Die Menschenrechte : unteilbar und gleichgewichtig?
Abstract
Vorwort: Im vorliegenden Heft der Studien zu Grund- und Menschenrechten wird der Vortrag dokumentiert, den Prof. Dr. Georg Lohmann von der Ottovon- Guericke-Universität Magdeburg am 12. Mai 2004 im Rahmen der neu eingerichteten Reihe „Philosophie der Grund- und Menschenrechte“ an der Universität Potsdam gehalten hat. Die Veranstaltung bot Gelegenheit, die Frage zu erörtern, ob die unterschiedlichen Menschenrechte tatsächlich gleichgestellt sind oder doch eine Hierarchisierung von Menschenrechten stattfindet. Diese Diskussion soll in diesem Heft durch den Abdruck von drei Kommentaren zum Vortrag nachvollzogen werden. Inhalt: Die Menschenrechte: unteilbar und gleichgewichtig? (Georg Lohmann) Kommentare Sinn der Menschenrechte (Stefan Gosepath) Die Menschenrechte: teilbar und ungleichgewichtig! (Arnd Pollmann) Zur Unteilbarkeit der Menschenrechte – Anmerkungen aus juristischer, insbesondere völkerrechtlicher Sicht (Claudia Mahler/Norman Weiß)
Examina-se a questão de saber se os direitos de grupo são Direitos Humanos. A questão de saber se os direitos de grupo são Direitos Humanos não é tão inofensiva e formal como parece à primeira vista. Se os Direitos Humanos fossem apenas direitos de seres humanos individuais e os direitos coletivos fossem apenas direitos de grupos, então eles pertenceriam a categorias de direitos substancialmente diferentes. Além disso, os direitos de grupo não poderiam ser baseados na dignidade humana. Neste artigo, pretende-se demonstrar que os direitos de grupo são de fato uma forma de Direitos Humanos. No entanto, nem a abordagem individualista nem a coletivista podem justificar essa afirmação. Há necessidade de encontrar um atributo comum a indivíduos e grupos, que possa ao mesmo tempo ser um elemento dos Direitos Humanos.
In this article, Habermas wants to defend the thesis that a conceptual connection between the moral notion of human dignity and the juridical conception of human rights has always existed, even if it has only become explicit in the recent past. Against skeptical positions or deflationary strategies, he wants to maintain that the concept of human dignity is not merely an empty classificatory expression, but rather, the source from which all the basic rights derive their sustenance (in concrete experiences of violations of human dignity), as well as the key to ground the indivisibility of all the categories (or generations) of human rights. Through a historical and conceptual reconstruction of the interconnections of two different traditions, he demonstrates how the idea of human dignity becomes the "portal" through which the egalitarian and universalistic substance of morality is imported into the law.
Human rights and democracy have been regarded as a mutually reinforcing couple by many political theorists to date. The internationalisation of human rights post-1945 is often said to have severed those links, however. Accounting for the legitimacy of international human rights requires exploring how human rights and democracy, once they have been decoupled or disconnected, can be recoupled or reunited across governance levels (vertically) and maybe even at the same governance level (horizontally) albeit beyond the state. The article does so in three steps. The first prong of the argument is dedicated to presenting the moral-political nature of human rights and their relationship to political equality and, hence, their inherent legal nature from a democratic theory perspective. The second section of the article then draws some implications for the domestic or international levels of legal recognition and specification of human rights by reference to their legitimation within the domestic democratic community. It explains the mutual relationship between human rights and citizens’ rights and where international human rights draw their democratic legitimacy from. In the third and final section, the author discusses potential changes in the nature and legitimacy of international human rights once political structures beyond the state become more democratic, and human rights and democracy are being recoupled again at various levels of governance. The European Union being one of the most advanced examples of post-national political integration, recent developments in the regime of human rights protection within the EU are discussed in this new light. In a final step, the transposition to the global level of the argument developed in the European case is assessed and the author flags issues for further research on what democratic theorists should hope for in the new global order.
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