Content uploaded by Jan Brzozowski
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Jan Brzozowski on Mar 28, 2016
Content may be subject to copyright.
2016, Vol. 4, No. 1 DOI: 10.15678/EBER.2016.040111
Proactive and Reactive Attitude to Crisis:
Evidence from European Firms
Jan Brzozowski, Marco Cucculelli
A
B S T R A C T
Objective
:
The aim of this study is to investigate the behaviour of European firms in
the time of the economic crisis in 2008-2009. We analyse the determinants of proac-
tive strategies in the context of innovation and the range of products offered by every
firm on the market.
Research
Design
&
Methods
:
Based on a large and representative sample of 14
750
(EFIGE dataset) firms from Austria, Germany, France, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the UK,
we estimate the logit model for two measures of proactive strategy: the investment
behaviour and the introduction of new products on the market.
Findings:
We find evidence that the experience of the former crisis by the company is
associated with the adoption of proactive behaviour in the case of investments in
innovation, and reactive behaviour in the case of the product offer range.
Implications
&
Recommendations:
As the public support for innovative investments
proved to be rather ineffective, the most promising direction for public policies in the
times of crisis are those that facilitate the access to external financing.
Contribution
&
Value
Added:
Our paper contributes to the development of
knowledge on the dynamics of company behaviour in the wake of the economic crisis
in 2008, and to the better understanding of the determinants of proactive behaviour
of enterprises within the context of rising uncertainty.
Article type: research paper
Keywords:
p
roactive behaviour; crisis reaction; investment; product introdu
c-
tion
JEL codes: C51, D81, L26
Received: 31 January 2016 Revised: 15 February 2016 Accepted: 21 February 2016
Suggested citation:
Brzozowski, J., & Cucculelli, M. (2016). Proactive and Reactive Attitude to Crisis: Evidence from
European Firms. Entrepreneurial Business and Economics Review, 4(1), 181-191, DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.15678/EBER.2016.040111
182
|
Jan Brzozowski, Marco Cucculelli
INTRODUCTION
Economic crisis has usually a detrimental effect on firms’ performance, employment and
innovative activities. However, for some companies recession can be perceived as
a chance to increase their competitiveness: while most of the rivals are cutting the ex-
penditures on R&D, the firms "swimming against the stream" might get additional bene-
fits, especially after the economy recovers from the crisis. Thus, proactive response to
recession can be a key to the economic success in the long run. The results of the study
carried out by Archibugi, Filippetti and Frenz (2013) in the UK clearly show that innova-
tive firms in 2008 were usually those which were innovators before, but this group is
complemented by recently-founded fast growing firms. Consequently, those gazelles in
the times of the economic downturn tend to become more innovative in order to exploit
their growing potential when the economic situation improves.
Still, what is missing in this picture is more general linkage between the economic
crisis and an active search for an economic opportunity, especially in the international
setting (Wach, 2015). This search for new opportunities can be understood in a broader
sense as the widening of the product offer, the introduction of a new innovation, or an
increase in the internationalisation process. For instance, the expansion to foreign mar-
kets is usually carried out in the times of the economic boom, as it requires substantial
investments and costs. However, the fact of being already economically active on the
international level during the economic downturn offers new perspectives not only for
the firm survival, but also for its further development (Mainela, Puhakka & Servais,
2014).
The aim of this study is to investigate the behaviour of European firms in the time of
the economic crisis in 2008-2009. We use quantitative methods for our research, namely
the econometric analysis. Based on a large cross-sectional, representative sample (EFIGE
dataset, cf. Altomonte & Aquilante, 2012) of European companies we analyse the de-
terminants of proactive strategies in the context of innovation and the range of products
offered by each firm on the market. Consequently, our analysis contributes to the grow-
ing literature on international entrepreneurship and opportunities by inspecting factors
that contribute to the search and creation of international opportunities.
The structure of our paper is as follows: in the second section we summarise the
theoretical discussion on firms’ reaction to crisis and we build hypotheses for our study.
In section three, we present methods and our dataset. In section four, we describe the
results of empirical analyses. In the last section we summarise our findings and present
some perspectives for further research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on firms’ reaction to recession is dominated by financial research, and
more precisely, by studies that evaluate the effect of different ownership and govern-
ance models on firms’ performance (and value) during economic crises (Leung & Horwitz,
2010; Liu, Uchida & Yang, 2012). Surprisingly, there are only few papers (Smith & Elliott,
2007; Latham, 2009; Marsen, 2014) that investigate firms’ reaction to crisis, by adopting
the lens and paradigms of international business and entrepreneurial studies.
Proactive and Reactive Attitude to Crisis: Evidence from European Firms
|
183
The first type of research describes the firm reaction to crisis within the uncertainty
concept. Carbonara and Caiazza define uncertainty as “a situation in which operators
have limited knowledge to exactly describe existing state or future outcome” (Carbonara
& Caiazza, 2010, p. 38). As such, uncertainty is present at every stage of entrepreneurial
activity, but increases substantially at the times of the economic turmoil and recession.
When the uncertainty increases, the need for the firm to re-evaluate the existing strate-
gies and ways of doing business also rises. In such a situation, proactive behaviour is
welcome, as it might help the enterprise not only to survive, but also to grasp extraordi-
nary opportunities which would remain hidden for passive actors. The authors propose
a framework of financial firms (banks) based on the perception (high/low) and reaction
(proactive/reactive) to uncertainty. Thus, they identify four types of banks:
− laggards, characterised by reactive behaviour and low perception of uncertainty.
Those banks tend to gradually lose their market;
− consolidators – although those banks have low perception of uncertainty, they at least
can adapt to a new situation by adopting proactive strategies, thus consolidating their
position on the market;
− value-driven – these banks have high perception of uncertainty, but are only able to
act reactively, by adapting the existent strategies to new events with the aim of creat-
ing value;
− champions – those banks in turn have not only high perception of uncertainty, but
also the ability to adopt proactive behaviour, thus “building a clear vision for a valua-
ble future” (Carbonara & Caiazza, 2010, p. 42).
Although this framework has limited potential for usage outside the financial sector,
it offers an interesting perspective for the analyses of more general reaction of firms to
crisis. Thus, we can have companies which adopt reactive or proactive strategies within
various aspects of their activity in the wake of an economic crisis. The ones which are
reactive tend to exploit the existing opportunities by keeping their activities on already
penetrated markets, keeping the same range of products and services and reducing in-
vestment spending in innovation. Proactive companies in turn are those which are acting
against the general pessimistic trend and which are actively searching for new opportuni-
ties whose future exploitation might help them not only in the firm survival, but which
could also facilitate the expansion when the negative trend in economy is over. We fur-
ther build upon the proactiveness-reactiveness dichotomy, providing solid grounds to
formulate the hypotheses for our study. Thus, we adopt the following definitions of
those two contrasting strategies. Proactive behaviour of the company is associated with
more risky orientation, aimed at opportunity search and creation in the times of the
economic downturn. It can be particularly demonstrated by maintaining the investments
in innovative processes and products, or by the expansion of the existing range of prod-
ucts or services. Reactive behaviour in turn is manifested through more passive, con-
servative and careful approaches – the reactive firm in the wake of crisis cuts down the
investments in innovative activities, maintains or even reduces the existing offer of
goods and products, by getting rid of the activities that bring losses, and focusing on
those which seem to be a safer source of income in the short run.
Proactive and reactive strategies towards the crisis can be particularly visible in deci-
sion-making on the innovation processes within companies. Filippetti and Archibugi
184
|
Jan Brzozowski, Marco Cucculelli
(2010) show that in economic literature two contrasting hypotheses on the relation be-
tween the innovation and business cycles have been formulated. The proponents of
cyclical hypothesis argue that investments in innovations are increased in the periods of
prosperity and reduced when crises hit the economy. This is caused by low profit margins
and the overall pessimistic view on the economic possibilities by potential investors dur-
ing the downturn, while in the period of economic expansion new possibilities arise for
the introduction of new ideas, technologies and products (Freeman et al., 1982) A similar
way of argumentation is present in the theoretical research on the demand impact on
innovation (Geroski & Walters, 1995): the rising demand during the economic boom
provides more fertile ground for the product absorption than during the recession.
Moreover, as firms have only a limited period of advantage over the competition (cf.
Schumpeter, 1939) during which they reap their returns to investments, it is safer for
them to come up with such activities when the economy is growing. On the other hand,
Mensch (1979) claims that innovations tend to be rather counter-cyclical instead, as
most of enterprises tend to “play safe” in the periods of economic expansion, by exploit-
ing the existing rents. However, during the recession the value of such rents falls and
then the firms are somehow forced to innovate (Filippetti & Archibugi, 2010). To con-
clude, the existing theoretical literature suggests heterogeneous (or even contrasting)
responses and strategies towards crisis. Therefore, we can formulate the following hy-
potheses:
H1: The adoption of the proactive strategy by the firm depends on the magnitude
of external shock, demonstrated by the size of the economic recession.
Moreover, we are aware of the potential endogeneity problem, i.e. while proactive be-
haviour can clearly improve the performance of the company hit by a crisis, still at
a given point of time (especially in the first year of a crisis, in our case: 2008) a decrease
in revenues limits the potential of proactive behaviour of the firm. Moreover, this poten-
tial of proactive behaviour varies across the categories of actions available to the com-
pany: while the cuts in expenditures are needed, in the first place they might probably
affect the innovations, whose benefits to the company materialise in the longer run,
rather than, for instance, the widening of the product range. Thus, we can formulate the
next hypotheses:
H2: A decrease in the company revenues will increase the likelihood of the reac-
tive behaviour of the company during the crisis.
and
H3: The likelihood of reactive behaviour of the company due to the revenue re-
duction will be greater in the case of innovation investment than in the case
of the product range widening.
An important field of the study which also needs to be addressed is the one which pro-
poses the concept of organisational adaptation and organisational learning within the
crisis reaction framework (Cucculelli & Bettinelli, 2015). The proponents of organisational
learning claim that former events and experiences affect the company governance, and
this in turn influences the decision-making in the company. Consequently, if the compa-
ny has been already hit by a crisis before, this should have an impact on the current be-
haviour and in the adoption of proactive and reactive strategies in various areas of the
Proactive and Reactive Attitude to Crisis: Evidence from European Firms
|
185
company activity, based on the previous experience of the company in such situations as
the direction of this linkage is uncertain. This enables us to build the following hypothe-
sis:
H4: The experience of the former crisis by the company matters for the adoption
of the proactive or reactive behavior.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
In our study we use the data on European firms collected within the EFIGE project (Euro-
pean Firms in a Global Economy: internal policies for external competitiveness, hence-
forth: EFIGE dataset). This data-set includes the results of a representative survey carried
among 14 750 companies having at least 10 employees in seven European countries
(Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Austria, Hungary). The survey was
made in 2010 and it includes a rich variety of information on firms’ organisational, R&D
and innovative behaviour for the period of 2007-2009 (Altomonte & Aquilante, 2012).
This initial, cross-sectional data-set has been enriched by panel dimension, including
information on sales, finances and employment for the 2001-2009 period. The panel
dimension of the data enables us to include the information on former performance of
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable name No. Obs. %
Countries
Austria 443 3
France 2973 20.14
Germany 2935 18.89
Hungary 448 3.31
Italy 3021 20.47
Spain 2832 19.19
UK 2067 14.01
Age
Less than 6 years 1043 7.07
Between 6 and 20 years 5194 35.19
More than 20 years 8552 57.74
Turnover in 2008
Less than 1 million Euros 1856 12.69
1-2 million Euros 3264 22.32
2-10 million Euros 6336 43.33
10-15 million Euros 921 6.3
15-50 million Euros 1346 9.2
50-250 million Euros 716 4.9
more than 250 million Euros 185 1.27
Number of employees in 2008
10-49 10779 73.03
50-249 2970 20.12
over 250 1010 6.84
Source: own elaboration.
186
|
Jan Brzozowski, Marco Cucculelli
the companies before the 2008-2009 crisis, including the 2002-2003 recession. The de-
scriptive statistics, including information on the firms’ geographical location, age and
employment size, as well as turnover are provided in Table 1. The most represented in
the sample are the companies from Italy, which account for ca. 20% of the total. The
majority of the sample (57.7%) is composed by well-established companies which have
been operating on the European market for more than 20 years. Moreover, most of the
companies belong to the SME category, with the turnover below 50 million EUR in 2008
and fewer than 250 employees in the same year.
We adopt two measures of proactive behaviour: investments in innovation contin-
ued in 2009 (dummy) and product offer expanded in 2009 (dummy). The operationalisa-
tion of those variables is based on the responses to questions c29
1
and Ea
2
taken from
the EFIGE questionnaire. Therefore, we estimate two equations for two different de-
pendent variables. As our dependent variables are binary, we adopt binomial logit re-
gression models. The results of the estimation are presented and discussed in the follow-
ing section.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results of the estimation of two models accounting for proactive behaviour (i.e.
investments in innovation continued and product offer expanded) are presented in Table
2. Due to some missing observations for several independent variables included, the
number of observations for both models has dropped to 13 439. We first describe the
model in which the dependent variable is the investments in innovation continued. For
this model, the most important determinant were the proxy variables for external shock
for the companies, represented by country dummies
3
and dummies for international
activities. The likelihood of keeping the investments in innovations was lowest in Spanish
and Italian companies, and in the case of exporting firms. Size matters for decisions on
innovation, but not the age of the company: the firms with higher turnover were more
able to keep the innovative investments than the smaller ones. According to our expec-
tations, the percentage of the company’s turnover reduction had a strong negative im-
pact on the dependent variable: in the critical situation, the cuts in innovations – which
should bring advantages only in the mid and long run – were the most pronounced. In-
terestingly, family-owned and family-managed companies were more likely to reduce
such investments, other things being equal. Any change in decision-making in the com-
pany was associated with the reduction in investments: in the case of more centralised
decision-making in 2008 the effect was much stronger than in the decentralised one.
An important finding is about the impact of former innovative activities on current
ones in the wake of crisis. Surprisingly, we have found the companies that have invested
in processes, market or organisational innovations in the years 2007-2008 were more
likely to cut investments in innovations in 2009, which is the opposite result to findings
1
“During 2009, did your firm decide to postpone investments in product or process innovation?” – the answer
“no” accounts for proactive behavior (value 1), while yes for reactive one (value 0).
2
“Always referring to the last year the product range offered by your firm has been…” - the answer “widened”
accounts for proactive behavior (value 1), while other (remained the same/has decreased) for reactive one
(value 0).
3
In the case of country dummies, the UK was the reference category.
Proactive and Reactive Attitude to Crisis: Evidence from European Firms
|
187
Table 2. Results of binomial logit regression on proactive behaviour
Independent variables
Dependent variable:
investments in innova-
tion continued
Dependent variable:
product offer expanded
Age of the company
0.013
0.032
-
0.082**
0.032
Turnover reduction
in 2008 (%)
-
0.364***
0.018
-
0.147***
0.018
Exporter (dummy)
-
0.145***
0.051
0.205***
0.050
Importer of materials (dummy)
-
0.066
0.044
0.236***
0.043
Importer of services (dummy)
-
0.148***
0.049
-
0.027
0.049
Passive outsourcer (dummy)
-
0.074
0.046
0.041
0.046
CEO in the family firm (dummy)
-
0.094**
0.043
0.068
0.042
CEO is male (dummy)
0.080
0.072
-
0.054
0.071
Age of the CEO
0.013
0.019
-
0.007
0.019
Decentralised management (dummy)
-
0.027
0.046
0.167***
0.045
Decision
-
making became more
centralised in 2008 (dummy)
-
0.429***
0.049
0.090*
0.050
Decision
-
making became more decentralised in 2008 (dummy)
-
0.246***
0.076
0.160**
0.078
Austria (dummy)
0.025
0.137
-
0.359***
0.133
France (dummy)
-
0.176**
0.080
-
0.345***
0.079
Germany (dummy)
-
0.122
0.081
-
0.254***
0.078
Hungary (dummy)
-
0.023
0.121
-
0.334***
0.120
Italy (dummy)
-
0.233***
0.083
-
0.124
0.082
Spain (dummy)
-
0.557***
0.084
-
0.384***
0.085
Specialised industry (dummy; traditional industry reference)
-
0.082
0.053
-
0.002
0.053
Economies of scale industry (dummy)
-
0.076
0.047
-
0.000
0.047
High
-
tech industry (dummy)
0.097
0.100
0.368***
0.099
Employment level 2008
-
0.001*
0.000
-
0.001***
0.000
Turnover in 2008
0.194***
0.023
-
0.020
0.022
Share of sales in 2008 made by core
product/business (%)
0.002*
0.001
-
0.001
0.001
Share of ownership of main owner (%)
0.003***
0.001
-
0.001**
0.001
Share of turnover invested in 2007 (%)
-
0.003**
0.001
-
0.001
0.001
Firm benefited from public support for investment in the
period 2007-2009 (dummy) -0.020 0.055 0.094* 0.056
Firm invested in product innovation before (dummy)
-
0.067
0.054
0.988***
0.052
Firm invested in process innovation before (dummy)
-
0.227***
0.045
0.309***
0.045
Firm introduced market innovation before (dummy)
-
0.145**
0.057
0.354***
0.056
Firm introduced organizational innovation before (dummy)
-
0.317***
0.048
0.191***
0.048
Firm requested new credit in 2008 (dummy)
-
0.765***
0.096
0.018
0.097
Firm obtained credit in 2008 (dummy)
0.551***
0.108
0.296***
0.110
Self assessment of the industry from external financing
-
0.098***
0.016
0.004
0.016
Self assessment of the quality of provided products and se
r-
vices 0.003** 0.001 -0.002 0.001
Firm went through quality certification in 2008 (dummy)
-
0.085**
0.042
-
0.053
0.041
Firm was hit by crisis in 2002
-
2003
0.126**
0.051
-
0.087*
0.051
Share of the employees with permanent contracts in 2008 (%)
-
0.001
0.001
-
0.000
0.001
Managers are rewarded with bonus (dummy)
-
0.139***
0.044
0.100**
0.043
Foreign work
experience of executives (dummy)
-
0.118**
0.051
0.086*
0.051
_cons
1.257***
0.224
-
0.106
0.221
R2
0.0817
0.1188
N.obs.
13439
13439
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: own study.
of Archibugi, Filippetti and Frenz (2013). Still, the explication of such reactive behaviour
can be quite simple: such firms might have decided that as the competition is cutting
such expenditures, their competitive advantage gained in 2007-2008 period is more than
188
|
Jan Brzozowski, Marco Cucculelli
enough to survive during the recession. Another interesting discovery is the one on for-
mer experience during the 2002-2003 crisis. The firms that were negatively affected by
the crisis in the past periods were actually more likely to invest in innovation in 2009.
Finally, the access to external financing is obviously important: when the firm was able to
obtain a credit in 2008, it is definitely more likely to invest in innovative activities.
In the case of the second model - with the dependent variable product offer ex-
panded - the age of the company is negatively associated with proactive behaviour, but
the level of turnover in 2008 (proxy variable for size) is not significant, while the impact
of the employment size in 2008 (another proxy variable for size) is significant, but of
marginal importance. According to our expectations, the size of the turnover reduction
in 2008 has a negative impact on product range widening (i.e. the second model), but to
a lesser extent than on the investments in innovation (the first model). Also the interna-
tionalisation of the company plays a different role in this regard. Exporting and importing
companies were actually more likely to expand the product offer in 2009, as opposed to
decisions on innovative investments for the same period.
The sector of the industry in which the firm operates matters for the decision on
product range widening: high-tech firms are more likely to adopt proactive behaviour in
this regard. The former innovators in the 2007-2008 period also exhibit higher proactive
propensity for the product offer expansion. Still, the former crisis experience for the
2002-2003 period is in this case associated with more reactive behaviour (i.e. negative
impact on the propensity to expand product offer). Consequently, these empirical results
allow us to verify the hypotheses in the following section.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results presented above, we can now turn to our hypotheses. We have
formulated 4 hypotheses for this study, namely:
H1: The adoption of the proactive strategy by the firm depends on the magnitude
of external shock, demonstrated by the size of the economic recession.
H2: The decrease of the company’s revenues will increase the likelihood of the
reactive behaviour of the company during the crisis.
H3: The likelihood of reactive behaviour of the company due to revenue reduction
will be greater in the case of innovation investment than in the case of the
product range widening.
H4: The experience of the former crisis by the company matters for the adoption
of proactive or reactive behaviour.
We have found some support for hypothesis 1 on the significant impact of the exter-
nal shock for the adoption of proactive strategy. Still, this evidence is somehow limited
by the nature of our dataset, in which the identity of firms is hidden: we could only iden-
tify the economic environment of the company by its domestic economy and the four
large types of industries (traditional, specialised, economies of scale and high-tech –
based on taxonomy developed by Pavitt et al., 1989). Therefore, we see a need for fur-
ther investigations in this direction.
Proactive and Reactive Attitude to Crisis: Evidence from European Firms
|
189
The magnitude of the company’s decrease in revenues is positively associated with
the likelihood of reactive behaviour: both in the case of investment and in the product
offer. Therefore, we have found support for hypothesis 2. Moreover, we have demon-
strated that the companies react more reactively motivated by the turnover reduction in
the case of innovative investments than in the case of product offer, which supports our
hypothesis 3.
Finally, we have found that former crisis experience, measured as the turnover re-
duction in the 2002-2003 period, matters for the adoption of proactive or reactive be-
haviour. However, this effect is different for two models: while for the innovative innova-
tion it is positive – the firms affected by recession tend to continue investments in inno-
vation in 2009 – it is negative for the product widening. Consequently, we have found
support for our hypothesis 4.
Yet, our study suffers from a number of limitations which need to be addressed in
subsequent research on this topic. We have already mentioned the very general infor-
mation on specific sectors in which the companies operate. This means that we can just
try to measure the proxy impact of the shock with dummy variables, and not the actual
magnitude of the shock with continuous variables. Moreover, the knowledge of specific
sectors would enable to look deeper for the opportunity seekers and more effective
usage of the information on internationalisation activities. In the EFIGE dataset we have
for instance information on the new international markets which some companies en-
tered in 2009. It would be extremely interesting to look for those companies which right-
ly identified the fast-growing markers, even when most of the global economy was hit by
recession. In this regard, the panel extension of the data-set beyond the 2009 period
would be also welcome. Our story still remains somehow unfinished: it would be ex-
tremely interesting to check whether the proactive behaviour really paid off during the
period of further economic growth and whether the proactive companies fared better
than reactive ones.
REFERENCES
Altomonte, C., & Aquilante, T. (2012). The EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-unicredit dataset. Bruegel working
paper (No. 2012/13).
Antonioli, D., Bianchi, A., Mazzanti, M., Montresor, S., & Pini, P. (2011, January). Economic crisis,
innovation strategies and firm performance. Evidence from Italian firm-level data. In SIE annu-
al meeting.
Archibugi, D., Filippetti, A., & Frenz, M. (2013). Economic crisis and innovation: Is destruction pre-
vailing over accumulation?. Research Policy, 42(2), 303-314.
Ardichvili, A., Cardozo, R., & Ray, S. (2003). A theory of entrepreneurial opportunity identification
and development. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(1), 105-123.
Carbonara, G., & Caiazza, R. (2010). How to turn crisis into opportunity: perception and reaction to
high level of uncertainty in banking industry. Foresight, 12(4), 37-46.
Clarke, G. R., Cull, R., & Kisunko, G. (2012). External finance and firm survival in the aftermath of
the crisis: Evidence from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Journal of Comparative Economics,
40(3), 372-392.
190
|
Jan Brzozowski, Marco Cucculelli
Cucculelli, M., & Bettinelli, C. (2015). Corporate governance in family firms, learning and reaction
to recession. Evidence from Italy. Futures,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2015.10.011
Filippetti, A., & Archibugi, D. (2010). Innovation in times of crisis: the uneven effects of the eco-
nomic downturn across Europe. MPRA Paper No. 22084.
Freeman, C., Clark, J., & Soete, L., (1982). Unemployment and Technical Innovation. Frances Pinter,
London.
Geroski, P. A., & Walters, C. F., (1995). Innovative activity over the business cycle. The Economic
Journal 105 (431), 916-928.
Latham, S. (2009). Contrasting Strategic Response to Economic Recession in Start-Up versus Estab-
lished Software Firms. Journal of Small Business Management, 47(2), 180-201.
Leung, S., & Horwitz, B. (2010). Corporate governance and firm value during a financial crisis. Re-
view of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 34(4), 459-481.
Li, Y., Chen, H., Liu, Y., & Peng, M. W. (2014). Managerial ties, organizational learning, and oppor-
tunity capture: A social capital perspective. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 31(1), 271-
291.
Liu, C., Uchida, K., & Yang, Y. (2012). Corporate governance and firm value during the global finan-
cial crisis: Evidence from China. International Review of Financial Analysis, 21, 70-80.
Mainela, T., Puhakka, V., & Servais, P. (2014). The concept of international opportunity in interna-
tional entrepreneurship: a review and a research agenda. International Journal of Manage-
ment Reviews, 16(1), 105-129.
Marsen, S. (2014). “Lock the Doors”: Toward a Narrative—Semiotic Approach to Organizational
Crisis. Journal of Business and Technical Communication, July 2014 vol. 28 no. 3 301-326.
Mensch, G. O. (1979). Stalemate in Technology: Innovations Overcome the Depression. Cambridge,
MA: Ballinger Publishing Company.
Pavitt, K., Robson, M., & Townsend, J. (1989). Technological accumulation, diversification and
organisation in UK companies, 1945–1983. Management Science, 35(1), 81-99.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1939). Business Cycle: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the
Capitalist Process. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Smith, D., & Elliott, D. (2007). Exploring the barriers to learning from crisis organizational learning
and crisis. Management Learning, 38(5), 519-538.
Wach, K. (2015). Entrepreneurial Orientation and Business Internationalisation Process: The Theo-
retical Foundations of International Entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial Business and Econom-
ics Review, 3(2), 9-24.
Proactive and Reactive Attitude to Crisis: Evidence from European Firms
|
191
Authors
The contribution share of authors is equal and amounted to 50% each of them.
Jan Brzozowski
Research Fellow at Department of Economics and Social Sciences (DISES), Facoltà di Economia
"Giorgio Fuà", Università Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona (Italy). PhD in Economics at Cracow
University of Economics (Poland).
Correspondence to: Jan Brzozowski, PhD, Department of Economics and Social Sciences (DIS-
ES), Facoltà di Economia "Giorgio Fuà", Università Politecnica delle Marche, Piazzale R. Martelli
8, 60121 Ancona, Italy, e-mail: j.p.brzozowski@staff.univpm.it
Marco Cucculelli
Associate Professor at Department of Economics and Social Sciences (DISES), Facoltà di Econo-
mia "Giorgio Fuà", Università Politecnica delle MarcheUniversità Politecnica delle Marche,
Ancona (Italy). PhD in Economics at Università Roma Tor Vergata.
Correspondence to: Prof. Marco Cucculelli, PhD, Department of Economics and Social Sciences
(DISES), Facoltà di Economia "Giorgio Fuà", Università Politecnica delle Marche, Piazzale
R. Martelli 8, 60121 Ancona, Italy, e-mail:
m.cucculelli@univpm.it
Acknowledgements
and Financial Disclosure
The article came into being within the project Research project: Apprendimento organizzativo,
competitività e finanza d’impresa. (2015-2016, Università Politecnica delle Marche).
Copyright and License
This article is published under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0) License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Published by the Centre for Strategic and International Entrepreneurship – Krakow, Poland
