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Analysis of Drug Trafficking and Corruption Nexus in Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Region

Canadian Center of Science and Education
Asian Social Science
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Abstract

The main objective of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is economic development in its region but directly unproductive profit seeking activities such as drug trafficking is the prominent barrier to reach this goal. All members spend lots of money to fight against drug trafficking, as all of them suffer from drug addiction and drug related problems. The first step to cope with this problem is to identify the factors and incentives that make this region vulnerable for drug trafficking activities and to unearth what makes this region a haven for drug traffickers. A bulk of literature supports the concept that organized criminal organizations are not able to operate when there are not any forms of corruption since they are strongly interrelated. In this paper, we analyze the link between drug trafficking and corruption in ECO region in order to develop ECO strategies to hamper and interrupt these transnational crimes. Corruption has posed major challenges to the efforts taken to control drug and also has seriously damaged the ECO members’ image in international community. One of the practical solutions is the responsibility of ECO organization in implementing rule of law in the region. Undoubtedly, fighting against corruption in ECO region is a joint responsibility of international and intercontinental community and this responsibility requires collective action and cooperation among countries in the region.
Asian Social Science; Vol. 12, No. 4; 2016
ISSN 1911-2017 E-ISSN 1911-2025
Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education
53
Analysis of Drug Trafficking and Corruption Nexus in Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO) Region
Salawati Mat Basir1, Mohammad Naji Shah Mohammadi1& Elmira Sobatian1
1 Faculty of Law, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, Malaysia
Correspondence: Mohammad Naji Shah Mohammadi, Faculty of Law, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi,
Selangor, 43600, Malaysia. Tel: 60-14-226-6247. E-mail: n.shahmohammadi@siswa.ukm.edu.my
Received: December 10, 2015 Accepted: February 18, 2016 Online Published: March 18, 2016
doi:10.5539/ass.v12n4p53 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ass.v12n4p53
Abstract
The main objective of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is economic development in its region but
directly unproductive profit seeking activities such as drug trafficking is the prominent barrier to reach this goal.
All members spend lots of money to fight against drug trafficking, as all of them suffer from drug addiction and
drug related problems. The first step to cope with this problem is to identify the factors and incentives that make
this region vulnerable for drug trafficking activities and to unearth what makes this region a haven for drug
traffickers. A bulk of literature supports the concept that organized criminal organizations are not able to operate
when there are not any forms of corruption since they are strongly interrelated. In this paper, we analyze the link
between drug trafficking and corruption in ECO region in order to develop ECO strategies to hamper and
interrupt these transnational crimes. Corruption has posed major challenges to the efforts taken to control drug
and also has seriously damaged the ECO members’ image in international community. One of the practical
solutions is the responsibility of ECO organization in implementing rule of law in the region. Undoubtedly,
fighting against corruption in ECO region is a joint responsibility of international and intercontinental
community and this responsibility requires collective action and cooperation among countries in the region.
Keywords: ECO, drug trafficking, corruption, economic development, Afghanistan, Central Asia
1. Introduction
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is the biggest economic association among Islamic countries and
second regional cooperation organization in the world, whose activity covers an area of 7,000,211 square
kilometers with the population of more than 350 million people (ecosecretariat.org). ECO’s Main objective is
economic development in its region and directly unproductive profit seeking activities such as drug trafficking is
a tight barrier to reach this goal (Barro, 1991). ECO member states are among a big producer of opium and
heroin in the world (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC, 2011) and all trafficking routes used
for trafficking illicit drugs to the world pass through ECO countries (UNODC, 2011). All members spend lots of
money to fight against drug trafficking, as all of them suffer from drug addiction and drug related
problems .These problems are of the reasons that slow down development in the area. Mac Coun and Reuter
(2001) reported that trafficking illicit drugs can affect developing countries by initially framing the effects of
illicit drugs on development in terms of their impact on social stability and human and social capital, economic
development, and political stability. Based on ECO objectives, it is necessary for ECO organization to take
measures and address this issue. To this end, the first step to cope with this problem is to identify the factors and
incentives that make this region vulnerable for drug trafficking activities and to unearth what makes this region a
haven for drug traffickers. This is a legal research, which uses a qualitative method with a critical and structured
descriptive approach to analyze the link between drug trafficking and corruption in ECO region in order to
develop ECO strategies to hamper and interrupt these transnational crimes.
2. Corruption
Different perspectives have presented different definitions for the term ‘corruption’, for example, in bureaucratic
views, corruption is termed as “illicit conduct used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the
bureaucracy's actions” (Garrido, 1997). In public interest perspective, corruption is regarded as any kind of
violation of the public interests to gain special advantages (Garrido, 1997); and also any conduct which goes
astray from the normal, standard duties inbuilt to the public welfare in consequence of private interests,
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54
including their family, clan, and friendship, in order to obtain personal benefits in terms of money or social
status.
Carvajal (1999) states corruption usually involves agent-client relationships, exploitation of public office as well
as violations of public interests. Transparency International (transparency.org) defines corruption as the misuse
of entrusted power in favor of private gain, and indicates that corruption, in general, takes two diverse forms.
The first type is according to the rule, involving paying a bribe in return for regular but preferential conduct, and
the second one is against the rule in which the bribe is paid in order to make someone perform something which
he/she is not allowed to do. Conversely, the Asian Development Bank (1998) describes corruption as conduct
that officials engage in and inappropriately unlawfully make themselves and those close to them rich or provoke
others to do so.
Corruption which has impact on drug trafficking is a significant factor bringing about weakness in developing
states (Andreas, 1996), particularly countries with leading part in drug trafficking. Likewise, corruption is
described as a hindrance to the development and sustainment of democracies where national wealth is exploited
by small proportion of the population (Basar, 2012). According to International Monetary Fund (1997),
impediment of economic growth; misallocation of talent connected instead of qualified individuals obtain
coveted positions; reduction in the effectiveness and usefulness of international assistance; and losing tax
revenue since bribes might be paid in order to escape taxes and customs are considered as major economic
consequences of corruption.
3. Literature Review
A bulk of literature supports the concept that organized criminal organizations are not able to operate when there
are not any forms of corruption since they are strongly interrelated. According to Freeman (reported in Morris,
2013), organized crime seeks for opportunities to generate and intensify corruption as it is not able to survive
without it. She further claims that doing business involves bribing and threatening public officials, law
enforcement officials and judicial agents. Not only does the organized crime make corruption in the government,
but also corrupt states create organized crime. Correspondingly, Peter Andreas argues (1998) “corruption is two
way street and involves not only the penetration of the state but also penetration by the state”.
Usually corruption has important role in and affect drug trafficking. Indeed, sometimes, corruption makes it hard
to distinguish violators from enforcers (Morris, 2013). The majority of scholars (Naylor, 2009), (Pimental, 2003)
and (Shelley, 2005) are of the opinion that there is a linkage between corruption and drug trafficking, and also
they concur that several organized crimes such as drug trafficking cannot be operated without corruption. Beittel
(2011) indicated that, corruption brings about neutralizing government action against the organization of drug
trafficking, ensure impunity, and ease smooth operations. Naylor (2009) emphasizes that illegal payoffs to local
officials and police not only allow these businesses to continue, but also maintain their activities and authority
within specific geographic and political boundaries.
4. Corruption and Drug Trafficking Linkage in ECO Region
The corruption perceptions index (CPI) is particularly low in ECO region compared to the world average
(transparency.org). Afghanistan ranks as the 172th country out of 175 according to the 2015 Transparency
International corruption perception index (CPI) (transparency.org). Other ECO members face similar problems.
It seems that this situation makes the region vulnerable for trafficking, especially central Asian countries which
are the main route for trafficking drugs from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe. ECO is the most important
region in terms of trafficking of Afghan heroin to Russia and remote areas in Europe. Heroin is being trafficked
from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan (mainly) or Uzbekistan or directly to Russia (by air) (UNODC, 2009). The 2015
CPI for Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is very low and they have favorable environment for developing
organized crime and corruption (transparency.org).
4.1 Corruption in Main Producer Country
Data shows (transparency.org) that the level of corruption in Afghanistan, as the main drug producer country in
ECO, is extremely high. The recent research on Afghanistan discloses a more intricate and negotiated link
between drug trafficking and the business of policing drug trafficking. In January 2010, the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) publicized a report titled as “Corruption in Afghanistan”. This report
revealed that, in 2009, Afghans paid USD 2.5 billion in the form of bribes and kickbacks, equivalent to 23% of
Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Gonzalez, 2011). Reports (Checchia, 2012) also show that almost
a quarter of Afghans have paid bribes to the Afghan National Police (ANP), supposed to take full responsibility
in terms of establishing security all over the country by the year 2014 with Afghan National Army (ANA). It is
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55
widely claimed that bribable officials working in the Kabul government, the Afghan National Police (ANP), and
different provincial administrations are believed to be paid by opium traffickers (Peters, 2009). Corruption has
spread out throughout the government in consequence of officials’ dealing with the business of the drug trade.
Hence, corruption is a critical concern since it arguably leads as much to continuous insecurity in the south of
Afghanistan where the insurgency is carried out through creating a perverse motivation for corrupt officials to set
up good governance (Peters, 2009). According to a British study in 2008, numerous Afghans in the south of the
country believe that state actors make larger profits from the business of drug trade compared to the insurgents
(Peters, 2009). According to the director of an Afghan research institute, “Government officials and police
officers are much more involved in drugs trade than the Taliban; after all, they hold the positions you need to
facilitate the higher-level trade (Jelsma, 2009).” There are serious accusations that officials are receiving
reimbursement from organized drug traffickers in return for protection and some may have a direct involvement in
the drug trade (UNODC, 2009).
In Afghanistan, there are both high level and low level corruption (Basar, 2012). The majority of corruption in
Afghanistan is low-level, such as “gift payments” to public officials and to other service providers, including the
private sector (Myint, 2000). This corruption of course has a negative impact, for example, it can increase the
costs of transportation and deprives the Afghan government of much needed funds (UNODC, 2009). High-level
or “grand” corruption is associated with corrupt acts carried out by politicians as well as other top country
officials and those with administrative positions (UNODC, 2009). According to Afghan Counter Narcotic
officials (Blanchard, 2009), high government officials, governors and police commanders are involved in the
business of drug trade. The report also identified the former warlords and commanders still in power and serve as
district chief officers and the local police as the major problem regarding corruption, particularly in the Ministry
of Interior. Likewise, in northern Afghanistan, numerous state actors who in preceding years were involved in the
trafficking of opiate are now politicians, public officials and businessmen. These stakeholders are continually
involved in the business of drug trafficking, bringing about high-level corruption (UNDC, 2012).
4.2 Corruption in Drug Trafficking Routes
Corruption is of course not limited to producer’s countries in ECO. Transnational trafficking networks have so
far been able to take advantage of corruption in the region to transport tens of thousands of metric tons of
precursors into Afghanistan and ship hundreds of tons of opiates to Europe via the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Pakistan, Turkey and Central Asia (UNODC, 2009). Besides Afghanistan, other ECO members also suffer from
corruption associated to drug trafficking (silkroadstudies.org) with both low level and high level of corruption
promoting many sectors of society, including public sector and the private sector, the military and political
parties (transparency.org). According to Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz (2004), the annual drug trade in Turkey was
US$ 50 billion in the late 1990s, which exceeded the total Turkish state budget.
On the other hand, in Central Asians countries, new members of ECO organization, large parts of the political
and law enforcement establishment are critically undermined by being involved in the drug trade. As a matter of
fact, all of Central Asian countries are affected by illicit drug trade corruption (UNODC, 2012). The effects of
embedded corruption in the government make favorable environment for organized crime in Central Asian
countries, unintended consequences that emerge in the transition to the democratic system (Cengiz, 2010) and
inability or insufficiencies to develop law enforcement in Central Asian countries. This helps strengthen
organized crime groups and there are some factors that lead to corruption in these countries. Attempts to
transition to a democratic regime failed in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan and resulted in a transition
to more authoritarianism (Collins, 2012).
In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for example, in the 1990s, organized crime groups paid approximately US
$10,000 to judges in order to release a low-level group member (Holmes, 2009). Approximately fifty percent of
the Tajik population believes that the almost all officials take bribes (Centre for Strategic Studies under the
President of Tajikistan & UNDP Tajikistan, 2011). The average monthly salary of a police officer is around 50
dollars in a month, therefore, police officers inevitably tend to take bribes rather than to enforce laws (Cengiz,
2010). In many such cases, officers are being paid to disregard rather than for active participation in the
smuggling process (UNODC, 2012).
5. Money Laundering
Corruption among ECO member states is not just limited to taking bribes by high government officials or law
enforcements. Money laundering is another important part of corruption in ECO area and is linked to drug
trafficking. Money laundering has gradually, increasingly become a serious threat for ECO’s economy. Money
laundering can potentially have devastating effect on economy, security, and society. It paves the ground for drug
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56
dealers, illegal arms dealers, terrorists, corrupt public officials, as well as others to operate and spread out their
criminal enterprises (McDowell, 2001). Based on information in the region, it is claimed that organized crime
groups transfer billions of dollars through underground banking systems such as Havala and Hundi, which are
informal money transfer networks (Passas, 2005). In such systems, it is not possible to know how much money
is transferred for drugs, donations, payment for weapons or other supplies needed for drug trafficking. The
United Nations and The World Bank calculated that Hawala dealers just in provinces of Helmand and Kandahar
transfer more than $1 billion of money obtained from drug trade yearly (Thompson, 2007). In this vein, Senior
Pakistani officials confirm that an overwhelming amount of money, i.e., one-third of Pakistan’s $8 billion
Hawala trade is believed to be related to drug trafficking. Also, there is report that Turkish organized crime
groups have become involved in an array of legal businesses to launder proceeds of heroin trafficking (EU
Organized Crime Report, 2004).
6. Conclusion
Corruption has posed major challenges to the efforts taken to control drug and also has seriously damaged the
ECO members’ image in international community. In this vein, the organized crime squads and insurgents,
including the Taliban, has discovered that the most effective way is to take advantage of weak government
institutions. Targeting government as well as administrative officials, who are assailable to corruption, can
undermine government authenticity and consequently ensures greater leverage (Zarif, 2008). Therefore, the
Taliban and associated rebels are not monopolizing the protection of the drug trade. Instead, they form close
relationships with Afghan local government administrators, political leaders and police equally (Zarif, 2008).
Corruption is not an issue limited to ECO region. In fact, it extends beyond the ECO region, including targeting
countries. Accordingly, international donors are required to take sustained efforts and refocus significant energy
(UNODC, 2009).
Undoubtedly, fighting against corruption in ECO region is a joint responsibility of international and
intercontinental community and this responsibility requires collective action and cooperation among countries in
the region. Given the importance of the fight against corruption, it appears to be a new chapter of the
negotiations agenda discussed between ECO countries. Also, the battle against corruption is claimed to be
directly connected to finding solutions for other problematic areas including the war on drugs, human rights,
investment promotion, distinct democratization processes, and economic development (Garrido, 1997). Similarly,
many bottom-up initiatives have commenced in ECO to fight corruption, which need to be promoted. The ECO
members and the international community are under pressure to take such initiatives for greater transparency as
well as effective action to fight corruption. One of the practical solutions is responsibility of ECO organization in
implementing rule of law in the region.
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"As long as America's seemingly insatiable appetite for imported psychoactive substances persists, Mexico's close proximity to the United States market assures that the logic of narco-corruption will remain entrenched" in the country's political system.
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Violence has been an inherent feature of the trade in illicit drugs, butthe violence generated by Mexico's drug trafficking organizations(DTOs) in recent years has been unprecedented and remarkably brutal.The tactics-including mass killings such as the widely reportedmassacres of young people and migrants, the use of torture anddismemberment, and the phenomena of car bombs-have led someanalysts to speculate whether the violence has been transformed intosomething new, perhaps requiring a different set of policy responses.According to government and other data, the best estimates are that therehave been slightly more than 50,000 homicides related to organized crimefrom December 2006 through December 2011.It has also been suggested that the targets of the drug traffickingrelatedviolence in Mexico have changed. In 2010, several politicians weremurdered, including a leading gubernatorial candidate in Tamaulipas and 15 mayors. While fewer local officials were killed in 2011, there isconcern that political violence could spike in 2012 in advance ofpresidential and congressional elections slated for July. Over the past fewyears, Mexico has come to be regarded as one of the most dangerouscountries for journalists, with 10 reported killings in 2010 and anothereight in 2011.In December 2006, Mexico's newly inaugurated President FelipeCalderón launched an aggressive campaign against the DTOs-aninitiative that has defined his administration-that has been met with aviolent response from the DTOs. Of the seven most significant DTOsoperating during the first five years of the Calderón Administration, thegovernment successfully removed key leaders from each of them, througharrests or by death in arrest efforts. However, these efforts add to thedynamic of change-consolidation or fragmentation, succession strugglesand new competition-that generate more conflict and violence. TheDTOs fragmented and increasingly diversified into other criminalactivities, now posing a multi-faceted organized criminal challenge togovernance in Mexico.U.S. citizens have also been victims of the security crisis in Mexico.In March 2010, three individuals connected to the U.S. consulate inCiudad Juárez, two of them U.S. citizens, were killed by a gang workingfor one of the major DTOs operating in that city. In February 2011, twoU.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents were shot, onefatally, allegedly by Los Zetas, one of Mexico's most violent DTOs. Inthe U.S. Congress, these events have raised concerns about the stability ofa strategic partner and neighbor. Congress is also concerned about thepossibility of "spillover" violence along the U.S. border and furtherinland. The 112thCongress has held several hearings on DTO violence,the efforts by the Calderón government to address the situation, andimplications of the violence for the United States. Members havemaintained close oversight of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation andrelated bilateral issues.This report provides background on drug trafficking in Mexico: itidentifies the major DTOs; how the organized crime "landscape" hasbeen altered by fragmentation; and analyzes the context, scope, and scaleof the violence. It examines current trends of the violence, analyzesprospects for curbing violence in the future, and compares it withviolence in Colombia.
Article
Money laundering has a corrosive effect on a country's economy, government, and social well-being, two State Department officials say. The officials --senior policy adviser John McDowell and program analyst Gary Novis of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs --say the practice distorts business decisions, increases the risk of bank failures, takes control of economic policy away from the government, harms a country's reputation, and exposes its people to drug trafficking, smuggling, and other criminal activity. Given the technological advantages money launderers now employ, they say, a high level of international cooperation is necessary to keep them in check. Money laundering is the criminal's way of trying to ensure that, in the end, crime pays. It is necessitated by the requirement that criminals --be they drug traffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, arms traffickers, blackmailers, or credit card swindlers --disguise the origin of their criminal money so they can avoid detection and the risk of prosecution when they use it. Money laundering is critical to the effective operation of virtually every form of transnational and organized crime. Anti-money-laundering efforts, which are designed to prevent or limit the ability of criminals to use their ill-gotten gains, are both a critical and effective component of anti-crime programs.
Book
This book provides the first multidisciplinary and nonpartisan analysis of how the United States should decide on the legal status of cocaine, heroin and marijuana. It draws on data about the experiences of Western European nations with less punitive drug policies as well as new analyses of America’s experience with legal cocaine and heroin a century ago, and of America’s efforts to regulate gambling, prostitution, alcohol and cigarettes. It offers projections on the likely consequences of a number of different legalization regimes and shows that the choice about how to regulate drugs involves complicated tradeoffs among goals and conflict among social groups. The book presents a sophisticated discussion of how society should deal with the uncertainty about the consequences of legal change. Finally, it explains, in terms of individual attitudes toward risk, why it is so difficult to accomplish substantial reform of drug policy in America.
Article
Journal of Democracy 13.3 (2002) 137-152 Central Asia is suddenly on the world map. Indeed, September 11 and the U.S. war against the Taliban and the al-Qaeda terror network in Afghanistan have drawn Central Asia from the periphery to near the center of that map. Policy makers forging strategies for Afghanistan have begun to realize that the entire vast region is plagued by increasingly weak states and regimes that are losing popular legitimacy. Thus a successful policy will have to take into account not only Afghanistan itself but also nearby countries that face the same challenge of building coherent and democratic states despite declining economies and fragmented, clan-based societies. Viewed in this larger strategic context, the problem of Central Asia is sobering indeed. The lapse of a decade since the breakup of the USSR finds the former Soviet Central Asian republics not more but actually less stable, politically consolidated, prosperous, and free than they were in 1991. Some or all could follow the disastrous path taken by Afghanistan in the 1990s. Any effort to avert this frightening prospect must begin by asking why it is such a plausible scenario in the first place. While much research has been done on the causes that drive transitions to democracy, we have a far shakier grasp of how transitions to authoritarianism or civil war can come about, as in fact they have in all too many places over the last ten years or so. Nor do we understand the types of authoritarianism that we now see emerging in what was once the Soviet world. Yet as Afghanistan reminds us, we need to understand the nature and dynamics of these nondemocratic regimes. Despite the relative homogeneity of the Soviet system and the similar circumstances that obtained across all five of the USSR's Central Asian republics, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan followed three distinct trajectories throughout the early 1990s. Kyrgyzstan experienced democratization. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan saw a renewal of authoritarianism. Tajikistan slid into failed statehood and a bloody civil war. The Kyrgyz case at least seemed to suggest that there was hope both there and elsewhere in the region for elite-driven, "pacted" shifts toward democracy. Yet by the time that the midpoint of the decade had passed, all five new Central Asian states had settled down to one shade or another of authoritarianism in which informal, clan-based networks dominated political life. Aside from asking the particular question of why Tajikistan so quickly lapsed into severe disorder, it is also worth inquiring more generally into the nature of this informal politics, which in turn will require us to study clans and gauge their likely impact on the viability and stability of the Central Asian republics. The post-Soviet cases have sparked a growing debate about how important favorable preconditions are to democratization, yet the answers seem more elusive than ever. The Central Asian cases are especially pertinent because they may shed light on currents not only in the post-Soviet sphere, but in Asia and the Middle East as well—regions that prima facie seem resistant to democratization. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan all started from about the same place with the same markers. These included clan and tribal divisions with deep historical roots stretching back before the Soviet era; a weak sense of national identity; an Asian-cum-Muslim cultural and religious climate; a 70-year history of oppressive Soviet rule; political institutions imposed by communism; ethnonational divisions between Turkic, Persian, and Slavic groups; and uneven economic development based on the exploitation of natural resources. The USSR's collapse in 1991 hurled them all into the same process of sudden and involuntary decolonization, independence, and putative political transition. While the conditions for democratization were not particularly favorable across the breadth of the vast former Soviet realm, Central Asia seemed the least likely region of all to become democratic. Yet the early post-Soviet period found theorists of democratization heady with optimism. If Kyrgyzstan—a poverty-stricken Muslim land bordering on China—could make the move to democracy, then any place could, the "preconditions" theorists and their skepticism notwithstanding. In the summer of...
Article
To facilitate law enforcement and regulatory actions in the relatively unfamiliar field of IVTS, three items are produced in this report. First, an analysis of difficulties likely to be encountered in investigations of hawala transactions in contrast with anticipated difficulties in investigations of any transnational type of misconduct. The point is to show what is specific about hawala and how it impacts regulatory actions. Second, a distinction is drawn between informal funds transfer systems (IFTS) and informal value transfer methods (IVTM). Both are within the wider category of IVTS, but the latter almost always involves crimes and other misconduct, whereas the former are primarily serving legitimate customers. In this way, controllers would know whenever they detect an IVTM operation, crimes were very likely committed. On the other hand, when they detect an IFTS operation, they should not automatically assume crimes are committed. Third, two sets of indicators are developed regarding the operation of IFTS. One is indicators of IFTS activity. In such cases, if the US operators are not registered and licensed, as required, they would be committing an offense. Otherwise, the operations/transfers probably do not involve other crimes. The second set of indicators flags criminal abuse of IFTS. When one or several of them obtain in a given case, the situation would merit investigation to find out what types of funds are transferred and for what purposes. IVTS interface with a wide range of criminal transnational activities. Therefore: * Understanding IVTS requires a better understanding of transnational crime, an understudied area thus far. * Studying IVTS more in depth can contribute to a better understanding of transnational crime.To a very large extent, traditional forms of IVTS serve legitimate needs that cannot be met in other ways. It would be wise therefore to: * Explore ways of offering additional channels for fund transfers; * Ensure continuation of vital services and minimum disruption; * Improve institutional or official methods offering similar services; * Reduce economic and other criminogenic asymmetries. IVTS include an extremely wide range of methods from very low tech and simplistic to highly sophisticated; we also see the interface of several of them, including cross-ethnic collaborations. Terrorism funding can and has come from all of the above channels. It is essential, thus, to consider, * that paying attention only to hawala-type operations is misplaced and ineffective; * the need for inclusive, comprehensive policy based on an adequate understanding of interfaces; * focusing on the most significant, rather than excluding from policy considerations methods like trade diversion; and, * engaging in more in depth studies of each method with the view of training officials for better detection and separation of legal use from suspicious and criminal abuses. As pressure often mounts to take swift action, we need to calculate as precisely as possible the anticipated consequences of policy and measures of anti-terrorism or other initiatives, so that we can: * ensure international cooperation of law enforcement and other authorities is improved (seminars, training, awareness for domestic and foreign organizations); * ensure law enforcement requests for assistance are based on facts, not on flimsy and uncorroborated evidence; * ensure US law enforcement agencies assist in the work of overseas counterparts as reciprocity is indispensable for long term successes. On a different level, given that strategies related to the financing of terrorism cannot solve all problems, we need to fully understand and fight the roots of terrorism and other serious crime problems. Supply-side approaches only have a limited and rather short-term effect. Demand-side policies hold a stronger promise for a safer planet and protection of US interests. * Given the ease with which serious transnational crime occurs, it would be cost-effective to better understand the causes and facilitating circumstances of these crimes and construct policies aimed at tackling the root of the problem. Criminal policy is only an immediate term solution, but offers little hope of effectively dealing with the problem in the long run.
Article
Corruption is a social pathology. It has much the same effect on the development of a nation that cancer has on the life of a biological organism. Through a review of the literature, a definition of corruption is derived. Large-scale corruption is supported by power networks. In order to function and survive, power networks require five capabilities: economic, technical, political, physical, and ideological. Large-scale corruption is an emergent social process. The same governing factors that sustain large-scale corruption are in direct opposition to efforts to promote development. The history and evolution of a government agency for small farmers in a developing country are reviewed. While extracting wealth, corrupt power networks generated waste, reduced production, and caused acrimony on the part of the victims. For each dollar embezzled there was a resulting loss of $2.5. The corrupt networks reached such a level that the government had to disassemble the agencies. The ability to detect and neutralize corrupt networks is essential to development.