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Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development
... Their survey findings indicate that, for most manufacturing firms, the most important product innovation (i.e., that new product accounting for the most revenue) accounted for 10% or less of their sales during 2009. Moreover, most innovations are imitated in less than three years (Levin et al., 1987), allowing little time for significant capacity expansion. ...
... Arrow (1962) argued that markets for inventions in disembodied form (i.e., descriptions) will tend to fail. Survey research shows that most manufacturing firms protect profits from inventions through first mover advantages, secrecy, and the use of complementary capabilities (e.g., marketing, sales, manufacturing), all of which are implemented through a firm's own sales (Levin et al., 1987;Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). 7 ...
... 8 Survey research confirms that complementary capabilities are among the key means through which firms profit from their new products and processes (Levin et al., 1987;Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). value from their inventions. ...
... Mansfield's conclusions received important support from a comprehensive study undertaken by Levin, et. al (1987). This study examined a=/ Some inventions that were developed in this time period (1981-83) were not introduced then, and some inventions that were introduced then were not developed then. Thus, the left-hand column of the table refers to somewhat different inventions than does the right-hand column. ...
... ale. The study showed that on average the most important means of appropriating the returns in process and product innovations are lead time and sales/service efforts; in contrast, patents to secure royalty income in process and product innovations were only 65% and 67% as important as lead time and sales-service efforts respectively. Table 3 from Levin, et. al. (1987) answers a similar question to that raised in Mansfield (1986), namely what is the inter-industry importance of Source: Levin, et. al., (1987). ...
... and sales/service efforts; in contrast, patents to secure royalty income in process and product innovations were only 65% and 67% as important as lead time and sales-service efforts respectively. Table 3 from Levin, et. al. (1987) answers a similar question to that raised in Mansfield (1986), namely what is the inter-industry importance of Source: Levin, et. al., (1987). ...
... There are various reasons for firms to apply for patents. Empirical studies using surveys find that firms may patent to patent to prevent copying, obtain licensing revenue, increase negotiation position, and avoid lawsuits (Levin et al., 1987;Cohen et al., 2000;Sichelman and Graham, 2008;Graham et al., 2009). Patents may also be used to avoid expensive imitation costs (Mansfield et al., 1981), to distort rival firms' decisions in R&D activities (Kortum and Lerner, 1999;Palangkaraya et al., 2008), to reduce the possibility of being held up by external patent owners (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) and to increase the value of innovation (Arora et al., 2008). ...
... answers. The Yale Survey (Yale) employed in Levin et al. (1987) was aimed at high-level R&D managers from more than one hundred manufacturing industries. They find differences across industries and between product and process innovations in the effectiveness of innovation protection channels. ...
... Incentives reported in those surveys are more general and broader than factors impacting locational decisions, but we can still get some insights about firms' locational decisions. While some firms patent abroad to enter a new market passively (for instance, Levin et al. (1987) find that as an entry condition to some countries, U.S. firms are required to license their technology to hostcountry firms, so that some patents are filed to gain access to foreign markets), other firms may proactively patent so as to increase their success in the new market. ...
The last two decades have witnessed a sharp increase in patent applications filed abroad by domestic innovators. Understanding how firms decide where to patent helps policymakers design policies to encourage domestic innovators to patent abroad or attract foreign innovators to patent in the domestic economy. Studies of locational patenting decisions are limited due to confidentiality issues that prevent researchers from merging firm-level data to patent data across countries. This thesis overcomes this hurdle for Canadian firms' patenting in Canada and the U.S. under arrangements with Statistics Canada that maintain legal confidentiality requirements. This thesis aims to study firms' locational patenting behavior, both empirically and theoretically. I start this thesis with a comprehensive literature review on innovators' decisions of whether to patent and where to patent. Based on the literature, I empirically analyze what factors affect Canadian firms' decisions to patent in Canada and the U.S. using a unique dataset in Chapter Two. Interestingly, when the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) enhanced its cooperation with other patent offices, more Canadian firms were encouraged to patent in Canada. This finding motivated me to investigate further how CIPO's role as an International Search Authority (ISA) in the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) affects Canadian firms' patenting decisions in Chapter Three. The empirical investigations do not answer how firm characteristics, business opportunities, and patent system design affect firms' locational patenting decisions. Thus, I develop a theoretical framework to investigate how firms decide where to apply for patents in Chapter Four. Several empirical findings deserve our attention. First, Canadian firms' propensity to patent increases in firm size and research and development (R\&D) intensity, but decreases in firm profitability and age. Second, the likelihood of patenting in both the U.S. and Canada is associated with past patenting experience, firm size, profitability, and patent scope. Third, while manufacturing firms in export intensive industries tend to patent in both countries, firms in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) intensive industries are more likely to patent domestically only. Moreover, CIPO's role as an ISA was associated with an increase in the number of patent applications by Canadian firms. Foreign-owned firms are the major contributor to the increased patenting. Furthermore, my theoretical analyses show that high-quality innovations are more likely to be patented in multiple countries. As well, patent offices with lower application fees and tougher examination intensities face a trade-off between patent quality and application quantity. Besides, business opportunities in a country can be an important factor in determining innovators' locational patenting decisions. In particular, I compare a simultaneous application system, in which an innovator submits his patent applications simultaneously to several patent offices, with a sequential application system, where his applications are submitted sequentially. Moreover, if third parties can observe application outcomes of the same innovation at different patent offices, it refers to information availability. My results suggest that information availability and application sequence could increase the perceived quality of patents and encourage more firms to apply for patents. Certain policy implications emerge from the results of this thesis. On the one hand, if the policy target is to attract firms to apply for patents in their home country, the domestic patent office may set preferential policies towards young and small firms. On the other hand, if the policy target is to encourage firms to apply for patents abroad, policymakers should design policies to reduce the barriers for firms to do business and enhance cooperation with other countries (e.g., PCT). The theoretical results also have several policy implications. First, if the policy target is to encourage firms to patent, one crucial direction is to improve firms' business environment to exploit their innovations. Second, patent offices can support cross-border patenting by increasing information availability and pushing innovators to apply for patents in sequence.
... Literature little discusses the relationship between innovation/appropriation and the real impact that the perception of appropriation has on the possible efforts of innovators, and there is a certain consensus that private efforts to innovate are made when expectations about private appropriation of benefits from innovation are positive. Most of the appropriation literature are, on the contrary, oriented to the analysis of the mechanisms and strategies that firms use to protect their innovations once they are introduced into the market (Teece 1986; Levin et al. 1987;Harabi 1995;Cohen et al. 2000;Arundel 2001;Galende del Canto 2006; González-Álvarez and Nieto-Antolín 2007; among others). ...
... Parallel to this theoretical debate a more empirical literature has mostly focused on identifying the mechanisms used by firms to protect and appropriate the benefits of innovation once it has been obtained (Teece 1986; Levin et al. 1987;Harabi 1995;Cohen et al. 2000;Arundel 2001;Galende del Canto 2006;González-Álvarez and Nieto-Antolín 2007; among others). The main mechanisms of appropriation can be classified into two broad categories: on the one hand the legal ones, which include the patent (or license, when the owner of the patent yields the right of its exploitation), the utility models and the industrial/design models; and on the other hand the strategic ones, especially complementary assets, industrial secret and first mover. ...
... The patent is a legal provision by which the inventor of a new device or process is assigned an exclusive (temporary) right over the production or use of it (Griliches 1990). The literature notes that the information that firms must disclose when publishing the patent (disclosure) allows competitors to legally innovate "around" that patent, this risk of copying is greater in process innovation (Levin et al. 1987;Cohen et al. 2000;Blind et al. 2006). The utility model is a right granted to a new form obtained in a known object that implies a better use in its function. ...
Following the evolutionary and neoshumpeterian theoretical framework, this research studies how the appropriation strategy of firms is formed in different industrial sector and what factors explain the use of the mechanisms that firms use to protect their innovations. The analysis is based on evidence from Argentine manufacturing firms surveyed by the National Survey of Employment Dynamics and Innovation (ENDEI) for 2010-2012. The results of the statistical analysis allow to identify three clusters at the sectoral level with differentiated characteristics in terms of their innovation activities and business conformation. The cluster of high innovative activity shows a greater incidence of the use of secrecy and patents, while the cluster of low innovative activity presents a greater use of complementary assets and first mover. The econometric analysis (Probit models) shows different effects of the factors considered (type of effort and innovative results, capabilities, linkages, structural factors) on the mechanism used, showing that the appropriation strategy is an emerging of innovation process and differs according to the sectoral cluster considered. The type of innovative effort affects only the appropriation strategy of the high and low innovative activity clusters; while the structural factors of firms explain only the appropriation strategy of sectors of high and medium innovative activity.
... Second, while theoretical studies have long treated formal and informal IPPMs as substitutes (Friedman et al. 1991), empirical evidence shows that there is some degree of complementarity between the different IPPMs (Landry et al., 2009;Gallié et Legros, 2012), reflecting the fact that firms rely on several protection mechanisms to protect different components of their increasingly complex and integrated innovations. The third recurrent empirical finding is that companies consider informal mechanisms more effective than formal ones to protect their innovations (Levin et al. 1987;Cohen et al. 2000;Arundel 2001). In particular, when firms need to protect large valuable investments, they tend resort on informal IPPMs, such as trade secrets or first mover advantage (Anton and Yao, 2004), to staving off free-riders (Hall et al., 2014). ...
... The belief in the importance of patent protection has led scholars in economics to focus on the use of patents by firms as a means to appropriating returns to innovation (Schmookler, 1966;Comanor and Scherer, 1969). However, evidence based on firm surveys indicates that patents are not effective in protecting firms' most valuable innovation, especially when it is simple to invent around them, and that firms prefer to resort to other IPPMs to protect their innovations (Levin et al. 1987;Cohen et al. 2000;Arundel 2001). Gradually, the literature has shifted its focus from patents to other IPPMs and to a portfolio of IPPMs. ...
... Altogether, these tables and figures show a great degree of heterogeneity in the use of IPPMs, and they support the evidence reported in previous studies that many firms have a preference for informal IPPMs or a combination of formal and informal IPPMs (Hall et al., 2014;Levin et al., 1987). 10 10 It is important to notice, however, that the available evidence relies on surveys where firms are asked to report whether they have formal IPPMs such as patents or use informal types protection mechanisms like lead time. ...
Intellectual property protection mechanisms (IPPMs) are critical to fostering innovation and their relevance has grown enormously with the increased trade in goods and services involving intellectual property. Scholars have investigated what factors facilitate or hinder the use of such IP protection strategies, identifying country, sector, and firm characteristics. However, the extant literature has overlooked the role of founding team characteristics on the choice of IPPMs. Using data from a large sample of European small and young entrepreneurial firms, we show that controlling for size, R&D intensity, and other firms and market effects, the founding team characteristics such as gender and education greatly influence the choice of IPPMs.
... Of course, as is well known, patent data are not without drawbacks. For example, not all inventions are applied for patent protection or get it granted and the importance of patent protection varies significantly across different sectors (Mansfield 1986;Levin et al. 1987). Another disadvantage of using patent data is that patent protection is perceived a more useful way to protect intellectual property for product innovations rather than for process technology (Levin et al. 1987). ...
... For example, not all inventions are applied for patent protection or get it granted and the importance of patent protection varies significantly across different sectors (Mansfield 1986;Levin et al. 1987). Another disadvantage of using patent data is that patent protection is perceived a more useful way to protect intellectual property for product innovations rather than for process technology (Levin et al. 1987). Moreover, the process of applying for patent protection and receiving a grant usually takes some time. ...
... What makes it especially appealing for the purpose of this study is that it allows associating inventive output with several technological fields. However, the use of patents to protect intellectual property various largely between sectors (Mansfield 1986;Levin et al. 1987). In addition, it varies also across types of innovations: patent protection is identified to play a more important role for the protection of product innovations than of process innovations (Levin et al. 1987). ...
This article aims to shed light on the role of technological opportunities for green innovation by studying the case of Green ICT innovation. We test whether firms active in low-opportunity technological areas are less likely to be innovative and whether they are more likely to change their direction of technical change. To do so, we construct a firm-level panel data set for the years 1992–2009 combining patent data from the European Patent Office with firm-level data from the German Innovation Panel (Mannheim Innovation Panel). The results are based on dynamic count data estimation models applying General Methods of Moments estimators. Our results support our hypotheses: firms active in low-opportunity technological areas are less innovative but are more likely to switch from pure ICT innovation to Green ICT innovation.
... Second, patent protection plays an outsized, almost unique role in the pharmaceutical industry. A dated but in ‡uential survey by Levin et al. (1987) of 650 corporate R&D managers found that patents were perceived to be a highly e¤ective 9 Modeling patent protection as a binary decision variable is without loss of generality. The key insights yielded by our analysis carry over when patent protection is continuous, e.g. when countries can choose the degree of imitation ( i ) facing …rms. ...
... To see the answer, simply substitute na k j f =0 and na k into the world welfare functions to obtain W W e k (P; P; na k j f =0 ) W W e k (P; I; na k ) < 0 (29) that is, extending foreign patent protection necessarily lowers world welfare under nationally optimal tari¤s. 25 Thus, we can state the following: ...
... Second, patent protection plays an outsized, almost unique role in the pharmaceutical industry. A dated but in ‡uential survey by Levin et al. (1987) of 650 corporate R&D managers found that patents were perceived to be a highly e¤ective 9 Modeling patent protection as a binary decision variable is without loss of generality. The key insights yielded by our analysis carry over when patent protection is continuous, e.g. when countries can choose the degree of imitation ( i ) facing …rms. ...
... To see the answer, simply substitute na k j f =0 and na k into the world welfare functions to obtain W W e k (P; P; na k j f =0 ) W W e k (P; I; na k ) < 0 (29) that is, extending foreign patent protection necessarily lowers world welfare under nationally optimal tari¤s. 25 Thus, we can state the following: ...
This paper develops a simple two-country model of quality-improving innovation to study the role tariff barriers play in shaping the welfare impact of global patent protection. We show that international patent policy coordination via national treatment is desirable only if tariff barriers between countries are sufficiently low. Furthermore, if countries are free to impose their optimal tariffs on one another, requiring national treatment in patent protection unambiguously lowers world welfare. Hence, constraining tariffs helps pave the way for international coordination over patent protection. This insight provides a potential rationale for the historical sequencing of policy reforms observed in the global trading system: multilateral rules on intellectual property were adopted only after decades of trade negotiations had succeeded in substantially reducing global tariffs.
... L'une des raisons qui explique la non-utilisation des brevets est tout simplement la difficulté naturelle de copier une invention. 85 % des industries visées par l'enquête de Levin et al. (1987) ont par exemple indiqué que le coût de l'imitation d'une innovation majeure non brevetée représentait au moins 50 % du coût de R&D de l'innovateur. Plus de 40 % des industries répondantes ont indiqué que les coûts d'imitation dépassaient 75 % des coûts d'innovation. ...
... Cette industrie semble avoir entraîné un virage important vers le brevetage dans ce domaine après cette découverte. Cohen et al. (2002), Arora, Ceccagnoli et Cohen (2008) et Levin et al. (1987) ont aussi montré que les innovateurs sont beaucoup plus susceptibles de se tourner vers le système des brevets lorsqu'il y a auto-divulgation que dans les domaines technologiques où la fabrication de procédés est plus facile à garder secrète. Murray et Stern (2007) ont élaboré une étude observationnelle astucieuse où ils se concentrent sur les recherches dans lequel une seule découverte peut contribuer à la fois à la recherche scientifique (article scientifique) et à des applications commerciales utiles (brevet). ...
Cette thèse traite du problème suivant : la justification théorique principale des brevets repose sur un arbitrage institutionnel, par le monopole temporaire, entre l’incitation offerte à certains individus et l’inhibition produite sur d’autres. Mais cet arbitrage est complexe et l’impact des brevets sur la recherche, l’innovation et le bien-être général est théoriquement et empiriquement toujours incertain.Le nombre de brevets déposés annuellement a triplé en seulement 20 ans passant de 500 000 à plus d’1,5 million de brevets délivrés annuellement dans le monde. Les brevets entraînent des coûts important, il est estimé que plus d’un quart du total des dépenses privées en R&D aux États-Unis est uniquement dépensé pour défendre les brevets. Au vu de l’importance de ces chiffres, en l’absence de preuves solides pour justifier l’arbitrage actuel, faut-il ne pas recommander cette politique publique ?Deux thèses s’opposent :• La thèse conservatrice attentiste : Au vu de l’incertitude, il faut conserver les brevets en attendant d’en savoir plus, car il est risqué de réformer une institution si développée sans avoir plus de connaissances à son sujet. Les brevets sont répandus de manière planétaire et depuis longtemps, il est déraisonnable de provoquer des changements susceptibles de générer des perturbations à court terme, augmenter les coûts, provoquer des erreurs et des inefficacités.• La thèse réformiste expérimentaliste : Au vu de l’incertitude, il faut réformer les brevets dès à présent, car il est risqué de conserver une institution si développée sans avoir plus de connaissances à son sujet. Il est déraisonnable de garder avec un tel niveau d’incertitude une institution qui pourrait être néfaste et sous-optimale.Notre thèse défend l’option réformiste expérimentaliste et la principale raison est la suivante : il faut réformer les brevets pour des raisons épistémiques car il s’est ajouté une difficulté nouvelle : l’uniformisation. En effet, depuis la quasi-uniformisation planétaire du droit des brevets en 1995 (accords ADPIC de l’OMC) il est devenu extrêmement difficile d’étudier les brevets par manque de moyens de comparaison. Il faut donc réformer les brevets afin de produire de la diversité institutionnelle, ce qui permettra de tester empiriquement, par comparaison longitudinale et transversale les effets des brevets sur l’innovation.Face à l’objection principale, c’est-à-dire, les risques que nous encourons à jouer aux apprentis-sorciers institutionnels, nous répondons par trois arguments : (1) Les risques sont faibles dans de nombreux domaines technologiques. Une part importante de l’innovation actuelle se fait hors brevet (environ 70 %) et cette part tendra à s’agrandir avec l’augmentation de l’importance des innovations informatiques. (2) Les coûts du changement et les risques d’inadaptation peuvent être expérimentés en laboratoire. Nous montrons que ce type d’expérimentation est possible. Nous avons réalisé une telle expérimentation en laboratoire. Nous nous sommes concentrés sur l’acceptation sociale et l’effet sur la créativité d’être forcés par l’avis majoritaire à abandonner les brevets. Notre expérimentation montre que supprimer les brevets en laboratoire ne réduit pas l’incitation à inventer chez les plus créatifs car ce ne sont pas eux qui votent pour les brevets. (3) De multiples solutions institutionnelles peuvent être expérimentées sur le terrain sans exiger l’abolition pure et simple des brevets. Nous identifions des mécanismes institutionnels ex ante (avant commercialisation) / ex post (après commercialisation) qu’ils seraient prometteurs d’expérimenter et qui diffèrent du droit des brevets actuel. Nous proposons par exemple un mécanisme, la iTVA, qui tout en maintenant le système actuel des brevets, offre une immunité à toute personne qui commercialiserait un produit protégé par brevet, car l’État serait garant du transfert d’une part de la TVA en royalties vers le détenteur du brevet.
... Threshold concept mastery often involves "messy journeys back, forth, and across conceptual terrain" (Cousin 2006, 5). included secrecy as a way to appropriate innovation (Levin et al. 1987;Von Hippel 1982). For example, Nonaka and Teece (2001) In jurisprudence, there has been a century-long debate on how best to regulate trade secrets. ...
... What matters is how managers of trade secrets teach and train their organization to keep those secrets, how the secrets are used for sharing knowledge within an organization and with third parties, and how the secrets are combined with other measures, such as patents and copyright, to create and maintain competitive advantages. In this view, the difference between secrets in general and trade secrets specifically is simply that trade secrets are managed with a commercial purpose (Levin et al. 1987;Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000;Arundel 2001;Leiponen and Byma 2009;Gallié and Legros 2012;Hall et al. 2014;Eurostat 2016). Laws constitute a framework for knowledge transfer, such as licensing, in the form of trade secrets. ...
... Appropriability refers to aspects of the product category that govern firms' abilities to capture innovation rents in the product category (Levin et al. 1987;Teece 1986). Levin and colleagues (1987) studied more than 100 industries and concluded that appropriability is a multifaceted construct that embodies the following six aspects: patents to prevent duplication, patents to secure royalty income, secrecy of the new product development effort, lead time for development of the product, learning-curve efficiency, and sales and service effort that underlies the innovation. ...
... Tight appropriability leads to disjointed competition and localized monopolies with several independent, disconnected market niches that reduce the selection pressures that are crucial for the emergence of a dominant design (Anderson and Tushman 1990;Frenken, Saviotti, and Trommetter 1999). With tight appropriability, product prices may also be higher because of limited industrywide learning effects, lowering the probability of emergence of a dominant design (Levin et al. 1987). In such a situation, developers of complementary goods may not have the knowledge or the incentives to develop complementary goods, reducing selection pressures and delaying the emergence of a dominant design. ...
In many product categories, technological evolution results in the emergence of a single product design that achieves market dominance. In this article, the authors examine two questions: Will a dominant design emerge in a new product category? and If it does, how long will it be before a dominant design emerges? Thus, the authors simultaneously model the probability of emergence of a dominant design and the time of that emergence, conditional on its emergence. The model incorporates the effects of several product-market characteristics on the probability and time of dominant design emergence, including appropriability of the rents associated with the product, network effects, size of the product's value net, the standards-setting process, radicalness of innovation, and research-and-development intensity. The authors use data for 63 office products and consumer durables to estimate a split-population hazard model for the probability and time of emergence of the dominant design. They find that a dominant design is more likely to emerge with weak appropriability, weak network effects, low product radicalness, and high research-and-development intensity. Dominant designs that emerge are likely to emerge sooner in product categories in which there is weak appropriability, there are a large number of firms in the value net, the standards are set by a de facto process, and there is low product radicalness The proposed model can be used to predict both the probability and the time of the emergence of a dominant design in a new product category.
... Theoretical studies show that the choice between patenting and secrecy depends on a variety of factors, including the strength of the protection instrument, the nature of the innovation, the ease of imitation, as well as market structure, firm capabilities, and competitor strategies (see Anton and Yao 2004;Kultti, Takalo, and Toikka 2006;2007;Mosel 2011;Panagopoulos and Park 2015;Ottoz and Cugno 2011). Empirical studies frequently find that firms favor secrecy over patenting (Levin et al. 1987;Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999;Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000;Cohen et al. 2002;Hall et al. 2013) and consider the former to be more effective than patenting (Arundel 2001). ...
... Our results confirm the findings of earlier empirical studies on the use of patents and secrecy, which have frequently found that a higher proportion of innovating firms rely on secrecy than patenting (see Levin et al. 1987;Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999;Cohen, Nelson, and John 2000;Cohen et al. 2002;Arundel 2001;Hanel 2008). When differentiating by size class, the findings become more diverse (see Table 2). ...
This paper analyzes the use and effectiveness of patents and trade secrets designed to protect innovation. While previous studies have usually considered patents and trade secrets as substitutes for one another, we investigate to what extent and in what situations the two protection methods are used jointly. We identify protection strategies for single innovation firms and hence overcome the assignment problem of existing empirical studies, that is, whether firms using both protection methods do so for the same innovation or for different innovations. Employing firm panel data from Germany, we find fairly few differences between the determinants for choosing secrecy and patenting. Single innovators that combine both strategies, 39% of the group, tend to aim at a higher level of innovation and act in a more uncertain technological environment. Firms combining both protection methods yield significantly higher sales with new-to-market innovations, providing some evidence for a complementarity of the two protection methods.
... When Mansfield et al. (1981) examined 48 products that had been copied within the major industries of New England during the 1970s, they reported the direct costs of copying were on average 65 per cent of the costs of innovation. A survey by Levin et al. (1987) of 650 Research and Development (R&D) managers provided similar results for the direct costs of industrial copying; and Mansfield et al. and Levin et al. reported that the marginal costs of copying were so high because the copiers had to rediscover for themselves the tacit knowledge embedded in the original innovation. Mansfield et al. and Levin et al., however, had reported only the marginal costs of the actual copying; and Rosenberg (1980) and Cohen and Levinthal (1989) showed that companies seeking success in the market need first to sustain the fixed costs of a research staff whose activities are directed towards maintaining their own tacit expertise, which requires them to pursue active, and therefore expensive, research programmes, as fixed costs. ...
Knowledge commons facilitate voluntary private interactions in markets and societies. These shared pools of knowledge consist of intellectual and legal infrastructures that both enable and constrain private initiatives. This volume brings together theoretical and empirical approaches that develop and apply the Governing Knowledge Commons framework to the evolution of various kinds of shared knowledge structures that underpin exchanges of goods, services, and ideas. Chapters offer vivid and illuminating case studies that illustrate this conceptual framework. How did pooling scientific knowledge enable the Industrial Revolution? How do social networks underpin the credit system enabling the Agra footwear market? How did the market category Scotch whisky emerge and who has access to it? What is the potential of blockchain-ledgers as shared knowledge repositories? This volume demonstrates the importance of shared knowledge in modern society.
... The literature has identified at least two distinct roles of patenting for startups: as a legal instrument to exclude others from using intellectual property in the product market (or to license those rights to others in the market for technology) and as signaling devices to capital providers. Patents are important in the biotechnology and medical industries for both reasons (Levin et al., 1987). Table 4.25 ...
This dissertation develops new methods to analyze firm behaviors and provides estimates and predictions that inform antitrust and innovation policies. The first chapter shows that horizontal merger policies may be tougher when taking into account a merger's effects on the composition of product offerings in addition to the merger's price effects. The second chapter quantifies and decomposes the effects of vertical integration. I show that the investment coordination effects are pro-innovation and dominate the price effects. The results suggest that vertical integration policies should fully consider the potentially positive dynamic implications of a vertical merger. Both chapters are empirical studies in the context of the US smartphone industry. The third chapter develops identification strategies for a general class of matching games and estimates the formation of investment relationships between venture capitalists and biomedical startups. The estimates show that unobservables may be as important as observables in determining which VC invests in which startup firm, and understanding these unobserved factors is important for innovation policies.
... Empresas que enfrentam dificuldades em reunir competências necessárias para implementar inovações podem unir esforços com outros agentes. A cooperação é fundamental para a inovação, pois amplia o acesso das empresas a uma infinidade de recursos desenvolvidos externamente (Zuniga et al. 2016;Levin et al. 1987). Nesse contexto, fontes internas e externas de insumos para a inovação são vistas como formas complementares, e não substitutas à inovação feita no laboratório próprio de P&D (Cassiman & Veugelers 2002;Faria, Lima & Santos 2010 De fato, as empresas que inovaram com cooperação representam uma ilha de excelência no universo das empresas brasileiras, pois possuem indicadores que se destacam em relação às empresas que inovaram sem realizar algum tipo de parceria, como será visto na sequência. ...
This paper analyses the innovation performance of manufacturing firms in Brazil with the objective of comparing innovating firms that cooperate with those that do not cooperate, according
to firms’ technological intensity and origin of capital. The research question is whether cooperation affects a differentiation in the innovation performance of firms according to categories of technological intensity and origin of capital. Evidences were provided by a compilation of original data from Brazilian Innovation Survey (Pintec/IBGE). The results show that cooperation is decisive for the differentiation of firms’ innovation performance, independently of categories of technological intensity. The origin of capital, in turn, has no influence on the differentiation
of firms’ innovation performance. Cooperation occurred mainly with clients, suppliers, and with another firm of the same business group in the case of multinationals. This result contrasts with the literature which emphasizes cooperation with universities and research institutes. The paper
concludes that cooperation to innovate is positive for firms’ innovation performance, and that to stimulate firm cooperation may increase the innovativeness of Brazilian manufacturing firms.
... However, there are various indicators of innovation and knowledge production, such as patents, trademarks, industrial designs and S&E publication. Using only patents is not an appropriate proxy of innovative output because all innovative outputs are not patented as innovators generally prefer other ways to protect their innovations (Levin et al. 1988). Moreover, innovative output can be a result of many inputs instead of single input (R&D) as the process of innovation is more dependent on new investment in machinery and capital equipment, exposure to foreign technology incorporated in FDI, consultancies, licenses and know-how (Freeman and Soete 1987). ...
The main objective of this study is to seek the robust and significant determinants of National Innovative Capacity in technologically advanced economies. In this era of knowledge-based economies having rapidly changing technology, innovation and digitization, it is very important to examine what determines innovation. For this purpose, the role of Information and Communication Technology, Exposure to external technology, R&D expenditure, Human capital, Governance and financial deepening in shaping the national innovative capacity is examined empirically. The aim is to reflect the factors that influence innovation and knowledge creation activities at national level. The study uses a panel of 13 technologically advanced countries with the aim to learn from the best practices. The fixed effect with robust standard errors estimation technique is used for estimation of the model over the period 1996–2015. Moreover, the innovative output index (IQ) is estimated to judge and analyze the national innovative capacity of selected countries. The results suggest that the core variables of estimated model remained significant with expected sings and yielded positive impact on dependent variable. Based on the results, it is suggested that the developing economies should make substantial investments in above mentioned factors in order to go along the path similar to OECD advanced economies.
... In the patenting process, the inventor must disclose critical information about the technology. Thus, even if the patent provides the inventor firm with protection from copying, the codified knowledge disclosed enables a competitor to build on or around the original invention (Anand and Khanna 2000;Levin et al. 1987). ...
The impact of the marketing function on firm performance has been the focus of much recent research in marketing. Thus, the effect of marketing capability on firm performance, compared with that of other capabilities, such as research and development and operations, is an issue of importance to managers. To examine this issue and generate empirical generalizations, the authors conduct a meta-analysis of the firm capability–performance relationship using a mixed-effects model. The results show that, in general, marketing capability has a stronger impact on firm performance than research-and-development and operations capabilities. The results provide guidelines for managers and generate directions for further research.
... This paper contributes to three strands of the patent literature. First, our study is related to the literature on incentives to patent. 1 Empirical studies using surveys (Levin et al., 1987;Cohen et al., 2000;Sichelman and Graham, 2008;Graham et al., 2009) find that firms patent to prevent copying, obtain licensing revenue, increase negotiation position, and avoid lawsuits. Empirical evidence also suggests that patents are used to avoid expensive imitation costs (Mansfield et al., 1981), to distort rival firms' decisions in R&D activities (Kortum and Lerner, 1999;Palangkaraya et al., 2008), to reduce the possibility of being held up by external patent owners (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) and to increase the value of innovation (Arora et al., 2008). ...
Using a unique data set combining Canadian and U.S patent data with firm level data, we analyze Canadian firms' locational patenting decisions during the period 2000-2008. We find that the likelihood of Canadian firms’ patenting in both the U.S. and Canada is associated with past patenting experience, firm size, profitability and patent scope. While manufacturing firms in export intensive industries are more likely to patent in both countries, firms in Foreign Direct Investment intensive industries are more likely to patent domestically. Finally, Canadian Intellectual Property Office's role as an International Search Authority under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) is associated with an increase in the use of PCT by Canadian firms.
... Alternatively, if VCs in low-agglomeration states are less experienced in screening, they may rely more on publicly observable signals such as patents. 36 Two influential surveys report that established IT firms in the United States consider patents the least effective mechanism to protect their R&D investments (Levin et al. (1987), Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000)). Instead, respondents rely on trade secrets, lead time, and design and manufacturing capabilities to profit from their inventions. ...
We provide evidence on the value of patents to startups by leveraging the quasi‐random assignment of applications to examiners with different propensities to grant patents. Using unique data on all first‐time applications filed at the U.S. Patent Office since 2001, we find that startups that win the patent “lottery” by drawing lenient examiners have, on average, 55% higher employment growth and 80% higher sales growth five years later. Patent winners also pursue more, and higher quality, follow‐on innovation. Winning a first patent boosts a startup’s subsequent growth and innovation by facilitating access to funding from venture capitalists, banks, and public investors.
... The second approach looked for correlations between patents and other variables that were thought to matter: R&D expenditures, productivity growth, pro…tability, or the …rm's stock market value (e.g., Pakes and Griliches 1984), but these variables are only indirect measures of innovative activities. The third approach surveyed the R&D managers of …rms (e.g., Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter 1987;Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000) and uncovered the fact that many …rms do not rely on patents to protect their inventions, casting doubt on the representativeness of patents as innovation indicators. ...
We assess the usefulness of patent statistics as an indicator of innovation, using a direct measure of innovation in the hard disk industry (1976–1998). Three findings emerge: (i) patents “predict” innovations better than a random guess, and a simple refinement makes them more useful; (ii) conditional on actually innovating, conglomerates and larger firms patent more than specialised startups and smaller firms; and (iii) patent reforms seem to make the patent–innovation relationship nonstationary. These results suggest that researchers should use caution when comparing patents of different types of firms and across years.
... Также и подражание этим результатам другими имеет определенные расходы. Исследования, проведенные Левином и другими [4], подтверждают, что имитированные изобретения стоят не меньше, чем 70-75% от стоимости оригинальных исследований, т.е. и даже для таких исследований требуются большие финансы. ...
... Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011) and Cleary et al (2018) discuss the relative roles of private and public actors in pharmaceutical research and development. 6 Dutfield (2003); Grabowski (2002); Levin et al. (1987); Mansfield (1986); Mansfield et al (1981). In addition to patents, pharmaceutical firms also rely on trademarks to promote their brand names and preserve market shares in the absence of patents. ...
This article analyzes the spread of intellectual property in trade agreements. We explain how the integration of intellectual property with international trade rules led to the globalization of pharmaceutical patenting, and then how additional provisions related to pharmaceutical products have been introduced by regional and bilateral trade agreements. We describe the additional ‘TRIPS-Plus’ rules contained in recent trade agreements, which go beyond the requirements of the World Trade Organization’s TRIPS Agreement, and explain the potential challenges that they may create for developing countries. We draw attention to the conceptual and methodological challenges of assessing the effects of patent provisions in trade agreements on prices and access to drugs, with particular emphasis on the importance of timing. Depending on when countries began allowing drugs to be patented, TRIPS-Plus provisions have different effects; and when pharmaceutical patenting has been in place for more countries for more time, the effects of TRIPS-Plus provisions will change again.
... IP owners that employ this licensing strategy only share their IPRs for a high price to carefully selected parties, if at all. Exclusive High-Priced IP includes trade secrets, which can be seen as an own form of IP (Levin et al. 1987) that has been given more attention over the last decades (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000 Al-Aali and Teece 2013) and Philips used patents to maintain a monopoly over a specific shaving technology (Bogers, Bekkers, and Granstrand 2012). The academic literature often refers to this IP licensing type as a monopoly. ...
Recently, a variety of organisations, including car and consumer electronics manufacturers, have applied so called IP Pledges. They facilitate access to Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) for a large group of third parties through a reasonable price or, in some cases, even entirely free of charge. Despite growing research to better understand IP Pledges, its underlying terminology remains contradictory. With this paper we contribute to building an established ontology of IP Pledges through proposing a definition and a taxonomy to distinguish different types of IP Pledges. Applying an inductive research approach, we analyse 59 pledges through a secondary data analysis. Based on the analysis, we propose a three-dimensional framework that can be used to distinguish eight types of IP Pledges. Extending this framework with examples from the literature we then propose an IP licensing taxonomy that can be used to distinguish IP licensing-strategies, including patent pools, cross-licenses, and trade secrets. Finally, we use this IP Licensing Framework to illustrate the paths IP owners take as they change their licensing strategies over time.
... Также и подражание этим результатам другими имеет определенные расходы. Исследования, проведенные Левином и другими [4], подтверждают, что имитированные изобретения стоят не меньше, чем 70-75% от стоимости оригинальных исследований, т.е. и даже для таких исследований требуются большие финансы. ...
... In the context of techno- logical assets, the degree of control is also dependent on the appropriability regime. The mechanism of appropriability can be reduced to two dimensions: one associated with lead time, learning curve advantages, and the ability of other firms to independently and concurrently develop the technology, and the other with the use of patents and the associated legal enforcement sys- tems (Kerin, Varadarajan, and Peterson 1992; Levin et al. 1987;Teece 1987). In the first context, strong appropriabil- ity regimes refer to environments in which technologies are proprietary and cannot be invented around easily. ...
In the context of mode of entry into new markets, existing theory tends to identify technology licensing as a step toward or an alternative to wholly owned subsidiaries. However, recent trends in technology licensing indicate that technology licensing is used increasingly as a conscious, proactive component of a technology-based firm's global product strategy. The authors present a conceptual framework from the licensor's perspective on technology licensing by combining the existing literature and licensing practices in industry to identify the antecedent product market, industry level, and resource-based factors that lead to technology licensing. They also present propositions on how these factors affect technology licensing and conclude by linking technology licensing to different dimensions of a firm's product strategy.
... Indeed, these results just confirm those obtained by Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) that patents are highly industryspecific and they are not the firm's preferred method of protection against imitation (trade secrets and first-mover advantages rank first in firms' preferences). Patents efficacy as a protection method depends on the type of knowledge (tacit or codified) and the innovation type (product or process). ...
... Previous research suggests important technology field-and industry-level differences in the importance of firm-specific capabilities, as well as the organization of innovative activities (e.g., Pavitt 1984, Levin et al 1987, McGahan and Porter 1997, Malerba 2005. We explore technology field differences by estimating the baseline AKM specifications, with the complete set of covariates, for each of the six technology fields defined in . ...
... 19 Although patent statistics have been widely used in studies of firm innovations, not all innovations are patented-especially process innovations, which are often protected in other ways (e.g., copyright, trademarks, secrecy; see Levin et al. 1987). Our measure implicitly assumes that, for any sector, patented and nonpatented knowledge both use (patented or nonpatented) knowledge from other sectors in the same manner and, in particular, with the same speed. ...
Aligning interests, motivating contributions to knowledge work, and giving direction to multiple business units and market initiatives represent daily challenges facing the strategist in most companies. The diversity of contexts within an organization has thus led critical management thinkers to suggest that in the presence of multiple initiatives and discourses, the introduction of a new technology has multiple unintended consequences for organization. New technology is regularly subject to power struggles, conflicting goals, and discrepant events (Markus, 1983; Barley, 1986; Orlikowski, 1992; Ciborra, 1996; Leonardi, 2008) which impact on how strategies are shaped within organizations.
In line with current tendencies toward sustainability and deglobalization, economies worldwide increasingly rely on circular business models that slow, close, and narrow resource loops. This research seeks to develop a conceptual framework by combining theory on circular business models, dominant designs, and user experience and extending these to the realm of innovation ecosystems. This framework is then employed to analyze the case of resale in the luxury fashion industry. We find the growth of secondhand luxury fashion would require a complex dominant design in terms of a business model that standardizes products, services, processes, data, and management elements. A design that combines these elements could center the market and, thus, further reduce resource input and waste in circular economies while promoting ecosystem emergence and expansion since it will reinforce the perceived values of craftmanship, durability, and sustainability of this ecosystem. For managers, the complexity requires questioning the feasibility of generating a proprietary dominant design for resale and instead relying on ecosystemic solutions.
Las empresas familiares desempeñan un rol fundamental en la economía, ya que constituyen una amplia mayoría de empresas en los distintos países y sectores y realizan un importante aporte al empleo, la producción y la generación de valor. Sin embargo, ocupan un espacio reducido en la literatura económica y empresarial, que generalmente estudia el comportamiento de las empresas sin considerar esta característica. Esto es incluso más marcado en el caso de la literatura sobre innovación, aun cuando las empresas familiares realizan también un aporte relevante a la economía a través de innovaciones productivas, organizativas y comerciales. Este artículo pretende cubrir este vacío en el caso argentino, analizando la conducta innovadora de estas firmas y, fundamentalmente, sus estrategias de apropiación. Para ello se basa en evidencia empírica derivada de la más reciente encuesta de innovación argentina (ENDEI II) que cuenta con datos sobre 3.944 empresas, de las cuales 2.945 son familiares. Para analizar el vínculo entre el carácter familiar de las empresas, sus actividades de innovación y sus estrategias de apropiación se recurre al concepto de familiness, que alude a aquellos elementos idiosincráticos que surgen de la interacción entre los miembros de la familia y su participación en la empresa, y le confieren a la misma su carácter distintivo. Los resultados del estudio muestran que la familiness no se presenta con la misma intensidad (débil o fuerte) en todas las empresas familiares, y que tanto la actividad innovadora como la forma en que las empresas familiares se apropian de los resultados de innovación difieren de acuerdo con su grado de familiness.
El posibilitar un mejor uso y acceso a los medicamentos para curar, aliviar y prevenir enfermedades es uno de los grandes retos a los que se enfrenta hoy en día la humanidad y especialmente los países de menor desarrollo e ingreso per cápita. De este modo, es aceptado que la falta de accesibilidad a los medicamentos para las personas y las comunidades, sobre en aquellos que viven en los países con menos ingresos, es un gran problema tanto en el ámbito de la salud como en a nivel social, económico, político y ético.
El precio que se ha de pagar por medicamentos vitales y esenciales no es asequible para una cantidad ingente de personas que viven en países con escasos recursos económicos. Esto provoca millones de muertes anuales y problemas de salud adicionales por no poder acceder a dichos medicamentos en palabras de la misma Organización Mundial de la Salud.
Uno de los motivos principales causante de la inaccesibilidad de los medicamentos a más de dos tercios de la población mundial, es la protección y monopolio que las patentes otorgan a los fabricantes de medicamentos. Las patentes les posibilita a las empresas de la industria farmacéutica el monopolio de la venta de un medicamento durante más 12 años, estando libres de cualquier competencia que disminuiría su precio y por tanto facilitaría la accesibilidad a dichos medicamentos.
El uso de las patentes de medicamentos, establecidas para proteger la propiedad intelectual que conlleva desarrollar un nuevo medicamento, se ha extendido a nivel mundial. La organización mundial del comercio, OMC, ha establecido los TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), un acuerdo que han firmado la mayoría de los países pertenecientes a esta organización y que extiende a nivel global el monopolio de las patentes de medicamentos. Estos acuerdos menoscaban el desarrollo o la continuidad de las industrias locales de medicamentos genéricos y su posibilidad de abastecer a sus poblaciones de forma barata con medicamentos esenciales.
Varias correcciones y cláusulas adicionales a dichos acuerdos, como los establecidos por ejemplo en Doha, han intentado paliar el grave problema de salud que generan a nivel mundial los acuerdos TRIPS. Entre dichas medidas de alivio a las restricciones de las patentes figura la posibilidad de otorgar licencias (compulsary license) por parte de los países, en caso de extrema necesidad y urgencia de salud o el poder recurrir a la importación de paralelos, han sido algunas de las medidas lenitivas suscritas para fabricar medicamentos genéricos de especialidades farmacéuticas con patente.
La industria farmacéutica ha sido mirada con lupa, ha sido criticada y examinada para poder justificar la protección de estos monopolios y las ganancias que obtiene. Han sido muchas las propuestas que han intentado compatibilizar los inmensos costes de dinero y tiempo que se emplean en la investigación y desarrollo de un medicamento con su accesibilidad, es decir, con su disponibilidad y precio asequible. Para que a una empresa le compense invertir en investigar y desarrollar nuevos medicamentos ha de tener la seguridad de poder recuperar su dinero y tiempo, y de que sus esfuerzos en avanzar en el arsenal terapéutico no van a ser minados rápidamente por la industria de genéricos.
Otro gran problema es que no se han dispuesto de las medidas eficaces para democratizar e impulsar la inventiva e innovación en la investigación básica y en el desarrollo de medicamentos para cualquier individuo o grupo que tenga el talento, la motivación y le dedique el esfuerzo suficiente para desarrollar esta actividad. La transferencia a los países de medio o bajo ingreso per cápita de capacidades investigadoras y de desarrollo de los medicamentos sobre todo en las fases más incipientes como son la investigación básica y las fases preclínicas y clínicas han sido muy escasas e insuficientes.
En este trabajo, se van a estudiar diferentes medidas que se han tomado o se han propuesto para paliar y mejorar la accesibilidad a los medicamentos en los países con menores ingresos. La industria farmacéutica con una estructura anquilosada y desproporcionada, que perdura desde el siglo XIX, no logra mejorar los resultados en investigación y se muestra incapaz de adaptarse a la nueva realidad social y política globalizada. Tampoco consigue adaptarse ni aprovechar en todo su potencialidad los avances científicos y técnicos actuales. No puede, además, compensar con nuevas innovaciones los desajustes que ocasionan los altos precios de sus medicamentos patentados ni los desequilibrios en acceso a bienes, recursos y conocimientos para que haya igualdad de oportunidades en la innovación e investigación farmacéutica. Por otro lado, el sistema de patentes farmacéuticas ha creado todo una serie de actitudes empresariales injustas que provocan profundos desequilibrios sociales y amenazas sanitarias.
La gran industria farmacéutica, con el actual régimen de patentes, no ha llegado a demostrar que de verdad necesite esta protección para proveer de medicamentos innovadores y vitales para el planeta. Pero tampoco, la industria local farmacéutica de los países emergentes, amparadas y protegidas por legislaciones proteccionistas en sus propios países, muchas veces adaptando las propias leyes de patentes a sus intereses, han demostrado que pueden sustituir como industria inventora e innovadora a sus rivales.
Las patentes, como recurso para recompensar la inversión en dinero y tiempo por innovar, son en general, cuestionadas y puestas hoy en entredicho en la mayoría de los sectores industriales. Los derechos de propiedad intelectual rompen con la competencia beneficiosa del mercado, son instrumentos de abuso para obtener monopolios sobre los productos e impiden el factor progresivo y exponencial que siempre tiene la innovación.
La ventaja temporal que conlleva ser el primero en lanzar un producto, mantener en secreto detalles de la innovación, ser la industria que ha desarrollado dicho artículo de valor y convertirse en marca de referencia para el mismo, suponen mecanismos suficientes para recuperar las inversiones y obtener beneficios aceptables de una innovación, antes de que las copias entren en el mercado de forma masiva.
Solo tendría, tradicionalmente, una justificación las patentes en la industria farmacéutica: el dinero y el tiempo invertidos en desarrollar los estudios exigidos por las autoridades regulatorias para registrar un medicamento, la cantidad de moléculas que son fallidas y que nunca logran comercializarse después de años de estudios, y la rapidez y facilidad para copiar y reproducir un medicamento a coste mínimo hacen pensar que sólo con la protección de las patentes un laboratorio se atreva a invertir en el lanzamiento de nuevos medicamentos.
En este trabajo, apoyados por estudios específicos sobre las patentes y la innovación en la industria farmacéutica, ensayamos someramente, de forma teórica y como hipótesis que la estructura de dicha industria pudiera ajustarse a las de los demás sectores industriales.
Nos basamos en recordar la tradicional separación entre las patentes de productos y las patentes de procesos en los medicamentos; es decir, de una industria que innova sobre productos descubiertos por científicos y de otra que innova sobre los procesos de fabricación. Conscientes, a su vez, de que la invención de moléculas, en más de un 75%, ha sido llevado a cabo por organismos públicos pequeños, universidades e instituciones científicas, financiados mayoritariamente por dinero público, mientras que la innovación, registro y comercialización del producto son siempre costeados y desarrollados por la gran industria.
Se proponen, por tanto, dos sectores industriales farmacéuticos separados. Una industria farmacéutica de la invención-producto y otra de la innovación-proceso. Dos sectores separados por la incompatibilidad de poder desarrollar las dos actividades industriales a la vez, pero unidas por la colaboración e interdependencia que necesitan mantener.
Serian sectores industriales con fines más precisos, desarrollos inventivos o innovadores más cortos en tiempo e inversiones más pequeñas. Así cada sector sería más dinámico, competitivo y cooperador sin depender ni basarse en monopolios sobre productos o procesos. Se crearía una industria de la invención que genera riqueza cuando hasta ahora era una inversión mayoritariamente pública con beneficio para la gran industria farmacéutica. No serían necesarias o no estarían justificadas las patentes. Y mucho de los problemas actuales de accesibilidad a los medicamentos quedarían resueltos.
Todo esto es una hipótesis que necesitaría de la realización de pruebas empíricas para que mediante estudios de casos reales basados en prueba y error se consiga crear un nueva estructura de industria farmacéutica que no dependa de las patentes y no genere las desigualdades en el acceso a los medicamentos y en las oportunidades innovadoras e inventivas. Se apoya esta propuesta concreta expuesta en este trabajo también en las conclusiones de estudios realizados por la propia industria farmacéutica para la mejora en los ratios de descubrimientos de moléculas nuevas con real trascendencia innovadora. Para ello, se han utilizado abundantes estudios para dar apoyo y justificación a la iniciativa de una nueva estructura de industria farmacéutica innovadora e inventiva que no dependa de las patentes.
Este trabajo no se reduce únicamente a plantear una nueva estructura de industria farmacéutica sin patentes, más cooperativa y dinámica, integrada por muchas empresas de tamaño mediano o pequeño que consigan reducir costes, ser sostenibles y conseguir una alta eficacia inventiva e innovadora. Se necesitan, además, plantear modelos de negocios sostenibles de alto valor social que sean capaces de implantarse en los países de menores ingresos y con altas carencias de infraestructuras, sociales y políticas. Estos modelos los encontramos en los las propuestas de C.K. Pranahad sobre las empresas “Bottom of Pyramid” y han dado manifiestos éxitos, sin estar tampoco exentos de críticas, al crear verdaderas capacidades de consumo, producción y de salud en muchos ámbitos realmente depauperados.
A su vez, este estudio académico pretende establecer y definir la opción ética y política que postule una teoría de justicia coherente en la defensa de una mejor accesibilidad y uso de los medicamentos a nivel global. Para ello se apoya, fundamentalmente y en primer lugar, en las teorías postulada por académicos como A. Sen y Martha C. Nussbaum referidas a las capacidades. Las capacidades son entendidas como espacios de oportunidad o logro para que cada uno de las personas pueda desarrollar sus propios planes vitales buenos. Aquí, nos veremos en la necesidad de validar esta teoría de las capacidades frente a la propuesta por J. Rawls y sus seguidores. Esto se debe a la importancia y necesidad de considerar la Teoría de Justicia de Rawls para cualquier propuesta sólida que se quiera realizar en temas de justicia distributiva en pleno siglo XXI.
Dentro de las capacidades que necesita toda persona para preservar su dignidad, sus propios planes vitales, etc., siempre de un modo u otro se incluirá a la capacidad a la salud. Así, de un modo indirecto, lo hará la propia M. Nussbaum cuando ofrece una lista de 10 capacidades básicas que toda persona necesita satisfacer en una mínima cantidad para a preservar su dignidad de ser humano. También, A. Sen entenderá la salud como una capacidad fundamental a considerar aunque nunca llegará a proponer un listado concreto y formal de capacidades básicas o fundamentales para el ser humano.
Los autores que han desarrollado más en concreto la salud como una capacidad a considerar han sido S. Venkatapuram y Nielsen, entre otros, que en este estudio desarrollaremos en profundidad. No nos olvidamos de estimar las propuestas de N. Daniels, que como seguidor de Rawls, verá la salud como un bien primario a cuidar ya que supone preservar la igualdad de oportunidades que demanda toda sociedad justa.
En este estudio, por tanto, trataremos de defender con detalle por qué es necesario proponer las capacidades como métrica fundamental a distribuir igualitariamente entre los individuos y los grupos frente a bienes primarios entendidos como libertades fundamentales, igualdad de oportunidades y recursos prioritarios para los más desfavorecidos. Las capacidades aportan frente a los bienes primarios el otorgar a todos y cada uno las oportunidades que realmente necesita el individuo, sin recurrir a estándares de bienes mínimos y teniendo en cuenta los condicionantes socioeconómico y personales e innatos, para conseguir los funcionamientos que le permitan realizar sus propios planes vitales. Tampoco, tal como el utilitarismo defiende, se acepta como prioridad distributiva la maximización del bienestar para el conjunto de individuos que conforman una sociedad.
Además, veremos como las capacidades de salud y las de salud farmacéutica en particular merecen una atención particular si se quiere ofrecer la mejora en el uso y el acceso de los medicamentos de un modo global para las poblaciones más pobres y para los individuos y grupos en particular que las conforman.
Serán las capacidades de salud farmacéuticas entendidas como las oportunidades o logros ofrecidos mediante bienes, recursos y conocimientos para mejorar el uso y el acceso a los medicamentos lo que se intentará conseguir al proponer la nueva estructura de industrias farmacéuticas inventivas e innovadoras sin patentes dentro de modelos de negocios “Bottom of the Pyramid” que aportan alto capital social.
Pero aun así no se considera que esto será suficiente para que de un modo justo e igualitario todas las personas y grupos en función de su talento y esfuerzo puedan disfrutar de una manera apropiada de las capacidades de salud farmacéutica que demandan. Necesitarán de marcos institucionales donde dichos individuos y grupos puedan gestionar estas capacidades de salud concretas que exigen. Marcos institucionales que les permitan tener un poder y control real sobre la gestión de sus capacidades y el poder político y legislativo para intervenir en estas instituciones que les permiten esta gestión.
Por ello, en la parte final del trabajo expondremos las instituciones de los “Common-Pool Resources” como el ámbito institucional apropiado para la gestión de las capacidades de salud farmacéutica ofreciendo el control y el poder sobre dicha gestión para las personas y los grupos que los conforman. Decir que estos “Common-Pool Resources” son los modos que han pervivido durante siglos para gestionar recursos naturales por parte de las comunidades tradicionales. Dichas instituciones fueron estudiadas por E. Ostrom y analizadas en conciencia para articular y analizar sus modos de estructurarse y funcionar. Esto nos ha servido para constituir y proponer de un modo similar nuestras instituciones de gestiones de capacidades básicas que en nuestro caso serán las capacidades de salud farmacéuticas.
Para nosotros estos “Common-Pool Resources” (CPR) de gestión de capacidades estarán constituidos por un contrato suscrito por todos y cada uno de los participantes de dicha institución. El contrato especificará las reglas y los objetivos de los CPR, que de este modo determina los tipos de participantes que existen junto a sus obligaciones y derechos así como las sanciones para aquellos que no respetan las reglas dictaminadas. Entre los objetivos que hemos estipulados como primordiales para todo “Common-Pool Resources” de capacidades será la mejora de las mismas a corto plazo y a medio y largo plazo la igualación de las capacidades de partida objeto de este CPR.
También, además del ámbito contractual que establecen las reglas en uso del CPR, ya sean las operativas, las de elección colectiva o las constitucionales, existirá un ámbito abierto para compartir capacidades de un modo totalmente libre siendo este espacio totalmente interactivo y dinámico. De este modo, si somos capaces de establecer instituciones donde es posible realmente gestionar con poder y control, por parte de todas las personas y los grupos, de las capacidades básicas que demanda todo ser humano al estar fuertemente unidas a su necesidad de supervivencia y de bienestar se conseguirá, también, cambiar la prioridad establecida por las teorías de justicia más emblemáticas de este y el anterior siglo.
Por esta razón, lo fundamental ya no será que cada persona pueda desarrollar su propio plan vital bueno y razonable para los demás sino de que sea capaz de tener el poder y control sobre la gestión de las capacidades básicas que demanda y la posibilidad de poder decidir legislativa y políticamente en las instituciones que le ofrecen esta posibilidad de gestión.
Así, en resumen, con la estructura de industria farmacéutica propuesta y los modelos de negocio “Bottom of the Pyramid” se consigue liberar al sector farmacéutico del monopolio de las patentes, posibilitar una industria local de medicamentos fuerte e innovadora en los países en vías de desarrollo, dar la oportunidad de generar medicamentos baratos y en cantidad suficiente, crear una industria de la invención e innovación junto a capacidades de consumo, trabajo y producción en las comunidades más pobres hasta entonces desconocidas, y mejorar las instituciones locales, sus infraestructuras y mercados de intercambio, etc.
Por ello, la igualdad de oportunidades, recursos y capacidades se hace más posible mediante un sector dinámico, competitivo, sostenible y de cooperación inventiva e innovadora. Además, una gestión de las capacidades de salud farmacéutica que implica ese mejor uso y acceso a los medicamentos mediante las instituciones de los “Common Pool Resources” hace que se tenga control y se tomen medidas eficaces sobre los condicionantes socioeconómicos, las habilidades de conversión de las oportunidades ofrecidas por parte de los individuos y grupos y las características innatas y adquiridas de cada persona.
This Chapter distinguishes three open approaches to innovation: The Market Correction Model, the Open Innovation Theory, and User and Open Collaborative Innovation and reviews how they explain the motivations behind giving voluntary access to intellectual property. What qualifies as “openness” differs dramatically between the three theories. On this basis, the open models and the licensing practices they represent are placed on a continuum that ranges from restricted to indiscriminate access. The impact on innovation and competition of each level of openness is analysed. Mechanisms that are based on indiscriminate licensing, such as patent pledges, patent pools, and open viral patenting, are evaluated in more detail concerning their legal foundations, legal bindingness, and incentives to employ them. The chapter identifies the scope of incentives to engage in open licensing and arrives at the conclusion of them being insufficient to resolve all the market failures that hinder follow-on innovation.
The chapter reviews the conditions for compulsory licenses for functional efficiency set in international law and the instruments’ adequacy to address the market failures that hinder follow-on innovation. Under the TRIPS Agreement, compulsory licenses (Art. 31) are a mechanism distinct from exceptions to patent protection (Art. 30). Of the general and procedural conditions of Art. 31 TRIPS, the requirement of prior effort to obtain a license before using a patent largely precludes the application of compulsory licenses to hold-up problems. Otherwise, TRIPS features considerable, albeit underused, procedural flexibilities for the application process of a compulsory license. Compulsory licenses for dependent patents (Art. 31 (l) TRIPS) have too narrow a scope of application to sustain the interests of follow-on innovators adequately. In theory, the market failures resulting from the deliberate conduct of a patent holder could be addressed on the grounds of abuse of rights. However, the instrument is toothless due to the requirement of prior effort. Essentially, only compulsory licenses that aim at remedying an anti-competitive practice are liberated from the condition of preliminary effort to obtain a license and could address the broadest range of market failures that hinder follow-on innovation.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relevance of efficient vaccine access, local absorption of technological capabilities in the bio-pharmaceutical sector and the factors fostering them, in order to contain the spread of Covid-19 and improve domestic health conditions. Having carried out pandemic extension simulations, we conclude that without adequate access of vaccines for Mexico’s entire population, the SARS-COV-2 virus, source of Covid-19, will probably remain in Mexico until mid-2022. Through the Poisson model proposed, we have found that the technological absorption and innovation capabilities of the Mexican biopharmaceutical sector (lagtime Citation -BwPatCit) are still scarce but could expand with an increase in: technological knowledge stock, team research size, academic science-technology links and cited patent value. The findings allow us to propose policies to foster bio-pharmaceutical innovation with a favorable health impact on the population.
At the cutting edge of contemporary wealth creation people form self-governed communities of collaborative innovation in conditions of relative equipotency and produce resources with free access to all. The emergent intellectual commons have the potential to commonify intellectual production and distribution, unleash human creativity through collaboration and democratise innovation with wider positive effects for our societies. Contemporary intellectual property laws fail to address this potential. We are, therefore, in pressing need of an institutional alternative beyond the inherent limitations of intellectual property law. This book offers an overall analysis of the moral significance of the intellectual commons and outlines appropriate modes for their regulation. Its principal thesis is that our legal systems are in need of an independent body of law for the protection and promotion of the intellectual commons, in parallel to intellectual property law. In this context, the author of the book proposes the reconstruction of the doctrine of the public domain and the exceptions and limitations of exclusive intellectual property rights into an intellectual commons law, which will underpin a vibrant non-commercial zone of creativity and innovation in intellectual production, distribution and consumption alongside commodity markets enabled by intellectual property law.
This paper is the introduction to the ICC special section on Industrial Dynamics. Industrial dynamics has a venerable heritage in economics and after a long dormant period, it has witnessed a major resurgence beginning in the early 1980s. The current Special Section takes stock of the progress along this new and rich intellectual journey. This Introduction does not aim to present a review of the accomplishments reached in the last period. Rather, it reflects on the broad themes characterizing our progress in understanding industry evolution and industrial dynamics.
Trade secrets are secrets with commercial value that are delimited and managed. They may concern technology, business strategy, customer data and any information of value to a business that is intentionally concealed. Recently the EU, Norway and the USA amended the legal framework for trade secrets. The changes concern how trade secrets can be objects for licencing and knowledge-sharing, as parts of collaborations and open innovation. Trade secrets need management from their creation to their end. The management needs are different from those for other intellectual property that can be published. When trade secrets are part of the knowledge flow in collaborations and open innovation, there is a need for managers to balance openness and secrecy. This thesis, with five papers, research that balance and how trade secrets are managed. The first three papers discuss openness and access to research results from collaborative projects between universities and industry. The studies build on the analysis of the contractual agreements in 483 research projects. The results comprise a framework that can help unravel the complicated contractual provisions and their interrelationships, as well as new perspectives on lead time advantages. The fourth paper investigates how SMEs use trade secrets to create competitive advantages from knowledge exchange and open innovation. This paper builds on survey data from 3871 Norwegian SMEs with a novel set of questions that include differentiation between establishing and using trade secrets. The paper also proposes how to set a baseline for future studies on the effect of the new legislation. The fifth paper concerns teaching and learning trade secret management. The threshold concepts framework is an educational lens well suited for teaching subjects that are transformative and troublesome, as trade secret management is. Trade secrets are part of the broader concept of appropriation mechanism. For researchers, it is crucial to understand better the shift from trade secrets for keeping knowledge secluded, to trade secrets used for knowledge transfer in open innovation. There is then no dichotomy of openness and secrecy. There is a process of knowledge appropriation where trade secrets blend with other mechanisms for the management of innovation.
An empirical study of publicly funded collaborative research projects in biotechnology identifies contractual provisions that govern the extent of access to and openness of research results.
Intellectual property (IP) laws were drafted for tangible objects, but 3D printing technology, which digitizes objects and offers manufacturing capacity to anyone, is disrupting these laws and their underlying policies. In this timely work, Lucas S. Osborn focuses on the novel issues raised for IP law by 3D printing for the major IP systems around the world. He specifically addresses how patent and design law must wrestle with protecting digital versions of inventions and policing individualized manufacturing, how trademark law must confront the dissociation of design from manufacturing, and how patent and copyright law must be reconciled when digital versions of primarily utilitarian objects are concerned. With an even hand and keen insight, Osborn offers an innovation-centered analysis of and balanced response to the disruption caused by 3D printing that should be read by nonexperts and experts alike.
Many studies agree that a weak intellectual property right (IPR) legal system likely reduces innovation or creation; they also predict that increasing intellectual properties (IPs) in developing countries will automatically lead to local needs for stronger formal protection. However, the situation is found to be more complex in China. With a focus on the use of IPs and relevant protection mechanisms in China, this study points out that many companies acquire IPs for purposes that do not depend on their enforcement; many companies have informal ways of protecting their IPs without resorting to court enforcement. Both the alternative functions and the alternative enforcement mechanisms are shaped by industrial characteristics, especially in four aspects: technological features, administrative regulation, market characteristics, and network structure. Based on studies of different industrial sectors in China, this article develops a general framework for analyzing the role of IPRs in industrial practice.
ResumoNos atuais modos de funcionamento do mercado e do Estado, a sociedade civil não tem possibilidade de criar valor a partir de sua visão sobre o que é necessário para sua comunidade. Na lógica do mercado, bens e serviços são produzidos com o objetivo principal de obtenção de lucro e no Estado representativo os cidadãos não têm poder de decisão sobre as políticas públicas necessárias para suas cidades. Este artigo introduz a ideia do comum, que situa a noção de valor na criação colaborativa visando a resultados voltados para o coletivo. Em seguida, é apresentada a idéia de inteligência coletiva - aquela universalmente distribuída entre os seres humanos e que permite a criação de soluções inteligentes para problemas complexos; o documento sugere que o exercício dos valores do comum aprimora a inteligência coletiva. A partir das características da produção e governança peer, o artigo indica como cidades no mundo vêm sendo transformadas. Finalmente, a iniciativa Rio+ é apresentada como um modelo colaborativo que permite que a sociedade civil carioca proponha soluções para sua cidade. AbstractWithin the current working modes of the market and the State, civil society does not have the possibility to create value based on its own vision of what is needed for its communities . In the logic of the market, goods and services are produced with the ultimate goal of profit-making and, within the representative State, citizens do not take part in the decision-making processes that define the necessary public policies for their cities. This article presents the vision of the commons, that places the notion of wealthiness in what is created collaboratively and is aimed towards collective-oriented results. The document introduces the idea of the collective intelligence, which is universally distributed among human beings and which allows the creation of intelligent solutions to complex problems; the paper suggests that the exercise of the values of the commons enhances the collective intelligence. Through the characteristics of peer production and peer governance the article indicates how cities in the world are being transformed. Finally, the Rio+ initiative is presented as a collaborative model that allows civil society in Rio de Janeiro to create solutions for the city.
Dieses Kapitel befasst sich mit der Analyse des Primärrechts.
Innovative activity is critical to a business, and offers the opportunity to benefit from its results. To achieve this objective, firms develop a strategy of appropriation, based on the use of various existing mechanisms of appropriation. This paper studies nine Argentine firms in the biopharmaceutical sector, which is characterized by intensive innovation, which is inherently cooperative, as firms systematically use external and public sources of knowledge. Public-private partnership necessarily impacts firms’ appropriation strategies, which need to consider the risks and benefits inherent to an innovation process of such characteristics. The traits collaboration between the parties assumes are critical to identify the specificities of the relationship between collaboration and appropriation, in a science and technology intensive sector which is strategic for Argentina due to its accumulated scientific and productive capabilities.
This paper reviews the economic literature on the role of fees in patent systems. Two main research questions are usually addressed: the impact of patent fees on the behavior of applicants and the question of optimal fees. Studies in the former group confirm that a range of fees affect the behavior of applicants and suggest that a patent is an inelastic good. Studies in the latter group provide grounds for both low and high application (or pre-grant) fees and renewal (or post-grant) fees, depending on the structural context and on the policy objectives. The paper also presents new stylized facts on patent fees of thirty patent offices worldwide. It is shown that application fees are generally lower than renewal fees, and renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age (to the notable exception of Switzerland and the U.S.).
The article shows that innovations are induced, since they become more profitable with the expansion of output. The amount of resources devoted to innovating activity, however, is in general not the optimal one because of the pressure of two opposing forces. On the one hand, competition between potential innovators tends to make this amount too large, on the other, the inability of innovators to capture all the benefits tends to make the amount too small. When all benefits are captured by the innovator either there is no economic growth due to innovations or else innovators are the sole beneficiaries from that growth. When benefits are diffused the innovation will always lead to economic growth, but only by sheer coincidence will it lead to maximum growth, which may be missed because the innovation is introduced either too early or too late. The rate of growth is always positive if the innovation is introduced too late. It may fall to zero with too-early introduction or even become negative if innovational activity is subsidized.
It has been empirically observed that, in some industries product users are the most frequent sources of product innovations while, in other industries, product manufacturers are. I hypothesize that such differences are caused by differences in the ability of these two “functional” categories of innovators to appropriate innovation benefit. I explore this hypothesis by examining the real-world effectiveness of mechanisms (such as patents and lead time) used for the appropriation of innovation benefit and the dependence of this effectiveness on the functional relationship between innovator and innovation.
This paper presents for the U.S. economy a technology flows matrix tracing 1974 industrial R&D expenditures from their industries of origin to industries in which the use of resulting products and processes was anticipated. The distinction between origin and using industries is crucial to understanding the links between R&D and productivity growth. A regression analysis reveals high social rates of return and substantial productivity impacts from R&D attributed to industries of use.
This paper attempts to explain why innovating firms often fail to obtain significant economic returns from an innovation, while customers, imitators and other industry participants benefit Business strategy — particularly as it relates to the firm's decision to integrate and collaborate — is shown to be an important factor. The paper demonstrates that when imitation is easy, markets don't work well, and the profits from innovation may accrue to the owners of certain complementary assets, rather than to the developers of the intellectual property. This speaks to the need, in certain cases, for the innovating firm to establish a prior position in these complementary assets. The paper also indicates that innovators with new products and processes which provide value to consumers may sometimes be so ill positioned in the market that they necessarily will fail. The analysis provides a theoretical foundation for the proposition that manufacturing often matters, particularly to innovating nations. Innovating firms without the requisite manufacturing and related capacities may die, even though they are the best at innovation. Implications for trade policy and domestic economic policy are examined.
This paper investigates when patent races will be characterized by vigorous competition and when they will degenerate into a monopoly. Undersome conditions, a firm with an arbitrarily small headstart can preempt its rivals. Such ‘ϵ-preemption’ is shown to depend on whether a firm that is behind in the patent race, as measured by the expected time remaining until discovery, cant ‘leapfrog’ the competition and become the new leader. An example of an R&D game with random discovery illustrates how ϵ-preemption can occur when leapfrogging is impossible. A multi-stage R&D process allows leapfrogging and thus permits competition. A similar conclusion emerges in a model of a deterministic patent race with imperfect monitoring of rival firms' R&D investment activities.
This paper analyses the propensity to withdraw European patent applications within a regional sample of Italian applicants. The procedure for obtaining a granted patent from the EPO is composed of a series of sequential and selective steps imposing additional costs to the applicants. Accordingly, we argue that early withdrawals - i.e. those occurring before the proper examination process begins - should be treated separately from late withdrawals. Our findings show the probability of an early withdrawal is higher for applicants with lower resources and competencies and rises with the number of backward citations added by EPO examiners to the original application. Late withdrawals, instead, are negatively affected by one factor only: the size of patent family, which approximates the sunk costs born by applicants in order to extend the geographical scope of patent protection. Such a limited explanation suggests that the interventions of EPO examiners are likely to play a significant role in inducing late withdrawals.
This paper proposes that the twin theorems of welfare economics provide an insubstantial basis for the faith of many economists that private enterprise is a good way of organizing production. Most economists implicitly recognize this. A reading of the literature in advocacy of private enterprise suggests that administrative parsimony, responsiveness, and innovativeness often are ascribed as virtues of the enterprise form of economic organization. The argument that private enterprise has these virtues has, however, no basis in orthodox microeconomic theory. This essay is concerned with considering arguments for those alleged virtues, and sketching some of the theoretical and empirical questions that are opened when these are scrutinized.
This essay presents an overview of the prevailing theoretical literature on innovation, probes the adequacy of existing theory to guide policy regarding innovation, and sketches some directions for more fruitful theorizing. The focus is on the vast interindustry differences in rates of productivity growth, and other manifestations of differential rates of technological progress across industries. It is argued that the most important policy issues involve finding ways to make the currently lagging sectors more progressive, if in fact that can be done. Theory, to be useful, therefore must organize knowledge and guide research regarding what lies behind the uneven performance of the different economic sectors. In fact prevailing theory cannot do this, for two basic reasons. One is that theory is fragmented, and knowledge and research fall into a number of disjoint intellectual traditions. The second is that the strongest of the research traditions that bear on the differential innovation puzzle, research by economists organized around trying to ‘fit’ production functions and explain how production functions ‘shift’, neglects two central aspects of the problem; that innovation involves uncertainty in an essential way, and that the institutional structure supporting innovation varies greatly from sector to sector. The bulk of the paper is concerned with sketching a theoretical structure that appears to bridge a number of presently separate subfields of study of innovation, and which treats uncertainty and institutional diversity centrally.
In many markets, firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs. Sometimes the cost-reducing investments operate directly on costs. In many instances, they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply. Therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction. In fact, if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer (in the way that Lancaster pioneered), then product development often is just cost reduction.
It has long been recognised that the costs of imitating new products have an important effect on the incentives for innovation in a market economy.' As Arrow (I962) and others have pointed out, if firms can imitate an innovation at a cost that is substantially below the cost to the innovator of developing the innovation, there may be little or no incentive for the innovator to carry out the innovation. In their discussions of the innovation process, economists frequently have called attention to the major role played by the costs of imitation, but there has been little or no attempt to measure these costs, to test various hypotheses concerning the factors influencing them, or to estimate their effects. In this paper, we report some findings of what seems to be the first study of this topic. In addition, we present data regarding the effects of patents on imitation costs and on the rate of innovation.
