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Science fiction: President medvedev's campaign for Russia's "technological modernization
Abstract
From its establishment in May 2009 until late spring 2012 when it lost momentum, the presidential Commission for the Modernization and Technological Development of Russia's Economy was instrumental in shaping the public debate on political and economic change in Russia in general, and the president's campaign for "technological modernization" in particular.1 The commission was designed to have a dual role: To accelerate priority projects for the technological modernization campaign and to provide a political venue for imagining the nature of the technological modernization and what it would mean for Russia. Ultimately, however, it is best to evaluate the role of the commission in the context of science fiction, since its work was focused more on fantastical imaginings of a possible future for Russia, rather than actually implementing practical change.
... Policies introduced by President Medvedev ranged from introducing more open electronic government to a series of expensive infrastructure projects, such as the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil export pipeline and the Skolkovo innovation park. However, in reality Medvedev's modernisation rhetoric, while appealing to Western observers, ran ahead of his ability to implement policies on the ground (Trenin 2010;Pynnöniemi 2014). ...
Nationalism is featuring increasingly in Russian society and public discourse; not least as a reaction to what many Russians see as the uncontrolled influx of labour migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russian nationalism, previously dominated by ‘imperial’ tendencies–pride in a large, strong and multi-ethnic state able to project its influence abroad–is focusing more and more on ethnic issues. This new ethnonationalism has come in various guises, like racism and xenophobia, but also in a new intellectual movement of ‘national democracy’ deliberately seeking to emulate conservative West European nationalism. In 2014 the importance of Russian nationalism rose further in dramatic ways as a result of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine. These events have utterly transformed the nationalist discourse in Russia, with the Putin regime increasingly stealing the thunder from opposing nationalist movements. The book gives a broad overview of recent trends in Russian nationalism both as an intellectual, social and political phenomenon, with case studies on migrantophobia; the relationship between nationalism and religion; nationalism and national identity in economic policy; nationalism in the media; and nationalism in the strategy of the Putin team; as well as a survey-based study of nationalism in public opinion.
... This view was emphasized during the Medvedev presidency that envisioned technological modernization and Russia's integration to western institutions as complementary tasks. Since 2012 and return of president Putin to the presidency, the focus has been on military-led economic modernization accompanied with an prioritization on Russia's strategic national interests (Pynnöniemi 2014). The events in Ukraine have reinforced this trajectory, although it is clear that when it comes to Russia's strategic thinking and view of the world, there is more continuity than change. ...
... Except for a few successes within the defence industry, the many attempts to address the continued dependence on natural resources-especially during the Medvedev 'interlude' between 2008 and 2012 -failed to overcome substantial structural impediments (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2010;Rutland, 2013). This prompted some analysts to relegate economic reforms to the realm of 'science fiction' (Pynnöniemi, 2014) or dismiss them as 'Potemkin modernisation' (Shevtsova, 2010). ...
This paper analyzes Western policies towards Russia from the realist perspective of E.H. Carr. The latter's critique of inter-war liberal 'utopianism' pointed to-among others-the tendency of liberal states to disregard the role of power in shaping an international normative order of their making; their discounting of contingency in favour of a progressive, teleological view of history; and their insensitivity to the structural inequalities reproduced by that order. These predispositions can also be observed in the liberal West's policies towards Russia in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. A teleologically expanding 'Kantian zone of peace' centred on the EU and NATO-and based on the liberal tripod of institutions, democracy, and free trade-became the core of Europe's de-facto security regime. Uncovering the power-political behind the normative, this Carrian perspective subsequently explains the gradual deterioration in relations between the West and the Kremlin through the latter's exclusion from institutions shaped at a time of its acute weakness, its inability to counter the symbolic power of democracy through political reforms, and its structural consignation to the semi-periphery of the globalized economic system. The article concludes by proposing a realist alternative for future engagement with Moscow.
... In the Russian context, the experience of the major Skolkovo high-tech innovation project is indicative. During Dmitry medvedev's presidency, it served as his top priority and received very generous funding from the Russian state and Big Business, despite serious skepticism from key players in the field (Pynnöniemi 2014). after medvedev's departure from the presidential post, Skolkovo's funding was greatly reduced, its proposed role as a key driver of technological progress and rapid economic development was nearly forgotten, and several financial scandals finally buried its reputation (Reiter and Golunov 2015). ...
Since the collapse of Communism, Russia and some other post-Soviet states have attempted to pursue socioeconomic reforms while relying upon the political institutions of neopatrimonialism. This politico-economic order was established to serve the interests of ruling groups and establish the major features of states, political regimes, and market economies. It provided numerous negative incentives for governing the economy and the state due to the unconstrained rent-seeking behavior of major actors. Policy reform programs revealed these institutions to be incompatible with the priorities of modernization, and efforts to resolve these contradictions through a number of partial and compromise solutions often worsened the situation vis-à-vis preservation of the status quo. The ruling groups lack incentives for institutional changes, which could undermine their political and economic dominance, and are caught in a vicious circle: reforms often result in minor returns or cause unintended and undesired consequences. What are the possible domestic and international incentives to reject the political institutions of neopatrimonialism in post-Soviet states and replace them with inclusive economic and political ones?
The gap between Russia’s aspirations to become a global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential to do so has become increasingly more visible, especially following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. I examine the mismatch between the Russian leadership’s AI narrative and the country’s technological capabilities via the lens of Russia’s quest for great power status and ontological security. Connecting literatures on status-seeking, ontological security, and narratives in International Relations, I show the need to scrutinise narratives surrounding technology, especially AI technologies and their associated ambiguities, as part of how states deal with the constant uncertainty about recognition of their self-perceived identity. Based on an analysis of textual and visual documents collected via open-access sources, I find that the Russian official AI narrative embeds three of the elements forming Russia’s conception of a great power, namely the ability to compete, modernise, and attain technological sovereignty. It features a plot where the state is the main protagonist leading Russia towards AI leadership despite the obstacles it is facing. Although the official rhetoric does not match the reality of Russian capabilities, the narrative is used as a cognitive tool in the quest for identity during times of uncertainty.
This essay is focused on the analysis of several success stories of state-directed developmental projects and programmes in Russia, which are designed and implemented amid conditions of bad governance. I argue that these success stories do not serve as exceptions to the general rules of bad governance but rather confirm its overall tendencies. The prioritisation of state support for successful projects and programmes is related to conspicuous consumption of material and symbolic benefits by the political leadership against the background of mediocre policy outcomes beyond the ‘pockets of efficiency’ intentionally designed by authorities. The analysis of several success stories related to technological development and the advancement of higher education addresses the questions of why they were short-lived and resulted in diminished returns and/or weak multiplicative effects. Thus, success stories become the other side of the coin for bad governance: these achievements are intertwined with the general trends of governing the state.
Building on contemporary social science, we intend to go beyond current Russian studies by creating a completely new paradigm in the field. In this chapter, we develop the conceptual starting points of this new paradigm and specify our methodological approach to modernity and modernization. Our critique of previous paradigms is not ‘flaw-centred’. Rather we intend to show that Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory gives us instruments for methodological specifications that broaden the horizon towards more comprehensive research programmes. Previous approaches do not seem to find ways to examine both structures and agencies at the same time. Russia’s development is explained either as an inevitable structural process, or only as a result of the intentions of the actors. We argue that it is essential to be able to study modernization both as a representation and as a broader analytical category referring to basic structural challenges. For this, we need new middle range theories and explanatory models. Our endeavour, however, is not only theoretical. Rather, we have developed the new paradigm in the context of interdisciplinary empirical analysis of the five major macro-level challenges of Russian modernization.
While the literature on democracy and its relationship to trust provides little consen- sus regarding the role of trust, researchers have emphasized the importance of generalized trust over particularized in relation to democracy. My research marks a departure from this consensus, and exposes the neglected role of personal relationships in fostering suc- cessful democracy.
One of the key measurements of democracy in a country is social trust. There are three forms of trust: generalized, particularized and institutional. Previously, the measurement of social trust focused on the importance of generalized trust, that is, trust in those we do not know (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995, et. al). Generalized trust is marked as having the greatest benefits for democracy. Those who are generalized trusters have the will to bridge across ethnicities and join civic groups in larger numbers. Institutional trust is society’s trust in its institutions. Countries ranking high on institutional trust are also believed to have positive democratic outcomes. By contrast, particularized trust is often dismissed because it is seen as highly atomizing and, therefore, incapable of making bridges to ethnic others resulting in a bankruptcy of democratic values. Thus, the combination of institutional and generalized trust has been the main crux of measurement and understanding in relation to a country’s ability to democratize.
The problem with this approach is two fold: first, it assumes the unidimensionality of trust and ultimately resigns a country of trusters to one category or the other with often negative impacts. The reality is, we are not solely one truster or the other: we are a combination of each form of trust. Secondly, this approach is Western in focus and does not account for the differentiation within cultures and is therefore unable to truly account for trust in a society. Nor does it account for new forms of trust and civil society in the new digital age. Recently, some questions about the legitimacy of this approach have surfaced and new methods have been employed to ascertain the true nature of social trust, however these methods have also fallen short (Gibson 2001; Bhary, et. al. 2005). Because trust is one measure used to determine the amount of democracy in a nation or the ability for it, accurate description is vital.
Here, I will take a new approach and focus on the importance of the often overlooked particularized trust, as well as control for the importance of institutionalized trust. I will be testing the hypothesis: those who trust particularly are also those who support democracy. Using Khodyakov’s (2007) research on trust and the Soviet case as the launching pad, I will empirically examine trust in the former Soviet Union today. Using the most recent World Values Survey data, I will construct a new trust variable which will be better able to capture the true, dynamic nature of trust. Placing this new trust variable in a Bayesian hierarchical linear model which will control for country level variables, it will be revealed that particularized trust can and does have positive impacts on support for democracy, debunking current notions to the contrary.
Sovmestoe zasedanie Komissii po modernizatsii i Popechitel'skogo soveta fonda 'Skolkovo
- Dmitry Medvedev
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Medvedev: nado sovmestit tvorchestvo s umeniem delat dengi [Medvedev: it is necessary to combine creativity with an ability to make money
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The Next Russian Revolution
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Vremya Prostyh Reshenii Proshlo
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