A Companion to the Philosophy of Action
Abstract
A Companion to the Philosophy of Action offers a comprehensive overview of the issues and problems central to the philosophy of action. The first volume to survey the entire field of philosophy of action (the central issues and processes relating to human actions). Brings together specially commissioned chapters from international experts. Discusses a range of ideas and doctrines, including rationality, free will and determinism, virtuous action, criminal esponsibility, Attribution Theory, and rational agency in evolutionary perspective. Individual chapters also cover prominent historic figures from Plato to Ricoeur. Can be approached as a complete narrative, but also serves as a work of reference. Offers rich insights into an area of philosophical thought that has attracted thinkers since the time of the ancient Greeks.
... Drawing on the philosophy of action literature, we introduce the construct of competitive rationale in studying the primary reasons that directly cause a specific competitive action or inaction. We apply the causal theory of action to provide theoretical underpinnings of competitive rationales (Davis, 2013;Davidson, 1963;O'Connor, 2013). This theory "can explain a person's actions by citing the reasons for which (s)he did them" (Davis, 2013: 35). ...
... We leverage the causal theory of action to provide a theoretical foundation for competitive rationales (Davis, 2013;Davidson, 1963;O'Connor, 2013). The premise of the theory is that reasons underlie human behavior. ...
... The premise of the theory is that reasons underlie human behavior. The focus is on an agent's own reasons for initiating an action rather than any external events that may stimulate an action (O'Connor, 2013). An agent has a reason to act when that action is a result of a desire-wanting to achieve something and a belief-confidence that by taking a specific action one would attain something desired (Davidson, 1963). ...
Competitive dynamics research has focused on studying whether rivals are able and likely to carry out competitive actions, typically by examining indirect reasons such as characteristics of the actions themselves, the firms involved, or the competitive context. We explore why rivals initiate a specific competitive action at a particular time and situation. Drawing from the philosophy of action literature, we introduce the concept of competitive rationales to examine the primary reasons that cause tactical actions. Given the rapid exchanges characterizing tactical competitive dynamics, we conducted an inductive, multicase study to explore the reasons behind over 800 discrete tactical decisions carried out by 9 professional basketball coaches during 15 basketball games. To garner insight, we develop a conceptual framework revealing their types and scope. Even during intense head-to-head rivalry, most rationales were not rivalrous but were instead organizational—to optimize resource use, strategic consistency, and reputation—or social—to manage relationships. Moreover, the three main types of rationales varied in scope, extending beyond immediate competitive situations and rivals to address longer term, strategic outcomes, and assorted stakeholders. Thus, our analysis reveals these rationales to be complex and potentially difficult for rivals to decipher. It also recasts each component of the dominant awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) model of rivalry, suggesting that awareness is challenged by subtle rationales, motivation drives not only action but also forbearance, and capability is both a requirement and product of action.
... Drawing on the philosophy of action literature, we introduce the construct of competitive rationale in studying the primary reasons that directly cause a specific competitive action or inaction. We apply the causal theory of action to provide theoretical underpinnings of competitive rationales (Davis, 2013;Davidson, 1963;O'Connor, 2013). This theory "can explain a person's actions by citing the reasons for which (s)he did them" (Davis, 2013: 35). ...
... We leverage the causal theory of action to provide a theoretical foundation for competitive rationales (Davis, 2013;Davidson, 1963;O'Connor, 2013). The premise of the theory is that reasons underlie human behavior. ...
... The premise of the theory is that reasons underlie human behavior. The focus is on an agent's own reasons for initiating an action rather than any external events that may stimulate an action (O'Connor, 2013). An agent has a reason to act when that action is a result of a desire-wanting to achieve something and a belief-confidence that by taking a specific action one would attain something desired (Davidson, 1963). ...
... Furthermore the mechanisms of attitude-behavior change, persuasive approaches and empathic response take on unique characteristics when shaped by the constraints and affordances of the computer game. Several theoretical investigations of actions-intentions and behavior have been made in philosophical fields [2,9,10,13,40,46,51] however these are based on the general ontological characteristics of actions, intentions and behavior, and are not focused on analyzing entities from a computer game point of view. To address this we propose a model of Action-Intention (mAI) to clarify to the notions of behaviors and actions and describe the relationships between actions and intentions with a particular focus on the disembodied communication of computer games. ...
... The lack of choice in player actions leaves the player simply to act out the dilemma proposed by the game. Without any agency to intervene in the situation, potential for player presence is reduced, and as actions available to the player are predetermined, the player without choices is not totally responsible [40] for the acts performed during the game. The player acts in a goal-direct way (e.g., complete the level) that implies a performed voluntary pro-attitude [13]. ...
This paper is a critical reflection on persuasion and behavior-change in serious computer games, with a particular focus on the design and play of games that can influence players’ real-world value judgments and actions through activating or manipulating empathy. Various models of behavior change and persuasion have been proposed that provide conflicting conceptualizations and design recommendations, while the literature investigating empathy is similarly clouded. In this interdisciplinary examination, we aim bring clarity the complicated design principles of persuasion and empathy, drawing a distinction between attitude and behavior change as a design intention and focussing on two core aspects of game persuasion: procedural rhetorics and empathy arousal. An operationalization of empathy is proposed which takes into account emotional, cognitive, dispositional and situational aspects of empathic experience. We then initiate an ontological analysis to examine the complexities of in-game communication, persuasion and empathy, attitudes and behaviors. A model of Action-Intention (mAI) is described to dissemble the interplay between one’s own actions and intentions as a player and those of others (including Non Player Characters, and the designer) within the imaginary ‘magic circle’ of the game. The mAI reflects concepts and properties from empathy research, Theories of Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior, models of persuasion and behavior change and is inspired by the foundational ontology DOLCE. Applying the mAI, we examine the mobile/online game Phone Story (http://www.phonestory.org) and analyze its challenging matrix of gameplay and design elements. The four levels of this game enact a series of ethical and environmental conflicts concerning mobile phones, with a strong narrative message of each player’s complicity in an inhumane and unsustainable industry. Our discussion explores each level as the player is presented with different configurations of procedural rhetorics, empathy arousal, action and intention, often utilizing sharply contrasting mechanisms. Our approach offers a fresh perspective on persuasion and empathy serious computer games, with implications for the design of game mechanics and player interactions and contributes to the application of ontologies in the study of computer games, demonstrating their potential to inform game design tactics and strategies for attitude and behavior change.
... Teleological statements are statements that ascribe some purpose, end, or goal state to their subject matter. 1 Statements of this kind are pervasive in the realms of human action and artifacts (see Preston, 2009;Sehon, 2010), but they are also frequently found in discourse about traits of biological organisms (Allen 56-2 2023 Teleological Fictionalism in Biology: ...
In this paper, I outline and motivate the fictionalist account of biological teleology, which has received relatively little attention in recent discussions. It holds that our teleological discourse about biological traits employs a useful metaphor that treats them as if they were purposefully designed by an intentional agent, say, God or Mother Nature. Drawing primarily on various conceptual tools developed in the contemporary philosophy of fictionalism and metaphor, as well as on different forms of evidence, I argue for two specific versions of teleological fictionalism: descriptive and prescriptive pretense fictionalism. I argue that when we ascribe a purpose to a biological trait, at least in some important classes of cases, we are invoking a game of prop-oriented make-believe in which the trait in question is used as a prop. I also argue that we should engage in such metaphorical discourse, at least on some important occasions, on the grounds that it can yield certain practical benefits that might outweigh its costs. The upshot is that teleological fictionalism is a live option that deserves further philosophical scrutiny as well as empirical investigation.
... Cf. Bratman (1987), Mele (2010), Harman (1976), Searle (1983), Cohen (1990). 11 ...
O objetivo desse artigo será apresentar parte do debate atual sobre o papel da intenção na teoria da ação e na racionalidade prática. Para isso, iniciarei com a perspectiva do autor responsável pela retomada da filosofia da ação na contemporaneidade, Donald Davidson. Após oferecer uma breve exposição da concepção davidsoniana da intenção e da ação, e sobre os modelos teóricos “crença-desejo” e “crença-desejo-intenção” na filosofia da ação, pretendo desenvolver algumas considerações sobre o aspecto normativo da racionalidade prática (no sentido em que envolve “razões para”) e o papel que a intenção tem nesse processo. Para isso, apresento o modo como Michael Bratman (1987) desenvolve uma linha de argumentação a favor de um tipo de função que a intenção pode desempenhar como input no raciocínio prático, argumentando em prol de um papel genuíno para a intenção em uma concepção de racionalidade prática. Por fim, apresento alguns desdobramentos da discussão sobre o modelo crença-desejo versus o modelo crença-desejo-intenção como propostas conflitantes para a explicação da racionalidade prática.AbstractThis paper aims to present part of the current debate about the role of intention in action theory and practical rationality. For this, I begin with the perspective of the philosopher responsible for the resumption of contemporary philosophy of action, Donald Davidson. After a brief exposition of davidsonian conception of intention and action, and of “belief-desire” and “belief-desire-intention” theoretical models in philosophy of action, I intend to develop some considerations about the normative aspect of practical rationality (in the sense that it involves “reasons for”) and the role of intention in that process. For this, I present the way that Michael Bratman (1987) develops a line of argumentation in favor of a certain type of role intention can play as input in practical reasoning, arguing for a genuine role for intention in a conception of practical rationality. Finally, I present some outspread on belief-desire versus belief-desire-intention discussion, as competing proposals for practical rationality explanation.
... Although determinism has historically been an important motivation for compatibilism-the form of compatibilism traditionally called "soft determinism"-(cf. Kane, 2005, p. 12;McKenna & Pereboom, 2016, p. 31), classical compatibilists such as Hobbes have been inclined to compatibilism as a consequence of naturalism about human nature (Pink, 2004, p. 44;2011). To be a naturalist about human nature is to believe in a fundamental continuity between humans and all other species. ...
... Folk psychology purports to explain how ordinary agents coordinate their everyday lives. Most philosophers agree that this coordination proceeds via attributions of propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires (e.g., Churchland, 1994). In order to show that people understand and predict mental states and behaviors via attributing beliefs and desires, theorists use examples like the following. ...
Theorists of oppression commonly accept that unfair social power disparities result in a variety of harms. In particular, oppression is characterized by a loss of open-mindedness in the oppressors, and negative internalization in the oppressed. That is, while oppressors are often unable or unwilling to consider the points of view of the oppressed, the oppressed often come to internalize conditions of oppression by experiencing them as indicative of their own alleged shortcomings. Nevertheless, the psychological mechanisms behind these phenomena have remained underexplored. This is unfortunate, since understanding the psychological processes behind these phenomena could help us understand how they could be reversed. In this work, I aim to fill this lacuna by extending debates on mechanisms of mindreading (simulation-based or theorizing-based mechanisms responsible for interpreting and manipulating one’s and others’ mental states via attribution of propositional attitudes) to show how close-mindedness and negative internalization come about. I synthesize empirical findings to show that while theorizing fosters emotional insulation by “reframing” affective cues from a third-person point of view, simulation fosters feelings of emotional vulnerability and psychological continuity. As a result, while theorizing allows oppressors to take a somewhat detached attitude during self and other interpretation, involuntary simulation fosters negative internalization on the part of the oppressed.
... The Catalytic Powers of Psychoanalytic Thought Models (2007) who has argued that human beings are agents with causal powers to produce effects by making and preventing something from happening. As argued also by Clarke (2013), this is hardly controversial. However, one may wonder why Valsiner and Brinkmann (2016, 84) have then stressed that we should make causality talk disappear rather than that we should acknowledge the relevance of the notion of causal powers. ...
This chapter explores the relationship between creativity and culture by arguing not only that the creative process is intrinsically social and cultural but, most of all, that the emergence, diffusion and transformation of culture are, ultimately, creative processes. This sociocultural proposition is supported by the sociogenetic diffusion of cultural innovations, the ontogenetic emergence of creativity and culture in early episodes of pretend play, and the microgenetic negotiation of cultural elements taking the form of tinkering and experimentation. The chapter ends with a few reflections on the theoretical, methodological and practical implications of understanding culture as a creative process.
... The Catalytic Powers of Psychoanalytic Thought Models (2007) who has argued that human beings are agents with causal powers to produce effects by making and preventing something from happening. As argued also by Clarke (2013), this is hardly controversial. However, one may wonder why Valsiner and Brinkmann (2016, 84) have then stressed that we should make causality talk disappear rather than that we should acknowledge the relevance of the notion of causal powers. ...
This book is the first to discuss in detail the different sides of Jaan Valsiner’s thought, including developmental science, semiotic mediation, cultural transmission, aesthetics, globalization of science, epistemology, methodology and the history of ideas. The book provides an overview, evaluation and extension of Valsiner’s key ideas for the construction of a dynamic cultural psychology, written by his former students and colleagues from around the world.
See: https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030778910#aboutAuthors
... The effects of positive and negative affect are often described in terms of 'reward' and 'punishment', as (Schultheiss & Wirth, 2008) explain: 'The first key characteristic of motivated behaviour is that it can be aimed either at attaining a pleasurable incentive (reward) or at avoiding an aversive disincentive (punishment).' This bivalent element of motivation has played an important role in the work of many motivation theorists and is also a fundamental consideration in the present work (Atkinson, 1957;Carver & Scheier, 1998;Döring, 2010;Mowrer, 1960;Schneirla, 1959). The Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. ...
I outline a theory of moral motivation which is compatible with the metaphysical claims of strong emotionism—a sentimentalist account of morality first outlined by Jesse Prinz (The emotional construction of morals, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) and supported by myself (Bartlett in Axiomathes, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09524-5) which construes moral concepts and properties as a subset of emotion-dispositional properties. Given these claims, it follows that sincere moral judgements are necessarily motivating in virtue of their emotional constitution. I defend an indefeasible version of judgement motivational internalism which takes into consideration both positively and negatively valenced affective states and how they promote both approach and avoidance motivation, respectively. On this view, in making sincere moral judgements agents are antecedently motivated by standing Desires to avoid or approach the stimuli picked out by their judgements. I also defend internalism against the objections from defeating circumstances and amoralists. As regards the former, I claim that the tendency of philosophers to frame the motivation debate in terms of positive moral judgements makes the argument from defeating circumstances appear more plausible than it is; as regards the latter, I claim the amoralist argument only has force if it is empirically well supported and that psychological data has hitherto been unconvincing.
... In this context, it may be fruitful to join efforts across scientific disciplines and, for example, include concepts and theories from philosophical action theory into empirical studies, as previously proposed by [331]. Action theory conceptualizes human agency by analyzing agency-related phenomena like intention and planning (for an overview see [254]). A central topic of the emerging interdisciplinary field of action science [277] is the integration of philosophical concepts with related empirical findings, e.g., from the field of neuroscience [64,151,256], into a comprehensive theory. ...
An industry in which processes are becoming increasingly complex and terms such as artificial intelligence, networking and increasing digitization are becoming more an more important, reliable automated processes and security are fundamental. In cooperation with humans, a reliable error detection subsystem in an automated intelligent robotic system can provide increased security and adaptivity. If this system is based on human brain signals, it is called Brain Computer Interface (BCI). For practical applicability, however, high decoding accuracies are required for the detection of errors, which all implementations currently have to struggle with.
First, this thesis classifies errors committed by robots using conventional methods by means of electroencephalography (EEG) of a human observer. Using deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) the performance can be significantly improved. This also applies to the differentiation of robot types and conclusions can be drawn about the appearance of the robot. In a second approach, the potential of the CNN architecture for error detection is confirmed on intracranial EEG (iEEG), where errors are generated by incorrect execution of the user himself. In order to imitate everyday situations in which little data is available for training, information is transferred across paradigms, finetuned with successively increasing available data and then classified. This leads to a significant improvement of performance in the case of little data in fine tuning.
Surface EEG cannot pick up signals directly at the tissue and recordings originate largely from the cortical areas near the surface, whereas iEEG is not limited by these circumstances. In order to gain a deeper understanding of error processing in the brain, the data obtained from the iEEG are examined for error-related information and the comprehensive involvement of the different areas is revealed. The power increase turns out to be a dominant feature of error processing.
A newly developed algorithm for the assignment of electrode contacts to brain areas is presented to compensate for deformations during implantations and individual differences in human brains. This algorithm is based on cortical retransformation and individual landmarks, and uses probabilistic, cytoarchitectonically-defined maps, and improves the assignment in the evaluation. The algorithm is also embedded in a user-friendly interface that can be used without any programming experience.
All methods presented were implemented with great care and results were checked for statistical significance and verified by the literature. In summary, this work represents a valuable contribution to detection of errors in human-robot cooperations by means of human brain signals, although the methods developed do not necessarily have to be limited to this type of signal. In addition to the fundamental findings gained in the ongoing neurophysiological research of error signals in particular, the developed ELAS method contributes in general to correct interpretations of cerebral phenomena.
... Complex actions are actions that have other actions as their components or antecedents, whereas basic actions are those that do not. The distinction between basic and complex action is crucial to the metaphysics of action (Lavin, 2013; see also Sandis, 2010;Hornsby, 2013). However, here we do not engage with the debate about metaphysical basicness. ...
There is a view on consciousness that has strong intuitive appeal and empirical support: the intermediate-level theory of consciousness, proposed mainly by Ray Jackendoff and by Jesse Prinz. This theory identifies a specific “intermediate” level of representation as the basis of human phenomenal consciousness, which sits between high-level non-perspectival thought processes and low-level disjointed feature-detection processes in the perceptual and cognitive processing hierarchy. In this article, we show that the claim that consciousness arises at an intermediate-level is true of some cognitive systems, but only in virtue of specific constraints on their active interactions with the environment. We provide ecological reasons for why certain processing levels in a cognitive hierarchy are privileged with respect to consciousness. We do this from the perspective of a prediction-error minimization model of perception and cognition, relying especially on the notion of active inference: the privileged level for consciousness depends on the specific dispositions of an organism concerned with inferring its policies for action. Such a level is indeed intermediate for humans, but this depends on the spatiotemporal resolution of the typical actions that a human organism can normally perform. Thus, intermediateness is not an essential feature of consciousness. In organisms with different action dispositions the privileged level or levels may differ as well.
... Todavia, apesar de já existirem inúmeros estudos e concepções filosóficas contemporâneas acerca da experimentação na construção do conhecimento (Franklin, 2002;Gooding, 2000;Hacking, 2012;Steinle, 1997Steinle, , 2002Steinle, , 2006, o ensino de ciências ainda perpetua visões equivocadas e limitadas da mesma. Seja por meio de materiais didáticos (ou paradidáticos) e, por vezes, de professores, o ensino negligencia os distintos papéis do experimento no desenvolvimento científico, a dinâmica entre hipóteses e experimentação, e acaba por demarcar que "as teorias científicas são derivadas de maneira rigorosa da obtenção dos dados da experiência adquiridos por observação e experimento" (Chalmers, 1993, p. 17). ...
Francis Bacon é, por vezes, apontado como o primeiro filósofo experimental e, normalmente, sua filosofia é atrelada à ideia comum empírico-indutivista. A fim de mostrar uma nova imagem baconiana, este artigo analisa partes de sua principal obra, o Novum Organum, e apresenta seu conceito de experientia literata, pouco conhecido. Além disso, explicita contrapontos entre algumas considerações apresentadas por Bacon e certas concepções do “novo experimentalismo”, sobretudo à luz do conceito de experimentação exploratória delineado por Steinle. Por fim, aborda-se algumas implicações dessas reflexões para o ensino de ciências.
... In general terms, an agent is one with the ability to choose, want, initiate, and perform behavior and movements that are at least to some degree controlled, or one with the power to cause intentional actions. If we look at how contemporary philosophy of action conceives of agency we find that it is reason dependent: One is an agent only as a rational author, and without deliberate reasons for acting there is no action, even if there is caused movement (Mele, 1997;Korsgaard, 2008;Lowe, 2008;O'Connor & Sandis, 2010). If we adopt this intellectualist view on agency in therapeutic contexts, then most of the violent and criminal offenders, including those regarded as being moved to behave violently by their unconscious, insecure internal working models cannot be considered agents and consequently held responsible for their violent deeds. ...
Attachment research shows that the formation of unconscious, insecure representations of the self, the other, and the self-other relations is linked to perpetration and receipt of violence. Attachment-focused therapy aims to change these internal schemata to more secure, adaptive representations by therapeutic work addressed to senses, emotions, and behavior. The paper proposes a new approach to altering the self and other representations in offenders and victims: it involves intellectual reflection on self, will, action and responsibility informed by Augustine's views, facilitated by actual relational experience, and translated into a distinct self-soothing strategy. The reflective-experiential approach can complement existing methods of working with violent or traumatized individuals both within and outside an attachment theory framework. It consists in: identifying that a non-reflective nondistinction between self and behavior supports damaging self- and other- representations and interactions; proposing ways for clients to comprehend and consciously operate with the distinction between self and action.
Much philosophy of action has focused on what could be called individual or collective actions. One can, however, also consider structural actions, which need not be deliberately performed by any individual, team, group, or institution. Structural actions can be extremely powerful and have a profound and also devastating social impact. In this chapter I am going to elaborate on the performative interpretation of mathematics by relating mathematics to individual, collective, as well as structural actions. A variety of different consequences can be brought about by actions, and so these actions need to be critically addressed. I see critique of action as being an ethical endeavour. Logical positivism has insisted on the existence of a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, mathematics and science, and, on the other hand, ethics. Logical positivism inserts mathematics and science into an ethical vacuum. A critical philosophy of mathematics opposes the elimination of ethics from mathematics, and highlights that mathematics is involved in all spheres of life, including the formation of wonders as well as of horrors. This brings mathematics face to face with an ethical challenge.
This article addresses a gap in existing research by focusing on the often-neglected realm of judicial interactions and internal dynamics within specific courts concerning the phenomenon of votum separatum. We examine the forms and practices of collegiality within Polish administrative courts and their influence on judges' decisions to file dissenting opinions. Additionally, we investigate the reactions of fellow judges when a dissent is announced. Our qualitative research methodology relies on in-depth interviews to prevent the imposition of predefined categories. Participants were encouraged to recount their experiences related to composing or participating in decisions involving dissenting opinions. This approach led to the emergence of categories related to collegiality, its functions, and inherent tensions. Our findings reveal that collegiality manifests in various forms beyond panel deliberations. Notably, our research uncovers the existence of departmental meetings in provincial administrative courts where issues addressed in dissenting opinions are discussed. Furthermore, judges' perspectives indicate that the most common scenario leading to dissenting opinions arises when judges from different panels reach opposing decisions. This dilemma prompts judges to choose between adhering to the initial panel's decision or voting for a divergent position proposed by the second panel. Finally, our observations within courtrooms highlight that the ideal of the dispassionate judge does not exclude subtle expressions of surprise or disappointment. These findings enrich our understanding of judicial interactions, shedding light on the complexities of collegiality and dissent within the context of Polish administrative courts.
This paper formulates a series of questions about the nature of human actionin the context of MSDs (MSD = multiple simultaneous un/natural disaster).Some questions are more important than others, and it is crucial to firstlyidentify the most significant ones that, if answered, would probably contribute to a more appropriate human action in the context of MSDs, namely,the clarity of actions. The paper attempts to highlight the importance of human action within MSDs and the philosophical (conceptual) questions thatcan contribute to such action. As for answering these questions, the paperonly provides directions for the answers, while eliminating the remainingoptions (using a previously described model of features of human actionsunder an MSD, i.e. AAR = Attention, Adaptation, Response). Its overall assumption is that individual human action is crucial for proper functioningunder MSDs. Firstly, the paper inquires what can be said about the subject,and then explores specific characteristics of human action within MSDs,and subsequently describes a possible elucidation of such action. Based onthe aforementioned points, the paper aims to express a moderate or slightlypessimistic stance regarding the description of proper human (civilian) action within MSDs and the endeavour to make such action more suitable forpossible challenges of future MSDs. This topic complements previous worksdealing with the philosophy of MSDs. Such approach to human action underMSDs has not been previously explored, neither in philosophy of action norin theory of disaster management, especially not in the context of MSDs.
This article addresses the problem of omissions and its impact in the field of responsibility theory. It problematizes around how omissions challenge the concept of causality and when we can say that a person is morally responsible for their omissions. Based on the inputs provided by the theory of action and the theory of moral responsibility, the tax jurisprudence in matters of legal responsibility of representatives and attorneys in fact is analyzed. It is concluded that the conceptual complexity presented by the omissions has resulted in the TCA not contemplating them when attributing responsibility, when, instead and in what is pertinent, they should be assigned the same weight as a genuine action.
Nihilism about practical reasoning is the thesis that there is no such thing as practical rationality—as rationally figuring out what to do. While other philosophers have defended a theoretically oriented version of the thesis, usually called “error theory”, a case is made for a fully practical version of it: that we are so bad at figuring out what to do that we do not really know what doing it right would so much as look like. In particular, much of our control of instrumental (or means-end) rationality is illusory, and we are almost entirely incompetent at managing the defeating conditions of our practical inferences—that is, of knowing when not to draw an apparently acceptable conclusion. If that is right, then instead of trying to reason more successfully, we should be trying to make failure pay.
In this paper, the author continues developing a philosophy of multiple simultaneous un/natural disasters (MSD) in terms of further development of epistemology of know-how, and the ontology of appearance/reality of such disasters, mostly in the light of globally relevant disasters during 2021, namely floods in central China and in Germany and Belgium, wildfires in Siberia, etc. The paper is a continuation of the research from the initial paper “Un/natural disasters, Philosophy of multiple simultaneous un/natural disasters” (Krkač, 2022) which concerns philosophy of MSDs during 2020, mostly in Croatia within the global context. The main issues in this text are epistemology and ontology of and in multiple simultaneous un/natural disasters, in terms of know-how and appearance-reality distinction. These are being analyzed in conceptual-morphological terms, the goal of which is reaching clear concepts of know-how and reality of and in MSDs which seem to have importance for our understanding of MSDs, deciding, and acting before, in, and after them. The critical finding is concerned with the fact that beyond global MSD hotspots, and beyond special services equipped and trained to act before, during and after MSDs, there is little understanding of and preparedness for MSDs, globally speaking and on average. This overall lack seems to be obvious, and the clearest proofs of it are MSDs in the period between 2020 and 2022.
The main goal of neuroscience is to bridge the gap from “membrane” to “mind” via empirical research that elucidates the functional processes from neuron to brain, or theoretical models that frame the cognitive flow from thought to action. Yet, in spite of great, technology-enabled advances in our knowledge of basic neural mechanisms, we still struggle to understand how abstract higher-order cognitive functions such as intention formation finally give rise to goal-directed behavior. Likewise, how external stimuli may precipitate subconscious, yet purposeful action remains unclear. The reasons for these difficulties are both methodological and conceptual in nature and might, in both cases, stem from neglect to account for the multiscale organizational elements in the human brain: for instance, connectivity analyses based on functional MRI (fMRI) routinely pre-process data with an arbitrarily selected single spatial filter, thereby obscuring cortical activity at other observation scales; similarly, signal sampling for BCI applications is usually limited to single lower-order processing areas, although neuronal correlates of intention are more likely to be distributed across higher-order association regions.
This doctoral thesis investigates the spatial multiscale dimension of neocortical network activity as observed via fMRI recordings and devises an integrative hierarchical model of intention formation informed by neuroscientific evidence and philosophical concepts established in the field of action theory.
Multiscale, surface-constrained pre-processing of movement-related data reveals spatiotemporal features of the hemodynamic response previously unknown in spite of the ubiquitous use of fMRI as an investigative tool: the biphasic response function underlying the majority of fMRI studies in the past 20 years is called into question, as the post-stimulus response undershoot is shown as a surround effect absent from higher-order processing areas; these multiscale data sets also lend themselves to the analysis of cortical networks and the scale-dependent variability of interregional network connections, indicating a possible relation to different levels of the processing hierarchy. Finally, the current neuroscientific and philosophical theories on intention formation are contrasted with each other, and suggested to reflect two opposed, yet complementing streams of top-down and bottom-up influences that scale across time and brain regions as they become integrated in a dynamic process before resulting in intentional, goal-directed action.
Visitors to SSA countries’ rural areas have perceptions or images of these places having ‘rural idyll symbols’ and in many cases want to share in the local communities’ unique knowledge, language, rituals, spirituality or way of life. Embedding IK of SSA destinations in rural tourism offerings is one of the emerging conditions or opportunities for SSA rural tourism. This can foster a knowledge exchange between local communities and tourists
or visitors, without eroding the identity and practices of such rural areas. One way to deliver authentic rural tourism value proposition in SSA was for the local communities to stage events for the tourists. This will help to establish a unique rural tourism experience which in turn will lead to securing a brand identity in the global rural tourism marketplace. This was termed ‘strategic event-based rural tourism’ in this chapter, where a lot of local or indigenous tourism offerings can be packaged by the local communities and delivered to the tourists through event staging. Highlights of traditional dances, local food, folklore, local way of life and other traditional activities, for example, can be sequentially presented to rural tourists. This emergent generic strategy for ‘rural SSA tourism development’, However, as Ezeuduji (2013) puts it, should be carefully adapted according to the ‘specific
local socio-economic and environmental conditions’.
This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume introduces new debates and questions old assumptions, inviting the reader to rethink substantive law and practical ethical reflection.
La distinción entre los niveles personal y subpersonal de explicación psicológica ha resultado de gran utilidad para diferenciar distintos modos de comprender el comportamiento humano. La discusión teórica en torno a la distinción se ha enfocado particularmente en torno a cómo caracterizar el nivel personal. Sin embargo, poco se ha dicho sobre cómo estas explicaciones operarían a la hora de hacer inteligible el comportamiento inteligente de animales no humanos. En este trabajo analizo las principales caracterizaciones que se han dado de las explicaciones de nivel personal y cómo éstas aplicarían a la interpretación del comportamiento animal en contextos científicos. Específicamente, defenderé que las explicaciones de nivel personal son especialmente relevantes para explicar las acciones humanas en tanto eventos singulares. A partir de esto, argumentaré que también los comportamientos animales pueden potencialmente ser eventos singulares como lo son las acciones humanas. Así, las explicaciones de nivel personal juegan un rol importante en las ciencias del comportamiento animal.
Some philosophers and scientists have argued that we humans cannot be held morally responsible for anything. Invoking results of the neurosciences and the cognitive sciences, they argue that humans lack the kind of conscious control and awareness required for moral responsibility. For theological ethics and Christian theology as a whole, moral responsibility is indispensable. I will begin by outlining some empirical results that are invoked in support of moral responsibility skepticism. I will, then, examine the subsequent discussion and the question why conscious awareness is central to moral responsibility. Consciousness contributes to morally relevant control over action in multiple ways. I will briefly examine some accounts of conscious control that are resistant to the skeptical challenge. Although the empirical results might lead us to revise the degree and range of conscious control, there seems to be enough of it to ground many everyday practices of responsibility. I will conclude the article with some theological reflections.
Os casos de fraqueza da vontade (incontinência) são tidos como paradoxais. Há, pelo menos, uma tensão entre tais casos e a lei psicológica que relaciona avaliações e volições: se julgamos que fazer x é melhor do que fazer y, então queremos fazer x; porém, por vezes, julgamos que fazer x é melhor do que fazer y e, ainda assim, queremos fazer y em vez de x. Como noutras propostas, defendo que a incompatibilidade é aparente. Porém, não rejeito que haja verdadeiros casos de fraqueza da vontade. Proponho que, em tais casos, há uma cisão entre a força psicológica e o conteúdo axiológico das avaliações: o que o agente representa como mais valioso não é o que se encontra mais representado como valioso no agente e, portanto, aquilo que tem eficácia causal. Proponho, ainda, que o sistema volitivo desenvolveu um mecanismo de correção de tais anomalias, pelo qual o agente tem a capacidade de determinar volições de acordo com a avaliação do melhor.
This paper builds upon the debate on 'moral luck' – i.e. the import that factors beyond one's control have on the cogency of normative claims such as responsibilities – to criticise claims towards backward- and forward-looking responsibilities to protect one's epigenome for the sake of personal or future generations' health. Luck, I argue, is part and parcel with the actions required to protect our epigenomes, and points to the need of dismissing the ensuing individual responsibility claims. But what about the consensual alternative of appeals to collective responsibilities? If a consideration of luck reveals the vulnerabilities, circumstances and uncertainties that call into question individual responsibilities, the same kind of reasoning could apply analogously to collective agencies. Luck is no less of a challenge to our moral intuitions in the case of collective epigenetic responsibilities, and demands abandoning dominant atomistic framings parsing out individuals and collectives in the societal uptake of epigenetics.
Cognitivists about intention hold that intending to do something entails believing you will do it. Noncognitivists hold that intentions are conative states with no cognitive component. I argue that both of these claims are true. Intending entails the presence of a belief, even though the intention is not even partly the belief. The result is a form of what Sarah Paul calls noninferential weak cognitivism, a view that, as she notes, has no prominent defenders.
The semantics of German "absichtlich" (intentionally, on purpose) in a Frame model.
In spite of all the scholarly attention it has garnered, effectuation research continues to face a series of theoretical and methodological challenges. In order to help move effectuation research forward, we content-analyze a comprehensive sample of 101 effectuation articles published in JCR®-listed journals between 1998 and 2016 (inclusively), with the specific aim of uncovering the main conceptual and methodological articulations that have underpinned effectuation research to date. In doing so, we not only uncover some the field’s achievements and shortcomings but also examine the extent to which published effectuation research addresses its most salient criticisms. We build on these observations to propose three recommendations for future advances, namely (1) conceiving effectuation as a “mode of action”; (2) developing new methodological indicators centered on effectuation’s concrete manifestations; and (3) examining the underlying dynamics explaining effectuation’s antecedents and consequences.
In this paper, I claim that both being and meaning constitute human actions. We can only apprehend their meaning through our phenomenological experiences of them as being. The methodology to explore and support such a proposal is both a phenomenological approach indebted to Sartre and a version of Panofsky’s iconology grounded in the understanding of the symbolical dimension of human being. The argument put forth is that since every phenomenon within a series responds to a principle that can be considered its essence, it logically follows that the phenomenological images of perceived actions, that is, the actions as they appear to our consciousness (praxical image), are also principled by an essence, and since actions are enrooted within a particular culture, therefore, the principle must be cultural as well; and given that the principle rules the series of phenomenological images from inside as well as from outside, then, it can be held that the principle is a cultural image of human being (anthropical image) which constitutes the essential meaning of the series of actions that accounts for a form of life, and thus, it can be concluded that the phenomenological images are already invested with cultural (symbolical) meaning, which endows the agent with identity.
Since the 1980s, the discipline of International Relations has seen a series of disputes over its foundations. However, there has been one core concept that, although addressed in various guises, had never been explicitly and systematically engaged with in these debates: the human. This volume is the first to address comprehensively the topic of the human in world politics. It comprises cutting-edge accounts by leading scholars of how the human is (or is not) theorized across the entire range of IR theories, old and new. The authors provide a solid foundation for future debates about how, why, and to which ends the human has been or must (not) be built into our theories, and systematically lay out the implications of such moves for how we come to see world politics and humanity's role within it.
Traditionalists affirm that in self-deception I intend to deceive myself; but, on the standard account of interpersonal deception, according to which deceiver intend to make their target believe a falsehood, traditionalism generates paradoxes, arising from the fact that I will surely know that I want to make myself believe a falsehood. In this thesis, I argue that these well-known paradoxes need not arise under my manipulativist account of deception. In particular, I defend traditionalism about self-deception by showing that what causes paradoxes is not the idea that self-deception is an intrapersonal analogue of interpersonal deception but rather our incorrect conceptions of deception, interpersonal deception, and lying.
While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, the most well developed extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this article, we argue that meditation provides a useful model for understanding a wider range of types of mental action than heretofore recognized. Conclusions yielded by two distinct bodies of current psychological research on meditation and cognition, and meditation and introspection, buttress meditation’s suitability for this role.
It is probably not a big exaggeration to say that contemporary philosophy of action (or: action theory), especially the one from the analytic tradition, has been shaped by the work of G. E. M. Anscombe and Donald Davidson. So, if we abstract from the Aristotelian, Humean, or Kantian roots and inspirations, it is rather plain that action theory does not have a long tradition. Nevertheless , I believe that it would be unjust oversimplification to say that Anscombe and Davidson were the only 'founding parents' of action theory. Among those who contributed to its development in no less degree is Tadeusz Kotarbiński. This is a bold claim. The name of this Polish philosopher-one of the most prominent figures from the Lvov-Warsaw School-is almost completely absent in the mainstream action theory. My goals in this essay are two. Firstly, I would like to show the reasons why Kotarbiński's so-called praxiology is a philosophy of action which should be considered as no less important for the tradition of analytic action theory and for contemporary action-theoretical debates as the classics. Secondly, I shall try to explain why Kotarbiński's action theory--despite its incontestable philosophical value--has remained almost unnoticed in the mainstream for over half a century.
The structure of this essay is as follows. I start with a brief description of what praxiology is. Second, on the basis of selected examples, I try to show its most typical and attractive--from the perspective of classic and contemporary action theory--aspects and features. Third, I shortly sketch my answer to the question why Kotarbiński's praxiology in its original form has had to meet serious difficulties when it comes to its reception and interpretation. I end the essay claiming that the issue behind these difficulties not only veiled the classic character of praxiology and its contemporary attractiveness, but it also is responsible for its original shape as the Polish analytic action theory.
We argue against the dominant view in the literature that concepts (understood as the standing meanings of general terms) are modulated in lexical modulation. We also argue against the alternative view that ‘grab bags’ of information that don’t determine extensions are the starting point for lexical modulation. In response to the problems with these views we outline a new model for lexical modulation that dispenses with the assumption that there is a standing meaning of a general term that is modified in the cases under consideration. In applying general terms we intend to conform with our linguistic ancestors and in doing so we take facts about the referents of these terms for granted. In cases of lexical modulation we become aware of facts we took for granted and we need to change the facts we take for granted in order to see ourselves as continuing in a practice. These changes result in utterances of the general term referring to different properties. In general, concepts are neither the starting point for lexical modulation nor the standing meanings of words.
Statistical mechanics is the name of the ongoing attempt to explain and predict certain phenomena, above all those described by thermodynamics on the basis of the fundamental theories of physics, in particular mechanics (classical or quantum), together with certain auxiliary assumptions. In another paper in this journal, Foundations of statistical mechanics: Mechanics by itself, I have shown that some of the thermodynamic regularities, including the probabilistic ones, can be described in terms of mechanics by itself. But in order to prove those regularities, in particular the time asymmetric ones, it is necessary to add to mechanics assumptions of three kinds, all of which are under debate in contemporary literature. One kind of assumptions concerns measure and probability, and here, a major debate is around the notion of “typicality.” A second assumption concerns initial conditions, and here, the debate is about the nature and status of the so-called past hypothesis. The third kind of assumptions concerns the dynamics, and here, the possibility and significance of “Maxwell's Demon” is the main topic of discussions. This article describes these assumptions and examines the justification for introducing them, emphasizing the contemporary debates around them.
The term “positivism” is used often in the social sciences to characterize research or theory as, variously, quantitative, foundationalist, realist, empiricist, or as excluding interpretative and qualitative methods. However, positivism over the past two centuries has included diverse epistemological stances and methodological practices. This article broadly outlines positivism's developmental trajectory from Comte's naïve empiricism and Enlightenment project to the neopositivism of the logical empiricists associated with the Vienna Circle to the postpositivism of 1950s and 1960s philosophy of science. The various approaches within the positivist framework have fundamentally shaped contemporary philosophy of the social sciences.
I begin this thesis in the classroom, and with a depiction of a particular, quite prevalent, approach to moral education. My aims are then as follows: (1) to trace how certain influential positions in philosophy of education bolster such an approach, (2) to critique the picture of ethics and ethical development shared by these positions, and (3) to suggest an alternative conception of the ethical life which promises to offer a richer, more fruitful, approach to moral education. My first aim is met through an examination of the works of Robert Dearden and Michael Hand on teaching controversial issues. From these writers I draw out what I describe as a 'rationalistic' approach; where a particular vision of rationality is (a) called on to provide definite foundations for the ethical life, and where by implication, (b) teachers are encouraged to teach various ethical concerns as 'issues' which are resolved, or potentially resolvable, by 'rational' means. My critique of this approach focuses on the deeper but unacknowledged senses of unease that underpin both its vision of rationality, and the justificatory role reason is supposed to play in ethics and moral education. The challenge considers the idea that its conception of rationality is ethically deflective (e.g. that it can constitute an attempt to avoid dealing directly with ethical doubt and disquietude). I go on to explore whether there might be a non-deflective philosophical engagement with the ethical: an approach which avoids succumbing either to the certainties of 'rationalism' or to the potentially corrosive nature of relativistic doubt. In arguing that such a conception can be found in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, I explore the possibilities it presents for moral education. Particular attention is paid to the role that the study of literature might play in deepening certain forms of ethical awareness in the classroom.
The notion of basic action has recently come under attack based on the idea that any putative basic action can always be divided into more basic sub-actions. In this paper it is argued that this criticism ignores a key aspect of the idea of basic action, namely, the ‘anything else’ part of the idea that basic actions are not done by doing anything else. This aspect is clarified, and it is argued that doing the sub-actions of which a putative basic action consists does not amount to doing something different from doing that putative basic action.
In this article, I examine recent debates concerning the existence and the nature of basic actions. The discussion is structured around four theses, with which Arthur Danto introduced basic actions to contemporary theorists. The theses concern (a) the relationship between agency and causality, (b) the distinction between basic and complex actions, (c) the regress argument for basic actions, and (d) the structure of practical knowledge in the light these actions. © 2017 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass
Since the 1980s, the discipline of International Relations has seen a series of disputes over its foundations. However, there has been one core concept that, although addressed in various guises, had never been explicitly and systematically engaged with in these debates: the human. This volume is the first to address comprehensively the topic of the human in world politics. It comprises cutting-edge accounts by leading scholars of how the human is (or is not) theorized across the entire range of IR theories, old and new. The authors provide a solid foundation for future debates about how, why, and to which ends the human has been or must (not) be built into our theories, and systematically lay out the implications of such moves for how we come to see world politics and humanity's role within it.
Since the 1980s, the discipline of International Relations has seen a series of disputes over its foundations. However, there has been one core concept that, although addressed in various guises, had never been explicitly and systematically engaged with in these debates: the human. This volume is the first to address comprehensively the topic of the human in world politics. It comprises cutting-edge accounts by leading scholars of how the human is (or is not) theorized across the entire range of IR theories, old and new. The authors provide a solid foundation for future debates about how, why, and to which ends the human has been or must (not) be built into our theories, and systematically lay out the implications of such moves for how we come to see world politics and humanity's role within it.
Brain-controlled robots are a promising new type of assistive device for severely impaired persons. Little is however known about how to optimize the interaction of humans and brain-controlled robots. Information about the human's perceived correctness of robot performance might provide a useful teaching signal for adaptive control algorithms and thus help enhancing robot control. Here, we studied whether watching robots perform erroneous vs. correct action elicits differential brain responses that can be decoded from single trials of electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings, and whether brain activity during human-robot interaction is modulated by the robot's visual similarity to a human. To address these topics, we designed two experiments. In experiment I, participants watched a robot arm pour liquid into a cup. The robot performed the action either erroneously or correctly, i.e. it either spilled some liquid or not. In experiment II, participants observed two different types of robots, humanoid and non-humanoid, grabbing a ball. The robots either managed to grab the ball or not. We recorded high-resolution EEG during the observation tasks in both experiments to train a Filter Bank Common Spatial Pattern (FBCSP) pipeline on the multivariate EEG signal and decode for the correctness of the observed action, and for the type of the observed robot. Our findings show that it was possible to decode both correctness and robot type for the majority of participants significantly, although often just slightly, above chance level. Our findings suggest that non-invasive recordings of brain responses elicited when observing robots indeed contain decodable information about the correctness of the robot's action and the type of observed robot.
Bill Pollard has recently developed an account of habits of action, endeavoring to rehabilitate the traditional notion of habit in a way that can be used to address current philosophical concerns. I argue that Pollard’s account has important shortcomings. The account is intended to apply indiscriminately to both habitual and skilled acts, but this overlooks crucial distinctions. Moreover, Pollard’s account fails to do justice to the various ways in which the idea of habit figures in the explanation and assessment of action. These shortcomings are a consequence of certain assumptions Pollard shares with the accounts of mind and action he sets to criticize. As long as these assumptions are left intact, the potential of dispositional notions such as habit and skill to contribute to contemporary debates will not be realized.
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