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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
ISSN: 1468-3857 (Print) 1743-9639 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fbss20
Limits to temporary protection: non-camp Syrian
refugees in İzmir, Turkey
Ayselin Yıldız & Elif Uzgören
To cite this article: Ayselin Yıldız & Elif Uzgören (2016): Limits to temporary protection: non-
camp Syrian refugees in İzmir, Turkey, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, DOI:
10.1080/14683857.2016.1165492
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1165492
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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1165492
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
Limits to temporary protection: non-camp Syrian refugees in
İzmir, Turkey
Ayselin Yıldız
a
and Elif Uzgören
b
a
Department of International Relations, Yaşar University, İzmir, Turkey;
b
Faculty of Business, Department of
International Relations, Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir, Turkey
Introduction
e civil war in Syria beginning in 2011 has caused a humanitarian crisis, with one of the
biggest refugee ows in this century. As of February 2016, more than 4.5 million Syrian
refugees were registered or awaiting registration in Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey
(UNHCR 2016a). While the humanitarian situation has continued to deteriorate, the total
number of internally displaced people in Syria has reached nearly 7.6 million, amounting
to the largest number of internally displaced persons in any country in the world (ECHO
2015). Turkey established an open-border policy at the onset of the crisis and welcomed
more than 2.5 million registered Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2016a) by hosting the largest
number of Syrian refugees in one country worldwide (UNHCR 2014a, 2016a; European
ABSTRACT
This article investigates the situation of non-camp Syrian refugees
living in İzmir with a focus on socio-economic prospects and
challenges concerning their survival and integration on the one
hand and social acceptance by the host Turkish society on the other.
The data were generated by semi-structured interviews conducted
between February and April 2014 with non-camp Syrian refugees
and Turkish citizens living in İzmir. The empirical research intends to
contribute to the literature through insights on the socio-economic
conditions of non-camp Syrians, their level of integration to Turkish
society, diculties and challenges encountered and the perception of
Turkish citizens about the rising Syrian population in Turkey. It argues
that Turkey’s open-border and ‘temporary protection’ policies are
approaching their limits with the increasing number of new arrivals
and the concomitant diculties faced in integrating into Turkish
society. The paper suggests that there is an urgent need to create
a ‘rights-based approach’ with a long-term integration policy and
presents policy recommendations which aim to extend and secure
the rights of Syrians through socio-economic adjustments without
jeopardizing their social acceptance from and peaceful co-existence
with Turkish citizens.
KEYWORDS
Syrian refugees; Turkey;
temporary protection
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 20 September 2015
Accepted 8 March 2016
CONTACT Ayselin Yildiz ayselin.yildiz@yasar.edu.tr
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2 A. YILDIZ AND E. UZGÖREN
Commission 2015). According to the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority
of the Republic of Turkey,
1
(AFAD), 269,672 Syrian refugees are currently sheltered in
25 camps in 10 provinces of Turkey (AFAD 2016a), while nearly 2.2 million non-camp
Syrian refugees are living dispersed among communities throughout the country. e non-
camp refugees are scattered around various locations, intensely concentrated in the south
and south-eastern provinces of Turkey such as Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş,
Şanlıurfa, Adana and Mardin. Beyond the border cities, a high number of non-camp Syrian
refugees are also concentrated in west coastal city of İzmir where they are making their way
across the sea to reach Greek islands of Chios (ve miles) and Lesvos (six miles). UNHCR
(2016b) and International Organization for Migration (IOM 2015) reported that of the
more than one million refugees who arrived in the European Union (EU) in 2015, more
than 850,000 arrived by sea in Greece from Turkey. In 2015, total arrivals of migrants and
refugees from Turkey to Chios are recorded as 120,804 (UNHCR 2015a) and to Lesvos as
494,978 (UNHCR 2015b). Consequently, İzmir, which formerly had been known as a hub
of tourism, started to become associated with an increasing number of desperate Syrians
risking their lives to cross the Aegean Sea on inatable boats and tragically washing up on
the İzmir coast. Apart from the transit ones, a considerable share of the Syrian refugees
also prefer to settle in İzmir permanently or spend a longer time to save money before they
depart to Europe. According to a senior ocial in İzmir branch of Directorate General for
Migration Management, the total number of registered Syrian refugees in İzmir is about
74,000 (Interview of Dr Düvell and Dr Yıldız, 2015). Accordingly, as Turkey has become a
migration transit and destination country (Kirişci 2009; Kaya 2012; İçduygu 2013), İzmir
emerges as an important transit hub and hotspot for migrants and refugees on their route
heading to Europe across Turkey.
Turkey’s open-border policy that ensures non-refoulement and humanitarian aid for
Syrian refugees has been publicly applauded by the international community (e.g., European
Commission 2014, 2015; UNHCR 2015c; United Nations (UN) 2015). As İçduygu observes,
it is also criticised due to some legislative loopholes and administrative shortcomings
(İçduygu 2015, 13). Unfortunately, the trajectory of support provided by the international
community has so far been inadequate. Hence, the main responsibility has fallen to Syria’s
neighbouring countries, with Turkey shouldering much of this burden. In its h year, the
Syrian conict has entered a stalemate, with the emergence of radical armed groups such as
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Violence continues to severely threaten the
lives of civilians, and estimates of future massive ows of refugees are dicult to predict.
Even if the conict in Syria ends, with the Assad regime in place or overthrown, peace
and stability in the country will not be restored easily. New waves of refugees would likely
threaten the sustainability of the open-border approach of Turkey, which would certainly
encounter additional socio-economic challenges. e future of nearly 2.5 million Syrian
refugees living in Turkey is unclear. Moreover, as the temporary stay of Syrians in Turkey is
prolonged and a high number of them started to permanently settle in Turkey, discontent is
increasing within Turkish society. Especially, there are three critical challenges for the non-
camp Syrian-settled refugees in Turkey as well as Turkish society: Syrians’ socio-economic
conditions, their integration into Turkish society and social acceptance by the Turkish
community. Accordingly, Turkey needs not only to consider the nancial aspect of accept-
ing refugees and providing humanitarian assistance but also to address the settled refugees’
social adaptation, acceptance and integration. is requires developing a comprehensive
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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 3
and sustainable long-term policy in order to avoid the economic, social and security pitfalls
of hosting such a high number of Syrians.
Despite the alarming growth of Syrian refugees in Turkey, there are few empirical studies
in the literature that focus on non-camp refugees who constitute almost 88% of all the Syrian
refugee population in Turkey. In addition to some studies and reports (AFAD 2013; Erdoğan
2015; Kanat and Üstün 2015; ORSAM 2014; ORSAM and TESEV 2015) the socio-economic
conditions of non-camp Syrian refugees and their acceptance by the host Turkish society
needs to be extensively studied in order to provide insights for future policies. is study
aims to contribute to the evolving literature on the non-camp Syrian refugees in Turkey by
conducting an empirical analysis relying on primary data generated through a eld study
in İzmir. It elucidates the prospects and challenges around the social adaptation of these
refugees and gauges their social acceptance by Turkish society. e research ndings have
been extracted from 32 face-to-face, semi-structured interviews conducted with Syrian
refugees and Turkish citizens living in İzmir from February to April 2014. is study is not
intended to represent the entire non-camp Syrian refugee situation in Turkey through a
quantitative sampling. Rather, it contributes to the debate through a qualitative study aspired
to present both the narratives of Syrian refugees and perceptions of the host society in İzmir.
e research, with its specic focus on İzmir, builds upon a previous comprehensive study
conducted by Erdoğan (2015), which presents ndings about the conditions and problems
faced by Syrian refugees in Turkey in general. On the basis of empirical research, this paper
argues that the current temporary protection regime has approached its limits and that such
prolonged regime presents a signicant challenge for the survival of the Syrian refugees and
their acceptance by Turkish society. e paper proposes Turkey to develop a rights-based
approach involving a long-term integration aspect constructed on an analysis of needs and
perceptions of both the Syrian refugees and Turkish people. It also pays attention to the
evolving Turkish migration policy at a larger level concerning its limits and possible future
challenges. e next section gives an overview of the legal status of the Syrian refugees in
Turkey and presents the limits of the current temporary protection regime. ese challenges
are then uncovered through the empirical research that falls to the scope of the following
subsections. e nal part debates shortcomings of the current policy and presents future
policy recommendations.
The legal status of Syrian non-camp refugees under temporary protection
and its limits
Since the eruption of the crisis, Turkey – with a border of 911km with Syria – has followed
an open-border policy by extending protection to all destitute Syrians regardless of their
political, ethnic, cultural or religious aliations. Regarding the Syrians’ legal status, Turkey
registers them under a temporary protection
2
regime according to Regulation No. 29153 on
Temporary Protection (2014 Regulation), which was enacted in line with Article 91 of the
new Law Number 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection. Since Turkey still main-
tains its ‘geographical limitation’ with regard to the Geneva Convention of 1951 and its 1967
Protocol,
3
Turkey does not grant ‘refugee’ status to the eeing Syrians. e 2014 Regulation
adopts a group-based ‘temporary protection’ and applies to all Syrian nationals, as well
as stateless persons from Syria seeking international protection, including those without
identication documents. It ensures non-refoulement and assistance to all Syrians whether
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4 A. YILDIZ AND E. UZGÖREN
they reside in or outside of camps. e 2014 Regulation is accompanied by a non-public
Circular on the ‘Admission and Accommodation of Mass-Arriving Syrian Asylum Seekers’,
which denes the domestic law basis for how the policy applies to the ‘temporary protection’
regime. e role of UNHCR in Turkey is limited by providing policy and technical advice
to the Turkish Government, such as refugee registration, camp management and assisting
with voluntary repatriation (UNHCR 2015d). It cannot carry out registration or be involved
in refugee status determination since the protection of Syrians is legally dened under the
authority of the Turkish Government.
e General Directorate of Migration Management, operating under the Turkish
Ministry of the Interior, registers Syrians covered by temporary protection. Almost 10% of
all registered Syrians have been hosted in 25 camps coordinated by AFAD, which provide
education, health, religious and other services. Camps are appreciated and described as
‘well-organized and well-run’ in terms of the facilities and services provided (International
Crisis Group 2013; European Commission 2014). However, the rising number of refugees
triggered by the ongoing conict in Syria has put the capacity of the government-run
camps under tremendous strain (Dinçer et al. 2013). Regardless of whether they live in or
out of the camps, all Syrians are ensured through their registration with Turkish authori-
ties to benet from free basic health care, education and social assistance. In line with the
Ministry of National Education’s circular on foreigners’ access to education issued in 2014,
all Syrian refugees are allowed to enrol in Turkish state schools and temporary education
centres. ey are also allowed to attend Turkish language or vocational training courses
oered by public education centres free of charge. In the same manner, registered Syrians
residing in or outside the camps may receive free medical treatment from state hospitals
for primary and emergency health services in 81 provinces of Turkey. ough there is no
limitation in principal or under legal terms, it is only through the empirical research that
can uncover whether Syrian refugees can actually benet from these services in practice
which is presented above.
Turkey has been generous in providing humanitarian protection and aid for Syrians in
the last ve years, even when the number of refugees has become overwhelming. In terms
of cost, Turkey, being the largest donor in 2012 with 980 million US dollars humanitarian
assistance to Syria (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2012) has spent more than 6.7 billion
US dollars so far on humanitarian assistance for Syrians in Turkey (AFAD 2016b). However,
the details of expenses concerning whether this amount is mostly spent for camp or non-
camp refugees are not clear. In contrast, international funding to Turkey has amounted to
only 455 million US dollars (AFAD 2016b) and overall funding covers a mere 44% the total
required funds for Turkey (UNHCR 2015a). e nancial burden is ever increasing with the
swelling numbers of incoming refugees, necessitating more camps and more social services.
Furthermore, most studies report that the majority of Syrian refugees seem prepared to
stay in Turkey for the long term since, even if the conict is resolved in Syria, peace and
stability will not be restored immediately (Kirişci 2014; Erdoğan 2015; Kanat and Üstün
2015). us, while eorts of the Turkish Government and the hospitality of the Turkish
people have been laudatory so far, the great number of refugees is straining the available
resources to the breaking point.
Turkey’s temporary protection regime does not violate international obligations since
Turkey maintains its geographical limitation under the 1951 Convention and its practices
are generally in line with the UNHCR’s Guide on Temporary Protection (UNHCR 2014b)
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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 5
and the European Union’s Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC)
4
introduced in
2001. It ensures non-refoulment as the main principle consistent with Article 33 of the
1951 Convention, Article 3 of the Convention against Torture, Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Ciger 2015, 29). However, the 2014 Regulation falls short in three areas.
First, it does not allow access to refugee status determination mechanisms since Article 16
of the 2014 Regulation indicates that the international protection applications of temporary
protection beneciaries will not be processed until the temporary protection regime ends.
us, it does not legally allow Syrians to be transferred to third countries as UN-recognized
refugees (International Crisis Group 2013). In fact, due to the geographical limitation clause,
only asylum-seekers from Europe are eligible for recognition as refugees. Second, the 2014
Regulation does not include a maximum time limit for temporary protection and fails to
clarify the path for access to individual refugee status determination procedures once the
temporary protection ends (Ciger 2015, 34). Last, the 2014 Regulation addresses access to
health care, education, employment and other social assistance as ‘services’ provided and
mandates the state to decide which should indeed be granted as ‘rights’ to the people in
need of protection. In its h year of the refugee crisis, Turkish Government has already
published a new regulation, which will allow Syrian refugees registered under temporary
protection to apply for work permits. As Erdoğan (2015, 61) mentions, formulating the
legal context concerning the rights-responsibility nexus for asylum seekers is as crucial as
their social acceptance.
Research papers developed by international organizations have already highlighted prob-
lems encountered in the absence of rights-based approach for migrants and presented strat-
egies and best practices to promote rights-based migration policies (e.g., ILO 2006, 2010;
IPU, ILO and UN 2015). Accordingly, the protracted temporary protection regime leaves
the refugees in a state of prolonged limbo as it might prevent the development of rights-
based sustainable policies. us temporary protection, which is designed as an emergency
scheme to oer refugees immediate protection in the event of a mass inux, also carries a
risk to allow states to escape from their international obligations in granting refugee status
and rights. Rather than oering refugee status, dierent types of decisions such as ‘subsidiary
protection’ or ‘humanitarian status’ – being issued by some European countries – (Eurostat
2015) constitute similar challenges in terms of granting rights. Notably, there are important
challenges with a service-based approach. First, it creates vulnerability on the part of the
refugees to claim and demand their fundamental rights to full their basic needs. Second,
the social assistance and/or service are le to the arbitrary mercy of political authority.
is also renders Syrian refugees vulnerable to manipulation of political authority, creat-
ing subjects or ‘needy’ individuals rather than refugees with legally guaranteed social and
economic rights. ird, a service-based approach is far from guaranteeing the continuity
of the social services. Fourth, it is problematic for providing refugees with the conditions of
decent work, rendering them vulnerable to exploitation. Fih, it further bears risks for dis-
advantaged group such as disabled, elderly, women, children, etc. Contrarily, a rights-based
approach guarantees the continuity, inclusiveness and sustainability of the services, as well
as equality to access and take advantage of services. It provides an institutional framework
to develop a comprehensive and inclusive integration strategy. Additionally, it also helps
to foster social acceptance by host society and eliminate the risk of rising xenophobia and
negative stereotypes.
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6 A. YILDIZ AND E. UZGÖREN
In terms of granting refugee status, Turkey has been criticized for maintaining the
geographical limitation of the 1951 Convention obligations, since this has actually become
void in practice due to the large number of non-European refugees already residing in the
country. However, Syrian case demonstrated that Turkey’s reluctance to li the geographical
limitation is understandable to an extent, as the response of the international community
has fallen short in providing international solidarity and protection to displaced Syrians.
e EU has not put its own temporary protection regime in action for the Syrian crisis.
e number of total asylum applications of Syrians in EU+countries
5
registered in the last
ve years remains only at 813,559 or approximately 17% of all Syrian refugees registered
by the UNHCR (2015a). e US has admitted 2200 Syrian refugees between 2011 and
2015 with a goal of resettling at least 10,000 Syrian refugees in 2016 (US Department of
State 2015). Canada accepted the resettlement of 36,300 Syrian refugees between 2013 and
2015 (UNHCR 2015e). Accordingly, Syrian case demonstrated that, even if Turkey were to
grant ‘refugee’ status, the lack of a comprehensive international assistance mechanism and
resettlement programme, as well as the low number of refugees being accepted by devel-
oped countries would leave all refugees mainly under the responsibility and protection of
Turkey. It might increase the number of stranded refugees in Turkey more. Accordingly,
this dilemma of keeping the geographical limitation on the one hand and hosting many de
facto refugees on the other, leaves the refugees in Turkey to the mercy of Turkish authorities
in terms of accessing their fundamental rights in line with universal principles.
It is the contention of researchers that if Turkey – as a transit and also as a destination
country – lis the geographical limitation, it might increase its attractiveness by granting
refugee status in its geographical position where it is exposed to high migration and refugee
ows. For instance, FRONTEX reports that the majority of the total number of 885,000
migrants in the EU in 2015 arrived via the Eastern Mediterranean route, through several
Greek islands, especially Lesvos (FRONTEX 2016). ey are not only originated from Syria
but also Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Prior to Syrian crisis, irregular migration was again
taking place intensively through Eastern Mediterranean route, as 40% of all migrants arriving
in the EU in 2008–2009 have followed this route. Additionally, the EU increasingly tries to
externalize asylum issues by designating non-EU territories as primary places of protection
which in turn puts Turkey at the risk of becoming a ‘buer zone’ for EU’s unwanted refu-
gees (Yıldız 2012). Triggered by the refugee crisis in Europe, the signing of joint action plan
between Turkey and the EU on 29 November 2015 constitutes an example of this politicized
relation since it has linked and conditionalized Turkey’s EU membership aspirations to the
cooperation in the eld of migration. us, the Syrian case proves that liing the geographical
limitation that would require Turkey to process asylum applications and build protection
capacity strongly necessitates the establishment of mechanisms that would ensure concrete
and sustainable international support of the refugees. e policy responses of Turkey to the
Syrian refugee crisis will have signicant implications for the future of evolving Turkish
migration policy as well. However, in specic respect, the crucial point is, temporary pro-
tection regime in Turkey, rst initially instituted as an urgent measure, has become the pro-
longed policy for ve years which cannot be constituted as a means to address access to and
full protection of Syrian refugee rights. Referring to the fact that, the vast majority of Syrian
refugees are not living in the camps but in the urban areas and most of them are intending to
stay in Turkey for a long period of time, the temporary protection regime does not provide
the eective use of basic rights and also it prevents developing eective integration strategies.
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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 7
However, once more, the limitations of the temporary protection regime can only fully be
uncovered through an empirical study that falls to the scope of the next subsection.
Field study on non-camp Syrian refugees in Izmir
İzmir, with a population of 4,168,415 (TÜİK 2016a) is third most popular destination city for
internal migrants aer İstanbul and Ankara. In 2014, the city received 124,439 newcomers
for a net migration rate of 5.6% (TÜİK 2016b). Unemployment rate is recorded as 15.4%
in 2013 (TÜİK 2016a). In addition to industry and agriculture, service sector constitutes
one of the main economic activities with an increased share of 58.4% in 2012 (IZKA 2015).
İzmir has also been one of the primary destinations for Kurdish migrants since the late
1980s and ranks as the third Turkish city with high rates of Kurdish immigrant population
(Saraçoğlu 2011, 145). e ethnic structure of the population in İzmir plays an inuential
role in attracting Syrians of Kurdish origin to the city, oen through a network of Kurdish
relatives and friends. Moreover, İzmir has become a transit city for migrants aiming to
illegally cross rst into Greece and then to more developed EU countries. In 2015, 91,611
people have been apprehended or rescued at sea during 2430 search-and-rescue operations
conducted by Turkish authorities in the Aegean Sea (UNHCR 2016b). us, İzmir is one of
the cities challenging the idea that Syrian refugees are mainly living in the cities with camps
along the Turkish–Syrian border. ey are dispersed around İzmir mainly in the districts
of Basmane, Çimentepe, Kadifekale, Buca and Yeşildere, where this eld study took place.
e research ndings rely on data generated through 32 semi-structured interviews
conducted from February to April 2014. e rst group consisted of 13 Syrian refugees
living in İzmir who had ed the civil war in Syria during 2011–2014. e respondents were
located by tracking their applications for social and economic aid from the local authorities.
Aer completing these initial interviews, researchers were guided towards other individual
refugees through their kinship and friendship networks. e second group of respondents
involved 19 randomly selected Turkish citizens who were interviewed mainly about their
perceptions of the Syrian refugees in Turkey. In most instances, the interviews took place
in informal settings and lasted from 30 minutes to an hour. Aer explaining the aim and
scope of the research, consent of each interviewee was taken with guarantees of anonymity
and condentiality before the interviews began. Naturally, some undocumented Syrians
were concerned about public exposure; thus the researchers avoided questions that could
make the respondents feel threatened. e interviews were not recorded on tape since that
could likewise prevent respondents from sharing sensitive information. e interviews were
mostly conducted in Turkish; however, for ve Syrian interviewees, researchers brought
along a Syrian translator. e presence of an interpreter of the same nationality as that of
the respondents made the interaction during the interviews more meaningful, trusting and
uid. It is decisive to highlight that the article does not aspire to come up with a quantita-
tive analysis in order to draw conclusions related to the prospects of integration and social
acceptance. Rather, it purports to present a qualitative analysis based on narratives and
stories of Syrian refugees related to their journeys from Syria and their socio-economic
conditions on the one hand, and narratives of the host Turkish community related to how
they had received and experienced immigration on the other. Although the aim was not
to draw general conclusions, still researchers continued conducting interviews until the
saturation point was reached and the gathered information started to repeat itself.
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8 A. YILDIZ AND E. UZGÖREN
Two dierent interview guides were used for the Syrian and Turkish respondent groups.
e guide used for Syrian respondents was divided into ve main categories involving
dierent sets of questions: demographic information related to age, occupation, ethnic
background and family; their migratory trajectory such as the way they entered Turkey
and why they chose İzmir as a destination; socio-economic conditions related to housing,
employment and social aid as well as diculties and challenges they encountered; their
perception of social acceptance by the host Turkish society and their level of integration
within the society; and their future prospects concerning their temporary or permanent
stay in Turkey. e interviews conducted with Turkish citizens attempted to nd answers
to research questions grouped under four categories, namely: their level of interaction with
and social acceptance of Syrian refugees; whether they considered Syrians as a security
and social challenge; their opinion about the possibility of Syrians being oered Turkish
citizenship and their likely permanent stay in the country; and their expectations of future
policies of the Turkish Government.
Socio-economic conditions and challenges of non-camp Syrian refugees
All 13 Syrian interviewees identied themselves as Kurdish and Sunni Muslim. Concerning
their education level, four (R2, R5, R9, R13) held university degrees, whereas the remain-
ing nine had had a primary school education or less. Most were married with at least two
children migrated with them, while only three respondents (R1, R13, R5) were single. All
of the respondents spoke Arabic and Kurdish and eight could speak very basic Turkish.
All stated that they le Syria due to security reasons and each recounted a tragic event that
prompted their departure. Some faced direct life-threatening situations, such as their houses
being bombed (R2, R6, R11), and the rest were similarly faced with serious situations that
threatened their lives. e respondents referred to three ways of crossing the Turkish border.
More than half entered Turkey with a passport or identity card (R2, R5, R7, R8, R9, R10,
R13) and registered with Turkish authorities, which allowed them to benet from some
public social services. e remaining respondents entered Turkey without any identica-
tion document (R1, R3, R4, R6, R11). is group is not registered and cannot apply for
social benets. Unregistered Syrians who entered the country through unocial channels
mentioned their inability to access public aid; their answer to why they did not register
with the authorities was the fear of being deported or sent to camps. us, researchers
observed that Syrians with or without documents were able to cross Turkish border without
encountering any serious problems. However, Syrians were aware that they needed to be
registered in order to benet from social services. For instance, a striking point was that
each documented respondent reported that they were the only member of their family to
hold a passport or ID, and that the other family members were undocumented. e social
aid given to the registered family member was shared by at least three or more unregistered
family members. is apparently reveals that they face challenges to benet from services.
On the one hand, unregistered Syrian refugees constitute a challenge in terms of document-
ing their socio-economic conditions and developing a needs analysis for a comprehensive
integration process. On the other hand, in most of the cases, the social services provided
for single person is shared by more family members, rendering the social assistance even
further insucient. More importantly, unregistered Syrians can be accepted as the most
vulnerable group since they do not exist in the society in legal terms. us, neither their
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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 9
social and economic activities can be traced nor their fundamental rights (e.g., economic,
social and cultural rights) can be protected.
As to why they decided to head for İzmir, most respondents referred to existing networks
of family and friends based in the city. Most respondents acknowledged İzmir as ‘safer’ as it
was farther from the war. us, İzmir provides a sense of security. ey all identied İzmir
as friendly and welcoming towards Syrians. R1 stated, ‘I stayed in Şanlıurfa for a while
before coming to İzmir and people in Şanlıurfa do not like Syrians at all. We are perceived
mostly as beggars. However, İzmir is safe and people are friendly’. Others referred to lower
costs of living in İzmir, especially in comparison to İstanbul. None of the respondents had
ever stayed or considered staying in the refugee camps. e camps are perceived as places
for people who lack relatives or friends in Turkey (R7), which constrain freedom (R11),
and which are overcrowded with poor living conditions (R9, R10, R11). One respondent
dened camps as ‘prisons’ (R8). ey believed that being out of the camps oered more
opportunities for employment (even if it is irregular) and the possibility of establishing a
life in Turkey.
As discussed above, there are no legal restrictions for registered Syrians to benet from
social services. However, in practice Syrians face constraints and socio-economic challenges
to access and benet from them. For instance, all respondents were living in desperate
housing conditions. e monthly average rent they paid for unsanitary, damp and shan-
ty-type dwellings was around 250–300 Turkish Lira (TL) as of April–May 2014. Families
consisted of at least four people in each dwelling and most were expecting additional new
family members escaping from Syria. ey all lacked enough basic food and drink, including
milk, which is critical, as the majority of the respondents had small children and babies.
Most respondents stated that they were helped by their neighbours in obtaining food. All
were economically dependent on their limited savings, which were almost exhausted at the
time of the interviews. Some registered Syrians (R2, R7, R10) mentioned that they could
receive nancial aid only once or twice from Association for Social Assistance and Solidarity
functioning under the İzmir Governor. is is a small amount, insucient to cover basic
needs. All respondents appreciated the shelter provided by Turkish Government but most
of them noted the inadequacy of the allocated aid and services.
Regarding employment, except for R8 (chronically ill), R3 (pregnant), R4 (housewife)
and R5 and R13 (student), the respondents were working illegally on a daily or weekly basis.
e working Syrians all wished to be granted work permits. ey worked in construction
or in restaurants, collected recycle paper, sold mussels or worked as tailor. R7 remarked, ‘I
work whenever I nd a job. I accept any job that is available’. It was observed that all were
victims of black market practices, working as cheap labourers without social protection.
Employment in the informal economy made them prone to exploitation. Since they are
not yet allowed to work under temporary protection status, there are no legal authorities
to resort to in case employers do not pay them. For example, R6 reported,
I worked as a construction worker for three days. e employer decided to dismiss me due
to his fear that the police might discover my illegal status and he would have to pay a high
penalty. en I found two other jobs consecutively, for ve days and three days, respectively.
I did not get paid for any of them.
e Syrians also stated that they were paid less than their Turkish co-workers for the
same job, since employers knew that they were desperate for any income to survive. As R10
put it, ‘ere is discrimination in employment. We are paid half of the amount compared
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10 A. YILDIZ AND E. UZGÖREN
to Turkish workers, although we do the same job. Besides, Turkish workers are insured and
have social protection’. To quote R7, ‘Some Turkish workers are also not pleased with the
situation. ey think that Syrians are pushing the wages down and taking the jobs of locals
by working for lower wages. Some employers even see us as slaves. I have two kids at home
and I have no other option than to get work under any terms’. Similarly, R1 remarked, ‘I
have a health condition, a hernia. However, I accept every kind of job, including hard labour.
I have worked as a construction worker and porter’ R2 stated, ‘I work until midnight as a
tailor. My Turkish colleagues are paid more for the same job and they work less than me. I
am sometimes paid, but sometimes not’. Finally, almost all of the registered Syrians raised
concerns about the diculty of obtaining a work permit even if they were allowed to work.
is was also explicitly revealed during an interview with two dental technicians, Turkish
and Syrian friends who met at an international conference before the Syrian crisis erupted.
e employer of the Turkish technician oered to hire the displaced Syrian friend. During
the discussion with his employer, the Turkish technician mentioned he was keen to get a
work permit for his Syrian friend so that he could be employed legally, but he was unable
to access clear information about the procedures to follow. Two crucial observations can be
deducted from all these narratives. First, the temporary protection regime reaches its limit
especially related to providing decent working conditions for Syrians to survive. Second,
without a comprehensive integration policy including an employment strategy, the risk for
social exclusion and rising xenophobia is increasing in the host society.
It is decisive to consider their perceptions related to social acceptance of the Turkish
society, respondents found local people to be welcoming and are thankful to the Turkish
state for providing them with protection. ey had not confronted discrimination on the
basis of their nationality and faced no discrimination in terms of benetting from social
services in schools, hospitals and so forth. e words ‘hospitable’, ‘helpful’ and ‘friendly’
were used to describe the attitude of İzmir residents. As far as their integration into soci-
ety, the lack of knowledge of the Turkish language was highlighted as the rst, and most
signicant, barrier. All respondents except R5 expressed an eagerness to learn Turkish in
order to integrate fully into daily life. Second, access to public services was noted as posing a
challenge to integration. Although the registered Syrians are nominally provided with educa-
tional and health care services, researchers observed that in practice, they have encountered
problems. Respondents were not well informed about such services. Proper schooling is
a growing concern, since a generation of Syrian children is increasingly deprived of edu-
cation. Interviewees recounted diculties in enrolling their children in public schools in
İzmir. Lack of the Turkish language among Syrian children is a major barrier. A respondent
stated that he was searching for ways to send his children to school, hoping that he would
nd classrooms where the language of instruction was in Arabic (R8). All respondents
with children wished them to learn Turkish but to also keep their native Arabic language.
In response to whether their children felt any discrimination in school, most respondents
replied that there was none. Most respondents found the attitude of teachers and parents
of other children to be positive. However, two respondents (R2, R12) stated that some
Turkish students had discriminated against their children. R12 stated, ‘Some Turkish stu-
dents insulted my children and now they do not want to attend the school anymore’. Another
respondent (R4) complained that a school ocial did not want to register her child saying
that the classroom was already full to capacity. As far as health services are concerned, most
respondents stated that they did not encounter any problems obtaining basic health services
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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 11
at the public hospitals for free, but they did mention the high cost of medicines and their
inability to aord them. e Syrians with serious health problems were desperately in need
of assistance, yet they did not have enough money to pay for their medication.
As far as expectations of the Turkish state and future plans are concerned, with one
exception (R5), respondents stated that they would prefer to stay in Turkey if they could
be granted work permits or citizenship. All respondents stressed that they did not want to
be a burden to the Turkish state but would prefer to have the right to work in order to look
aer themselves. Most stated that if they were not oered citizenship or work permits in
Turkey, they would try to migrate to a European country. ere was little hope among the
respondents that the war in Syria would end soon. Even if it did, the loss of their belongings,
houses and property in Syria gave them little reason to return. Most added that they would
prefer to stay in Turkey rather than go to Europe due to cultural and religious similarities
between the two countries. As R8 stated, ‘I would prefer to reside in Turkey and would not
even consider migrating to Europe if I am granted Turkish citizenship. We are culturally
similar. Europeans do not like Muslims, anyway’. None of the respondents were informed
about refugee status or UNHCR’s activities. Two had considered contacting smugglers.
However, they changed their minds due to tragic stories they had heard. R10 told a story in
which smugglers took Syrians from one point along the coast of İzmir (Konak district) and
le them on a point farther north (Karşıyaka district), saying that they had reached Greece.
ese narratives support that temporary protection regime underestimates the situation that
most of the Syrians are not temporary, but they are willing to stay permanently in Turkey.
us, the prolonged regime in fact limits their healthy integration in the society and also
does not provide a reasonable and sustainable solution in the long-run.
Social acceptance of Syrian refugees by Turkish society
Nineteen Turkish citizens living in İzmir were randomly selected and interviewed. Except
R17 and R19, all respondents mentioned that they had encountered Syrians in İzmir. Most
said that they had no direct contact with Syrians but they had seen them living under des-
perate conditions. In general, those interviewed expressed hospitality and social acceptance
towards Syrians on humanitarian grounds, and believed that they should be provided with
shelter and protection due to the ongoing war in Syria. However, the majority perceived
Syrians as ‘guests’ who must return to Syria aer the war ends. Some thought that Turkey
should stop accepting further Syrians and establish a quota for the newcomers according
to its own limited resources (R20, R27, R28, R29). e rest thought that Syrians would
probably settle in Turkey and emphasized the need for a better organized and comprehen-
sive policy, especially for the non-camp refugees (R19, R20, R23, R29, R30, R31, R32). For
example, R23 stressed that ‘Syrians can stay in Turkey as long as they adapt to the social
order. However, the assistance should be managed in a planned and organized way. ey
should be accommodated in the camps or we should provide them with some special places
to live’. R19 stated that
Turkey should have developed a plan before allowing protection to such high numbers of
Syrians. I do not see a comprehensive policy that manages the process aer accepting people.
I appreciate our open-border policy, but we are not well prepared to handle Syrians inside.
Almost all respondents indicated that the presence of Syrians in the long run would likely
cause negative eects on the local labour market and might also hinder the social services
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12 A. YILDIZ AND E. UZGÖREN
provided for Turkish citizens. Nine respondents (R15, R16, R17, R20, R21, R22, R23, R25,
R26) mentioned that employment priority should be given to unemployed Turkish citizens
rather than the Syrians. Syrians were thought to be mostly unskilled and could cause wages
to drop or might take the jobs of unskilled locals. On the other hand, they were not consid-
ered a threat to skilled Turkish workers. To quote R17, ‘Most of the incoming Syrians do not
have education, thus I do not see them as a threat for my job security. I do not think there
are skilled labourers among them that could contribute to our economy’. Eight respondents
remarked that Syrians benetting from social services would restrict and negatively aect
the provision of services for Turkish citizens. Some respondents were content with Syrians
receiving services as long as those for Turkish citizens were not restricted. e majority
stated that Syrians placed a burden on Turkey’s limited resources. For instance, R15 said, ‘I
am not pleased because while most of our Turkish citizens are already unemployed and in
need of social assistance, Syrians are becoming an additional burden on us’.
Strikingly, half of the respondents perceived Syrian refugees as a security threat now,
whereas the other half thought that they would most likely become a security threat if they
stay longer under current conditions. R18 remarked, ‘We do not know whether they were
criminals before; it is dicult to dierentiate them. Even if only one of them was involved
in a crime, all of them might be labeled as criminals’. Similarly, R29 stated, ‘Syrians do not
constitute a security threat now, but if they remain on their own, under these conditions with
no homes or food, they could easily become a threat’. Most respondents expressed unease
at seeing increasing numbers of Syrians, especially children, begging on the streets (R14,
R16, R21, R22, R25, R26, R27), citing this as one of the main security concerns. ey said
that they supported Syrian children getting an education and did not feel uneasy if Syrian
children shared the same class with their own children.
Almost all respondents strongly opposed granting citizenship to Syrians. Some (R15,
R19, R32) stressed that they do not see citizenship as a solution since the Syrian crisis is not
merely Turkey’s issue, but rather one requiring international responsibility and solidarity.
R19 stated that conferring citizenship is something to be discussed later, but other possible
options for protection should be explored rst with the support of the international com-
munity. While R15 expressed the view that ‘Syrians must not be granted citizenship, since
it would have a socially devastating impact’, R28 thought that ‘Syrians might be allowed to
stay here and granted citizenship if they do not damage our country, people, language, and
religion’. Some of the respondents highlighted that the Syrian refugee crisis was being highly
politicized in order to benet Turkish politicians, rather than being assessed on humani-
tarian grounds (R17, R19, R20, R21, R24). Respondents raised concerns that Syrians might
vote in the local elections in 2014, which proved unfounded, though it is possible that the
Syrian refugee problem may be used for political purposes in the future unless a rights-
based approach replaces the current policies that leave the distribution of social services
to the discretion of political authorities. It is critical that politicizing the issue carries the
high risk of marginalizing it and aggravating new misperceptions that might distort the
peaceful co-existence of the Syrians and Turkish people.
Conclusion
According to UNHCR (2014a), Turkey is the world’s largest refugee-hosting country with
its open-border policy that provides temporary protection to nearly 2.5 million displaced
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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 13
Syrians. e response of the international community has remained insucient, both in
terms of opening national borders and providing humanitarian aid to the refugees. is has
le the burden of protection and aid to Syria’s neighbouring countries, Turkey being not
an exception. While Turkey’s open-border policy has been praised in terms of providing
shelter to millions of Syrian refugees, for security reasons and absorption capacity Turkey
cannot continue to expand its humanitarian protection at the rate that Syrians are arriving
at the border. Under these circumstances, in which Turkey is le to deal with huge numbers
of Syrian refugees without substantial international support, Turkey’s concern regarding
liing the present geographical limitation and becoming a more attractive destination
country for more refugees is a serious issue that warrants debate. Turkey registers Syrian
refugees under its temporary protection regime, which is largely in line with international
standards in terms of accepting them on the frontier, ensuring them non-refoulement and
providing them with basic needs, including shelter, food and medical support. Notably, this
regime is approaching its limits given the rising number of refugees crossing the border
and it bears weaknesses and diculties in practice. First, the lack of a clear maximum time
limit for temporary protection creates an unclear path for future status and prospects of
the refugees. Second, their current status puts restrictions in accessing to a refugee status
determination mechanism. Last but not least, the vague language of the 2014 Directive that
seems to equate ‘rights’ with ‘services’ creates diculties such as leaving the sustainability
of and fair access to granted services under the mercy of Turkish Government. Besides, the
empirical research revealed that although these services are not restricted under legal terms,
interviewees highlighted diculties in practice while taking advantage of these services.
As the vast majority of Syrian refugees in Turkey reside outside of camps, this study
focused on the socio-economic challenges of non-camp Syrian refugees based in İzmir, as
well as their social acceptance by Turkish local society through an empirical study conducted
between February and April 2014. e empirical research revealed that the sustainability
of the temporary protection regime is approaching its limits and extending this emergency
measure as an alternative to refugee protection cannot be considered as a viable solution.
ough most Syrian interviewees indicated that they faced no discrimination in general,
they are facing various socio-economic challenges related to housing, employment and edu-
cation. ey are not well informed enough to access and take advantage of public services.
Moreover, the aws and insuciencies of the legal context are causing bureaucratic hurdles
on the ground. In the absence of institutionalized policies especially for non-camp refugees,
their situation is mainly le to judgement of local authorities, which may cause problems
with their smooth integration into and acceptance by the host society. is also threatens
the sustainability of the tolerance for refugees currently shown by Turkish citizens. If the
accessibility to and distribution of public services are observed as becoming strained and
insucient, this could increase unrest within Turkish society and endanger the peaceful
coexistence between the newcomers and the locals. e interviews reveal that there is a
sentiment among Turkish citizens that unrest may arise due to the lack of a comprehensive
integration policy. Without such a policy, Syrians may be perceived as a threat to security
and to the economy in the long run in line with the risk of rising xenophobia. In addition,
there are concerns that the refugee crisis is becoming politicized for the benet of a few
rather than eliciting the appropriate humanitarian response.
e eld study conducted in İzmir revealed important insights that might contribute
to future policies concerning Syrians in Turkey. First, considering that almost all Syrian
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14 A. YILDIZ AND E. UZGÖREN
respondents said that they had no intention of returning to their homeland, there is an
urgent need for Turkey to develop a comprehensive and long-term integration policy for
Syrians rather than prolonging the ad hoc arrangements based on the assumption of tem-
porary stays. e reality that a signicant amount of Syrians will remain permanently in
Turkey must prompt a shi in government policy addressing long-term integration issues.
is is especially important given the high number of Syrians living outside the camps,
who seem to be le on their own without guidance. While the access to public health and
education services are appreciated, there remain several problems encountered in practice.
Granting work permits to Syrians, enabling their access to the labour market, ensuring
enrolment of children and youth into schools are urgent measures that should be priorities
of this policy shi. Moreover, since these growing challenges have the potential to generate
tension between Syrians and the host Turkish society, there must be a clear, long-term and
comprehensive government strategy to integrate Syrians into the society. As Erdoğan (2015,
23) has stated, ‘xenophobia and enmity may rapidly spread among some groups within
Turkish society, which so far has demonstrated high levels of social acceptance toward
Syrians and has been quite supportive of them’. An integration policy needs to reduce the
legal, administrative and practical barriers to participation in the labour market, sustain
the education of Syrian children and foster Turkish language courses for all Syrians to
facilitate communication. Second, the policy should take a rights-based approach rather
than one that puts the emphasis on ‘services’ provided by the Turkish Government. In
doing so, the integration policy should encompass not only the socio-economic needs of
Syrians, but also respond to the concerns of the Turkish people by respecting the limits of
their social acceptance and tolerance, which has been constructed so far on the idea that
the Syrians’ stay will be temporary. ird, a healthy social connection between Syrians and
local communities should be encouraged in order to prevent the rise of racism, xenophobia
and hatred. Moreover, the public transparency of the new policy is essential to combat the
growing perception that the refugee issue is being used for political purposes, overshadow-
ing the humanitarian aspect. Lastly, Turkey has to call for more international support, not
only in nancial terms, but more for developed countries to undertake their fair share of
absorbing one of the world’s largest displacements of people in recent history. By underlining
the fact that the Syrian refugee crisis is not only an issue for Turkey, but one that requires
international solidarity, developed countries should be called upon to accept more Syrian
refugees through extended resettlement programmes. Without these measures, Turkey runs
the risk of becoming an outsourced land of humanitarian protection and a hub for higher
and higher numbers of stranded refugees.
Notes
1. Disaster and Emergency Management Authority of the Republic of Turkey (AFAD) is the
coordinating institution for managing refugee camps in Turkey and all related services,
including the provision of shelter, food, health care, security, social activities, education,
worship, translation, communication, and banking, with the support of relevant ministries,
public institutions and organizations.
2. Temporary protection is an emergency measure meant to serve during a situation of mass
outow and is complementary to the international refugee protection regime. Being one
of the essential mechanisms to provide immediate protection status to refugees in crisis, it
also carries a risk in terms of giving governments the opportunity to avoid full protection
of refugee rights.
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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 15
3. Turkey signed the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol with a ‘geographical
limitation’. It does not have a refugee status determination process for asylum seekers
coming from countries outside Europe. According to its April 2013 law on foreigners and
international protection and its 1994 Asylum Regulation (amended in 2006 and supplemented
by a government directive the same year), Turkey provides non-European refugees with
‘temporary asylum-seeker status’.
4. In the case of a mass inux of displaced persons, it does not oer refugee status immediately
but provides a generalized form of protection to all members of a large group (Ocial Journal
of the European Communities 2001).
5. EU+countries include the EU28 plus Switzerland and Norway.
Acknowledgements
e authors wish to thank each anonymous interviewee for sharing their opinions and also Ayham
Taleb for translating the interviews in Arabic and Kurdish. ey extend their deepest thanks to Murat
Erdoğan for his valuable cooperation and Kemal Kirişci for his constructive and insightful comments.
Ayselin Yıldız is grateful to the grant provided by the project entitled “EU GLOBAL: Transatlantic
Perspectives in a Changing Global Context: Multilateralism rough Regionalism” (EU FP7-Marie
Currie IRSES Programme) that have made this publication to be prepared during her secondment
at University of Pittsburgh as visiting scholar. She owes special thanks to Ronald Linden, Allyson
Delnore and Eleni Valliant for hosting her at University of Pittsburgh EUCE/ESC.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Ayselin Yıldız is an assistant professor at Yaşar University Department of International Relations and
has been the director of Yaşar University European Union Center between 2005 and 2015. She has
been research fellow at Wageningen University, University of California Berkeley and University of
Pittsburgh. Her main areas of study include migration studies, Turkey–EU relations and external
relations of the EU.
Elif Uzgören is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Business, Dokuz
Eylül University, İzmir. She completed her PhD on Politics from Nottingham University. Her research
interests are International Political Economy, Turkish politics and the European integration.
ORCID
Ayselin Yıldız http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8845-2367
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