characterised as insuring against
core ‘old social risks’, whilst family policies are said to belong to the category of social
investment policies addressing ‘new social risks’. In a final section we develop a European
Index of Free Movement and Social Rights (EIFMSR) to illustrate how the very right of free
movement is conditional on social rights derived or exported from the country of origin.
2 There are numerous hypotheses of why there may be a certain relationship between immigrants’ social rights
and specific types of welfare states; see Römer (2016) for an overview.
3 In this regard, there is also a scholarly perception of a ‘misfit’ between universal welfare states and the EU
social security framework (c.f. Martinsen, 2005).
5
Legal social rights of EU migrant citizens
Core to EU citizens’ social rights is their right to freedom of movement (Guild, 2004).
Initially, freedom of movement was limited to workers and self-employed persons; and only
these groups were entitled to equal treatment with national citizens in the realm of social
rights (Wollenschläger, 2011: 3-4)4. Over time both the material and personal scope of
freedom of movement and equal treatment with regards to social rights was extended, largely
through the CJEU’s rulings (Pennings, 2012; Wind, 2009). The material scope of EU citizens’
social rights is regulated by the ‘coordination’ of social security among Member States;
“coordination rules are intended to adjust the social security schemes in relation to each
other… with the objective of protecting the social rights of persons in case the facts of their
circumstances are not limited to one State” (Pennings, 2015: 6). Benefits subject to the
coordination rules can be exported between countries, intended to prevent the loss of
entitlement for those who use their right to freedom of movement. Although court rulings
have gradually extended equal treatment to forms of social support that previously remained
reserved to national citizens, such as certain non-contributory benefits (Ferrera, 2005: 131-
138), European social security coordination does not extend to all social security benefit
schemes;5 most importantly it continues to exclude social assistance.6
4 Directive 2004/38 regulates freedom of movement. Regulations 1612/68 (now 491/2011) and 1408/71 (now
883/2004) specify the co-ordination of social protection between national welfare systems.
5 The material scope of social security coordination encompasses: sickness and maternity benefits; invalidity
benefits; old-age benefits; survivors’ benefits; benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases;
death grants; unemployment benefits; and family benefits.
6 The introduction and further development of non-contributory benefits in many European welfare states over
time blurred the boundaries between social security and social assistance, leading to the introduction of non-
exportable ‘special non-contributory social security benefits’ into the EU legal framework (Cousins, 2007). The
Dano (C-333/13) and Alimanovic (C-67/14) cases constitute recent landmark rulings clarifying the conditions
under which such benefits may be accessible.
6
Central to the expansion of social rights has been the formal establishment of EU
citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht (Article 20 TFEU).7 Subsequent to the introduction of
EU citizenship, some of the privileges that were previously linked to a person’s legal status as
a worker or self-employed have been extended through CJEU rulings to EU citizens (c.f.
Pennings, 2015: 163-176). Despite the expansion of freedom of movement and social rights
on the basis of EU citizenship, EU citizens’ right to reside and their access to social rights in a
Member State of which they do not hold citizenship continues to be heavily stratified during
the first five years of residence. During this initial period, economic status remains key for
accessing social rights, with a stark distinction between EU workers (employed or self-
employed) and all other EU citizens. Workers have the same rights as nationals from the first
day of their employment in another Member State, based on the principle of non-
discrimination.8 EU citizens who are economically inactive can be divided into jobseekers,
students, retired persons, and accompanying family members (European Commission, 2014).
To have the right to reside for more than three months, all economically inactive EU migrant
citizens must have comprehensive sickness insurance and sufficient resources for themselves
and their family members in order not to become an ‘unreasonable burden’9 for the social
assistance system of the Member State. However, Member States must grant EU migrant
citizens the same access to social benefits as nationals after five years of lawful residence.
Child benefits, however, can be accessed in the destination country irrespective of economic
status and duration of residence.
7 EU citizenship was further embedded in the Lisbon Treaty and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2009
(Pennings, 2012).
8 We exclude from our elaboration the categories of ‘frontier workers’ and ‘posted workers’.
9 The concept of ‘unreasonable burden’ continues to lack a clear definition. Any assessment needs to consider
not only the personal situation (e.g. if need for benefits is temporary), but also whether the system is potentially
threatened, which would require taking the total number of (potential) claimants into account (Pennings, 2015:
75).
7
Jobseekers can export unemployment benefits from the Member State of origin for a
minimum duration of three months while seeking work in another Member State, if they were
previously registered as unemployed in their country of origin (c.f. Pennings, 2015: 287). If a
jobseeker has a child, he/she can be entitled to family benefits in the country of destination.
Workers who have become unemployed retain worker status for at least six months, or even
longer, if they continue to seek employment in the ‘host’ EU country and have a ‘genuine
chance’ 10 of finding work. Students must have comprehensive sickness insurance and
sufficient financial means to support themselves and their family to have the right to reside for
more than three months. If a student has a child, s/he would be entitled to family benefits in
the destination Member State. After five years a student could gain full access to social rights
in the new Member State, if s/he fulfilled the conditions for residence throughout this period.
Pensioners are entitled to ‘exporting’ their pension and have access to the healthcare system
of the destination country of which the costs are to be reimbursed by the country competent
for the pension. Overall, pensioners should have sufficient financial means to support
themselves and their family. Pensioners retiring in another Member State after having worked
in said Member State can access means-tested supplementary pensions; under specific
conditions these benefits can also be available to pensioners ‘exporting’ their pension from
another Member State after a certain period of residence. A pensioner is entitled to the family
benefits of the Member State competent for his/her pension.11
10 This is not further defined in Directive 2004/38.
11 We limit our analysis to those who move as pensioners. For an analysis of EU migrant citizens’ who retire in a
destination Member State, see Meyer et al. (2013).
8
TABLE 1: EU CITIZENS’ SOCIAL RIGHTS BY CATEGORY AND TIME
3 month or less
3 - 6 months
1 - 5 years
+ 5 years
Worker
- full access
- full access
- full access
- full access
Jobseeker
- export/import of
unemployment
benefits
- family benefits
- family benefits
- family benefits
- full access, if legal
resident for a
minimum of five
years
Student
- export/import of
sickness insurance
- family benefits
- export/import of
sickness insurance
- family benefits
- export/import of
sickness insurance
- family benefits
- full access, if legal
resident for a
minimum of five
years
Pensioner
- export/import of
pension
- export/import of
sickness insurance
- export/import of
pension
- export/import of
sickness insurance
- export/import of
pension
- export/import of
sickness insurance
- export/import of
pension
- export/import of
sickness insurance
Table 1 clearly illustrates the significant gaps in social rights of economically inactive
EU migrant citizens during the first five years of residence in destination countries. This is
especially the case for jobseekers, who are fully reliant on the labour market after the three
months during which they can export unemployment insurance, until they establish a right to
contribution-based jobseeker benefits, as they are usually also excluded from social
assistance.
Substantive social rights of EU migrant citizens
The legal definition of different categories of EU citizens and their social rights is insufficient
to assess the substantive social rights. In the following, we will show the extent to which
social rights are stratified by the country of origin. For this analysis we have chosen the
categories of jobseekers and pensioners, as they do not have full access to social rights in the
destination Member State (see table 1). However, want to highlight that we do not aim to give
a comprehensive assessment of benefits EU migrant citizens actually receive; moreover, we
9
attempt to provide an overview of how social policies of Member States result in stratified
substantive social rights both across and within categories of EU migrant citizens.
Unemployment benefits
Social security coordination allows unemployed EU migrant citizens to ‘export’ their national
unemployment insurance benefits from the Member State of origin for a minimum period of
three months. Table 2 shows the exportable benefit of a stylized unemployed worker (single
with a previous income of 67 per cent of the average national wage).12 Table 3 in turn shows
the absolute difference between the exportable unemployment benefit of the stylized
unemployed worker who has moved to another Member State and the respective
unemployment benefit for a single unemployed worker (67% AW) of that destination country.
E.g. an unemployed worker from Romania having moved to Denmark in search for a new job
would only receive a weekly unemployment benefit of €27, whilst someone who lost his/her
job in Denmark would receive a weekly benefit of €368. In other words, an unemployed
worker from Romania would be more than €340 worse off than a Danish unemployed. The
exportable weekly unemployment benefit of €27 would constitute the theoretical reservation
wage, as the unemployed person from Romania would not be entitled to any social assistance
benefit in Denmark. Such a low reservation wage forces the unemployed worker from
Romania to take up any job offer, even if it is exploitative. In other words, s/he has virtually
no substantive social rights in Denmark.
12 We have chosen a single worker with 67 per cent of average wage, as the majority of intra-EU migrants are
young people and therefore unlikely to have a higher wage.
10
TABLE 2: UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT, 2014 (single, 67% of AW)
Net annual
earnings (in €)
Replacement
rate (in %)
Weekly
unemployment
benefit (in €)
Social-
democratic
Denmark
22,705
84
367.70
Sweden
23,490
61
274.99
Conservative
Netherlands
24,430
74
347.99
Belgium
19,957
89
341.59
Finland
21,895
71
297.65
France
18,381
69
244.57
Germany
20,144
59
227.87
Austria
20,338
55
215.12
Liberal
Ireland
19,915
49
185.97
United Kingdom
23,804
20
90.78
Mediterranean
Italy
15,536
73
218.91
Spain
14,284
78
213.11
Portugal
9,403
75
135.63
Malta
11,961
41
93.49
Greece
10,953
39
81.75
A8
Slovenia
8,533
86
140.42
Czech Republic
6,134
65
76.68
Latvia
4,696
84
75.99
Estonia
6,814
55
71.68
Slovakia
5,583
62
66.69
Hungary
4,278
67
55.32
Poland
5,164
45
44.59
Lithuania
4,353
52
43.44
A2
Bulgaria
2,668
77
39.27
Romania
3,146
45
27.21
Notes: Cyprus is excluded, as no data on net annual earnings is available; Luxembourg is excluded, as
it is an outlier with a disproportionately large EU migrant citizen population.
Source: Annual net earnings for a single person, 67% of AW from Eurostat
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/labour-market/earnings/database); replacement rates from OECD for
single person without children, 67% of AW, initial phase of unemployment
(http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm).
11
TABLE 3: ABSOLUTE NET DIFFERENCE OF WEEKLY UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
BETWEEN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND COUNTRY OF DESTINATION, 2014
!
Unemployment benefits can also be accessed in the ‘host’ Member State if a worker loses
his/her job. The point at which an unemployed worker can do so, depends on the qualifying
periods defined by Member States (Table 4). The minimum qualifying period for
unemployment benefits in the destination country varies considerably across countries. E.g.
the UK formally does not have a minimum qualifying period, but a minimum amount of
contributions, and in Ireland, Lithuania and Slovakia they are comparatively long. As many
migrant workers are employed in precarious jobs, they in theory have a higher social risk of
unemployment than nationals. At the same time, however, they have a lower likelihood to
fulfil the minimum qualifying period than nationals, as only the employment in the Member
State of destination is included in determining the reference period. In other words, shorter
minimum qualifying periods ease access to contribution-based unemployment benefits for EU
migrant citizens and places them on a more equal footing with nationals of the destination
Member State.
Absolute net difference of weekly unemployment benefits between country of origin and country of destination, 2014
DK SE NL BE FI FR DE AT IE UK IT ES PT MT EL SI CZ LV EE SK HU PL LT BG RO
Absolute net difference of weekly unemployment benefits between country of origin and country of destination, 2014
A8
A2
Liberal
Conservative
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
Soc-Dem
Mediterranean
DK
SE
NL
BE
FI
FR
DE
AT
IE
UK
IT
ES
PT
MT
EL
SI
CZ
LV
EE
SK
HU
PL
LT
BG
RO
Source: Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/labour-market/earnings/database), OECD (http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm)
Notes: Weekly exportable unemployment benefit calculated for mobile unemployed single EU citizens without children with 67% of AW for the initial period of
unemployment; Cyprus excluded as data on net annual earnings is unavailable; Luxembourg excluded as outlier with disproportionately large proportion of EU migrant citizens
Conservative
Mediterr.
Lib
A8
A2
SD
COUNTRY OF DESTINATION
-93 -20 -26 -70 -123 -140 -153 -182 -277 -149 -155 -232 -274 -286 -227 -291 -292 -296 -301 -312 -323 -324 -328 -340
93 73 67 23 -30 -47 -60 -89 -184 -56 -62 -139 -181 -193 -135 -198 -199 -203 -208 -220 -230 -232 -236 -248
20 -73 -6 -50 -103 -120 -133 -162 -257 -129 -135 -212 -254 -266 -208 -271 -272 -276 -281 -293 -303 -305 -309 -321
26 -67 6 -44 -97 -114 -126 -156 -251 -123 -128 -206 -248 -260 -201 -265 -266 -270 -275 -286 -297 -298 -302 -314
70 -23 50 44 -53 -70 -83 -112 -207 -79 -85 -162 -204 -216 -157 -221 -222 -226 -231 -242 -253 -254 -258 -270
123 30 103 97 53 -17 -29 -59 -154 -26 -31 -109 -151 -163 -104 -168 -169 -173 -178 -189 -200 -201 -205 -217
140 47 120 114 70 17 -13 -42 -137 -9 -15 -92 -134 -146 -87 -151 -152 -156 -161 -173 -183 -184 -189 -201
153 60 133 126 83 29 13 -29 -124 4 -2 -79 -122 -133 -75 -138 -139 -143 -148 -160 -171 -172 -176 -188
182 89 162 156 112 59 42 29 -95 33 27 -50 -92 -104 -46 -109 -110 -114 -119 -131 -141 -143 -147 -159
277 184 257 251 207 154 137 124 95 128 122 45 3 -9 50 -14 -15 -19 -24 -35 -46 -47 -52 -64
149 56 129 123 79 26 9 -4 -33 -128 -6 -83 -125 -137 -78 -142 -143 -147 -152 -164 -174 -175 -180 -192
155 62 135 128 85 31 15 2 -27 -122 6 -77 -120 -131 -73 -136 -137 -141 -146 -158 -169 -170 -174 -186
232 139 212 206 162 109 92 79 50 -45 83 77 -42 -54 5 -59 -60 -64 -69 -80 -91 -92 -96 -108
274 181 254 248 204 151 134 122 92 -3 125 120 42 -12 47 -17 -18 -22 -27 -38 -49 -50 -54 -66
286 193 266 260 216 163 146 133 104 9 137 131 54 12 59 -5 -6 -10 -15 -26 -37 -38 -42 -55
227 135 208 201 157 104 87 75 46 -50 78 73 -5 -47 -59 -64 -64 -69 -74 -85 -96 -97 -101 -113
291 198 271 265 221 168 151 138 109 14 142 136 59 17 5 64 -1 -5 -10 -21 -32 -33 -37 -49
292 199 272 266 222 169 152 139 110 15 143 137 60 18 6 64 1 -4 -9 -21 -31 -33 -37 -49
296 203 276 270 226 173 156 143 114 19 147 141 64 22 10 69 5 4 -5 -16 -27 -28 -32 -44
301 208 281 275 231 178 161 148 119 24 152 146 69 27 15 74 10 9 5 -11 -22 -23 -27 -39
312 220 293 286 242 189 173 160 131 35 164 158 80 38 26 85 21 21 16 11 -11 -12 -16 -28
323 230 303 297 253 200 183 171 141 46 174 169 91 49 37 96 32 31 27 22 11 -1 -5 -17
324 232 305 298 254 201 184 172 143 47 175 170 92 50 38 97 33 33 28 23 12 1 -4 -16
328 236 309 302 258 205 189 176 147 52 180 174 96 54 42 101 37 37 32 27 16 5 4 -12
340 248 321 314 270 217 201 188 159 64 192 186 108 66 55 113 49 49 44 39 28 17 16 12
higher in origin than in destination country 25-50% lower than in the destination country
up to 25% lower than in the destination country more than 50% lower than in destination country
Source: Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/labour-market/earnings/database), OECD (http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm)
Notes: Weekly exportable unemployment benefit calculated for mobile unemployed single EU citizens without children with 67% of AW for the initial period of
unemployment; Cyprus excluded as data on net annual earnings is unavailable; Luxembourg excluded as outlier with disproportionately large proportion of EU migrant citizens
12
TABLE 4: MINIMUM QUALIFYING PERIODS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS, 2015
Qualifying period (months)
Social-
democratic
Sweden
6
Denmark
12
Conservative
France
4
Netherlands
6
Finland
6
Germany
12
Austria
12
Belgium
15.6
Liberal
United Kingdom
n/a*
Ireland
24
Mediterranean
Italy
3.25
Greece
6.25
Spain
12
Portugal
12
Malta
12.5
A8
Slovenia
9
Czech Republic
12
Latvia
12
Estonia
12
Hungary
12
Poland
12
Lithuania
18
Slovakia
24
A2
Bulgaria
9
Romania
12
Notes: *Although the UK does not have a formal qualifying period, a jobseeker must have
contributed at least 26 times the minimum weekly contribution for the year on which the claim is
based and 50 times the minimum weekly contribution for the past two years.
Cyprus is excluded for comparability with reservation wage tables; Luxembourg excluded as outlier
with disproportionately large proportion of EU migrant citizen population
Source: MISSOC
(http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MIS
SOCDATABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp)
Pensions
Social security coordination for pensions specifies that EU citizens can export their pensions
if they choose to retire in a different Member State. Table 5 provides an overview of non
13
means-tested old age pension expenditure per beneficiary across EU Member States in 2012.13
Means-tested pensions, while relatively important in some states, are excluded, as EU
pensioners can only export non means-tested pension payments. Table 6 shows the absolute
difference in average pension expenditure per beneficiary between origin and destination
countries within the EU. The substantial absolute differences indicate that the ease to retire in
another Member State on an exported pension varies significantly across countries. E.g. a
pensioner from Bulgaria making use of his/her freedom of movement and with the aim to
settle in Denmark would de facto have no substantive social rights in Denmark, as his/her
annual pension would only be approximately € 1,500, whereas someone entitled to a full
Danish pension would receive more than €20,000 per annum. Overall, pensioners from CEE
countries would have significantly lower substantive social rights when retiring in another
Member State, compared to pensioners from Northwest European Member States.
13 We chosen total non means-tested old-age pension expenditure per beneficiary as an approximation of average
non-means tested pension receipt. We acknowledge the limitations of taking pension expenditure per
beneficiary: the data likely overstates average non means-tested pensions in countries with long minimum
contributory periods to qualify for minimum non-means tested pensions and pension benefits might be liable to
taxation in some countries. However, in the absence of comparable data on pension benefits across countries, we
believe non means-tested pension expenditure is a good proxy measure.
14
TABLE 5: PENSION EXPENDITURE PER
BENEFICIARY, 2012
Expenditure per
beneficiary (in €)
Social-democratic
Denmark
20,395
Sweden
19,926
Conservative
Austria
19,237
Netherlands
18,691
Belgium
17,554
Finland
16,338
France
16,073
Germany
13,387
Liberal
Ireland
19,370
United Kingdom
15,300
Mediterranean
Italy
15,417
Cyprus
13,891
Spain
13,382
Greece
10,825
Malta
8,855
Portugal
8,588
A8
Slovenia
5,825
Czech Republic
5,085
Poland
4,568
Slovakia
4,244
Hungary
3,955
Estonia
3,890
Latvia
3,216
Lithuania
2,821
A2
Romania
2,347
Bulgaria
1,527
Notes: Luxembourg is excluded as it is an outlier with a
disproportionately large EU migrant citizen population.
Source: Eurostat; total expenditure on non means-tested old
age pension, pension beneficiaries, non means-tested old
age pensions (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/social-
protection/data/database).
15
TABLE 6: ABSOLUTE NET DIFFERENCE (IN €) OF NON MEANS-TESTED OLD AGE
PENSION EXPENDITURE PER BENEFICIARY BETWEEN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
AND COUNTRY OF DESTINATION, 2012
Family benefits
Child benefits are different to unemployment and pension benefits as they can be received in
the destination country from the first day of habitual residence and are not exported from the
country of origin. A parent can receive child benefits also when the child or children live in a
different Member State.14 Hence, the export of child benefits can work in the opposite
direction than the export of unemployment benefits or pensions, i.e. from the country of
destination to the country of origin. Table 7 presents monthly child benefits for the first child
(below age 1) as well as for two children.
14 If parents live in two different Member States rules apply to prevent an overlap of benefits for the same child
and periods. The benefit received will depend on the way national schemes provide benefits, and rights will be
given in the following order; first, rights available on the basis of an activity as an employed or self-employed
person are paid (family benefits could also be residence depending on the national scheme). Second, rights
available on the basis of receipt of a pension. Finally, rights obtained on the basis of residence.
16
TABLE 7: CHILD BENEFIT, 2015
Monthly benefit, 1st
child (in €)
Monthly benefit for 1st
+ 2nd child (in €)
Social-democratic
Denmark
199
397
Sweden
114
244
Conservative
Germany
188
376
Austria
110
233
Finland
96
202
Belgium
90
258
Netherlands
64
128
France
0
129
Liberal
Ireland
135
270
United Kingdom
127
211
Mediterranean
Portugal
141
211
Malta
96
193
Italy
47
94
Cyprus
32
63
Spain
24
49
Greece
n/a
n/a
A8
Slovenia
114
240
Estonia
45
90
Hungary
39
84
Lithuania
29
57
Slovakia
24
47
Czech Republic
18
36
Poland
18
36
Latvia
11
34
A2
Romania
44
89
Bulgaria
18
44
Notes: monthly child benefit for 1st child (< 1 year) and two children (<1 year and < 2 years,
respectively); if dependent on household income or means-tested amount available for household in
the lowest income-bracket; two-parent household; Luxembourg excluded as outlier with
disproportionately EU migrant citizen population.
Source: MISSOC
(http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDAT
ABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp)
17
As family benefits are not exported from the Member State of origin but rather paid by the
Member State of destination, the parent’s residence determines the benefit level. This can
impact the overall level of social transfers available to a job-seeking EU citizens, but also the
benefit available to a child, as children also have the right to free movement, for example to
study in a different Member State. Table 8 illustrates the absolute differences in child benefits
between Member State of origin and destination that a child of EU citizens would have, if it
were to relocate to another Member State whilst the parents continue to reside in the Member
State of origin.
TABLE 8: ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN MONTHLY CHILD BENEFITS BETWEEN
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND COUNTRY OF DESTINATION, 2015 [CHILD]
The flipside to children using their right to freedom of movement is parents relocating to
another Member State, while their child or children remain in the Member State of origin.
Absolute net difference (in €) in monthly child benefits between country of origin and country of destination, 2015
DK SE DE AT FI BE NL FR IE UK PT MT IT CY ES SI EE HU LT SK CZ PL LV RO BG
Absolute net difference (in €) in monthly child benefits between country of origin and country of destination, 2015
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
Soc-Dem
Conservative
Liberal
Mediterranean
A8
A2
DK
SE
DE
AT
FI
BE
NL
FR
IE
UK
PT
MT
IT
CY
ES
SI
EE
HU
LT
SK
CZ
PL
LV
RO
BG
COUNTRY OF DESTINATION
SD
Conservative
Lib
Mediterr.
A8
A2
Notes: monthly child benefit for 1st child (< 1year); if dependent on household income or means-tested amount available for household in the lowest income-bracket;
Two-parent household; Greece excluded as data unavailable; Luxembourg excluded as outlier with disproportionately large proportion of EU migrant citizen population
Source: MISSOC (http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDATABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp)
-85 -11 -89 -103 -108 -135 -199 -64 -72 -58 -102 -152 -167 -174 -84 -154 -160 -170 -175 -181 -181 -187 -154 -181
85 74 -4 -18 -24 -50 -114 21 13 27 -18 -67 -82 -90 0 -69 -75 -86 -90 -96 -96 -103 -70 -96
11 -74 -78 -92 -98 -124 -188 -53 -61 -47 -92 -141 -156 -164 -74 -143 -149 -160 -164 -170 -170 -177 -144 -170
89 4 78 -14 -19 -46 -110 25 17 31 -13 -63 -78 -85 5 -65 -71 -81 -86 -92 -92 -98 -65 -92
103 18 92 14 -5 -32 -96 39 31 45 1 -49 -64 -72 19 -51 -57 -67 -72 -78 -78 -84 -51 -78
108 24 98 19 5 -26 -90 45 37 50 6 -43 -59 -66 24 -45 -51 -62 -67 -72 -72 -79 -46 -72
135 50 124 46 32 26 -64 71 63 77 32 -17 -32 -40 50 -19 -25 -35 -40 -46 -46 -53 -19 -46
199 114 188 110 96 90 64 135 127 141 96 47 32 24 114 45 39 29 24 18 18 11 44 18
64 -21 53 -25 -39 -45 -71 -135 -8 6 -39 -88 -103 -111 -21 -90 -96 -107 -111 -117 -117 -124 -91 -117
72 -13 61 -17 -31 -37 -63 -127 8 14 -31 -80 -95 -103 -13 -82 -88 -99 -103 -109 -109 -116 -83 -109
58 -27 47 -31 -45 -50 -77 -141 -6 -14 -44 -94 -109 -117 -26 -96 -102 -112 -117 -123 -123 -129 -96 -123
102 18 92 13 -1 -6 -32 -96 39 31 44 -49 -65 -72 18 -51 -57 -68 -73 -78 -78 -85 -52 -78
152 67 141 63 49 43 17 -47 88 80 94 49 -16 -23 67 -2 -8 -19 -24 -29 -29 -36 -3 -29
167 82 156 78 64 59 32 -32 103 95 109 65 16 -7 83 13 7 -3 -8 -14 -14 -20 13 -14
174 90 164 85 72 66 40 -24 111 103 117 72 23 7 90 21 15 4 -1 -6 -6 -13 20 -6
84 0 74 -5 -19 -24 -50 -114 21 13 26 -18 -67 -83 -90 -69 -75 -86 -91 -96 -96 -103 -70 -96
154 69 143 65 51 45 19 -45 90 82 96 51 2 -13 -21 69 -6 -17 -21 -27 -27 -34 -1 -27
160 75 149 71 57 51 25 -39 96 88 102 57 8 -7 -15 75 6 -11 -15 -21 -21 -28 5 -21
170 86 160 81 67 62 35 -29 107 99 112 68 19 3 -4 86 17 11 -5 -11 -11 -17 16 -11
175 90 164 86 72 67 40 -24 111 103 117 73 24 8 1 91 21 15 5 -6 -6 -12 21 -6
181 96 170 92 78 72 46 -18 117 109 123 78 29 14 6 96 27 21 11 6 0 -7 26 0
181 96 170 92 78 72 46 -18 117 109 123 78 29 14 6 96 27 21 11 6 0 -7 26 0
187 103 177 98 84 79 53 -11 124 116 129 85 36 20 13 103 34 28 17 12 7 7 33 7
154 70 144 65 51 46 19 -44 91 83 96 52 3 -13 -20 70 1 -5 -16 -21 -26 -26 -33 -26
181 96 170 92 78 72 46 -18 117 109 123 78 29 14 6 96 27 21 11 6 0 0 -7 26
higher in origin than in destination country 25-50% lower than in the destination country
up to 25% lower than in the destination country more than 50% lower than in destination country
Notes: monthly child benefit for 1st child (< 1year); if dependent on household income or means-tested amount available for household in the lowest income-bracket;
Two-parent household; Greece excluded as data unavailable; Luxembourg excluded as outlier with disproportionately large proportion of EU migrant citizen population
Source: MISSOC (http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDATABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp)
18
Tables 9 and 10 indicate that parents who relocate to a destination country that is more
generous in terms of family benefits than their country of origin will gain financially, as the
difference between child benefits in destination and origin country is positive, assuming their
child or children remain in the state of origin.
TABLE 9: ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN MONTHLY CHILD BENEFITS (1 CHILD)
BETWEEN DESTINATION AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 2015 [PARENT]
Absolute net difference (in €) in monthly child benefits (1 child) between country of destination and country of origin, 2015
DK SE DE AT FI BE NL FR IE UK PT MT IT CY ES SI EE HU LT SK CZ PL LV RO BG
Absolute net difference (in €) in monthly child benefits (1 child) between country of destination and country of origin, 2015
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
Soc-Dem
Conservative
Liberal
Mediterranean
A8
A2
DK
SE
DE
AT
FI
BE
NL
FR
IE
UK
PT
MT
IT
CY
ES
SI
EE
HU
LT
SK
CZ
PL
LV
RO
BG
COUNTRY OF DESTINATION
SD
Conservative
Lib
Mediterr.
A8
A2
Notes: monthly child benefit for 1st child (< 1 year); if dependent on household income or means-tested amount available for household in the lowest income-bracket;
Two-parent household; Greece excluded as data unavailable; Luxembourg excluded as outlier with disproportionately large proportion of EU migrant citizen population
Source: MISSOC (http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDATABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp)
85 11 89 103 108 135 199 64 72 58 102 152 167 174 84 154 160 170 175 181 181 187 154 181
-85 -74 4 18 24 50 114 -21 -13 -27 18 67 82 90 0 69 75 86 90 96 96 103 70 96
-11 74 78 92 98 124 188 53 61 47 92 141 156 164 74 143 149 160 164 170 170 177 144 170
-89 -4 -78 14 19 46 110 -25 -17 -31 13 63 78 85 -5 65 71 81 86 92 92 98 65 92
-103 -18 -92 -14 5 32 96 -39 -31 -45 -1 49 64 72 -19 51 57 67 72 78 78 84 51 78
-108 -24 -98 -19 -5 26 90 -45 -37 -50 -6 43 59 66 -24 45 51 62 67 72 72 79 46 72
-135 -50 -124 -46 -32 -26 64 -71 -63 -77 -32 17 32 40 -50 19 25 35 40 46 46 53 19 46
-199 -114 -188 -110 -96 -90 -64 -135 -127 -141 -96 -47 -32 -24 -114 -45 -39 -29 -24 -18 -18 -11 -44 -18
-64 21 -53 25 39 45 71 135 8 -6 39 88 103 111 21 90 96 107 111 117 117 124 91 117
-72 13 -61 17 31 37 63 127 -8 -14 31 80 95 103 13 82 88 99 103 109 109 116 83 109
-58 27 -47 31 45 50 77 141 6 14 44 94 109 117 26 96 102 112 117 123 123 129 96 123
-102 -18 -92 -13 1 6 32 96 -39 -31 -44 49 65 72 -18 51 57 68 73 78 78 85 52 78
-152 -67 -141 -63 -49 -43 -17 47 -88 -80 -94 -49 16 23 -67 2 8 19 24 29 29 36 3 29
-167 -82 -156 -78 -64 -59 -32 32 -103 -95 -109 -65 -16 7 -83 -13 -7 3 8 14 14 20 -13 14
-174 -90 -164 -85 -72 -66 -40 24 -111 -103 -117 -72 -23 -7 -90 -21 -15 -4 1 6 6 13 -20 6
-84 0 -74 5 19 24 50 114 -21 -13 -26 18 67 83 90 69 75 86 91 96 96 103 70 96
-154 -69 -143 -65 -51 -45 -19 45 -90 -82 -96 -51 -2 13 21 -69 6 17 21 27 27 34 1 27
-160 -75 -149 -71 -57 -51 -25 39 -96 -88 -102 -57 -8 7 15 -75 -6 11 15 21 21 28 -5 21
-170 -86 -160 -81 -67 -62 -35 29 -107 -99 -112 -68 -19 -3 4 -86 -17 -11 5 11 11 17 -16 11
-175 -90 -164 -86 -72 -67 -40 24 -111 -103 -117 -73 -24 -8 -1 -91 -21 -15 -5 6 6 12 -21 6
-181 -96 -170 -92 -78 -72 -46 18 -117 -109 -123 -78 -29 -14 -6 -96 -27 -21 -11 -6 0 7 -26 0
-181 -96 -170 -92 -78 -72 -46 18 -117 -109 -123 -78 -29 -14 -6 -96 -27 -21 -11 -6 0 7 -26 0
-187 -103 -177 -98 -84 -79 -53 11 -124 -116 -129 -85 -36 -20 -13 -103 -34 -28 -17 -12 -7 -7 -33 -7
-154 -70 -144 -65 -51 -46 -19 44 -91 -83 -96 -52 -3 13 20 -70 -1 5 16 21 26 26 33 26
-181 -96 -170 -92 -78 -72 -46 18 -117 -109 -123 -78 -29 -14 -6 -96 -27 -21 -11 -6 0 0 7 -26
higher in destination than in origin country 25-50% lower than in the origin country
up to 25% lower than in the origin country
more than 50% lower than in origin country
Notes: monthly child benefit for 1st child (< 1 year); if dependent on household income or means-tested amount available for household in the lowest income-bracket;
Two-parent household; Greece excluded as data unavailable; Luxembourg excluded as outlier with disproportionately large proportion of EU migrant citizen population
Source: MISSOC (http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDATABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp)
19
TABLE 10: ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN MONTHLY CHILD BENEFITS (2
CHILDREN) BETWEEN COUNTRY OF DESTINATION AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN,
2015 [PARENT]
As the family benefit of the destination country can be received in addition to the
exported unemployment benefit, it can increase the overall level of social protection benefits
available to, or in other words the reservation wage of an unemployed EU parent. Countries
with high reservation wages tend to have high exportable child benefits. Hence, the difference
in reservation wages between origin and destination country generally becomes less negative
for unemployed EU parents who can “top-up” their reservation wage with the destination
country child benefit, as compared to unemployed EU migrant citizens without children. For
instance, the reservation wage of an unemployed Romanian worker seeking employment in
the UK, able to export his/her Romanian unemployment benefit and with two children living
in Romania, would increase from €27.21 per week to €79.96. If he/she would migrate to
Germany, his/her weekly reservation wage would increase to €121.21.
Absolute net difference (in €) in monthly child benefits (2 children) between country of destination and origin, 2015
DK SE DE BE AT FI FR NL IE UK PT MT IT CY ES SI EE HU LT SK CZ PL LV RO BG
Absolute net difference (in €) in monthly child benefits (2 children) between country of destination and origin, 2015
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
Soc-Dem
Conservative
Liberal
Mediterranean
A8
A2
DK
SE
DE
BE
AT
FI
FR
NL
IE
UK
PT
MT
IT
CY
ES
SI
EE
HU
LT
SK
CZ
PL
LV
RO
BG
Notes: monthly child benefit for two children (< 1 and < 2 years, respectively); if dependent on household income or means-tested amount available for household in the
lowest income-bracket; Two-parent household; Greece excluded as data unavailable; Luxembourg excluded as outlier with disproportionately large proportion of EU
migrant citizen population
Source: MISSOC (http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDATABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp)
COUNTRY OF DESTINATION
SD
Conservative
Lib
Mediterr.
A8
A2
153 21 140 165 196 268 270 127 186 186 205 303 334 349 157 307 313 340 350 361 361 363 309 353
-153 -132 -14 11 42 115 116 -26 33 33 51 150 181 196 4 154 160 187 197 208 208 210 155 200
-21 132 118 143 174 247 248 106 165 165 183 282 313 328 136 286 292 319 329 340 340 342 287 332
-140 14 -118 25 56 128 130 -12 47 47 65 164 195 209 18 168 174 201 211 222 222 224 169 214
-165 -11 -143 -25 31 103 105 -37 22 22 40 139 170 184 -7 143 149 176 186 197 197 199 144 189
-196 -42 -174 -56 -31 72 74 -68 -9 -10 9 107 138 153 -38 112 118 145 155 166 166 167 113 158
-268 -115 -247 -128 -103 -72 2 -141 -82 -82 -63 35 66 81 -111 39 45 72 82 93 93 95 41 85
-270 -116 -248 -130 -105 -74 -2 -142 -83 -83 -65 34 65 79 -112 38 44 71 81 92 92 94 39 84
-127 26 -106 12 37 68 141 142 59 59 77 176 207 222 30 180 186 213 223 234 234 236 181 226
-186 -33 -165 -47 -22 9 82 83 -59 0 18 117 148 163 -29 121 127 154 164 175 175 177 122 167
-186 -33 -165 -47 -22 10 82 83 -59 0 19 117 148 163 -29 121 127 154 164 175 175 177 122 167
-205 -51 -183 -65 -40 -9 63 65 -77 -18 -19 98 129 144 -47 103 109 136 146 157 157 159 104 149
-303 -150 -282 -164 -139 -107 -35 -34 -176 -117 -117 -98 31 46 -146 4 10 37 47 58 58 60 5 50
-334 -181 -313 -195 -170 -138 -66 -65 -207 -148 -148 -129 -31 15 -177 -27 -21 6 16 27 27 29 -26 19
-349 -196 -328 -209 -184 -153 -81 -79 -222 -163 -163 -144 -46 -15 -192 -42 -36 -9 1 13 13 14 -40 5
-157 -4 -136 -18 7 38 111 112 -30 29 29 47 146 177 192 150 156 183 193 204 204 206 151 196
-307 -154 -286 -168 -143 -112 -39 -38 -180 -121 -121 -103 -4 27 42 -150 6 33 43 54 54 56 1 46
-313 -160 -292 -174 -149 -118 -45 -44 -186 -127 -127 -109 -10 21 36 -156 -6 27 37 48 48 50 -5 40
-340 -187 -319 -201 -176 -145 -72 -71 -213 -154 -154 -136 -37 -6 9 -183 -33 -27 10 21 21 23 -32 13
-350 -197 -329 -211 -186 -155 -82 -81 -223 -164 -164 -146 -47 -16 -1 -193 -43 -37 -10 11 11 13 -42 3
-361 -208 -340 -222 -197 -166 -93 -92 -234 -175 -175 -157 -58 -27 -13 -204 -54 -48 -21 -11 0 2 -53 -8
-361 -208 -340 -222 -197 -166 -93 -92 -234 -175 -175 -157 -58 -27 -13 -204 -54 -48 -21 -11 0 2 -53 -8
-363 -210 -342 -224 -199 -167 -95 -94 -236 -177 -177 -159 -60 -29 -14 -206 -56 -50 -23 -13 -2 -2 -55 -10
-309 -155 -287 -169 -144 -113 -41 -39 -181 -122 -122 -104 -5 26 40 -151 -1 5 32 42 53 53 55 45
-353 -200 -332 -214 -189 -158 -85 -84 -226 -167 -167 -149 -50 -19 -5 -196 -46 -40 -13 -3 8 8 10 -45
higher in destination than in origin country 25-50% lower in destination than in the origin country
up to 25% lower than in the origin country more than 50% lower in destination than in origin country
Notes: monthly child benefit for two children (< 1 and < 2 years, respectively); if dependent on household income or means-tested amount available for household in the
lowest income-bracket; Two-parent household; Greece excluded as data unavailable; Luxembourg excluded as outlier with disproportionately large proportion of EU
migrant citizen population
Source: MISSOC (http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDATABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp)
20
The stark differences of substantive social rights in the domains of unemployment, old
age, and family illustrate that the differentiation of social rights is not only the result of legal
rules determining access to social rights, but is a consequence of institutional variation in an
economically differentiated Union (Bruzelius and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2016). In other words,
different (legal) categories of EU citizens not only create different social rights in other
Member States, but citizens who fall into the same category have different substantive rights,
depending on the country competent for the payment of their benefits (normally country of
previous employment).
Freedom of movement and substantive social rights
The fundamental right to freedom of movement (Art. 20 of the TFEU) and social rights are
inherently linked, as EU citizens have to move in order to be able to exercise their social
rights. Limited substantive social rights of EU migrant citizens, however, can severely restrict
the right to free movement. In the following analysis, we define the degree of freedom of
movement and citizenship to be high, if a person can move to another Member State without
being significantly worse off 15 in terms of social benefits, compared to a person with the
same socio-demographic characteristic in the country of destination. As this is fully achieved
for workers, we will focus our attention in the following section on children/parents,
jobseekers and pensioners. We will identify Member States whose citizens enjoy a high,
moderate and low degree of freedom of movement and European citizenship. Figure 1 shows
the degree of freedom of movement across EU Member States for unemployed EU migrant
citizens. 16 Unemployed EU migrant citizens from four Member States, i.e. Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands, have sufficiently generous exportable unemployment
15 Defined as having at least 75% of the benefit of a person with the same socio-demographic characteristic in
the country of destination.
16!We!use!the!same!stylized!unemployed!worker!as!above.!
21
benefits to enjoy a high level of freedom of movement and European citizenship (indicated in
green) across Europe, as their unemployment benefit does not drop below 75% of the
unemployment benefit in any EU destination state. Jobseekers from Western Europe enjoy a
medium degree of freedom of movement (indicated in amber), as they can relocate to the
majority of Member States without being relatively much worse off than unemployed
nationals of the destination state. However, they will generally be disadvantaged when
relocating to Belgium, Denmark, Finland, or the Netherlands, as their unemployment benefit
amounts to less than 75% of some destination countries’ unemployment benefits.
Comparatively very low levels of unemployment benefits restrict jobseekers’ freedom of
movement from CEE countries, Portugal and the United Kingdom; their benefit is often
significantly less than 50% of the unemployment benefit in destination countries. Jobseekers
from these Member States (highlighted in red) possess a very low degree of freedom of
movement and citizenship rights, as an extremely low exportable unemployment benefit
constitutes their de facto reservation wage. Jobseekers from these countries are highly
commodified and at risk of exploitation
22
FIGURE 1: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR UNEMPLOYED EU CITIZENS
23
The effective freedom of movement is also varied for pensioners (Figure 2). Using
pension expenditure as a proxy, countries highlighted in green indicate high pension payments
per beneficiary (in absolute Euro terms). Pensioners that relocate from green-coloured
countries to amber and red-coloured Member States and export their pension will be better off
than pensioners in the destination Member State. They can also relocate to any other green-
coloured Member State, as average pension expenditure in the origin state is about the same
and at most 25% lower than in the destination state. Pensioners from amber-coloured Member
States have less choice where to retire as pension expenditure per beneficiary amounts to less
than 75% of some destination states’ expenditure. Hence, in general it will be financially
more difficult for Germans, Spaniards and Greeks to retire in Northern Europe than in
Mediterranean countries or CEE countries where they are relatively well off by exporting
their comparatively generous pension. Lastly, pensioners of red-coloured Member States,
accession countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, are significantly limited in choosing
where to retire as their exportable pensions are frequently below 50% of comparable pensions
in destination countries. In short, freedom of movement for pensioners differs significantly
depending on which Member State EU citizens have earned their pension rights. While
pensioners from Northern and Central Europe can choose their preferred place of retirement,
their peers from the Iberian peninsula or CEE countries are much more restricted in their
freedom of movement.
24
FIGURE 2: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR PENSIONERS
25
Finally, we asses the impact of child benefits on freedom of movement of children that
relocate to another Member State without their parents as well as the impact of child benefits
on freedom of movement of parents that relocate and receive these benefits in the Member
State of destination. Figure 3 shows the degree of freedom of movement for children. The
results highlight that only children from Denmark and Germany enjoy a high degree of
freedom of movement; overall the freedom of movement for children is severely curtailed in
the majority of EU Member States.
26
FIGURE 3: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR CHILDREN
Source: MISSOC
(http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDA
TABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp), own calculations
Freedom of movement for children
Child benefit in the origin country not lower than 75% of any
destination country's child benefit
Child benefit in the origin country not lower than 50% of any
destination country's child benefit
Child benefit in the origin country lower than 50% of some
destination countries' child benefits
Note: exportable child benefit (< 1 year) used for sake of comparison across countries
27
The flipside to freedom of movement of children is the freedom of movement of
parents to relocate to another Member State. Figure 4 shows parents’ freedom of movement
with one child, respectively. It is essentially the mirror image of Figure 3. In countries where
children enjoy a high degree of freedom of movement, parents’ freedom of movement is
limited. Parents from Germany and Denmark, who relocate to another EU Member State
while their children continue to reside in Germany or Denmark, will receive a lower child
benefit in the Member State of destination. On the contrary, parents in green-coloured
countries in Figures 4 and 5 benefit from moving to an amber or red-coloured Member State,
if their children stay in the country of origin. Hence, the possibility of receiving higher child
benefits in the Member State of destination increases parents’ freedom of movement. In
particular, it can have the effect of ‘topping up’ the low reservation wage of job-seeking
parents from CEE countries and the UK.
28
FIGURE 4: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR PARENTS
Freedom of movement for parents
Exportable child benefit for the first child (< age 1)
Source: MISSOC
(http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDA
TABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp); own calculations
Child benefits in destination countries considerably higher
(more than 100%) than origin country's child benefit
Child benefits in destination countries higher (up to 100%)
than origin country's child benefit
Child benefits in destination countries lower or about the same
as origin country's child benefit
29
Our analysis shows that the degree of freedom of movement and European citizenship
can vary for different socio-demographic groups. Overall, the degree of freedom of movement
and European citizenship is extremely limited for unemployed and senior citizens from CEE
countries, as they are faced with low levels of social protection outside their region of origin.
Unemployed and senior citizens from Belgium, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands enjoy
a very high degree of freedom of movement and EU citizenship, as their level of benefits is
not below 75 per cent of nationals in any other Member State. Whereas both German
pensioners and unemployed enjoy only moderate freedom of movement, children of EU
citizens working in Germany enjoy a high degree of freedom of movement. Long-term
residents of Denmark, irrespective of them being children, unemployed or pensioners, enjoy a
high degree of freedom of movement and European citizenship.
European Index of Free Movement and Social Rights
We have shown that freedom of movement can be severely restricted for nationals of certain
EU Member States. Combining data for jobseekers, pensioners, children and parents, we
develop a European Index of Free Movement and Social Rights (EIFMSR), which indicates
the degree of freedom of movement, based on the entitlement to substantive social rights. We
construct the EIFMSR as follows: first, for each country and entry category, jobseeker,
pensioner and child, we calculate the effective freedom of movement, i.e. the number of
countries the respective EU citizen can relocate to without being significantly worse off than
their counterparts in the country of destination. This corresponds to above figures, green
countries indicating a high degree of freedom of movement, red countries a restricted degree
of freedom of movement. Second, we add-up effective freedom of movement across entry
categories for each country and divide by three to get the average freedom of movement for
each country. Third, we divide the data, ranging from full freedom of movement in Sweden
30
(24 countries across all categories, 100% of destination countries) to practically no freedom of
movement in Romania (1.67 countries on average, 7%), into three parts. The upper section
signifies (full) freedom of movement, i.e. nationals can relocate to more than 90% (22 states)
of the 24 destination Member States in our sample. The middle section indicates limited
freedom of movement; nationals can relocate to 50% (12 states) to 90% 22 (states). The lower
section, restricted freedom of movement, encompasses countries in which citizens can
relocate to less than 50% (12 states) of EU destination Member States. Table 11 shows the
effective freedom of movement for single jobseekers, pensioners and children.
TABLE 11: EFFECTIVE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR SINGLE JOBSEEKERS,
PENSIONERS AND CHILDREN
Job-
seeker
Pensioner
Child
Avg. /
category
Denmark
24
24
24
24.00
(100%)
Finland
24
24
21
23.00
(96%)
Sweden
23
24
22
23.00
(96%)
Belgium
24
24
20
22.67
(94%)
Netherlands
24
24
18
22.00
(92%)
Austria
20
24
22
22.00
(92%)
Ireland
19
24
22
21.67
(90%)
Germany
21
19
24
21.33
(89%)
United Kingdom
11
24
22
19.00
(79%)
Italy
20
24
12
18.67
(78%)
Spain
20
19
10
16.33
(68%)
Portugal
13
12
23
16.00
(67%)
France
21
24
-
15.00
(63%)
Slovenia
14
9
22
15.00
(63%)
Malta
11
12
20
14.33
(60%)
Czech Republic
11
9
8
9.33
(39%)
Estonia
11
8
9
9.33
(39%)
Slovakia
9
8
10
9.00
(38%)
Hungary
6
8
12
8.67
(36%)
Greece
11
14
-
8.33
(35%)
Poland
4
9
8
7.00
(29%)
Latvia
11
6
3
6.67
(28%)
Lithuania
4
3
10
5.67
(24%)
Bulgaria
3
-
8
3.67
(15%)
Romania
-
2
3
1.67
(7%)
31
Figure 5 shows the EIFMSR taking into account the rights of single jobseekers, pensioners
and children. EU citizens from Northern European countries enjoy the highest degree of
freedom of movement and EU citizens from Eastern Europe enjoy the lowest degree of
freedom of movement.
FIGURE 5: EIFMSR FOR SINGLE JOBSEEKERS, PENSIONERS AND CHILDREN
Freedom of movement index for EU migrant citizens
Single Jobseekers, Pensioners, Children
Note: Freedom of movement index based upon freedom of movement of single jobseekers,
pensioners and children
Source: own calculations
Full freedom of movement (> 90% of destination countries)
Limited freedom of movement (50-90% of destination countries)
Restricted freedom of movement (< 50% of destination countries)
32
While unemployed EU parents, especially from new accession countries, might be able to top-
up their reservation wage by destination country child benefits, this does not remedy the
economic disadvantages these citizens have with regards to exportable unemployment
benefits, pensions, and child benefits (see appendix Table 1). Hence, overall freedom of
movement for many citizens from Eastern Europeans remains very restricted.
Conclusion
Rainer Bauböck (2011) has argued that freedom of movement consists of three separate
rights: exit, entry and settlement. Our analysis of the legal and substantive social rights of EU
migrant citizens clearly demonstrates that classifying EU citizens as a homogenous migrant
category with more or less the same social rights as nationals can be misleading. Formal
access to benefits in the destination state continues to be differentiated primarily by economic
status, as only workers and EU citizen with more than five years of lawful residence have the
same social rights as national citizens. Moreover, certain groups of economically inactive EU
migrant citizens, such as jobseekers, who were previously registered as unemployed in the
country of origin, and pensioners export benefits from the Member State of origin. This can
lead to significant differences with regard to substantive social rights in the Member State of
destination. Furthermore, we argue that limited substantive social rights can severely restrict
EU citizens’ freedom of movement and undermine the concept of EU citizenship, as these
citizens do not have the means necessary to settle. Hence, the welfare regime of the Member
State of destination may be less important for accessing social rights than the welfare regime
and generosity of the country of origin.
The ability to settle for a longer period of time in any Member State is clearly
stratified according to economic status and Member State of origin. Consequently, we might
ask if the very notion of European citizenship is undermined for those EU citizens whose
33
freedom of movement within the EU is severely restricted by a lack of substantive social
rights. As Marshall observed in his classical account, social rights are crucial for the ability of
all citizens, irrespective of class, to more fully participate in the community and to enjoy their
political and civil rights (Marshall 1950). They are a precondition to full citizenship, or the
“the final stone in the arch which holds up the roof of citizenship” (Dahrendorf 1985: 94).
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36
Appendix:
TABLE 1: Effective freedom of movement for jobseekers with one child, pensioners and
children
Job-
seeker
Pensioner
Child
Avg. /
category
Denmark
24
24
24
24.00
(100%)
Sweden
24
24
22
23.33
(97%)
Finland
24
24
21
23.00
(96%)
Belgium
24
24
20
22.67
(94%)
Netherlands
24
24
18
22.00
(92%)
Austria
20
24
22
22.00
(92%)
Ireland
18
24
22
21.33
(89%)
Germany
20
19
24
21.00
(88%)
United Kingdom
11
24
22
19.00
(79%)
Italy
21
24
12
19.00
(79%)
Spain
21
19
10
16.67
(69%)
Portugal
13
12
23
16.00
(67%)
France
23
24
-
15.67
(65%)
Slovenia
14
9
22
15.00
(63%)
Malta
11
12
20
14.33
(60%)
Czech Republic
12
9
8
9.67
(40%)
Estonia
11
8
9
9.33
(39%)
Slovakia
10
8
10
9.33
(39%)
Greece
13
14
-
9.00
(38%)
Hungary
6
8
12
8.67
(36%)
Poland
4
9
8
7.00
(29%)
Latvia
12
6
3
7.00
(29%)
Lithuania
4
3
10
5.67
(24%)
Bulgaria
4
-
8
4.00
(17%)
Romania
-
2
3
1.67
(7%)