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Indonesia's 2014 Elections: How Jokowi Won and Democracy Survived
Abstract
This article discusses the 2014 presidential elections in Indonesia, which saw a strong populist challenge launched against the country’s young democracy. Prabowo Subianto, the former son-in-law of longtime autocrat Suharto, promised to roll back many of the democratic reforms of the last 15 years. Prabowo came within a hair’s breadth of winning the presidency, but ultimately lost out to Joko Widodo, a political newcomer from Central Java. The article evaluates what Widodo’s victory (and Prabowo’s strong campaign) tell us about the state of Indonesian democracy, and about the challenges that Widodo will face in leading Indonesia into the next phase of democratic strengthening.
... Jokowi empowered millennials using his new political values in his campaign through Instagram. Other studies in similar Indonesian settings by Mietzner (2014) indicated that the political branding of Jokowi's characteristics such as openness, closeness to people, professionality, and soft political posts in social media could successfully present him as a suitable president. These studies suggest the difference between the Indonesian political campaign of Jokowi and the American one held by Trump during their respective journeys to the presidency. ...
... He also plans to pursue all corruption result funds abroad to be used for the country's interest in the future. Jokowi prefers to adopt polite ways in accordance with eastern Indonesian culture that is more rooted in Javanese culture because his origin is Solo, Central Java, which is famous for andhap asor (Javanese term for being humble); he does not knock down his political opponents directly because, in keeping with Javanese ethics, he often uses indirect satire (Mietzner 2014;Agung, Nugraha, and Kusuma 2020). Previous findings did not report this indirect negativity (Ross and Caldwell 2020). ...
... Jokowi adopted his strategy by approaching some top religious leaders to convince all people that he is also part of the Muslim community, and he will not be discriminative against any Muslim people in Indonesia. Jokowi's strategy to tackle negative attacks on him was also reported in previous studies (Agung, Nugraha, and Kusuma 2020;Mietzner 2014). In a study of the political aesthetic between Jokowi and Prabowo, Agung, Nugraha, and Kusuma (2020) reported that Jokowi as an incumbent approached big Ulama (clerics) or Muslim leaders to penetrate any religion issues. ...
... This depolarization flowed from a collusive party elite that neutralized ideological differences by incorporating opposition parties into the cabinet and preserving wide access to rents (Aspinall 2015;Slater 2018). Wide collusion complicated efforts to identify ideological throughlines in national politics-while parties' backgrounds had ideological components, their behavior in parliament was most consistent with a patronage logic (Mietzner 2013). Without clear partisan lines around which to build political identities, polarization in the electorate seemed unlikely to emerge. ...
... In 2014, Jakarta governor Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, defeated the former general and son-in-law of Suharto, Prabowo in the race for the presidency. The race was divisive, with Prabowo mounting a populist campaign that leveraged Islamist militants and worked diligently to spread rumors (Mietzner 2014). The rumors focused on conspiracy theories that Jokowi was secretly a Christian and controlled by a shadowy group of Chinese tycoons. ...
... While state restrictions on Chinese Indonesians loosened after Indonesia democratized in 1998, anti-Chinese sentiment continued to shape politics. In the 2014 presidential election, the candidate Prabowo Subianto-who had strong links to Islamic conservatives-circulated rumors that his opponent, the eventual winner Jokowi was a puppet of Chinese business interests (Mietzner 2014). In 2016 and 2017, Islamist organizers staged massive rallies in Jakarta against the city's governor, the ethnically Chinese politician Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as "Ahok." ...
Is political polarization in Indonesia here to stay? For years, scholarly consensus on partisanship in Indonesia viewed weak partisan identity, collusive party behavior, and the predominance of personality as features of a system that would prevent the emergence of deep polarization. In the wake of religious and ethnic mobilizations during three contentious elections, the question of whether polarization has come to Indonesia is increasingly salient. Where previous studies have focused on elite polarization, we focus on whether polarization has a mass base. Using an original, nationally representative survey of 1,520 Indonesian adults shortly before the 2019 election, we tested whether political preferences in Indonesia reflected any of four underlying sets of resentment—religious, anti-Chinese, anti-Java, or regional. We found links of varying strength between each of these resentments and political preferences. Analyzing the sources of resentments, we find evidence that different resentments may travel through different channels: religious resentment through organizational membership, anti-Chinese resentment through exposure to social media, regional resentment through awareness of regional resource disparities, and resentment of Java through having experienced the old politics of Java—Outer Islands conflict. These links between political affiliation and resentment suggest that polarization is here to stay, so long as politicians make use of real, underlying resentments.
... Kedua kandidat ini memiliki gaya yang populis (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014). Namun Jokowi dan Prabowo memiliki gaya populisme yang berbeda, Jokowi bersifat pragmatis, moderat, dan inklusif (Mietzner, 2014), sedangkan Prabowo dianggap lebih bersifat populis klasik (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014). ...
... Persona kesederhanaan Jokowi ditampilkan melalui cara bicara dengan logat Jawa, makan di warung pinggir jalan, menggunakan penerbangan kelas ekonomi, dan tidak sungkan untuk berinteraksi hangat dengan masyarakat (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014). Jokowi juga menggunakan pakaian yang murah dan berbicara dengan santai, tampilan Jokowi terlihat seperti rata-rata orang Indonesia kelas menengah ke bawah, yang membuatnya tampak seperti antitesis dari tipikal politisi elit Indonesia (Mietzner, 2014). Ciri khas yang paling melekat dalam diri Jokowi adalah kebiasaannya melakukan kunjungan langsung ke masyarakat secara tiba-tiba untuk berinteraksi langsung, bercanda, dan mendengarkan keluhan serta harapan masyarakat, kegiatan ini diistilahkan dengan blusukan (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014). ...
... Selain itu, Jokowi juga mampu memobilisasi akar rumput tanpa menggunakan caracara khas populisme klasik, dengan mengedepankan gaya hidupnya yang sederhana dan citra lamanya selaku rakyat biasa, serta menjanjikan berbagai kebaikan dalam program-program kesehatan dan pendidikan nasional yang merujuk kepada keberhasilannya sebagai walikota dan gubernur. Namun, dengan persona tersebut, Jokowi membuat masyarakat miskin pedesaan di Indonesia secara alami merasa tertarik padanya (Mietzner, 2014). ...
In the 1950s, political life was divided due to sect politics. The New Order and Reform had suppressed and made political polarization subside, but political polarization strengthened again in 2014, due to the meeting of two spectrums between pluralist and Islamist groups. This study aims to examine the causes of the strengthening of political polarization between Islamists and pluralists in Indonesia, after it has faded for so long in a repressive and open political system. This research uses a qualitative approach with literature study method. The results of the study found that political actors pursue their political goals by using polarization strategies, such as mobilizing voters to divide them, spreading hate speech, and exploiting public unrest. The conclusion is that the political polarization that occurred between Islamists and pluralists in Indonesia in 2014-2019 was caused by strategic political actors. This research will add to the study of political polarization in Indonesia which is still limited, especially those discussing the causes of political polarization.
... During the 2014 Indonesian election, Prabowo Subianto performed 'bad manner' rhetoric. Prabowo openly criticized Indonesian democratic institutions since they are corrupted by oligarchic politics (Mietzner, 2014). It is a topic that might resonate with the sentiments of large voters but is generally avoided by ordinary politicians. ...
... While each populism might have other figures, Widodo and Shihab arguably represent the most influential figures in Nationalistic and Islamic populism, respectively. Joko Widodo have won presidential elections twice against Prabowo Subianto, another populist (Mietzner, 2014) candidate who also utilize nationalistic rhetoric. His followers anointed Rizieq Shihab as the "Great Imam of Indonesian Muslim during Aksi 212." ...
... Scholars portray Indonesian presidential election in 2014 as the competition between the two populist figures. (Hadiz & Robison, 2017;Mietzner, 2014). Both Jokowi and Prabowo campaigned from the idea that they were political outsiders, albeit in a very different expression. ...
In recent years, populist movements have emerged to become a significant force in Indonesian politics. The meteoric rise of these movements could not be separated from the integration of digital media into politics, particularly to mobilize and propagate their political ideas. Despite the influence, the study that seeks to understand the relationship between populism and digital media in Indonesia is still nascent. In this regard, the article examines the entanglement between technology and the development of populism in Indonesia. Drawing from the notion of understanding populism as a political style, the article argues that digital media is integral to the formation of Indonesian populist movements. The specificities of digital media provide an ideal platform for performative politics that serves as the foundation of populism. To elaborate on the proposition, the article compares the role of digital media between the two dominant populist movements in Indonesia: the nationalistic and the Islamic movement. Both movements can utilise digital media to advance their influence on Indonesian politics. However, the influence is still contingent on the ability to control established political institutions. In this context, populism is no longer separated from formal political institutions, which contributes to the deterioration of Indonesian democracy.
... He campaigned as a political outsider with the support of a loose network of grassroots volunteers across Indonesia. He beat his rival Prabowo, a prominent retired general with more than 30 years of career as a politician (Mietzner 2014). ...
... The findings of this study supported all hypotheses except for Jokowi's active persona of his brand trust and perceived qualities of his brand trust. This suggests that voters were not attracted too much by the candidate's perceived qualities, considering that Jokowi was considered a newcomer and therefore, inexperienced (Mietzner 2014). Yet, the fact that Jokowi's servant leadership, proposed programs, engagement style, and responsible persona are significant to voters' trust suggests that voters were more interested in how Jokowi attempted to provide solutions and act of service to the people through his leadership approaches, which may strengthen his genuineness and enhanced his political brand trust. ...
... This unique act of engagement was seen by voters as an attempt to serve them by Jokowi, thus improving his image as a servant leader (Greenleaf 1977). The study found that Jokowi engaged directly with the citizens to understand their aspirations (Mietzner 2014). It is also important to note that most Indonesians adopt collectivism as their dominant culture (Goodwin and Giles 2003), where modesty and humility are highly valued (Cullen, Gentry, and Yammarino 2015). ...
Successful political outsiders from the largest democracies, such as Narendra Modi (India), Donald Trump (USA), Joko Widodo (Indonesia), and Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), have strong leadership images as a reformist. The case of Widodo of Indonesia is unique considering that he rose to power within less than ten years with an image of a servant leader, compared to his counterparts, who tend to be perceived as far right-wing conservatives. Yet, the interplay between leadership brand image and important branding components such as personality and trust remained a gap in the literature. To fill these gaps, this study investigates the brand impact of servant leadership and reformist (perceived qualities, proposed programs, and voters’ engagement style) on a leader’s brand trust with the mediating effect of brand personality (responsible and active) based on Widodo’s case. PLS-SEM is utilized to estimate the model with latent variables and conduct analysis. Results indicate high overall mean scores from all dimensions despite 53.4% of samples (n = 453) not having a political party preference. The study found that servant leadership and reformist image have moderate to substantial effects on brand personality and trust. Responsible persona has proven to mediate most proposed relationships. Implications are discussed.
... Indonesia as the world's third largest democracy and fourth largest population for example, boasts a unique case of the rise of political outsider. The unexpected win of newcomer Joko Widodo in the 2014 presidential election captured the world's attention since his rival was Prabowo, an elite, retired general with over 30 years of a career in politics and the son-in-law of Soeharto 1 (Mietzner 2014). Jokowi's rise to the national level was followed by the rise of outsiders such as Ahok and Risma, who have solid reputations as reformers and were perceived successful in serving the citizens (Ramdhani 1969;Setijadi 2017). ...
... Abou-Abou-Khalil and Aoun (2020) further argued that being a political outsider means they have a clean slate in their political career which brought advantage to their political brand if they are being compared to the existing political establishment, particularly those who are in the state of stagnancy or those who have failed to fulfill their promises. In relation to this, if political outsiders-who tended to be newcomers in politics-are successful in serving the citizens, they may be perceived as those who have brought progress through reforms and broke the stagnancy, which is relevant to the rise of political outsiders in the Indonesian context (Mietzner 2014;Tyson and Purnomo 2017). ...
... Despite the entry barriers put up by the oligarchs (Fukuoka and Djani 2016;Winters 2014), the emergence of political outsiders disrupted the Indonesian political arena. This was due to the rising popularity of Jokowi who topped mainstream candidates in polls (Mietzner 2014;Singh 2014). At this stage, Jokowi as a reformer has already been perceived to have a close relationship with the people and to possess a strong political image as the hope of the people due to his success in serving the citizens (Hatherell 2014;Tomsa and Setijadi 2018). ...
This research attempts to develop the reformist dimensions based on the case of successful political outsiders. Literature suggest that reformers are those perceived to be successful in serving the citizens through their capabilities on making changes. To achieve this goal, this study explores the brand images of Indonesia’s political outsiders who have strong image of reformers which are Jokowi, Ahok and Risma and investigate how they are being perceived to be successful in serving the citizens. The present research, which consist of three studies, conduct exploratory factor analysis using sequential mixed methods. The first two studies utilize qualitative paradigms with interview and document analysis to determine reformist dimensions using thematic analysis. Following this, a survey was launched (n = 453) for a reliability and validity test. The qualitative studies have delineated the reformist characteristics into three dimensions: perceived qualities (three items), implemented programs (four items) and engagement style with citizens (three items). The dimensions have adequate factor analysis values and high reliability scores. Findings suggest that reformist attributes have several traits such as ‘anti-corruption’, ‘innovativeness’ and a high rate and unique voter engagement style. This research contributes to the development of political marketing theories on candidates’ reformist branding attributable to the phenomenon of the rise of political outsiders. It explores the interplay of leadership and political brand image from the cases of successful rise of political outsiders. The leadership aspects relevant to shape the brand image of a reformist from voters’ perspective are discussed based on findings.
... In the 2014, a populist and authoritarian candidate with a New Order affiliation, Prabowo Soebianto, was one of the only two contenders in one of Indonesia's most bitter democratic elections to date. The grassroot candidate with humble origin, Joko Widodo came out as a winner (Mietzner, 2014). Still, in the post-Reformation era, the anti-foreign and anti-Chinese sentiment is utilized by Prabowo (Mietzner, 2014). ...
... The grassroot candidate with humble origin, Joko Widodo came out as a winner (Mietzner, 2014). Still, in the post-Reformation era, the anti-foreign and anti-Chinese sentiment is utilized by Prabowo (Mietzner, 2014). The rise of right-wing populism and nationalism is happening all over the world and Indonesia is not an exception. ...
While some countries are thriving in political stability and economic prosperity, others are struggling with political instability and poverty. The fundamental difference between the successful and the failed nations boil down to their institutions, as stated by Acemoglu and Robinson in their influential institutional economics work, "Why Nations Fail". Inclusive institution is the reason why some countries achieved economic success and prosperity because they allow the population to participate and take advantage of the economic activities while extractive institutions hinder it in case of failed nations. The purpose of this study is to explore more closely how extractive institutions persist in an ex-colonised country in spite of institutional drift and the political disruptions of post-colonial governments avowedly vying to rid the present of the past. Indonesia is chosen as the subject for this historical desk research case study wherein the relevant history surrounding the colonial period and the subsequent development will be explored and analysed through the lens of secondary literature. In addition to being based on textual evidence, the institutional economics approach will be used as a theoretical framework to break down the social, economic, and political aspects of the history. Furthermore, the mechanism of how the institutions evolve will be seen through the political development framework. The result will show that patrimonialism is present as an extractive feature in both modern and colonial Indonesia and how it has been sustained after independence. This study also suggests other extractive features as a legacy of the Dutch colonialism that is separate from the native tradition and customs which are Javacentrism and racism in the form of social stratification between races as a result of colonial policies.
... All of these made him to be perceived as the new hope to solve a persisting problem in Indonesia, corruption (McRae, 2013). Due to this reputation and a clean track record, Jokowi has topped various polls as the most favourite president candidate compared to his rival Prabowo way before the 2014 presidential race (Mietzner, 2014). Jokowi's branding as an anti-corruption leader did not just stem from his leadership style, it was also leveraged from his compliance and relationship with the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) --the Corruption Eradication Commission (Warburton, 2016). ...
... Considering Indonesia's long time struggles to eliminate corruption (Budiman, Roan & Callan, 2013;Purdey, 2002), a political brand image of being an anti-corruption figure and a reformer were a significant advantage for a political leader to gain public support (Mietzner, 2012;Setiawan et al., 2020;Taufik, 2020). As someone who was born from a poor family and part of the grassroot level, Jokowi's status as an outsider amplified his political brand identity and brand image: he was seen as the new hope to break Yudhoyono's government stagnancy and to challenge the power of the oligarchs (Mietzner, 2014). In addition, his personal approach to voters, 'blusukan', has contributed to strengthen his brand image as very few government officials directly engaged with citizens particularly those in the poorest areas (Hatherell, 2014). ...
Studies proposed that the meteoric rise of Joko Widodo was because of his strong image as the new hope of the people in combating Indonesia’s most persistent problem: corruption. During his rise, Widodo’s compliances to the policies of the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK, Corruption Eradication Commission) and his promises to empower the institution served as evidence of his genuine commitment to eliminate corruption. In 2019, soon after winning a second presidential term, Joko Widodo approved a KPK law amendment that significantly weakened the institution and contradicted his promises. This chapter analyses Jokowi’s personal brand image, identity and brand transgression, from his alignment with KPK to enhance his anti-corruption persona, to his ‘betrayal’ to his core brand value.
... Nugroho and Setia (2014) note that there were 148 networks of Jokowi volunteers, including JASMEV (Jokowi Advanced Social Media Volunteers). Thus, Mietzner (2014) states that the mobilization and optimization of supporter/volunteer networks (grassroots volunteerism) on social media indicated not only the characteristic of the 2014 Presidential Election, but also the victory of Jokowi's supporters. ...
... The activities of Jokowi's voluntary supporters in the 2014 Presidential Election on social media, particularly Twitter, provided a positive image on Jokowi's figure as a presidential candidate rising from the common people. Jokowi's victory in the 2014 Presidential Election is regarded by Mietzner (2014) as the victory of grassroots volunteerism against machine politics. According to Woodward (2015), Jokowi's image in the 2014 Presidential Election was portrayed as a moderate Muslim, a populist, a tolerant pluralist and defender of justice with great concern in the education sector. ...
This article discusses expressions of hatred as a political category that has become a topic of discourse among Indonesian netizens on Twitter. The Twitter conversations data used in this analysis were obtained through a Twitter thread reader application operated by DEA (Drone Emprit Academic). As a political category, hatred is considered new. It emerged as and became a conversational topic for netizens on Twitter due to various political promises President Joko Widodo has made during his campaign and has not fulfilled. Political hatred has spread extensively owing to Twitter leading to absolute freedom of expression. On Twitter, political hatred has increased because of two main clusters during the 2019 Presidential Election campaign. The two clusters represent two pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, namely Joko Widodo-Ma’ruf Amin (Number 01/JKW-MA) and Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno (Number 02/PS-SU). This study may have implications on broader hatred-based political conflict. Additionally, political hatred may also have implications on the waning of the public’s function to criticize political actors and the government because criticism may be suppressed on the basis of it being an expression of hatred. This will, accordingly, turn into a new dilemma in a democratic country, between freedom of expression and potential rise of new authoritarianism.
... Most commentators cast Jokowi (as he is known) in the role of democratic reformist while Prabowo, a retired general linked to human-rights abuses and the three decades of Suharto's dictatorship , represented a return to the recent authoritarian past. 2 When Jokowi won again in 2019, besting Prabowo this time by eleven points (55.5 to 44.5 percent), the country's democratic consolidation might have seemed secure. ...
Political unity is a good thing—except when it is not. This essay argues that recent elections in Malaysia (2022), Thailand (2023), and Indonesia (2024) illustrate a growing trend towards toxic forms of unity. Toxic unity occurs when politicians who are supposed to be at opposite ends of the political spectrum join forces, citing the common good while in fact pursuing opportunistic goals. Features of toxic unity include improbable bedfellows, reputational whitewashing, clandestine deals, hidden brokerage, exclusionary agendas, discursive appeals, and voter alienation. Some toxic unity coalitions are proclaimed before polling day, while others are secret pacts.
... Bonica (2017) (Mietzner, 2014). ...
Penelitian ini bertujuan mengekplorasi transformasi voluntarisme Pilpres 2014 dan 2019, melalui gerakan Pro-Jo sebagai barisan relawan terbesar Joko Widodo. Karya ini dimaksudkan untuk menjelaskan perubahan mendasar makna kesukarelawanan dan pertarungan kepentingan di tubuh relawan politik. Penelitian ini menggunakan studi kasus purposive pendekatan kualitatif. Penggunaan metode ini dikarenakan dapat menjawab pertanyaan mendalam tentang transformasi dan wujud politik kepentingan relawan dengan elit politik. Penulis mengedepankan penjelasan komprehensif ketimbang sekedar memberikan konfirmasi terhadap suatu permasalahan. Sedangkan pendekatan kualitatif sangat cocok untuk menganalisis fenomena kejadikan dan tindakan aktivis relawan Joko Widodo. Penulis menemukan bahwa terjadi transformasi akibat masuknya kepentingan-kepentingan elit dalam setiap agenda gerakan voluntarisme. Partisipasi politik otonom tidak bekerja secara penuh, sebaliknya yang terjadi partisipasi aktivis relawan telah dimobilisasi oleh elit politik.
... President is different from the presidential institution. President is always associated with office holders, while presidential institution is always associated with office environment (Mietzner, 2014). ...
The existence and authority of the executive, legislative and judicial institutions are regulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, then regulated in more detail in the law, except for the President. There is no law on presidential institutions yet, so there is concern that the President will exceed or abuse his authority in carrying out his duties. This research discusses the importance of regulating presidential institutions in strengthening the presidential system. The research approach was normative juridical; examining legal rules or regulations as a building system related to a legal event. The data used were secondary data in the forms of primary and secondary legal materials. Based on the results of the analysis, it is concluded that: 1) the regulation of presidential institutions is only found in the Constitution. There is no description of the position and division of authority between the President and Vice President and other positions in the presidential institution. 2) The position of the Vice President is as assistant to the President, and the Vice President replaces the President when the President dies, resigns, is dismissed, or is unable to carry out his obligations during his term of office. 3) Regulation of presidential institutions in strengthening the presidential government system is very urgent to prevent arbitrary actions by the President and to provide clarity on the authority of positions within the presidential realm so that they can carry out their duties well in supporting the President as head of state and head of government. With clear arrangements, each person has responsibilities, and there will be no overlapping of authority.
... In addition to legitimacy capital, President Jokowi's communication style, which is equalitarian (building equality with the audience) and structuring (wanting to influence the public through packaged political messages) (Sayuti, 2020), can be a very significant capital for gaining public trust. Moreover, coupled with the fact that Jokowi was elected president not from the party elite (political oligarchy), not from an influential family, and not from the military (Muhtadi, 2015;Mietzner, 2014;Tapsell, 2017). ...
Communication requires attention to honesty and trust. Communicators must have credibility that can be trusted. The speech will be rewarded if it matches the action. The discrepancy between speech and implementation action will only make a speech as lip service. There are two objectives of this research. First, reveal various lip service texts from President Jokowi. Second, reveals the context of the emergence of President Jokowi's lip service communication texts. This intertwined reading of the text and context will provide a comprehensive understanding of President Jokowi's lip service communication as well as an understanding of why this lip service communication occurred. This research uses the Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) method. The use of the PDA method is to analyze the text and context of Jokowi's lip service communications. The texts and contexts examined included the text regarding the permissibility of demonstrations during the second term of President Jokowi's inauguration, the revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Law, President Jokowi's request that the public be more massive in criticizing, and regarding the National Insight Test (TWK) for KPK employees. President Jokowi's lip service communication occurs when the subject of the conversation is related to two discourses. First, the discourse related to the fundamental values of democracy. Second, discourse related to anti-corruption. This research concludes that lip service communication is carried out to politicize discourse so that President Jokowi is still associated as a democratic and anti-corruption leader.
... In Indonesia, democratization is made by the elite and proletary classes. Jokowi from Solo District changed the political construction of the local and national landscape (Mietzner 2014). ...
The growth of democracy in Indonesia from 1999 to 2019 was significantly hampered by Islamic populist forces, conservatives, and politicians who discriminated against women. This article aims to explore the challenges facing Indonesian political democracy after the 2014 and 2019 elections, using qualitative methods and interviews with party officials. The study uses the theories of Islamic populism, conservation, and discrimination against women. The article finds that the most dangerous challenges include the presence of populist and conservative Islamic forces that use religious sentiment in elections, political party elites that use women as men's political friends, and women seen as a threat to male politicians. This article emphasizes the importance of considering factors outside the electoral political process, such as religious beliefs and understanding, especially in the Indonesian context.
... However, the threat of democratic setbacks comes from military coups such as those in Egypt and Thailand, which even appeared in the presidential election. The rise of authoritarian regimes can occur in countries with democratic electoral systems (Mietzner, 2014). The risk of the emergence of an authoritarian regime with a democratic electoral system also occurs in Indonesia This article explores the decline of democracy in contemporary Indonesia during the Jokowi years. ...
This article explores the decline of democracy in contemporary Indonesia during the Jokowi years. Jokowi's lukewarm commitment to democratic norms and illiberal attitude in running the government have made him an essentially conditional democrat, who is heavily influenced by the old political elite within a transitional political framework. As the result, Indonesia under the Jokowi's administration is entrapped with the old political practices, particularly oligarchic rules and political manipulation which awaken a new autocratization episode in its contemporary political history. This article is based on interviews with eight key informants and supported with numerous secondary data from various sources. The article highlights three important points: first, the decline of democracy was caused by the old oligarchic, and cartelism practices. Second, Jokowi's superficial commitment to democracy essentially makes him a conditional democrat, rather than a progressive liberal. Third, Jokowi's leadership led to a new style of autocratization and authoritarianism in Indonesia which was influenced by the manoeuvring of the old political elite.
... However, the threat of democratic setbacks comes from military coups such as those in Egypt and Thailand, which even appeared in the presidential election. The rise of authoritarian regimes can occur in countries with democratic electoral systems (Mietzner, 2014). The risk of the emergence of an authoritarian regime with a democratic electoral system also occurs in Indonesia This article explores the decline of democracy in contemporary Indonesia during the Jokowi years. ...
Keywords: autocratization, conditional democrat, democracy decline, Indonesian politics, Jokowi.
... Such political polarization in Indonesia is not only visible in the real world but in the virtual as well, particularly on social media and Twitter. The polarization was a representation of the two presidential candidates, Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, during the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections (Irawanto, 2019;Mietzner, 2014). Joko Widodo was considered to represent nationalist voters while Prabowo Subianto represented Islamist voters. ...
... It is due to both presidential candidates sharing strong support from the Indonesian community (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014). Even though Jokowi did not belong to the Indonesian elite, he won the 2014 Indonesian presidential election due to his popularity and defeated Prabowo, the elite's representative (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014;Mietzner, 2014Mietzner, , 2015. Jokowi and Prabowo's rivalry repeated itself in the 2019 Indonesian presidential election. ...
Hate speech has challenged Indonesian democracy. Mockery and insulting the president have become a common form of political expression during the 2019 Indonesian presidential election. This article analyses the discourse of the internet meme 'Jokowi planga-plongo' that mocked and insulted the president in the 2019 Indonesian presidential election. The insults and mockery of the president were massive. It urged the government to regulate insults to the president and vice president in the new draft of the Criminal Code. We collected 'Jokowi planga-plongo' memes during the 2019 presidential election campaign. We analyse qualitatively with the social semiotics analysis from the viewpoint of the internet meme theory and bisociation theory. We found that Indonesians use abusive and non-abusive memes to insult the president. We found that both abusive and non-abusive texts had been used in the insult. The insults came from a framework free of harsh or abusive language. These new languages were transmitted through memes that used insulting comparison, matching, modification, and freezing motion in a context where insults were intended. The non-abusive insulting memes created without harsh and abusive words could sneak in without being caught under the EIT law. The illogical, exaggerated, and incoherent content articulation mechanisms were the memetic trait that hid the abusive content. The discourse was developed by relating it to another discourse in unrelated discourses. These illogical sequences were tied together into a logical context by the creativity of the meme creator. We also found that the non-abusive memes were more than the abusive ones to avoid violation of the law. These findings can become an alternative perspective regarding contemporary Indonesian democracy that has declined.
... Intolerance in all sectors of life shows that peace is being imaginative in the life of the Indonesian nation. Some elite elements use issues related to specific ethnicity, religion, or ideology to build the image of their opponents without using harmful educational content for society [1]. From this, people who do not fully understand the "game" of politicians will readily believe the negative image, and the process is very sentimental towards groups with different views so that they can face threats, be discriminated against, or be uncomfortable in cross-group relations [2,3]. ...
The high rate of spread of hoax news about politics influences the emergence of conflict in society, including conflicts due to differences in support for political figures and leading to disputes on social media and even directly in the community. On the other hand, the community promoting peace in the Greater Malang area is thriving. This study explored the best strategy for building political awareness through peace education organized by civic communities. Qualitative methods were used with a comparative-evaluative design, and the study was conducted in the community based in Malang Raya. The results showed that the strategy of building political awareness through peace education was carried out by focusing on several things, namely: 1) the form of activity was adjusted based on age and social background; 2) the materials included information on national insights, hoaxes, and tolerance; and 3) activities were evaluated periodically and program participants were involved for continuous improvement. Almost all programs which were adapted to the characteristics and needs of the community were able to help build political awareness in the field of fighting hoaxes. However, community development efforts by the government should also be appropriately considered. Keywords: political literacy, peace education, civic community
... Problematically, however, studies of Islamic populism in Indonesia have primarily used municipal, provincial, and national elections as their cases (Sulistyo, 2002;Bhakti, 2004;Aspinall, 2005;Buehler & Tan, 2007;Tomsa, 2009;Erb & Sulistiyanto, 2009;Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010;Choi, 2011;Mietzner, 2014;Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019). Village elections (pilkades) are absent from public discourse and receive little scholarly attention, not being used to understand contemporary Indonesian politics but perceived as unimportant local events that are unrelated to broader electoral phenomena. ...
The strengthening of political identities, including the use of Islamic populism, has widely been used to explain the electoral victories and defeats of candidates at the municipal, provincial, and national levels. However, no study has been found to investigate this phenomenon in the village elections (pilkades) of Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Our research, conducted in ten villages, did not find a tendency to use Islamic populism. Rather, in two villages—Baleharjo, Gunungkidul, and Temon Kulon, Kulon Progo—we identified an interesting phenomenon: the principle of inclusivity was used to ensure that competition was open to candidates of all backgrounds, including religious minorities. This article seeks to investigate this trend, which enabled religious minorities to be elected to the highest position within the village government: chief. It finds that minority candidates' electoral victory was made possible by several factors. Importantly, Islam's limited penetration into suburban Java restricted its ability to be used for identity politics in village elections.
... First, party organizations are less important in broker recruitment. Even in the underinstitutionalized party systems 24 Aspinall 2014a;Hadiz 2003;Mietzner 2014;Slater 2004;Fossati et al. 2020. 25 Aspinall 2019. ...
Studies of electoral clientelism -the contingent exchange of material benefits for electoral support- frequently presume the presence of strong parties. Parties facilitate monitoring and enforcement of vote buying and allow brokers to identify core voters for turnout buying. Where money fuels campaigns but elections center around candidates, not parties, how do candidates pitch electoral handouts? The authors analyze candidates' distribution of cash during an Indonesian election. Drawing upon varied data, including surveys of voters and brokers, candidates' cash-distribution lists, and focus-group discussions, they find heavy spending but little evidence of vote buying or turnout buying. Instead, candidates buy brokers. With little loyalty or party brand to draw on, candidates seek to establish credibility with well-networked brokers, who then protect their turf with token payments for their own presumed bloc of voters. The authors find little evidence of monitoring of either voter or broker behavior, which is consistent with their argument that these payments are noncontingent.
... e Jokowi-Ma'ruf government, initially believed to be able to eradicate corruption on a massive scale, has been questioned from Civil Society. (Hadiz 2017;Mietzner 2014;Warburton 2018). Freedom of religion and freedom of opinion have likewise come under attack, as Jokowi-Ma'ruf have tended to see their opposition as potentially disrupting Indonesia's political stability. ...
During Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election, significant religious and ethnic contestations occurred using hatred and stigma in expressing support for favored candidates. This article focuses on the case of West Kalimantan Province which has a divided society and memories of ethnic-based bloody communal violence in the early 2000s. This article notifies that wherein ethnic Dayak, Javanese, and Chinese voters tended to support Joko Widodo (Jokowi)-Ma’ruf Amin, while ethnic Malay, Madurese, and Buginese voters tended to back Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno up in the election. However, such ethnic and religious contestations in West Kalimantan did not generate violent conflicts during the election. Instead, voters continued to interact peacefully and harmoniously among different ethnic and religious groups. This contestation coincided with the emergence of political awareness among the Dayaks, Chinese, and Malays of West Kalimantan, which further contributed to Jokowi’s electoral victory. Nevertheless, this political contestation produced the political identity.
... Populism is but a tsunami caused by political illiberalism as a movement in political tectonics; the latter producing tendencies other than populism. Indonesia's recent authoritarian turn (see Mietzner 2019;Power 2018), and the persistence of both autocratic values (Bourchier 2015(Bourchier , 2019) and actors like Prabowo Subianto who is currently serving as minister of defense even after suffering two electoral defeats from the incumbent Joko Widodo (Aspinall 2015;Mietzner 2014Mietzner , 2015aMietzner , 2015b have prompted scholars to look beyond populism and analyze political illiberalism itself (e.g. Aspinall et al. 2020;Mujani 2020). ...
There is an urgent need to study illiberal political values. However, current efforts have focused on democratic values, democratic support, populist attitudes, and authoritarian values. Consequently, they have missed something older and more fundamental, namely, political illiberalism. Hence, I pave the way for future inquiries by proposing and validating a composite measure built upon a reverse engineering of political illiberalism from existing works on illiberal democracy, political intolerance, and the normative philosophy of political liberalism. Through quantitative psycho-political analysis (i.e., factor analysis, internal reliability tests, and basic descriptive statistics), I posit and dissect an index responding to the limits of existing ones. Overall, I define illiberal political values as a value system constituted by intolerant and leader-centric values tied with anti-institutionalist tendencies.
... The contention underlies the creator picks the boundaries of the established ramifications of the official service time restraint. In the first place, an official service time restraint in the Constitution will causally influence the position and authority of the most significant state MPR in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2014). The MPR, as the most elevated state establishment, might encounter a shift if the President's power is so solid in controlling the parliament. ...
This literature review aims to discuss the discourse of postponing elections and requests for an extension of the term of office of the President of the Republic of Indonesia for the 2024 period. This is an issue that is currently being discussed in the country. On that basis, we have compiled literature discussing the issues above. An information data collection model, and we have to understand something that is currently phenomenal. The review process involves a sharp devaluation of the data, careful coding, and extracting digests that answer the problem with high validity. Our data search was done online on several published data sources that we marketed from 2010 to 2022. Several scientific publications on the political science of regional elections and democracy, especially in Indonesia, have been interviewed. The President of the Republic of Indonesia is a constitutional discourse according to the laws of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore all elements have the right to remind the Government and political figures to be loyal and obedient to the official Constitution.
... SBY personally backed Jokowi's complex statement not to support any presidential candidate that intends to nationalize state assets from the beginning of the political development. This statement addressed Prabowo and his decision to engage in such an act (Mietzner, 2014). However, Megawati Soekarno Putri failed to respond because it seemed they still held a political grudge against SBY's choice of candidates from PDI-P. ...
Joko Widodo (Jokowi) is the first Indonesian Democratic President elected by the peripheral people and not the elite. Jokowi is the only Indonesian President that is not the leader of any political party. Therefore, the President was faced with the issues of power consolidation in the initial administrative years. Some professional elites failed the President because they assumed a possible overthrown. During the presidential election in 2019 with Prabowo Subianto, Jokowi took K. H. Ma'ruf Amien as a vice presidential candidate and was attacked by China and the Indonesian Communist Party (ICP/PKI). However, Jokowi was re-elected for the second period (2019-2024) due to his close relationship with Indonesians, which is different from other presidents. Received: 23 August 2021 / Accepted: 24 November 2021 / Published: 3 January 2022
... His pro-people and technocratic measures earned him awards and adulation, which led to increased support from the PDIP that would prove vital to his campaign for governor of Jakarta. Jokowi also benefitted from a dedicated volunteer base and active use of social media during his campaign (Mietzner, 2014). It was during his term as Jakarta's governor that further honed 'Jokowi the politician'. ...
This study seeks to understand why President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo decided to implement the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) the way he did. It examines his foreign policy decisions through the actor-specific approach in foreign policy, specifically focusing on the role of the highest executive leader in making foreign policy decisions. This study seeks to understand why the GMF declined in its importance through the lens of actor-specific theory. It examines the relation between Jokowi’s psycho-milieu and his choices of foreign policy within the context of implementing the GMF vision by drawing from insights at the individual level, namely by understanding Jokowi’s political ‘self’. This study makes two observations. First, Jokowi’s inexperience in foreign policy led to a ‘hands-off’ approach in the issue areas observed. Second, his overt technocratic outlook contributed to ad-hoc decisions, which eventually impeded the development of key GMF policies. This study examines three issue areas related to the GMF: maritime policymaking, infrastructure development and diplomacy. Across these three areas, Jokowi has shown a tendency to avoid involvement in areas where he lacks expertise, which results in a haphazard implementation of the GMF.
... Prabowo has unfortunately lost three presidential elections, one of which he ran for vice president. According to Mietzner (2014), Indonesian democracy is said to have survived because of Jokowi's victory over Prabowo. Mietzner also mentions Jokowi's victory as the end of the concern about the return of authoritarianism in Indonesia brought by Prabowo. ...
Despite the variety of explanations of populism, Ioneschu and Gellner (1969) defined populism as an understanding of “populism worships people”. A wider explanation will be explained in this paper, together with the basic understanding of Indonesia's background as a democratic country, its political condition, and the development of populism in Indonesia, whereby the main focus will be on Indonesia’s presidential election 2019. Therefore, the effects and possible solutions will be provided at the end of the paper, to answer whether populism is giving positive or negative impacts to the democratic culture in Indonesia.
... PascaPemilu 2014, banyak mencuat isu tentang politisasi identitas. Isu-isu yang berkaitan dengan etnik, agama, atau ideologi tertentu yang digunakan oleh sebagian elite politisi untuk membangun citra negatif lawan-lawan politiknya (Mietzner, 2014). Politisasi merupakan proses akusisi kapital politik oleh suatu kelompok, institusi atau kegiatan yang diarahkan untuk mencapai kepentingan demi mencapai atau mempertahankan kekuasaan (Adediji, 2016: 115). ...
Pelaksanaan Pilkada Serentak 2020, yang kemudian menjadi
pilkada unik karena dilaksanakan di masa pandemi Covid-19, ada
beberapa catatan yang bisa menjadi pelajaran bagi pelaksanaan
Pilkada selanjutnya dan sebelumnya. Meskipun beberapa tahapan
seperti aksi kampanye dengan pengerahan massa tidak bisa
dilaksanakan dan kerap menjadi sumbu konflik, tetap ada beberapa
racun demokrasi yang musti didetoksifikasi, sehingga momentum
elektoral lokal ideal tetap bisa direalisasi.
Seperti galibnya Pilkada yang kerap dilihat sebagai sebuah
momentum elektoral lokal berbiaya mahal, beberapa racun-racun
demokrasi sudah diprediksi sejak awal, kembali terjadi lagi pada
Pilkada kali ini.
... Our study indicates a different trend as Yani's (2015) study shows that trust in the local government is higher than in the national government. The high level of young people's trust in the national government is strongly related to the large network of young professionals and youth volunteers who support President Jokowi when he ran in the 2014 Presidential Election (Mietzner, 2014). The table 3 below demonstratesthe level of trust in legislative branch of government. ...
The importance of trust in government plays a fundamental role for legitimacy and strengthening state-society relationship. It has been long known that the ability to govern people rest on weapon, food and trust especially in Confucian tradition. In the context of Indonesia, it is important to see the millennials" preference in government. Furthermore, such study may bring a better understanding on the level of political trust young people have. This information is paramount as Indonesia is stepping to the first phase of having the majority of working-age population, which will expectedly reach 189 million people in 2020 (World Bank, 2014). In other words, the vast majority of the Indonesian population are in productive age and their level of confidence toward government institution is an important map for the current government officials, especially in designing effective development policy. For that reason, this study addresses a research question: What is the level of confidence toward government institution that the millennials have? The data collection was conducted through online and offline survey and we limited respondents only for those attended in senior high school and college students. A total of 1584 respondents were collected from ten selected cities in Sulawesi, Sumatera, Java and West Nusa Tenggara islands. The data were analysed by descriptive statistics to map the level of political trust. The results show that although the majority of respondents trusted executive government bodies, a significant number are in the opposite. This is not the case for legislative bodies, where the majority of respondents chose "not trust". While the millennials were sceptical about what the media have reported, the millennials seemed to have more positive perception toward religious leaders.
... This situation is quite ironic considering the Freedom House report in 2007 [5] categorizes Indonesia as the only "free democracy" in Southeast Asia. So far, majority of researchers claim that the threat to Indonesian democracy comes from political contestation at the national level such as identity politics in elections [6]. However, few have turned their eyes to an equally serious threat, namely local level friction. ...
The current development of public administration is influenced by three main factors namely market pull, governance, and digitalization, which often distracts public administration observers from other fundamental aspects. This article intends to revisit the New Public Administration (NPA) paradigm that focuses on the goals of public administration namely relevance, value, change, and social justice by focusing on contemporary Indonesia. By conducting a systematic literature review of publications released in the last 10 years, this article analyses the discussion of articles that address the pillars of NPA, namely debureaucratization, democratization, delegation, and decentralization (4Ds). The article finds that while there has been significant progress in terms of economic and infrastructure development under President Joko Widodo ( Jokowi), there has been criticism about the lack of attention to democratic values and civil liberties. Efforts to strengthen governance and bureaucratic efficiency in Indonesia have often come at the expense of democratic principles and wider public participation, resulting in less space for civil liberties and tighter controls on dissent or criticism. From these findings, this article calls for a return to the views of scholars such as Frederickson, Crow, and Bryer who emphasize the importance of a more adaptive and value-based public administration design that involves citizen participation as a key component of the system.
This chapter provides a brief review of Indonesian foreign policy its evolution and contemporary dynamics, prominent theories and ideas, its adaptative fundamentals and the impact of the main leadership, especially President Jokowi and former President Yudhoyono. The main goal consists of understanding how Africa entered Indonesia's geopolitical perspective and leadership mindset, especially during the Jokowi presidency. Situating Africa inside the Indonesian geopolitical worldview will allow to better comprehend Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Africa per se. Despite the Asia–Africa discourse relating to the Bandung Conference, Africa is not naturally present in Indonesia’s Weltanschauung. “Afro-Asia” existed as an abstract historical concept, an Indonesian international legacy, but Africa and African nations were not sufficiently considered for themselves. Indonesia’s current geopolitical frameworks and discourses, such as the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) and its Indo-Pacific concept, are examined.
This paper sought to examine the influence of the political education program on young voters’ perceptions in responding to a threefold issue: democracy, election, and political parties. By applying a quantitative method, this research employs a regional survey to gather data through a series of intensive training for university students with 17 to 24 in age. There are 37 questions, of which 68 valid respondents shall answer before the training (pre-test) and after the training (post-test). The finding reveals that intensive political education has an authoritative influence in transforming young voters’ perceptions of those issues. It can be proven that most young voters’ perceptions increased from pre-test to post-test. When positive perceptions reached 56.76% in the pre-test, they changed dramatically to 94.59% in the post-test. Conversely, negative perceptions declined from 43.24% in the pre-test to 5.41% in the post-test. This indicates that young voters believe in the fruitfulness and effectiveness of the political education program in constructing the way of thinking and behaving comprehensively toward those three issues. Therefore, this paper not only recommends but also strongly demands that all stakeholders organize such a political education earnestly for young voters to generate future generations who participate in consolidating the democratic fate.Artikel ini merupakan sebuah usaha mengkaji pengaruh program pendidikan politik terhadap persepsi pemilih pemula dalam merespon tiga isu, yaitu demokrasi, pemilu, dan partai politik. Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian kuantitatif, studi ini menggunakan teknik survei yang dilakukan secara regional untuk mengumpulkan data melalui serangkaian pelatihan yang intensif terhadap mahasiswa dengan usia antara 17 dan 24 tahun. Ada 37 pertanyaan di mana 68 responden yang valid harus menjawab sebelum pelatihan (pre-test) dan setelah pelatihan (post-test). Temuan studi ini menunjukkan, bahwa program pendidikan politik yang dilakukan secara intensif memiliki pengaruh yang luar biasa dalam merubah persepsi pemilih pemula terhadap tiga isu tersebut. Ini dibuktikan dengan hasil survei, bahwa mayoritas persepsi responden mengalami peningkatan dari saat pre-test ke post-test. Ketika persepsi positif hanya di prosentase 56,76% saat pre-test, persepsi tersebut meningkat tajam ke prosentase 94,59% saat post-test. Sebaliknya, persepsi negatif turun dari prosentase 43,24% saat pre-test ke prosentase 5,41% saat post-test. Hal ini menunjukkan kenyataan, bahwa pemilih pemula yakin terhadap keberhasilan dan efektivitas program pendidikan politik dalam membentuk cara berfikir dan bertindak yang komprehensif terhadap tiga isu tersebut. Oleh karena itu, artikel ini tidak hanya merekomendasikan tetapi juga meminta secara kuat terhadap sejumlah pihak yang terkait untuk menyelenggarakan program pendidikan politik secara serius terhadap para pemilih pemula agar dapat melahirkan generasi masa depan yang memiliki komitmen untuk mengonsolidasikan nasib demokrasi.
This Element explores how in the Philippines a 'whiggish' narrative of democracy and good governance triumphing over dictatorship and kleptocracy after the 'people power' uprising against Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986 was upended by strongman Rodrigo R. Duterte three decades later. Portraying his father's authoritarian rule as a 'golden age,' Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. succeeded Duterte by easily winning the 2022 presidential election, suggesting democratic backsliding will persist. A structuralist account of the inherent instability of the country's oligarchical democracy offers a plausible explanation of repeated crises but underplays agency. Strategic groups have pushed back against executive aggrandizement. Offering a 'structuration' perspective, presidential power and elite pushback are examined as is the reliance on political violence and the instrumentalization of mass poverty. These factors have recurrently combined to lead to the fall, restoration, and now steep decline of democracy in the Philippines.
This research scrutinized the use of social media in the 2014 presidential election in Indonesia. In particular it analyzed their role to empower democracy due to their capacity to encourage the constituents to engage in public debates on political issues and to make informed voting decisions. Incorporating theories on mediapolis, celebrity, and intermedia agenda setting as well as employing content analysis as analytical tools, it explored the coexistence and interactions of social media, celebrity, and traditional media power in the election and how such accounts had implications on the capacity of social media to empower democracy in the country.
This research analyses the factors that affect people’s preferences in their political decisions. In Indonesia, the people of Java Island account for 56.10% of the total population and lead to changing the contemporary political structure. Researchers held focus group discussions at several cities across Java Island to identify citizen knowledge of socio-political conditions and trace out characteristics of future leaders. One of the significant findings of this paper is that the ability to understand public interest in political issues is an essential factor for Javanese people to consider when selecting leaders in the future.
Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan politik populisme Marianus Sae sebagai strategi politik pertahanan kekuasaan dalam Pilkada Kabupaten Ngada tahun 2015. Sejatinya eksekusi kebijakan yang sifatnya populis oleh pemimpin politik memberikan dampak elektoral yang positif dalam proses pemilihan kepala daerah/Pilkada. Kebijakan populis yang ditawarkan dapat dilihat sebagai instrumen strategi politik dalam upaya memperoleh dukungan politik serentak sebagai upaya mempertahankan kekuasaan. Berkaitan dengan itu, artikel ini berupaya membedah keterkaitan antara kebijakan populis terhadap strategi politik pertahanan kekuasaan. Dalam menjelaskan hal ini, peneliti memanfaatkan elaborasi populisme menurut Gidron, dan Bonikowski (2014) sebagai pisau analisis, serta menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif deskriptif. Dalam memperoleh data penelitian, peneliti memanfaatkan metode wawancara mendalam dan dilengkapi dengan studi kepustakaan terhadap laporan, pemberitaan media dan surat kabar berkaitan dengan obyek penelitian. Adapun hasil yang ditemukan dalam penelitian ini ialah bahwa keberhasilan Marianus Sae terpilih kembali menjadi Bupati dalam Pilkada Ngada tahun 2015, dengan persentase suara yang signifikan tidak lepas dari kuatnya figuritas dan citra Marianus Sae sebagai pemimpin populis, serta keberhasilannya menjalankan serentak mempropagandakan berbagai kebijakan dan program populis yang ditawarkan kepada masyarakat kabupaten Ngada, diantarnya; program PERAK (Pemberdayaan Ekonomi Rakyat), program JKMN (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat Ngada), serta program beasiswa pendidikan. Dalam bingkai kekuasaan, eksekusi dan propaganda kebijakan populis demikian tidak lain merupakan bagian dari upaya membangun legitimasi publik sebagai bagian dari strategi politik untuk memperoleh dukungan elektoral dalam rangka mempertahankan kekuasaan.
Anti-corruption efforts are inherently political. Corruption charges can be levied against political opponents as an instrument of repression; they can also be used against troublesome allies in the same party coalition to further consolidate power. In this paper, we focus on Indonesia and ask: Do major corruption charges follow a presidential electoral cycle—and if so, how? We contend charges against prominent members of the government coalition are more likely to happen before an election, allowing the government to replace intra-party rivals with loyal allies. Conversely, charges against prominent opposition members are more likely to happen after an election when fears of retaliation are low, opportunities for credit-claiming are high, and there is an incentive to remove veto players who may inhibit implementing the government's agenda. To test this argument, we use an original, newly assembled dataset of all major corruption charges—i.e., those involving high-profile politicians and garnering international attention—in Indonesia from 1998–2015 as reported in the Associated Press . We find a significant and robust relationship between the electoral calendar and major corruption charges. This relationship is robust across presidential administrations. These results yield insights into how anti-corruption efforts can become a political tool and counsel caution about the effectiveness of “good governance,” especially in new democracies. Finally, we discuss how contextual political factors external to Indonesia's anti-corruption commission, reinforce this empirical pattern.
This chapter aims at demonstrating the limit of domestic populism in shaping Jakarta’s South China Sea (SCS) policy. In both eras of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jokowi, the SCS has experienced heightened tension. China’s violation of Indonesia’s maritime rights in the Natuna waters took place during the two administrations. Nevertheless, SBY tended to conceal the incidents from the public eye. Having enjoyed the popular support from majority of the country’s political elements—including that of the Islamist hardliners—SBY had more room in managing Indonesia’s relations with Beijing. In particular, SBY dedicated his foreign policy to construct Indonesia’s role as regional leaders and honest broker in the SCS issue. Jokowi, on the other hand, excludes the hardliners from his administration which makes the management of the relations with Beijing more delicate. While Jokowi can no longer conceal the incidents in the Natuna waters from the public eye, he takes two measures. First, placating the public anxiety by showing a firm gesture in defending the country’s sovereign rights. Second, substantiating Jakarta’s maritime entitlement in the Natuna waters in diplomatic and defence realms. Since Jokowi government intends to secure the economic cooperation with China, the public fuss around the Natuna waters incidents is deemed unnecessary. In the current administration’s judgement, patriotic expression, must be steered by the government-not mass-driven-to ensure its focus and effectiveness.
This chapter will discuss the latest developments in democracy in Indonesia. The aim is to outline the context of the politics of citizenship studied in this volume, as the ongoing democratisation process is the basis of, and in turn shaped by, various struggles for citizenship rights. This chapter argues that the widely praised and celebrated democracy in Indonesia is currently stagnated. Despite a relatively stable political transition, successful instalment of core democratic institutions, high economic growth, and increasing freedom and liberty, problems such as corruption and other power abuse, poor welfare provision, and violence against minorities are holding back the democratisation process. At the centre of this stagnation is a weak popular representation in which the general populace hardly make better use of democracy to pursue their interests. The democratisation process, realised through a combination of moderate elite pacts and developing core rules and regulations, has produced merely a formal democracy that benefits elite the most, has yet to significantly challenge the power of oligarchy, and lacks sufficient political capacity for civil and popular groups to overcome the problem of weak representation. In this regard, the politics of citizenship in Indonesia should be better understood and debated against the relatively successful rise of formal democracy, the continuing grip of oligarchy, and the poor capacity of civil society- and popular sector-based activists in promoting democracy.
TheHiariejaimTörnquist of this chapter is to provide historical background for the contemporary politics of citizenshipPolitics of citizenshipin IndonesiaIndonesia. This subject has become increasingly popular as the country has witnessed the emergence of civil- and popular-based movementsPopular-based movementsclaimingClaiming citizenship rightscitizenship rightsCitizenship rights.
In Indonesia's political strategic environment, Islamic narratives have been among the main narratives, but have not always been dominant. The 2014 presidential election displayed the beginning of a rising trend of Islamic narratives within the political context in Indonesia. Since then Islamic narratives influenced the strategy of Indonesia's populist leaders, as particularly seen during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election and 2019 presidential election. This paper analyzes how populism as a strategy was used in recent Indonesian elections. For this purpose, it uses the conception of populism as a political strategy proposed by Weyland. Building on this approach, the paper explains the strategic adjustments made in the use of populism from 2014, 2017, and 2019 in Indonesian political events. It argues that the strategic environment faced by populist actors in Indonesia's 2019 election affected their decision to choose Islamic narratives as an instrument for mass mobilization.
Disasters often leave affected regions and societies prone to vulnerability. Regions with strong exposures to risks need to navigate the situation by managing the financial impacts of natural or man-made disasters. In this regard, disaster risk financing is increasingly believed to be a significant tool to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience in disaster-affected regions worldwide. The objective of disaster risk financing has extended beyond financial protection by also giving extra attention in financing the community resilience programme. In the last Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (GPDRR) 2019, the agenda was widely discussed in panels and clearly mentioned in the co-chair summary, reflecting strong political commitment to its implementation. Yet, the model of disaster risk financing developed by donor organisations and also by humanitarian scholars and practitioners predominantly stresses funding instruments from the private sector, such as risk insurance, bound and sovereign fund. This model, although deemed promising in setting the best practices for disaster risk financing worldwide, is still unable to capture the complexity of disaster risk management realities on the ground, especially that of ‘Global South’. The experience and practices in Indonesia suggest that community-based disaster risk financing driven by public investment has created a new instrument and alternative funding for Disaster Risk Reduction. The development shift from centralisation to decentralisation has created a huge space for local administrative to be empowered under the support of ‘Village Fund’. The practices of disaster risk financing in Indonesia suggest that the Village Fund has not only financed the community action plan, but also attracted bigger funding for small-scale mitigation plans, such as the development of water reservoirs and smart agriculture. Based on empirical research, this article investigates the practices of community-based disaster risk financing in Indonesia, particularly in Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT). Using qualitative methods for data collection, processing and analysis, this paper elaborates complex interactions between different stakeholders in the management of disaster risk financing through the Village Fund. Multiple methods of data collections are used to further elaborate the data: (1) participatory observation, (2) document review techniques, (3) qualitative impact study and (4) semi-structured interview. Empirical findings suggest that in Indonesia different routes of alternative disaster risk financing exist and are proven to work. These alternative ways of disaster risk financing are effective for disaster management in the community level and could be replicated elsewhere.
There are two perspectives toward the appearance of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) to a national political field. The first impression represents optimism towards political decentralization in Indonesia is by addressing Jokowi as a populist figure who can be a politician from a regional area to a capital city. Then, the second impression represents the oligarchy thesis, which is called the rise of Jokowi to a national political landscape because of oligarchies firmly rooted in Indonesia. This study aims to analyze Jokowi’s political communication through populism and oligarchy framework, and the domination of both. This study uses the transformative critical paradigm with the critical discourse analysis (CDA) Teun. A van Dijk’s model as method. The communication of Jokowi’s politics related to corruption eradication, investment escalation, and freedom of expression are analyzed critically by using that method. The result reveals that Jokowi is under two political concepts which contrast to one another, namely populism and oligarchy. These concepts make Jokowi a weak figure who fights the oligarchy’s will. Consequently, Jokowi is not sincerely fighting the KPK’s weakening strategy, inconsistency in developing investment, and the non-sense statement about freedom of expression. In this case, Jokowi (a populist) is being in the oligarchs’ co-optation or ‘oligarchical populism’.
This article assesses the role played by Indonesian capitalists in the country's new democratic political system. It takes as its starting point the analysis presented by Richard Robison in his influential 1986 book, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital. Robison saw the authoritarian state as central to capitalist class formation, viewing it as midwife and protector of an emergent business class. Though democratisation was not his primary concern, this analysis made him pessimistic about the prospects of democratic change. Over the intervening years, Indonesia has not only undergone democratisation; its capitalist class has also changed significantly. The article notes elements of continuity in the nature of Indonesian capital (including the continuing weight of politically vulnerable ethnic Chinese business interests) as well as change (including the taking of political office by businesspeople and the strengthening of provincial business). Overall, there is now much greater independence of private capital vis-à-visthe state, even if business-state relations are still characterised by patterns that developed during authoritarian rule, including the clientelist and predatory behaviours that have been the subject of much analysis in post-Suharto Indonesia. A focus on the capitalist class and its enmeshment in state power, in the style pioneered by Robison, thus helps explain continuity between Indonesia's authoritarian past and its new democratic order, especially the continuing ubiquity of corruption and patronage. However, such a focus is less useful in accounting for political change, especially democratisation itself. To explain democratisation we need to broaden our class analytical optic to bring into focus the actions and interests of lower and middle class forces.
Considering its strong, highly institutionalized two-party system, Venezuela was surely one of the least likely countries in Latin America to experience a party system breakdown and populist resurgence. That traditional party system nevertheless was founded on a mixture of corporatist and clientelist linkages to social actors that were unable to withstand the secular decline of the oil economy and several aborted attempts at market liberalization. Successive administrations led by the dominant parties failed to reverse the economic slide, with devastating consequences for the party system as a whole. The party system ultimately rested on insecure structural foundations; and when its social moorings crumbled in the 1990s, the populist movement of Hugo Chavez emerged to fill the political void. This populist resurgence both capitalized on and accelerated the institutional decomposition of the old order.
Although military rule disappeared in Latin America after 1990, other forms of authoritarianism persisted. Competitive authoritarianism, in which democratic institutions exist but incumbent abuse skews the playing field against opponents, emerged in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador during the post-Cold War period. This article seeks to explain the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. It argues that populism – the election of a personalistic outsider who mobilizes voters with an anti-establishment appeal – is a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. Lacking experience with representative democratic institutions, possessing an electoral mandate to destroy the existing elite, and facing institutions of horizontal accountability controlled by that elite, populists have an incentive to launch plebiscitary attacks on institutions of horizontal accountability. Where they succeed, weak democracies almost invariably slide into competitive authoritarianism. The argument is demonstrated through a comparative analysis of all 14 elected presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010.